Products Liability Statute of Repose-A Florida Perspective

Linda D. Caldwell*

Copyright ©1987 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Products Liability Statute of Repose-A Florida Perspective

Linda D. Caldwell

Abstract

On November 21, 1979, a seventeen-year-old boy, Dana Lamb, was a passenger in a 1967 Volkswagen.

KEYWORDS: pitfalls, courts, repose
in existence. The traditional agency arrangement must undergo a fundamental change, whereby the selling broker acts as the agent for the buyer. Until then, real estate brokers must exercise extreme caution in listing property for sale, as any home can prove to be a potential liability.

Gary S. Gaffney

Products Liability Statute of Repose—A Florida Perspective

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 849
II. HISTORICAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO FLORIDA'S ADOPTION OF THE STATUTE OF REPPOSE ........ 851
III. THE FLORIDA JUDICIAL APPROACH WITH THE STATUTE OF REPPOSE ................................ 853
   A. The "Access to Courts" Argument ................. 854
   B. Guidance from the Architectural Statute of Repose ........ 854
   C. Florida's Application of the Products Liability Statute of Repose ................................ 856
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION .................................. 860
V. SHOULD FLORIDA CONSIDER THE ENACTMENT OF ANOTHER STATUTE OF REPPOSE? .................. 862
   A. Inherent Problems with Florida's Statute of Repose ........................................ 863
   B. The Pitfalls of an Overbroad Statute of Repose ................................................ 864
   C. Faulty Reasoning which Justified the Enactment of the Statute of Repose ............... 865
   D. A Statute of Repose for Durable Goods .......... 867
VI. FEDERAL PREEMPTION ................................ 868
VII. CONCLUSION ........................................ 871

I. Introduction

On November 21, 1979, a seventeen-year-old boy, Dana Lamb, was a passenger in a 1967 Volkswagen.¹ The car left the road and overturned, ejecting Lamb.² The accident rendered him a permanent quadriplegic.³

Lamb brought suit in the United States District Court for the

². Id.
³. Id.
Southern District of Florida against the car manufacturer, alleging that defects in the design — which resulted in a rollover propensity and easily-fracturable windshield — caused his injury. The allegations of the defect appeared viable at the time the plaintiff brought suit, and the defects certainly could not have appeared until an accident such as this occurred.

Nevertheless, the outcome of the lawsuit need not be discussed; the case did not go to trial. The Florida legislature had terminated Lamb's cause of action before it ever arose. Based on the enactment of section 91.031(2) of Florida's Limitations of Actions Statutes, commonly known as a "statute of repose," the court barred his action. This statute provided the following:

Actions for products liability and fraud under § 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in § 95.11(3), but in any event within twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered.

As a result, the trial court exonerated the automobile manufacturer, granting it summary judgment and effectively foreclosing Lamb's opportunity for redress.

The irony of the situation is this: had the accident and filing of suit taken place just days before it did, the court would have permitted his action to proceed on the merits. Instead, the accident occurred eight days after the automobile reached its twelfth year after the date of its manufacture. Although the plaintiff brought suit three years after the accident, well within Florida's statute of limitations pertaining to personal injury which provided a claimant with four years from the time of the injury to bring an action, it was not controlling. Because the plaintiff's misfortune resulted in a "product liability" claim, the statute of repose applied to bar his claim.

Less than four months after the Lamb decision, the Florida legislature repealed the products liability statute of repose. While it has been temporarily put to rest in Florida, products liability statutes of repose are still a live issue in pending federal legislation. Manufacturing firms and defense attorneys understandably will favor such legislation.

This Note will examine Florida's ten-year experience with a products liability statute of repose prior to its repeal in 1986. It will investigate the reasons for its enactment and the problems encountered by the courts. Consideration will also be given to the feasibility and necessity of a future enactment of a statute of repose in Florida.

II. Historical Factors Contributing to Florida's Adoption of the Statute of Repose

Statutes of repose are legislation placing an outer time limit on negligence and related claims in contexts where the potential hardship to the defendant appears great. Contrasted with the customary statute of limitations, there is a fundamental difference. The traditional statute of limitations establishes a time period within which an action must be brought and generally begins to run when an injury occurs. By contrast, a products liability statute of repose is measured from a specified fixed date, such as the manufacture of a product. The significant difference is its limitation period begins to run whether an injury has occurred or not, and is thereby unaffected by the date on which the cause of action accrues. After the lapse of the specified period, the

---

4. Id.
5. Id. at 1152.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 1152.
17. Id. at 165 n. 9.
18. Id. at 168.
19. Id.
Southern District of Florida against the car manufacturer, alleging that defects in the design — which resulted in a rollover propensity and easily-fracturable windshield — caused his injury. The allegations of the defect appeared viable at the time the plaintiff brought suit, and the defects certainly could not have appeared until an accident such as this occurred.

Nevertheless, the outcome of the lawsuit need not be discussed; the case did not go to trial. The Florida legislature had terminated Lamb’s cause of action before it ever arose. Based on the enactment of section 91.031(2) of Florida’s Limitations of Actions Statutes, commonly known as a “statute of repose,” the court barred his action. This statute provided the following:

Actions for products liability and fraud under § 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in § 95.11(3), but in any event within twelve years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser regardless of the date the defect in the product was or should have been discovered.

As a result, the trial court exonerated the automobile manufacturer, granting it summary judgment and effectively foreclosing Lamb’s opportunity for redress.

The irony of the situation is this: had the accident and filing of suit taken place just days before it did, the court would have permitted his action to proceed on the merits. Instead, the accident occurred eight days after the automobile reached its twelfth year after the date of its manufacture. Although the plaintiff brought suit three years after the accident, well within Florida’s statute of limitations pertaining to personal injury which provided a claimant with four years from the time of the injury to bring an action, it was not controlling. Because the plaintiff’s misfortune resulted in a “product liability” claim, the statute of repose applied to bar his claim.

Less than four months after the Lamb decision, the Florida legislature repealed the products liability statute of repose. While it has been temporarily put to rest in Florida, products liability statutes of repose are still a live issue in pending federal legislation. Manufacturing firms and defense attorneys understandably will favor such legislation.

This Note will examine Florida’s ten-year experience with a products liability statute of repose prior to its repeal in 1986. It will investigate the reasons for its enactment and the problems encountered by the courts. Consideration will also be given to the feasibility and necessity of a future enactment of a statute of repose in Florida.

II. Historical Factors Contributing to Florida’s Adoption of the Statute of Repose

Statutes of repose are legislation placing an outer time limit on negligence and related claims in contexts where the potential hardship to the defendant appears great. Contrasted with the customary statute of limitations, there is a fundamental difference. The traditional statute of limitations establishes a time period within which an action must be brought and generally begins to run when an injury occurs. By contrast, a products liability statute of repose is measured from a specified fixed date, such as the manufacture of a product. The significant difference is its limitation period begins to run whether an injury has occurred or not, and is thereby unaffected by the date on which the cause of action accrues.

Upon the lapse of the specified period, the

4. Id.
5. Id. at 1152.
7. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 1152.
17. Id. at 165 n. 9.
18. Id. at 168.
19. Id.
statute of repose terminates any right to bring an action.  

Controversy has long surrounded repose statutes. Difficulty arises from the possibility that such a statute may bar an action before it arises. When this happens, the statute operates to deny the claimant a judicial forum simply because the product has attained the age specified in the statute.

Although legislative history is scarce concerning Florida's enactment of the products liability statute of repose, manufacturers' expanded liability appears to be the primary influence in its enactment. Florida, as well as the rest of the country, experienced a "products liability revolution" in the past two decades. Several factors have contributed to increased litigation in Florida.

