Peace and Conflict Studies

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- Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World
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Fictional Reality or Real Fictionality? The Relationship between Fictional Texts and Psychological Perceptions of Societies in Conflict

Yuval Benziman

Abstract
The study of groups’ behaviors in conflicts has shown that societies favor the in-group, delegitimize the out-group, and provide explanations for members of society as to why the conflict erupted and how to cope with it. It has been claimed that societies share a psychological in-group repertoire, an ethos of conflict, and that they develop a culture of conflict. As part of societies’ mechanisms, culture and fictional products – films, books and plays – have an important role in shaping the way people perceive, think and act in conflicts. Yet fictional texts, by their mere characteristics, provide a discourse which is more ambiguous and more equivocal: They speak in different voices, have many layers, and present the fictional reality in complex and even self-contradicting ways. There is therefore a contradiction between the role cultural texts supposedly have in an ethos of conflict, and the complex discourse they present. Looking at novels and films produced in Israel in the 1980s as a case study, the article shows that cultural products do not necessarily go in line with what one could expect from texts produced in a society in conflict. It is shown that in this particular case the cultural products provide a picture that resembles the ethos of conflict that will take the forefront 20 years later but not of the time in which they were produced. Three hypotheses are suggested in order to explain this gap.

Introduction
In his influential book, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson claims that unlike earlier times when communities were small enough for members of society to meet and know each other, modern communities try to find ways that will help them imagine their shared identities (Anderson, 1991) and cultural texts have an enormous role in doing that.

Continuing that school of thought, Bhabha (1990) argues that nations are in a constant process of creating themselves through narratives: there is a continuing dialectical interchange between the nation which creates a master-narrative for its cultural texts on the one hand, and the cultural texts that provide a narrative for the nation on the other hand. As
Bruner (1991) notes, when discussing the different features of narratives, “There seems to be some sense in which narrative, rather than referring to ‘reality’, may in fact create or constitute it, as when ‘fiction’ creates a ‘world’ of its own” (Bruner, 1991, p. 13).

For these and other reasons, as Jameson (1981) claims, it is a mistake to try to differentiate between cultural texts which have social political aspects and those who supposedly do not. Everything that is poetic is also political, and “…there is nothing that is not social and historical – indeed, that everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political” (Jameson, 1981, p. 20). Therefore, every cultural text should be looked at as a political text; and analyses of such texts should reveal the underlying assumptions, the unconscious political worlds, and the hidden ideologies that they are based on. As Dowling (1984) explains it, taking the Freudian interpretation of dreams as a reference, when a dream is dreamt the unconscious supposedly does not exist because the dreamer experiences it as a full independent story. Yet the unconscious actually dictates the dream. Likewise, cultural texts are supposedly autonomous, but they are actually constructed and based on ideologies, schools of thoughts, social perceptions and collective shared values. That is why genres change as times change (Bruner, 1991) and different nations at different times produce different kinds of narratives in their cultural texts.

Fictional texts produced in societies in conflict have an important role in shaping the conflict and introducing it to the societies involved. It is even claimed that societies in intractable conflict actually share a culture of conflict in which “the socio-psychological infrastructure… is not only widely shared but also appears to be dominant in public discourse… (and) is expressed in cultural products such as literary books, TV programs, films, theatre…” (Bar-Tal, 2010, p. 191). Cultural products help the members of society cope with the stressful experience: they illuminate the conflict situation, justify problematic and violent acts toward the enemy, create a sense of differentiation and superiority, prepare society for difficult conditions, motivate solidarity and contribute to strengthening the social identity.

Although fictional cultural texts are part of the building of the national narrative and of the culture of conflict, they suggest a different discourse by their mere definition: they are more ambiguous and more equivocal than the way societies supposedly think and act during conflicts. Fictional texts are not obligated to tell a mimetic story about reality; they do not have to be true or false and do not necessarily have any conclusion. On the contrary, what makes them interesting and unique is the fact that they have many layers, talk in different
voices (see for example: Bakhtin, 1981) and provide different perspectives than one can see in the non-fictional discourse. Therefore, there is a gap, a kind of contradiction, between the fictional texts’ complex characteristics and the claim that they actually not only take part – but also have a significant role – in shaping societies’ experiences and actions in conflicts.

Although there seems to be an understanding that cultural texts do not have a “bottom line”, that they are not manifest or political pamphlets, the discipline of conflict research commonly looks at them as such. For example, relying on scholarly research – from both social science studies and humanistic studies – Bar-Tal concludes that society’s narratives emerge through these cultural texts that “provide a ‘good story’ that is well understood and meaningful. The plot of the story is simple and clear, elaborated in black-and-white form with unambiguous villains, victims, and heroes” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 257) and that “through these cultural products, societal beliefs and emotions of the socio-psychological infrastructure are disseminated and can reach every sector of the public” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 260).

The picture is more complex because of the special traits of fictional texts which are not the same as other kinds of discourses. In what follows, by studying how the Israeli-Arab conflict is manifested in Israeli cultural texts of the 1980s, the complex relation between the conflict and how it is seen in fictional texts will be viewed. The decision to focus on Israeli cultural texts of the late 1970s and the 1980s was done for three main reasons:

1. The end of the 1970s and through the 1980s was a time of change both in how Israeli society perceived the long-lasting Israeli-Arab conflict, and in the way Israeli cultural texts dealing with the conflict represented it (Benziman, 2013; Oren, 2009). Therefore it provides an opportunity to view the changes that occurred in the two different discourses – the social-political and the cultural-fictional – which can be compared.

2. Israeli culture – and more specifically Israeli literature and films – has always had an important and influential part in shaping Israel’s collective ethos and national identity (Hever, 2002; Miron, 1993; Schwartz, 2005; Shohat, 2010). Therefore, studying the dynamic relation between reality and fictionality in this case is of special interest.

3. One of the basic traits of a protracted conflict is that it influences a large portion of society’s daily lives and wide aspects of its behaviors (Azar, Jureidini, & McLaurin, 1978). The Israeli-Arab conflict is one of such conflicts, as the core disputes between the sides are real and have to do with lands, infrastructures, money and more; yet this conflict has lasted for so long and became so complicated and connected to other conflicts, that it influences almost all parts of the societies’ conducts to a point where
it is sometimes hard to tell what is the real conflict and what are its consequences (Kriesberg, 1980). Its influence is rooted so deeply in the daily lives of the societies involved, that the tendency of Israeli-Jewish society (the in-group) to favor itself over the Arabs (the out-group) is seen in almost any comparison between the two groups (Maoz, 1996) and reaches a point where the in-group holds extreme positions like support for violation of human rights of the out-group (Maoz & McCauley, 2011). It is therefore argued that in order to end the conflict, a just and fair distribution of real infrastructures might not be enough, and that psychological and cultural dimensions should be overcome in order to solve it (Kelman, 1999). Therefore, the immense and widespread influence of this conflict on all sections of the Israeli society and culture makes the study of the role of cultural texts in the ethos of conflict all the more important.

**Methodology**

The methodology described in this article is an innovative combination of scholarly studies from two different disciplines: social political psychology and cultural studies. Looking at these two different academic fields, which are not too often studied together, provides a new and richer picture about cultures in conflict, narrative discourse produced by fiction texts, societies’ perceptions of conflicts and the relations between them.

The research done on fictional texts derives its roots from interpretations of culture. Its origins can be summarized in Clifford Geertz (1973) well known sayings about the study of culture: “…the analysis of it… be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (Geertz, 1973, p. 5) in which the scholar “characteristically approaches such broader interpretations and more abstract analyses from the direction of exceedingly extended acquaintances with extremely small matters” (Geertz, 1973, p. 21). On the other hand, the data about the public perception of the conflict is mostly quantitative, based on interpretation and analyses of social science surveys and polls. By combining these two different approaches, it is possible to compare the discourse of the fictional texts about the conflict and society’s perceptions and ethos of conflict.

**The Context: Israelis’ Perception of The Israeli-Arab Conflict in the Late 1970s and the 1980s**

Major developments occurred in the Israeli-Arab conflict during the late 1970s through the 1980s. These changes – in the relationships between Israel and its neighbor Arab countries, Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and between Israel and its
Arab-Palestinian citizens – influenced Israeli public perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict as a whole:

1. Israel and its neighbor Arab countries – In 1979 Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty and by 1981 Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. This peace agreement demonstrated for the Israeli public that the Israeli-Arab conflict was no longer a threat to Israel’s existence; the notion that Israel could be secure due to the fact that it has peace agreements and that the land-for-peace approach could be implemented, changed the way Israeli society perceived the conflict (Horowitz & Lissak, 1990). In 1982 the Lebanon War took place and also fundamentally changed the way the Israeli public viewed relations between Israel and its neighbors; Israelis implicitly acknowledged that Israel was not only a peace-seeking country that fights no choice and just wars (Ben-Porat, 2008), but that it also initiates wars.

These two developments, taken together, weakened fundamental elements of the Israeli traditional narrative, including the belief that Israel is always right, is always reaching for peace, doesn’t have a partner to sign a treaty with on the Arab side, and the popular conviction that more land equals more security. Israel appeared to its own citizens to be a country that is not always right, that has a partner for peace in the Arab world, and for which a peace agreement is essential to help stabilize the region and to ensure Israel’s security more efficaciously than victories of wars did.

2. Relations between Jewish and Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel – On March 30th, 1976, a brutal clash took place between the Israeli police and Arab-Palestinian-Israeli citizens demonstrating against government expropriation of lands. Six Israeli Arab-Palestinians were killed in these clashes and the Arab-Palestinian minority vehemently claimed that Israeli police used disproportional force solely because the protestors were Arabs. This day, which later became known as Land Day, brought into the open the dimensions of Israeli Arabs’ distrust of the Jewish Israeli state, and is considered a landmark in the conflict between Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens (Smooha, 1993).

Israeli scholars provide different explanations about the causes for the outbreak of the conflict between Jewish and Arab-Palestinian citizens in the late 1970s and through the 1980s. Some believe it emerged because of the Palestinianization of the Arab minority and the rise of Jewish nationalism after the 1967 War. Others maintain that the political change in Israel after the elections of
1977, ending the dominant Labor Party-led regime and bringing the Likud Party to power for the first time, was the important factor (see Eisenstadt, 1989; Kimmerling 1998; Smooha, 1993). Regardless of causation, the Jewish–Arab conflict inside Israel underwent an important transformation. Even though the conflict had been there for almost a century, particularly since the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state and the 1948 War, its intensity increased at the time. It is therefore not surprising that a new generation of Arab-Palestinian Israeli citizens, born in the 1970s, would become unprecedentedly demanding in its struggle against the Israeli establishment. This new generation, labeled by Israeli sociologists as the Stand-Tall Generation, grew up during the 1980s and 1990s with no illusions of being able to achieve the civil equality that their parents had thought they could acquire (Rabinowitz & Abu Baker, 2005).

3. Relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank – During the 1980s crucial changes occurred in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. These included an increase in violence, Israel Defense Forces’ harsher policy against the Palestinians, a crisis of the Palestinian economy, and the establishment of a local Palestinian leadership as opposed to the traditional exile leadership (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1999; 2003). These components were some of the factors that led to the outbreak of the Intifada in late 1987. The Intifada itself was a very important milestone in the relations between the rival sides and influenced the beginning of the peace process which started in the 1990s. Yet, even more important than the Intifada itself was the growing realization by Israelis that the Palestinians could no longer be seen as isolated groups fighting for local rights. Rather, they must be perceived as a people or a nation struggling for an independent and autonomous state (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1999; 2003).

Israelis’ Ethos of Conflict and Psychological Inter-group Repertoire

These changes in the conflict led to a dramatic change in the Israeli ethos of conflict, psychological inter-group repertoire and in the perception of the image of the Arab (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Oren (2009) shows that it is during the late 1970s and through the 1980s, and until the beginning of the 1990s that Israel’s ethos of conflict changed. For example, in the late 1970s delegitimization of Arabs in Israeli textbooks had significantly dropped (Firer, 1985) and less pejorative terminology was used in describing the Arab violent resistance to Jewish immigration and settlement (Podeh, 2002). Public polls of the time show that
perception of Arabs as intending to destroy Israel dramatically lost strength after Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1979 (Stone, 1983). Public polls of that time also show an influential drop in Israeli Jews’ belief that Israel can successfully wage war against all the Arab states (Oren, 2009). Textbooks transformed from a didactic patriotic approach to a more academic one (Dror, 2004) and Israelis’ willingness to sacrifice themselves for their state dropped (Oren, 2009). It is also at this time that peace beliefs became more central in Israeli society and more concrete than an abstract idea as it was before.

Oren separates the changes of the Israeli ethos of conflict into five different periods. She claims that when comparing the ethos of conflict of the years 1977-1987 to the ethos during earlier years, there is a “general weakening of the ethos of conflict as a unifying element for Israeli society and its various divisions” (Oren, 2009, p. 15). This weakening is mainly related to contradictions between the old elements of the ethos and the new reality in which Israel did sign a peace agreement with Egypt. Israeli society realized that there was not one unified Arab population in conflict with it, but rather there are a few different conflicts between Israel and its Arabs neighbors. The third period, defined by Oren as the period between 1987 and 1993, although starting in the Intifada, also showed “a further decline in the strength of the ethos of conflict in Israeli society” (Oren, 2009, p. 16). This decline had to do with contradictions between valuing greater Israel and keeping Israel as a Jewish democratic state, and a decrease in the perception of continuing the status quo as good for Israel (Goldberg, Barzilai, & Inbar, 1991; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). It is at this period that Israelis showed more optimism about finding a way to end the conflict, and less fear of the Arabs wish to exterminate Israel (Oren, 2009).

These changes all lead to the period between 1993 and 2000 when the ethos of conflict was the weakest with “a reduced tendency to consider the conflict as a zero-sum game” (Oren, 2009, p. 19). Yet in the year 2000, after the failure of the Camp David talks and the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the ethos of conflict strengthened due to the new perception of Israeli society in which Israelis perceived themselves as wanting peace but not believing it can be reached because of their adversaries (Oren, 2009). This can be seen, for example, in the platforms of both the leading right wing and left wing parties running in the Israeli election at the time (Oren, 2010).

Although Oren (2009) separates her analyses to different time periods, in the timeframe discussed in this paper, it is important to note that the general picture is one in which a
decrease in the ethos of conflict started from the late 1970s and through the 1980s. This trend continued in the 1990s but completely changed in 2000 after the second Intifada.

The Conflict’s Representation in Israeli Cultural Texts of the Late 1970s and the 1980s

Societies in conflict form a culture of conflict that is rooted in the themes and symbols of society; in its mass media, theatre, literature and films. These have an important role in influencing society, making it understand the conflict and coping with it (Bar-Tal, 2010). It could be assumed that the changes discussed above in the “real” conflict, in public opinions, in the inter-group psychological repertoire and in the ethos of the conflict – will be in line with the changes in the cultural texts. And so, while the shape, focus, and perception of the Israeli-Arab conflicts and ethos of conflict started to change in the late 1970s, the representation of the conflict in cultural texts of the time also changed. But although the changes happened simultaneously, they weren’t identical and at times even showed contradicting perceptions of the conflict.

Some aspects of the changes in the ethos of conflict were similar to the changes that occurred in the cultural texts; it is at this decade that Israeli films became more critical of the national narrative and changed the way they portrayed the Israeli-Arab conflict. After decades in which they almost fully embraced the Israeli-Jewish national narrative (Shohat, 1989) the perception of the conflict became more complex and less focused on the Israeli-Jewish perspective (Shohat, 2010). Scholars debate whether the films of the 1980s truly brought a new narrative to Israeli cinema or only proposed a new way to tell the same Israeli-Jewish narrative (see Gertz, 2004; Loshitzky, 2001; Ne’eman, 1995; Shohat, 1991), but all agree that a significant change did occur in the representation of the conflict. Interestingly, at this same time some important changes also took place in the Palestinian cinema (Gertz & Khleifi, 2008).

It is in this decade that Israeli theatre plays were more focused on the conflict; as Orian (1996) shows, between 1982 and 1994 Arab characters can be seen in more than a hundred Israeli plays, in central roles, a number that exceeds the number of all plays dealing with this topic in the previous seven decades combined. It is not only that the quantity of Arab characters increased, but their representation was also transformed: from stereotypical characters, presented as the other, whom the Jews fear but to whom they are also attracted, they became non-stereotypical, rounded characters who more authentically present the Arab narrative (Orian, 1996).
It is in this decade that Israeli literature also changed as more novels were written on the Israeli-Arab conflict than before (Benziman, 2010). The primary genre in which the conflict was represented changed as well, from short stories to novels (Morahg, 1987). As Bruner (1991) notes, a change in genres “may have quite as powerful an influence in shaping our modes of thought as they have in creating the realities that their plots depict” (Bruner, 1991, p. 15). And so this change at this time should be related to a general perception that more must be written in order to understand the conflict; and it allows, at least theoretically, a more polyphonic (see Bakhtin, 1981) representation of the conflict, in which a variety of voices from the Israeli-Jewish narrative can be heard and in which even the Arab voice could be audible.

The Arab characters in these texts became more rounded and complex (Levy, 1983; Morahg, 1986). They were no longer stereotypes (Ramras-Rauch, 1989), who only project onto the Jewish hero (Ben-Ezer, 1999). Instead, they stood for themselves, and exposed the reader to the Arab perspective of the conflict, and not only the Jewish-Israeli one (Perry, 1986). This new representation of Arabs and their more visible presence also resulted in ending the dichotomy and hierarchy between Jews and Arabs, and posited a more equal discourse (Gertz, 1993).

Yet other aspects of the representation of the conflict in cultural texts show that they did not change as did the ethos of conflict, but actually went in a different direction. The focal point remained an Israeli-Jewish one; even when the Arab characters became more complex, they still told the story of how the Israeli-Jewish narrative looks at them. As Oppenheimer (2008) points out, these texts, like most of Israeli texts that represent Arab characters, were written with an Orientalistic approach, framing the topic from a supercilious perspective of how the Jewish-westernized society sees the inferior Arab-eastern one.

What actually happened is that even though important changes occurred in the conflict and in the cultural texts of the time, the texts did not endorse the changes that occurred in the ethos of conflict. Looking at the tendencies shown in these studies and based on Benziman’s (2011) study of the representation of the conflict as a whole and not solely on the representation of the Arab characters, at least four themes of the representation of the conflict in the 1980s can be seen which contradict the changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict of the time. The tendencies listed below exist in most of the major texts of the decade which deal with the conflict, but in what follows only a few examples will be given to illustrate them:
1. Although the conflict is their main topic, the texts dealing with the conflict are mostly concerned with the feeling that it is impossible to grasp and understand it. In a way, these texts are oxymoronous as they tell a story about the inability to tell the story of the conflict (Benziman, 2011). For example, David Grossman’s (1983) *The Smile of the Lamb (Heyuch Hagdi)* is a novel in which the question of what is true and what is false is the light-motif and in which the characters “understand that they cannot understand” (Gertz, 1993, p. 96). This novel is rendered by four different narrators (an Arab, two Israeli officers, and a psychologist who is married to one of the officers and has an affair with the other officer) as if to say that in order to describe the conflict one needs several distinct points of view because one perspective is simply insufficient. In addition, the characters involved in the conflict cannot construct a coherent narrative that will give them a clear perspective on it. The identity of each of the characters seems split and embroiled in itself. They cannot manage to find a full and coherent prism through which to view the world. As a result of the absence of a stable identity, the characters seek group-belongings that will help them understand and define themselves, but their attempt fails. The image conveyed is one in which everyone sees the conflict differently and no communication between the different prisms materializes. However – as opposed to a regular Rashomon in which each narrative is full and coherent in its own way and competes with the others – the chaos and fragmentation in this text results in the collapse of the prism of all the individuals who cannot tell a full and coherent story about the conflict.

As mentioned, this is an example, one of many, of texts of this time which present the same tendency. *The Lover (Ham’ahev)* by Yehoshua (1977), *Delusion (Ta’atu’on)* by Yitzhak Ben-Ner (1989), *Martyr (Shahid)* by Avi Valentin (1989) and others are all told in the same divided, multi-narrators technique, which splits reality in order to try to understand it. *Arabesques* by Anton Shammas (1986), a novel written in Hebrew by an Arab, is also structurally divided into portions titled “The Teller” and “The Tale.” *The Road to Ein Harod (Haderech l’ein Harod)* by Kenan (1984) tells a story that is set partly above ground and partly underground, in which “whatever happens above ground level has no meaning for what happens underground” (Kenan, 1984, p. 71).

In other texts of the decade, the inability to present the conflict comprehensively through one stable prism is dealt with by presenting the interaction between Israelis and Palestinian-Arabs as a dialog between deaf people. In the movie *Fictitious Marriage (Nisuim*
Fictiviim), for example, the only way the Jewish-Israeli protagonist can create a dialogue with his Palestinian co-workers is by pretending to be mute, and so only by not talking can he attempt to speak a common language with them. Likewise, in the novel A Trumpet in the Wadi (Hatsutsra bavadi) by Michael (1987), the only dialog of equals is between Alex, a Jewish-Russian immigrant who does not speak Hebrew, and Huda, the Arab who teaches him the language of the nation that oppresses her. And some of the Israeli movies of the period are bilingual, spoken in Hebrew and Arabic (e.g., Cup Final, [Gmar Gavia], and Avanti Popolo), but not translated into both languages (only to English subtitles).

Other texts manifest a total confusion between fiction and reality. The characters deal obsessively with questions of truth and falsity, signifying that in the conflict one cannot determine what has really happened and what is imagined. The obsessive preoccupation with these questions paints a picture in which the characters find it difficult to believe in the reality in which they are involved and to organize it in some rational narrative. Then there comes a moment, as in The Smile of the Lamb, when “the question if something is real or not is no longer important” and “that there is a lie that two believe in, and then it is no longer a lie, but a new kind of a more tolerant truth” (Grossman, 1983, p. 156, 125). The same is seen in Ta’atu’on when “everything is so confusing and complicated. Everything turns out to be the opposite of what you think. What a mess. How can you know what is correct and what is not. What is truth, say, and what is false?” (Ben-Ner, 1989, p. 47). This can also be found in Refuge (Hasut) by Michael (1977) when “Fatkh… has long since learned that his future brother-in-law believed his own lies” (p. 48). Another such example can be given from the movie Time for Cherries (Onat Haduvdevanim) in which the story of the conflict goes through three different filters in order to be told: it is seen through the eyes of an international news crew who have come to tell the story of the war. They choose to follow an advertising copywriter who has been mobilized as a military reservist and who confuses himself, the crew, and the audience about the question of what is reality, what is news, and what is an advertisement.

Consequently the conflict is seen in these texts as a never-ending event that can be understood as a fairy tale or through undermining the credibility of a particular narrative, but not as reality. While Israeli ethos of conflict and public perception of the time started to see it as a conflict that can be rationally understood and even solved, the texts produced a different narrative. More than anything else, these texts of the 1980s tell a story of not being able to tell a story; a story about a fictional-reality that is too complicated to grasp and understand.
2. Many of the characters in these texts lose their minds, get hospitalized in institutions for the mentally ill, or otherwise disappear from society. For example, in *Ta’atu’on* a strange and noisome odor comes from Holy, the protagonist, who serves as an Israeli soldier in the Palestinian territories which Israel occupies. Only after he is forced to take a shower it is understood that this smell – symbolizing the situation as a whole – cannot be changed, and he is hospitalized in an institution for the mentally ill. Shortly afterward, another soldier from his unit, Michael, is also hospitalized there. The other two main characters of the novel have no better future: Holy’s father disappears, while the forth character gets fired and his end is likewise unknown. A few other examples of the same phenomena are: Chava and Kita, a daughter and her mother, both lose their minds and die in *A Good Arab* (*Aravi Tov*) by Kaniuk (1984). In almost every movie about the Lebanon war, like *Ricochet* (*Shtei Etzbaot mitzidon*) and *Time for Cherries*, some of the Israeli soldiers become mentally unstable. In *The Smile of the Lamb* the Arab Hilmi completely mixes fiction and reality, he lives in an almost imagined world of his own, which distances him from his society. But this made-up world of his is the reason that the Israeli officer Uri tries to connect with him and learn how to leave in a world that is detached from reality.

Based on Foucault’s *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (1965), Benziman (2011) claims that the societies that continue to function despite painful conflicts should be questioned, and not the characters who are unable to live a normal life in them: the mentally ill, who are removed from them, seem to be messengers of the insight that it is the conflict itself that is insane and that people cannot contain it. The fact that these societies seem to function in the midst of the conflict and to expel those who try to convey a message about its terrible effects can provide better testimony about the conflict than about the characters that, understandably, cannot live in a reality full of hatred and violence. Therefore, the majority of texts dealing with the conflict at the 1980s, while presenting characters that lose their minds, actually tell us something about the conflict which is crazy, illogical, and not understandable, in which normal people cannot live. This, once again, is in contrast to growing tendencies in Israel at the time to understand the conflict, put sense into it, rationalize it, and understand how it can be solved in a logical and rational way.

3. The texts tell a story in which the conflict is not only tragic but also offers no optimistic future hope. All these texts have bad, tragic and unhappy endings. In almost every text that deals with the conflict in the 1980s, death is an important
factor. The Israeli soldier Alex of *A Trumpet in the Wadi* dies as he goes to war. While going to fight against his lover’s brothers he is killed, leaving the Arab Huda pregnant and not knowing how she will be able to raise a half-Jewish/half-Arab baby (Michael, 1987). In *A Good Arab*, Chava, supposedly a national hero, dies when she takes the wheel from her peace-seeking Arab husband and roles their car over (Kaniuk, 1984). Yuad in *The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist* by Emile Habibi (1984), Katzman in *The Smile of The Lamb* (Grossman, 1983), the child Anton Shammas in *Arabesques* (Shammas, 1986), Khaled in the movie *Heat-Wave* (*Hamsin*), Rauf in *Ricochet*, almost all the Arab characters in the movie *Cup Final*, and more – all die.

The crucial role assumed by death is not only evidence of the horrors of the conflict, but also of the inability to end it. The texts tell a story in which the conflict is not only tragic but also offers no future hope. The authors, screenplay writers, and filmmakers could, at least theoretically, have written texts with happy endings. They are, one should remember, not obligated to the “truth” or to a mimetic representation of the conflict; yet they all chose to end their texts with death, tragedy and no hope. While Israelis started to see how at least parts of the conflict can be resolved, the texts told stories in which conflict does not end, not even when the texts’ producers have the liberty to choose any ending they want.

4. Jewish and Arab characters in these texts cannot establish normal relationships or romantic relationships in Israel/Palestine. The characters can have such relationships outside the holy land, but not in it. Anyone who is seen as too close to someone from the out-group is immediately condemned. The only places in which Jewish and Arab protagonists do meet in these texts are, therefore, outside of Israel or in extra-territorial Heterotopian venues (Foucault, 1997) such as hospitals, isolated spots, or mental institutions. For example, *A Good Arab* tells a story in which individuals from the opposing sides can be friends and lovers outside of Israel but not in it. In Germany, the Arab Azuri is involved in a love-triangle with the Jewish couple Kita and Franz. It ends when they arrive in Israel. Azuri meets Kita and Franz’s daughter, Chava, and they marry, but are unsuccessful in establishing a normal life in Israel and so they move to France; when they return to Israel their relationship fails again. Their son, Yosef, half-Arab--half-Jew, fails in establishing any kind of intimate relationship, either with Jews or with Arabs (Kaniuk, 1984).
It seems as if it is only by physically distancing themselves from the conflict can Arabs and Jews meet and establish some kind of dialogue. Likewise, most of the texts that narrate love stories between Jews and Arabs have an unhappy ending with the relationship breaking off. Significantly, when a relationship takes place outside Israel—it prevails.

In the movie *A Narrow Bridge* (*Gesher tzar meod*), the love story between Laila, a Palestinian widow, and an Israeli officer ends when she leaves for Jordan due to societal pressure. In *Heat-Wave*, Chava’s brother releases an ox that kills her Arab boyfriend, Halad. In *Arabesques*, (Shammas, 1986) the Jewish writer Yosh Bar-On gets acquainted with an Arab-Israeli and a Palestinian only when staying in Paris and in the United States. In *The Smile of the Lamb* the Israeli officer Uri and the Arab Hilmi have an equal status that can permit a dialog only when Uri comes to Hilmi’s isolated cave (Grossman, 1983). In *Ta’atu’on*, the place where Palestinians and Israelis meet in order to try and have a dialogue is an institution for the mentally ill (Ben-Ner, 1989). In the movie *Fictitious Marriage* the only place where the Palestinian workers and the Jewish protagonist can meet is in a construction site (significantly, not a constructed house, for example). Likewise, in *A Trumpet in the Wadi*, the love story between Alex and Huda does not take place in a house but in the attic (Michael, 1987).

**The Contradiction**

When comparing the Israeli cultural texts of the time and the Israeli psychological repertoire and ethos of conflict of the time – one can see that they do not go in the same directions. Although both changing at about the same time, and undoubtedly influencing one another, they do not share the same characteristics of change.

The most revealing fact is that while Israeli public discourse showed a reduction in viewing the conflict as a zero-sum-game, the texts do not: they end in death, the protagonists lose their minds, and no chance for a positive future is presented. The dialogues are not between equals and – according to the cultural texts of the time – the only place where Jews and Arabs can meet and sustain a normal relationship is outside of Israel/Palestine.

The most important trait of these texts is that they tell a story of not being able to tell a story and so the texts are confusing. They deal almost obsessively with the questions of what is true or false and question what is reality and what is not. At the same time, though, the perceptions of Israelis about the conflict changed after the peace treaty with Egypt and the new belief that there is a rational way to understand the conflict and even to solve it. The concept of Land for Peace, proven to be a solution, was a way of understanding the conflict.
rationality and it proposed a way to end it (Ben Porat, 2008) which brought optimism to the public discourse (Oren, 2009) while the fictional texts told exactly the opposite story: no rationality, telling the story of the inability to understand it, showing no future hope and no Jewish-Arab relations that prevails in the conflicted land.

While Israeli public opinion towards Arabs transformed, it included less stereotypes and prejudices (Smooha, 1998; Stone, 1983), Israel’s literature was Orientalistic even when trying to present a more balanced perspective of the Arab (Oppenheimer, 2008). The texts continued to present the Israeli-national narrative, even when the overall picture is not one of black and white.

