Negotiating Under the Security Dilemma A Loss-Framed Approach to the Question of Cyprus

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Abstract
The present study introduces a revised adaptation of the “ethnic security dilemma” theory to explain the nature of antagonisms between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in negotiations for resolving the Cyprus Question. The proposed theory accounts for security positions adopted by parties under conditions of fear and uncertainty. The indistinguishability of offensive-defensive positions and the perceived windows of opportunity have turned the negotiating process into a competitive cost-benefit problem marked by their distinct security considerations. Furthermore, the study develops a loss-framed negotiations model to illustrate likely choices when perceived costs outweigh the importance of prospective gains. The analysis concludes that although parties could be better off by cooperating, suspicion and distrust encourages defection by creating fears of prospective losses with regards to security.

Keywords: Cyprus Conflict, negotiations, security, ethnic conflict

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Negotiating Under the Security Dilemma: A Loss-Framed Approach to the Question of Cyprus

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Posting on his personal web-calendar, Stephen Saideman describes how Barry Posen moved on first to publishing a theoretical piece on the ethnic security dilemma (Saideman, 2015). Openly regretful of his remissness for not publishing it first, Saideman admits that Posen’s more popular version of the ethnic security dilemma has continued to shape how people think about ethnic conflict today. Had it been for Saideman’s perceived notion of the ethnic security dilemma (ESD) to dominate theoretical literature on the subject, we would have talked less of ethnic dilemmas as principally seen through Posen’s “civil war battlefield” lens, and more about the political content and ramifications of inter-group competition, which according to Saideman, is not (only) for terrain and neighbourhoods, but for control of government, legitimacy and for the state’s coercive apparatus (Saideman, 2015).

Despite an abundance of valuable descriptive and prescriptive scholarly work on the question of Cyprus, the conflict’s protracted dynamic calls for the adoption of a deeper explanatory approach to the central “problem of conciliation” within its original competitive framework. This article adopts Saideman’s innovative yet unrefined theoretical proposition to the conflict in Cyprus and makes a twofold contribution to the study of ethnic conflict in Cyprus and to the study of conflict resolution at large. First, the analysis projects the security dilemma in Cyprus as a key reason why negotiations have not yet worked there, and exhibits how aspects of the security dilemma, consolidated through the major active phases of conflict in Cyprus, continue to hold firm, and how these aspects encourage competition over security. Second, the analysis presents an assessment of options in strategic policy-making illustrating more clearly the difficult exchanging of established rights with prospective gains or inducements due to the prevailing insecurity and suspicion that originates from the security dilemma. For doing so, the present work sheds some light on the unjustly sidelined influence of “security perceptions” as reflected on the attitudes adopted by the negotiating parties in Cyprus. Under the veil of security dilemma, and taking into account each side’s stated political goals and positions, the analysis sets up a framework that allows for assessing the perceived utility of strategic options available to the negotiating parties.
The study embarks on a slightly refitted version of the ethnic security dilemma in order to explain more accurately the limitations posed by the distinct security considerations and priorities held by competing groups in Cyprus, and moulds the concept of the security dilemma in a way that produces a comprehensive account of the security considerations that complicate the reaching of an agreed settlement in Cyprus. This theory begins with an analysis of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict as reflected during negotiations by transferring its basic logical tenet, the dilemma between offensive and defensive attitudes and responses, to the Cypriot political context. The study presents a number of perceived security gains and losses for each side resulting from decisions to comply with, or defect from, an agreed settlement. Using a loss-framed negotiations approach in which prospective losses are esteemed higher than gains, the study estimates possible reactions and decisions during negotiations.

**The Ethnic Security Dilemma**

Barry Posen was the first one to use Herz and Butterfield’s “security dilemma” (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 1951), a concept from the realist tradition of international relations, and adopt it to the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their security (Posen, 1993a). Driven up by his deep-seated conviction that most analysts of the early 1990s were inclined to the view that most of the trouble (i.e., with ethnic conflict) lies “either in the specific nature of group identities (constructivism) or in the short-term incentives for new leaders to “play the nationalist card” to secure their power (instrumentalism),” Posen urged for the need to “understand the security dilemma, as reflected onto the competitive relations between groups, and examine its consequences” (Posen, 1993a, p. 29).

According to Posen, the collapse of multi-ethnic states can create conditions equivalent to an emerging anarchy resulting from the lack of effective central government control, leaving thus the numerous ethnic groups within the state to provide for their own security and to make judgements as to the intentions of other ethnic groups (Posen, 1993a; Van Kuppevelt, 2012). The origin of each security dilemma is clearly described in Butterfield’s, Herz’s and Jervi’s core assertion that “what seems sufficient to one state’s defence will seem, and will often be offensive to its neighbours…and because neighbours wish to remain autonomous and secure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own positions, even if they have no explicit evidence of expansionist inclinations” (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 2003). Based on this typical assertion, Posen reiterates that “what one does to
**enhance one’s own security causes reactions that in the end can make one less secure**” (Posen, 1993b, p. 116 & p. 104).

Under this premise, cooperation to mute these competitions can be difficult because someone else’s “betrayal” may leave one in a militarily weakened position (Posen, 1993b, p. 28). In order to justify the distinctiveness of ethnic groups in their rivalling security considerations, Posen explains that “the groupness” of ethnic groups with strong national identities characterised by religious, cultural, and linguistic cohesion, and coming out of collapsed regimes, give each of them an inherent offensive military power” (Posen, 1993b, p. 30).

Posen argues that the security dilemma may become particularly intense under three major conditions: i) when offensive and defensive purposes are *indistinguishable*, making it difficult for groups to determine whether their neighbouring groups are a threat; ii) *superiority* of offensive over defensive action such as when one group is perceived to possess more effective offensive capabilities (weapons, large armies, or ethno-geographical advantages such as “ethnic islands” which can be mobilized on the spot and in times of need), and finally; iii) when *windows of opportunity* exist at a time when emerging groups calculate their current position relative to each other and make judgments about their relative power in the future expectations for external military intervention (Posen, 1993a, p. 111).

