Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Enhance International Policy

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Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Enhance International Policy

Abstract

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization created from the express consent of states and established upon a multilateral international treaty between those states in order to perform the functions of promoting international peace and security, aid in the development of international relations, promote human rights, and aid in "harmonizing actions" between nations. The most ardent of these functions falls to the UN Security Council due to its responsibility for maintaining peace and security. UN peacekeeping missions were originally an alternative to collective security but they have evolved into Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. Evaluations of PSOs is imperative in order to effectively provide policy makers with the knowledge necessary to improve strategy and resource allocation for future PSOs.

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This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol22/iss1/4
Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Enhance International Policy

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Abstract

The United Nations (UN) is an international organization created from the express consent of states and established upon a multilateral international treaty between those states in order to perform the functions of promoting international peace and security, aid in the development of international relations, promote human rights, and aid in “harmonizing actions” between nations. The most ardent of these functions falls to the UN Security Council due to its responsibility for maintaining peace and security. UN peacekeeping missions were originally an alternative to collective security but they have evolved into Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. Evaluations of PSOs is imperative in order to effectively provide policy makers with the knowledge necessary to improve strategy and resource allocation for future PSOs.

Introduction

International agreements between states have led to the creation of the United Nations (UN) and its six organs which facilitate diplomacy and moderate conflict. Of these six organs, the UN Security Council has been noted as the most ambitious due to their primary function being to maintain international peace and security (Janis, 2008, p. 215). Maintaining peace and security is an extensive and rigorous process which includes numerous practices but most notable are peace support operations. The peace support operations of today have changed drastically since the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal in 1944 which laid the original principles and
organization for the establishment of the UN and its organs. UN peace operations have evolved over several generations from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to peace support operations which incorporate peace enforcement capabilities. “Louis Henkin has written that in relations between nations, the progress of civilization may be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law” (Rochester, 2012, p. 261). I argue that because the world is constantly changing, the movement of force to diplomacy, and from diplomacy to law needs to take one step farther. An evaluation of the law needs to be continually undergone in order for the law to evolve and grow with the changing needs of the world. This means an evaluation process needs to be utilized for the peace support operations of today in order to determine what constitutes a success or failure of a peace support operation. This will, in turn, set the building blocks for the knowledge needed to make international policy. Evaluations will provide policy makers with an analysis of the effectiveness of a mission, allow for improvement, and offer an understanding of resource allocations and strategy (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p. 202).

The Creation of the United Nations

The UN is an international organization whose legal roots are founded in the law of treaties. The law of treaties states the accepted rules about the making, the affect, amendment, invalidity, and termination of agreements among states. The law of treaties has its roots in customary international law which is where international organizations ground their legal effect among nations. International organizations are created from an express consent of states and are established upon a multilateral treaty agreed upon by states. These international organizations are created to fulfill specific designated functions in international relations. In order for international organizations to legally perform these functions, states delegate some of their sovereign powers to these international organizations. International organizations have become forums for negotiating international issues (Janis, 2008).

The institution of the United Nations is an international organization that was developed from a failed League of Nations through a post-World War II desire to develop a working international entity that would be able to aid in the facilitation of diplomacy and moderate conflict. The UN Charter established six main organs: the Security Council, the General assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat,
and the Trusteeship Council. These organs work together to carry out the four main purposes of the UN:

- “to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations” (United Nations Security Council, 2014, para. 2).

**An Ambitious Organ: The United Nations Security Council**

Mark Westin Janis has referred to the UN Security Council as “the most ambitious of the United Nations’ organs, having ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’” (Janis, 2008, p. 215). When the UN Security Council receives a complaint they encourage that the parties try to reach an agreement through peaceful means. This is a multifaceted process which begins with parties agreeing to principles for a peaceful agreement and committing to investigation and mediation. When necessary it can escalate to the dispatch of a mission, appointment of special envoys, or to request the Secretary-General to use his offices to promote peaceful dispute settlements. If a dispute is hostile, the Council will require a complete cessation of violence and dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force. The Council can enact Chapter VII of the UN Charter and mandate enforcement measures which are economic sanctions, use of arms, embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, travel bans, severance of diplomatic relations, blockades, and collective military action (United Nations Security Council, 2014).