At common law, courts required privity between a manufacturer and plaintiff in an action based upon the manufacturer's negligence. The inequities of such a rule became obvious by the 1940's, however, when manufacturers began regularly selling products to wholesalers or retailers. As a result, the Florida Supreme Court displaced the privity requirement with a duty to avoid "reasonable foreseeable injuries to those who might use the commodity."

The trend toward the adoption of the strict liability doctrine imposed an added burden on manufacturers. Under this theory, a manufacturer became liable simply when it placed a product on the market, knowing that it was to be used without inspection for defects, and the product proved to have a defect which caused an injury. The Florida Supreme Court expressly adopted this doctrine in 1976.

Another significant contribution to the expansion of liability of manufacturers was the judicial adoption of the "discovery rule" for statutes of limitations.

Under this doctrine, the accrual of a cause of action begins when the facts giving rise to the action are known, or should have been known, with the exercise of due diligence. In essence, it rendered the defendant virtually "vulnerable to suit indefinitely, sometimes decades after the event." The discovery rule became commonly used with regard to long-term effects of pharmaceuticals or with regard to diseases acquired over a long period of time.

A perceived liability "crisis" in the 1970's appears to have also given credence to the idea of a statute of repose. Because courts permitted a greater number of claims to be brought against manufacturers, as well as frequent and large recoveries, products liability litigation increased nationwide. Authorities claimed that the increased litigation led to unaffordable insurance rates and, in some instances, unobtainable coverage at any price. In response, legislative proposals advocated the enactment of statutes of repose to remedy the insurance market. The Florida legislature undoubtedly reacted to all of these factors when it enacted its statute of repose in its 1975 legislative session.

III. The Florida Judicial Approach with the Statute of Repose

The application of a statute which simply placed a cap on products liability actions was not an easy task; the Florida courts were not receptive to a statute that would terminate a claimant's action before it arose, and they quickly questioned the statute's validity on state constitutional grounds. The judiciary, in an effort to uphold the legislation,

22. Id.
23. Id. at 576.
26. See generally Hughes v. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1944).
27. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 607 (Fla. 1958).
29. Id. at 84.
30. Id. at 87.
35. Copeland, 447 So. 2d at 926.
39. Id. at 348.
40. See Batalla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, (Fla. 1980) (Mc-
statute of repose terminates any right to bring an action.\textsuperscript{20} Controversy has long surrounded repose statutes. Difficulty arises from the possibility that such a statute may bar an action before it arises.\textsuperscript{21} When this happens, the statute operates to deny the claimant a judicial forum simply because the product has attained the age specified in the statute.\textsuperscript{22}

Although legislative history is scarce concerning Florida's enactment of the products liability statute of repose, manufacturers' expanded liability appears to be the primary influence in its enactment.\textsuperscript{23} Florida, as well as the rest of the country, experienced a "products liability revolution" in the past two decades.\textsuperscript{24} Several factors have contributed to increased litigation in Florida.

At common law, courts required privity between a manufacturer and plaintiff in an action based upon the manufacturer's negligence.\textsuperscript{25} The inequities of such a rule became obvious by the 1940's, however, when manufacturers began regularly selling products to wholesalers or retailers.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, the Florida Supreme Court displaced the privity requirement with a duty to avoid "reasonable foreseeable injuries to those who might use the commodity."\textsuperscript{27}

The trend toward the adoption of the strict liability doctrine imposed an added burden on manufacturers.\textsuperscript{28} Under this theory, a manufacturer became liable simply when it placed a product on the market, knowing that it was to be used without inspection for defects, and the product proved to have a defect which caused an injury.\textsuperscript{29} The Florida Supreme Court expressly adopted this doctrine in 1976.\textsuperscript{30}

Another significant contribution to the expansion of liability of manufacturers was the judicial adoption of the "discovery rule" for statutes of limitations.\textsuperscript{31} Under this doctrine, the accrual of a cause of action begins when the facts giving rise to the action are known, or should have been known, with the exercise of due diligence.\textsuperscript{32} In essence, it rendered the defendant virtually "vulnerable to suit indefinitely, sometimes decades after the event."\textsuperscript{33} The discovery rule became commonly used with regard to long-term effects of pharmaceuticals\textsuperscript{34} or with regard to diseases acquired over a long period of time.\textsuperscript{35}

A perceived liability "crisis" in the 1970's appears to have also given credence to the idea of a statute of repose.\textsuperscript{36} Because courts permitted a greater number of claims to be brought against manufacturers, as well as frequent and large recoveries, products liability litigation increased nationwide.\textsuperscript{37} Authorities claimed that the increased litigation led to unaffordable insurance rates and, in some instances, unobtainable coverage at any price.\textsuperscript{38} In response, legislative proposals advocated the enactment of statutes of repose to remedy the insurance market.\textsuperscript{39} The Florida legislature undoubtedly reacted to all of these factors when it enacted its statute of repose in its 1975 legislative session.

III. The Florida Judicial Approach with the Statute of Repose

The application of a statute which simply placed a cap on products liability actions was not an easy task; the Florida courts were not receptive to a statute that would terminate a claimant's action before it arose, and they quickly questioned the statute's validity on state constitutional grounds.\textsuperscript{40} The judiciary, in an effort to uphold the legislation,
began weaving a piecemeal group of decisions on a case-by-case method. A brief look at Florida case law will illustrate the difficulties which faced the courts as they carved out exceptions and created an anomaly out of the products liability statute of repose.

A. The "Access to Courts" Argument

Plaintiffs whose cause of action would be terminated by the statute immediately attacked it, claiming an unconstitutional denial of their right of "access to the courts."\(^4\) The Florida Constitution provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."\(^3\) Claimants asserted that, according to this guarantee, their rights were unconstitutionally violated. In support of their argument plaintiffs cited *Kluger v. White*,\(^5\) in which the Florida Supreme Court stated the following:

> [W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the right of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.\(^\)\(^6\)

Based on this reasoning, the courts began their difficult struggle to interpret the statute of repose and its effect on the Florida Constitution.\(^\)\(^7\) This task was not easy, as the results discussed below will reveal.

B. Guidance from the Architectural Statute of Repose

Faced with a potential state constitution conflict in applying the products liability statute of repose and little legislative history concerning its enactment, the courts sought guidance from previous cases in-

---

46. See *Purk*, 387 So. 2d at 357; *Loughran v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.*, 624 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1980); *Batillia*, 392 So. 2d at 874; *Universal Eng’g Corp. v. Perez*, 451 So. 2d 463, 466 (Fla. 1984).
47. *Fla. Stat.* § 95.11(c) (1985).
48. 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
49. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
50. 357 So. 2d at 401.
51. Id. at 403.
52. Id.
53. 369 So. 2d at 572.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 575.
57. Id. at 573. The constitutional provision under consideration was *Fla. Const.* art. I, § 21.
began weaving a piecemeal group of decisions on a case-by-case method. A brief look at Florida case law will illustrate the difficulties which faced the courts as they carved out exceptions and created an anomaly out of the products liability statute of repose.

A. The "Access to Courts" Argument

 Plaintiffs whose cause of action would be terminated by the statute immediately attacked it, claiming an unconstitutional denial of their right of "access to the courts."41 The Florida Constitution provides that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."42 Claimants asserted that, according to this guarantee, their rights were unconstitutionally violated. In support of their argument plaintiffs cited Kluger v. White,43 in which the Florida Supreme Court stated the following:

[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided . . . the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the right of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.44

Based on this reasoning, the courts began their difficult struggle to interpret the statute of repose and its effect on the Florida Constitution.45 This task was not easy, as the results discussed below will reveal.

