Reasons of Failure and Shortcomings in Afghanistan's Political Settlements
Institutional Affiliation
PhD Student in Peace Studies and Anthropology
Start Date
January 2026
End Date
January 2026
Proposal Type
Presentation
Proposal Format
On-campus
Proposal Description
This study investigates the fundamental causes behind the failure of Afghanistan’s political and elite settlements, focusing on their inherent flaws. It analyzes five political settlements from 1992 to 2021 to explore the relationship between these settlements and their durability, adapting the “bargaining for power” theory to Afghanistan’s distinct political context. Employing a mixed-methods approach, the study integrates an extensive literature review, interviews, discourse analysis, and informal discussions. The analysis identifies critical internal and external factors undermining the settlements’ success. Internal factors include: A) lack of commitment to implementing agreements, often dismissed as null and void; B) exploitation of ethnic and racial divisions by party leaders; C) economic crises and poverty silencing citizen dissent; D) power monopolization and absence of cohesive policies; E) manipulation of loopholes in agreements; and F) character assassination and blame-shifting. External factors encompass: 1) Afghanistan’s role as a battleground for rival ideologies; and 2) deficiencies in international law and security guarantees. These findings highlight the complexities of achieving durable political stability in Afghanistan through political/elite settlements, where internal divisions and external pressures perpetuated instability despite repeated reconciliation efforts. By elucidating the linkage between political settlements and their durability, this study provides insight into the persistent barriers to peace in Afghanistan, contributing to scholarly and policy discussions on conflict resolution and state-building in fragile states.
Reasons of Failure and Shortcomings in Afghanistan's Political Settlements
This study investigates the fundamental causes behind the failure of Afghanistan’s political and elite settlements, focusing on their inherent flaws. It analyzes five political settlements from 1992 to 2021 to explore the relationship between these settlements and their durability, adapting the “bargaining for power” theory to Afghanistan’s distinct political context. Employing a mixed-methods approach, the study integrates an extensive literature review, interviews, discourse analysis, and informal discussions. The analysis identifies critical internal and external factors undermining the settlements’ success. Internal factors include: A) lack of commitment to implementing agreements, often dismissed as null and void; B) exploitation of ethnic and racial divisions by party leaders; C) economic crises and poverty silencing citizen dissent; D) power monopolization and absence of cohesive policies; E) manipulation of loopholes in agreements; and F) character assassination and blame-shifting. External factors encompass: 1) Afghanistan’s role as a battleground for rival ideologies; and 2) deficiencies in international law and security guarantees. These findings highlight the complexities of achieving durable political stability in Afghanistan through political/elite settlements, where internal divisions and external pressures perpetuated instability despite repeated reconciliation efforts. By elucidating the linkage between political settlements and their durability, this study provides insight into the persistent barriers to peace in Afghanistan, contributing to scholarly and policy discussions on conflict resolution and state-building in fragile states.