Peace and Conflict Studies

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Civil Society at the Negotiation Table, Legitimacy Beliefs and Durable Peace

Direnç Kanol

Abstract

It is argued that including civil society at the negotiation table can increase the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. As a result, it can contribute to the consolidation of peace. In this paper, the author presents the findings from a controlled experiment in order to test the impact of inclusive peace negotiations on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. Contrary to the expectations of the scholars working on the inclusiveness and the consolidation of peace hypothesis, the results show that the treatment group in the experiment does not perceive inclusive peace agreements to be more legitimate.

Introduction

At the time of writing, a number of peace negotiations were underway all over the world. Peace negotiations may be ongoing for years as in the case of Palestine/Israel, or they may take a briefer time right after lengthy civil wars such as the one in Liberia. Sometimes, civil society is included at the negotiation table during these processes. Civil society refers to the organizations or collective citizen movements outside of the spheres of family and government. The Accra 2003 agreement was largely successful in ending violence in Liberia in contrast to the Abuja 1996 peace accord which failed to do so (Drew & Ramsbotham, 2012). Civil society participation was low in the latter and high in the former.

The Accra 2003 peace accord was signed not only by the government and two different rebel groups, but by political parties and civil society organizations as well (Nilsson, 2012). Various studies have suggested a positive link between civil society participation at the negotiation table after violent conflict and the consolidation of peace. Although most of these studies followed an exploratory approach (Jessop, Aljets & Chacko, 2008; Lanz, 2011;
McKeon, 2005; Paffenholz, 2014; Wanis-St.John & Kew, 2008; Zanker, 2013; Zartman, 2008), Nilsson (2012) tested this hypothesis with a large-N statistical design. Although this impressive study presented some interesting results in favour of the inclusion hypothesis, it has its theoretical and methodological shortcomings.

In the next section of this paper, Nilsson’s (2012) study is analysed and the limitations that need to be addressed are outlined. Nilsson (2012) argues that the perceived legitimacy of inclusive peace treaties increases the likelihood of acceptance of these agreements by the wider public, so this may be the main causal mechanism that can explain the relationship between inclusion of civil society at the negotiation table and the consolidation of peace. In the later sections of this paper, the findings from a controlled experiment which tests this anticipated causal mechanism is presented.

This mechanism is tested in the Cypriot context. More specifically, a sample of Greek Cypriot students’ perception of the legitimacy of a hypothetical peace treaty is used to measure the impact of inclusive peace treaties when compared to exclusive peace treaties. The Cypriot context is quite relevant for this study as it is a typical post-conflict country where peace negotiations have been still going on since violence first erupted in 1950s. Contrary to the expectations of the scholars working on the inclusiveness and the consolidation of peace hypothesis, the results show that the wider public may not perceive inclusive peace agreements to be more legitimate. The implications of this finding are then further analysed and discussed.

**Literature Review**

Procedural fairness theory argues that fair decision-making procedures determine how people are to react to authoritative decisions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Civil society is representative of the people. Therefore, civil society’s inclusion in the peace negotiations may be positively received not only by those who participate, but also the wider public (Nilsson, 2012). Inclusive treaties may be perceived as more fair, just or legitimate by the people. In turn, the belief in the legitimacy of a peace treaty increases the likelihood of support for it. Thus, the belief in the legitimacy of any peace treaty is absolutely crucial for its approval by the people and its implementation.

Nilsson (2012) presents the richest data collected so far on the topic. She analyses 83 peace agreements while measuring civil society inclusion with a dummy variable and the dependent variable as duration of peace. The operationalisation of the independent and the
dependent variable are both problematic. On the one hand, measuring civil society inclusion with a dummy variable is not a very realistic indicator of civil society inclusion at the negotiation table. One context may provide the opportunity for active involvement of hundreds of civil society organizations while another may provide an opportunity for a few which may make a significant difference just in terms of quantity. Moreover, the intention of the authorities behind involving civil society organisations in such cases cannot be measured with this method. For instance, are those few organisations included only for the need of getting some technical information? Are they co-opted in order to silence opposition while not giving them effective opportunities to participate in discussions? Or is the inclusion of a large number of civil society organisations not practically possible, so, a few representative ones are included and provided an opportunity to participate and deliberate during the negotiations? We simply do not know.

It should be noted that the operationalisation of the dependent variable is also problematic. Peace in Nilsson’s (2012) work is conceptualised and measured by relying just on the negative violence definition (Galtung, 1964). Measuring the duration of absence of violent conflict cannot fully capture the nature of the relationship between former enemies. Suppose that in one country the root causes of the conflict are targeted, reconciliation between former conflicting parties is achieved, so conflict is being transformed à la Lederach (1997). Are we to assume that some violence in this kind of setting makes this context less peaceful than another context where discrimination, injustice, negative feelings between conflicting groups is a rule, but for this or that reason, violence is contained? It is doubtful that this would be a meaningful interpretation of peace.

A final note on Nilsson’s (2012) work is that despite her attention to regression assumptions, she cannot avoid specification error. There are probably tens, if not hundreds of reasons why one divided society is more peaceful than another. Although one may not have to go so far as Bell and O’Rourke (2007) who suggested that this makes it impossible to establish causality between civil society participation during peace negotiations and the consolidation of peace, it needs to be stressed that establishing causality cannot be done by controlling a few variables. When variables that are potentially correlated with both x and y are not included in statistical models, such models can establish only correlations rather than causality.

Suppose, for instance, that there is variation in the active involvement of international actors in the making of peace treaties. Actors such as the United Nations or the European
Union are known to promote good governance and partnership with civil society organisations. What happens if the inclusion of international actors increases the chances of civil society inclusion at the negotiation table and also increases the chances of the consolidation of peace? While trying to control for such variables, researchers might also face the opposite problem by over-controlling (Greene, 1997, pp. 586-588), thus suppressing the true effect of the independent variable. Therefore, case studies should also be considered in order to test the inclusion hypothesis.

While we see that advancement of methodology in the field of establishing correlational causality is still needed, the few preliminary studies published, so far, points to a positive correlation. What is more worrying is the lack of a robust theory in order to give meaning to such a correlation. Nilsson’s (2012) theory which is based on legitimacy beliefs can be challenged. The positive effect of participation on legitimacy beliefs is far from established. In spite of the confidence of political philosophers who argue that inclusive methods are the most fair policy-making styles, and thus, are more likely to be perceived as legitimate by the participants and the wider public, empirical findings are mixed (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007; Cavalcanti, Schläpfer, & Schmid, 2010; Esaiasson, 2010; Esaiasson, Gilljam, & Persson, 2012; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Morrell, 1999; Olken, 2010; Sutter, Haigner & Kocher, 2010; Ulbig, 2008). Hence, Nilsson’s (2012) innovative study needs to be cross-checked with alternative methods before coming to definitive conclusions.

Although the legitimacy beliefs of the representatives of civil society representatives who participate in the negotiation process are important, one should keep in mind that including a substantial number of civil society organisations at the negotiation table is not practical. Cunningham (2013) argued that including many actors at the negotiation table may complicate the negotiation process and hinder the possibility of finding an agreement. In the case that only a few representative civil society organisations are consulted during the negotiation process, it is not only important to measure how their inclusion changes their legitimacy beliefs but the wider society’s beliefs as well. In fact, one can argue that the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society, especially the potential spoilers of peace, are much more crucial than the beliefs of a few civil society organisations. Therefore, this study focuses on the potential effect of the inclusion of civil society organizations in peace negotiations on the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society.
Method

This review of the literature shows that any observational study, even as sophisticated as Nilson’s (2012), faces various problems. Experimental research may overcome some of the important problems that come with correlational studies. By using randomization, researchers can overcome the specification error problem. Therefore, this paper uses the first experimental design on this topic in order to advance our knowledge. The experimental study was conducted at the University of Nicosia and the University of Cyprus in the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot side). The Republic of Cyprus presents a good example of how peace agreements can fail if they are not embraced by the wider society. London-Zurich Agreements (1959) which paved way for a short-term peace in Cyprus were never embraced by the Cypriot society which resulted in renewed violence on the island (Kanol & Kanol, 2013). The secretive nature of talks that took place during the Annan Plan negotiations may have contributed to the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 as well (Amaral, 2014). To the author’s knowledge, there is no specific reason that may lead to the belief that Cyprus is a deviant case study among the population of countries which have experienced violent conflict. However, it should be emphasized that inferring from just one case is not possible so the findings in this paper should be cross-checked in other post-conflict countries before coming to definitive conclusions.

University students were randomly assigned into two groups. Like most experiments, this study uses convenience sampling instead of representative sampling. Students in the campus were approached and the surveys were handed out to the students. The researcher was granted the permission to conduct the experiment from the authorities in both universities. The treatment group comprised of 171 students who completed a survey by reading a paragraph that invited them to think that a hypothetical agreement was found which satisfies most but not all of the concerns of both sides. The subjects were notified that this hypothetical agreement was found as a result of the negotiations between the presidents of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations. Another 166 students were assigned to a control group where the participants were given the same text without any information about the active involvement of civil society organisations. The students in the treatment group are coded as 1 and the students in the control group are coded as 0. Using the means of vignettes like this enabled the use of a simulation to measure the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society, depending on the participation of civil society
organizations in peace-treaty negotiations. The short texts that were presented to the subjects are provided below. Unlike the short text given to the control group, the one provided to the treatment group stresses that 50 civil society organisations which are representative of the Cypriot people have actively participated during the peace negotiations.

**Treatment Group** (coded as 1)

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organisations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organisations from both sides stated that the agreement satisfies most but not all of the concerns of their side.

**Control Group** (coded as 0)

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that the agreement satisfies most but not all of the concerns of their side.

Perceived legitimacy was measured for all students after they read the texts that talk about this hypothetical agreement. After a reflection on the questionnaires used by de Fine Licht (2011), de Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson, & Gilljam (2013), Persson, Esaiasson & Gilljam (2013), Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger (2009), Sulkin & Simon (2001) and Zhang (2012), the dependent variable is measured by taking the average of three questions in order to ensure face validity. In line with these studies, the current study understands legitimacy to be a subjective phenomenon which can only be measured by procedural fairness, satisfaction with the outcome and acceptance of the decisions.

The first statement used for calculating the perceived legitimacy index is: “the decision was taken in a fair way.” The respondents were asked to put a circle around one of the numbers on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 which implies that the respondent strongly disagrees with the statement to 6 which implies that the respondent strongly agrees with the statement. The second statement used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: “please indicate what you thought of the outcome.” The respondents were asked to put a circle around one of the numbers on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 which implies that the respondent is not satisfied at all to 6 which implies that the respondent is completely satisfied. The third question used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: “how willing
are you to accept the decision?.” The respondents were asked to put a circle around one of the numbers on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 which implies that the respondent is not willing at all to 6 which implies that the respondent is completely willing.

A perceived legitimacy scale is generated by taking the averages of these three variables that is used as the dependent variable in the analysis. Cronbach’s alpha (0.84) shows that the perceived legitimacy index is very reliable (internal consistency). The sample size is large (N=337) and there are 7 categories for the dependent variable. To make sure that the randomization process was successful, the author also asked the subjects their age, gender, religiosity, ideology, trust towards Turkish Cypriots and vote intention in a future referendum. The full questionnaire which includes the question wordings and the coding structures of these variables can be found in the appendix. Descriptive statistics, correlations between the independent variable and the control variables, and the results of the t-test are provided in the next section.

Results

Table I presents the number of observations, means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for the dependent, independent and control variables. The number of observations is similar between the treatment and control groups with a mean of 0.51 (166 people in the control group and 171 people in the treatment group). There is a large age variance considering that the sample is only comprised of university students (standard deviation=3.28) and a large number of the sample are females (mean=0.64, 121 males and 216 females). The descriptive data show that the sample is slightly negative towards the Turkish Cypriots and the peace process. The means for vote intention in a future referendum (mean= 2.6) and trust towards the Turkish Cypriots (2.66) are slightly more negative than the possible average value, which is 3. Similarly, the average perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty (2.82) is a little less than the middle value of the 0 to 6 scale, which is 3.
Table I – Descriptive statistics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Civil Society</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>22.44</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust TC</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum vote</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived legitimacy</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table II reports the correlations between the independent variable and the control variables in order to see if the random assignment procedure was successful. The correlations show that none of the control variables are significantly correlated with the independent variable at the 90% confidence level. Therefore, we can be confident that the sample is randomly assigned into control and treatment groups.

Table II – Correlations between the independent variable and the control variables

| Civil Society Inclusion | Age   | 0.05 | Gender | 0.01  | Ideology | 0.04  | Religiosity | -0.07 | Trust TC | 0.06  | Referendum vote | -0.05 |

The perceived legitimacy means of the two groups in table III show that the control group scores slightly higher on the perceived legitimacy index than the treatment group (control group: 2.89 and treatment group: 2.72). This is quite the contrary of what is suggested in the literature. However, the difference of the means test (t-test) shows that this difference is not significant at the 90% confidence level (p=0.23, see table III). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the two groups. In order to show the difference between the two groups more clearly, figure I graphs the perceived legitimacy means for the control and treatment groups.
Table III – T-test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Group</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure I – Graph bars of means of perceived legitimacy for the control and treatment groups

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of the controlled experiment presented in this paper suggest that for the participants of this study civil society participation during the making of peace agreements does not have a significant positive effect on their perceived legitimacy of these agreements. This might come as a disappointment for the proponents of the inclusiveness hypothesis. However, some important points have to be made before rejecting the possible positive effects completely. Even though the sample size in this study is large, an obvious shortcoming of this research is that the sample is comprised of university students only. This implies that different results may be obtained with a representative sample. Therefore, researchers should also conduct a similar study by using a representative sample of the whole population. Even though using university students in experimental studies is quite common,
using a representative sample could strengthen the validity of research findings of a study which tries to infer to the whole population.

It should also be emphasized that this study looks at the perceived legitimacy of the wider public as a function of the participation of civil society organisations at the negotiation table and not the perceived legitimacy of the civil society organisations that participate in the making of the peace treaties themselves. The results presented here should not be interpreted in any way as to negate this possible effect. One should, however, take into account the issue that; active participation of a considerable number of civil society organisations may not be possible. If the policy-makers include a large number of civil society organisations, then the participation of these organisations would be very limited. Therefore, it is an empirical matter to measure if there would be any change in these organisations’ legitimacy beliefs as a result of their inclusion. If, however, a small number of civil society organisations participate actively during the peace-making process and their legitimacy beliefs do increase, it is again an empirical matter to see if increased legitimacy beliefs of these limited number of organizations can have a substantial impact on the consolidation of peace.

One should also not forget that the current study was not able to take into account the effect of positive discourse of civil society organisations on the wider public. If participation influences civil society organisations’ legitimacy beliefs and this has a positive impact on their discourse and activities with regard to embracing peace agreements, then the researchers should also measure if their discourse and activities may have an effect on the legitimacy beliefs of the wider public.

Another point to note is that this paper does not deal with a different possible causal mechanism that might suggest that inclusive treaties should be preferred. This point is about the epistemic quality of peace agreements. Might one suggest that inclusiveness can help to create better agreements that are more realistic and responsive to the socio-cultural situation in the conflict societies? Various scholars argue that engaging experts and societal actors in the policy-making process may help to find the best available public policy by making credible information available (Albin, 1999; Corell, 1999). One should argue, therefore, that the possible improvement in the epistemic quality of peace agreements and its possible impact on the consolidation of peace should also be explored in future research before forming definitive conclusions about the impact of civil society participation during peace negotiations and the consolidation of peace.
Despite these shortcomings, one can argue, based on the findings in this paper, that scholars should be much more cautious before advocating civil society inclusion at the negotiation table. Including civil society at the negotiation table may also have some negative consequences. Some authors argued that it may slow down the peace process and create deadlocks (Cunningham, 2013). Therefore, the theoretical arguments in favour of inclusion should be thoroughly tested before advocating civil society’s inclusion at the negotiation table during peace processes.

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Appendix

Dependent Variable

*The Perceived legitimacy index is created by taking the average of the following three variables. The index varies from 0 to 6.

1) The decision was taken in a fair way.
   Strongly disagree  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly Agree

2) Please indicate what you thought of the outcome.
   Not Satisfied at All  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely Satisfied

3) How willing are you to accept the decision?
   Not willing at all  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely willing

Control Variables

Age:

Gender: Male 0 1 Female

Ideology: Left 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Right

How religious do you consider yourself as?
   Not religious at all  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very Religious

Overall would you say that Turkish Cypriots can be trusted?
   No, they cannot be trusted 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Yes, they can be trusted

If there was a referendum tomorrow for reunification your likelihood of voting yes would be?
   Definitely no  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Definitely yes
The Components of Dehumanization
Aniuska M. Luna

Abstract
Dehumanization is a complex, relational and subjective phenomenon. Studies on it primarily focus on how it enables abuse in the midst of conflict, or how it shapes perceptions of others. Scholars, however, have not deconstructed it into components. The current article breaks down dehumanization into three components: elements, characteristics, and dimensions. It is hoped that the discussion of the connection between the three can encourage additional discussions on how each of the components contributes to dehumanization and how that can help towards undermining it. Until the phenomenon is understood from its most basic to its most elaborate parts, undermining dehumanization as a means to securing positive peace will remain challenging. The components came to the fore through the content analysis of dehumanization in anecdotes from survivors of the Holocaust. The latter study looked into the use of non-human referents applied to humans or their lived experiences. The findings were additionally considered in light of the literature on perpetrators and of samples that matched search criteria but were not deemed dehumanizing.

Introduction
“The Components of Dehumanization” distinguishes between three parts of dehumanization: elements, characteristics, and dimensions. The need to make a distinction between them first emerged during a literature review on the phenomenon and the analysis of anecdotes of survivors of the Holocaust aimed at studying the dynamics of dehumanization (dissertation research – Luna, 2014). The discussion of the terms presented throughout the article is aimed at pinpointing the complexities of a phenomenon that is multi-layered, though not often
acknowledged as such, relational in nature and dependent on individual, group and contextual idiosyncrasies and subjectivities. It is believed that until dehumanization is understood and deconstructed from its most basic components to its most complex dynamics it will be challenging to neutralize it. Embedded in the values of a society, dehumanization can undermine the existence of social justice in positive peace. It is thus hoped that the current article will encourage further discussions on how the different parts of the phenomenon are connected to one another and to other phenomena.

**Dehumanization and Positive Peace**

Studies on conflict dynamics show that dehumanization undermines ways of viewing that have moral implications (e.g. Haslam, 2006; Hinton, 1996; Leyens, 2009; Scheck, 2006; Uvin, 1997). These moral implications determine what is good and bad, acceptable and non-acceptable towards an in-group versus an out-group. By framing others as something other than human, the dehumanizer challenges their sense of individuality, identity and community (Kelman, 1973), enables their moral exclusion and group discrimination (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005), and psychologically conditions the abuser to morally disengage from this “non-human” (Bandura, 1999) in order to justify violence and abuse (Stanton, 1998).

Dehumanization is thus present in ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. The phenomenon is embedded in language (e.g. insults and propaganda), emotions (e.g. anger, compassion, indifference), ideology (e.g. Nazi pseudoscientific ideas of Aryans as a superior race and Jews as sub-humans), psychological conditioning (e.g. using views of a non-human other to justify abuse), behavior (e.g. beatings, exclusionary attitudes that marginalize someone or a group), laws (e.g. the Nuremberg laws of 1935 that limited the rights of Jews under the Third Reich), and the various institutions of society (i.e. family, religion, government, education, and the economy) that affect interpersonal relations (e.g. Dower, 1986; Hiebert, 2008; Müller, 2007; Scheck, 2006). Furthermore, Leyens and colleagues (e.g. Paladino et al., 2002) have shown that dehumanization can also be present in mild ways that individuals may not be aware of, a state termed “infrahumanization” (Leyens, 2009, p. 808).

The scope of the areas and institutions that dehumanization has an impact on means that it can affect interpersonal, institutional, and structural types of violence (Barak, 2003). The
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immediate consequence of this is the undermining of social justice within a society that challenges the existence of positive peace. Positive peace is present when the values, attitudes and institutions of a society support and enable social, economic and political justice and promote and enforce their protection for all groups within it (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Dehumanization, to assure positive peace, cannot be neutralized until the concept is clarified and deconstructed. It is not clear from the literature how the different parts of dehumanization work with one another, what these are, similarities or differences, and the relevance of each. The issue is complicated by a misuse of terms that are associated, sometimes interchangeably, with the word “dehumanization” – such as humiliation, degradation, animalization, and labeling – that create confusion about how the phenomenon is unique from other phenomena (e.g. Prescott, 2010).

The Components

In a dissertation study of 451 anecdotes from 74 survivors of the Holocaust, the application of non-human references to experiences as potential indicators of dehumanizing situations were thematically analyzed. The content of these experiences related pieces that were relevant to them, were expressed at times as dehumanizing by the survivors, and were interpreted by the researcher as components of a dehumanizing experience. On their own, these components do not have to be dehumanizing, but their combination can result in the experience or perception of dehumanization.

The distinction that the individual components are not exclusively dehumanizing but can stand on their own as part of other phenomena is important. It highlights how every aspect of society is interconnected (systems theory) as all the different parts have an impact on the others. Therefore, when considering how to actively undermine dehumanization through education initiatives an awareness of these individual parts may provide a place to start. In addition, it shows that the experience by a victim of dehumanization and the intent to dehumanize are dependent on how the various components are meant, interpreted, and understood as dehumanizing by the parties involved (i.e. the dehumanizer, the dehumanized, and the third party – in this case, the researcher). The following anecdote describing a concentration camp experience by Birnholtz (1982) can help illustrate this; the non-human references are italicized:
So my brother was hiding out this boy, was hiding out this boy and uh, and in the barracks, and the German, Stiglitz, found out that he hid him. So he took him to the back and he gave my brother twenty-five beatings on his back with a stick. And uh, this Stiglitz, if he saw a man walking, if he saw a man walking he would say--and he was walking with a big German shepherd dog. He said, “Mensch, dem Hund.” The dog he would call person and that person would be a dog. He would say to him—if he didn't like the way you bowed to me, the way you said hello, he would say “Mensch, ??? Hund.” That means, “Dog eat up that man.”

The anecdote contains an insult (calling the inmate a dog, which is part of linguistic constructions), descriptions of behavior (abuse), references to context (in the camp), the name of the abuser (important as an identifier of the perpetrator), his nationality (German), other individuals (inmates) and beings (the shepherd dog). Embedded in these are certain dynamics such as the German overseer as an agent, the inmates as patients (i.e. lacking agency to stop abuse), issues of power (of overseer over inmates; limited power by the inmates), control (of inmates over their own bodies; of guard over the inmates; of guard over the dog), and face (inability of inmates to restore face when they are insulted through references to non-humans). In addition, there is the historical human relation to dogs who were the first animals to be domesticated by humans (Morey, 2010; Price, 2002) and used for various purposes such as behavioral compliance of other beings (e.g. cattle, institutionalized humans such as prison inmates or in this case concentration camp inmates). The human-dog relation influences how the Jewish inmate as a mistreated human is equated to a non-human, spoken to and behaved towards compared to the dog.

The glue that holds these components together is the assigning and interpreting of their meaning as dehumanizing. Meaning was proposed to be the overlapping function of dehumanization for perpetrators, as shown in the literature on perpetrators and dehumanization that acknowledges the phenomenon as a means to justify abuse, and for the victims who used non-human references to show how as humans they were treated and lived as non-humans, and to justify behavior that was morally reprehensible outside of the camp environment (e.g. stealing from the dead). What the function of dehumanization is for survivors is not a subject found addressed in depth in the literature. The terms elements, characteristics, and dimensions as
components of dehumanization helped to explain and distinguish how these individual parts relate to one another.

Elements.

Elements are defined here as the individual parts in an exchange or situation that can range from units of verbal and body language (e.g. words, postures) to interpretations of a combination of those units as a type of exchange (e.g. as in humiliation) that may or may not be dehumanizing. They came to the fore as a concept associated with dehumanization as I deconstructed the anecdotes in the original study for thematic analysis. I felt I needed to find a way to visualize, summarize and explain the layers of meaning encountered. I decided to capture them at the level of “realms” as illustrated in Figure 1.

The tangible and material realm contains the physical and visual that draws attention to an interaction that seems unnatural (i.e. odd or out of place) between two human beings or groups. Unburied corpses; mutilated corpses (burned, cannibalized, defiled by other means); emaciated, tortured, and disfigured live bodies; movement that deviates from the natural movement of the individual under healthy conditions; beatings; unsuitable living and environmental conditions (fenced enclosures, no bedding, no lavatory, no eating utensils, unsuitable food); dominant versus submissive postures or body language; visual symbols that differentiate between individuals and groups (signs, clothing, colors, written documents/buildings) are examples found in the survivors’ interviews.
Tangible & Material

Psychological, affective, social, linguistic

Tangible & Immaterial

Conveyed & Interpreted

Humiliation, degradation, depersonalization, deindividuation, categorization, labeling, etc.

Dehumanization = Combination of several elements in Meaning

Figure 1: The elements of dehumanization
Tangible and material are noted as connected but not equal elements of the same realm. Tangibility describes what is perceived and seen; material is the physical, what can be touched. A man, in a military uniform, with fists raised, standing over another who is laying on the ground, dressed in rags, dirty and bloody, with arms raised over and palms away from face is an example of material. Understanding the material as a situation in which the uniformed man is beating or has beaten the man laying on the ground, who is shielding himself from the blows, represents what is tangible about the example.

Tangibility provides a layer of meaning to the material, and links it to the immaterial realm. This realm contains the psychological, affective, social, and linguistic aspects of interaction; it is the combination of all strategies for meaning making within the individual that can manifest outwardly in interaction: spoken language, societal mores, culture, emotions, and thoughts. The uniformed man in the prior example, which is loosely based on a combination of similar situations described in the anecdotes reviewed (e.g. Ferber, 2001, on getting kicked, beaten, and stepped on while on the ground by a German overseer), can call the other a “pig” but the word is not seen floating in the air as he says it. The intention and emotions behind the expression used by the uniformed man are not visual though visual cues (e.g. facial expressions) can hint at them, and can be interpreted differently by onlookers (e.g. frustration or aggression) in the same way that their understanding by and effect on the man on the ground as an insult is not spelled out in a material manner. Neither are the reasons behind the physical interaction obvious and visual without additional (material and immaterial) information provided.

Dehumanization, when examples in the testimonials are considered, is then what happens when multiple elements of the tangible/material and tangible/immaterial overlap in a third realm – meaning (i.e. what is conveyed and interpreted). Several of the latter’s elements are combined in dehumanization into one instance that is deemed dehumanizing by one or several parties (perpetrators, victims, and third parties – bystanders, or observers removed in time and place). When one considers these elements in light of the dynamics that affects them, the characteristics of dehumanization come to the fore.

**Characteristics.**

The characteristics of dehumanization reviewed in the current section were initially derived from the thematic analysis of anecdotes that were deemed dehumanizing. They were
then tested on anecdotes that were too subjective for a clear assessment (those containing insults), and on anecdotes that were not considered dehumanizing although they matched search criteria (i.e. the contained non-human codes applied to humans). The characteristics were useful in differentiating and explaining why some anecdotes and not others were dehumanizing.

The characteristics were then compared to topoi found in the literature on perpetrators and visually reduced into a model that could show how they connected to one another (Figure 2). The topoi in the literature on perpetrators were noted as buzzwords, shown in Table 1:

**Table 1: Buzzwords in Literature Mentioning Dehumanization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topoi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Animals/Disease names and language – Appearance – Degradation –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination – Evil-Bad/Good – Human/Subhuman – Human dignity/Human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nature – Humanity/Inhuman – Humiliation – Identity –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual/Community/Collective – Labels/Euphemisms/Epithets/Propaganda –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than/Inferior to/Superior to – Moral: obligations/responsibility/qualms –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Characteristics of dehumanization deconstructed

**General Characteristics**
- Victim’s lack of control/powerlessness; perpetrator’s power/control over victim
- Victim’s perceived/actual lack of volition; perpetrator’s volition over self and victim
- Presence of hierarchies and inequalities
- Dimensionality of act/situation
- Violation of face
  - Inability of one party to save face
  - Attempts by one party to cause face-loss to another
- Presence of dichotomies
- Progressive/ Present in multiple stages of outcasting situations (e.g. genocide, war, structural violence in peace times)

**Characteristics of Content**

**Function: Themes**
- Psychological
- Ideological
- Societal
- Other

**Content: Themes**
- One individual/group renders self/others/situation as non-human/other
- “human”/ “non-human” denote group membership
- Positive/negative values in referents denote group inclusion or exclusion

- Normal/ Abnormal = Human/ Nonhuman
- Good/ Bad
- Barbaric/ Civilized
- Feeling/ Absence
- Value-Worth/ Absence of
- Caring / Absence
- Control/ Absence
- Power/ Absence of
- Free will/ Absence

**Revealed in:**
- Acts of language: Propaganda, insults, laws
- Actions and behaviors: Things normally done by animals, Things normally done to animals, “Internalized dehumanization”
- Environments: Natural/Living conditions
References to the dehumanized as “less than,” for instance, are found in Anderson (2010) and Cohen (1996). This theme in the perpetrator literature was connected to the concepts of hierarchies and inequalities in the general characteristics of dehumanization. The first is seen as fixed (e.g. Aryans above Jews or animals) and shaped by views of world order, while the second is based on values and can flux. Inequalities were defined within the context of the research as any disparity between two things/people/beings that is imbued with positive and negative associations that make one preferable over the other. In other words, the two do not stand an equal chance of been selected thus creating inequality for the entity that is perceived in a negative light (Luna, 2014).

Labeling/euphemisms and propaganda (Ginsburg, 2012; Stanton, 2012) were found to be connected to the violation of face and dichotomies that can be found in language such as insults, ideology, and propaganda. In addition, concerns about the morality of actions were found in perpetrator related texts and survivor anecdotes. For the former, moral concerns involve the need to justify abusive behavior/actions not deemed moral or to delineate group inclusion or exclusion on the basis of moral associations with ideas of human and non-human; for the latter, it involved behavior or conditions that were not seen as appropriate or suitable outside of the extreme environment of the camps or ghettos (e.g. Kelman, 2001, and Stanton, 1998, on moral exclusion that facilitates abuse; Binke, 1997, on stealing from corpses in the camps).

Two types of characteristics were noted in the survivor anecdotes and the literature on dehumanizers: general and content. General characteristics give shape to the dehumanizing exchange or situation; they do not change, but the combination of which ones are present in an exchange does. Content characteristics, on the other hand, are those associated with the human and non-human references or ideas used in insults, propaganda, behavior, thematic function of dehumanization that satisfies the need for a specific type of meaning (e.g. justification of abuse, justification of morally reprehensible acts, keeping a distinction between human and non-human), among others. Content characteristics do change since content is influenced by regional, religious, political, and other types of values that shape how in-group and out-groups are framed and viewed. The content themes noted in Figure 2 (e.g. Things normally done to animals) were based on the analysis of animal references, which was the focus of the original study. Since content changes depending on the non-human referents considered, these themes may change as other thematic references (e.g. devils or parasites) are incorporated.

The example from the previous section, based loosely on the anecdotes of the survivors, can help to illustrate how characteristics and elements work together to understand a situation.
experienced as dehumanizing by a survivor and interpreted as a dehumanizing by the researcher. As noted, spoken language (the insult), body language, clothing, identification of the exchange as a beating, etc. show the elements in the exchange. When the insult “pig” is slurred at the attacked, the man on the ground is powerless to stop what is happening to the self. The attacker has the power to make the beating happen. The beating has taken place because, one may learn, the attacker sees the attacked as “less than,” the attacked identifies the intentions behind the attack as based on such views, or the attacked feels like “less than” a man, object or being. These descriptions are representative of the characteristics of dehumanization related to power, inequality, and hierarchy. In addition, they show the presence of dichotomies, which are opposites that serve to characterize those they are associated with such as human/non-human, power/less on the basis of group membership and identity.

Differentiating between elements and characteristics and how they conform to one another shows the complexity of dehumanization as a phenomenon. Furthermore, it shows the need to understand it at different levels. These different levels are referred to here as the “dimensions” of dehumanization.

Dimensions.

Dimensions are the different and multiple sides of dehumanization as a phenomenon, as if one looked at it in 3-D. They include the characteristics and the areas of life affected as described by the survivors, or as impacted by the dehumanizer, with the elements acting as the building blocks. “Areas of life” was a thematic category derived from the anecdotes reviewed that helped to visually reduce the data into a table containing them along with the stages of the Holocaust. They included descriptions of behavior (e.g. manners), settings (e.g. housing, barracks, bathroom), language (e.g. insults/cursing), activities (e.g. education, work), and various situations (e.g. beatings, arrival to ghetto/concentration camp).

In the assessment of anecdotes it was noted that dehumanizing anecdotes tended to include multiple dimensions. Anecdotes where the non-human referent could be minimally associated with an area of life and characteristics were usually not dehumanizing. The use of “pig” as an insult exemplifies this [references to non-humans are in Italics]:

And we had some men who snored at night and then nobody could sleep. And then one of the women was very nervous, hysterical, she woke, we woke him up. He apologized and went back to sleep and snored. And this woman cursed him that he's a pig, he's an animal (Berki, 1983).
... Then we went outside and they put outside every people, so many people and I see in
the line my sister. And I stand up like this and I said in Yiddish “????” in Yiddish the
name and she saw me, “Oh my sister!” and she wanted to go to me. And when I step, I want to go to my sister, is coming two policemen--he beat me up. “Schwein Jude
you wanna, you will...” I forgot what they said--I wanna--no, eh, I wanna run away from
the, from the line? I said, “No this is my sister, I want to see my sister.” He said, “There's
not sisters, not brothers, not mothers, nothing. You have to go in this line from the right,
left, right, left.” Okay. And she stayed, she cried and I'm crying. She went one camp not
too far from me and I went other one camp. She went Parschnitz and I went Gabersdorf
(Greenspan, 1983).

In the first example, there are no power imbalances, no inequality or hierarchy issues, there is no
dichotomy and there is no inability by the snorer to restore face upon hearing the insult. Both
insulter and insultee are members of the same group, forced into the same overcrowded and
difficult conditions of the ghetto by Nazis, and snoring is not something abnormal by human
standards (though it is bothersome) that can reflect other types of negative-positive dichotomies.
The association in the insult recalled by Berki (1983) is metaphoric and based on onomatopoeic
associations referencing only one area of life through the insult: the snoring of the man made him
sound like a pig and an animal, but the sound is not based on his view as a non-human,
embedded with the other characteristics, by the woman.

The lack of dimensionality in the first example contrasts with its presence in the second.
Greenspan’s (1983) experience is of the insult “Jewish pig” taking place along with a beating
during deportation. It shows two areas of life (insults and beatings) in connection to the physical
power exerted by the policemen who deport and abuse the survivor who is unable to stop both; it
similarly shows the lack of control over the self by the survivor and the control exerted by the
Nazis. Besides these dichotomies there is the human/non-human dichotomy, as the insult informs
the worldview about and associated behavior against Jews as other than human since beatings are
seen by some as acceptable tools used in the behavioral modification and compliance of non-
humans. Worldviews of Jews as something other than human are further shown in the statement
of the policeman that for the deportees “There's not sisters, not brothers, not mothers, nothing”
from that point on (Greenspan, 1983). This dismembering of the family reflects Kelman’s (1973)
explanation of dehumanization as a denial of community and identity as humans that enables
abuse and quiets down moral concerns in the perpetrator. There is thus depth and dimensionality
in Greenspan’s account.
Considering the relationship between elements, characteristics and dimensions, Figure 1 is reconfigured as follows in Figure 3 to illustrate their interconnection.

Dehumanization = Combination of several dimensions

Figure 3: The components of dehumanization

Characteristics

Conveyed & Interpreted

Humiliation, degradation, depersonalization, deindividuation, categorization, labeling, etc.
Summary

The discussion presented in this article proposed the deconstruction of dehumanization into three components based on the analysis of anecdotes from survivors of the Holocaust who used non-human references to describe their experiences. Elements are the basic parts in an exchange or situation (e.g. words). The characteristics of dehumanization shape, structure and give meaning to the content of dehumanization. Dimensions show the complexity and depth of dehumanization as an experienced phenomenon. Individually any of these three components may or may not be dehumanizing but their combined presence helps in the assessment and explanation of dehumanization.

The distinction between the three components highlights that the seeds of dehumanization are present in everyday human interaction, language, and ways of seeing that are not always dehumanizing. Their understanding can help to undermine the phenomenon as it is tackled at its most elementary levels. Since dehumanization is a value based phenomenon that affects interpersonal, institutional, and structural types of violence, minimizing it by addressing its components may help in the securing of positive peace within a society. In addition, it can help explain how it is connected to other elements of interaction such as humiliation, degradation, and language to which dehumanization is often connected to but not always differentiated or explained in academic texts.

References


Toward a Buddhist Theory of Structural Peace: Lessons from Myanmar in Transition

Tatsushi Arai

Abstract
This essay analyzes the result of in-depth interviews that the author conducted with Burmese Buddhist leaders, with a view toward building Buddhist theories of social conflict, reconciliation, and structural peace. Findings include their shared understanding of the deeply spiritual, inner-directed nature of conflict and reconciliation, and their highly divergent, contested understandings of the structural roots of human suffering in today’s globalized and interconnected world. To meet these structural challenges, this essay introduces the concept of structural awareness, which it defines as educated, enlightened consciousness to appreciate and act responsibly on the complex chains of causal relations in which well-intended action can inadvertently generate the suffering of others.

Introduction
This inquiry contributes to building a theory and practice of Buddhist approaches to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Conflict transformation refers to a sustained process of relationship-building aimed at enabling conflict parties to develop an in-depth, systematic, and multi-angled understanding of the sources and dynamics of the conflict at hand and use the renewed understanding to re-channel the conflict energy inherent in their relationships in order to build sustainable, nonviolent coexistence.

A case study selected for this purpose focuses on Myanmar, a Buddhist-majority nation undergoing a historical transition from decades of military rule to democracy. Based on a series of in-depth interviews that this author has conducted with influential Buddhist leaders in 2013, the study seeks to articulate how they view the sources and nature of social conflict in general, how they understand reconciliation, and how they describe structural violence, all from a Buddhist theological perspective.
Structural violence (Galtung, 1969) is a well-established concept in peace and conflict research. It suggests that violence, as a harming, incapacitating effect on the human body, mind, and spirit, exits not only in its direct, physical form, but also in an indirect, structural form. Structural violence thus finds its expression in routinized and entrenched relationships. At the core of these relationships is a systematic, categorical denial of access to resources and opportunities that human beings need for their physiological, spiritual, and social survival. Examples of structural violence include political repression (as in totalitarian rule and military occupation) and economic exploitation (as in hyper-capitalism and commercial fundamentalism).

This study’s focus on the link between structural violence and Buddhism is both significant and timely. As a religious tradition committed to overcoming human suffering and achieving enlightenment, Buddhism is relatively modest in terms of the scope of the discourse it offers on social structure, especially on matters related to governance, economic production, and resource allocation. (In contrast, Islam, for example, explicitly teaches zakat, a religious duty to make offerings to the poor, to ensure greater economic equity.) In the age of increasingly globalized economy and modern state structure, however, the traditional Buddhist belief that mindfulness and good intentions necessarily lead to both inner and outer peace is seriously challenged. At the heart of this challenge is the recognition that in today’s interconnected world, cause-and-effect relationships between one’s action and its unintended consequences, as exemplified by global climate change and North-South economic relations, are so structurally complex and pervasive that the actor is socially responsible but unaware of his or her responsibility. Buddhist-majority societies that explicitly place Buddhist philosophy at the heart of nation-building must exercise a great degree of caution because their religious beliefs can make it difficult for them to self-critically examine whether and how their well-intended actions can unknowingly harm others. To respond to this challenge, the discussion that follows advocates the need to build structural awareness, which is defined as educated consciousness that seeks to understand both visible and invisible causal chains of action and inaction that either generate or transform structural roots of human suffering.

From the perspective of contemporary peace and conflict studies that have evolved primarily in the Western World, this study is an attempt to further diversify and globalize their religious, cultural, and philosophical foundations. It is informed by the observation that the more diverse, locally-generated theories of peace are available, the less likely the conflict parties in these local contexts will need to rely on unfamiliar concepts and methods exported.
from outside, most frequently from Western society. Myanmar, as an Asian country undergoing numerous conflicts, represents a prime example of a non-Western society in need of diverse homegrown theories of peace and conflict.

Given this conceptual background, the following discussion consists of four parts. First, it will describe the methodology of the inquiry. Second, it will introduce the social and historical context of Myanmar and the role of the Buddhist community in Burmese society. This second section includes a brief review of the growing scholarship on Buddhist nationalism and social activism and contextualizes the present inquiry from the viewpoint of this scholarship. Third, it will present the major findings on Buddhist perspectives on conflict, reconciliation, and structural violence. Fourth and final, it will conclude with a possible way forward that the Burmese Buddhist community can take with emphasis on the structural nature of social conflicts it faces.

Methodology

The analysis presented in this paper draws on fifty-two interviews, eleven focus group meetings, and four capacity-building workshops on conflict transformation that the present author conducted in Myanmar in August 2013. About eighty percent of these interviews and meetings were carried out in Burmese and interpreted in English. The mean length of the interviews and meetings was approximately 75 minutes.

These interviews and meetings involved religious leaders of the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Christian backgrounds, members of political parties, government officials, media professionals, public intellectuals, and civil society organizations (CSO) leaders, including women and youth groups. The interviews and meetings took place in five cities – Mandalay, Meiktila (Mandalay Division), Taunggyi (Shan State), Sittwe (Rakhine State), and Yangon. (See the map in Attachment 1.) While these activities surveyed a broad range of peace, conflict, and development issues in relation to Myanmar's democratic transition, a large part of the interviews and meetings was dedicated specifically to an analysis of Burmese Buddhist perspectives on peace and conflict. Fifteen of these interviews and four of the focus group meetings involved Buddhist monks, nuns, and secular Buddhist organizations that work on peace, development, humanitarian, and human rights issues. While this subset of the collected data that focuses specifically on Buddhism forms the basis of this paper, the information collected for the whole of the research has proven invaluable to contextualize and make sense of Buddhist perspectives.
At least one third of these fifteen Buddhist interviewees are nationally-recognized Buddhist leaders, all actively engaged in broad-based social movements. Approximately half of the Buddhist interviewees, including these recognized national leaders, publicly advocate either the Buddhist-led 969 movement to serve Buddhist business interests or the national Buddhist campaign for introducing a marriage law to the legislature for the purpose of protecting Buddhist women, or both. (A more detailed description of each of these movements is forthcoming.) The remaining half of the Buddhist interviewees are Buddhist leaders – mostly religious, some secular – with substantial experience in either local, national, or international leadership. This latter category of Buddhist interviewees takes noticeably different approaches to the question of Buddhist patriotism and Buddhist-Muslim relations from those leading the 969 movement and the campaign on the proposed marriage law. Religious interviewees are predominantly monks and include a few nuns. Their ages range from the 30s to 80s. Four focus-group meetings supplemented these one-on-one interviews. Representatives of Buddhist youth organizations, both male and female, participated in the focus-group meetings.

Grounded theory (Strauss, 1987) informed the entire process of data collection and analysis. This theory advocates a systematic, discovery-oriented method of field-based inquiry that seeks to identify patterns of observed social phenomena in order to construct relevant theories. It suggests an antidote to the kind of well-established methods that apply pre-determined theories to the explanation of social phenomena. Concretely, to select interviewees, this author and a small team of well-connected Burmese Buddhist guides first approached a broad range of Buddhist leaders and organizational representatives whose publicized positions on important social activities and movements had widely been known. As mentioned earlier, the selection process also took into account the need for diversity with respect to ethnicity, gender, and age, for these factors play a decisive role in Burmese society. This initial application of purposive sampling, which purposefully identifies interviewees of selected types, was later supplemented by solicited referrals of additional interviewees whose perspectives promised to help examine emerging theories that the ongoing analysis had generated. The final analysis of the interview notes also followed grounded theory in that it sought to identify patterns, as well as evocative irregularities and departures from pattern that suggest potentially important aspects of Burmese Buddhist theories of peace and conflict. These patterns were categorized and presented in the form of recurring narratives and themes that the interviewees with different organizational and demographic backgrounds offered.
The English-speaking Burmese guides to this author, all with advanced degrees in Buddhist studies, assisted in the interpretation of Buddhist concepts and Burmese terms.

The combined effect of the relatively small sample size and non-probability sampling suggests that the findings are neither exhaustive in scope nor conclusive in nature. As demonstrated by the analysis that follows, however, this inquiry has generated highly evocative hypotheses about both the uniformity and diversity of self-reported Buddhist narratives on peace and conflict. They suggest a promising basis for a much broader scope of rigorous empirical research.

The interview questions used for this inquiry asked the respondents to reflect on their understanding of social conflict, reconciliation, and structural violence, three of the many essential concepts that must be explored to understand Burmese Buddhist approaches to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. These questions and concepts will be explained in greater detail in the following sections.

Background of Myanmar and its Buddhist Community

As of July 2014, Myanmar is a country with 56 million people (CIA, 2015). Its multicultural nation consists of 135 recognized ethnic communities. Sixty-eight percent of Myanmar’s population is ethnic Burman (CIA, 2015), whose relationships with such minority groups as Shan (nine percent) in the east, Karen (seven percent) in the southeast, Rakhine (four percent) in the west, and Mon (two percent) in the south have been strained because of the long-standing majority-minority conflicts over political representation, resource allocation, human rights, and a host of other issues. Eighty-nine percent of the Burmese population is Buddhist, four percent Christian, and four percent Muslim, while the rest consist of Hindus, animists, and diverse others (CIA, 2015). Bordering five neighboring countries, Bangladesh, India, China, Thailand, and Laos, Myanmar’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious society represents a crossroads of cultures in Southeast Asia.

Against this backdrop of cultural diversity, Buddhism has played an indispensable role in shaping the basic character of the Burmese nation throughout the past millennium. Theravada Buddhism’s central role in Burmese politics was first institutionalized in 1057, when King Anawrahta of the Pagan Empire formally adopted Theravada Buddhism as a spiritual guide to his politically unified Burmese nation (“Myanmar Profile,” 2015). This Buddhist-majority character of the Burmese nation has essentially remained intact throughout the tumultuous periods of British colonialism in 1824-1948 and the Japanese invasion in
1942-45. Since the nation’s independence in 1948, under tightly controlled military rule, the successive national leaders have either actively promoted Buddhism as a state religion or otherwise mobilized a Buddhist discourse to legitimize their political status (Steinberg, 2010). This national commitment to upholding Buddhist ideals and a Buddhist-inspired way of governance has often taken place at the cost of marginalizing the country’s religious minorities, including Muslims and Christians.

Historically the Burmese Buddhist community has grown under state protection and gained strong popular support. Selected statistics on the Burmese Buddhist community, summarized in the table below, show the broad popular base of the Buddhist community:

TABLE A: SELECTED STATISTICS ON THE BURMESE BUDDHIST COMMUNITY.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monasteries</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monks (over 18 years old)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novices</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuns</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Steinberg (2010, p. xxv)

There has recently been a steady rise in the number of novices who enter monasteries, especially in poor rural areas. According to a senior monk overseeing the administration of monasteries at the national level, this increase is attributed largely to the rise in the number of families who cannot afford to send their children to government schools and consider the monasteries’ free education as the only alternative available (personal communication, Mandalay, August 10, 2013).

Recent trends in Myanmar’s democratization, including the multi-party national election in November 2010, represent an unprecedented shift in the way the military government, previously under the one-party rule of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), has chosen to interact with its political opponents, such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The liberalization of the domestic and international media has increased the visibility of the long-standing tension over ethnic, religious, and socio-economic differences that the military government has long sought to
contain. One of these differences that have most seriously escalated to the point of provoking inter-communal violence in 2012 is the conflict between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State, near Bangladesh, as well as in the mixed-religious cities of Meiktila in Mandalay Division and Lashio in Shan State. A series of attacks and counterattacks that had taken place since 2012 between the Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim (Rohingya) communities have deepened their mistrust and resentment. The Rakhine conflict has also significantly deepened the already polarized Buddhist-Muslim relations throughout Myanmar. For the Buddhist community, the fear of expanding Islamic influence, which many Buddhist leaders attribute to Burmese Muslims’ financial, political, and ideological ties to sympathetic Muslim supporters in South Asia and the Middle East, justifies the decisive Buddhist action to defend their faith, as well as the historical continuity and integrity of the Burmese nation (personal communications with Buddhist leaders, Mandalay and Rakhine, August 11-15, 2013). As an already marginalized minority group, the Muslim community in turn feels increasingly alienated from Myanmar’s cultural, political, and economic life (personal communications with Muslim leaders, Mandalay and Yangon, July 25-27, 2014).

Two of the interconnected Buddhist movements reflect the Buddhist understanding of these challenges and their response. One of them is the 969 movement, a Buddhist-led nationwide campaign aimed at building unity among Buddhists, including lay believers. A concrete action adopted by the movement’s proponents includes disseminating stickers that display a Buddhist symbol representing an ancient pillar that King Ashoka, a famous Buddhist ruler, constructed in the third century BC to promote unity among his subjects in the Indian sub-continent. (See Attachment 2 for the 969 symbol.) The three digits of 969 each correspond to the number of virtues associated with each of the three objects of reverence – the Buddha, the dhamma (the teachings), and the sangha (the community of monks) – known as the Triple Gems. Today a large number of Buddhist-owned businesses, including street vendors, small restaurants, and taxis, publicly display these stickers to support the 969 movement, willingly or not, following the monks’ instructions. While the stated goal of the 969 movement emphasizes the need for mutual support among Buddhists to patronize businesses owned by fellow Buddhists displaying these stickers, there exists a widespread practice of Buddhist sermons and publicity material disseminated to encourage boycotting Muslim-owned businesses. Muslim community leaders and business owners interviewed by the author confirm severe adversarial effects of the 969 movement on their economic livelihood, while Buddhist leaders interviewed strongly deny the movement’s responsibility
for causing adversarial impact on Muslim-owned businesses (personal communications, Yangon and Mandalay, August 3-15, 2014). Regardless of whether the 969 movement intentionally excludes Muslims, it is important to note that its leading proponents’ determination to spread the movement nationwide was solidified by the Organization of Islamic Organization’s (OIC) intervention in the Rakhine conflict and its attempt to establish OIC’s Myanmar office in 2012 (personal communication with a senior 969 leader, Yangon, August 3, 2013).

The second Buddhist response to the challenge of Buddhist-Muslim relations is a national movement that encourages both the general public and the national parliament to adopt a set of laws aimed at resolving a range of contentious issues concerning interreligious marriage. Under the leadership of the Buddhist-led Central Nationality and Religion Safeguarding Association, this broad-based movement seeks to change the existing practices of Muslim men marrying Buddhist women who typically come from economically disadvantaged households and regions. In many cases of these interreligious marriages, Buddhist wives are converted to Islam following their husbands’ faith. This Buddhist movement also advocates monogamous marriage and seeks to control population growth, in an attempt to tackle what many Buddhists view as a social problem caused by Islamic practices that threaten the moral character of their Buddhist-majority nation. In July 2013, the Central Nationality and Religion Safeguarding Association submitted to the president four draft laws, which deal with religious conversion, interreligious marriage, monogamy, and population control, respectively, along with some 1.3 million signatures to petition for their passage in the national parliament (“President urges Speaker,” 2014).

In view of the broader historical context of Buddhist-led social engagement that the recent scholarship on Buddhism examines, these two Burmese movements represent Myanmar’s unique adaptations of contemporary Buddhist nationalism. According to Jerryson and Juergensmeyer (2010), there are numerous historical precedents of Asian Buddhist communities that organized themselves to take strong direct action to defend their nations and advocate their political causes in the name of Buddhism. Jerryson and Juergensmeyer (2010) demonstrate that Buddhist communities in such countries as Sri Lanka, Thailand, Mongolia, China, and Japan have frequently used Buddhist scriptures, mythologies, and institutional influence to justify their use of direct and structural violence. Jerryson’s (2011) ethnographic study examines militarized monasteries and armed monks in southern Thailand’s Muslim-majority communities and demonstrates how deeply-entrenched Buddhist
nationalism routinizes and normalizes a sustained systematic use of force. These empirical studies of politicized Buddhist nationalism show that Buddhist nations’ political and military actions and their Buddhist-inspired discourses of nationalism powerfully reinforce each other, often to the extent that politics and religion become indistinguishable.

These studies of politicized Buddhist nationalism present an evocative contrast to another growing body of scholarship that examines the rise of engaged Buddhist movements. Engaged Buddhism is defined as an organized form of contemporary Buddhist practices that actively and nonviolently tackle social, political, economic, and environmental issues in such a way as to make a clear departure from the kind of solitary Buddhist practices that concentrate primarily on individual spiritual salvation (Queen, 2000; Queen & King, 1996). Many engaged Buddhist movements strive to apply such ethical and spiritual principles as compassion, loving-kindness, and the interdependence of all beings to organized public actions that seek to alleviate poverty, racial discrimination, and other forms of structural violence. A review of the writings by prominent engaged Buddhist authors such as Hanh (1987), Ghosananda (1992), Sivaraksa (2005), Chappell (1999), and King (2009) suggests that engaged Buddhist leaders generally trust the presumed social effect of their spiritually-guided actions on structural change. In this process, the nature of Buddhist concepts they articulate, unlike their social actions that demand concreteness and precision, is generally too abstract and generic to be useful as an actionable guideline for complex structural change. Experienced Buddhist scholar-practitioners such as Sivaraksa (2005) supplement Buddhist spiritual guidance with Western social scientific concepts to generate an integrated approach to the transformation of structural violence.

A comparison between the studies of Buddhist nationalism and violence, on the one hand, and those of engaged Buddhism, on the other, points to an important area of inquiry that merits attention. While the former focuses on how social structure shapes Buddhist consciousness and identity, and vice versa, from a historical and empirical point of view, the latter explores how Buddhist consciousness and identity can guide structural transformation. From a comparative standpoint, there is a relative paucity in the depth and breadth of systematic action-oriented knowledge that can guide Buddhist-inspired structural transformation. On the contrary, there appears to be a more established basis of empirical and conceptual explanations as to how Buddhist-led structural violence interacts with Buddhist spirituality and identity.
Given this background, this study of Myanmar’s Buddhist community seeks to expand the empirical and conceptual understanding of Buddhist approaches to the analysis and transformation of structural violence and conflict. The concept of structural awareness, as demonstrated shortly, contributes to bridging the gap between inner-directed Buddhist awareness and Buddhist social actions designed to advance structural transformation. In addition, structural awareness as an analytical framework integrates the insights from the empirical studies of politicized Buddhist nationalism, on the one hand, and the applied practice of engaged Buddhism, on the other, in order to develop a more coherent understanding of the dialectical relationship between the inner-directed and externally-directed nature of Buddhist thinking and social action.

**Buddhist Perspectives on Peace and Conflict**

The analysis of the interviews conducted for the present inquiry seeks to identify and present selected narratives that exemplify typical responses. These narratives illustrate an area of consensus, as well as a broad range and typology of divergent responses that illustrate areas of possible disagreement and contention. Each of the fifteen Buddhist interviewees is given a number (as in interviewee 1 and interviewee 2) in what follows, in order to establish a balance between anonymity and identity. Insights obtained from the four focus group meetings, to which no numbers are assigned, are incorporated as background information and cited explicitly when necessary.

**Theme 1: Nature and sources of social conflict**

In response to the question, “From a Buddhist perspective, where does social conflict come from?,” the interviewees’ perspectives are similar to one another. These responses include: greed, hatred, and wrong view (interviewee 1); egoism, illustrated by a Buddhist story on the inability to remove a spear from one’s heart (interviewee 3); bad intentions that hurt others (interviewee 5); and jealousy and envy, derived from wrong view (interviewee 9).

Two underlying themes connect these responses. First, they all describe human beings’ inner attributes, especially about the inner working of human mind. Interviewee 1’s response, for example, highlights greed, anger, and wrong view – the latter synonymous with foolishness and ignorance in Buddhist terms. These three qualities of human life are commonly referred to as three poisons. Buddhists consider the three poisons as the ultimate source of delusionary impulses and earthly desires that give rise to suffering.
It is important to contrast this Buddhist worldview of the origin – and by extension, the perceived nature – of social conflict with a well-established view of social conflict in contemporary peace and conflict studies. Johan Galtung (2010), a pioneer in the field, defines conflict as an incompatibility of goals pursued by two or more parties. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994), in their widely-used introductory textbook on conflict studies, define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously” (p. 5). Regardless of which perspective one adopts from the growing literature on peace and conflict research, one can argue that researchers and practitioners in the field essentially view social conflict as a challenge in relationships between two or more parties and that they understand people’s inner qualities, such as anger, as a characteristic embedded in such conflict-prone relationships. In contrast, the Buddhist worldview of conflict, as illustrated by Burmese Buddhists’ responses, places such inner attributes as anger, greed, and wrong view in the foreground of their conflict analysis, while seeing the resulting nature of externalized human relationships in the background. This Buddhist emphasis in conflict analysis reflects the enduring theme of the faith tradition whose ultimate purpose is to remove suffering and attain enlightenment – both decisively internal and intimate to the human body, mind, and spirit. Consequently, Buddhist practitioners understand the source, nature, and perceived effect of social conflict as a subjective, experiential process that is internal to their mind. Furthermore, these Buddhist practitioners generally interpret the resulting relationships as an externalized effect of what they view as an essentially internal process.

The second underlying theme derived from the Burmese Buddhist narratives suggests that the rise of social conflict results from a contraction of the human mind to a narrowly-defined sense of self, which makes human beings egoistic. From a Buddhist point of view, this means that the human inability to acquire a right view and to appreciate the inherent interdependence and unity between oneself and others, as well as between sentient beings and insentient beings, generates myopic, egoistic behavior. According to this view, such negative behavior leads to social conflict. In other words, Buddhism views destructive conflict behavior as a failure to connect life’s inherent potential to the vast spiritual universe of interdependence and unity. This second point becomes the basis of a Buddhist worldview of reconciliation and conflict transformation, to which we now turn.
Theme 2: Reconciliation

The most common response to the question, “From a Buddhist perspective, how do you describe reconciliation between parties involved in conflict?,” was: practice patience and loving kindness (interviewees 1, 6, 7). Patience is the capacity and readiness to persevere in trying circumstances in pursuit of enlightenment. Loving kindness (metta) refers to universal love and friendship that embraces all beings without prejudice. Like the Buddhist worldview of social conflict, emphasis on patience and loving kindness suggests an inherently inner-directed spiritual nature of a Buddhist approach to reconciliation. It also suggests that reconciliation requires expanding one’s universe of togetherness, true to the Buddha’s teaching on the universality of compassion.

