SECURING CHILD RIGHTS IN TIME OF CONFLICT

Diane Marie Amann

It is an honor to serve on this panel alongside representatives from two pillars of child protection, the Office of Children’s Issues at the United States Department of State and the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Since its establishment in the wake of the landmark 1996 United States report on armed conflict and children,¹ the United Nations office has worked tirelessly to demobilize children in militias, to include children’s issues in peace negotiations, and also to raise awareness through means such as its ongoing “Children Not Soldiers/Enfants Pas Soldats” social media campaign.² The State Department office, meanwhile, spearheads efforts to enforce adherence, within and without the United States, to two Hague treaties relating to cross-border abduction and adoption of children.³

My role on this panel derives from my own legal research regarding children affected by war. I plan not only to identify a bridge between the


activities of the United Nations and the State Department offices, but also to situate my own research within that linkage. I will explore my precise topic, “Securing Child Rights in Time of Conflict,” by examining every element of that title: “securing,” “child,” “right,” “in time of,” and “conflict.” At first blush all these elements seem simple to grasp; however, each provides much food for thought.4

Let us begin with the last word, “conflict.” Not unlike this panel’s theme—“conflict resolution”—the word is at once narrow and broad. To the extent it refers to “armed conflict,” it is relatively narrow, given that legal doctrine ascribes precise meaning to that term.5 Yet even within international legal regimes, the term may be used more broadly, to reflect severe and sustained violence that falls short of armed conflict, yet has been deemed to warrant at least a modicum of international intervention. The International Criminal Court thus enjoys jurisdiction over enumerated crimes when committed in armed conflict—that is, war crimes—and also “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”—that is, crimes against humanity.6 To similar effect, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict routinely reports on events occurring in places like Yemen and Somalia in the context of “extreme violence,” a term that tends to describe situations that, although they cause great concern, may not satisfy legal definitions of “armed conflict.”

This attention to incidents of extreme violence has merit. Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, has urged action against “structural violence” as well as “direct violence.”7 The latter is analogous to what the law calls “armed conflict,” while the former refers to institutions and incidents involving exploitation. Exploitation “may lead to direct violence” and, as Galtung wrote, “is violence in itself.”8 The State Department office concentrates on this sort of structural violence; that is, instances in which a child is at risk because she has been taken abroad by a noncustodial parent, or because she is the subject of an insufficiently regulated transnational adoption. In comparison, the extreme violence of concern to the United Nations office falls on a spectrum between Galtung’s structural violence and direct violence. Often it draws close to the latter—but not always, and thus the conceptualization of “extreme violence” opens a lacuna in settled law aimed at protecting children and others who may become victims of armed conflict. One effort to bridge this gap is the United States’ Atrocities Prevention Board, which President Barack Obama established in 2011 in order to identify the structures of violence that may sow the seeds of a full-blown armed conflict.9

Taking these considerations into account, we must ask whether there is something that we can call not-conflict; that is, “peace.” Is there a peace-time? War and peace frequently are discussed as if they are two separate things. Yet the concepts lose their definition upon a mapping of the world as it is, a patchwork of overt and direct conflicts interspersed with suppressed conflicts, halted conflicts, or conflicts-in-making. In recognition of this fluidity, a team of Europe-based social scientists wrote in a 2011 report:

The ‘post-conflict’ situation is not as easy to define as it sounds. In big international wars, a formal surrender, a negotiated cessation of hostilities, and/or peace talks followed by a peace treaty mark possible ‘ends’ to conflicts. But in the sort of intra-state wars that we are chiefly concerned with it is not so simple. Hostilities do not normally end abruptly, after which there is complete peace. There may be an agreed ‘peace’ but fighting often continues at a low level or sporadically, and frequently resumes after a short period.10

In short, there is no easy answer to the question of what is a conflict, let alone which conflicts merit international scrutiny with respect to the treatment of children.


5. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (stating that “armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State”), http://www.iccy.org/v/cases/tadic/acidex/en/51002.htm.


9. Id. at 154.


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This discussion points to our penultimate term, “in time of.” Can we distinguish a “time of conflict” from other time? Common discourse draws that distinction with an air of certainty, but critical literature is more circumspect. As one example, the 2012 monograph War Time in effect labeled all of our lifetimes—indeed, those of our parents and grandparents—as a continuous time of war. Its author, legal historian Mary Dudziak, used as an empirical marker those events for which United States armed forces awarded medals to service members. These included high-intensity conflicts like the Civil War and the two World Wars, of course, but also incidents like the three-and-a-half-month Nicaraguan Campaign of 1912 and the twenty-nine-day intervention in Grenada in 1983. In Dudziak’s view such events—often given names like “action,” “operation,” “mission,” or “expedition,” rather than “conflict”—engender levels of violence sufficient to negate claims to a time of peace. Another example is a three-part series of posts that Judge Patricia Wald published at IntLawGrrls in 2009, eight years after her retirement from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In it she asked what women wanted from international legal institutions, then answered: “I believe women want international law and tribunals to make a difference in their daily lives.” Wald elaborated:

Even if tribunals do their work well, so that women’s wrongs are recognized as serious war crimes, crimes against humanity, and tools of genocide—even if enough women can infuse their own sensitivities into the process—even if tribunals achievements are truly accessible to ordinary women—will all that really help women in states where old ways survive? In states where women are treated, in peacetime as well as in wartime, as property, and their sexual and physical integrity impugned at will?