Peacekeeping was originally an alternative to collective security. The UN could essentially create a space where negotiated solutions to conflicts could occur while military troops kept the opposing sides separated. It was thought that during this cessation of conflict the UN could help with conflict resolution and conciliation (Caldwell & Williams, 2012).

**Generational Evolution of Peacekeeping**

First generation peacekeeping was the peaceful settlement of disputes and enforcement. They operated on the premise of: consent of all parties, political neutrality, impartiality (commitment to the mandate), the non-use of force except in self-defense and finally, legitimacy (sanctioned by and accountable to the Security Council advised by the Secretary General). These
peacekeeping missions sought to monitor borders and buffer zones after a ceasefire. During the Cold War thirteen of these peacekeeping missions were enacted (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).

Immediately after the Cold War, the weakening state of countries previously occupied by regional powers could be seen. “No longer were ethnic groups within the superpowers’ areas limited with their ambitions to gain nation status nor were nations reluctant to challenge the arbitrary lines drawn on colonial maps” (Woodhouse, & Ramsbotham, 2000, p.64). Herein complex emergencies emanate. Intra-state conflict becomes the norm as opposed to inter-state conflict. With this weakening of the state came the decline in human rights, the destruction of social and cultural institutions and the rise of warlords. The Cold War peacekeeping missions could not adequately accommodate the rapid growth of conflict worldwide. The function and composition of the peacekeeping operations changed from monitoring after a ceasefire to covering security, humanitarian, and political objectives. These peacekeeping missions were second generation. The number of countries who participated in peacekeeping operations tripled from 1980’s-1990’s. Peacekeeping operations became more diversified by utilizing more sources such as military, civilian police, and took a diplomatic approach. But with the ever increasing problems of lack of protection for its workers, genocide, killings, and human rights violations the peacekeeping missions found “that faced with attempts to murder, expel, or terrorize entire populations, the neutral, impartial and mediating role of the UN was inadequate” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 151).

These were the precursors for today’s peacekeeping operations. Third generation peacekeeping missions reflect the change peacekeeping operations needed to undergo in order to handle the current complex emergencies that are simultaneously occurring worldwide. While there is debate on the effectiveness of the means which are deployed in carrying out these operations it is known that global support is needed in order to transform and reconcile conflict of today. The peacekeeping missions of today are referred to as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and are deployed with a strategy and mission in mind that will coordinate the multitude of organizations joining in to support the society undergoing a complex emergency. The PSO covers both the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, “but now used more widely to embrace in addition those other peace-related operations which include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2000, p.64).
Early engagement in a PSO mission will make the investment more cost effective as well as affect the likeliness of long term success of the mission. PSOs operate on the basis of neutrality taking on the role of a third party conciliator and are designed to enforce a safe environment where entities can come into a complex emergency and began their peace process. Differences in third generation PSOs are that consent is no longer required and they can utilize Peace Enforcement (PE) doctrine to enforce cooperation of the peacekeeping mandate. The end-state of peacekeeping is to have a secure and self-sustaining environment within the society.

The complexities of conflict today require the peacekeeping process to become more complex and rigorous in order to transform society. It is not acceptable to stand by and allow human rights and a lack of human security to ensue. Though we cannot expound a definite recipe that will work for every conflict emergency we can continually strive to work for transformative solutions that will allow for a growth process that will build from the ground up. As Kofi Annan has stated, each individual is entitled to have “freedom from fear (through conflict management and resolution), freedom from want (through economic development and growth) and sustaining the future (through careful husbanding of the earth’s resources and ecosystems)” (Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2000, p. 163). It is the duty of the international community to continually strive to help those who cannot help themselves.

**Evaluating Peace Support Operations to Determine the Effectiveness of International Policy**

Research on peacekeeping has mainly focused on the practicality of conflict management and resolution with the primary importance being what works and not on how or why it worked. The UN and militaries have a focus on “lessons learned” in order to discern what success is and what will improve future operations. Explicit evaluative measures need to be provided in order to understand what constitutes success and what the process to achieve that success was. An important note to make is that not every peace support operation can be evaluated by the same standards because not every peace support operation is the same. For example, peace support operations deployed to support civil wars will not have the same standards as peace support operations deployed to support interstate conflicts. “A proper specification of peace operation success thus yields a number of policy making benefits” (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010, p.6). Policy makers will be able to make valid inferences about the conditions associated with success,
provide a multifaceted assessment, and provide a baseline in order to make judgment and international policy changes (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010).