An equally prominent theme that many interviewees (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8) highlighted was the notion that reconciliation is a means by which to achieve a higher end of unity. Two kinds of responses illustrate this point. The first of these was presented by a prominent monk who opposes both the 969 movement and the proposed marriage law:

Reconciliation is ultimately about building unity and overcoming disunity. If people on opposing sides have ill will and wish to fight, they don’t have good knowledge to inform their action, and they have a selfish mind, then they will never attain unity. We must practice loving kindness (metta) in thought, speech, and action in order to build unity.

This narrative illustrates the interviewee’s way of reasoning that reconciliation is a means by which to attain unity and that it is realized by right thought, speech, and action.

The second example is adopted from a senior monk who spearheads the marriage law campaign:

The Buddha taught that if one side apologizes, the other side should not retaliate. We must learn to forgive. There is a story about the Buddha working to prevent two adversarial kingdoms from fighting. To build universal peace, we must see everyone as a member of our own family. We need to develop wisdom so that we can recognize the interconnectedness of all beings.

While this second narrative is not as explicit on the relationship between means and ends as in the first, it nevertheless suggests the imperative of forgiveness and wisdom, among other means, to realize interconnectedness and unity in human relationships.

Importantly, despite the opposing political views that these interviewees hold, there is no disagreement, at least not in theological terms, over the desirability of all-inclusive, all-
encompassing unity that human beings in general and Buddhists in particular should strive for. This Buddhist consensus on unity as a goal reflects Buddhists’ shared commitment to put into practice their realization that all phenomena in the universe are interconnected and that these phenomena arise and evolve incessantly according to the underlying cosmic rhythm of cause and effect. The Buddhist search for unity, therefore, is a moral and social practice aimed at attaining enlightenment by aligning and devoting one’s life to this underlying rhythm of the universe.

In the reality of Burmese Buddhist practice, however, many obstacles stand in the way of realizing these visions of unity and reconciliation. Serious disagreements abound, for example, as to what concrete, practical means Buddhists should or should not adopt to attain unity, who decides the right means to take, and how Buddhists should behave when they face a perceived existential threat to the way of life in which Buddhist unity matters. At the heart of these questions lies the inescapable reality of organizational and political structure in which Buddhists with opposing views interact with one another, as well as with people practicing other religions.

**Theme 3: Structural violence and peace**

The last in a series of three questions under study is, “From a Buddhist point of view, how can we overcome structural violence?” Since the term structural violence cannot be translated easily into Burmese, a brief standardized explanation was added to the question. The explanation described the intent of the question that sought to elicit diverse Buddhist perspectives on how to overcome deep-rooted historical patterns of human relationships that reproduce and perpetuate harmful effects on the human body, mind, and spirit. Also added to the question was a brief reference to the trend of globalization that deepens the interconnectedness in human relationships and that multiplies the complexity of causal chains responsible for such harmful effects.

Responses to this third question were truly diverse. One respondent (interviewee 4) stated that Buddhism, as a system of teachings dedicated primarily to the enlightenment of each individual, does not offer any explicit view on an ideal social structure. Nearly all the respondents emphasized inner spiritual virtues, such as loving kindness (metta), compassion (karuna), joy for others’ welfare and happiness (mudita), and the importance of feeling others’ suffering with equanimity (upekka), as a Buddhist moral basis for overcoming structural violence.
While the analysis of the interviews has generated no uniform pattern of Buddhist thinking on structural violence, at least three respondents (interviewees 6, 7, and 8) pointed out the Buddhist concept of right livelihood as an essential requirement. Arguably, right livelihood is one of the most widely known and accepted Buddhist principles that suggest how to overcome structural violence, with emphasis on its economic manifestations. (See Schumacher (1999) on Buddhist economics on this subject.) This Buddhist ideal of non-exploitive, virtuous livelihood is an application of the five precepts, which prohibit killing, theft, sexual misconduct, lying, and drinking. The precept on the prohibition of theft suggests a broader social practice of abstention from taking what is not given. This precept, by implication, encourages working proactively to protect others’ possessions. Such an expanded scope of the precept’s application promotes positive peace (defined as the overcoming of not only direct violence, but also indirect, structural violence), which goes beyond negative peace (defined as the overcoming of direct violence, which Buddhists strive to realize by observing the five abstentions). Moreover, one respondent (interviewee 6) supplemented the discussion on right livelihood by adding his understanding that the five precepts ensure the fulfillment of basic human needs, that is, irreducible requirements of life, both material and non-material, without which human beings cannot survive. In short, these respondents essentially argued that Buddhism provides a spiritual and philosophical basis of structural equity.

To broaden the scope of discussion on structural violence, mention must be made on the structural contexts in which Burmese Buddhist leaders interact with one another, as well as with members of other religious communities, especially Muslims. To this end, analysis must focus not only on how these Buddhist interviewees describe what Buddhist practice should be, but also on what concrete action they actually take. Inference is made to answer this latter question based on the useful clues that the interviewees offered on the kinds of action and inaction they are adopting in the face of structural challenges that concern economics, politics, and security.

The interviewees described a range of severe challenges of structural violence, to which some form of cultural violence (destructive cultural influence that justifies violence) is often inseparably linked. These structural challenges, which are simultaneously cultural in nature, include the following. Representative narratives adopted from the interviews are listed in what follows in order to show concrete examples of structural challenges:
Fear of losing Myanmar’s Buddhist heritage (1): “We are proud of our lineage of the historical Burmese kingdoms. After independence, there was a Muslim leader who became a minister of education. While we as Burmese [Buddhist] people accepted Muslims, they have tried to overwhelm us. If the current trend [of a growing Muslim population and influence] continues, our race and religion will one day disappear. Look at Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, and other nations in the region. They used to have a much greater proportion of Buddhist population. However, their national characters have changed significantly over time. These nations are increasingly under the influence of Islam and other religions. Will Myanmar eventually follow suit? We are organizing a national Buddhist movement [on interreligious marriage] in order to protect our nation and our religion.” (Interviewee 5)

Fear of losing Myanmar’s Buddhist heritage (2): “We started our 969 movement for two reasons. One is to build unity among Buddhists … The second reason is to create a common symbol that enables all Buddhists to readily pay respect to the Triple Gems – the Buddha, the dhamma [the teachings], and the sangha [the community of monks]. … The 969 symbol illustrates an ancient pillar that King Ashoka built. We chose this symbol because we respect the significant contribution he made to Buddhism. … The immediate reason for starting the 969 movement was the OIC’s [Organization of Islamic Cooperation] visit to Myanmar [in response to the Buddhist-Muslim tension in Rakhine State in 2012]. We thought we should build unity among Buddhists in Myanmar when the OIC came. If we can build a large social movement, we should be able to attain unity. Otherwise, our nation will one day disintegrate because of disunity.” (Interviewee 6)

Need to defend Myanmar’s Buddhist nation in the age of globalization: “In today’s increasingly globalized world, we see many religious communities interacting with one another. These religious communities are getting closer to each other because of globalization. But while these trends grow, we cannot let any single group to dominate the rest of the other groups. To maintain a good balance between different groups, we as a Buddhist community must build a greater capacity to defend ourselves …. To build peace in Rakhine State, we have to do what Israel has done, to become more conscious of the need to protect our lives. There is a possibility of Arab attacks and wars that will be forced on us in Rakhine State. We need effective collective means of self-defense, such as a strong army and police, in order to protect
Rakhine people. If we have these means, we will have peace in Rakhine State for a long time to come.” (Interviewee 8)

While these interviewees’ narratives refer to what they view as structural challenges, these narratives in fact reflect their own group identity that represents a collective and deeply internalized image of who they are and what they care about. A strong sense of in-group cohesion (unity among Buddhists) in the face of threats posed by out-groups (especially, Muslims, critical foreigners, and the media) is palpable.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the strong support of Buddhist-inspired patriotism and nationalism that the preceding narratives exemplify does not necessarily represent a universally accepted norm about how Burmese Buddhists hope to tackle structural challenges. There exists a much broader range of views, suggesting substantive room for disagreement, debate, and dialogue among influential Buddhist leaders. One way of illustrating the diversity of their perspectives is to think of a continuum that places a single-minded commitment to following good intentions as a guide to social action, on one end, and a commitment to shouldering responsibility for unintended social consequences, on the other:

ILLUSTRATION: A CONTINUUM OF BUDDHIST VIEWS ON STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE.

- Responsible for intention
  (not for the consequences of action?)
- Responsible for acts of commission
- Responsible for the consequences of action, either intended or unintended
- Responsible for acts of omission
The left end of the continuum corresponds to a view shared by the proponents of the 969 and marriage law movements. It maintains that if the intentions that motivate and guide Buddhist social action are genuine and consistent with Buddhist teachings, then they will necessarily generate social impact that is harmless and beneficial to everyone in society. Consistent with this perspective, one interviewee, as a prominent national leader of the 969 movement, remarked:

All acts under Buddhism are harmless to everyone. Buddhist acts performed with good intentions are like a train moving on a railway. If a dog crosses the railway and is run over by the train, that’s not the train’s fault. That’s the dog’s fault.

In response to a follow-up question on his view on the reported cases of Muslim business losses that the Muslim interviewees attribute to the 969 movement, the same Buddhist leader answered:

These [Muslim] people’s opinions are their own personal feelings that do not accurately reflect the true intent of the 969 movement. It is their perceptions, not the 969 movement itself, that are causing their suffering. Personally I don’t know what assumptions they are making to cause the problems they are suffering from. There is nothing I can do about their problems because their own uninformed view is causing their suffering. We [as the proponents of the 969 movement] have never advocated boycotting the businesses of the people of other religions. We have never intended to cause any harm to anyone.

In other words, those seeking the purity of intention based on Buddhism can trust the oneness of cause and effect, as well as the oneness of means and ends. Proponents of this perspective thus devote their religious practice to refrain from doing acts of commission, defined as acts that people knowingly and intentionally commit to do harm to others.

In contrast to this view, some Buddhist interviewees expressed a completely different perspective on this subject. They essentially argued that Buddhist compassion must unconditionally be extended to everyone at all times. They suggested that Buddhists should take action to overcome known circumstances of human suffering for which they may or may not be directly responsible. One of the interviewees who hold this view remarked:

The Buddha taught that we must take responsibility for the situation of suffering which we think we might have caused. Buddhist teachings also encourage us to think that even if we didn’t create the particular situation of suffering, we should take action to remove the suffering. If you know the situation that caused the suffering, you have
to take responsibility. … The Buddha taught that our Buddhist consciousness must be able to see our deep bonds to our families, friends, nations, and the whole world.

This perspective suggests expanding the realm of Buddhists’ social responsibility for removing the suffering of others regardless of the goodness of their intentions associated with the causal chain of events that have generated the suffering. This perspective also views the awareness of someone else’s suffering as a sufficient reason in and of itself to take voluntary action, while setting aside the question of intention as secondary and non-essential in the face of the practical reality of human suffering. It invites Buddhist practitioners to reflect on acts of omission, defined as acts one should have taken but one has not in order to prevent the reality of suffering from arising.

The proposed continuum is undoubtedly an oversimplified view of far more complex patterns of Buddhist thinking regarding structural causality. As a preliminary way of conceptualizing a wide range of views, however, the continuum offers a useful starting point for self-reflection and dialogue because many other interviewees’ perspectives fall somewhere between the two ends of this continuum.

**Conclusion: Building Structural Awareness**

The preceding analysis of Buddhist narratives has demonstrated a range of challenges that Burmese society faces today in the context of democratization, globalization, and interfaith relations. To overcome these challenges, this concluding section will answer the following questions: How can the Burmese Buddhist community build structural awareness under the structural constraints it has inherited from the past? How can Burmese Buddhists expand their capacity to build a more inclusive multi-religious nation that upholds its integrity and moral virtues it has inherited from the past and at the same time, establish sustainable relationships of mutual respect with Muslims and other minority communities? Lessons learned from this study suggest at least two complementary answers.

The first of these ways is to support and deepen the ongoing discussion within the sangha, and in the attentive public, on the long-term merit of introducing secular education to monastic schools that currently specialize exclusively in Buddhist scriptures. Rural monasteries that admit an increasingly number of uneducated children from poor households must receive special attention to their financial and pedagogical needs for this purpose. The three subjects that some senior leaders of the sangha are currently considering (as of August 2013) – mathematics, computer skills, and English – will become a promising start. A
gradual increase in the number of additional subjects, such as history and geography for elementary education, and philosophy, comparative religions, and peace studies for higher education, will enable the future generations of Buddhist leaders to think creatively, analytically, and self-reflectively to cope with the increasingly complex and interconnected world of globalization. One of the goals of a carefully defined scope of secular education is to enable future monks and nuns to sensitize their minds to the ever-expanding universe of cause-and-effect relationships in today’s globalized society in which their well-intended actions and inactions can inadvertently generate structural violence, which in turn generates human suffering. Building structural awareness must therefore become a high priority in contemporary Buddhist education in search of structural peace that promotes a collective form of individual fulfillment. While the known objection to introducing such secular education to traditional monastery schools, especially those led by conservative Buddhist leaders, must be taken seriously, a sustained, systematic effort must be made to carry out dialogue with them, in view of the long-term prosperity of the Buddhist sangha in the reality of the twenty-first century.

The second approach to expand structural awareness to build structural peace is to introduce a more balanced, empirical, and multi-angled interpretation – and perhaps even a purposeful reinterpretation – of essential Buddhist discourses and symbols which are currently used to mobilize the sangha and the public. One of the most significant examples of such interpretive acts is the way in which the meaning of the 969 symbol is defined and propagated in the ongoing effort to create Buddhist unity.

The 969 leaders that the author has interviewed provided a detailed explanation of the 969 symbol. As previously mentioned, this symbol is taken from the image of the elegantly decorated pillar that King Ashoka of the Maurya dynasty had constructed in the third century BC. Their explanation of the pillar highlighted the virtues of an ideal Buddhist practitioner, such as a commitment to unity and strength, all associated with each of the components of the Ashoka pillar. What their explanation did not offer, knowingly or unknowingly, is the broader historical context and meaning of the pillar’s construction, as well as the defining characteristics of King Ashoka’s reign from 268 BCE to 232 BCE.

While King Ashoka was a committed Buddhist, he actively supported Hindu, Jain, Ajivika, and diverse other religions. He encouraged the diverse religious communities to work together to build social harmony. He strove to prevent any acts that would marginalize
and persecute other religions. To quote King Ashoka’s edict, in which he is referred to as Priyadarsī:

King Priyadarsī honors men of all faiths, members of religious orders and laymen alike, with gifts and various marks of esteem. Yet he does not value either gifts or honors as much as growth in the qualities essential to religion in men of all faiths. This growth may take all forms, but its root is in guarding one’s speech to avoid extolling [sic] one’s own faith and disparaging the faith of others improperly ….