B. Guidance from the Architectural Statute of Repose

 Faced with a potential state constitution conflict in applying the products liability statute of repose and little legislative history concerning its enactment, the courts sought guidance from previous cases in-

41. See Park, 387 So. 2d at 357.
42. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
43. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
44. Id. at 4.
45. See Park, 387 So. 2d at 354.
It noted that this basic common law was in effect in 1776 and when the "access to courts" mandate of the constitution was re-adopted in 1968, a right of redress for plaintiffs such as Sirmons existed. Thus, the court held that the statute of repose, in this case, abolished the plaintiff's right to sue and provided no alternative right to redress.

In applying the next part of the test, the court attempted to find an indication that the legislature perceived a public necessity for the legislation. Although it acknowledged that there are many problems associated with bringing suits after the "passage of time," it could not determine that a public necessity existed. The court's ultimate conclusion was that the statute "benefits only one class of defendants, at the expense of an injured party's right to sue."

From Overland, two theories developed dealing with different factual situations. Courts would consider a statute of repose either "constitutional" or "unconstitutional," depending on the facts of the case. In essence, if the construction had been completed over twelve years at the time of injury, the statute operated to bar the plaintiff's cause of action before it arose, thereby rendering the statute "unconstitutional" as applied. This interpretation, however, conflicted with the ultimate purpose of the statute of repose, as expressed by its plain words, which was to bar precisely just such actions. Nevertheless, guided by this interpretation, the Florida courts embarked upon a case-by-case approach in interpreting the products liability statute.

C. Florida's Application of the Products Liability Statute of Repose

The Florida Supreme Court first addressed the validity of Florida's products liability statute in the 1980 case of Purk v. Federal Press Co. The plaintiff alleged that a defect in a ten-year-old punch press machine had caused her injury, leaving her with only two years in which to bring suit. Because the statute merely "shortened" her time period in which to bring an action rather than absolutely barring her action, the court held that the statute was constitutional. There had not been an absolute denial of "access to the courts."

In another 1980 case, Batilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the supreme court declared the products liability statute of repose unconstitutional as applied to the facts. The court did not discuss the specific facts of the case but stated its reliance on Overland and the statute "as applied to this case."

Later courts construed Overland's holding to be a declaration of invalidity as applied to products liability cases in general.

The Purk and Batilla holdings left the products liability statute declared unconstitutional as applied to certain factual situations only. Simply stated, if the plaintiff had time to bring suit before the expiration of the twelve year limit, the statute was constitutional as applied. Ironically, in such instances, the statute had no effect, even though held constitutional, because the time period had not lapsed. On the other hand, if the twelve years had passed before the injury occurred, it was unconstitutional as applied.

The result was that the statute applied only to plaintiffs who were injured by a product between eight and twelve years old. This limited group merely had a reduced time period in which to bring suit. For example, a person injured by a product eleven years old had one year in which to bring an action. By contrast, a person injured by an eight year old product had a full four years in which to bring suit, confined only by the personal injury statute of limitations. Similarly, a person injured by a seven year old product had four years in which to bring suit.

The Florida courts' interpretation of the products liability statute of repose led to an incongruous situation. If the objective of the legislation was to avoid perpetual liability, it clearly could not have intended for the plaintiff to bring suit when injured after the product was

58. Overland, 369 So. 2d at 573-74.
59. Id. at 575.
60. Id. at 574.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 575.
64. Id. The court did not use the words "unconstitutional as applied." However, the author has used this phrase for purposes of clarity.
65. 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980).
66. Id. at 356-57.
67. Id. at 357.
68. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
69. Id.
71. 387 So. 2d at 354.
72. 392 So. 2d at 874.
73. E.g., Purk, 387 So. 2d at 354.
74. E.g., Batilla, 392 So. 2d at 874.
75. Id. at 875 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
It noted that this basic common law was in effect in 1776 and when the “access to courts” mandate of the constitution was re-adopted in 1968, a right of redress for plaintiffs such as Sirmons existed. 65 Thus, the court held that the statute of repose, in this case, abolished the plaintiff’s right to sue and provided no alternative right to redress.66

In applying the next part of the test, the court attempted to find an indication that the legislature perceived a public necessity for the legislation.67 Although it acknowledged that there are many problems associated with bringing suits after the “passage of time,” it could not determine that a public necessity existed.68 The court’s ultimate conclusion was that the statute “benefits only one class of defendants, at the expense of an injured party’s right to sue.”69

From Bauld and Overland, two theories developed dealing with different factual situations. Courts would consider a statute of repose either “constitutional” or “unconstitutional,” depending on the facts of the case.68 In essence, if the construction had been completed over twelve years at the time of injury, the statute operated to bar the plaintiff’s cause of action before it arose, thereby rendering the statute “unconstitutional” as applied.64 This interpretation, however, conflicted with the ultimate purpose of the statute of repose, as expressed by its plain words, which was to bar precisely just such actions. Nevertheless, guided by this interpretation, the Florida courts embarked upon a case-by-case approach in interpreting the products liability statute.

C. Florida’s Application of the Products Liability Statute of Repose

The Florida Supreme Court first addressed the validity of Florida’s products liability statute in the 1980 case of Purk v. Federal Press Co.66 The plaintiff alleged that a defect in a ten-year-old punch press machine had caused her injury, leaving her with only two years in which to bring suit.66 Because the statute merely “shortened” her time period in which to bring an action rather than absolutely barring her action, the court held that the statute was constitutional.68 There had not been an absolute denial of “access to the courts.”

In another 1980 case, Batilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 68 the supreme court declared the products liability statute of repose unconstitutional as applied to the facts. The court did not discuss the specific facts of the case but stated its reliance on Overland and the statute “as applied to this case.”69 Later courts construed Overland’s holding to be a declaration of invalidity as applied to products liability cases in general.70

The Purk71 and Batilla72 holdings left the products liability statute declared unconstitutional as applied to certain factual situations only. Simply stated, if the plaintiff had time to bring suit before the expiration of the twelve year limit, the statute was constitutional as applied.72 Ironically, in such instances, the statute had no effect, even though held constitutional, because the time period had not lapsed. On the other hand, if the twelve years had passed before the injury occurred, it was unconstitutional as applied.74

The result was that the statute applied only to plaintiffs who were injured by a product between eight and twelve years old. This limited group merely had a reduced time period in which to bring suit. For example, a person injured by a product eleven years old had one year in which to bring an action. By contrast, a person injured by an eight year old product had a full four years in which to bring suit, confined only by the personal injury statute of limitations. Similarly, a person injured by a seven year old product had four years in which to bring suit.

The Florida courts’ interpretation of the products liability statute of repose led to an incongruous situation. If the objective of the legislation was to avoid perpetual liability,76 it clearly could not have intended for the plaintiff to bring suit when injured after the product was

66. Id. at 356-57.
67. Id. at 357.
68. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
69. Id.
71. 387 So. 2d at 354.
72. 392 So. 2d at 874.
73. E.g., Purk, 387 So. 2d at 354.
74. E.g., Batilla, 392 So. 2d at 874.
75. Id. at 875 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
twelve years old. Therefore, the courts re-established "perpetual liability" by refusing to apply it when it would bar an action.\textsuperscript{76}

In the following years, the Florida legislature did not speak on the issue, and the courts continued in their struggle to apply the statute without violating the Florida Constitution. For example, in \textit{Ellison v. Northwest Engineering Co.,}\textsuperscript{77} the Third District Court of Appeal permitted an action to proceed in which a twenty-three year old machine mangled the plaintiff's arm. Similarly, in \textit{Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.},\textsuperscript{78} a plaintiff brought an action against a drug company for effects resulting from medication given to her mother while the plaintiff was still a fetus.\textsuperscript{79} Although the plaintiff discovered the deleterious effects twenty years later, the court allowed the action to proceed.\textsuperscript{80}