The texts deal with almost all of the topics that comprise the inter-group psychological repertoire and the ethos of conflict – security, self-identification, group belongings and more – but show them in a different light than the public discourse of the time. Why is it, then, that while Israeli society’s beliefs became more exceptive of other narratives and less pessimistic, the cultural texts became more confusing? Why is it that while the texts did become consistent with the public discourse by giving more voice to the Arab other, they at the same time told a story in which there actually cannot be any coexistence between Arabs and Jews, Israelis and Palestinians? How is it that these texts actually told a story that might not have been the story of Israeli public discourse of the 1980s but certainly reflects the Israeli discourse after the year 2000?

These findings challenge the well-known concept that cultural texts are part of the narrative of societies in conflict. They show that while both cultural texts and political public discourse changed at the same time – they went in different directions. The cultural texts were more pessimistic and confused than the public discourse. Interestingly enough, although not completely in line with the discourse back in the 1980s, they – in a way – present a picture similar to what would become the Israeli ethos of conflict two decades later. After the year 2000, the Israeli perception and ethos of conflict included beliefs about the inability to have a dialog with the Palestinians; a perception that there is “no partner” in the rival side; belief that the conflict cannot be solved as Israel has done extensive efforts to do so but could not strike a peace agreement; total confusion about the question of how to end the conflict, as all the efforts done did not prevail; perception that peace treaties signed outside of Israel (Oslo or Geneva for example) can only last outside of Israel-Palestine but collapse in the middle-eastern reality; beliefs that people who were talking about a peace-agreement, a “new middle east” and a coexistence between Israelis and Arabs were day-dreaming or living in a
fantasy world that is not connected to reality. All these are, of course, much closer to what Israeli novels and films of the 1980s showed than to the ethos of conflict of the 1980s in which they were produced.

**Potential Explanations**

Various explanations can be given to this gap between the ethos of conflict and the psychological inter-group repertoire, and the way cultural fictional texts present the conflict. I would like to suggest three explanations, not necessarily competing ones – and sometimes even overlapping – although many more can be thought of:

1. Fictional texts can present a different perspective of conflicts than the one shared by society because they are not obligated to a mimetic representation of the conflict. Their fictionality allows them to tell different stories and they show a more complicated picture of the conflict. Their role, as being part of society but also outside of it because of their fictionality, gives them more freedom in their ability to deal with the conflict. It allows them to produce works that are not consistent with what their audiences are used to hearing, reading or seeing – and to still be appreciated and loved. And so, they are capable of being much more critical of the national narrative and the ethos of conflict, and might even foresee future events just because they are based on the imagination of their producers.

In the case study discussed above, although the real conflict transformed at the time and so did the public opinion (Oren, 2010), the cultural texts – while going through dramatic changes – did not go with the flow. Although changing the representation of the Arab characters (Ben-Ezer, 1999; Orian, 1996; Shohat, 1991), although challenging the dichotomy between Jews and Arabs (Gertz, 1993), although presenting a more multi-layered perspective of the conflict (Benziman, 2011) – their essence is actually rooted in viewing the conflict as a dead-end one, which was the basic understanding of the conflict in Israeli society before the 1980s and came back to be the main belief of Israeli society after the year 2000.

2. Fictional texts do not present claims or positions. They tell stories which can be interpreted in a variety of ways. One reader or scholar can understand them in one way and the other in another. They also, as mentioned, contain different layers to them. And so the text can at the same time contain elements of the ethos of conflict and criticize the national narrative, they can preserve the ethos while presenting crucial variations from it. Knowing that conflicts influence the way individuals and societies understand and perceive information (see for example Markus & Zajonc,
1985) – it is fair to believe that while the texts contain a complex view of a conflict, the audience sees only parts of it. For example, while a text can show that characters of both sides are to blame – the reader might only see that one side is to blame. Therefore, texts can be canonical, mainstream and loved by their society just because they can be interpreted differently and because different people and different portions of society understand them in different ways. In practice, the members of society reading or watching them might perceive these texts as strengthening their beliefs, as proving their cases, and as enforcing their perspectives – even if the texts have other (more controversial) sides to them as well.

In the case studied above, it is fair to believe that the change in the representation of Arab characters went in the path of changes of Israelis perception of Arabs (Oren, 2009; Smooha, 1998). But the readers did not notice that this supposed change still keeps the texts’ Orientalistic approach (Oppenheimer, 2008).

3. There are certain elements in these texts that do correspond with the ethos of conflict and psychological inter-group repertoire. Even when presenting a different perspective, these cultural texts do share common elements with the public discourse. For example, the pessimistic endings of the texts discussed above do not show a light at the end of a tunnel for society or a brighter future as the Israeli public started to perceive it. But at the same time, their unhappy endings are completely logical and reasonable for a society that at this decade went through two wars that were on-going and without a clear ending (The Lebanon War and the Intifada). Likewise, their confusion and their tendency to deal with the fact that they cannot deal with the conflict does not present an illuminated picture of the conflict which could help members of the in-group understand the conflict and provide a coherent picture of it (see, for example: Burton, 1990); however, they might comfort the audiences’ feeling of misunderstanding and show them a fictional-reality in which the confusion does not make the situation wrong or weaken society’s national narrative.

It is possible that in this specific conflict, texts which say out loud that the conflict is unresolved and problematic, and which do not wholeheartedly support one side, but at the same time still retain elements of the national narrative – are the kind of national texts which preserve the culture of conflict. And so, although not completely consistent with expectations, cultural texts do have some characteristics which are part of the culture of conflict. These are difficult to generalize and almost impossible to make inductive
conclusions from because they differ from one case study to the other, but they still have some elements which actually align with the national narrative and the psychological inter-group repertoire of each specific society.

**Conclusion**

Fiction novels, art works, theatre plays, films and other cultural texts sometimes tell stories which differ from the way societies in conflict perceive and understand the conflict in which they live. Fictional cultural texts – by their mere characteristics – tell a more complex and multi-layered story about conflicts than other kinds of discourses. This study is a first step in identifying the contradiction between cultural texts and the discourse they produce on the one hand, and the ethos of conflict and culture of conflict on the other hand. Three different explanations were given to try to understand this contradiction: it could be that the fictionality of these texts enables them to be appreciated and still tell a different story than what society expects; it might be that they are not fully understood by society; and it might be that portions of them do align with parts of the in-group narrative. Maybe all is true. Yet much more research has to be done in order to understand how these texts can be at the same time canonical mainstream texts in a society, and tell a different story from the typical ethos of conflict narrative shared by it.

**References**


The Role of Youth in Post Accord Transformation in Northern Ireland

Christine Smith Ellison

Abstract
Despite increased international interest in the contribution of education to peacebuilding, there has been a neglect of the role that non-formal youth programming can play in this process. This article examines three such youth programmes in post-accord Northern Ireland through the theoretical lens of their contribution to social, economic and political transformations. Given the sustained context of segregation and limitations of the formal education sector as a mechanism for transformation, the paper argues that the non-formal sector has played an important role in ensuring inclusion of multiple youth perspectives in a divided society. It also raises a number of critical questions regarding the politics of multiple youth representation and the strength of genuine commitment to peacebuilding in terms of conflict transformation.

Introduction
The past decade has seen a growing recognition of the role that education plays in both fuelling conflict and contributing to processes of peacebuilding. This has been driven by the push to fulfil the education-related Millennium Development Goals. The focus on basic education for all (EFA) has arguably led not only to a neglect of the contribution non-formal education makes to peacebuilding, but also to the role of youth. Despite recent disturbances, Northern Ireland is often seen as a peacebuilding success and, fifteen years post-agreement, this paper examines the role of non-formal youth programming in peacebuilding. It begins by outlining developments over the past decade in the field of education and conflict, before highlighting the need to prioritise youth analysis in situations of conflict. It then provides a synthesis of the international research evidence on the linkages between youth, education and conflict. The second half of the article employs this theoretical framework to examine three youth programmes and their contribution to social, economic and political transformations in post-accord Northern Ireland. The paper argues that the non-formal sector has played an important role in ensuring inclusion of multiple youth
perspectives in a divided society where structural education reform is not yet a politically viable option. It also raises a number of critical questions regarding the politics of multiple youth representation and the strength of genuine commitment to peacebuilding in terms of conflict transformation.

**Education, Conflict and Peacebuilding**

The field of education and conflict emerged as a topic of concern due to its significance for the achievement of the education-related Millennium Development Goals. Over the course of the past two decades academics and donors have explored the ‘two faces’ of education and its role in both fuelling and mitigating conflict. An important study by Bush and Saltarelli (2000) drew on a number of international examples to highlight different forms of violence in education: “The negative face shows itself in the uneven distribution of education to create or preserve privilege, the use of education as a weapon of cultural repression, and the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance” (2000, p. 7). Subsequent studies have discussed the multiple ways that schools systems might reproduce social and gender inequalities that may be a catalyst for war (Davies, 2004).

On the other hand, academics have examined the ways in which education can contribute positively to peace. Perhaps the most obvious way in which education may do this is through peace education programs. These programs have a wide variety of goals ranging from what Marc Ross (2000) has called ‘good enough conflict management’, in other words some level of mutual understanding and reduction in violence, through to programs that aim to attain the legitimization of the other side's perspective (Salomon, 2007). In a review of quasi-experimental studies carried out with Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian youth Salomon argues that peace education can produce more views of peace, better ability to see the other side's perspective, and greater willingness for contact. Perhaps most interestingly he also finds that in the context of protracted conflict these programs can play a preventative role in blocking the further deterioration of inter-group relations following adverse events outside the confines of the program.

More recently there has also been a shift towards examining the role education can play in explicitly contributing to processes of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The concept of peacebuilding originated in the field of peace studies in the work of Johan Galtung (1976) who argued that peacebuilding “has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking” (1976, p. 297). In particular, he introduced the distinction between negative peace (the absence of violence) and positive peace (the
absence of structural violence and the conditions for war) and highlighted the importance of local knowledge and participation. Another key scholar in the field, John Paul Lederach (1997), expanded our understanding of the concept. He sees peacebuilding as a dynamic social process and introduced the term conflict transformation which he defines as an “ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behaviour, attitudes and structures” (1997, p. 20). Key to this process are relationships: “Cultivating an ‘infrastructure for peacebuilding’ means that ‘we are not merely interested in ‘ending’ something that is not desired. We are oriented toward the building of relationships that in their totality form new patterns, processes, and structures” (1997, pp. 84-85).

Education for peacebuilding is therefore oriented towards the transformation of the structural conditions and social relations that generate violent conflict. This may include the role that access to education can play in addressing group inequalities, the importance of education sector reform in encouraging new forms of power relations and the potential for education to support transformation processes related to security sector reform, political institutions, economic regeneration and social development (Smith, 2011).

The recent UNESCO Global Monitoring Report (2011) calls for an increased role for education in peacebuilding and, in particular, for the resources available through the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to be increased to between $500 million and $1 billion a year. Whilst the report argues for early engagement and prioritization of education throughout all conflict phases, there is no critical analysis of the way in which non-formal education, particularly for youth, can contribute to these processes.

**Why Prioritise Youth?**

The definition of “youth” is highly contested and there is a lot of variation in the age ranges used by international organisations. The United Nations (UN) defines those aged between 15 and 24 as youth; this is the most common age range used, and is advocated by the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Youth Foundation. However, defining youth in terms of chronological age is arguably even less appropriate in conflict situations than elsewhere. Youth are often thrust into adult roles earlier than would otherwise be the case in times of peace. They may, for example, find themselves heading households in the event of parental death and displacement. Conflict also causes difficulties for the socio-cultural definition of youth since the traditional markers of the transition into adulthood are often disrupted. A more appropriate way of understanding youth is as a transitional stage in life.
between childhood and adulthood. This allows for the exploration of the specific factors that determine the transition into adulthood in different contexts (Hilker & Fraser, 2009, p. 9).

Partly due to the complexity of defining the category, youth are often overlooked. However, there are a number of reasons why it is essential to consider youth as distinct actors in conflict situations. First, youth are disproportionately affected by conflict. The past fifteen years have seen increasing recognition of the negative impacts of conflict on youth. Disruption to schooling means that they miss out on the physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection that education provides (UNESCO, 2011). Reports also indicate that youth are increasingly on the front line of armed conflicts, with classrooms, teachers and students seen as legitimate targets (O’Malley, 2010).

Youth are also likely to be represented in the ranks of armed groups and state armies. Here there are two sets of literature. The first relates to the forced recruitment of child soldiers and espouses the need for protective measures. The UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council, covering fifteen countries, identifies fifty-seven groups recruiting child soldiers (United Nations, 2010). The second relates to the “threat” posed by older, mostly male youth who are thought to be easily mobilised by rebel leaders. This is related to an increasing demonization of youth in the media (for critique of this see Hendrixson, 2004; Sommers, 2006). However, it does reflect the reality that youth “provide much of the crucial energy and mass power to get wheels turning for divergent ‘vehicles’ of social and political change” (Hamilton, 2010, p. 4).

Second, youth are often key actors in peacebuilding. As McEvoy-Levy (2001) writes, in any conflict context one examines, the dominant presence of the young in youth work, in community development, and in inter-ethnic and dialogue and peace groups is clear. Many have direct experience of violence, conflict and imprisonment themselves. They are not well paid, their projects are under-funded, often stressful and can be life threatening. Like other civil society actors they are less visible in analysis of peace processes than key elites. (pp. 24-25)

As the “primary actors in grassroots community development/relations work” McEvoy-Levy argues youth are “at the frontlines of peacebuilding” (2001, p. 24). However, for many years policymakers and scholars have not adequately explored the positive contribution made by youth. This shortfall is starting to be acknowledged by some. The 2007 World Development Report of the World Bank, for example, focused attention on the needs and transformative potential of “the next generation” in development, but much of the
literature remains ad hoc and descriptive, missing out on the potential to learn from the experience of many youth peacebuilders around the world.

Finally, youth is a period—whether defined by chronological age or socially constructed roles—during which individuals undergo a number of important transitions. It is a difficult period under the best circumstances. During times of conflict, however, many youth can be stuck in “waithood” (Singerman, 2007, p. 6), unable to make the transition into adulthood. As just one example, unemployment often affects youth more than any other group. The frustrations that this generates and the effects can last well beyond the end of war. Youth in situations of conflict therefore have specific needs that require analysis and attention. Furthermore, as Hamilton points out, “Youth voices tend to go unheard by political and economic leaders (even by social scientists) unless they are raised as a revolutionary cry or as an articulated threat to the social order” (2010, p. 7).

Youth, Education and Conflict: The Theory

Overall the evidence suggests that youth get involved in violence for multiple and diverse reasons, which need to be understood in each specific context. In practice, there is usually no one singular reason why a particular young person participates in violence. Different individuals may join the same violent group for different reasons (see for example Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008). There are, however, three broad approaches in the literature to examining the linkages between education youth and conflict: social/cultural, economic, and political.

Social and Cultural Theory

One hypothesis is that conflict is generated out of grievances based on “horizontal inequalities”, defined as inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups (Stewart, 2008). This is especially the case where the inequalities have perceived “social significance”. Gurr (1970) adds that even in contexts where the data shows no evidence of inequalities, there may be an increased risk of conflict where there is perceived “relative deprivation” between groups. Opinion is divided on whether the existence of different identity-based groups (linguistic, cultural, religious) carries an inherent potential for conflict. Although the view that cultural differences are the root cause of violent conflict underpins concepts such as “a clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996), Stewart argues that identity is important as it may be mobilized to generate or escalate conflict.
Given the role that identity plays in mobilisation for violence, there are implications for youth education programming. Over the past decade there has been increased recognition of the fact that education can be provided in a way that either promotes the peaceful management of diversity or be an instrument by which divisions are exacerbated, potentially providing the basis for conflict. Careful thought needs to be given to issues such as the language of instruction; values transferred through the curriculum and, in particular, the way young people are taught about the country’s past; and the ideological orientation of the education system. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) has recently developed a Conflict Sensitive guideline to help integrate these issues into education policy and programming (INEE, 2013).

Attention should also be paid to equality issues between groups within society, especially in terms of access to education, resource inputs, and actual and perceived benefits to different groups in terms of education outcomes. It is also important to understand the social significance of education for different communities. Stewart (2008) highlights that the social significance can lie either in an element’s innate value or in its instrumentality for achieving other goals, such as incomes and wellbeing. This point seems particularly relevant with regards the role of education. It is certainly the case that some minority groups not only have lower access to education, but also lower returns on their education. It is not difficult to imagine this to be a source of grievance in a context where education is valued as a means of social mobility.

Economic Theory

One economic hypothesis argues that youth participation in conflict occurs when it is financially viable and profitable. It is based mainly on research by Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2004), who used three main proxies to measure the opportunity cost of participating in civil conflict across a number of countries. The first two proxies were mean income per capita (a population with high income may have more to lose from conflict) and growth rate of the economy (with high growth there are more employment opportunities). The third proxy indicator was the male secondary school enrolment rate. Collier and Hoeffler argued that young males are the group from which rebels are most recruited, the number of years of secondary education affects earning potential, and therefore having more years of schooling is likely to affect the opportunity cost of participating in conflict. Other studies have found similar results regarding this protective nature of secondary education (Barakat & Urdal, 2009; Thyne, 2006).
However, this theory has also received criticism for being dependent on strong links between the education and labour markets, which is often not the case. For example, Urdal (2006) argues that when countries respond to large youth cohorts by expanding access to higher education, this may result in a much larger group of highly educated young people than the labour market is able to absorb. High levels of unemployment among highly educated youth may cause frustration that could lead to grievances and incidence of violence. In fact, Choucri (1974) argues that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the most destabilising forces a state can face.

In addition, this theory characterizes ‘greed’ as the main driver of conflict, and has been challenged as overly simplistic and dependent on a rational choice theory of human behaviour (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003). Some authors argue there are other explanations for the mitigating effect of education on conflict that remain to be explored. These range from the values that quality education transmits, the evidence it gives of a government’s ability to provide for its citizens, through to the role it plays in simply keeping young people occupied. Although opinions are divided on the mechanisms by which education and political violence interact, the literature highlights the need for education programming to focus on secondary education for youth in and out of school, the role of technical and vocational education, and the relevance of education to employment opportunities and economic development.

**Political Theory**

While the greed and grievance perspectives examine the reasons why youth take up arms, the third approach critically examines the nature of the politics that “prepared the field” (Bates, 2008, p. 131) for conflict. Bates argues that ruling elites in many countries post-independence have been driven by the need to maintain a political power base by concentrating resources on a narrow section of the population, rather than developing policies to provide social goods such as education as a wider benefit for all. Drawing on examples from sub-Saharan Africa, Bates argues that post-independence elections were costly and incumbents preserved their position through the distribution of public goods. As it became too expensive to continue in this manner, ruling elites moved towards an authoritarian regime. Under this system, providing the constituency with public goods, including education, was no longer important. The goal of both incumbents and political opponents alike was to garner the favour of ruling elites, on which their chance of success and being included in the narrowing “private distribution” of material benefits depended. This
centralised, closed and regulated economy was costly and in the long run meant a decrease in public revenue and less rewards from public services. This further entrenched the status of rulers as “predators”. Eventually, citizens react to this behaviour of their rulers by taking up arms.

Bates (2008) documents the ways in which rational (self-interested), political decision-making by elites can lead to the demise of the social contract. The past decade’s emphasis on liberal peacebuilding, with a focus on early electoral and market reform, has received criticism on the grounds that it serves the interests of elites and does little to address the underlying causes of conflict. This is certainly one of the criticisms of the peace process in Northern Ireland where, despite a halt in overt conflict, tensions between communities are still apparent (Knox, 2010; Leonard & McKnight, 2012). In particular, a number of authors have noted a sense of alienation among young people and frustration that peace has not delivered on its promises of a better life.

The implication is that there is a need for programmes that promote wider political engagement of youth in understanding and participating in the political systems that operate within their communities. There is a well-established body of evidence that shows that greater levels of schooling increase political participation (Bénabou, 2000; Dee, 2004; Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Civic education has been shown to increase young people’s understanding of their political systems and environment, although effort must be made to ensure that this translates into action and political participation. Research also indicates that it is important to engage young people early as they are unlikely to become more interested in politics with age (Institute for Conflict Research, 2005). In the case of Northern Ireland it is especially important to engage this section of society as they will be tasked with managing the decision on the sovereignty of their country.

**Education and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland**

On 10th April 1998, the negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement were finally concluded. Thirty years of violence had resulted in 3,600 people being killed, more than half of whom were civilians, and 30,000 injured. Fifty-three percent of those killed were under 30 years old (Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999). The agreement involved the establishment of cross-border bodies with executive powers set up by the Irish and British governments, a Northern Irish Assembly based on power-sharing, support for victims of the ‘Troubles’ and the early release of paramilitary prisoners. The British and Irish governments
recognised “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British or both” and the agreement accepted that the future constitutional status of the territory will be determined by “the wish of the majority of the people who live there” (Northern Ireland Office, 1998).

Fifteen years after The Agreement peace is increasingly well established and the former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has claimed that “the lessons of peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland can be learned in other conflicts across the world” (Blair, 2008). The European Union, a longstanding and major actor in the peace process, has held up its role in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland as an opportunity for lesson-learning and modelling as it seeks to expand its capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution (Tonra, 2011). However, a number of issues remain capable of stalling progress in Northern Ireland (see Fitzduff & O’Hagan, 2009); most recently the flags dispute that began in December 2012 is evidence of a deep alienation within a section of the unionist community from the peace settlement that has emerged (Nolan, 2013). Perhaps most crucially, as Smith (2010) argues, The Agreement deferred a decision on the ultimate sovereignty of the territory: “the agreement managed to ‘transform’ the conflict, but the dispute has not been ‘resolved’” (2010, p. 58).

Of particular interest to this study is the role that education and employment linkages played in the lead up to the period of conflict known as the Troubles. When Ireland was partitioned in 1921 the six counties in the North-East became known as Northern Ireland and remained part of the United Kingdom, whilst the other 26 counties gained independence as the Republic of Ireland. At the time Protestant Unionists made up two thirds of the population of Northern Ireland and the state was described by its first prime minister as having “a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people” (Fitzduff & O’Hagan, 2009, p. 3). The evidence available shows that systematic inequalities in many dimensions persisted for the first fifty years of the newly created Northern Ireland state. The Catholic unemployment rate was 2.6 times the Protestant rate in 1917 and the same in 1971 (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). There has been much research into the causes of the employment differential and a comprehensive review is provided by Gallagher (1991). Since 1812 and the formation of Catholic schools, Northern Ireland’s education system has been effectively segregated along religious lines. One explanation for the employment differential therefore relates to lower academic achievement: data shows Catholic disadvantage in admission to grammar schools and O and A-level achievements up to the mid-1970s (Stewart & Langar, 2007, p. 21).
addition, Catholic school leavers were less likely to have qualifications in scientific and technological subjects. These issues were visible in the civil rights riots in the 1960s.

Significant progress has been made in reducing these inequalities through the introduction of a common curriculum and the 1976 and 1989 Fair Employment Acts (Stewart & Langar, 2007). The recent Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report finds that “those who have entered the labour market operate on a level playing field and amongst the older age cohorts the numbers of Catholics and Protestants who are unemployed are proportionate to their population size” (Nolan, 2013, p. 8). However, it also notes that “the growth of youth unemployment has opened up a new communal differential: 20% of Catholics aged 18-24 are unemployed as opposed to 15% of Protestants” (p. 8). Further, whilst progress has been made with regards to equality of educational outcomes, the system remains highly segregated. Education is mentioned twice in the Good Friday Agreement, once in relation to support for the development of integrated schools and once in relation to support for Irish language education. However, recent figures indicate that almost half of Northern Ireland’s school children are still being taught in schools where 95% or more of the pupils are of the same religion (Hansson, O’Connor-Bones, & McCord, 2013, p. 47).

Peacebuilding in Practice: Non-formal Youth Education in Northern Ireland

The previous section has highlighted the contribution of education to peacebuilding in terms of social, economic and political transformation. This provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of three youth programmes that have been implemented in post-agreement Northern Ireland.

Recent data from the 2011 census indicates that there are 227,634 youth in Northern Ireland between the ages of 16 and 24, making up 12.6% of the population. As in many cases elsewhere, youth in Northern Ireland have suffered in the context of the current economic crisis. Between November 2007-August 2010 the number of unemployed young people (24 years and younger) increased by 171%, compared to 145% in the general population. There was an even more dramatic rise in the percentage of young people experiencing long term unemployment of more than a year, with the figure increasing by 688% from July 2008 to July 2010. More recent evidence from the Labour Force Survey (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, 2013) also identified 42,000 young people Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs).

At the same time there is evidence that youth are switching off from politics. In a survey of 1434 sixteen year olds 62% of sixteen year olds responded that they had “not very
much” or no interest at all in politics (Young Life and Times Survey, 2011). They also represent the age group that is the least likely to vote. A recent opinion poll found that 52% of the 18-24 year olds said that they would not bother voting compared with 40% of the 45-64 age-group, and 38% of the 65+ age-group (Belfast Telegraph, 2013).

On a more positive note, there are signs from a small sample survey of 15-21 year olds that young people are supportive of greater sharing and integration across many different aspects of education, relationships, culture and social/physical regeneration (Ellis, McNeill, Erskine, & O’Sullivan, 2013). For example, over 90% of respondents supported greater levels of contact between the communities and 64% of respondents indicated that they would prefer to be educated in a mixed environment rather than a segregated one. One issue on which the respondents were divided relates to the aspiration either to stay in Northern Ireland (53%) or seek a better future elsewhere (47%).

Social Transformation

Research has highlighted the role that identity and social values play in mobilisation for violence. As a result there are many examples of youth peacebuilding programmes based on the idea that intercultural exchanges lead to reduced prejudice and improved relations between groups (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1976; Maoz, 2002; Trew, 1986). One example of such programmes is the Children’s Friendship Project for Northern Ireland (CFPNI) which was established with the aim of promoting understanding through interaction. It ran from 1987 until 2007 when the organisation directed its activities into the creation of an Alumni Group of past participants. The project has its origin in the many “holiday schemes” of the 1980s which allowed children from both the Catholic and Protestant communities to travel to the United States for a few weeks during the summer months. Over 2,500 young people participated in the CFPNI programme that included a four-week stay in the United States with a host family along with organised pre and post “holiday” programmes. Activities varied, but included participation in community service and volunteer schemes and cultural and teambuilding activities, concentrating on leadership and conflict resolution (Irish Times, 2007). However, the main focus was on the building of a friendship and a key requirement was that both the youth participants from the two major traditions in Northern Ireland had to share a room for the duration of their stay with the American host family.

The impact of these programmes has been the subject of much research across a number of contexts (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Horenczyk & Bekerman, 1997). According to the contact hypothesis on which these types of programmes are based, four key
conditions are necessary for inter-group contact to be beneficial (Pettigrew, 1998). The
groups should have equal group status, work towards common goals, be able to cooperate
with each other without intergroup competition and the contact should have the support of the
relevant authorities or customs. The literature also highlights that important consideration
should be given to the management of anxiety which accompanies inter-group contact
(Hewstone, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998). An evaluation of CFPNI by Stringer and Murphy-
Cowan (2008) finds that:

the programme follows the key steps suggested by leading contact researchers.
During the first stage cross community friendships are encouraged in a safe and
anxiety free Northern Irish environment and friendships are given time to develop
in the more religiously neutral USA context. During this initial stage relationships
are also supported by important authority figures (parents, group co-ordinators and
host families) providing essential support for cross group contacts. (p. 5)

A common criticism of holiday schemes relates to a lack of follow up events in order
to maintain friendships across the groups (Stringer & Cairns, 1992). It is argued that the
impact can only be limited given the challenges of maintaining friendships once participants
have returned to their everyday lives in a strongly divided society. Interestingly, this is
something which CFPNI aimed to tackle. First, a key requirement in pairing up participants
was that they must live within a few miles of each other. Parents were also actively involved
in the process and had to agree to meet up at least once for a pre-departure program as well as
agreeing to attend the follow-up program (Harroun, 2009). In particular, the project put a
strong emphasis on its structured post-holiday programmes which included a reunion event
where participants, parents, a selection of host families and CFPNI volunteer coordinators
could come together to share what they had learned and experienced.

More generally, questions have been raised about the need to go beyond the level of
superficial contact towards engaging youth in understanding the root causes of conflict and
analysing power relations within society. Despite theory highlighting the importance of
intergroup inequalities, many programmes have been accused of operating at the level of
interpersonal exchange that is unlikely to have an impact on broader social, institutional and
structural change within conflict affected societies. A variety of studies have highlighted a
failure of cross-community schemes to address divisive issues (McKeown & Cairns, 2012;
Robinson & Brown, 1991). This may reflect the “avoidance culture” where there is evidence
of a reluctance to discuss religion and politics (Niens & Cairns, 2008).
Despite some of the criticisms, recent evidence suggests that intergroup contact can have a positive impact on attitudes between the two communities. McKeown and Cairns (2012) highlight research from the Young Life and Times (YLT) survey that indicates that young people aged 16 living in Northern Ireland who had attended cross-community groups demonstrated more favourable attitudes towards the outgroup in comparison with those who had not (Schubotz & Robinson, 2006). Data from the 2007 to 2008 YLT further indicates that 82% of young people who had participated in a cross-community programme agreed or strongly agreed that relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better if there were more community relations projects (Schubotz & McCarten, 2008). They argue that despite some of the weaknesses of some of these programmes related to the length of engagement and depth of discourse,

the fact that participants in such programmes have volunteered to make contact with other communities and to learn about prejudice is surely in itself a step forward from a society who only 30 years ago was involved in violent conflict. (McKeown & Cairns, 2012, p. 73)

**Economic Transformation**

In terms of the contribution of economic change to peacebuilding, the literature highlights the importance of increasing potential livelihoods and therefore the opportunity cost to an individual of taking part in war. One organisation with a long-standing interest in this area is the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). The Fund was established in 1986 by the British and Irish Governments “to promote economic and social advance and to encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, 2011, p. 8). Financed by contributions from the United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as of September 2011 the total resources committed totalled £695 million.

One of the Fund’s longest established programmes *Wider Horizons* was established in 1986 to bring together young adults aged 16 to 28 years to enhance their employability. Each project typically lasts 20 weeks and is divided into three stages. The first stage includes training in vocational skills, conflict resolution, mutual understanding, team building and personal development. Stage two involves work experience in destinations such as Canada, America, Europe and South Africa and the third stage involves completing a vocational qualification and developing job search skills on their return. Over 17,000 young people have taken part in the programme. Whilst it has always targeted young people, the
programme has evolved to actively target disadvantaged groups. In 1994 it was decided to channel all resources to only one target group, “young people aged 18 to 28 years, who are disadvantaged either socially, economically or physically, especially through poor qualifications and poor employment prospects” (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2008, p. 15). It specifically aims to attract those in long-term unemployment or those who have been carers (this links with the social disadvantage criterion). It also targets young people with a poor employment record, and with consent, those who are in jobs that are at-risk, or are under-employed.

The peacebuilding literature highlights that what is crucial is whether training results in increased employability. Short term programming that is not well aligned to an analysis of labour market needs is unfortunately an all too common occurrence in the post-conflict international literature (Ginifer, 2003; Paulson, 2009). The resulting frustration with training that fails to deliver what it seems to promise is very problematic in terms of long term peacebuilding. In 2010, 71% of Wider Horizons participants progressed into employment or training. This is a positive result given that the programme specifically targets the long-term unemployed and compares very favourably with an average of 50-55% for other employment programmes.

The international literature on technical and vocational training indicates that the degree of choice and flexibility that participants have with regards their training has critical implications for their level of satisfaction and therefore the likelihood of successfully completing the programme (Paulson, 2009). The training provision delivered through IFI programmes has evolved to provide more choice and flexibility for participants. A realisation that there is a need and desire for accreditation has led to a greater variety of qualifications being offered. There is now a choice of 68 qualifications offered to Wider Horizons participants. For example, those undertaking training in multimedia can choose between completing a BTEC qualification III or the shorter BCS Digital Creator Certificate depending on the time and resources they have available and their academic background and abilities. There has also been a shift in the types of training offered in line with the changing needs of the labour market. Much of the early training provided through Wider Horizons was in carpentry, plumbing and hospitality and tourism. However, in recognition of a shift towards a knowledge-based economy there has been an increase in multimedia and IT related training. This shift towards greater choice and flexibility in vocational training is something which is also reflected in changes in the formal sector. The Northern Ireland Council for the
Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) pushed for a revision of the curriculum and these changes were formalised in the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006. The revised curriculum aims to provide a more joined-up and holistic approach, place greater emphasis on work skills and provide greater flexibility for pupils (Department of Education Northern Ireland, 2009). In particular, in an attempt to greater prepare students for work, the revised curriculum requires students from 11-16 years to study “Learning for life and work”. This includes education for employability, local and global citizenship, personal development and home economics. There is also a greater emphasis on cross-curricular skills such as communication, using mathematics, and using ICT. As part of this revised curriculum the Department of Education has also started to introduce an “Entitlement Framework”, which aims to provide students aged between 14 and 19 with a guaranteed minimum number and range of applied (vocational) and general (academic) courses. From 2013, schools will be required to provide students aged 14-16 years with access to a minimum of 24 courses, and post-16 students with access to a minimum of 27 courses. At least one third of the courses must be general and one third must be applied (Department of Education Northern Ireland, 2014).

Northern Ireland is also participating in a UK-wide programme to reform the vocational qualification system. The aims of the new Qualifications and Credit Framework (QCF) are to simplify the current complicated National Qualifications Framework (NQF) by presenting qualifications in a way which is easier to understand, to recognise more learning through the award of qualifications and to instil more flexibility into the system through the use of units and credit awarded for achieving those units. (Byrne. 2010, p. 31)

Every unit and qualification in the QCF has a level between Entry level and level 8 which indicates the degree of difficulty. Every unit and qualification also has a credit value (with one credit representing 10 hours of study). There are three types of qualifications in the QCF: Awards (1-12 credit); Certificates (13 to 36 credits); Diplomas (37 credits or more) (Byrne, 2010, p. 31).

What makes the Wider Horizons programme distinctive from the type of training provided in the formal system, however, is the composition of each project group and the holistic approach. A Wider Horizons project group typically involves 21 participants drawn equally from the nationalist and unionist traditions in the North of Ireland and young people from the Republic of Ireland. The Wider Horizons programme has as one of its main aims to
encourage and support peace and reconciliation between young people from both nationalist and unionist communities in the North and young people from the South of Ireland. The programme employs a number of approaches to delivering Mutual Understanding, and all offer accredited training, as well as informal and one-to-one support (see Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2008 for further details). A 2008 evaluation found clear evidence of Mutual Understanding having been advanced. The level of cross-community and cross-border contact among past participants up to two years after the end of the programme is 80%. Indeed 93% of the Northern participants have maintained cross border and cross-community contact. This was one of the highest indicators of lasting mutual understanding (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2008, p. 6).

**Political Transformation**

The research literature has highlighted the importance of promoting political engagement among youth. The WIMPS (Where is My Public Servant?) project was founded in Belfast in 2004 by the non-profit organisation Public Achievement. Public Achievement staff work with the young people through their ‘Civic Youth Work’ model (VeLure Roholt, 2005; VeLure Roholt, Hildreth, & Baizerman, 2009), encouraging them to take action on issues they identify as important. Participants are also trained in journalism and media skills to enable them to research and create interviews and articles, and produce video and audio programming. Young people interview politicians and others for video “Hot-Seat” interviews, make films about issues in their communities, and can identify (through a postcode search) and email their elected representatives at local government (District Council), Northern Ireland Assembly, Westminster and European Parliament levels about issues that are important to them. The website also has an active discussion forum, where young people discuss issues that are important and relevant to them.

A common criticism of civic education programmes is that too much emphasis is placed on transferring civic “knowledge” and insufficient attention is paid to engaging young people in the practice of democracy (Quaynor, 2012). However, Public Achievement takes the position that young people are citizens now, rather than citizens in preparation (Smyth, 2012, p. 8). This, the director of Public Achievement argues, is in line with Miller’s (2000) active model of citizenship. Distinct from the liberal model (under which citizenship is seen as a set of rights and obligations) and the consumer model (whereby citizens are consumers of services and rights are ‘handed down’); under the active model citizens are actively
involved in the way their community functions. Under this model Miller (2000) envisages a society,

In which ordinary people are heavily involved in deciding issues and achieving goals, not just voting for governments and then letting them make decisions for them. ..If we are going to rely on active citizenship to decide issues, then citizens have to be prepared to see beyond their own interests and commitments and take a wider, more impartial view. ..This identification...gives you a sense of responsibility for the whole, and not merely the particular subgroup you belong to, whether this is an ethnic group, or a group of like-minded activists. (p. 29)

Public Achievement’s evaluation indicates early evidence of impact both in terms of increased civic knowledge of participants and also an increased readiness to approach politicians and take action on what they consider to be important issues. Research, by Smyth (2013), documents the way in which attitudes of young people towards politicians have changed throughout the course of the project. In fact the young people expressed surprise at the ease with which they could approach key figures, “The access that we could have with politicians as young people, and how easy it was to go up to Stormont (the home of the parliament in Northern Ireland)...in fact they wanted you to come up!” (p. 344). In particular, Smyth’s research demonstrates that the media training and the quality of the equipment plays a key role in giving participants the confidence needed to approach and, at times, challenge politicians. This highlights the importance of the skills training element of the project. Moreover, Smyth’s (2013) research indicates a level of impact beyond the scope of the project, with some evidence of participants going on to become involved in school and student politics (pp. 344-345).

The active citizenship model is not only important in encouraging greater forms of youth participation, but also has particular benefits given the problematic nature of national identity in post-accord Northern Ireland. The baseline data indicates that WIMPS participants have diverse backgrounds. Ages of participants range from 12 to 30 years old, with the mean age of participants being 17.3 years. Both female and males participate in WIMPS, although there is a larger proportion of females (70%) than males (30%). Most notably, however, there is an almost equal distribution of participants from the Protestant (52%) and Catholic (48%) communities. Smyth (2012) argues that it is the active citizenship model that allows the creation of a neutral space (both virtual and face-to-face) where members of the different traditions can come to work together on common goals.
The young people are aware of the citizens paradox— that it is difficult to agree on notions of citizenship when we can’t agree what we are citizens of- but their practical sense of active citizenship means that notions of national identity take a back seat. (p. 348)

More research is needed into the implications of this approach for long term social cohesion and democratic values. However, it is clear that one important impact of the programme is that it has allowed young people to meet and work with individuals from other communities and gain greater awareness of the multiples sides to understanding truth.

**Conclusion**

This analysis has highlighted important linkages between education and conflict with implications for peacebuilding programming. The literature, however, has largely neglected the role of non-formal youth programming, despite its importance in contexts of conflict. This paper has provided an analysis of three youth programmes that have contributed to social, economic and political transformations in post-accord Northern Ireland. One important distinction to emerge relates to the inclusion of multiple youth perspectives and backgrounds in each of these programmes. Fifteen years after the peace agreement people in Northern Ireland “still live, work and learn in a largely segregated society” (International Fund for Ireland, 2010, p. 3). There are currently 59 peace walls dividing communities across Northern Ireland, nine of which have been erected since the signing of the peace agreement in 1998, and data from the 2011 census shows that 37% of electoral wards are single identity (as defined by having 80% or more from one communal background). In particular, the education sector is an important mechanism in the reproduction of this structural segregation. The establishment of 62 integrated “common” schools serving 7% of the school population is a considerable achievement in the midst of conflict and within a divided society (Smith, 2013). However, recent figures show that almost half of Northern Ireland’s school children are still being taught in schools where 95% or more of the pupils are of the same religion (Hansson et al., 2013, p. 47).

Given the context of segregation and the current limitations of the formal education sector as a mechanism for transformation, the inclusion of multiples youth perspectives in non-formal youth programmes is an important contribution. A common criticism of intercultural programmes is that they tend to attract young people who already hold positive attitudes towards intergroup mixing and who have parents who also support intergroup mixing. From a peacebuilding perspective this raises a critical question regarding the politics
of which youth voices are represented. Youth are not a homogeneous group that exist in isolation from conflict itself. Youth may be perpetrators as well as victims of violence, mobilized to fuel the conflict as well as motivated to end it. This presents significant challenges for genuine youth engagement in terms of identifying the multiplicity of youth perspectives on the conflict, the politics of who represents youth opinion, and which youth organizations receive funding and resources. Perhaps the greatest challenge is that peacebuilding inevitably involves bringing politically opposed or marginalized groups into dialogue. While peace agreements might represent new working arrangements between political elites, relapses into conflict are common, especially where younger generations do not see or experience the benefits of peace. Sustainable peace is therefore unlikely without youth commitment, since it is the youth who have the capacity to carry a conflict into the next generation. This means that difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions have to be made about how to achieve youth engagement that is inclusive of the full range of youth. From a peacebuilding perspective, consideration of inclusion needs to go beyond measures of equality in terms of representation from the two communities, to examine the politics of which youth voices are being represented.

Furthermore, whilst the three case study youth programmes have clearly identified theories of change, it is questionable to what extent these have been designed and articulated from a peacebuilding perspective. The Children’s Friendship Project for Northern Ireland (CFPNI) has a strong basis in contact hypothesis theory and follows the key steps outlined by researchers. However, the reluctance to discuss divisive issues leads us to question its transformative potential. In terms of economic contribution to transformation, technical and vocational training schemes often receive criticism in the international literature for failing to increase employment opportunities. It is argued that this may even lead to the creation of grievances in the mismatch between aspirations and reality. Wider Horizons has demonstrated a level of success in this regard, with a relatively high level of graduates progressing into employment. However, it will be important to give consideration to the implications of the current economic downturn for the programme from a conflict and peacebuilding perspective. Finally, Public Achievement’s WIMPS project has perhaps the most explicitly defined peacebuilding goal. New media allow participants to communicate on an equal basis and raise issues that are of relevance to their lives. By putting youth in direct contact with politicians, they can also act as an important mechanism of accountability in support of political transformation.
In conclusion, this article has highlighted three examples of programming that contribute to social, economic, and political transformations. Over the course of the past fifteen years there has been an important shift in the priorities and objectives of actors and agencies involved in youth programming in Northern Ireland. From an early emphasis on economic regeneration, realisation of the persistent nature of segregation has led to an emerging consensus around the need for peacebuilding. This is a significant shift, with important implications for programming. Crucially, it involves a shift towards a more political realm. WIMPS is an explicitly political project, which perhaps explains why it is the project that seems most at ease with the peacebuilding goal. However, all actors and agencies need to give further thought as to what this shift means in practice for their priorities and programming. From a peacebuilding perspective, key issues include the politics of multiple youth representation as well as the design of youth programmes that are most likely to bring about social, economic, and political transformation.

References


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Moving ‘Beyond Neutrality’ and Cross-cultural Training: Using World Café Dialogue to Address End-of-life Care Inequalities

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Abstract

In this article I discuss how World Café Dialogues can be used to unveil structural and cultural violence that drive the behaviors that maintain end-of-life care inequalities, especially among minorities, in acute healthcare hospitals. Conflict practitioners are rarely included in conversations of end-of-life care inequalities and when included it is to “solve a problem” through bioethics mediation or provide training in cross-cultural competence. I argue that conflict practitioners need to broaden their approach to conflict and use their skills to surface unequal power structures and implicit beliefs that maintain the unjust status quo in end-of-life care disparities.

Introduction

“‘You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real world, that you’re part of all sound and anguish, and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognize you. And, alas, it’s seldom successful!’” (Ellison, 1995, p. 4)

In May 2006, I co-facilitated with two colleagues (Debra Gerardi and Rob Robson) a World Café Dialogue in San Francisco, USA (hereinafter, Patient Safety World Café). We welcomed approximately fifty people from North, Central, and South America to share their experiences, wisdom, and knowledge on how to improve patient safety and raise awareness about the devastating impact of medical errors. The participants of the Patient Safety World Café fell in one of the following categories: victims of a medical error as a patient or family member, clinicians who had partaken in a chain of events that led to a medical error, and/or patient advocates. The result of many of the medical errors discussed in the Patient Safety World Café had resulted in someone’s death. This event was sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).

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The Patient Safety World Café participants were welcomed into a room with background music, snacks, round tables, and tablecloths. At the tables there were colored markers, different color post-it notes, and flip chart paper for participants to write notes summarizing the main points in the discussion and/or doodle. There were three rounds of conversations driven by questions, previously drafted, and every twenty minutes or so, music alerted the participants that it was time to relocate to another table with a newly formed group and share their ideas. The three questions that served as discussion starters in each successive round were: What is important to our group? What does the group need in order to be energized and feel engaged in these efforts? What conversations could create ripples and create new possibilities for engagement? After finalizing all three rounds, the facilitators led a group discussion to share as a group the patterns and themes that had emerged. Contrary to brainstorming, where the main goal is usually to generate solutions or strategies to solve a problem, through these questions our aim was to foster deep listening, enable a diverse group of people to connect with each other, and tap into their inner wisdom. A graphic artist captured the narratives that emerged in the conversations.

Within minutes, strangers were actively engaged in powerful conversations. They were sharing their intimate experiences, frustrations, fears, hopes, values, expectations, and feelings about death, dying, and living. These conversations not only served as a communication tool, they were creating experiences. You could feel the intensity of the synergy in the room. As I will further discuss in this article, the taboo topics of dying, medical errors, and the structural and cultural violence that surrounds dying patients, were unveiled. Contrary to ethics consultation which focuses on the care of an individual patient, these conversations addressed broader systemic challenges.

This article is an invitation to conflict practitioners to use dialogue processes, specifically World Café, to unveil unequal power structures during end-of-life care that allow for disparate treatment of minorities and to confront oppressive structures that prevent their end-of-life needs and wishes to be honored. This invitation is consistent with Mayer’s (2004) call to have engagement professionals question normative assumptions of the field in order to deal more effectively with diversity and challenge hierarchical structures that favor the dominant culture. I argue that through dialogue processes, conflict practitioners can pose a challenge to oppressive power structures by educating those with power about the mutual benefit of altering relationships so that they can lead using “power with” and not “power over.” Conflict practitioners need to expand their role in healthcare beyond the scope of
mediation, negotiation, and cross-cultural training (hereinafter, CCT) as a way to engage with end-of-life conflict.

I have chosen end-of-life care because it is a stage in which cultural beliefs, from patients and providers, are more palpable and prone to clash (Krakauer, Crenner & Fox, 2002). In addition, throughout the dying process, structural and cultural violence become ubiquitous. Moreover, death is a universal phenomenon and how we die is intrinsically related to how we live. I also focus the discussion on clinician/physician’s role in end-of-life care to narrow the scope of this article. I begin by discussing end-of-life care disparities. I then discuss structural and cultural violence in end-of-life care and how it is institutionalized in ways that sustain end-of-life care disparity. I conclude by showing how CCT training has been ineffective in addressing disparate end-of-life care and that conflict engagement practitioners have the necessary skills to facilitate structural interventions in acute healthcare facilities that may rearrange power structures and lessen unequal end-of-life care.

**Health Disparities and the Dying Patient**

The manner in which dying patients continue to be invisible in many acute healthcare settings in the United States and are victims of healthcare inequalities is unconscionable. The dying patients in acute healthcare settings are either “minimized” or “swept beyond view into palliative care” because they do not fall within the norm of saving lives (Chapple, 2010, p. 27). Palliative care aims at alleviating pain and relieving symptoms. Since many physicians/clinicians see palliative care as inconsistent with saving lives, they have the misconception that this type of care should only take place once all rescuing attempts have been exhausted (Chapple, 2010). As I will illustrate in this article, worse than being a dying patient, is being a dying patient who is perceived by medical personnel as belonging to a “different” culture, race, or ethnicity. Evidence points to the fact that minority patients are not benefiting from the efforts that have been undertaken to improve end-of-life care (Krakauer, et al., 2002). These “different” dying patients become unintelligible. In Butler’s (2004) words, you are unintelligible

> when the laws of culture and of language find you to be an impossibility [you have no] access to the human, [you] find that your language is hollow, that no recognition is forthcoming because the norms by which recognition takes place are not in your favor. (p.30)

There is bountiful empirical evidence that African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities receive lower quality of healthcare than whites, even when taking into
account factors such as insurance status, age, income, and illness severity (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies (IOMNA), 2002; American Medical Association, 2009). This unequal treatment is also present in end-of-life care (Welch, Teno, & Mor, 2005). Many dying patients are subjected to unnecessary pain as a result of caregivers’ lack of knowledge of available pharmacological interventions and ignorance as to other available palliative care (Institute of Medicine (IOM), 1997; Krakauer et al., 2002). Furthermore, cultural biases and fears about death are a contributing factor in healthcare professionals avoiding dying patients and their families (IOM, 1997). Additionally, minority patients’ responses to physicians’ biases and their own biases may result in higher levels of mistrust towards clinicians and healthcare institutions when compared with white patients (Dovidio & Fiske, 2012).

In an attempt to improve the communication skills of physicians with dying patients across cultures and reducing health care inequalities, cultural competence programs have flourished throughout the United States. Medical schools and residency programs in the United States are required to include in their curriculum CCT and education in end-of-life care (Chun, Yamada, Huh, Hew, & Tasaka, 2010; Sulmasy, Cimino, He, & Frishman, 2008; Graves, Like, Kelly, & Hohensee, 2007). Although research indicates that CCT has the potential for improving cross-cultural communication between physicians and patients, evidence linking minority healthcare disparities with lack of cultural competence is, at the most, meager (Stone, 2008; Yamada & Breckke, 2008).

Herein I argue that dying patients, in particular minorities, in acute care facilities are victims of larger social forces (e.g., poverty, racism, and discrimination) who are either ignored or marginalized during their last days. I maintain that in order to address healthcare inequalities in end-of-life care, it is imperative to address the power structures that allow for health disparities to take place (Farmer, 2010; Farmer, Nizeye, Stulac, & Keshavjee, 2006). Blaming physicians’ lack of cultural competence for health disparities is at best, a cop-out strategy. Playing the blaming game provides a false sense of action and ignores the root causes of unequal distributions of power within the health care system. In many healthcare CCTs, culture has been reduced to a utilitarian variable, “a kind of quasi-analytical category used to explain variation in behavior” (Stephenson, 2001, p. 4). Minorities continue to suffer painful deaths in acute hospitals and their end-of-life care preferences are ignored because they are dying, immigrants, poor, non-white, and victims of racism; it is not because physicians lack cultural competency.
Structural Violence and Cultural Violence in End-of-Life Care

Minority patients dying in acute care facilities are rendered invisible and at best, are a marginalized group within the healthcare system who are victims of structural violence. Structural violence is a process by which social or institutional structures (e.g., legal, religious, political, economical) perpetuate unequal power distributions that prevent certain groups from fulfilling basic needs such as survival, wellbeing, identity, and freedom (Galtung, 1990). This type of violence is structural because it is ingrained in the political and economic systems that form our social world; violent because it is preventable and it injures members of the society, usually those that are more distressed or destitute (Farmer et al., 2006). The “underdogs” can be so disadvantaged in this relationship that they can die or be in a “permanent state of misery” (Galtung, 1990, p 293).

In the healthcare and legal systems, insurance companies, hospitals, and schools of medicine there are plentiful evidence of structural violence that are sources of healthcare disparities for minorities and interfere with providing adequate care to the dying patient (IOM, 1997; IOMNA, 2002). Examples include economic barriers due to inadequate healthcare insurance, social barriers that prevent equal access to care in comparison to whites, and underrepresentation of minority clinicians in medicine (Krakauer et al., 2002). These barriers have a direct impact on patients’ wellbeing and survival (Moseley & Kershaw, 2012). Several studies have shown that some physicians perceive black patients as less intelligent, less cooperative, less likely to comply with treatment plans, and more likely to engage in destructive behavior such as drug abuse when compared to white patients (Ryn & Burke, 2000; Sabin, Nosek, Greenwald, & Rivara, 2009; Weng & Korte, 2012). Physicians that hold these beliefs may be less likely to recommend certain treatments to blacks because they see it as “wasteful” (IOM, 1997, p. 173). These racial biases that lead to discrimination are often present at a subconscious level and are more prevalent when communicating with patients and families that are perceived to be from a different culture or race (Surbone, 2010, citing Sabin et al., 2009).

Many of these disparities are traced to historic patterns of segregation and discrimination that were legalized in the past and unfortunately continue to have a negative impact today (IOMNA, 2002). Segregation, oppression, and violence against blacks were institutionalized as a result, in part, of the American elite and the judicial system defining who is black by the one-drop rule (Davis, 2002). Anyone who had a “single drop of black blood” was considered black by definition and consequently inferior (Davis, 2002, p. 5). This
social construct was institutionalized with the help of legislation and judicial decisions such as *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) 163 US 537. This judicial decision endorsed segregation by taking judicial notice, “that a negro or black is any person with any black ancestry” and it was acceptable to be separate but equal (Davis, 2002, p. 8).

One of the many impacts of segregation in the United States is that there is a legacy of underrepresentation of minority healthcare providers (Welch et al., 2005; Merchant & Omary, 2010). Decisions such as *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) 163 US 537 and Jim Crow laws (U.S. laws that allowed for racial segregation prior to 1965) accentuated racial divides which resulted in the exclusion of minority physicians from medical education which historically has been largely limited to white, male, and upper class individuals (IOMNA, 2002). Throughout the 20th century, only 12% of North American physicians come from a working class background (Wear, 2003, p. 553). The mean income of the parents of medical students who enrolled in all the Association of American Medical Colleges for year 2000 was $101,319 and the mean education level for fathers was a graduate degree and for mothers a college degree (Wear, 2003, p. 553, citing Association of American Medical Colleges, 2000). This tendency of medical students to come from a family in which both parents are highly educated and have a high socioeconomic background continued between 1992 and 2008 and is most noticeable among white students (Grbic, Garrison, & Jolly, 2010). In 2011 the percentage of minority students matriculated in medical schools (e.g., Asian (20.1%), Hispanic (8.5%), black (6.1%), and Native American, Alaskan, Hawaiian, and other Pacific Islander (0.1%)) continues to be extremely low when compared to white students (57.5%) (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2012, p.27).

Beyond the legal and medical ideology, the scientific community has also been instrumental in legitimizing and perpetuating discrimination towards minority groups by promoting theories such as eugenics that were used to wrongly justify the inferiority of minority groups (e.g., African Americans, poor, mentally retarded) (IOMNA, 2002). To this day, many blacks distrust medical institutions and white physicians as a result of a collective memory of oppression that springs from abuses such as the Tuskegee experiments by which black patients were untreated for syphilis decades after there was a cure in order to see the effects of the disease (Bloche, 2001; Welch et al., 2005).

Structural violence, in turn, is justified or legitimized by cultural violence to the extent that it becomes ubiquitous and yet, simultaneously, invisible (Farmer et al., 2006; Galtung, 1990). Cultural violence “makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right,
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or at least not wrong” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). Cultural violence is a mental process that operates by changing the moral value of an act from wrong to right or acceptable (Galtung, 1990). For example, black and other minority patients are usually administered less pain medication when compared to white patients (Krakauer et al., 2002; Pletcher, Kertesz, Kohn, & Gonzales, 2008). The question has been posed as to whether there is an unconscious belief that blacks have less sensitivity to pain, which was one of the many alleged features that justified the medical community to perform unconscionable experiments on them (Krakauer et al., 2002). This would make it “right” or “acceptable” to withhold pain medication.

Another way in which cultural violence operates is by blurring reality so that a violent and/or unjust act becomes invisible or not so violent (Galtung, 1990). For example, providing futile healthcare or unwanted extraordinary measures to a patient that is dying has become an invisible violent act; alternatively, it is not seen as overly violent. Biotechnology has turned into an ideology and physicians feel compelled to exercise power over the patient and sustain life, in spite of the patient’s wish (Brodwin, 2000). Technology becomes a social imperative and is seen as necessary and not as a contingency; “what is contingent […] is regarded as natural” (Brodwin, 2000, p. 214).

Cultural violence also takes place through language. Medical students learn how to communicate in very formalized, unambiguous, and precise terms with the purpose of selecting from the patient’s narrative “only the ‘important negatives’ that might cast doubt on a diagnosis, and not to mention a positive symptom or finding without following its implications further” (Sinclair, 1997, p. 213). In end-of-life conversations, the focus continues to be on specific interventions rather than long term implications (e.g., “Do you want an insulin drip?”) (Lamas & Rosenbaum, 2012, p. 1656). Although some medical schools are beginning to address this issue, medical students continue to focus on the problem at hand and thinking in terms of “what ifs?” is not encouraged (Dokken & Ahmann, 2006, p.175). The focus is on the present. For example, oncologists “deliberately ‘blur the horizon of the future’ and create for patients an experience of immediacy or living for the moment” (Johnson, Cook, Giacomini, & Willms, 2000, p. 281; Lamas & Rosenbaum, 2012). The mother of a premature baby who died in a pediatric intensive care unit describes the impact of the doctor’s discourse on her in the following way: For the most part in the critical care setting, thinking tends to be short-term. We were never, and I say truly never, given enough information or enough of an opening to discuss a long term view of
Abby’s situation. No clinician had the courage to give us a “what ifs?”[…] the approach impedes the notion of thinking about the longer-term consequences in any aspects of planning ‘whether planning is going home or planning is starting to confront that your child might die. (Dokken & Ahmann. 2006, p. 175)

Acquiring scientific language, “although unsuited to dealing with internal mental events,” (Sinclair, 1997, p. 321) is seen as a necessary evil that allows physicians to be objective and emotionally detached so that they can make proper clinical judgments (Robichaud, 2003; Sinclair, 1997). Patients that are categorized as “incurable” are not worth taking care of (Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1977, pp. 316-317; Chapple, 2010). Physicians learn to limit their conversations with patients and families to “technical matters” (Anspach & Beeson, 2001, p.122; Lamus & Rosenbaum, 2012). Recent studies have shown that in spite of incorporating end-of-life care into the medical school “formal curriculum,” the “hidden curriculum” (including the trainee’s observations and what they are taught in their medical rounds) is to be emotionally detached and depersonalize the patient during their end-of-life care (Billings, Engelberg, Curtis, Block, & Sullivan, 2010).

Structural and cultural violence are enabled and sustained by erasing and distorting the historical memory thereby allowing hegemonic accounts of “what happened and why” (Farmer, 2010, pp. 354-357). Therefore, it is not possible to have an honest dialogue about drug addiction among blacks without having a conversation about slavery, segregation, and discrimination in the United States (Farmer et al., 2006). As I will discuss later on, World Café is an appropriate process to facilitate authentic conversations about end-of-life that stimulate new ways of thinking and explore possibilities without ignoring the broader historic and current context in which healthcare disparities take place.

Cross-cultural Competency Training (CCT)

Culture has been extensively discussed in the academic literature across different disciplines and an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article. However, since cultural differences are constantly (mis)used as “causes” of health disparity, I will provide a brief contextual discussion. When it comes to culture most scholars in the health care and conflict studies disciplines would agree that it is a set of behaviors, values, and customs that are common to a group of people and that they use to make meaning of the world they live in (e.g., Gregg & Saha, 2006; Mayer, 2012). Culture is about sense making. In his seminal work, Geertz (1973) describes culture as “webs of significance” that man has spun himself
“and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (p.5).

In the context of end-of-life care, culture shapes the manner in which patients, doctors, family members and those who participate in the decision-making process make sense of and experience death, life, and illness. Herein, I am adopting Kleinman’s (1988) definition of illness as opposed to disease: illness is how the sick person and those who comprise their social network experience and make sense of their symptoms; disease is the situation as seen through the lens of the physician and the biomedical model (e.g., hypertension, panic attack).

In healthcare, cultural competence is defined as “the ability of health care professionals to communicate with and effectively provide high-quality care to patients from diverse sociocultural backgrounds; aspects of diversity include, but go beyond, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and country of origin” (Betancourt & Green, 2010, p. 583). After examining the definition of culture, it is perplexing that CCT has focused on categories, such as race and ethnicity, to increase cultural competence and reduce health care inequalities. It raises the question, if culture is about making sense and finding meaning, why is the focus of CCT on boilerplate categories? How do these trainings reduce healthcare inequalities for the dying patient?