(Nikam & McKeon, 1959, p. 51)

The edict goes on to state:

The faiths of others all deserve to be honored for one reason or another. By honoring them, one exalts one’s own faith and at the same time performs a service to the faith of others. By acting otherwise, one injures one’s own faith and also does disservice to that of others. For if a man extols his own faith and disparages another because of devotion to his own and because he wants to glorify it, he seriously injures his own faith.

Therefore concord alone is commendable, for through concord men may learn and respect the conception of Dharma accepted by others.

King Piyadarsī desires men of all faiths to know each other’s doctrines and to acquire sound doctrines. Those who are attached to their particular faiths should be told that King Priyadarsī does not value gifts or honors as much as growth in the qualities essential to religion in men of all faiths. (Nikam & McKeon, 1959, pp. 51-52)

Upon examining these and other historical sources, Hajime Nakamura (1994), a leading scholar of Buddhism, observes that King Ashoka, like other prominent early Buddhist thinkers, sought to remove prejudices, understand the foundations of diverse philosophical traditions, and try to embrace and transcend their differences. Nakamura (1994) also maintains that Ashoka and his contemporaries saw Buddhism as a path to enlightened awareness that could enable its practitioners to recognize the virtues and strengths of diverse other religions and philosophies, and to find ways to actively build on them to create universal value and to benefit them all.

In view of this historical background, what would a contemporary application of King Ashoka’s vision to Myanmar’s multi-religious society look like? It would mean creating an inclusive Buddhist-majority society in which Buddhist leaders proactively reach out to learn from Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and other faith traditions and strive to find ways in which
Buddhism can help these religious communities to fulfill their own spiritual potential as partners and contributors to a peaceful multi-religious society. Importantly, public education and dialogue aimed at realizing such a Buddhist vision consist of finding an ideal image of the future that a more multi-angled, empirical, and holistic understanding of the past will generate. To paraphrase John Paul Lederach (2005), a leading peacebuilding scholar-practitioner, the past, as a collective legacy, is in front of the present, and an authentic memory of the past can shed light on what the sangha should do in the future. To realize this vision, however, Buddhist leaders must reflect self-critically on their worldviews. They must resist the temptation to fit a preferred image of the past to justify a narrowly-defined need of the present. To practice Buddhism in the increasingly interconnected world of the twenty-first century, responsible Buddhist leaders must promote a more empirically-grounded, multi-angled inquiry into familiar Buddhist teachings and symbols that they habitually use to mobilize public action.

The two suggested approaches to building structural awareness outlined above – one on the introduction of secular education and the other on the reexamination of popularized Buddhist discourses and symbols – are both essential for the future of the Burmese Buddhist community. However, in order to apply structural awareness to the transformation of intercommunal conflicts to which the Buddhist community is presently a party, it must also consider practicing more concrete and proactive initiatives that help improve Buddhists’ relationships with other religious communities. One of the possible ways in which Buddhists can practice structural awareness to this end is to reexamine the Buddhist sangha’s approach to interreligious marriage.

As discussed earlier, the Buddhist sangha’s national movement to petition the national government for its passage of the proposed laws reflects their proponents’ fear of losing Myanmar’s Buddhist-majority identity and its moral character. As a number of Buddhist and Muslim interviewees have pointed out in the course of the present inquiry, many of the perceived problems concerning interreligious marriage, population growth, and religious conversion are inseparably linked to socio-economic deprivation and the lack of basic education. In parts of Myanmar in which Muslim-Buddhist marriages concern Buddhists, Buddhist girls and their families accept interreligious marriages with financially established Muslim men as means to ensure their livelihood and survival. One way of applying Buddhist structural awareness to the interconnected problem of poverty, illiteracy, and religious conversion is to ask different questions than what the Buddhist community is currently
asking: What can both Buddhist and Muslim leaders do together to uplift the socio-economically deprived communities from abject poverty and provide them with basic education? What can they do to expand the freedom of choices for Buddhist girls, their families, and their Muslim neighbors with respect to marriage, livelihood opportunities, and religious practices? What if the significant amount of resources, time, and political capital dedicated to the Buddhist national movement on the marriage issue is rechanneled to promote such educational and development initiatives? What if both Buddhist and Muslim leaders actively promote interreligious dialogues in which they, together with their community members at the grassroots level, confront the deep roots of their historical mistrust and fear that gave rise to the Buddhist national movement in the first place?

Once the Burmese Buddhist community recognizes the value of these questions, many evocative precedents of Buddhist-led development and dialogue initiatives become relevant to its future. One of the most compelling examples of such initiatives is the Sarvodaya Shramadana movement in Sri Lanka. (Sarvodaya means progress of all, and Shramadana means a gift of work.) Established in 1958 by A. T. Ariyaratne, this Buddhist-led movement of participatory development empowers the poor and strengthens community ties in over fifteen thousand of Sri Lanka’s twenty-four thousand villages (King, 2009). While Theravada Buddhist offers the spiritual foundations of the movement, it actively engages participants of all religious, ethnic, and political backgrounds. In each of the villages in which the Sarvodaya moment is introduced, villagers discuss their development needs and work together to build roads, schools, clean water systems, latrines, or other forms of basic infrastructure that help them meet their needs. In addition to promoting development, the movement’s leader Ariyaratne convenes conciliation dialogues between political, ethnic, and religious communities, including Buddhists and Muslims (Queen, 2003).

Whether the Burmese Buddhist community chooses a path to inclusive development and interreligious dialogue that the Sarvodaya movement exemplifies depends on how seriously it is willing to face difficult questions about its history and identity. Answering these questions requires Buddhist practitioners’ willingness to reconcile their individual spiritual commitment with their collective responsibility to overcome the structural roots of the existing religious tension. This process of reflection and dialogue also requires Burmese Buddhists’ self-motivated choice to become active contributors to building a truly inclusive and democratic nation while confronting the deep culture and structure of exclusive nationalism.
References


Attachment 1: Map of Myanmar

 Adopted from: http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=map+of+Myanmar&id=FAE4D9FDC8EFCA08B22E18BCEEC41FAE23CBFF92&FORM=IQFRBA#view=detail&id=FAE4D9FDC8EFCA08B22E18BCEEC41FAE23CBFF92&selectedIndex=0
Attachment 2: The 969 symbol

Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Enhance International Policy

Noreen Towle

Abstract

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization created from the express consent of states and established upon a multilateral international treaty between those states in order to perform the functions of promoting international peace and security, aid in the development of international relations, promote human rights, and aid in “harmonizing actions” between nations. The most ardent of these functions falls to the UN Security Council due to its responsibility for maintaining peace and security. UN peacekeeping missions were originally an alternative to collective security but they have evolved into Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. Evaluations of PSOs is imperative in order to effectively provide policy makers with the knowledge necessary to improve strategy and resource allocation for future PSOs.

Introduction

International agreements between states have led to the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its six organs which facilitate diplomacy and moderate conflict. Of these six organs, the UN Security Council has been noted as the most ambitious due to their primary function being to maintain international peace and security (Janis, 2008, p. 215). Maintaining peace and security is an extensive and rigorous process which includes numerous practices but most notable are peace support operations. The peace support operations of today have changed drastically since the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal in 1944 which laid the original principles and
organization for the establishment of the UN and its organs. UN peace operations have evolved over several generations from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to peace support operations which incorporate peace enforcement capabilities. “Louis Henkin has written that in relations between nations, the progress of civilization may be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law” (Rochester, 2012, p. 261). I argue that because the world is constantly changing, the movement of force to diplomacy, and from diplomacy to law needs to take one step farther. An evaluation of the law needs to be continually undergone in order for the law to evolve and grow with the changing needs of the world. This means an evaluation process needs to be utilized for the peace support operations of today in order to determine what constitutes a success or failure of a peace support operation. This will, in turn, set the building blocks for the knowledge needed to make international policy. Evaluations will provide policy makers with an analysis of the effectiveness of a mission, allow for improvement, and offer an understanding of resource allocations and strategy (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 202).

The Creation of the United Nations

The UN is an international organization whose legal roots are founded in the law of treaties. The law of treaties states the accepted rules about the making, the affect, amendment, invalidity, and termination of agreements among states. The law of treaties has its roots in customary international law which is where international organizations ground their legal effect among nations. International organizations are created from an express consent of states and are established upon a multilateral treaty agreed upon by states. These international organizations are created to fulfill specific designated functions in international relations. In order for international organizations to legally perform these functions, states delegate some of their sovereign powers to these international organizations. International organizations have become forums for negotiating international issues (Janis, 2008).

The institution of the United Nations is an international organization that was developed from a failed League of Nations through a post-World War II desire to develop a working international entity that would be able to aid in the facilitation of diplomacy and moderate conflict. The UN Charter established six main organs: the Security Council, the General assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat,
and the Trusteeship Council. These organs work together to carry out the four main purposes of the UN:

- “to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.” (United Nations Security Council, 2014, para. 2)

An Ambitious Organ: The United Nations Security Council

Mark Westin Janis has referred to the UN Security Council as “the most ambitious of the United Nations’ organs, having ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’” (Janis, 2008, p. 215). When the UN Security Council receives a complaint they encourage that the parties try to reach an agreement through peaceful means. This is a multifaceted process which begins with parties agreeing to principles for a peaceful agreement and committing to investigation and mediation. When necessary it can escalate to the dispatch of a mission, appointment of special envoys, or to request the Secretary-General to use his offices to promote peaceful dispute settlements. If a dispute is hostile, the Council will require a complete cessation of violence and dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force. The Council can enact Chapter VII of the UN Charter and mandate enforcement measures which are economic sanctions, use of arms, embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, blockades, and collective military action (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

Peacekeeping was originally an alternative to collective security. The UN could essentially create a space where negotiated solutions to conflicts could occur while military troops kept the opposing sides separated. It was thought that during this cessation of conflict the UN could help with conflict resolution and conciliation (Caldwell & Williams, 2012).

Generational Evolution of Peacekeeping

First generation peacekeeping was the peaceful settlement of disputes and enforcement. They operated on the premise of: consent of all parties, political neutrality, impartiality (commitment to the mandate), the non-use of force except in self-defense and finally, legitimacy (sanctioned by and accountable to the Security Council advised by the Secretary General). These peacekeeping missions sought to monitor borders and buffer zones after a ceasefire. During the
Cold War thirteen of these peacekeeping missions were enacted (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011)

Immediately after the Cold War, the weakening state of countries previously occupied by regional powers could be seen. “No longer were ethnic groups within the superpowers’ areas limited with their ambitions to gain nation status nor were nations reluctant to challenge the arbitrary lines drawn on colonial maps” (Woodhouse, & Ramsbotham, 2000, p.64). Herein complex emergencies emanate. Intra-state conflict becomes the norm as opposed to inter-state conflict. With this weakening of the state came the decline in human rights, the destruction of social and cultural institutions and the rise of warlords. The Cold War peacekeeping missions could not adequately accommodate the rapid growth of conflict worldwide. The function and composition of the peacekeeping operations changed from monitoring after a ceasefire to covering security, humanitarian, and political objectives. These peacekeeping missions were second generation. The number of countries who participated in peacekeeping operations tripled from 1980’s-1990’s. Peacekeeping operations became more diversified by utilizing more sources such as military, civilian police, and took a diplomatic approach. But with the ever increasing problems of lack of protection for its workers, genocide, killings, and human rights violations the peacekeeping missions found “that faced with attempts to murder, expel, or terrorize entire populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the UN was inadequate” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 151).

These were the precursors for today’s peacekeeping operations. Third generation peacekeeping missions reflect the change peacekeeping operations needed to undergo in order to handle the current complex emergencies that are simultaneously occurring worldwide. While there is debate on the effectiveness of the means which are deployed in carrying out these operations it is known that global support is needed in order to transform and reconcile conflict of today. The peacekeeping missions of today are referred to as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. The PSO covers both the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, “but now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace-related operations which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2000, p.71). Early engagement in a PSO mission will make the investment more cost effective as well as affect the likelihood of long term success of the mission. PSOs operate on the basis of
neutrality taking on the role of a third party conciliator and are designed to enforce a safe environment where entities can come into a complex emergency and began their peace process. Differences in third generation PSOs are that consent is no longer required and they can utilize Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine to enforce cooperation of the peacekeeping mandate. The end-state of peacekeeping is to have a secure and self-sustaining environment within the society.

The complexities of conflict today require the peacekeeping process to become more complex and rigorous in order to transform society. It is not acceptable to stand by and allow human rights and a lack of human security to ensue. Though we cannot expound a definite recipe that will work for every conflict emergency we can continually strive to work for transformative solutions that will allow for a growth process that will build from the ground up. As Kofi Annan has stated, each individual is entitled to have “freedom from fear (through conflict management and resolution), freedom from want (through economic development and growth) and sustaining the future (through careful husbanding of the earth’s resources and ecosystems)” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2000, p. 163). It is the duty of the international community to continually strive to help those who cannot help themselves.

Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Determine the Effectiveness of International Policy

Research on peacekeeping has mainly focused on the practicality of conflict management and resolution with the primary importance being what works and not on how or why it worked. The UN and militaries have a focus on “lessons learned” in order to discern what success is and what will improve future operations. Explicit evaluative measures need to be provided in order to understand what constitutes success and what the process to achieve that success was. An important note to make is that not every peace support operation can be evaluated by the same standards because not every peace support operation is the same. For example, peace support operations deployed to support civil wars will not have the same standards as peace support operations deployed to support interstate conflicts. “A proper specification of peace operation success thus yields a number of policy making benefits” (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010, p.6). Policy makers will be able to make valid inferences about the conditions associated with success, provide a multifaceted assessment, and provide a baseline in order to make judgment and international policy changes (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010).
The success of international peace support operations can be determined through a variety of perspectives. According to *Evaluating Peace Operations*, by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2010), five dimensions of evaluation decisions need to be considered. They are: the stakeholders, time perspectives, baselines, “lumping,” and mission types. We will explore these five dimensions and then discuss what Diehl and Druckman consider to be core goals of success and a framework for assessment of those goals as applied to MINUSTAH.

**Case Study: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)**

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an ongoing mission which began in June 2004 and is continuing to the present day. It is a transformative result stemming from a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which began in February 2004 after the military coup ousted and caused the democratically elected president of Haiti, Bertrand Aristide, to be exiled. Security Council Resolution 1542 was enacted on 1 June 2004 to:

- aid in securing the rule of law, to enable a stable environment for the transitional government,
- to restructure the Haitian police force, to aid in public safety and order,
- to aid in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, to prevent violence,
- and support the constitutional and political processes, to assist in municipal organizational process, public elections, and support and assist the government and human rights institutions ("MINUSTAH Mandate," 2004).