The courts continued to declare the statute constitutional only when "reasonable time" remained to file an action,\textsuperscript{81} and consequently were confronted with determining what constituted a "reasonable time." In \textit{MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Co.},\textsuperscript{82} the First District Court of Appeal ruled that twenty months was a reasonable amount of time for a passenger of an airplane, which crashed due to an alleged defect, to bring suit.\textsuperscript{83} The Fourth District Court of Appeal defined the "reasonable time period" further in \textit{Feil v. Challenge-Cook Brothers, Inc.},\textsuperscript{84} in which a concrete chute at a construction site struck the plaintiff on the head just four months before the expiration of the twelve year period.\textsuperscript{85} The court held that four months was a reasonable time in which to bring suit and declared the statute constitutional as applied to the facts.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{itemize}
\item 76. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 1, \textit{Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.}, 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
\item 78. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
\item 79. \textit{Id.}
\item 80. \textit{Id.}
\item 81. \textit{See generally Cates v. Graham, 427 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (the court may determine whether a party had a reasonable time in which to act, based on the "facts of the case."); aff’d, 451 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1985).}
\item 82. 457 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1985).
\item 83. \textit{Id. at 1095.}
\item 84. 473 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1986).
\item 85. \textit{Id. at 1339.}
\item 86. \textit{Id. at 1339.}
\end{itemize}

\textit{Statute of Repose}

Finally, in \textit{Pullum v. Cincinnati Inc.},\textsuperscript{87} the First District Court of Appeal certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question: "Does section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, deny equal protection of the laws to persons such as appellant who are injured by products delivered to the original purchaser between eight and twelve years prior to the injury?"\textsuperscript{88} While previous cases had generally challenged the right of access to the courts,\textsuperscript{89} the plaintiff in \textit{Pullum} argued that the statute irrationally applied to a very limited class of persons — specifically, "those persons injured during a time period of eight to twelve years after delivery of the completed product . . . ."\textsuperscript{90}

The supreme court avoided answering the specific question certified to it. Instead, it expressly receded from the \textit{Batilla} decision in which it had declared the products liability statute of repose violative of the Florida Constitution.\textsuperscript{91} The \textit{Pullum} court credited the dissenting opinion in \textit{Batilla} as correctly reasoning that there is "a rational and legitimate basis for the legislature to take this action, particularly in view of the relatively recent developments in expanding the liability of manufacturers."\textsuperscript{92} The court thus declared Florida's products liability statute of repose constitutional, regardless of whether there is access to courts.\textsuperscript{93}

Less than one year after \textit{Pullum}\textsuperscript{94} came the decision in \textit{Lamb},\textsuperscript{95} in which a car accident left the plaintiff a quadriplegic with no opportunity for redress.\textsuperscript{96} Lamb's injuries occurred after the twelve year limitation.\textsuperscript{97} Nevertheless, because the Florida Supreme Court decided \textit{Pullum} while \textit{Lamb} was pending, the United States District Court for the Southern District applied \textit{Pullum} retroactively.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{itemize}
\item 87. 458 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d, 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
\item 88. \textit{Id. at 1140.}
\item 89. \textit{See, e.g., Batilla, 392 So. 2d at 874.}
\item 90. \textit{Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.}, 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), aff’d, 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
\item 91. \textit{Id.}
\item 92. \textit{Id. at 660 (quoting Batilla, 392 So. 2d at 874-75 (McDonald, J., dissenting)).}
\item 93. \textit{Id. at 659.}
\item 94. \textit{Id. at 657.}
\item 96. \textit{Id. See supra text accompanying notes 1 to 6.}
\item 97. \textit{Id.}
\item 98. \textit{Id. at 1152.}
\end{itemize}
twelve years old. Therefore, the courts re-established "perpetual liability" by refusing to apply it when it would bar an action.\textsuperscript{76}

In the following years, the Florida legislature did not speak on the issue, and the courts continued in their struggle to declare the statute without violating the Florida Constitution. For example, in \textit{Ellison v. Northwest Engineering Co.},\textsuperscript{37} the Third District Court of Appeal permitted an action to proceed in which a twenty-three year old machine mangled the plaintiff's arm. Similarly, in \textit{Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.},\textsuperscript{38} a plaintiff brought an action against a drug company for effects resulting from medication given to her mother while the plaintiff was still a fetus.\textsuperscript{39} Although the plaintiff discovered the deleterious effects twenty years later, the court allowed the action to proceed.\textsuperscript{40}

The courts continued to declare the statute unconstitutional only when "reasonable time" remained to file an action,\textsuperscript{41} and consequently were confronted with determining what constituted a "reasonable time." In \textit{MacRae v. Cessna Aircraft Co.},\textsuperscript{42} the First District Court of Appeal ruled that twenty weeks was a reasonable amount of time for a passenger of an airplane, which crashed due to an alleged defect, to bring suit.\textsuperscript{43} The Fourth District Court of Appeal defined the "reasonable time period" further in \textit{Feil v. Challenge-Cook Brothers, Inc.},\textsuperscript{44} in which a concrete chute at a construction site struck the plaintiff on the head just four months before the expiration of the twelve year period.\textsuperscript{45} The court held that four months was a reasonable time in which to bring suit and declared the statute constitutional as applied to the facts.\textsuperscript{46}

\footnotesize
76. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 1, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
78. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. \textit{See generally} Cates v. Graham, 427 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (the court may determine whether a party had a reasonable time in which to act, based on the "facts of the case.").
82. 457 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1985).
83. 457 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), \textit{review denied}, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1985).
84. Id. at 1095.
85. 473 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), \textit{review denied}, 486 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1986).
86. Id. at 1339.
88. Id. at 1140.
89. \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{Batilla}, 392 So. 2d at 874.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 660 (quoting \textit{Batilla}, 392 So. 2d at 874-75 (McDonald, J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 659.
94. Id. at 657.
96. See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 1 to 6.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1152.

Finally, in \textit{Pullum v. Cincinnati Inc.},\textsuperscript{87} the First District Court of Appeal certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question: "Does section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes, deny equal protection of the laws to persons such as appellant who are injured by products delivered to the original purchaser between eight and twelve years prior to the injury?"\textsuperscript{88} While previous cases had generally challenged the right of access to the courts,\textsuperscript{89} the plaintiff in \textit{Pullum} argued that the statute irrationally applied to a very limited class of persons — specifically, "those persons injured during a time period of eight to twelve years after delivery of the completed product . . . ."\textsuperscript{90}

The supreme court avoided answering the specific question certified to it. Instead, it expressly receded from the \textit{Batilla} decision in which it had declared the products liability statute of repose violative of the Florida Constitution.\textsuperscript{91} The \textit{Pullum} court credited the dissenting opinion in \textit{Batilla} as correctly reasoning that there is "a rational and legitimate basis for the legislature to take this action, particularly in view of the relatively recent developments in expanding the liability of manufacturers."\textsuperscript{92} The court thus declared Florida's products liability statute of repose constitutional, regardless of whether there is access to courts.\textsuperscript{93}

Less than one year after \textit{Pullum},\textsuperscript{94} came the decision in \textit{Lamb},\textsuperscript{95} in which a car accident left the plaintiff a quadriplegic with no opportunity for redress.\textsuperscript{96} Lamb's injuries occurred after the twelve year limitation.\textsuperscript{97} Nevertheless, because the Florida Supreme Court decided \textit{Pullum} while \textit{Lamb} was pending, the United States District Court for the Southern District applied \textit{Pullum} retroactively.\textsuperscript{98}
IV. The Aftermath of the Florida Supreme Court’s Interpretation

After the Florida courts’ ten-year struggle with the statute of repose, the legislature in effect repealed it by amending section 95.031; it simply deleted the words which had constituted the limitation upon the initiation of products liability actions. The Lamb result was the misfortune of being heard after Pullum, but before the repeal.