The following parameters are extremely relevant for exploring the indistinguishability of group intentions, the nature of superiority, and the existing windows of opportunity, helping parties to determine the nature and severity of the ethnic security dilemma: i) Group cohesion; ii) History of rivalry and/or armed clashes; iii) Presence of isolated “ethnic islands;” vi) Presence of small bands of fanatics; v) Anticipated shifts in relative power; vii) Expected intervention of allies (creates offensive incentives for favoured group), and viii) Large number of conflicts and crises in the international environment (Posen, 1993a). Putting all these together, Posen emulates a micro-framework for group-conflicts in which conceptual notions and conditions interplay, starting with the adopted notion of *anarchy* and *fear*, assuming a *lack of expansionist or malign intentions* and stepping towards *an action-reaction spiral* that can drive groups to preventive or pre-emptive actions as a result of the indistinguishability between offense and defense leading to a self-defeating result (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Firstly, the source of the security dilemma is anarchy or lack of a higher coercive authority. Second, it requires uncertainty and fear over others’ intentions to do harm in the
anarchical situation. Faced with the condition of existential uncertainty in an anarchic world, involved parties have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or self-protective purposes only, or whether they are for offensive purposes (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). Hence, they are faced with the difficult choice to decide if they should interpret the intentions of another actor as aggressive, and thus adopt a stronger security posture in response, or if they should view them as defensive, and thus exercise restraint to assuage their neighbour’s security fears (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p.30). Thirdly, the situation has an unintentional origin. Parties presumably hold benign intentions to each other and no one wishes to engage in confrontational strategies.

In theory the application of the security dilemma to intra-state conflict by Posen is to a certain extent successful, as it matches the original interstate security dilemma. Yet Posen’s parameters and conditions are solely designed for explaining group decisions to use preventive military force against other groups in a climate of perceived threats, fear, and uncertainty. However, core parts of Posen’s theoretical model can be somewhat transmuted to serve as a framework for calculating decisions regarding problems of security in a non-battlefield context, where notions of anarchy and self-help, fear, mistrust, and the indistinguishability of offensive over defensive intentions conveyed by groups, are most crucial.

Following the initial attempt by Posen, several authors tracked his assumptions that security dilemma would be an effective concept to explain ethnic conflict. Authors like Stuart Kaufman (1996a, 1996b, 1994), Paul Roe (2006, 2004, 2001, 2000, 1999), Erik Melander (1999), William Rose (2000), Chaim Kaufmann (1996), Shiping Tang (2009), and Carter Johnson (2015) have all, in varying ways, used the interstate theory of the security dilemma to explain intra-state and ethnic conflicts. While these authors still perceive the security dilemma as a useful concept for explaining the outbreak of ethnic conflict, they critique each other on the “failure to operationalize the security dilemma in terms of its original Butterfieldian conception” according to which states are drawn into conflict despite their benign motives, due to fear and uncertainty over the others’ intentions (Roe, 1999, p. 200). However, when we examine the applications by the authors Posen, Kaufman, Melander and Roe, we find that they do not uphold all aspects of the security dilemma theory in their applications of the security dilemma (Posen, 1993a; Kaufman, 1994; Melander, 1994; Roe, 1999).
In fact, as they attempt to apply the concept, which was originally focused on interstate relations, it appears that the concept does not always fit to the purposes of studying ethnic conflict (Van Kuppevelt, 2012). This essentially useful concept requires considerable readjustment to be made more reflective of the multi-layered (group-national-regional-international) micro-dynamics of ethnic conflict and to expand its explanatory potential to a stage beyond the mere outbreak of violence. While these authors discuss the case of former Yugoslavia, they have different definitions and different approaches to explain the outbreak of conflict with the security dilemma. It appears that all authors refer to the original concept of Butterfield and Herz, but acknowledge that in order to operationalize the concept within an intra-state setting, the concept has to be adapted to successfully account for intra-state conflicts. While each author took a different approach, their attempts have proven that the concept has to be adapted so drastically that it no longer complies with the original concept.

This, however, should not be necessarily considered an error of capital importance, let alone a skewing diversion annulling the theory. Given the tactical peculiarities and differentiating aims and dynamics of ethnic politics, compared to the more comprehensible power-struggles and grand strategies upheld by states and superpowers, we may easily regard well-structured theories on strategic behaviour as impossible, or at least unsuitable to robustly explain or predict the fluid and subtle nature of competitive ethnic politics. Yet, for as long as security questions are brought forth in relations between rivalling ethnic groups, there will be efforts to organize and operationalize behaviour so as to understand the ways groups, and their representatives, may think or react.

Going beyond the strict military manifestations of the security dilemma, ethnic groups appear to be influenced by the same deep-cutting security considerations during negotiations. Interestingly, despite the adversarial calculations adopted by rivalling groups, such as those entailed by most security dilemma theorists, interethnic relations are not always or necessarily expressed through a strict zero-sum formulation, although many conflicts present elements of entrenchment and intractability. Nonetheless, questions of “fear and trust” predominate amongst politicians and their ethnic constituencies when it comes to securing access to power and government control. Therefore, it is worth investigating how the incurring [real or perceived] excess of fear creates an evolving trust deficit that produces vital security concerns for the competing groups.

Drawing from empirical evidence on the subject, Saideman’s critique pinpoints the “strictly physical notion of the security dilemma, i.e., vulnerability to armed attack” that
Posen was principally interested in (Saideman & Zahar, 2010, p. 3). Indeed, Posen’s facsimile reproduction of a classic international relations concept confines the utility of security dilemma within its strictly defined original military framework. Of course, neither Posen nor any other scholars have precluded the expansion of the security dilemma to political decision making processes. William Rose recognizes that Posen’s hypotheses emphasized military issues apparent during the emergence stage of conflict, and therefore decides to move ahead with new additions to the theory that focuses more on the political-diplomatic relations between groups (Saideman & Zahar, 2010, p. 3; Rose, 2000, p. 4).

By his account, Rose puts forth a number of hypotheses addressing the difficulties imposed by the security dilemma through a political perspective including the adoption of fait accompli tactics in inter-group diplomatic relations, “blame-shifting,” lack of commitment and honouring of agreements, concealed or secretive political strategies, and unconditional alliance building. These ideas, according to Rose, offer clues about ethnic political relations when the security dilemma is intense, including reasons for the actions and their probable consequences (Rose, 2000, p. 22). This so-called “belligerent diplomacy” represents the motif to acquire military, political and economic elements of power, and the struggle to provide means for collectivities to protect their interests (Rose, 2000, p. 22). For example, under an intense security dilemma, ethnic groups will be more keen to adopt “red line” tactics for key policy demands or propound a fait accompli in order to provide themselves with security assets (Rose, 2000, p. 24). Yet Rose acknowledges that groups will take hostile actions just because they have a conflict of interest, even if the security dilemma is not acute and this is crucial for understanding confrontational behaviour during negotiations (Rose, 2000, p. 24).

Moreover, the assumption that groups hold benign rather than malign intentions is at least questionable, if not naïve, not just because groups in conflict become fully aware of their competitive interests through formal and informal channels of communication, but because they often clearly decide to act maliciously in order to enhance them. A very similar counter-argument against Posen’s unaltered application of security dilemma theory on ethnic conflict is developed by Paul Roe (2004). In his critique of the ethnic security dilemma, Paul Roe himself devalues the element of “unintentionality” within a security dilemma and argues that a security dilemma can still arise within an ethnic conflict with malign intentions on one or both sides (Roe, 2004, p. 288). Similarly, Snyder and Jervis take seriously the difficulty involved in disentangling predatory motives from security concerns (Snyder, 1993; Saideman
Security fears are often intertwined with predatory goals which leads to a spectrum of conflict situations (Snyder & Jervis, 1999). Security dilemma gives rise to predation (as resources may become essential in defeating threats) while predation increases security dilemmas (aggression leads to hostility and resistance and raises future issues of accountability) (Snyder & Jervis). Besides, in most cases the assumption that both sides want to avoid war and are willing to compromise, but cannot because they do not trust each other, is flawed as information failures and commitment problems are irrelevant for so long as hostile perceptions are rooted more deeply than information and commitment can reach (Lake, & Rothchild, 1996, p. 41-75). Therefore, sometimes parties enter into a struggle for positioning and control—a situation in which physical safety and access to power and resources matches with the (perceived) necessity to transgress and dominate over others. The analytical predictions between predation and security-seeking are not always clear, and in fact the two can mutually reinforce each other (Levy, 2002, p. 254). Predation in conflict generally describes a violently intrusive action aimed at obtaining gains using identity politics. In other words, wars are mostly caused by “opportunities for primary commodity predation” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, p. 26-27).

Predatory wars are most often understood as violence associated with profiteering and access to natural resources and power, instigated by unscrupulous elites exaggerating group grievances, recalling emotional fears of past occurrences, and arousing fears of extinction and oppression regardless of a real or immediate threat to security (Kaldor, 2000). First, as Snyder and Jervis point out, “it is often difficult to separate security-drivers and predatory motivations, since long-term fears may drive security-seekers to take every opportunity to exploit others in an effort to build up their reserve of strategic resources, even when they face no immediate security threat” (Snyder & Jervis, 1999, pp. 15-37). Second, in critical security junctures, offensive violence may be motivated by the anticipation of a negative power shift and the fear of its consequences, which may similarly appear as predation (Levy, 2002, p. 254). Hence offensive or as it may appear predatory violence in typical security dilemmas may occur “when strategic conditions render aggression the most advantageous form of self-defense” (Snyder & Jervis, 1999, p. 15). Therefore, predation in security dilemmas cannot be solely understood as a pure desire for exploitation and domination. This perceivably defensive or proactive type of predation, when clearly and accurately portrayed as such, may associate convincingly with existing or prospective.
security fears, and hence it may be understood as a preventive reaction to perceived threats. This takes us finally to the concept of spiralling. The security dilemma deteriorates (spirals) when two reasonably benign parties interpret each other’s self-proclaimed defensive-security postures as being motivated by offensive aspirations (Booth & Wheeler, p. 5 & pp. 23-25). In principle, an action or demand perceived as wholly defensive in nature by one group may be seen as clearly predatory and offensive by another, leading up to actions that bring about mutual insecurity causing inadvertent escalation and war.

Security dilemma thinking is prominent during negotiations for the institutional accommodation of conflict (Downes, 2004). Problems with trust and intentions are critical during phases of rapprochement as strong group solidarity, proximity, and the projected magnitude of the military and political threat are likely to encourage groups to fear each other. While a revised and adapted version of the security dilemma may be useful in explaining the outbreak of ethnic conflict, it nevertheless shows weaknesses when applied to explain security considerations and decisions in the negotiating phases of conflict, the stage groups enter to decide and regulate their future by political means. Surely, the birth notion of the security dilemma, assuming a situation where an effort to improve one’s security decreases that of others, remains largely relevant throughout all phases of conflict, from emergence and escalation to stalemate and regulation. For instance, Posen focuses mostly on the first stage which may or may not lead to war (Posen, 1993a, p.103). Stuart Kaufman likewise concentrates on this stage (Kaufman, 1999, p. 109). Chaim Kaufmann concentrates on the third stage, forwarding a theory of how ethnic wars end (Kaufman, 1996b, p. 137), and Barbara Walter likewise focuses on the termination of civil wars (Walter, 1997).

According to Zartman (1997), parties decide to negotiate because they reach stalemate. However, this study argues that the decision of parties to negotiate will not entirely or necessarily diminish the fundamental tenets of the security dilemma. Most often, warring parties enter negotiations with the whole load of bitterness, suspicion and fear built at length during the conflict. As a result, parties will continue to interpret behaviour and objectives with mutual fear and suspicion, turning the negotiation process into a firm contest for political prevalence. This trail of behaviour reproduces the security dilemma well through the post-military phases of conflict.

In a political context, however, the action-reaction spiral is relevant to the ways groups perceive the intensity and meaning of postures, especially when one group’s conceivably offensive security demands or actions are often met with another group’s
counter-demands and counter-actions, spilling into a vicious circle of aggravation, as well as
triggering responses. In cases where security considerations are still in place but political
means have in many ways surpassed military solutions and the effects of a hurting stalemate
have gradually dwindled, group negotiators will naturally assess the costs of a dynamically
aggravating action-reaction spiral to the costs of defecting from the conflict resolution
process. Hence, fear, insecurity, and distrust will normally continue to cast their shadow
over efforts to resolve conflict, and hence positioning, competition, and cost-benefit
calculations will continue to influence decisions to act.

This may be particularly true for conflicts which are thought to be intractable:
conflicts which are highly resistant to a negotiated settlement, characterised by a
substantially long record of animosity, regular outbursts of violence, long and unproductive
phases of stagnancy and entrenchment, marked by intangible issues including identity,
sovereignty, and a history of failed peace-making (Putnam & Wondolleck, 2003). Yet,
calculations are no longer taking place for the military seizure of land or the military
suppression of the opponent, but rather focus on gaining access to political power and
resources, or imposing the restrictions that would help bridle the opponent. Under these
conditions, confidence-building measures have an important functional role to play,
especially during the pre-negotiation stage, but it is generally unlikely they will drastically
affect the competitive nature of the process itself.

In fact, not all security dilemmas escalate through the spiral to a situation of
competitive aggression and violent conflict. This is to suggest that the essence of security
challenges in non-militarily active conflicts may be the same as in military ones, or exert
similar influence on decisions made by groups, but in the rolling stage of negotiations
Posen’s deterministic account of inadvertent aggravation can be avoided because informed
political exchanges and formal channels of communication may presumably reduce risks of
uncertainty and abate misunderstandings. However, although negotiations can help parties
formulate a clearer picture of each other’s “wants and needs” and reduce the possibilities of
inadvertent aggravation, they will not necessarily ensure the merging of conflicting interests
or define a zone of possible agreement because parties will often bring into the process their
respective traumas, bitterness and bias, charging the negotiation process with questions of
commitment, fairness and trust (Fisher & Ury, 2011).
The Ethnic Security Dilemma in Cyprus

The present study scrutinises the indistinguishability of offensive and defensive attitudes, the superiority of offensive over defensive action in responsive attitudes, and the influence of existing windows of opportunity in order to define the political intensity of the ethnic security dilemma in Cyprus and examine the precarious nature of strategic choice during peace-making negotiations. Before doing so, we must first put the problem of Cyprus into a context and sketch out a concise summary of the major security-related positions held by the two parties.

Attributing the diachronic failure of negotiations in Cyprus to a specific cause or dysfunction would be unwise. As far as we know, efforts reaching a negotiated settlement in Cyprus are so far troubled by a number of apparent and less apparent obstacles, making the entire venture particularly cumbersome. Broadly speaking, the apparent obstacles relate first to the expected difficulties posed by administrative and state-building issues such as restoring property rights for internally displaced people, accepting a whole range of participation quotas and restrictions and making territorial arrangements, as well as defining the constitutional character of the new state. These are the substantial issues of the negotiating agenda. Equally apparent obstacles include the presence of the Turkish military forces on the island and the lifting off of external security guarantees. The latter are generally regarded as key questions and require sufficient concessions by third parties whose security interests may be affected. Parties are well aware that every sector-related arrangement, which is to come about following a comprehensive agreement, will tie parties to specific post-agreement security conditions. Judging from their stated positions, both parties are deliberately seeking to promote secure living conditions that will address their distinct “security needs” in a post-agreement environment. In every single attempt to resolve outstanding issues, security lies blatantly at the centre of concern for both ethnic communities. One possible conception holds that problems with the Cyprus question descend from a holistic problem of security, fuelled not so much by the problematic founding principles or technically inappropriate arrangements of the proposed settlement, but by the fear and suspicion for the days following an agreement. Fear of deception or misusage of provisions set by an agreement prompts parties to maximize security demands and try to overpower each other in an attempt to buttress their security defenses at the event of a possible break down.

Security considerations underpin negotiations and therefore drastically affect the attractiveness of a compromise, as the security of one party is often seen to be working at the
expense of the other. As a result, negotiations stumble because parties assess the quality of compromise solely on the supposed security conditions it entails, and then compare these to their current security status. The dilemmatic situation is therefore split between the choices of making painful but meaningful concessions to create a new idea of “security community” in return for a perceivably “greater good,” or defect after competing to avoid a possible deception. Thus, realizing a federal Cypriot Republic remains an option subject to the merging of contrasting security considerations.

Although the two sides in Cyprus recognize the necessity of a federal solution, their perspectives on the political outlook of the new state differ significantly (Berg, 2007, p. 213). Greek Cypriots underline the importance of “rectification”, “integration”, “unity”, and “independence”, seeking to bring about the island’s “unification” as means to reclaim their suspended rights and reduce the military threat posed by Turkey through establishing a bizonal-bi-communal system of joint governance for the two major communities on the island.

Turkish Cypriots emphasize the idea of a new “consensual partnership” between two politically equal people inhabiting two politically equal self-governing entities, by which they can achieve equal representation, lift the constraints (embargo) imposed on them by the international community, access resources across the island and attain legal status for the currently non-recognized Turkish Cypriot entity (state). Hence, the different views on the constitutional settlement of a Cypriot federation reflect the diverging notions of “oneness” and “togetherness” held by the two communities.

For successive Greek Cypriot governments, the federalization of Cyprus is merely seen as the constitutionally transformed continuation of the internationally recognized, and Greek-Cypriot administered, Republic of Cyprus (Anastasiades, 2016). By contrast, Turkish Cypriot leaders have insisted that by signing an agreement to federalize Cyprus, an entirely new state will emerge, replacing the Republic of Cyprus in all respects (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 82). Despite the seemingly legal nature of this variance, the question of where sovereignty must lie is important for implicit reasons of state succession in the event of defection or federal dissolution.

Beyond doubt, the two sides are pressing to secure the survival and legitimacy of their respective state entities in the occasion of federal collapse. Greek Cypriot governments see the federal-central state structure as the sole legal successor following a federal demise, whereas Turkish Cypriots point to the “dual legitimacy” argument, according to which state
legitimacy is drawn equally from the two constituent states and whichever of the two states decides to withdraw from existing federal structures, the state thereof ceases to exist, and its powers should be therefore transferred to the constituent state entities (Burcu, 2016). Hence, the two parties are faced with a question of sovereignty.

Turkish Cypriot centrifugal versus Greek Cypriot centripetal tendencies are not merely shaped by experiences of the past or by habituation with existing realities alone. Current insecurities and perhaps more importantly strategic considerations continue to shape preference of one over the other. During negotiations both communities seek to safeguard their prospective leverage and rights in a new federal consociation, so that “no community would be able to dominate over the other or take the other one hostage” (Olgun & Rochtus, 2008, p. 114). Parties seek therefore to obtain mutual reassurances that will advance or maintain their current security status. Indicatively, Greek Cypriot negotiators press for constitutional assurances such as the vertical (hierarchical) structure of jurisdiction in the new federal state, whereas Turkish Cypriot negotiators prefer the horizontal jurisdiction of competencies in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

In sum, Greek Cypriot policy aims for a bi-zonal sovereign state with a strong federal centre pressing for the removal of mainland Turkish settlers, the immediate withdrawal of Turkish military forces, the reduction of third-party rights vis-à-vis Turkey (security guarantees) and the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire across the island, without exceptions. Turkish Cypriots seek to improve their security-autonomy status aiming for a loose federal state with sovereignty status emanating from the two constituent entities and defending strong veto mechanisms, third-party guarantees and equitability. In order to appraise the theory’s exerted influence on Cyprus, this part of the study examines the empirical magnitude and effect of indicators grouped in three separate sets typical of the ethnic security dilemma theory.

(a) The Indistinguishability of Offensive and Defensive Attitudes

(i) Group Cohesion. Ethnic groups must first determine whether neighbouring groups pose a threat (Posen, 1993a). During negotiations, the capacity to earn people’s support for a particular security agenda, favourable to one group’s sense of security, could place another group’s sense of security at risk, and this can be seen as offensive. Similar to classical assumptions on the ethnic security dilemma, actions, statements and demands aimed at protecting or enhancing one group’s perceived security interests are interpreted through a
lens of fear and suspicion, making it particularly difficult to distinguish the malign or benign nature of one groups’ intention.

As Van Kuppevelt accurately explains, “It is of mere importance to the security dilemma to view ethnic groups as cohesive and organized actors, as it is the ability of an ethnic group to act as a cohesive unit that poses a threat to its neighbouring ethnic groupings” (Van Kuppevelt, 2012, p.30). Hence, the security dilemma approaches ethnic groups as unitary actors and expects groups to act homogenously in the face of security challenges. Consequently, fear and insecurity between groups with opposing security interests may strengthen in proportion to the perceived sturdiness and homogeneity of the bond between groupness and security. The two groups in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are divided along distinct linguistic, religious and territorial lines, forming two separate political constituencies. Yet when political ideas of security coincide with the supposed welfare of a community, to the perceived detriment of another, a perception of fear is created. The level of popular consensus signifies popular support for a stated group attitude on security. Hence, the more an ethnic group is seen or understood to operate as a “single and coherent” entity, the more fear it may create to the opponent group. Indicative are the opposing views held by political parties and their supporters across the divide on matters central to the shaping of a federal Cyprus, such as on the constitutional makeup of the new state and state-building (Beyatli, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2015).

(ii) History of Rivalry. A history of armed clashes or bitter rivalries between groups increases the tendency of groups to perceive each other as offensive threats (Posen, 1993a). Retracting to historical records of rivalries and emotional or magnified narratives influence groups in assessing the offensive implications of another group’s continuing ambitions during the negotiations stage (Wertheim, 1996). Indeed, the history leading up to the partition of Cyprus is close as possible to a textbook case of security dilemma-driven behaviour (Lindley, 2007, p. 236). Outright inter-group hostilities emerged during the Greek-Cypriot-led armed struggle for independence (1955-1959) between the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus, escalating into full-blown hostilities shortly after the island gained independence. Security considerations in Cyprus have been largely shaped by a decades-long record of fear, suspicion and conflict marked by numerous failed peace-making attempts and critical third-party political and military interventions.
(b) The Superiority of Offensive over Defensive Action

(iii) Presence of “ethnic islands.” Isolated ethnic groups can produce incentives for offensive action if one side has (or believes itself to have) an advantage that will not be present later (Posen, 1993a). Although primarily applicable to military interpretations on offensive action, the existence of “ethnic enclaves” is of important strategic value, serving as an offset to demands on the table, especially on issues pertaining to autonomy rights. Before the Turkish invasion in 1974, the two ethnic groups lived scattered all over the island, creating a patchwork of ethnic enclaves. Since then, ethnic groups have been living separately in two highly exclusive and homogenous ethno-territorial domains. Today, there is no substantial ethnic intermixing between the communities across the divide, and no substantial “ethnic islands.” Ethnically mixed areas, especially in the capital Nicosia, had once become hotspots of intercommunal riots and served only to increase general political tension. Today, the absence of interface areas has made it very difficult for the two ethnic to clash on the communal level.

(iv) Presence of small bands of “fanatics.” Historically, Greek and Turkish Cypriot ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups helped provoke the escalating inter-communal hostilities on the island, and their role was critical in the configuration of the current division in Cyprus. If nothing else, the division of Cyprus has been instrumental in pacifying the daily confrontations between armed groups, and it has therefore contributed decisively to the absence of armed spoilers and fanatics. Moreover, ever since the island’s division, there have been no active nationalist-paramilitary groups aiming to derail negotiations. Despite the absence of extra-constitutional paramilitary groups, Cyprus remains heavily militarized with the two ethnic communities facing off against each other across the truce line.

(c) Windows of Opportunity

(v) Anticipated shifts in relative power. Groups calculate their current position relative to each other and make judgments about their relative power in the future (Posen, 1993a). Adjusting the classical ethnic security dilemma proposition on relative power into a context of negotiations, we may argue that “if those with greater advantages expect to remain in that position, then they may see no window of opportunity, and therefore shall remain firm to their positions. However, if they expect their advantages to wane or disappear, then they will have incentive to solve outstanding issues” (Posen, 1993a, p. 10).
Developments in Cyprus and the region have increased levels of insecurity and aloofness in both sides. The extraction, management and distribution of energy resources lying within the Greek Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have offered a considerable diplomatic asset to the Greek Cypriot side. To ensure access to currently Greek Cypriot administered resources, Turkish Cypriots need entering into an agreement with their Greek Cypriot counterparts, creating pressure on the Turkish Cypriot breakaway entity for a deal.