“No,” the post replied. Effectively rejecting the wartime/peacetime binary that undergirds both international humanitarian law and international criminal law, Wald argued that these bodies of law ought to protect women in peace as well as in war.

13. See id. at 138–54.
14. Id. at 135–53.
17. Id.
18. Id.

We turn next to the human subject of this essay’s title: “child.” Again, initially this is a word that invites immediate understanding, yet any number of questions may be asked of it. Who is a child? What is a child? When—how old—is a child? How adult is a child? Everyone knows some child who is sometimes quite precocious, who sounds quite old and wise. Most of us also probably know some thirty-somethings who often sound quite juvenile, and seem unlikely ever to reach adulthood.

Notwithstanding these developmental vagaries, laws often determine childhood exclusively by reference to chronological age. Such legal line-drawing itself may give rise to discrepancies. This is evident with respect to child soldiers, a crime against children with which the United Nations office is especially concerned. In treaties like the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions children are protected against recruitment only until they reach their fifteenth birthday, while more recent treaties raise the level of protection to eighteen. A child living amid conflict whose age lies in between those milestones subsists in a legal gray area—assuming, of course, that records exist to pinpoint the day on which he or she was born. Often, in conflict zones, they do not. The dilemma persists elsewhere in international law, too. The Convention on the Rights of the Child generally applies to all persons who have not yet reached their eighteenth birthday, but the Hague treaty intended to protect children against kidnapping by noncustodial parents “shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”

Where is the child? This question may seem out of place, but only if one ignores the degree to which geography determines which legal frameworks are applicable. Reference to “the global child”—the term of art that informs my current scholarship—may conjure images of children elsewhere, in other places, often in great distress. Yet in fact, the American boy or girl at ease and chewing bubblegum is a participant in global society no less than a child soldier at the frontlines in Colombia or a newborn at a refugee camp in Jordan. The same may be said of a homeless teen in Detroit, on the one hand, and a toddler prince in England, on the other. All young

21. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Child Rights Convention], http://www2.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRPC.aspx. The convention does allow exceptions, specifying: “For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” Id.
22. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 3, at art. 4.
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people share the experience of growth, and also a unique duality based in part on the inherent vulnerability of the young.

Yet even as many in global society assert the child’s virtue and vulnerability, others assert the culpability of certain children; indeed, some children are viewed as enemies deserving of eradication. The latter claims complete the dual status of the child: simultaneously, she may be innocent and guilty, defenseless and dangerous. A recent example may be found in the story of Canadian-born Omar Khadr, a fifteen year old whom United States service members seized following a firefight in Afghanistan. Rebuffing complaints that he was a child soldier who should undergo rehabilitation, the United States detained him until 2012, when Khadr, by then twenty-five, was transferred to Canada’s custody. Early on, the United States subjected Khadr to intense interrogation. A video published by the Toronto Star showed the anguished teenager, his orange jumpsuit falling from his shoulders, crying out again and again, “Ya Umi—Oh, Mommy.” Accounts of police killings of unarmed youngsters, as well as occasional images of a tiny, shackled child standing before a judge in a felony courtroom, belie any assumption that this side of the child’s dual status emerges only in time of armed conflict.

Sinister expressions of the child-as-threat likewise appear throughout history. In 1946, Nazi leader Otto Ohlendorf testified that his Einsatzgruppe had liquidated 90,000 “men, women, and children” during World War II. He matter-of-factly explained when a judge asked why the children were killed: “The order was that the Jewish population should be totally exterminated.” Nearly three decades later, Loung Ung, a seven year old displaced along with her parents and siblings when the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh, observed: “The soldiers are executing the entire families of those whom they’ve taken away, including young children. The Angkar fears the survivors and children of the men they have killed will rise up one day and take their revenge. To eliminate this threat, they will kill the entire family.”

Ung did not publish those words until 2000, decades after her childhood had ended. That fact serves as a reminder that in contrast with other human groups, children are especially voiceless. Even a young person who feels she has autonomy—who has opinions—frequently finds that familial, social, and legal structures operate to forbid her to offer her voice and be heard.