The abolition of Florida’s statute of repose presents new problems for those cases that were pending at the time of the repeal. The question confronting the courts now is whether the repeal should be given retroactive or prospective effect. At this date, there has not been a decision reported. In examining several factors which the courts should consider in ruling on this question, it appears that the repeal should be applied retroactively.

In determining whether the legislation will apply retroactively, the primary factor to consider is legislative intent indicated in the language of the statute itself, in amending Florida Statutes section 95.031 and providing for an effective date, the legislature indicated an intent to apply the repeal retroactively. The provision states the following: “Section 1 of this act shall take effect October 1, 1986, and shall apply to causes of action accruing after that date, and Section 2 of the act shall take effect July 1, 1986.” The legislature clearly states that section 1 (which applies to limitations other than recovery of real property) is to be prospective. On the other hand, in reference to section 2 (which deletes the limitation on products liability cases) there is no expression of future application.

Recognizing that these two provisions were drafted together, the legislature clearly intended the repeal to be applied retroactively. Had this not been the intention, the legislature would have constructed the provision so that the words “shall apply to causes of action accruing after that date” modified both section 1 and section 2. Also, an alternative means would have been to repeal that clause after each section’s declared effective date. Having chosen neither of these methods, the reader of the act can only conclude that the legislature intended for section 2 (repealing the statute of repose) to be applied retroactively.

Although legislative intent indicates retroactive application, the courts will have to determine another factor: whether this legislation can be constitutionally applied. In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court held that statutes which are remedial in nature generally apply to all pending cases, whereas a substantive law is to be applied prospectively only. The basis for this rule is that statutes should not apply retroactively when they interfere with vested rights.

Although statutes of repose have been held to be substantive in other jurisdictions, the issue here is with respect to legislation constituting the repeal of a statute of repose. Legislation is considered remedial if it does not create new rights, and operates to further a remedy already in existence without taking away vested rights.

New rights are not created through the abolition of the statute of repose because the remedy to a product liability action was recognized at common law prior to the statute’s enactment. Also, the new legislation results in furthering the remedy by the removal of the twelve-year cap.

Furthermore, Florida case law appears settled that laws pertaining to limitations on time within which rights may be enforced are remedial in nature. Arguably, the abolition of a law which had placed a cap on the enforcement of rights would be remedial. Nevertheless, should an argument be advanced that the repeal is substantive, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that “an amendment to a statute of limitations enlarging the period of time within which an action can be brought as to pending causes of action is not retroactive legislation...
IV. The Aftermath of the Florida Supreme Court's Interpretation

After the Florida courts' ten-year struggle with the statute of repose, the legislature in effect repealed it by amending section 95.031; it simply deleted the words which had constituted the limitation upon the initiation of products liability actions. The *Lamb* result was the misfortune of being heard after *Pullum*, but before the repeal.

The abolition of Florida's statute of repose presents new problems for those cases that were pending at the time of the repeal. The question confronting the courts now is whether the repeal should be given retroactive or prospective effect. At this date, there has not been a decision reported. In examining several factors which the courts should consider in ruling on this question, it appears that the repeal should be applied retroactively.

In determining whether the legislation will apply retroactively, the primary factor to consider is legislative intent indicated in the language of the statute itself. In amending Florida Statutes section 95.031 and providing for an effective date, the legislature indicated an intent to apply the repeal retroactively. The provision states the following:

"Section 1 of this act shall take effect October 1, 1986, and shall apply to causes of action accruing after that date, and Section 2 of the act shall take effect July 1, 1986." The legislature clearly states that section 1 (which applies to limitations other than recovery of real property) is to be prospective. On the other hand, in reference to section 2 (which deletes the limitation on products liability cases) there is no expression of future application.

Recognizing that these two provisions were drafted together, the legislature clearly expressed the intention that only section 1 apply prospectively. The legislature's conscious omission of that same instruction on section 2 suggests that it knowingly intended the repeal to be applied retroactively. Had this not been the intention, the legislature would have constructed the provision so that the words "shall apply to causes of action accruing after that date" modified both section 1 and section 2. Also, an alternative means would have been to repeal that clause after each section's declared effective date. Having chosen neither of these methods, the reader of the act can only conclude that the legislature intended for section 2 (repealing the statute of repose) to be applied retroactively.

Although legislative intent indicates retroactive application, the courts will have to determine another factor: whether this legislation can be constitutionally applied. In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court held that statutes which are remedial in nature generally apply to all pending cases, whereas a substantive law is to be applied prospectively only. The basis for this rule is that statutes should not apply retroactively when they interfere with vested rights.

Although statutes of repose have been held to be substantive in other jurisdictions, the issue here is with respect to legislation constituting the repeal of a statute of repose. Legislation is considered remedial if it does not create new rights, and operates to further a remedy already in existence without taking away vested rights.

New rights are not created through the abolition of the statute of repose because the remedy to a product liability action was recognized at common law prior to the statute's enactment. Also, the new legislation results in furthering the remedy by the removal of the twelve-year cap.

Furthermore, Florida case law appears settled that laws pertaining to limitations on time within which rights may be enforced are remedial in nature. Arguably, the abolition of a law which had placed a cap on the enforcement of rights would be remedial. Nevertheless, should an argument be advanced that the repeal is substantive, the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that "an amendment to a statute of limitations enlarging the period of time within which an action can be brought as to pending causes of action is not retroactive legislation.
and does not impair any vested rights." Since the repeal of the statute clearly operates to enlarge the plaintiff’s period in which to bring suit by removing the cap of twelve years, applying it to pending cases would at the outset not seem to be rendering the repeal as retroactive legislation.

Furthermore, the repeal of the statute does not affect vested rights in pending actions. Defendants will most likely assert that their defense arising from the statute of repose previously in effect has vested. However, in 1986, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida declared a vested right to be "more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand." Thus, the repeal of the statute of repose cannot deprive a defendant of a vested right in a products liability case because the defense never vested.

Given the legislature’s implicit indication that the amended statute was to have retroactive effect, along with the absence of constitutional obstacles, the repeal will likely be applied to pending cases. Those claims which had not been adjudicated prior to the repeal will then be afforded the full four year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims without regard to the age of the product.

V. Should Florida Consider the Enactment of Another Statute of Repose?

Although the Florida courts’ complex application of the statute would seem the most obvious reasons for the repeal, the Legislature stated simpler policy reasons. One of the grounds cited was that the statute was unfair to plaintiffs and in effect created a "penalty" for citizens in Florida by treating persons in the same position differently. Another contributing factor was that many products, such as machinery and aircraft, are intended to be used for long periods of time, and defects may not necessarily appear in the first twelve years. By repealing the statute of repose, all persons injured by a design defect have a full four years to bring suit from the time in which they learn of the defect or, with exercise of due diligence, could have discovered the defect.

Florida currently is without a products liability statute of repose. After ten years of the statute’s incongruous application and the foreclosure of many plaintiffs’ actions, a products liability claim can now be brought at any time before the personal injury statute of limitations has run. Undoubtedly manufacturers and defense attorneys will be urging the Florida legislature to enact a statute of repose again in the future. However, the many flaws with the now-repealed statute indicate that Florida will fare better without such a law.

A. Inherent Problems with Florida’s (Now-Repealed) Statute of Repose

Florida’s products liability statute of repose was “incurably defective.” The statute was not comprehensive and failed to address key issues that arise in products liability litigation. One case that illustrates its procedural deficiencies was decided soon after the Florida Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional. In Phlieger v. Nissan Motor Co., the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action based on an alleged design defect of a truck. However, a separate statute of limitations which governed wrongful death actions and directly conflicted with the statute of repose complicated the decision.

