Biology Faculty Articles

Title

Synthetically Engineered Microbes Reveal Interesting Principles of Cooperation

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-2017

Publication Title

Frontiers of Chemical Science and Engineering

Keywords

Synthetic biology, Engineered bacteria, Cooperation, Cheater, Quorum sensing, Programmed cell-death, Pseudomonas-aeruginosa, Antibiotic tolerance, Altruistic behavior, Drug-resistance, Snowdrift game, Public-goods, Fish stocks, Population, Evolution

ISSN

2095-0187

Volume

11

Issue/No.

1

First Page

3

Last Page

14

Abstract

Cooperation is ubiquitous in biological systems. However, if natural selection favors traits that confer an advantage to one individual over another, then helping others would be paradoxical. Nevertheless, cooperation persists and is critical in maintaining homeostasis in systems ranging from populations of bacteria to groupings of mammals. Developing an understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms by which cooperation operates is critical in understanding ecological and evolutionary relationships. Over the past decade, synthetic biology has emerged as a powerful tool to study social dynamics. By engineering rationally controlled and modulatable behavior into microbes, we have increased our overall understanding of how cooperation enhances, or conversely constrains, populations. Furthermore, it has increased our understanding of how cooperation is maintained within populations, which may provide a useful framework to influence populations by altering cooperation. As many bacterial pathogens require cooperation to infect the host and survive, the principles developed using synthetic biology offer promise of developing novel tools and strategies to treat infections, which may reduce the use of antimicrobial agents. Overall, the use of engineered cooperative microbes has allowed the field to verify existing, and develop novel, theories that may govern cooperative behaviors at all levels of biology.

ORCID ID

0000-0002-6835-0029, 0000-0002-4807-4979

ResearcherID

A-2977-2016, A-2990-2009

DOI

10.1007/s11705-016-1605-z

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