HCBE Faculty Articles
Why Shouldn't You Invest in Companies with Revolving Door Lobbyists?
ORCID
Emre Kuvvet 0000-0001-5925-8004
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Journal of Investing
ISSN
1068-0896
Publication Date
2016
Abstract/Excerpt
This article analyzes the effect on firm value of having former government officials as lobbyists. The results suggest that the number of “revolving door” lobbyists is negatively correlated with firm value. The authors find that firm value decreases as the number of revolving door lobbyists employed by a firm increases. The results suggest that high numbers of such lobbyists are an indicator of wider agency problems in the firm.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3905/joi.2016.25.3.060
Volume
25
Issue
3
First Page
60
Last Page
68
NSUWorks Citation
Kuvvet, Emre, "Why Shouldn't You Invest in Companies with Revolving Door Lobbyists?" (2016). HCBE Faculty Articles. 766.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/hcbe_facarticles/766