The presence of these two competing statutes forced the Phlieger court to determine which statute applied to a combined wrongful death and products liability action. It was able to avoid the issue, however, by acknowledging that at the moment of plaintiff’s decedent’s death,
and does not impair any vested rights." 112 Since the repeal of the statute clearly operates to enlarge the plaintiff's period in which to bring suit by removing the cap of twelve years, applying it to pending cases would at the outset not seem to be rendering the repeal as retroactive legislation.

Furthermore, the repeal of the statute does not affect vested rights in pending actions. Defendants will most likely assert that their defense arising from the statute of repose previously in effect has vested. However, in 1986, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida declared a vested right to be "more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a demand." 113 Thus, the repeal of the statute of repose cannot deprive a defendant of a vested right in a products liability case because the defense never vested.

Given the legislature's implicit indication that the amended statute was to have retroactive effect, 114 along with the absence of constitutional obstacles, the repeal will likely be applied to pending cases. Those claims which had not been adjudicated prior to the repeal will then be afforded the full four year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims without regard to the age of the product.

V. Should Florida Consider the Enactment of Another Statute of Repose?

Although the Florida courts' complex application of the statute would seem the most obvious reasons for the repeal, the Legislature stated simpler policy reasons. One of the grounds cited was that the statute was unfair to plaintiffs and in effect created a "penalty" for citizens in Florida by treating persons in the same position differently. 115 Another contributing factor was that many products, such as machinery and aircraft, are intended to be used for long periods of time, and defects may not necessarily appear in the first twelve

years. 116 By repealing the statute of repose, all persons injured by a design defect have a full four years to bring suit from the time in which they learn of the defect or, with exercise of due diligence, could have discovered the defect.

Florida currently is without a products liability statute of repose. 117 After ten years of the statute's incongruous application and the foreclosure of many plaintiffs' actions, a products liability claim can now be brought at any time before the personal injury statute of limitations has run. Undoubtedly manufacturers and defense attorneys will be urging the Florida legislature to enact a statute of repose again in the future. However, the many flaws with the now-repealed statute indicate that Florida will fare better without such a law.

A. Inherent Problems with Florida's (Now-Repealed) Statute of Repose

Florida's products liability statute of repose was "incurably defective." 118 The statute was not comprehensive and failed to address key issues that arise in products liability litigation. 119 One case that illustrates its procedural deficiencies was decided soon after the Florida Supreme Court declared the statute constitutional. 120 In Phlieger v. Nissan Motor Co., 121 the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action based on an alleged design defect of a truck. 122 However, a separate statute of limitations which governed wrongful death actions and directly conflicted with the statute of repose complicated the decision. 123 The presence of these two competing statutes forced the Phlieger court to determine which statute applied to a combined wrongful death and products liability action. 124 It was able to avoid the issue, however, by acknowledging that at the moment of plaintiff's decedent's death, 116.

116. Id.
118. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 12, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1098.
124. Id. at 1096.
the twelve-year statute of repose had not run. In dicta, the court stated that if he had been killed after the statute had run, his survivor’s action would have been barred. Nevertheless, the issue in this case remained clouded because the court had stated in the outset of its opinion that the lower court should have applied the “wrongful death statute of limitations.” This case illustrates the confusion that is created by the enactment of a statute without considering co-existing legislation.

B. The Pitfalls of an Overbroad Statute of Repose

Another flaw in Florida’s oversimplified statute of repose was that it applied to all three theories of recovery: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Such a broad approach for the protection of manufacturers could only result in severe inequities for plaintiffs if applied as written. Other jurisdictions, however, have attempted to avoid this problem by creating alternatives for the benefit of the consumer as well. For example, Colorado has enacted a products liability statute that includes exceptions for “hidden defects, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, express warranties and prolonged exposure.” Kansas also excepts “injury causing aspects not discoverable . . . until after the statutory period.” Had Florida’s statute offered similar provisions, the courts could have more easily granted the relief desired.

Along with Colorado and Kansas, Idaho and Arizona exclude express warranties from their repose statutes. Florida’s statute ignored the fact that some manufacturers may warrant their product against defects for much longer than twelve years. Although a Florida statute did provide for the shortening of the limitations period by contract, there was no express protection for those who may bargain to receive a warranty for longer than twelve years.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1098-99.
127. Id. at 1098.
130. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659 (explanation in a footnote as to why relief granted in a previous pharmaceutical case: “it was a different factual context.”).

135. Id.
136. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
the twelve-year statute of repose had not run. In dicta, the court stated that if he had been killed after the statute had run, his survivor's action would have been barred. Nevertheless, the issue in this case remained clouded because the court had stated in the outset of its opinion that the lower court should have applied the "wrongful death statute of limitations." This case illustrates the confusion that is created by the enactment of a statute without considering co-existing legislation.

B. The Pitfalls of an Overbroad Statute of Repose

Another flaw in Florida's oversimplified statute of repose was that it applied to all three theories of recovery: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Such a broad approach for the protection of manufacturers could only result in severe inequities for plaintiffs if applied as written. Other jurisdictions, however, have attempted to avoid this problem by creating alternatives for the benefit of the consumer as well. For example, Colorado has enacted a products liability statute that includes exceptions for "hidden defects, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, express warranties and prolonged exposure." Kansas also excepts "injury causing aspects not discoverable . . . until after the statutory period." Had Florida's statute offered similar provisions, the courts could have more easily granted the relief desired.

Along with Colorado and Kansas, Idaho and Arizona exclude express warranties from their repose statutes. Florida's statute ignored the fact that some manufacturers may warrant their product against defects for much longer than twelve years. Although a Florida statute did provide for the shortening of the limitations period by contract, there was no express protection for those who may bargain to receive a warranty for longer than twelve years.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1098-99.
127. Id. at 1098.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127.6(b), (c), (d) (1985).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976); cf. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3) (1975) (repealed 1986). Florida's products liability statute of repose contained no exception.
130. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659 (explanation in a footnote as to why relief granted in a previous pharmaceutical case: "it was a different factual context.").
131. IDAHO CODE § 6-1303 (1980).
133. FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1975).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West 1986).
138. Id.
139. Id.
ern consumer society. It was merely a vestige left over from an era when all members of society produced their own goods. As technology advanced and citizens began to rely on manufacturers for necessities, the privity requirement became totally unjustified. As Justice Cardozo stated in "MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," "[p]roducts drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today.\textsuperscript{144}\) A trade-off was not necessary since consumers had only gained privileges to which they were entitled. Rather, increased responsibility furthered the public interest because it is the manufacturer who "stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects.\textsuperscript{144}\)

Another issue that has become clouded in justifying reposes statutes is the misleading notion that simply because a products liability action is allowed to proceed, its success is guaranteed. Although claims initiated when a product is several years old do create difficulties for defendants, the problems with proof affect the plaintiff as well.\textsuperscript{144}\) Whether the claim is brought under the theory of strict liability, negligence, or warranty, the plaintiff must establish all of the elements of each cause of action. If the necessary elements cannot be shown, the case fails.

For example, a "defect" must have existed at the time of delivery.\textsuperscript{144}\) There must also be an injury and a causal relationship between the defect and the injury.\textsuperscript{144}\)

At the heart of each theory is the requirement that the plaintiff's injury must have been caused by some defect in the product. Generally, when the injury is in no way attributable to a defect, there is no basis for imposing product liability upon the manufacturer. If it is not contemplated that a manufacturer should be made the insurer for all physical injuries caused by his products.\textsuperscript{144}\)

142. Overland Constr. Co., 369 So. 2d at 574.

In addition to these basic requirements of bringing a products liability action, the defendant has defenses under both common law and statute.\textsuperscript{144}\) It is clear that the new found cause of action against the manufacturer was not intended to be absolute.