The success of international peace support operations can be determined through a variety of perspectives. According to Evaluating Peace Operations, by Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman (2010), five dimensions of evaluation decisions need to be considered. They are: the stakeholders, time perspectives, baselines, “lumping,” and mission types. We will explore these five dimensions and then discuss what Diehl and Druckman consider to be core goals of success and a framework for assessment of those goals as applied to MINUSTAH.

Case Study: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an ongoing mission which began in June 2004 and is continuing to the present day. It is a transformative result stemming from a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which began in February 2004 after the military coup ousted and caused the democratically elected president of Haiti, Bertrand Aristide, to be exiled. Security Council Resolution 1542 was enacted on 1 June 2004 to:

- aid in securing the rule of law, to enable a stable environment for the transitional government, to restructure the Haitian police force, to aid in public safety and order, to aid in Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, to prevent violence, and support the constitutional and political processes, to assist in municipal organizational process, public elections, and support and assist the government and human rights institutions (“MINUSTAH Mandate,” 2004).
- The devastation caused by the 12 January 2010 earthquake left an already unstable society in shambles. The earthquake caused two hundred twenty thousand deaths. Because of the severity of the occurrence, the United Nations Secretary General proposed an increase in support levels to aid in the recovery, reconstruction and stability endeavors (“Restoring a secure and stable environment,” 2013).

A Brief Haitian History

Haiti has a long history of strife, repression, and revolutionary efforts. In 1804, after a thirteen year rebellion, the African slave population overthrew the wealthy landowner and political leaders, gained their independence, and created the nation of Haiti. This was the first slave population to gain control of their society which created fear of possible revolts in other
slave owning nations. Haiti is the world’s oldest black republic and the world’s second republic in the Western Hemisphere, the United States being the first. Haiti’s independence movement was feared by other Western countries and was not even recognized by the United States until the 1960’s after the country abolished slavery (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).

In 1844 Haiti split from its western side, Santo Domingo, which became the Dominican Republic. Haiti was isolated from market links to other countries because of the fact that it was a black free state which was detrimental to its economy.

There was no indigenous capital with which to construct the infrastructure necessary to trade with the wider world. Nor was it possible to fund the educational system necessary to provide the human capital required to improve the range of products produced domestically (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010).

While still a slave nation sugar was the exported product of the country but after the revolution there was no slave population to farm the sugar cane. The lands were subdivided and used for sustenance farming.

Twenty two changes in government occurred in Haiti from 1843-1915 which marked a time of political and economic disarray that left a legacy for the next century. Because of this political and economic disorder, the United States occupied the country for nineteen years and finally left 1934. A series of dictators ran the country after until 1957 when a father and son duo, Francois Duvalier and Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled until 1986. During this time frame the country was corrupt, over run with violence, and rampant with warlordism (“Haiti: A history of misfortune,” 2010). Upon the completion of the Duvalier family dictatorship, a constitutional government was ratified in 1987 which made provisions for an elected government and also provided political decentralization of the local government which allowed for the elections of mayors and administrative bodies to run the localities (“1987 Constitution of Haiti,” 2011).

Provisional bodies ran the government from 1987 until the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in December 1990. Aristide won what was seen, internationally, as a fair and free democratically run election with a sixty-seven percent vote. A violent coup overthrew Aristide once he took government and caused his exile. Violence and corruption ensued which contributed to every one in eight Haitian nationals to flee from the country (“Haiti’s history,” 2011).
United Nations Intervention in Haiti: Background (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013)

While the provisional government was holding their elections in 1990, they requested the involvement of a United Nations observers group in order to verify the elections process (ONUVEH). After the military coup the United Nations along with the organization of American States (OAS) deployed to aid the country in February 1993. By September 1993 Haiti’s first United Nations peacekeeping operation was organized by the Security Council called, the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). This mission was unsuccessful due to the Haitians lack of military cooperation. This type of UN peacekeeping mission began as a second generation mission because the UN was invited in to monitor and handle the political objectives of the Haitian diplomatic process but evolved into a third generations peace support operation (Ramsbotham et al., 2011).