Acting to reinforce the position of the Turkish Cypriot entity, Turkey has refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus’ exclusive legal right to extract and utilize resources lying within its declared EEZ prior to a solution of the Cyprus Question. Turkish objections against Cyprus’ EEZ have culminated into frequent threats and contestations of the Greek Cypriot energy extraction zones. Greek Cypriot governments have responded by strengthening defensive-diplomatic relations with Egypt, Greece and Israel, and have continued nurturing their long-standing relations with Russia (Zeiger, 2013; Kyriacou, 2014; Reback, 2015; Mekel, 2016).

In our view, this action-reaction spiral is typical of a security dilemma moving beyond the actual battlefield, affecting thus the negotiation process. On the one hand, the defensive-military balance on the island, formed after the stationing of the Turkish military forces in Cyprus, appears to cling more favourably to the Turkish Cypriot side, but on the diplomatic level, Greek Cypriots have so far used their legal and political leverage to control the consequences of division, and pressurize Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots into making concessions.

**(vi) Expected Third-Party Intervention.** The possibility of hegemonic third-party actors intervening in situations of crisis, altering the balance in favour of one group versus the other is creating a situation of fear and insecurity (Posen, 1993a). Admittedly, a sequence of political and military interferences by Greece and Turkey amplified internal confrontations leading up to the eventual division of Cyprus. After the 1974 Turkish military invasion of Cyprus, the permanent military presence of Turkey on the island, alongside with the economic and political dependencies, created between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, have magnified Greek Cypriot concerns over the role played by Turkey in the protection and consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot breakaway entity. The fear stemming from previously traumatic third-party interventions could accurately explain Greek Cypriot objections to accepting the reinstatement of security guarantees (and interventionist rights) granted to third parties (Greece, Turkey and Britain) on Cyprus.
(vii) **Large number of conflicts and crises in the international environment.** The large number of regional wars and crises may present a twofold effect on security-related concerns during negotiations. Regional wars, crises and geopolitical fluidity are thought to be affecting the positioning of groups during negotiations, such as by altering an existing balance of power. Presumably, regional conflicts and crises affect regional shifts of power, influence the formation of alliances and determine political leverage to the advantage or disadvantage of parties. Hence, a regional reshuffling of power may either make parties more resistant to concessions or encourage them to embrace more cooperative responses.

Cyprus is virtually surrounded by a series of volatile hot-spots, including Syria, South Eastern Turkey, Israel-Palestine and Egypt, countries in which both Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus have an interest.

**A Theoretical Matrix on the Cyprus Negotiations**

The variables set above point to the existence of a medium-scale security dilemma (five out of seven variables exert an influence on security considerations). Quite paradoxically, peace-making negotiations take place under a perceived threat of subordination in the event of a precarious settlement. The ethnic security dilemma is thus formulated according to the new security considerations influencing decisions to accept or reject a settlement under the current UN-framework for a federal-consociational, bi-zonal and bi-communal political system in Cyprus aiming to replace the current ethno-territorial dichotomy (S/Res/649/1990 & S/Res/716/1991). The key question is whether the perceived security status of the two communities could improve following a negotiated solution.

To answer this question, we have designed a prescriptive gain-loss framework integrating outcome-evaluations for respective gains and losses framed along the lines of a typical “negotiator’s dilemma” (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). The negotiator’s dilemma stems from the difficulties of negotiation, namely facing off against an opponent with goals which are opposite, and possibly contradictory to another’s. Hence, negotiators face a dilemma in deciding whether to pursue a cooperative or a competitive strategy.

What essentially distinguishes the negotiator’s dilemma from its closely related “prisoner’s dilemma” is the capacity of parties to communicate, and their increased ability to shape and control the process by claiming (competing) or creating value (cooperating) (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). In value-claiming approaches, negotiators work primarily to claim the largest share of available resources (“fixed pie”). Conversely, value-creating approaches
seek primarily to expand the spectrum of available resources and create new possible gains ("enlarged pie") from which all parties will benefit (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50). However, effective competition undermines the realization of joint gains whereas a cooperative approach can make one party vulnerable to the hard bargaining tactics of a competitor (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50). Hence, problems of decision arise from the tension between cooperative and competitive strategies.

The effects of different framing games have been found in security dilemmas (Kramer, Meyerson, & Davis, 1990). In the present study, perceived rational outcomes are framed in a specific paradigm, in which decision outcomes are expressed in relation to the relative gains and losses they entail. Yet it is important to recognize that how one approaches the dilemma depends intimately on the paradigm through which one understands and interprets the negotiation process. The study is concerned with the effects of a gain-loss framework, according to which cooperative or competitive behaviour necessarily entails gains and losses weighed against each other in order to produce a desirable equilibrium between benefits and concessions. Furthermore, outcomes arise from the confluence of one party’s decisions with the decisions of the other (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). This is to suggest that desirable outcomes depend not so much on the prospective benefits of an agreement ("eyes on the prize"), but on the outcomes judged with respect to weighing the perceived gains and losses in accordance to the other party’s likely behaviour (cooperative or competitive) (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Hence, parties judge outcomes by defining the effects of competition and cooperation on their perceived gains and losses. To put it simply, parties evaluate outcomes in accordance to the gains and losses compared to their current state of affairs and accordingly define their behaviour during negotiations. This line of reasoning suggests that an agreement between parties must increase current gains without incurring costs that greatly exceed the costs of not having an agreement. Thus, the value of a settlement rests on whether its supposed gains outweigh the significance of losses compared to the current state to which parties have adapted, known as reference point, and hence this depends not on whether but on how an agreement shall be ultimately reached.
Table A: *Gains and Losses for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots per Action*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gains-Losses per Action</th>
<th>Greek Cypriot</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gains – Cooperating</strong></td>
<td>Ending Turkey’s military presence</td>
<td>Self-determination - legal recognition <em>(limited)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+α)</td>
<td>Territorial Reunification <em>(conditional)</em></td>
<td>Accessing valuable resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retrieving land</td>
<td>Lifting EU entry suspension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Property Compensations</td>
<td>Accession of Turkey to EU <em>(conditional)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gains – Competing</strong></td>
<td>Avoiding risks of adversarial interferences</td>
<td>Avoiding risks of adversarial interferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+β)</td>
<td>Avoiding risk of post-agreement defection</td>
<td>Avoiding risk of post-agreement defection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reducing risks of third party interferences</td>
<td>Reducing risk of subordination to majority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Losses – Cooperating</strong></td>
<td>Risks of exerting adversarial interferences</td>
<td>Risks of exerting adversarial interferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-χ)</td>
<td>Risk of post-agreement defection</td>
<td>Risk of post-agreement defection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk of hostile third-party interferences</td>
<td>Increasing risk of subordination to majority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Losses – Competing</strong></td>
<td>Division and military occupation</td>
<td>Continuation of political and economic isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-ζ)</td>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk of international recognition of Turkish North</td>
<td>Loss of access to valuable resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(in case of defection)</em></td>
<td>Blocking accession of Turkey to EU <em>(conditional)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lax and Sebenius (1992) apply the negotiator’s dilemma as such: if both parties cooperate they will both receive a *good outcome* (win-win). If one cooperates while the other competes, the cooperative party will get a *terrible outcome*, while the competitive party will receive a *great outcome* (win-lose). If both parties compete they both will get a *mediocre outcome*. 