Before enacting a similar statute in the future, Florida must consider all aspects of products liability litigation in order to create effective legislation and equitable results. The short-sighted termination of a cause of action is not the answer.

D. A Statute of Repose for Durable Goods

Some commentators have suggested that statutes of repose should at least apply to capital goods or durable goods, such as aircraft and large machinery.\textsuperscript{144}\) It is not uncommon for their "useful lives" to be several times that provided by a statute of repose.

There are obvious policy reasons which conflict with the justification of a statute of repose in the area of durable goods. However, if a manufacturer produces goods that are intended to last for long periods of time, he should be prepared to warrant these products against defects for that intended useful life. There is no logical basis for relieving a manufacturer of liability after twelve years when he has sold and received a profit for a product intended to be used for fifty years.

Another factor mitigating against a statute of repose for durable goods is that the persons injured by these products are generally "passive victims." These people usually are not purchasers of the product and are not in the position to know of their age or life expectancies. The injured persons are commonly employees working with the machinery\textsuperscript{144}\) or passengers on aircraft.\textsuperscript{144}\) Policy reasons mandate that these unsuspecting victims not be penalized and held accountable for knowledge they could not have easily obtained. Those who profited by the product and are responsible for the defect should continue to re-

146. See West, 336 So. 2d at 80.
147. See Martin, A Statute of Repose for Products Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 745, 755 (1982). Commentators refer to these products as "durable" because they generally continue in use for long periods of time.
148. See generally Hustet, 120 F. at 865-66, in which the plaintiff was a laborer who was employed to operate a threshing machine. To operate the machine, it was necessary for him to walk on its sheet-iron covering. However, the covering was so pliable and without support that it collapsed, causing the plaintiff's foot and leg to be crushed.
149. E.g., MacRae, 457 So. 2d at 1093.
ern consumer society. It was merely a vestige left over from an era when all members of society produced their own goods. As technology advanced and citizens began to rely on manufacturers for necessities, the privity requirement became totally unjustified. As Justice Cardozo stated in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., "[p]recedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today." A trade-off was not necessary since consumers had only gained privileges to which they were entitled. Rather, increased responsibility furthers the public interest because it is the manufacturer who "stands in a superior position to recognize and cure defects."

Another issue that has become clouded in justifying repose statutes is the misleading notion that simply because a products liability action is allowed to proceed, its success is guaranteed. Although claims initiated when a product is several years old do create difficulties for defendants, the problems with proof affect the plaintiff as well. Whether the claim is brought under the theory of strict liability, negligence, or warranty, the plaintiff must establish all of the elements of each cause of action. If the necessary elements can not be shown, the case fails.

For example, a "defect" must have existed at the time of delivery. There must also be an injury and a causal relationship between the defect and the injury.

At the heart of each theory is the requirement that the plaintiff's injury must have been caused by some defect in the product. Generally, when the injury is in no way attributable to a defect, there is no basis for imposing product liability upon the manufacturer. It is not contemplated that a manufacturer should be made the insurer for all physical injuries caused by his products.

In addition to these basic requirements of bringing a products liability action, the defendant has defenses under both common law and statute. It is clear that the new found cause of action against the manufacturer was not intended to be absolute.

Before enacting a similar statute in the future, Florida must consider all aspects of products liability litigation in order to create effective legislation and equitable results. The short-sighted termination of a cause of action is not the public answer.

D. A Statute of Repose for Durable Goods

Some commentators have suggested that statutes of repose should at least apply to capital goods or durable goods, such as aircraft and large machinery. It is not uncommon for their "useful lives" to be several times that provided by a statute of repose.

There are obvious policy reasons which conflict with the justification of a statute of repose in the area of durable goods. However, if a manufacturer produces goods that are intended to last for long periods of time, he should be prepared to warrant these products against defects for that intended useful life. There is no logical basis for relieving a manufacturer of liability after twelve years when he has sold and received a profit for a product intended to be used for fifty years.

Another factor mitigating against a statute of repose for durable goods is that the persons injured by these products are generally "passive victims." These persons usually are not purchasers of the product and are not in the position to know of their age or life expectancies. The injured persons are commonly employees working with the machinery or passengers on aircraft. Policy reasons mandate that these unsuspecting victims not be penalized and held accountable for knowledge they could not have easily obtained. Those who profited by the product and are responsible for the defect should continue to re-
main liable.

VI. Federal Preemption

By repealing section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes during the final days of the 1986 session, the Florida legislature may have thought the products liability statute of repose issue was buried, only to discover someday that the United States Congress has resurrected it. Both houses of Congress have entertained the idea of a uniform products liability statute with repose provisions.

The Consumer Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has been soliciting public comment on a draft bill to reform products liability law. Senator Kasten, former chairman of the subcommittee, revised the draft bill and introduced it in 1983. This bill would have set a time limit of twenty-five years from the date of first sale on the liability of manufacturers of capital goods only such as machinery and commodities used to produce goods. The limitations of twenty-five years would not apply if (1) the manufacturer intentionally misrepresented or (2) fraudulently concealed facts about the product or (3) the product caused harm within the twenty-five year period but the injury did not actually develop until after the expiration of that period.

The House Bill would limit actions for products liability to within ten years after the date of sale of the product. The bar would apply to all products, rather than just capital goods. The absolute ten year limit would be extended for three additional years if the manufacturer warranted the product for more than ten years, and five additional years if the product caused harm within the ten year period but the injury did not manifest itself until after the period expired. Also, one could bring a claim within fifteen years of the first sale if the manufacturer's misrepresentations clearly caused the injury. Neither the Senate or House bills were voted upon during the 98th Congress.

The Consumer Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has concluded to analyze the need for federal tort liability legislation. A Committee report on Senate Bill 2670, a bill introduced in the 99th Congress to regulate interstate commerce by providing for uniform liability law, was printed on August 15, 1986. The Committee reported Bill 2670 favorably to the Senate on a 9-7 Committee vote. One section of the bill establishes uniform standards of limitations and repose. It provides a two year statute of limitations that runs from the time the claimant discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the harm and its cause. A person with a legal disability has two years from the date the disability ceases to file suit. A claim for harm caused by capital goods, except toxic harm, must be filed within twenty-five years of the time of delivery of the product or be barred. Motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or railroads used primarily to transport passengers for hire are not, however, subject to the twenty year limit. Non-capital goods are subject to a shorter time limitation. A manufacturer of a non-capital good that has caused harm is not subject to liability if the harm caused by the product occurred after the product's "useful safe life." The useful life of non-capital goods is presumed to be no more than ten years after the delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee. The presumption can be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. The useful safe life may be extended beyond ten years through a manufacturer's express warranty, or an intentional misrepresentation causing an injury, or exposure within a

152. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FEDERAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROPOSALS 98th CONG. 2d SESS. 9 (1984). Senator Kasten introduced the bill as Senate Bill 2631 (S. 2631) and as Senate Bill 44 (S. 44) in the 98th Congress.
153. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, FEDERAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY PROPOSALS 98th CONG. 2d SESS. 9-10.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 27.
156. Id.
157. Id.
main liable.

VI. Federal Preemption

By repealing section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes during the final days of the 1986 session, the Florida legislature may have thought the products liability statute of repose issue was buried, only to discover someday that the United States Congress has resurrected it. Both houses of Congress have entertained the idea of a uniform products liability statute with statute of repose provisions.

The Consumer Subcommittee of the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has been soliciting public comment on a staff draft of a bill to reform products liability law. Senator Kasten, former chairman of the subcommittee, revised the draft bill and introduced it in 1983. This bill would have set a time limit of twenty-five years from the date of first sale on the liability of manufacturers of capital goods only such as machinery and commodities used to produce goods. The limitations of twenty-five years would not apply if (1) the manufacturer intentionally misrepresented or (2) fraudulently concealed facts about the product or (3) the product caused harm within the twenty-five year period but the injury did not actually develop until after the expiration of that period.

The House Bill would limit actions for products liability to within ten years after the date of sale of the product. The bar would apply to all products, rather than just capital goods. The absolute ten year limit would be extended for three additional years if the manufacturer warranted the product for more than ten years, and five additional years if the product caused harm within the ten year period but the injury did not manifest itself until after the period expired. Also, one could bring a claim within fifteen years of the first sale if the manufacturer's misrepresentations clearly caused the injury. Neither the Senate or House bills were voted upon during the 98th Congress.

The Consumer Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation has continued to analyze the need for federal tort liability legislation. A Committee report on Senate Bill 2670, a bill introduced in the 99th Congress to regulate interstate commerce by providing for uniform liability law, was printed on August 15, 1986. The Committee reported Bill 2670 favorably to the Senate on a 10-7 Committee vote. One section of the bill establishes uniform standards of limitations and repose. It provides a two year statute of limitations that runs from the time the claimant discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered the harm and its cause. A person with a legal disability has two years from the date the disability ceases to file suit. A claim for harm caused by capital goods, except toxic harm, must be filed within twenty-five years of the time of delivery of the product or be barred. Motor vehicles, vessels, aircraft, or railroads used primarily to transport passengers for hire are not, however, subject to the twenty year limit. Non-capital goods are subject to a shorter time limitation.

A manufacturer of a non-capital good that has caused harm is not subject to liability if the harm caused by the product occurred after the product’s "useful safe life." The useful life of non-capital goods is presumed to be no more than ten years after the delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee. The presumption can be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. The useful safe life may be extended beyond ten years through a manufacturer's express warranty, or an intentional misrepresentation causing an injury, or exposure within a...
product's useful life resulting in the manifestation of injury later.\textsuperscript{171}

Should a bill such as these be finally enacted, it will signal a significant encroachment on states sovereignty in an area of the law traditionally reserved to the states.\textsuperscript{172} This legislation would preempt the system of products liability in each state by a federal products liability law.\textsuperscript{173}

The arguments for and against such federal legislation are well documented. The justification which has most often been relied upon to enact similar legislation is the need to regulate interstate commerce.\textsuperscript{174} The principle benefits suggested are the removal of the uncertainty and inconsistency facing manufacturers and plaintiffs by the differing statutes and judicial interpretations in the various states.\textsuperscript{175}

The Reagan administration favors federal legislation in this area.\textsuperscript{176} Its policy is that "federal interference with traditional state rules should be kept to an absolute minimum to achieve its purpose."\textsuperscript{177} The administration is looking at the various legislative proposals to see "which have impacts on interstate commerce and are susceptible only to federal treatment."\textsuperscript{178} before deciding whether to lend administration support to specific legislative bills.\textsuperscript{179}

Inevitably, plaintiffs would challenge a federal statute of repose on constitutional grounds as well as the power of the federal government to usurp the states' power to develop their own tort law. Courts would undoubtedly question the validity of preempting a part of a state's tort law while leaving the rest intact.\textsuperscript{180} An example of the latter is an automobile accident suit in which the plaintiff joins the manufacturer of the automobile and the negligent driver in the same action. Differing federal and state rules of negligence theory and defense would have to be applied by the state court.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{171} Id. at § 304(2)(B).


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Statement of Sherman E. Unger before the ABA} 5-6, (Aug. 10, 1982) (available in Nova Law Center Library).

\textsuperscript{175} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{176} Id.

\textsuperscript{177} Id. at 10.

\textsuperscript{178} Id.

\textsuperscript{179} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{180} Ghiardi, supra, note 172 at 5-6.

\textsuperscript{181} Id. at 7-8.

\textsuperscript{182} Id. at 6.

\textsuperscript{183} Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).
product's useful life resulting in the manifestation of injury later.\textsuperscript{171}

Should a bill such as these be finally enacted, it will signal a significant encroachment on states sovereignty in an area of the law traditionally reserved to the states.\textsuperscript{172} This legislation would preempt the system of products liability in each state by a federal products liability law.\textsuperscript{173}

The arguments for and against such federal legislation are well documented. The justification which has most often been relied upon to enact similar legislation is the need to regulate interstate commerce.\textsuperscript{174} The principle benefits suggested are the removal of the uncertainty and inconsistency facing manufacturers and plaintiffs by the differing statutes and judicial interpretations in the various states.\textsuperscript{175}

The Reagan administration favors federal legislation in this area.\textsuperscript{176} Its policy is that "federal interference with traditional state rules should be kept to an absolute minimum to achieve its purpose."\textsuperscript{177} The administration is looking at the various legislative proposals to see "which have impacts on interstate commerce and are susceptible only to federal treatment"\textsuperscript{178} before deciding whether to lend administration support to specific legislative bills.\textsuperscript{179}

Inevitably, plaintiffs would challenge a federal statute of repose on constitutional grounds as well as the power of the federal government to usurp the states' power to develop their own tort law. Courts would undoubtedly question the viability of preempting a part of a state's tort law while leaving the rest intact.\textsuperscript{180} An example of the latter is an automobile accident suit in which the plaintiff joins the manufacturer of the automobile and the negligent driver in the same action. Differing federal and state rules of negligence theory and defense would have to be applied by the state court.\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{itemize}
\item[171.] Id. at § 304(2)(B).
\item[174.] Statement of Sherman E. Unger before the ABA 5-6, (Aug. 10, 1982) (available in Nova Law Center Library).
\item[175.] Id. at 5.
\item[176.] Id.
\item[177.] Id. at 10.
\item[178.] Id.
\item[179.] Id. at 5.
\item[180.] Ghiardi, supra, note 172 at 5-6.
\item[181.] Id. at 7-8.
\item[182.] Id. at 6.
\item[183.] Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902).
\end{itemize}
time, not interfere with the development and availability of worthwhile products.

Linda D. Caldwell

A Practitioner's Guide to Dismissals for Failure to Prosecute Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(e)

I. Introduction

In a typical scenario, plaintiff's counsel files an action to rectify an alleged injury. Counsel for the plaintiff, in dereliction of his professional responsibilities and duty to his client, fails to prosecute the cause with due diligence for a period of one year. The defendant can then file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1.420(e) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Absent a showing of "good cause" to excuse the inactivity, the plaintiff's cause must be dismissed. However, the plaintiff is not through yet; as long as the applicable statute of limitations has not run, the plaintiff is free to refile his claim.

The hardship that the ability to refile works on the defendant is obvious. Not only is the defendant unfairly burdened by having to replead his defense, but the judicial system is likewise burdened by a plaintiff who has already had an opportunity to seek judicial relief. When the practical application of a rule of procedure offends notions of judicial economy, standards of professional responsibility and principles of fundamental fairness governing the adversarial process, that rule should be amended.

Rule 1.420(e) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure reads:

All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activity by filing of pleadings, order of court or otherwise has occurred for a period of one year shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on the motion of any interested person, whether a party to the action or not, after reasonable notice to the parties, unless a stipulation staying the action is approved by the court or a stay order has been filed or a party shows good cause in writing at least five days before the hearing on the motion why the action should remain pending. Mere inaction for a period of less than one year shall not be sufficient cause for dismissal for failure to prosecute.1