Because of the UNMIH failure the UN Security Council enacted a multinational series of peacekeeping missions, from 1994-2000, which deployed a force of twenty thousand that would “return the legitimate Haitian authorities, maintain a secure and stable environment in the country, and promote the rule of law” (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013, para. 2). This was a quick development into a third generation peacekeeping process resulting from the lack of peace enforcement which affected mission capabilities. Third generation peacekeeping allows for troop deployments to abate violence, achieve conflict containment and promote conflict settlement (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011). Developments made during this timeframe were the positive proactive advancement of democracy, and the growth of civil society. Though growth and progression were seen, some residual issues remained such as regression of implemented reforms to the political crisis and stability to the country that never took hold. Insurgency broke out in Gonaives and spread over the northern part of the country. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1529 in February 2004 to authorize the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) which would stabilize and secure the environment in order to continue support of a peaceful political process.

The MIF transformed into the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) on 30 April 2004 upon the recommendation from the UN Secretary-General. The mandated goals of MINUSTAH were
to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013, para. 6).

Between 2004 and 2009 adjustments to the mandate were made in order to adapt to the changing needs on the ground and great progress was made towards all areas of the mandated goals. Setbacks to Haiti came when the devastating earthquake hit on 12 January 2010. Because of the devastation caused by the earthquake, all progress previously made under MINUSTAH was halted. Nation-building and presidential and municipal elections previously set into place were stopped which added to the uncertainty and unrest of the state. MINUSTAH was no longer a functioning program because one hundred and two UN personnel were killed in the earthquake to include the UN Special Representative and his principal deputy. Because of this, the priorities of the mandate changed. The UN Secretary General reported on the situation and the need for relief efforts, security, and restoration of the state. Endorsement of the Secretary General’s report came on 19 January under Resolution 1908 which increased force levels of MINUSTAH to support recovery, stabilization, and reconstruction in Haiti not only for short term recovery help but for long term reconstruction (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013).

Resolution 1927 was enacted on 4 June 2010 which gave additional police and troops to aid with Haitian recovery but clearly stated that along with the surge in troop and police aid, the government of Haiti needed to take primary responsibility for stabilization and development, MINUSTAH was solely there as a supportive role. Requests for Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to provide support in humanitarian and recovery efforts along with the OAS to help support continued international electoral assistance were made as well.
MINUSTAH’s success was seen in the March 2011 elections where the technical, logistical and administrative assistance proved rewarding. Michael Martelly was elected into office and transitioned smoothly. Renewing Haitian economy and further strengthening the rule of law was still necessary. A year after the earthquake, the fragility of security in Haiti still resounded. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2012 in October 2011 which called for a drawdown in forces but allowed for the continuing support in Haiti. Because of the smooth transition from one elected President to the other and continuing progress in the nation, Resolution 2070 was passed in October 2012 which further reduced forces to accommodate the growing stabilization in Haiti (“MINUSTAH background,” 2013).

Using Evaluating Peace Operations (Diehl, & Druckman, 2010) to Analyze the Evolution of the United Nations MINUSTAH Resolutions in Haiti

1. The Stakeholders

The first in the five dimensions of evaluative decisions are the stakeholders. As we consider all the stakeholders contributing to a peace support operation we also need to consider that each of the stakeholders will have a different definition of the success of the peace support operation. The international community represents a large piece. These are third party stakeholders such as states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s). Their goals can be varied but include stopping the spread of conflict across borders, aiding the development of international norms such as human rights and cooperative securities, and promoting world values. The interactions from the international stakeholders can include the promotion of political stakes and will entail certain states promoting sides to ensure that certain groups are recognized and considered during the peace process. Troop contribution to a peace support operation can have vested interests from their state of origin and can contribute to the determining factor of success (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

A particularly relevant subset of interested states assume leading roles in peace support operations and/or contribute personnel to the peace support operation…there is some debate over whether states contribute troops for altruistic, power and status, or pecuniary reasons, but once troops are deployed, contributors have vested interests in protecting those troops. (Diehl & Druckman, 2010, p.13)
This can change the assessment values of a peacekeeping operation from containment of the spread of the conflict and promoting human securities to ensuring that one’s troops participating in the peace support operation are not harmed. This is particularly relevant when the domestic audiences of a state are watching, through the use of media, the outcome of conflict. Poorer states contributing troops to a peace support operation could have priorities that are not altruistic in nature. Sometimes these states are looking for the training, experience and financial payments that the UN can provide their troops. This takes the main focus away from the conflict resolution process needed in the area and brings the focus to the international community contributing to the peace mission (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

An example of this occurrence in Haiti is shown in the article *Canadian Army Troops Return Home from UN Mission in Haiti*. The article discusses how Canada sees the importance of a Canadian platoon deploying with a Brazilian battalion in order to strengthen their partnership with Brazil. “Brazil is an important partner for Canada. This deployment has been an excellent opportunity to deepen our defence relationship with the Brazilian Armed Forces and further strengthens the connection between our people” (“Canadian Army Troops,” 2013, para. 1).

NGO’s can have bureaucratic interests when it comes to peace support operations because they vie for funding and resources from outside entities. Their perception of success will be related to how they participate in the peace support operation and how they acquire their funding and resources. Beyond funding and resources, NGO’s are concerned with the assessment of their reputations because, “when peace operations denigrate the reputation of an organization, its other missions may suffer” (Diehl& Druckman, 2010, p.14).

There are over three thousand NGO’s working to aid in Haiti’s recovery which has given the country a nickname of “The Republic of NGO’s” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 1). Because of the intense amount of aid coming from multiple directions without a centered leadership, Haitians were looking to the NGO’s for all support instead of their government. This in itself is defeating of the original mandated purpose from the UN which sought to strengthen the governmental capacity. This problem was heightened following the 2010 earthquake.

Haiti’s government has been criticized for not taking a more visible role in responding to people’s needs following the earthquake. If projects implemented by NGO’s do no match
up with the government’s priorities, the long-term success of recovery efforts will be undermined. (Kristoff, et al., 2010)

Even though the Haitian government does not have the resources to directly implement the required programs that will aid in its nation’s recovery, it does have the ability to oversee the NGO’s activities which will not only ensure that NGO work aligns with the governments goals but will also serve to strengthen the government. This is in alignment with the initial goal mandated in MINUSTAH (“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2013). One example of NGO’s non-alignment issues is funding. Outside entities are afraid to give the government money to implement funding so they funnel the money through the NGO’s. Because the NGO’s have more funding than the government the Haitian people look to the NGO’s for support and not their government. This “perpetuates a cycle of low capacity, corruption and accountability among Haitian government institutions” (Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010, para. 2). Since NGO’s have the funding they can hire local people at a higher wage than the government. Though this is appealing for the Haitian people, it is not sustaining in the long run because eventually the NGO’s will leave and take their jobs with them. If the government was providing jobs then it would mean long term employment for nationals.

After the 2009 donor’s conference a slow transition to provide funding through the government began. This notion is further expanded by Localising Aid: A whole Society Approach (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). The authors of this document seek to express the importance of utilizing a Whole of Society (WoS) approach. This approach states that all key stakeholders need to be involved in the solution of the issue. This entails constant communication between NGO’s, international governments, local governments, and the people. This lack in communication is one of the primary flaws seen today. WoS also states that donors and NGO’s need to participate in government led strategies. Allowing NGO’s unfettered entrance into the area undergoing peacekeeping is chaotic and needs to be centralized and in alignment with the goals of the local society while allowing for engagement in information sharing (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013).

The primary protagonists within the conflict hold an interest in the redistribution of goods but they usually do not agree on how they should be redistributed. This can be problematic during a conflict resolution process because, though a cease-fire has been called and negotiations for the redistribution of goods has begun, it is possible that the only reason protagonists are participating is to allow themselves time to rearm in order to start fighting again. In times of civil
war and intrastate conflict, the actors participating in the conflict can be very diverse which makes a fair dividing of the goods more difficult especially when each side wants a zero-sum outcome. Issues with Haitian primary protagonists initially lied within the gangs and other various violent groups of the nation who wished to oppose the government (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2004). These gangs and groups are impeding the success of the mission by importing small arms, are violent against the local government, and are involved with human and drug trafficking.

Finally, the local population in an area of conflict will have their own interests and interpretations of what a successful peace support operation is. The presumption is that the cessation of conflict will improve the lives of the population but this is not the entirety of the conflict resolution process as it relates to the people. Issues that have arisen during peace support operations caused by the entities that are supposed to help the population are: the inability to repatriate refugees, creation of distortions to the local market economy; and the incidence of rape and spread of disease from the peace soldiers.

The Haitian local population has a legacy of issues that will need to be addressed over generations. Many programs have been implemented to address their needs but their ability to resonate and stick will only be seen over time. Instilling democratic desires in the people of Haiti was slow in coming because they lacked the will to participate. This has slowly changed over time and success can be seen by the participation in the May 2011 election and by the successful transfer in power between presidents (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2004; “MINUSTAH Background,” 2013). Attracting outside investors in the Haitian economy is slow and difficult to come because of the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake but movements are being made to entice foreign investors (“Jatropha Foundation,” 2009). In order to deter the incidences of abuse caused by international troops, the UN Secretary-General has requested that international militaries give a no tolerance policy against those external actors who sexually exploit or abuse persons in order to prevent cases of misconduct and require that personnel are properly investigated and punished (Resolution 2119, 2013).

2. **Time Perspective**

Next in the evaluative framework is the perspective of time which can be viewed in short-term and long-term success. Since MINUSTAH is a long term and transformative peacekeeping operation that has had a devastating natural disaster occur during its nine year
mission we will be evaluating it by looking at changes that have occurred over time. Long-term success is assessed by looking at the peace support operation for several years to decades after the operation has ended. It is based on policy interventions that influence behaviors which can only be assessed on the effects those behaviors have over an extended length of time. Long-term perspectives will lead to other assessments when various stakeholders undergo changes as shown in evaluating baselines (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

MINUSTAH has not ended but has seen success which is shown in the drawdown of international troops and the successful transfer of government during recent presidential elections (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).

MINUSTAH has seen great setbacks because of the 2010 earthquake but recuperation and recovery are still underway. According to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Haiti, the stabilization of Haiti is currently underway but is still fragile. “Enduring political stability is the key to strengthening the country’s governance institutions, promoting socio-economic development, and attracting foreign investment” (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012, p. 3).

Promoting the Rule of Law and counteracting corruption is of primary importance. This entails promoting democratic governance, the police force, and justice programs. This will secure the legal and physical security of the local population so that stabilization of the country will occur. When the country is perceived as stable, investments, economic growth and development will grow (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Good institutional governance is being promoted through the launch of the national coordination framework of external development aid in Haiti (CAED) which aids in the progress of government reforms. This will be enacted at all levels of government to include national government, department level and community level government (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Housing and urban development will be expanded and safer building practices will be adopted to help strengthen the structural capacity of the buildings to prepare for possible future natural disasters. Displaced individuals need to be repatriated to homes after construction. Along with this, disaster risk reduction will aid with the problems erosion and deforestation which impact frequent flooding during hurricane and cyclone season (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).
Health education and treatments will continue through state and non-state actors so that significant progress will continue with nutrition, preventing the spread of HIV-AIDS, and aid with the fight of the cholera outbreak. This will require supporting expanded access to clean water and sanitation. Continued humanitarian action over the long term has significantly helped with all the above listed programs but it is necessary to continue it because the difficulties have not ceased within the nation (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

With the widespread poverty and high unemployment rates along with slow economic growth, job creation is a central problem. An unemployed population is more likely to participate in crime. Creating projects and jobs that employs the population is a priority (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

Finally, due to the lack of public infrastructure, school fees, and an uneven distribution of schools throughout the country, educating the population is very difficult. The UN and the Haitian government have been working closely together in order to increase access to education, regulate the education system, abolish fees and define educational standards for state non-state service providers (“Haiti Moving forward,” 2012).

These have all been necessary changes made over time. It will take generations to recover from the hardships that have occurred within the country. Many lessons have been learned from the organization and conduction of MINUSTAH which are shown in Lessons Learned in Haiti such as the need for incorporating Whole of Society (WoS) techniques and practices (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013). Though progress and stabilization has been slow, it can still be seen by the continual positive outcomes.

3. Establishing a Baseline

Establishing a baseline is a necessity for effective assessments of a peace support operation. You must first define what you are comparing the peace support operation to (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). The assessment of MINUSTAH is done in a longitudinal analysis to show the slow but positive changes that are being made. Even after the crisis caused by the 2010 earthquake which physically devastated the country and all progress made with social-political activities, the continual involvement and support provided has, overtime, made positive contributions to the Haitian society (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013; “Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). Also, the idea of Haiti being a “Republic of NGO’s” has promoted change in how future peace support operations are conducted as seen in how new documents
have appeared discussing the importance of governments aligning goals, sharing information, and communicating with NGO’s in order to perform and achieve in a shorter period of time (Glennie & Robinowitz, 2013; Kristoff & Panarelli, 2010).

4. Lumping

The next dimension of assessment is understanding “lumping” and how each element therein should be assessed. Peace support operations are a compilation of multiple procedures and processes such as size, training, strategy, tactics, time horizons, clarity and change of mandate, involvement with civil society, and host country and constituent support. These processes are “lumped” together in the peace support operation. These factors make it difficult to assess which one if not all pieces are contributing to the success or failure of an operation. General evaluations focus on the success of the whole rather than separating each part for assessment in order to prevent possible problems that arise from an assessment of a single part. But, knowing which factors contributed to the success of an operation can be imperative for understanding how to implement new peace support operations (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Since MINUSTAH is a long-term peace support operation that has spanned from 2004 to the present lumping will be required in order to assess the full progress of the peace support operation. To this day there have been challenges with the recovery to the Haitian society which were greatly heightened due to the devastation caused by the 2010 earthquake. But there is unending hope for the people who live there. Success can be seen by analyzing the facts of the strength of the forces aiding in Haiti. Personnel aid provided by the MINUSTAH mandate in April 2004 was 6,700 military personnel, 1622 police, 548 international civilian personnel, 154 UN volunteers, and 995 local civilian staff. In October 2009, 6,940 military personnel and 2,211 police personnel were provided. In June 2010, after the earthquake numbers were increased to 8,940 military personnel and 4,391 police in order to aid in the reconstruction. In October 2011, success was seen which allowed for the number of military and police personnel to drop to 7,340 military personnel and 3, 241 police personnel. In October 2012, the drawdown continued to reduce numbers to 6, 270 military personnel and 2,602 police. Finally, in October of 2013, numbers once again were reduced to 5,021 military personnel and 2, 601 police which indicates that there is gradual success in handing over power to the Haitian government while slowly decreasing the need for international forces (“MINUSTAH facts and figures,” 2013).
5. What type of Peace Support Operation is MINUSTAH and what are the Core Goals of the Operation?

Determining what type of peace mission you are looking at will determine how you analyze that peace mission. Different peace support operations have different goals so when deciding how to analyze an operation you must first ascertain what the goal or goals of the operation are then formulate key questions to evaluate the outcome of mission effectiveness. Analysts recommend using guidelines in the operations mandate of the mission because they contain specific tasks, requirements and benchmarks (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Core goals of a peace support operation mission are violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement. Violence abatement is a reduction or complete cessation of armed violence and the prevention or the reoccurrence of violence. Conflict containment is preventing the spread of violence into new geographic areas. Conflict settlement is creating a conducive environment necessary in order to resolve issues and positions of the conflict participants. Peripheral goals of a peace support operation mission are election supervision, democratization, humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and human rights protection. Other peripheral goals that fall under the peacebuilding umbrella are local security, the rule of law, local governance and restoration, reconciliation and transformation (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

In order to define a mission as successful, you must first identify what the specific core and peripheral goals are in a peace mission, these are usually found in the mandate. The next step would be to identify measures that will check the progress of each goal and identify the benefits and limitations of those measures. Finally, analyze the extent to which those goals were achieved or not achieved. There can be a mixed record of success or failure depending on how well the goals were defined, what variables interceded with the measurements of success, and the interpretations of each of the parties (Diehl & Druckman, 2010).

Currently MINUSTAH is a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation which includes over three thousand NGO’s, the UN, the OAS, UNISUR, and CARICOM partnering with the national government and people of Haiti. The goals according to the MINUSTAH mandate (Resolution 2119, 2013) are as follows: MINUSTAH will continue in the resolution process it has enacted since 2004 to further deploy 5,021 troops and 2,601 police that will continue to aid the Haitian government in a transitional partnership configured from the security
situation on the ground in Haiti. The forces given will continue to aid in maintaining a secure and stable environment. This will in turn strengthen the Haitian state capabilities of national police, national authorities, and state responsibilities. A drawdown in troop size shows that there is a success increase in the Haitians state abilities to conduct these aspects on their own but a full withdrawal cannot occur as of yet because the stability is still fragile. Since considerable progress has been made, the secretary general has proposed that in 2014 MINUSTAH be replaced with a smaller more focused mission (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013). This is a sign of successful peacekeeping.