The devastation caused by the 12 January 2010 earthquake left an already unstable society in shambles. The earthquake caused two hundred twenty thousand deaths. Because of the severity of the occurrence, the United Nations Secretary General proposed an increase in support levels to aid in the recovery, reconstruction and stability endeavors ("Restoring a secure and stable environment," 2013).

**A Brief Haitian History**

Haiti has a long history of strife, repression, and revolutionary efforts. In 1804, after a thirteen year rebellion, the African slave population overthrew the wealthy landowner and political leaders, gained their independence, and created the nation of Haiti. This was the first slave population to gain control of their society which created fear of possible revolts in other slave owning nations. Haiti is the world’s oldest black republic and the world’s second republic.
in the Western Hemisphere, the United States being the first. Haiti’s independence movement was feared by other Western countries and was not even recognized by the United States until the 1960’s after the country abolished slavery (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).

In 1844 Haiti split from its western side, Santo Domingo, which became the Dominican Republic. Haiti was isolated from market links to other countries because of the fact that it was a black free state which was detrimental to its economy.

There was no indigenous capital with which to construct the infrastructure necessary to trade with the wider world. Nor was it possible to fund the educational system necessary to provide the human capital required to improve the range of products produced domestically (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).

While still a slave nation sugar was the exported product of the country but after the revolution there was no slave population to farm the sugar cane. The lands were subdivided and used for sustenance farming.

Twenty two changes in government occurred in Haiti from 1843-1915 which marked a time of political and economic disarray that left a legacy for the next century. Because of this political and economic disorder, the United States occupied the country for nineteen years and finally left 1934. A series of dictators ran the country after until 1957 when a father and son duo, Francois Duvalier and Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled until 1986. During this time frame the country was corrupt, over run with violence, and rampant with warlordism (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010). Upon the completion of the Duvalier family dictatorship, a constitutional government was ratified in 1987 which made provisions for an elected government and also provided political decentralization of the local government which allowed for the elections of mayors and administrative bodies to run the localities (“1987 Constitution of Haiti,” 2011).

Provisional bodies ran the government from 1987 until the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in December 1990. Aristide won what was seen, internationally, as a fair and free democratically run election with a sixty-seven percent vote. A violent coup overthrew Aristide once he took government and caused his exile. Violence and corruption ensued which contributed to every one in eight Haitian nationals to flee from the country (“Haiti’s history,” 2011).
United Nations Intervention in Haiti: Background (MINUSTAH background, 2013)

While the provisional government was holding their elections in 1990, they requested the involvement of a United Nations observers group in order to verify the elections process (ONUVEH). After the military coup the United Nations along with the organization of American States (OAS) deployed to aid the country in February 1993. By September 1993 Haiti’s first United Nations peacekeeping operation was organized by the Security Council called, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). This mission was unsuccessful due to the Haitians lack of military cooperation. This type of UN peacekeeping mission began as a second generation mission because the UN was invited in to monitor and handle the political objectives of the Haitian diplomatic process but evolved into a third generations peace support operation (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

Because of the UNMIH failure the UN Security Council enacted a multinational series of peacekeeping missions, from 1994-2000, which deployed a force of twenty thousand that would “return the legitimate Haitian authorities, maintain a secure and stable environment in the country, and promote the rule of law” (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013, para. 2). This was a quick development into a third generation peacekeeping process resulting from the lack of peace enforcement which affected mission capabilities. Third generation peacekeeping allows for troop deployments to abate violence, achieve conflict containment and promote conflict settlement (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011). Developments made during this timeframe were the positive proactive advancement of democracy, and the growth of civil society. Though growth and progression were seen, some residual issues remained such as regression of implemented reforms to the political crisis and stability to the country that never took hold. Insurgency broke out in Gonaives and spread over the northern part of the country. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1529 in February 2004 to authorize the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which would stabilize and secure the environment in order to continue support of a peaceful political process.

The MIF transformed into the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 30 April 2004 upon the recommendation from the UN Secretary-General. The mandated goals of MINUSTAH were
to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013, para. 6).

Between 2004 and 2009 adjustments to the mandate were made in order to adapt to the changing needs on the ground and great progress was made towards all areas of the mandated goals. Setbacks to Haiti came when the devastating earthquake hit on 12 January 2010. Because of the devastation caused by the earthquake, all progress previously made under MINUSTAH was halted. Nation-building and presidential and municipal elections previously set into place were stopped which added to the uncertainty and unrest of the state. MINUSTAH was no longer a functioning program because one hundred and two UN personnel were killed in the earthquake to include the UN Special Representative and his principal deputy. Because of this, the priorities of the mandate changed. The UN Secretary General reported on the situation and the need for relief efforts, security, and restoration of the state. Endorsement of the Secretary General’s report came on 19 January under Resolution 1908 which increased force levels of MINUSTAH to support recovery, stabilization, and reconstruction in Haiti not only for short term recovery help but for long term reconstruction (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013).

Resolution 1927 was enacted on 4 June 2010 which gave additional police and troops to aid with Haitian recovery but clearly stated that along with the surge in troop and police aid, the government of Haiti needed to take primary responsibility for stabilization and development, MINUSTAH was solely there as a supportive role. Requests for Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to provide support in humanitarian and recovery efforts along with the OAS to help support continued international electoral assistance were made as well.
MINUSTAH’s success was seen in the March 2011 elections where the technical, logistical and administrative assistance proved rewarding. Michael Martelly was elected into office and transitioned smoothly. Renewing Haitian economy and further strengthening the rule of law was still necessary. A year after the earthquake, the fragility of security in Haiti still resounded. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2012 in October 2011 which called for a drawdown in forces but allowed for the continuing support in Haiti. Because of the smooth transition from one elected President to the other and continuing progress in the nation, Resolution 2070 was passed in October 2012 which further reduced forces to accommodate the growing stabilization in Haiti (‘MINUSTAH background,” 2013).

*Using Evaluating Peace Operations (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010) to Analyze the Evolution of the United Nations MINUSTAH Resolutions in Haiti*

1. The Stakeholders

The first in the five dimensions of evaluative decisions are the stakeholders. As we consider all the stakeholders contributing to a peace support operation we also need to consider that each of the stakeholders will have a different definition of the success of the peace support operation. The international community represents a large piece. These are third party stakeholders such as states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s). Their goals can be varied but include stopping the spread of conflict across borders, aiding the development of international norms such as human rights and cooperative securities, and promoting world values. The interactions from the international stakeholders can include the promotion of political stakes and will entail certain states promoting sides to ensure that certain groups are recognized and considered during the peace process. Troop contribution to a peace support operation can have vested interests from their state of origin and can contribute to the determining factor of success (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

A particularly relevant subset of interested states assume leading roles in peace support operations and/or contribute personnel to the peace support operation…there is some debate over whether states contribute troops for altruistic, power and status, or pecuniary reasons, but once troops are deployed, contributors have vested interests in protecting those troops. (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p.13)
This can change the assessment values of a peacekeeping operation from containment of the spread of the conflict and promoting human securities to ensuring that one’s troops participating in the peace support operation are not harmed. This is particularly relevant when the domestic audiences of a state are watching, through the use of media, the outcome of conflict. Poorer states contributing troops to a peace support operation could have priorities that are not altruistic in nature. Sometimes these states are looking for the training, experience and financial payments that the UN can provide their troops. This takes the main focus away from the conflict resolution process needed in the area and brings the focus to the international community contributing to the peace mission (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

An example of this occurrence in Haiti is shown in the article Canadian Army Troops Return Home from UN Mission in Haiti. The article discusses how Canada sees the importance of a Canadian platoon deploying with a Brazilian battalion in order to strengthen their partnership with Brazil. “Brazil is an important partner for Canada. This deployment has been an excellent opportunity to deepen our defence relationship with the Brazilian Armed Forces and further strengthens the connection between our people” (“Canadian Army Troops,” 2013, para. 1).

NGO’s can have bureaucratic interests when it comes to peace support operations because they vie for funding and resources from outside entities. Their perception of success will be related to how they participate in the peace support operation and how they acquire their funding and resources. Beyond funding and resources, NGO’s are concerned with the assessment of their reputations because, “when peace operations denigrate the reputation of an organization, its other missions may suffer” (Diehl& Druckman, 2010, p.14).

There are over three thousand NGO’s working to aid in Haiti’s recovery which has given the country a nickname of “The Republic of NGO’s” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 1). Because of the intense amount of aid coming from multiple directions without a centered leadership, Haitians were looking to the NGO’s for all support instead of their government. This in itself is defeating of the original mandated purpose from the UN which sought to strengthen the governmental capacity. This problem was heightened following the 2010 earthquake.

Haiti’s government has been criticized for not taking a more visible role in responding to people’s needs following the earthquake. If projects implemented by NGO’s do no match
up with the government’s priorities, the long-term success of recovery efforts will be undermined. (Kristoff, et al., 2010)

Even though the Haitian government does not have the resources to directly implement the required programs that will aid in its nation’s recovery, it does have the ability to oversee the NGO’s activities which will not only ensure that NGO work aligns with the governments goals but will also serve to strengthen the government. This is in alignment with the initial goal mandated in MINUSTAH (“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2013). One example of NGO’s non-alignment issues is funding. Outside entities are afraid to give the government money to implement funding so they funnel the money through the NGO’s. Because the NGO’s have more funding than the government the Haitian people look to the NGO’s for support and not their government. This “perpetuates a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among Haitian government institutions” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 2). Since NGO’s have the funding they can hire local people at a higher wage than the government. Though this is appealing for the Haitian people, it is not sustaining in the long run because eventually the NGO’s will leave and take their jobs with them. If the government was providing jobs then it would mean long term employment for nationals.

After the 2009 donor’s conference a slow transition to provide funding through the government began. This notion is further expanded by Localising Aid: A whole Society Approach (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). The authors of this document seek to express the importance of utilizing a Whole of Society (WoS) approach. This approach states that all key stakeholders need to be involved in the solution of the issue. This entails constant communication between NGO’s, international governments, local governments, and the people. This lack in communication is one of the primary flaws seen today. WoS also states that donors and NGO’s need to participate in government led strategies. Allowing NGO’s unfettered entrance into the area undergoing peacekeeping is chaotic and needs to be centralized and in alignment with the goals of the local society while allowing for engagement in information sharing (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013).

The primary protagonists within the conflict hold an interest in the redistribution of goods but they usually do not agree on how they should be redistributed. This can be problematic during a conflict resolution process because, though a cease-fire has been called and negotiations for the redistribution of goods has begun, it is possible that the only reason protagonists are participating is to allow themselves time to rearm in order to start fighting again. In times of civil
war and intrastate conflict, the actors participating in the conflict can be very diverse which makes a fair dividing of the goods more difficult especially when each side wants a zero-sum outcome. Issues with Haitian primary protagonists initially lied within the gangs and other various violent groups of the nation who wished to oppose the government (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2004). These gangs and groups are impeding the success of the mission by importing small arms, are violent against the local government, and are involved with human and drug trafficking.

Finally, the local population in an area of conflict will have their own interests and interpretations of what a successful peace support operation is. The presumption is that the cessation of conflict will improve the lives of the population but this is not the entirety of the conflict resolution process as it relates to the people. Issues that have arisen during peace support operations caused by the entities that are supposed to help the population are: the inability to repatriate refugees, creation of distortions to the local market economy; and the incidence of rape and spread of disease from the peace soldiers.

The Haitian local population has a legacy of issues that will need to be addressed over generations. Many programs have been implemented to address their needs but their ability to resonate and stick will only be seen over time. Instilling democratic desires in the people of Haiti was slow in coming because they lacked the will to participate. This has slowly changed over time and success can be seen by the participation in the May 2011 election and by the successful transfer in power between presidents (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2004; “MINUSTAH Background,” 2013). Attracting outside investors in the Haitian economy is slow and difficult to come because of the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake but movements are being made to entice foreign investors (“Jatropha Foundation,” 2009). In order to deter the incidences of abuse caused by international troops, the UN Secretary-General has requested that international militaries give a no tolerance policy against those external actors who sexually exploit or abuse persons in order to prevent cases of misconduct and require that personnel are properly investigated and punished (Resolution 2119, 2013).

2. Time Perspective

Next in the evaluative framework is the perspective of time which can be viewed in short-term and long-term success. Since MINUSTAH is a long term and transformative peacekeeping operation that has had a devastating natural disaster occur during its nine year
mission we will be evaluating it by looking at changes that have occurred over time. Long-term success is assessed by looking at the peace support operation for several years to decades after the operation has ended. It is based on policy interventions that influence behaviors which can only be assessed on the effects those behaviors have over an extended length of time. Long-term perspectives will lead to other assessments when various stakeholders undergo changes as shown in evaluating baselines (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

MINUSTAH has not ended but has seen success which is shown in the drawdown of international troops and the successful transfer of government during recent presidential elections (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).

MINUSTAH has seen great setbacks because of the 2010 earthquake but recuperation and recovery are still underway. According to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Haiti, the stabilization of Haiti is currently underway but is still fragile. “Enduring political stability is the key to strengthening the country’s governance institutions, promoting socio-economic development, and attracting foreign investment” (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012, p. 3).

Promoting the Rule of Law and counteracting corruption is of primary importance. This entails promoting democratic governance, the police force, and justice programs. This will secure the legal and physical security of the local population so that stabilization of the country will occur. When the country is perceived as stable, investments, economic growth and development will grow (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Good institutional governance is being promoted through the launch of the national coordination framework of external development aid in Haiti (CAED) which aids in the progress of government reforms. This will be enacted at all levels of government to include national government, department level and community level government (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Housing and urban development will be expanded and safer building practices will be adopted to help strengthen the structural capacity of the buildings to prepare for possible future natural disasters. Displaced individuals need to be repatriated to homes after construction. Along with this, disaster risk reduction will aid with the problems erosion and deforestation which impact frequent flooding during hurricane and cyclone season (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).
Health education and treatments will continue through state and non-state actors so that significant progress will continue with nutrition, preventing the spread of HIV-AIDS, and aid with the fight of the cholera outbreak. This will require supporting expanded access to clean water and sanitation. Continued humanitarian action over the long term has significantly helped with all the above listed programs but it is necessary to continue it because the difficulties have not ceased within the nation (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

With the widespread poverty and high unemployment rates along with slow economic growth, job creation is a central problem. An unemployed population is more likely to participate in crime. Creating projects and jobs that employs the population is a priority (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Finally, due to the lack of public infrastructure, school fees, and an uneven distribution of schools throughout the country, educating the population is very difficult. The UN and the Haitian government have been working closely together in order to increase access to education, regulate the education system, abolish fees and define educational standards for state non-state service providers (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

These have all been necessary changes made over time. It will take generations to recover from the hardships that have occurred within the country. Many lessons have been learned from the organization and conduction of MINUSTAH which are shown in Lessons Learned in Haiti such as the need for incorporating Whole of Society (WoS) techniques and practices (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). Though progress and stabilization has been slow, it can still be seen by the continual positive outcomes.

