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Abstract
This paper critically examines Clark Moustakas’s presentation of Husserl in Phenomenological Research Methods. I argue that Moustakas’s account misrepresents two core elements of Husserl’s phenomenology – intentionality and the transcendental reduction – in ways that directly compromise the foundations of qualitative phenomenological research. First, Moustakas treats intentional meaning as something private, located within the individual, rather than as given in the world. This misreading severs the connection between experience and a shared world of meaning, leaving qualitative researchers unable to clarify participants’ accounts beyond private expression. Second, Moustakas reduces the transcendental reduction to introspective reflection, overlooking its function as a method for revealing how experience becomes meaningful at all. This strips qualitative inquiry of the very tool it needs to examine the conditions of experience. Together, these misinterpretations remove both the philosophical grounding and the methodological framework that make qualitative phenomenological inquiry possible.
Keywords
phenomenology, qualitative methodology, methodological critique, conceptual analysis, education research methods
Publication Date
2-15-2025
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
DOI
10.46743/2160-3715/2026.8402
Recommended APA Citation
Byrne, T. (2026). Clark Moustakas’ counterfeit Husserl. The Qualitative Report, 31(2), 5089-5105. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2026.8402
ORCID ID
0000-0002-8809-3664
Included in
Continental Philosophy Commons, Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons
