This paper suggests a two-level game analysis of Israel’s strategy toward peace during the 1990s. The paper shows how various paradoxes in Israeli society create domestic obstacles and internal opposition that weaken Israel’s bargaining position toward neighboring countries. Treating domestic parameters in these countries as a given, we argue that Israeli leaders can hardly use this weakness to manipulate information in the bargaining process, because neighboring countries can observe Israel’s internal processes. Therefore, attempts by Israeli leaders to create the impression that they are willing to adopt a conflictual approach towards neighboring polities, especially the Palestinians, without actually creating the necessary internal conditions for such a policy, may finally lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel – in terms of territory and deterrent ability – since it will have to compromise under difficult conditions. Several practical implications as to the preferred bargaining process under these conditions follow.
1990s, Arab countries, Israel, Middle East, Palestine, peace process, power relations
Mizrahi, Shlomo; Mehrez, Abraham; and Naor, Arye
"A Two-Level Analysis of Israel’s Strategy toward Peace during the 1990s,"
Peace and Conflict Studies: Vol. 8
, Article 3.
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol8/iss1/3