Since the late 1970s many universities began to offer as part of their medical education CCT to teach students about the health beliefs and practices of ethnic populations; examples include the University of California at Davis and the Harvard Medical School (Good, James, Good, & Becker, 2002). However, these trainings rarely focus on the socialization of physicians or how it may contribute to the institutionalization of racism in the practice of medicine (Good et al., 2002). Cross-cultural competency trainings in medicine usually focus on attitudes, knowledge, and skills (IOMNA, 2002). The main focus in attitude training is to increase provider awareness on how patient’s social and cultural background impacts health care decisions (IOMNA, 2002). This approach encourages self-reflection, which includes understanding one’s culture and biases (IOMNA, 2002). However, these trainings usually are not effective in addressing the implicit biases that physicians hold. For example, a recent study found that physicians show implicit (i.e., non-conscious beliefs not apparent to the individual) reference for white Americans when compared to black Americans (Sabin et al., 2009). The second approach, usually referred to as an etic approach, is to focus on teaching providers the attitudes and beliefs of certain cultural groups (e.g.,
“patients of culture x believe...and behave…” (IOMNA, 2002, p. 206). The third approach is to focus on developing tools and skills that improve the providers’ communication skills and to apply an inductive framework that “focuses on the patient, rather than theory, as the starting point for discovery” (IOMNA, 2002, p. 206-207).

The increased interest in trying to improve physicians’ cultural competency has certainly raised awareness of the need to be culturally sensitive. However, there is still much room for improvement. For example, although I do not deny the potential heuristic value of taking an etic approach to CCT, one that privileges the outsider’s point of view and focuses on isolating specific component of cultural groups, it tends to oversimplify the human cultural matrix and encourage stereotypes (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999). The focus on attempting to configure universal categories of cultural behavior has unintentionally ignored the synergistic interaction that takes place among different cultures and the fact that cultures are dynamic.

A recent literature review reflects that most studies measure cultural influence through racial or ethnic group membership that is “at best, a proxy for culture” (Kwack & Haley, 2005, p. 640). Furthermore, there is an inherent challenge in trying to reduce healthcare disparities by minimizing discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. That is, “in order to minimize discrimination on the basis of difference between people, differences must be systematically and authoritatively monitored, recorded and hence re-emphasized” (Banks, 1999, pp. 74-75). By subsuming race under culture, racism is redefined as a “cultural difference” which makes it easier to ignore racism, privilege, and power relations such as dominance/subordination (Beagan, 2003; Gregg & Saha, 2006). Framing CCT as learning how the “other” non-dominant group behaves and what their beliefs are has tendencies that may lead the learner to see them as inferior, exotic, or aberrant (Wear, 2003). This erroneously assumes that “normal” is an objective and color blind standard that does not reflect the cultural values of the dominant medical culture.

Taking an etic approach to culture allows for the hard questions to remain unanswered: What are the structural and systemic changes that need to take place so that dying patients are no longer oppressed and ignored? How does occupying a space of white privilege impact end-of-life care for minorities? How do we address in CCTs the unequal power relationships and structural forces that have been sustaining health care inequality in the United States for centuries?
Even more worrisome is the fact that most of the approaches to teach cultural competency ignore the relationship between cultural differences and inequities; by focusing on individual attitudes they ignore the source of inequality by keeping the “focus off structures, institutions, and governmental policies” (Wear, 2003, p. 551). In short, power differentials are ignored. As Kritek (2002) has pointed out “if you take the time to evaluate an uneven table, you can usually find what is missing—what dimensions of the conflict are being treated as if they simply did not exist” (p. 274). I posit that dialogue processes, such as World Café, are better equipped to unveil these unequal power structures. These invisible power structures become visible in World Cafés through deep listening and conversations about dying that take place among a diverse group of people (diversity in professional backgrounds and cultures). Once participants’ “blindfolds” are lifted they can name the injustices and address them. The structural inequities that lead to unequal treatment are so complex that they must be addressed through “deliberative and collaborative actions” from diverse sectors (Beadle, 2011, p. S17). The World Café is an excellent process for these deliberative and collaborative actions to take place.

**Beyond Bioethics Mediation: World Café**

When it comes to end-of-life conflict, conflict practitioners have limited their interventions, for the most part, to bioethics mediation. Bioethics mediation addresses conflicts that arise in a clinical healthcare context regarding the “proper” or “appropriate” plan regarding future goals of care (Bergman, 2013; Dubler, 2011). The main exponents and pioneers of bioethics mediation are Nancy N. Dubler and Carol B. Liebman (2004, 2011). Their model, which started in the 1990’s at Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx, is based on a problem-solving mediation style and is framed within a principle-based approach or principlism.

A principled-based-approach to mediation visualizes principles as the essence of moral reasoning and has been the dominant discourse in Western bioethics for the last forty years (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; McCarthy, 2003). In the context of bioethics mediation, “a principled resolution is a consensus that identifies a plan that falls within clearly accepted ethical principles, legal stipulations, and moral rules defined by ethical discourse, legislatures, and courts, and that facilitates a clear plan for future intervention” (Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p. 14). Within the bioethics mediation model as applied by Dubler and Liebman (2004) the four ethical principles are patient autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and distributive justice. Patient autonomy is the center of the decision...
making process and what this means is that priority should be given the patient’s values and wishes, and their choices must be supported (Dubler & Liebman, 2004). The principle of beneficence “underlies obligations to provide the best care for the patient and balance the risks or burdens of care against the benefits” (Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p. 37). Non-maleficence requires that the benefits of treatment outweigh the possible harm and the patient should not be harmed (Dubler & Liebman, 2004). Finally, distributive justice is defined as providing to each individual what is due or owed, “what is fair” (Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p. 37).

The role of a bioethics mediator is to remain neutral while equally empowering all of the participants to engage in problem-solving within the limits of the accepted dominant medical norm, as delineated by the four ethical principles listed above. Neutrality, in the context of bioethics mediation, is usually defined as not having a stake in the outcome and not favoring any side (Gibson, 1999; Marcus, Dorn, & McNulty, 2011), and not taking a stand as to the legitimacy of a moral position (Fiester, 2012). The mediator remains neutral as to the participants’ final agreement, but is not neutral when it comes to how the process is managed; the mediator is an advocate of the process not the participants (Dubler & Liebman, 2011; Fiester, 2012).

I am not implying that bioethics mediators using a problem-solving methodology and principled-based approach are ignoring the end-of-life goals of minority patients and their cultural values by privileging the dominant medical culture. Dubler (2005) has argued, and I agree, that while bioethical analysis usually privileges the “dominant medical culture,” the mediation process may deal better with addressing cultural differences than non-facilitated discussions (p. S24). The mediation setting provides a space in which the voices of disempowered groups can be amplified and diverse cultural values are honored (Dubler & Liebman, 2011). Nevertheless, there are serious limitations in the bioethics mediation model in terms of addressing structural and cultural violence. For example, during a bioethics mediation session, if agreement is not reached, the dominant medical, legal, and ethical culture will be imposed (Dubler & Liebman, 2011).

I submit that conflict practitioners should take a more active role in addressing healthcare inequalities within healthcare institutions through other processes such as World Café conversations. In other words, what would happen if conflict practitioners move beyond their traditional “neutral” and problem-solving approaches? What if conflict practitioners were willing to use dialogue processes to raise awareness regarding unequal power structures
that negatively impacts end-of-life care within acute hospitals? “The problem-solving mindset can be adequate for technical problems. But it can be woefully inadequate for complex human systems where problems often arise from unquestioned assumptions and deeply habitual ways of acting” (Senge, Scharmer, Jaworski, & Flowers, 2005, pp. 51-52). Structural and cultural violence persist when erroneous assumptions remain unquestioned and become accepted ways of acting. Therefore, taking a problem-solving approach to surface and identify structural and cultural violence is ineffective in altering an unjust status quo.

Conflict practitioners can provide an important service by unveiling power structures that are an obstacle for patients to have their end-of-life wishes honored. This can happen through dialogue processes that raise awareness about the importance of discussing end-of-life goals of care, explore the social forces that operate in healthcare institutions that are oppressive to dying patients, and empower clinicians and patients to alter unequal social structures. Awareness of these social forces and the skills to change the power structures are very rarely taught to clinicians (Farmer, et al., 2006). However, there is some evidence that it is possible to address structural violence in healthcare, by way of structural interventions without the need of tackling more complex issues such as eliminating racism or a lack of national insurance (Farmer, et al., 2006). For example, a group of researchers and clinicians in Baltimore were able to reduce significantly the racial, gender, and socioeconomic disparities in HIV treatment within the group being studied by posing the following question: “what would happen if race and insurance status no longer determined who had access to standard of care?” (Farmer et al., 2006, p.1688). Exploring the answer to this question allowed clinicians to address issues of structural violence by first being able to “see” these injustices as they surface throughout the conversation and subsequently removing obvious economic barriers such as transportation costs, providing community-based care that allowed for better access, and educating the community to decrease stigma against patients with AIDS (Farmer et al., 2006).

The World Café is a conversational process that surfaces deeper assumptions and network patterns through which people can have intimate exchanges, discover shared meaning, engage in disciplined inquiries, cross-pollinate ideas, and think about what is possible (Brown & Isaacs, 2005; Brown, Homer, & Isaacs, 2007). The emphasis is on collective understanding and not problem-solving. In a World Café several small round tables that sit four to five participants are placed in a welcoming space and in each table they explore questions that matter to them (Brown et al., 2007). Questions are discussed in
iterative rounds of conversations, usually no more than three, with each round lasting between twenty to thirty minutes (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). After the first round of conversation, participants are invited to move to another table and share their ideas with the newly-formed group (Brown et al., 2007). Usually one participant stays at the table and serves as a “host” to the new group and shares with the new participants the highlights of the earlier conversation (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). After several rounds of conversations the whole group engages in mutual reflection and a conversation to identify patterns, discuss what they have discovered, and share ideas that are meaningful to them (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). The collective knowledge is made visible by writing or drawing the ideas that surfaced throughout the process (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). These ideas, as explained later on, may lead to action.

The World Café approach entails a dialogue process which is built on the assumption that people already possess the wisdom and creativity to engage challenges and also, the following seven core principles: 1) clarify purpose and parameters; 2) focus on questions that encourage collaborative participation; 3) encourage full participation; 4) cross-pollinate and connect diverse perspectives; 5) listen together for patterns, insights and deeper questions; 6) share collective knowledge; and 7) create a hospitable space (Tan & Brown, 2005).

World Café is a deceptively simple process (Prewitt, 2011). Its simplicity and lack of emphasis on problem-solving is what makes it such a powerful process in surfacing implicit beliefs and social forces such as those that perpetuate unequal treatment during end-of-life care. World Café theory and practice is partly informed by Bohm’s (1996) approach to dialogue (as cited in Prewitt, 2011). Bohm (1996) posits that in order to think in new ways, society’s tacit infrastructure (e.g., assumptions, attitudes and beliefs that are rigidly and unconsciously held) need to be unearthed and understood through a dialogic process that requires the suspension of assumptions and values (as cited in Nichol, 2003). Bringing these assumptions to light and reflecting upon them could reveal “blind spots” that allow participants of the dialogue process to achieve greater collective understanding and learning (Prewitt, 2011, p. 191, as cited in Atlee, 2009; Hansen, 2008). When participants act based on this collective understanding and learning one can see the tangible results of the World Café conversations (Brown, 2001).

Participants of the initial small group conversations share their new ideas with other groups and this creates the possibility of large-scale institutional and societal change (Brown, 2001; Brown et al., 2007). For example, World Café dialogue may raise awareness of how the system operates and raise consciousness about the need for institutional change. At the
individual level patients and clinicians may modify their behavior if they “see” the connection between their behavior and health inequalities; at the community level, awareness may lead to groups organizing and pushing for changes in public policies that maintain oppressive structures (Benz, Espinosa, Welsh, & Fontes, 2011). Participants in World Café dialogues have described the process, not as “an activism against the authority structure but for the world we want” (Tan & Brown, 2005, p. 89). World Café conversations serve as a conduit to minimize the distance inherent in unequal power relationships and serves as a bridge between the past and the future (Tan & Brown, 2005).

Stepping away from a neutral stance and hosting World Café conversations through a critical theory framework could transform the taken-for-granted inequities that take place in end-of-life care. Hansen (2008) makes a compelling argument as to how conflict practitioners who wish to address social justice issues would benefit from incorporating into their practice an analysis of power and how to assist clients in overcoming structural and cultural violence. In the Patient Safety World Café, some of the unequal power relationships that participants identified as being important to them were the following: justice, equity, and addressing power imbalances; address political barriers such as corruption and fear of retaliation; the need for meaningful dialogue between patients and healthcare professionals; and challenge conventional authority in healthcare. By facilitating a discussion of these themes, participants shared their collective wisdom as to how to address these social justice concerns, and more importantly they began building networks and relationships.

Facilitating World Café conversations with physicians, healthcare clinicians, patients, family of patients, policy makers, and administrators could be valuable in unveiling end-of-life structural and cultural violence to the extent that it allows participants to: 1) discover and reframe unconscious biases; 2) share new meanings and knowledge through collective discoveries; 3) build relationships and networks; 4) develop attitudes that stimulate innovative thinking 5) engage in self-reflection; 6) cultivate collective intelligence; 7) identify and analyze the causes and effects of unequal distributions of power in healthcare; and 8) explore in-depth some of the key challenges and opportunities in end-of-life care. Brown and Isaacs (2005) invite us to see conversation as action because, based on their experiences with World Cafés, when participants are having conversations about issues that they care about they want to organize and take further action. In the Patient Safety World Café, one of the themes that emerged was, “transform pain and hurt into action.” Participants in the Patient Safety World Café drafted a joint statement pledging to fight medical errors and
developed strategies to advance their cause. Some of the strategies discussed were to identify power figures and organizations to share their statement with, identify media connections, create a listserv/clearing house, and connect with other organizations. Conversation, led to action.

Conclusion

In spite of the many initiatives that have been initiated in the last decades directed at eliminating end-of-life care inequalities; these disparities continue to be prevalent in healthcare institutions in the United States. Conflict practitioners have not fully inserted themselves, nor are they usually invited, to these conversations due, in part, to a narrow approach to conflict that hinders the capacity to step out of a position of neutrality and use their skills and processes to challenge the status quo and unequal power relationships. For the most part, conflict practitioners are partaking in end-of-life conflict as a third party “neutral” through bioethics mediation whose role is to remain impartial and try to assist people in reaching a mutually agreeable solution to their problem or serving as trainers in CCTs. These approaches have made some progress in raising awareness, improving clinicians’ attitudes towards minorities, and increasing cultural competence. However, they have been less successful in addressing cultural and structural violence, reducing healthcare disparities, or improving healthcare outcomes (Betancourt & Greene, 2010; Rabinovich-Einy, 2011).

Nearly a decade ago, Mayer (2004) invited conflict professionals to challenge their assumptions of neutrality and expand their role in helping people engage with conflict. Most recently, Hansen (2008) has also argued in favor of conflict practitioners taking “atypical” roles and serve as advocates, advisors, or any other role that allows marginalized individuals to challenge oppressive structures through constructive dialogue. These “atypical” roles, are more common among peacebuilding practitioners, but are less common among conflict practitioners. Being a third party neutral is still seen by conflict practitioners as a core part of their identity. Conflict practitioners continue to identify themselves by the role they have in a conflict as opposed to focusing on the purpose of the intervention (Mayer, 2012). As I have discussed in this article, hosting World Café conversations could be an excellent process for unveiling unequal power structures in end-of-life care. If conflict practitioners “let go” of their illusion of neutrality they could make significant contributions to reducing end-of-life care inequalities.
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After a Century of Injustice: Moving Toward Turkish Recognition of the Armenian Genocide
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Abstract
Nearly one hundred years have passed since the Armenian genocide, which prefaced and in some ways encouraged the Holocaust – yet the Turkish government continues to deny the genocide and uses political manipulation to prevent its recognition by others. The denial’s history has been one of collaborative repression, but in recent years Turkish voices have joined with Armenians’ in the struggle for recognition; collaborative struggle, particularly in recognition of shared history, may represent the best chance to pressure Turkey to federally recognize the genocide. This paper explores the machinations of the denial and its significance in the twenty-first century, as well as the consequences of the Armenian genocide for its victims and their descendants. As a global perspective drawn from Armenian diaspora studies demonstrates, the genocide remains a significant part of a global consciousness of pan-Armenian identity. This identity remains trapped as a victim of the genocide, just as the denial entraps Turkish identity.

