HCBE Faculty Articles
Title
Why Shouldn't You Invest in Companies with Revolving Door Lobbyists?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2016
Publication Title
Journal of Investing
ISSN or ISBN
1068-0896
Volume
25
Issue/Number
3
First Page
60
Last Page
68
Abstract/Excerpt
This article analyzes the effect on firm value of having former government officials as lobbyists. The results suggest that the number of “revolving door” lobbyists is negatively correlated with firm value. The authors find that firm value decreases as the number of revolving door lobbyists employed by a firm increases. The results suggest that high numbers of such lobbyists are an indicator of wider agency problems in the firm.
DOI
10.3905/joi.2016.25.3.060
NSUWorks Citation
Kuvvet, Emre, "Why Shouldn't You Invest in Companies with Revolving Door Lobbyists?" (2016). HCBE Faculty Articles. 766.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/hcbe_facarticles/766