The negotiator’s dilemma holds that both parties are better off if they both cooperate because they will both get good outcomes, as opposed to mediocre or terrible outcomes (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, pp. 49-62). We could thus prescribe three prevalent outcomes: i) *win-win*, a case in which both sides cooperate and are better off than without an agreement (gains outweigh losses), ii) *lose-lose*, where both sides lose by competing and are worse off without the agreement, and iii) *win-lose*, one side wins by competing, and the other one loses by cooperating. Notably, an additional possibility appears when both sides lose by competing, but are better off without the agreement (costs of agreement higher than costs of defection).
Hence, as Lax and Sebenius succinctly explain:

In the face of uncertainty as to the other’s choice of strategy, each side’s best choice is to compete. They will either get the great outcome, or avoid a terrible outcome and get a mediocre outcome. If the other is cooperating, the first side actually has an incentive to compete. Of course, when each party follows this reasoning and adopts the competitive strategy they both end up worse off, with mediocre outcomes. (Lax, & Sebenius, 1992, p. 52)

Under conditions of uncertainty over one party’s real intentions, the best choice for each player is to compete while the other party cooperates (great outcome), the second best choice is mutual cooperation (good outcome), the third best is mutual defection (mediocre outcome), and the worst case is to cooperate while the other party defects (terrible outcome). Hence, if both parties rationally decide to compete in order to maximize their gains, the “dominant strategy” (the best strategy independent of the move of the other side) is to compete because one gets the best instead of the second best, or the third best instead of the worst result. Hence, if both players compete, they just get the third best result instead of the second best for mutual cooperation. Using this logic, the best strategy is to compete, so that parties end up with either a great or mediocre outcome. A competitive strategy will allow parties to either receive a maximum reward or, provided the other party similarly decides to compete, control losses by not making concessions. Yet by deciding to defect, both parties end up with mediocre outcomes. In this inescapable, yet often paradoxical context, negotiating parties work primarily to claim:

…the largest share of the disputed goods…negotiators engage in hard bargaining; they start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of concessions, minimize the benefits of the other’s concessions, conceal information, argue forcefully on behalf of principles that imply favorable settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements, and are willing to outwait the other fellow. (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50)

We can nevertheless make two relevant observations with this recommended approach. First, knowing that in the face of uncertainty as to the other’s choice of strategy, each side’s best choice is to compete, parties will either get a great outcome, or avoid a terrible outcome
and get a mediocre one. Even more so, if one party’s cooperative approach translates into a sign of weakness, the other party has an additional incentive to compete. Sometimes, cooperative intentions could be well regarded by opponents as signs of weakness, encouraging thus the adoption of offensive and more antagonistic postures. Yet if each party follows this reasoning and adopts the competitive strategy they both end up worse off, with mediocre outcomes. Thus acting on a rational calculation of their individual best interests causes the parties to forego cooperative gains, and potentially leaves them worse off than they could have been (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50). Secondly, gains are not independent from losses. Admittedly, there is no such thing as “pure gains” since gains are usually received in return for concessions, and deciding to compete does rarely imply that parties will not need to make significant concessions in order to receive pay-offs. Cooperation therefore occurs within a competitive context, though one in which gains received outweigh the costs of concessions. Thus, assessing the relative costs of stalemate in conjunction with the relative gains of a negotiated settlement is crucial for adopting a cooperative response to negotiations. By contrast, if parties assess the concessions and losses of a negotiated settlement to outweigh the costs of stalemate, they could thus judge they would live better off by coping with existing security threats without a negotiated settlement (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, p. 106).

Interestingly, this tendency for loss-aversion, or the idea that losses loom larger than equivalent gains, has been clearly noted and described in Kahneman’s and Tversky’s “Prospect Theory” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Results of human decision-making research are generally consistent with the notion of loss-aversion (Budescu & Weiss, 1987; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Camerer, 2000; Bleichdrodt, Pinto & Wakker, 2001). More recently, Gill and Prowse (2012) have provided experimental evidence that loss-aversion could become more salient within a competitive environment.

As Tversky and Kahneman argued, loss aversion implies that “a given difference between two options will generally have a greater impact when it is evaluated as a difference between two losses…than when it is viewed as a difference between two gains” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, p. 1045). Thenceforth, the fact that losses are more dissatisfying than equivalent gains implies that losses loom at least twice as large as equivalent gains, and all outcomes in a loss-framed negotiation should be multiplied by two (De Dreu, & McCusker, 1997). This is an important factor when the individual faces the decision of whether to leave
the interdependent situation (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The larger the difference in utility between two behavioural options (cooperate vs compete), the more obvious it is what to choose and what strategy to pursue (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In loss-framed negotiation dilemmas, defection seems the dominant strategy from the individual’s point of view.

In real context negotiations, elements of insecurity, unfortunately, encourage competitive strategies, while taking a cooperative approach makes one vulnerable to the hard bargaining tactics of a competitor (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). In the case of Cyprus, we could assume that if both parties cooperate they could sufficiently increase their security. If one party cooperates while the other party competes, the cooperative party will see its security levels reduced while its competitor will receive a far better outcome. If both parties compete, or ultimately defect, they will receive a mediocre security outcome by defecting. This, however, should be only regarded as a possible scenario given that benefits and losses in real negotiations are less clear. We have designed a matrix where joint outcomes are maximized when both participants cooperate (3), personal outcomes are maximized if one participant competes while the other cooperates (5, 0), and if both participants compete end up with a mediocre outcome (1). Thus, from the participant’s perspective and under conditions of uncertainty, competing is the dominant strategy because it maximizes one’s own gains or minimizes one’s own losses (Dawes, 1980; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).

**Table B: Cooperate vs. Compete Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GC1 = Cooperate</th>
<th>TC1 = Cooperate</th>
<th>TC2 = Compete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Reward for mutual cooperation)</td>
<td>3, 3</td>
<td>0, 5 (&quot;sucker’s payoff&quot;, and temptation to defect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Temptation to defect, and “sucker’s payoff”)</td>
<td>5, 0</td>
<td>1, 1 (Punishment for mutual defection)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one assumes that negotiating parties seek to prevent losses, then we are presented with a loss-aversion strategy, or the idea that losses loom larger than equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This is to suggest that losses are counted as more important to prospective gains, and thus, concessions for cooperation would become significantly more hurtful to the cooperative party in case the other party persistently competes, which makes it even harder for a party to cooperate in the first place irrespective of the other party’s initial strategy.
Hence, we are presented with the following range of loss-aversion choices: if both compete 0/0, if both cooperate 3/3, and if one competes while the other cooperates 5/3. Equally consistent with the analysis are findings from negotiation studies that showed that loss-framed negotiators demand more, concede less, and settle less easily than gain-framed negotiators where the value of gains is evaluated higher than the costs incurred from losses (De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans & Van de Vliert, 1994).

At some point, negotiating parties in Cyprus will be faced with an eventual “make or break” dilemma. As highlighted above, negotiating vital security matters under conditions of uncertainty and under a loss-centred approach embolden the adoption of risk aversive positions, and thus negotiations could be deadlocked. First, it may be more likely that parties will defect in case they decide that their current gain-loss equilibrium is preferable to the damages incurred by the prospective costs and gains of a settlement. Secondly, a similar conjecture may emerge in case where both parties signal their desire to cooperate but are paralysed by the dreadful influence of possible deception and distrust.

We could suggest a possible escape route for reducing the level of uncertainty in Cyprus and breaking up with the paralytic influence posed by loss-centred approaches. Most importantly, both parties in Cyprus need to acknowledge the idea that some uncertainty is unavoidable, before and after a negotiated settlement. Then Cypriot negotiators may be able to deliberately manage the existing levels of uncertainty by addressing vital areas of concern through mutual guarantees, monitoring processes and binding commitments, and if possible, by enlarging the “pie of possible gains” and creating new value. Emphasis, for example, could be placed on the mutual satisfaction of fundamental needs and wants expressed by the two parties. These could include major areas of interest which are deemed non-negotiable (e.g., human security and human rights) and areas reflecting practices and norms contained within international law. The furtherance of value-creating bargaining approaches can help parties mitigate the influence of uncertainty by trading-off risks with reasonable benefits to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Prospective Gains</th>
<th>Prospective Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Party Competes, other Party Cooperates</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Parties Cooperate</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Parties Compete</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the point they overcome the effect of costs. Reaching the point where cautious risk-taking on important concessions happens in return for previously unforeseen gains is crucial for negotiators to counterpoise the cost of risks and win public support.

**Conclusion**

In view of the two parties’ stated positions, the analysis adopted a non-military version of the ethnic security dilemma to explain the antagonistic attitudes in efforts to ensure sufficient political control and security in a post-settlement Cyprus. Major aspects of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, such as the indistinguishable intentions of groups, increased group loyalty and cohesion, a history of rivalry, the role of third parties, anticipated shifts in relative power and the large number of conflicts and crises in the international environment, are evident in Cyprus.

Through the lens of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, the study recreated a typical “negotiator’s game” to account for the likely choices made under the influence of antagonistic security considerations on the negotiation process in Cyprus. The fear and suspicion induced by the security dilemma works primarily at the expense of a solution, transforming the negotiating process into a competitive cost-benefit problem marked by distinct security considerations, pushing parties towards the adoption of protective measures, which may be seen as offensive by each other.

The analysis puts forth a set of possible strategic options in relation to the perceived gains and losses they entail. Using a loss-aversive negotiation model, the analysis suggests that despite the stated eagerness of parties to resolve the Cyprus question, they will most probably operate reservedly under a veil of uncertainty; as a result of fear and suspicion induced by the security dilemma, losses are evaluated higher than the prospective gains of a settlement. Hence, although parties would be better off by cooperating, the utility of current gains and the fear of prospective losses on security could instead prompt parties to compete, or eventually defect in order to preserve valued gains and prevent losses in exchange for prospective gains. Parties may become increasingly resistant to a compromise entailing giving up their established gains to incur themselves with costs which are seen as disproportionate to the “security value” of prospective benefits. Essentially, bi-communal negotiations, and the proposed institutional arrangements in Cyprus could gradually become hostage to crude security considerations, blurring prospects for a mutually propitious solution.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that corresponding gains and losses may not be equally important, or valued equally by the two sides, and thus, gain-loss correlations could be varyingly prioritized or measured by the two communities and their leaders. Therefore, loss-aversion and gain-oriented approaches should be separately tested on each group. This methodological suggestion is worth investigating for future research on the Cyprus state-building negotiations.

Although it may be difficult to eliminate completely the propensity towards loss-aversion in security-seeking strategies involving concensual and competitive exchanges, there still exists a possible way to reduce the influence of loss-framed approaches and encourage the adoption of more constructive security-seeking strategies. The idea of motivating parties by “creating value” is central to reducing the perceived weight of losses. By “enlarging the pie” of potential gains and spreading it across new sectors of opportunity and beyond the normative and predictable agenda, the scope of possible convergence could increase, to the point where additional prospective gains will encourage parties to make more mutual concessions.
References