This leads to consideration of yet another title term. Do children, in fact, have “rights”? Before 1945, international law accorded them almost none. One searches in vain for references to children in the pivotal international documents of the immediate postwar era, such as the Nuremberg Charter and United Nations Charter. By contrast, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court speaks repeatedly of children. The very first words of the preamble state: “Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men—note that children are named first—have been victims of unimaginable atrocities.” The statute authorizes the appointment of experts to advise the prosecutor on violence against children. It mandates the selection of judges with expertise on children’s issues, and sets forth numerous protections for child witnesses. It confers jurisdiction over the war crimes of recruiting and using child soldiers, as may be expected, and also over a range of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal acts that either are specific to children or disproportionately affect children.

This shift in legal regulation is due in no small part to the development and implementation of the 1989 Child Rights Convention, to which all the world’s countries except the United States belong. Even South Sudan and Somalia—two of the newest nation-states, and both the chronic sites of extreme violence—have joined the treaty. The same is true of two nonmember states recognized by the United Nations, the Holy See and the State of...
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Palestine. By dint of this near-universal support, nearly all young persons are said to enjoy similar rights; enforcement of that guarantee is, of course, another matter. Also of significance in shaping the current climate of child rights is the Hague Abduction Convention, which was adopted nearly a decade before the Child Rights Convention and to which the United States is party. 35

Postdatting the Rome Statute is another important development on the United Nations’ agenda on children and armed conflict. Anchored by a 1999 Security Council resolution, 36 and promoted by the Office of the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, the agenda turns on a legal framework for child protection in the 21st century—“the Six Grave Violations Against Children.” 37 These grave violations, to which the United Nations office devotes its attention, are: killing or maiming of children; recruitment or use of children in armed conflict; sexual abuse; attacks against schools and hospitals; denial of humanitarian access; and abduction. 38 Given that the source material is international humanitarian and international criminal law, it should come as no surprise that this list overlaps the Rome Statute’s enumeration of crimes against children. 39 Accordingly, both the United Nations office and the Office of the International Criminal Court Prosecutor have worked to find common ground in efforts at prevention and punishment.

Since taking office in 2012, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has expressed concern for all aspects of children’s existence in armed conflict. She said in a 2014 keynote speech: “in addition to focusing on children who are forced to carry arms, we must also address the issue of children who are affected by arms.” 40 Thus at the International Criminal Court the initial, almost singular attention to the recruitment and use of children as combatants has broadened to include other in-conflict crimes against children, such as trafficking, forced recruitment, sexual and gender-based violence, killing, wounding, detention, deprivation of loved ones, food, shelter, health care, schools, culture, and community.

It is perhaps advisable to pause at this juncture to recall once again that:

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It is perhaps advisable to pause at this juncture to recall once again that many of these harms occur not only in what the law calls armed conflict, but also, unfortunately, in the day-to-day lives of some children—even children in our own communities. Spurred by a state legislative initiative, my home institution, the University of Georgia School of Law, has just launched the first law school clinic in the United States that will deal with child sexual abuse.\(^{41}\) The establishment of this clinic underscores the ubiquity of sexual and gender-based violence, among other forms of abuse, and so serves as a reminder that protection of the global child must begin in our own schools and on our own soccer pitches.

We thus conclude with examination of the first word in our title. How do we go about “securing” rights? To secure rights—to use human-rights legal terms of art, to respect and ensure rights\(^{42}\)—requires the enlistment of multiple actors, in multiple sites and by multiple means. Necessary is the participation of organizations like the International Criminal Court, the Office of the Special Representative and myriad other United Nations entities, regional organizations like the European, inter-American, and African human rights systems, and national units like the United States Department of State. The same is true of subnational units like the State of Georgia, as well as civil society actors ranging from Human Rights Watch to the International Law Students Association to a law school clinic. All have a role to play in securing child rights.

The means must include civil or criminal litigation, claims commissions and other reparations schemes, and reporting mechanisms. Yet even if these post hoc means were to achieve full success, they would be insufficient: in an ideal world, violations would not occur in the first place. Attention to prevention is thus essential.

Among the newest efforts to pursue human security ex ante are the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by United Nations member states in 2015.\(^{43}\) The seventeen goals—eradication of hunger, poverty, and inequality, for instance, as well as improvements in health, education, and the

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35. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 3.
38. Id.
39. See generally ICC Statute, supra note 6, at arts. 5–8.
environment—offer ways to better humans’ lives and, presumably, to reduce frictions that spark violence.44 Of particular interest is Goal 16, “dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.”45 Within its scope are instruments ranging from the Child Rights Convention to the Arms Trade Treaty46—full implementation of which could do much to improve children’s fate—and the full range of institutions and actors under review. Together, they bear promise as means to secure child rights in time of conflict.

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#LAWYERING PEACE: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN PEACEBUILDING

Paul R. Williams* & Christin Coster**

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Based on the Public International Law & Policy Group’s (“PILPG”) two decades of experience assisting countries and clients in conflict situations, it is clear there are a number of ways for lawyers and international law to promote peacebuilding. This article condenses insights shared during the International Law Weekend panel, “International Law and States in Emergency: Responses and Challenges.” The focus of the presentation was

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