3. Establishing a Baseline

Establishing a baseline is a necessity for effective assessments of a peace support operation. You must first define what you are comparing the peace support operation to (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). The assessment of MINUSTAH is done in a longitudinal analysis to show the slow but positive changes that are being made. Even after the crisis caused by the 2010 earthquake which physically devastated the country and all progress made with social-political activities, the continual involvement and support provided has, overtime, made positive contributions to the Haitian society (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013; “Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). Also, the idea of Haiti being a “Republic of NGO’s” has promoted change in how future peace support operations are conducted as seen in how new documents...
have appeared discussing the importance of governments aligning goals, sharing information, and communicating with NGO’s in order to perform and achieve in a shorter period of time (Glennie & Robinowitz, 2013; Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010).

4. Lumping

The next dimension of assessment is understanding “lumping” and how each element therein should be assessed. Peace support operations are a compilation of multiple procedures and processes such as size, training, strategy, tactics, time horizons, clarity and change of mandate, involvement with civil society, and host country and constituent support. These processes are “lumped” together in the peace support operation. These factors make it difficult to assess which one if not all pieces are contributing to the success or failure of an operation. General evaluations focus on the success of the whole rather than separating each part for assessment in order to prevent possible problems that arise from an assessment of a single part. But, knowing which factors contributed to the success of an operation can be imperative for understanding how to implement new peace support operations (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Since MINUSTAH is a long-term peace support operation that has spanned from 2004 to the present lumping will be required in order to assess the full progress of the peace support operation. To this day there have been challenges with the recovery to the Haitian society which were greatly heightened due to the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake. But there is unending hope for the people who live there. Success can be seen by analyzing the facts of the strength of the forces aiding in Haiti. Personnel aid provided by the MINUSTAH mandate in April 2004 was 6,700 military personnel, 1622 police, 548 international civilian personnel, 154 UN volunteers, and 995 local civilian staff. In October 2009, 6,940 military personnel and 2,211 police personnel were provided. In June 2010, after the earthquake numbers were increased to 8,940 military personnel and 4,391 police in order to aid in the reconstruction. In October 2011, success was seen which allowed for the number of military and police personnel to drop to 7,340 military personnel and 3, 241 police personnel. In October 2012, the drawdown continued to reduce numbers to 6, 270 military personnel and 2,602 police. Finally, in October of 2013, numbers once again were reduced to 5,021 military personnel and 2, 601 police which indicates that there is gradual success in handing over power to the Haitian government while slowly decreasing the need for international forces (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013).
5. What type of Peace Support Operation is MINUSTAH and what are the Core Goals of the Operation?

Determining what type of peace mission you are looking at will determine how you analyze that peace mission. Different peace support operations have different goals so when deciding how to analyze an operation you must first ascertain what the goal or goals of the operation are then formulate key questions to evaluate the outcome of mission effectiveness. Analysts recommend using guidelines in the operations mandate of the mission because they contain specific tasks, requirements and benchmarks (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Core goals of a peace support operation mission are violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement. Violence abatement is a reduction or complete cessation of armed violence and the prevention or the reoccurrence of violence. Conflict containment is preventing the spread of violence into new geographic areas. Conflict settlement is creating a conducive environment necessary in order to resolve issues and positions of the conflict participants. Peripheral goals of a peace support operation mission are election supervision, democratization, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and human rights protection. Other peripheral goals that fall under the peacebuilding umbrella are local security, the rule of law, local governance and restoration, reconciliation and transformation (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

In order to define a mission as successful, you must first identify what the specific core and peripheral goals are in a peace mission, these are usually found in the mandate. The next step would be to identify measures that will check the progress of each goal and identify the benefits and limitations of those measures. Finally, analyze the extent to which those goals were achieved or not achieved. There can be a mixed record of success or failure depending on how well the goals were defined, what variables interceded with the measurements of success, and the interpretations of each of the parties (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Currently MINUSTAH is a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation which includes over three thousand NGO’s, the UN, the OAS, UNISUR, and CARICOM partnering with the national government and people of Haiti. The goals according to the MINUSTAH mandate (Resolution 2119, 2013) are as follows: MINUSTAH will continue in the resolution process it has enacted since 2004 to further deploy 5,021 troops and 2,601 police that will continue to aid the Haitian government in a transitional partnership configured from the security
situation on the ground in Haiti. The forces given will continue to aid in maintaining a secure and stable environment. This will in turn strengthen the Haitian state capabilities of national police, national authorities, and state responsibilities. A drawdown in troop size shows that there is a success increase in the Haitians state abilities to conduct these aspects on their own but a full withdrawal cannot occur as of yet because the stability is still fragile. Since considerable progress has been made, the secretary general has proposed that in 2014 MINUSTAH be replaced with a smaller more focused mission (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). This is a sign of successful peacekeeping.

MINUSTAH places importance on allowing the primary responsibility of the nation’s stability on the government to include logistical and technical expertise along with decentralization efforts so that the capacity of the national and local governments will enhance State authority throughout the country and will promote good governance and rule of law. As part of this the political actors will need to work cooperatively to complete the necessary steps of electoral law so ensure free, fair, and transparent senatorial, municipal, and local elections that comply with the Haitian constitution. The continued electoral assistance is coordinated by MINUSTAH with the Haitian government, OAS, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These same stakeholders are to also support women’s political participation which is accorded by the Haitian constitution (“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2004; “Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013).

Continual support of the Haitian National Police is needed to ensure that the force grows to a minimum of 15,000 fully operational police officers by 2016. This includes all logistical and administrative capacities that law enforcement entails with accountability to the rule of law. This will include law enforcement accountability and respect for human rights, enhanced vetting and recruitment procedures, strengthened land and maritime border patrol, and deterrence from transnational organized crime. Justice reforms are encouraged to deal with the issues of prolonged pre-trials, prison conditions and overcrowding (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).

MINUSTAH stresses that donors and the Haitian government need to communicate, facilitate and coordinate to enhance the effectiveness of the HNP. Coordination with international actors is encouraged to enhance their programs to inhibit gang violence, organized crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of persons especially children. This will help to end the
impunity within the country which is currently impeding the process in Haiti. Increased
coordination efforts are called between all donors, partners, and international NGO’s to work
through the Haitian governments Coordination of External Aid (CAED) which will insure
increased transparency, national ownership and increase the government’s ability to manage the
assistance given (“Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013).

Increased and renewed efforts need to be made at developing improved living conditions
especially for women and children, which will also aid in decreasing the gender based violence
against women and children from gangs and the widespread incidences of rape and other sexual
abuses. MINUSTAH is encouraged to keep protecting internally displaced persons in camps by
jointly patrolling the camps utilizing Haitian national forces and international forces as well. The
Secretary-Generally is explicitly requesting to give a no tolerance policy against those external
actors who sexually exploit or abuse persons in Haiti in order to prevent cases of misconduct. He
also requests that all cases are properly investigated and punished. The MINUSTAH mission for
human rights protection is reaffirmed as being the essential element to stability in the nation. A
continued community violence reduction approach is requested to be coordinated with the
Haitian government in order to build local stability and capacity. Programs for the control of the
flow of small arms and development of a registry, as well as a revision of laws on the possession
of weapons, is requested to be reformed in order to aid law enforcement in counteracting

Final Analysis

Haiti has endured hardships from the moment of their conception. They have endured
slavery, revolts, warlords, gangs, corruption, and natural disasters. It has seen two hundred years
of destruction and corruption. When comparing the strides made in the ten years that
MINUSTAH has been enacted, Haiti is vastly becoming a nation of growth and stabilization. A
rapid overnight change cannot be expected. Changing the organization and processes of an entire
society takes generations to overcome. MINUSTAH has not only affected change in Haiti but it
has built and expanded the concept of operations on how peacekeeping missions should be
conducted in the future. This is shown in Localising Aid: A Whole of Society Approach (Glennie
& Rabinowitz, 2013) where the WoS process is explained and impressed upon. MINUSTAH is
an example of a successful peace support operation because it was able to grow, change and expand from its disasters and strife. The helping of people is never a failure.

Conclusions

J. Martin Rochester tells us that “there seems to be a feedback, learning process at work that moves international law along incrementally” (Rochester, 2012, p. 275). This is certainly true when applied to peace support operations. Evaluating peace support operations is necessary in order to enhance international policy. The international law used to back peacekeeping missions has taken three generations to evolve into the robust peace support operations that are utilized to maintain peace and security. This is not a perfected process, but it is a process that is continually growing and expanding to accommodate the changing needs of the world today.

References

Ireland’s history is well known for the intense violence between Irish natives and English “conquerors.” Throughout the decades, Irish Catholics and English Protestants came to violent blows through the country in an attempt to cement political and social control over the Island. Only recently has the work by a number of politicians, activists and scholars provided an environment in which the road to peace can be paved through intense work and engagement with the surrounding communities. *Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process* details the events, circumstances and opportunities for continued learning about how ethnic conflict can be effectively resolved allowing for communities to redevelop identities which allow them to work together to create a peaceful society. The text is a collection of chapters written by various authors analyzing and revealing the important components of The Good Friday Agreement; the volume is edited by Timothy J. White, currently a professor of Political Science at Xavier University, with expertise in Irish Politics and Irish Political culture. The authors included in the publication illustrate an understanding of the workings of Irish political culture and various degrees of understanding of conflict analysis and resolution perspectives.

While the stories of the Northern Ireland peace process are promising and many lessons have been learned, it is vital to understand that each lesson is held within a certain context and may not be easily applied to other circumstances as implied in the text. There is a great deal to be learned and extracted but as conflict resolution practitioners we must be extremely wary of broad-based application of lessons from one peace process to another. In this review, I will briefly cover the various factors described by the authors within the text that they believe contributed to a successful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland as well as provide a critical analysis of each aspect as well and an evaluation of the book as a whole. These factors can be divided into seven distinct categories, not all of which will be covered within this review: redefinition of identities and interests, the use of inclusive negotiations and settlements with few
or no pre-conditions, the changing of structural conditions such as the policing organizations and the provision of security, civil society and reconciliation, and finally intense engagement in the process while supporting moderates and marginalizing spoilers. For the purpose of this review I will cover redefinition of identities and interests, the use of inclusive negotiations and settlements, and civil society and reconciliation. Each of these components provided distinct lessons to learn according to each author.

Redefinition of Identities and Interests

Each of the puzzle pieces of lessons that fit into the Northern Ireland peace process can be effectively applied to other conflicts if, and only if, the true nature and context of the conflict is understood. Since identity played a key role in the perpetuation of conflict in Northern Ireland, it is important to stress that these lessons may be better applied in ethnic conflicts that are drawn along lines of political control. In Northern Ireland, the majority of the population is Protestant and segregation of Catholic minorities played a key part in perpetuation of violence. Redefinition of the identities of the key players in the violence can, according to the authors, assist in creating “salience” within the identity of groups. This, according to Landon Hancock (2013), allows for the limiting of each side to see the other as an “enemy”. In the case of Northern Ireland, Hancock is correct in insisting that communities find a way to depolarize the importance of the identity, however, the process is essentially unending and difficult to achieve. Our identities, our stories are woven into our lives with such care and tight knit strings that it is not that simple to open up the weave and allow ourselves to change. Loyalists and Republicans in Northern Ireland may find it very difficult to let go of that identity, unless there is a reward for doing so. Applying this lesson to other ethnic conflicts can certainly prove to be difficult. Imagine a negotiator attempting to ask a Palestinian to give up or let go of their identity of “Palestinian” in order to achieve peace with Israel. This cannot occur without concessions in power or political control from other groups. While this occurred in Ireland, we, as conflict resolution practitioners should accept this factor of letting go of identity with skepticism when approaching negotiation or mediation with other groups.

Identity salience can be achieved, according to Hancock (2013), in the text, if and only if structural changes occur that allow it to happen naturally. In the case of Northern Ireland, this was achieved through the complete restructuring of the policing system and security organizations. When a population feels safe from violence, feels as if the security systems in place will protect rather than marginalize them, identity salience can occur with greater frequency. John Doyle (2013), the author of this chapter, insists that policing created “an
apparently unbridgeable divide between the two communities” (p. 148) in Northern Ireland. Social inequalities between Protestants and Catholics required that the primarily Protestant police forces be transformed into a system that was politically impartial. This was achieved in Northern Ireland and could successfully be implemented into other conflict situations, with relative ease, if parties are willing to cooperate.

**Inclusive Negotiations and Settlements**

Another important contextual unit that can be applied from the lessons learned in Northern Ireland includes the use of inclusive negotiations and settlements with few pre-conditions, and intense engagement with moderates and the marginalization of spoilers (essentially people or groups who are insistent in not reaching agreements). In the case of Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein, viewed by many as a terrorist group, was included in the negotiations and settlements with very few preconditions. Decommissioning of weapons proved to be the most important precondition and took place quickly by the political group after the U.S. was attacked on September 11, 2001. Again, inclusive negotiations are vital, however, it is very difficult to imagine certain groups coming to the conclusion that this is an acceptable position to take. There is a natural tendency to believe that allowing the inclusion of certain groups creates a sense of weakness in one or more of the parties involved. Negotiators may have more success using this lesson, provided they have, once again, a deep understanding of the context of the conflict, according to the author (White, 2013).

**Civil Society and Reconciliation**

The most important lesson learned in the case of Northern Ireland is the re-establishment of civil society and reconciliation. Violence, especially in the case of ethnic conflict, cannot be eradicated without the practice of forgiveness and reconciliation within the groups involved. It is important to note that there is likely still a great deal of distrust within Catholic and Protestant populations in Northern Ireland and as more time passes without episodes of violence, with more community interaction this distrust will fade. White, Owsiaiak and Clarke (2013), discuss the importance of this aspect in Northern Ireland in great detail within the text; emphasizing that the Good Friday Agreement failed to transform the relationship between opposing communities. Without the transformation of relationships from that of violence to tolerance and eventually compassion, a true peace cannot form in Northern Ireland.

Each lesson learned in Northern Ireland is incredibly valuable, as this conflict has literally raged for hundreds of years. Though, as conflict resolution practitioners, we must be, once more, very wary of applying these lessons to other conflicts without understanding and
having a deep knowledge of the context of the conflict we are addressing. The participants in the peace process must be willing to work together, with few preconditions, be inclusive and be willing to restructure society and communities with the help of third parties if they are to achieve a lasting peace. *Lessons from the Northern Ireland Peace Process*, provides an excellent introduction to the effective aspects of the peace process as well as emphasizing the importance of context in each situation. The collection of chapters contributes significantly to the understanding of conflict resolution processes in relation to long-lasting ethnic conflicts for students and practitioners alike. While more time is needed to fully understand the impact of the lessons from Northern Ireland the basic recommendations, cautions and advice provide an initial look at how negotiators can assist conflict parties in coming to an understanding on the creation of peaceful societies.

**References**