MINUSTAH places importance on allowing the primary responsibility of the nation’s stability on the government to include logistical and technical expertise along with decentralization efforts so that the capacity of the national and local governments will enhance State authority throughout the country and will promote good governance and rule of law. As part of this the political actors will need to work cooperatively to complete the necessary steps of electoral law so ensure free, fair, and transparent senatorial, municipal, and local elections that comply with the Haitian constitution. The continued electoral assistance is coordinated by MINUSTAH with the Haitian government, OAS, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These same stakeholders are to also support women’s political participation which is accorded by the Haitian constitution (“MINUSTAH mandate,” 2004; “Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013).

Continual support of the Haitian National Police is needed to ensure that the force grows to a minimum of 15,000 fully operational police officers by 2016. This includes all logistical and administrative capacities that law enforcement entails with accountability to the rule of law. This will include law enforcement accountability and respect for human rights, enhanced vetting and recruitment procedures, strengthened land and maritime border patrol, and deterrence from transnational organized crime. Justice reforms are encouraged to deal with the issues of prolonged pre-trials, prison conditions and overcrowding (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).

MINUSTAH stresses that donors and the Haitian government need to communicate, facilitate and coordinate to enhance the effectiveness of the HNP. Coordination with international actors is encouraged to enhance their programs to inhibit gang violence, organized crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of persons especially children. This will help to end the
impunity within the country which is currently impeding the process in Haiti. Increased coordination efforts are called between all donors, partners, and international NGO’s to work through the Haitian governments Coordination of External Aid (CAED) which will insure increased transparency, national ownership and increase the government’s ability to manage the assistance given (“Report of the Secretary-General,” 2013).

Increased and renewed efforts need to be made at developing improved living conditions especially for women and children, which will also aid in decreasing the gender based violence against women and children from gangs and the widespread incidences of rape and other sexual abuses. MINUSTAH is encouraged to keep protecting internally displaced persons in camps by jointly patrolling the camps utilizing Haitian national forces and international forces as well. The Secretary-Generally is explicitly requesting to give a no tolerance policy against those external actors who sexually exploit or abuse persons in Haiti in order to prevent cases of misconduct. He also requests that all cases are properly investigated and punished. The MINUSTAH mission for human rights protection is reaffirmed as being the essential element to stability in the nation. A continued community violence reduction approach is requested to be coordinated with the Haitian government in order to build local stability and capacity. Programs for the control of the flow of small arms and development of a registry, as well as a revision of laws on the possession of weapons, is requested to be reformed in order to aid law enforcement in counteracting violence (“Report of the secretary-general,” 2013).

Final Analysis

Haiti has endured hardships from the moment of their conception. They have endured slavery, revolts, warlords, gangs, corruption, and natural disasters. It has seen two hundred years of destruction and corruption. When comparing the strides made in the ten years that MINUSTAH has been enacted, Haiti is vastly becoming a nation of growth and stabilization. A rapid overnight change cannot be expected. Changing the organization and processes of an entire society takes generations to overcome. MINUSTAH has not only affected change in Haiti but it has built and expanded the concept of operations on how peacekeeping missions should be conducted in the future. This is shown in Localising Aid: A Whole of Society Approach (Glennie & Rabinowitz, 2013) where the WoS process is explained and impressed upon. MINUSTAH is
an example of a successful peace support operation because it was able to grow, change and expand from its disasters and strife. The helping of people is never a failure.

**Conclusions**

J. Martin Rochester tells us that “there seems to be a feedback, learning process at work that moves international law along incrementally” (Rochester, 2012, p. 275). This is certainly true when applied to peace support operations. Evaluating peace support operations is necessary in order to enhance international policy. The international law used to back peacekeeping missions has taken three generations to evolve into the robust peace support operations that are utilized to maintain peace and security. This is not a perfected process, but it is a process that is continually growing and expanding to accommodate the changing needs of the world today.

**References**