Introduction
“Denial of genocide strives to reshape history into order to demonize the victims and rehabilitate the perpetrators, and is – indeed – the final stage of genocide” (Lipstadt in Balakian, 2003, p. 383). If we take denial to be the final phase of genocide, this means the Armenian genocide has continued for nearly a century, as this final phase has been inherited and continued by successive generations of Turkish politicians, whose efforts have become more aggressive in recent decades. In turn, members of Armenian communities, in Armenia itself, where approximately 3 million Armenians live, and in the diaspora as well, the scattered international communities of as many as 8 million Armenians, have worked to counter Turkey’s efforts, lobbying governments and international organizations to officially recognize the genocide. Despite some success, the Turkish denial continues, and continues to
have significance not solely for Armenian communities, but also all of humanity. This is particularly true because Turkish genocide denial sets a precedent and model, following in step with the genocide itself, which set the precedent for the Holocaust of World War II.

This article reviews the history of the Turkish government’s denial of the Armenian genocide, including the methods and goals of the denial, and the impacts of the genocide and the denial on Armenians worldwide. Just as it argues that there has been a collaborative repression of historical truth, involving academics and foreign state governments, among others, it also argues that collaborative struggle between Armenian and Turkish activists, non-governmental organizations, and communities offers the best opportunity to achieve Armenian genocide recognition in Turkey based on recent events and the opportunity to continue building on their momentum.

The Armenian Genocide and Its Aftermaths

At the end of the nineteenth century, the greatly diminished Ottoman Empire was in the final stages of its decline. The Armenians, a Christian minority in the Muslim empire, were living on the traditional homelands they had occupied for over 2000 years. In the 1800s, the Ottoman Empire repeatedly went to war with Russia, a Christian empire, and lost much of its territory, including Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina (Balakian, 2003, p. 145), and the Balkans, largely Christian populations (p. 161). In response, the Ottoman government began to frame Christians as its enemies (p. 145). Thus, those Christians within the Ottoman Empire came under suspicion, in particular the Armenians (p. 198), as a large part of the Armenian community lay within Russia’s borders. Armenians in what’s now eastern Turkey suffered increasing attacks from Turkish mobs incited by official powers, the worst of these occurring from 1894 – 1896 (p. 5), and again in 1909 (Balakian, 1997, p. 232; Gibbons, 1917).

At the start of World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with Germany, and using the war as a guise, the Ottoman’s new government, the Young Turk Committee for Union and Progress, enacted a policy of genocide against the empire’s Armenian population, as well as Assyrian (Travis, 2006), Greek and other non-Muslim communities. The genocide officially started on April 24, 1915, when Armenian intellectuals, community and religious leaders in Istanbul were rounded up for interrogation, torture and execution (Balakian, 1997, p. 235). Persecution of Armenians with intent of extermination continued across Anatolia, what it today eastern Turkey, and then in the independent Republic of Armenia as Turkish forces continually invaded (Balakian, 1997, p. 242; 2003, p. 328). Aida Alayarian (2008) sets
the total number of Armenian deaths at over two million, including deaths from the pogroms and massacres that began in 1894 and continued until 1922 (p. 9).

Two key events after the genocide have had profound and lasting impact on Armenia and Armenians. One of these was the fate of the survivors. Their homelands became eastern Turkey: village names were changed and Armenian churches and monuments destroyed; even today, practically no Armenians live on this land (Hovannisian, R. K., 2003, p. 275). Some survivors fled east to what is now the Republic of Armenia, then under the protection of the Russian Empire and soon to be part of the Soviet Union. Others escaped and attempted to assemble the remains of their families and villages in communities scattered across the Middle East, Europe and North America. This formed the Armenian diaspora, which may number approximately eight million today. The population of Armenia itself is only three million (World Bank, n.d.). Studies of the diaspora have attested to a global, pan-Armenian identity, though, as a result of its wide dispersion, it exists in a necessarily fragmented and heterogeneous fashion (compare Bakalian, 1993; Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005; Kirkland, 1980a, 1980b; Schwalgin, 2004; Ziemer, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Although few studies document the Armenian diaspora (Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005, p. xxvi), those completed indicate this collective diasporan Armenian identity is trapped as a victim of the genocide that created it. It is impossible to give any sense of Armenianness without serious consideration of the genocide; it is an inevitable part of modern Armenian identity (Theriault, 2003). This is particularly evident for the diaspora, which originally formed as a result of the genocide (Hovannisian, R., 2003).

Examining the major studies published in English allows insight into the lasting impact of the genocide on diasporan communities. One American study describes the genocide as the Armenian “overarching cultural narrative” and presents some of the difficulties that arise from limited cultural knowledge of identity due to genocide (Manoogian, Walker, & Richards, 2007). Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in an Armenian community in Russia has also provided key insights into Armenian diasporan-consciousness. There, Ulrike Ziemer found that the genocide remains a significant factor influencing Armenian identity, both in the sense of the personal family narrative as well as the diasporan “collective identity” (2010a, p. 295). In her study of tensions between descendants of genocide victims and recent Armenian migrants to Greece, Susanne Schwalgin (2004) emphasizes a contrast between an imagined “pure,” pre-genocide Armenia and the present-day, impoverished, post-Soviet Republic of Armenia. This contrast is an indication that in
many ways, the Armenian homeland of the diaspora no longer exists. In that sense Armenian diasporan longing for “homeland” may be, particularly for the older, original diasporan communities formed immediately after the genocide, a longing for both a place and time before genocide.

The genocide’s other significant and long-reaching consequence is the Turkish denial, described as “the most consistent, strident, and elaborate state-organized attempt to conceal a record of past atrocities” (Cohen, 2001 p. 134). During and after the genocide, the Young Turk government, and each consecutive Turkish government, claimed to be innocent of any wrongdoing. They institutionalised an official policy of denial that began in tandem with the genocide and continues through today (Balakian, 2003, epilogue). In Turkey, article 301 of the Turkish penal code makes it a federal crime to mention the unrecognized genocide because it is an insult to “Turkishness” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 137). Although the word “genocide” did not exist until World War II, witnesses and international media described the state-planned massacres using the same terminology that would come to define the crime (Balakian, 2003, p. xix). Despite this, Turkey maintains its denial, and “truths that were certain at the time … were transformed into speculation, rumours, and uncertainties” (Cohen, 2001, p. 134). Denial is a typical criminal strategy to “promote forgetting” (Herman in Balakian 2003, p. 373). Prior to the 1970s, the denial was passive (Balakian, 2003, p. 379; Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 96, 114), but it has since become increasingly widespread, systematic and well-funded (Theriault, 2001). The Turkish government fuels the denial internationally by political manipulation and financial incentive. Through these means it has even gained the support of some academics (Hovannisian, R., 1997).

Denial has been described as the final phase of genocide and the desecration of historical memory (Hovannisian, R., 1999). Framed in this sense, the Armenian genocide has not officially ended, but is still actively carried on by Turkish government officials a century later. The individuals who died – often after suffering malicious violence including torture and rape (Balakian, (2003[1918]) and (Sarafin 2000[1916]) document the extreme violence employed, a typical aspect of genocide), and their centuries of cultural existence in the Ottoman Empire, are still under attack. This continued denial prevents Armenians from moving on in any way from the genocide. Diasporan Armenians advocate for recognition of the genocide often more fervently than Armenian nationals, who have been forced to move on in some ways due to their political realities (Hovannisian, G., 2010; Judah, 2012). For example, when diasporan Raffi Hovannisian, an Armenian American, served as foreign
minister in the first post-Soviet Armenian government, his hard stance demanding genocide recognition was one of the reasons President Levon Ter-Petrosyan requested his resignation (Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 171-178). Thomas de Waal (2010) notes, “In October 2009, many diaspora Armenians, mostly descendants of Genocide survivors, found themselves in the awkward position of denouncing the Yerevan government for moving to normalize relations with Turkey” (p. 31). Examples like these illustrate how the continued denial has managed to cause tensions even between Armenians.

**Genocide and Denial: Setting Precedents**

It was the destruction of the Armenians by the Ottoman state – viewed as an internal affair of a sovereign entity by international laws of the time – that first inspired the Polish-born lawyer Raphael Lemkin to create a framework in international law for the concept of genocide (Power, 2007, pp. 17-19). Indeed, he created the term genocide himself. Although he began this effort in the 1930s, while warning people with a prophetic nature of the Nazi regime’s intentions, he failed to convince either the community of international lawmakers or even his own family that action needed to be taken. As a result, he lost 49 of his family members, including his parents, in the Holocaust (p. 49). He dedicated his entire life to the creation and ratification of the genocide convention, article 2 of which defines genocide as:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Power, 2007, p. 62)

Based on this definition, and perhaps on its adoption by the UN in 1948, while the Nazi atrocities of WWII remained forefront in people’s minds, the Holocaust became the defining example of what a genocide is (Akçam, 2012, p. xxix). Yet, Lemkin’s aim was to create an international law expressly forbidding and making punishable what had happened to the Armenians as well as the Jews.

Scholars agree that the Armenian genocide was a direct predecessor to the Holocaust, in part because Germany, as the Ottoman ally and mentor, had German officers assisting in the genocide (Balakian, 2003, p. 167; Coloroso, 2008; Lifton, 2003). One of the most ubiquitous quotations now associated with the Armenian genocide is the rhetorical question Hitler posed...
prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland: “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?” (Balakian, 2003, pp. 164-165). One might imagine that this would have drawn Armenian and Jewish survivors together in mutual support, recognition and solidarity, but this has unfortunately not been the case. Writing in the 1970s, Armenian American Michael Arlen witnessed both defensive Armenian and Jewish reactions to the mention of the “other” genocide (Arlen, 1976), and in the course of my own research 35 years later, I have encountered the same. In a detailed comparison of genocide denial strategies, eminent Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian (1997) describes efforts to create animosity between Armenians and Jews:

Deniers of the Armenian Genocide uphold the truth and criminality of the Holocaust and make an appeal to keep it uncontaminated by confusing it in any way with the hoax of a so-called Armenian genocide; deniers direct representations of their version of the Armenian genocide to Jewish groups as well as the Israeli government. (p. 43)

It is disappointing but not surprising that, in response, many Armenians feel historically overshadowed by the widely recognized Holocaust despite the two events’ closely connected narratives and their joint basis for the formation of Lemkin’s genocide convention.

The successful Turkish effort to frame the Armenian genocide as “illegitimate” to Jewish groups is an example of Patricia Williams’ “representational force” (1998). This refers to the ways groups are represented to each other (and the wider community) and consequently by each other. This process results in the continual (re)creation and (re)enforcement of borders. The Armenian genocide is represented as illegitimate, and this illegitimacy is represented as a threat to the legitimacy of the Holocaust. As members of Jewish groups absorb this representation, they draw distinctions between Jewish and Armenian histories, and consequently, between people. These distinctions are recreated and passed on, strengthening the borders. Armenian perceptions of Jewish attitudes (regardless of the reality of these attitudes) result in mutual border building and further group differentiation. Instead of finding common ground, differences are continually highlighted. Representational force is powerful, dangerous and unfortunate – these negative experiences of border creation and enforcement may discourage Armenian collaborative efforts with non-Armenian groups, even if doing so may be the best way to achieve their goals, as I will return to later.

The Turkish government denial remains the one major distinction between the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust (Hovannisian, 1997). The denial has become
institutionalized (p. 44). The Turkish government’s official position is that Armenians were safely deported to Syria and Lebanon; although “gangs” attacked some Armenians and some local authorities acted “irresponsibly,” this “emigration” was successful (Süleyman, 2008, pp. 122-123). This type of reinterpretation of historical events is a common tactic used by governments to “manage outrage” over actions such as genocide (Martin, 2009). The actions of the Turkish government as recently as 1996 put their denial in sharper context. They repatriated the remains of Ismail Enver from Tajikistan several decades after his assassination by an Armenian. Enver was one of the three Young Turk leaders who planned and coordinated the genocide. In Istanbul, the former Ottoman capital, he received a state burial, during which the Turkish president described him as an important national hero and symbol (Gakavian, 1997). This echoes the Turkish government’s state burial of Mehmed Talât on Istanbul’s Hill of Liberty after Hitler returned his remains in 1942, 21 years after Talât’s assassination by an Armenian genocide survivor in Berlin (Power, 2007, pp. 2, 23). In Turkey today, there remain streets, public schools, communities, and mosques honoring Talât’s legacy (Bedrosyan, 2013).

The ultimate goal of denial is to prevent the genocide from becoming part of global collective memory (Hovannisian, 2003, p. 2), which, as noted, is the final phase of genocide (Lipstadt in Balakian, 2003, p. 383). Turkey has thus far achieved some success of this final phase of genocide by using political and financial pressure to obfuscate historical fact and deter other nations from officially recognizing the genocide. More and more nations and government bodies have recognized the genocide, including the Council of Europe in 2001 (Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute “International Organisations” n.d. This website contains a list of all recognizing governments and organizations). However, Turkey pressures the United States in particular to prevent official recognition. In 2005, an American congressional committee passed two resolutions to officially recognise the Armenian genocide as historical fact, but the Bush administration refused to pass the resolutions due to their military relationship with Turkey (Coloroso, 2008, p. 189). While Barack Obama acknowledged the genocide during his senatorial tenure, he has yet to do so as U.S. president because of America’s strategic partnership with Turkey (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). This has a historic precedent as well: when the United States entered World War I, it declared war against Germany but not the Ottoman Empire, choosing to maintain relations with the Turkish government, which ultimately weakened its position in relation to post-war justice for Armenia (Balakian, 2003, ch. 23).
Governments that do take action to historically preserve the genocide face Turkish retaliation. This issue drew international media attention in 2011 when the government of France debated a bill to criminalize denial of any officially recognized genocide – including, in France, the Armenian genocide. In response to this, the Turkish government recalled its ambassador and banned French military vehicles from Turkish docks and airspace while threatening further retaliation (“Watch your words,” 2011). France had seen this before, in 2000, when they passed a bill officially recognizing the genocide; at that time, Turkey took six months to resume diplomatic relations with France (Balakian, 2003, p. 390). Although the 2011 bill became law in France, France’s Constitutional Council later overturned it (“French court overturns,” 2012).

Strategies of denial also manipulate academics. The Institute for Turkish Studies in the United States – funded by the Turkish government – awards grants to academics and then requests their involvement in political action preventing genocide recognition (Balakian, 2003, pp. 381-385; Hovannisian, 1997, p. 42). The Turkish government also uses coercion to fuel the denial. For example, the first major conference considering all genocides was planned in Tel Aviv in 1982. Some speakers intended to make reference to the Armenian genocide. For that reason, the Turkish government put so much pressure on the universities and institutes involved, as well as the Israeli government, that it was felt that “Jewish lives … were at risk” (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 122; Hovannisian, R., 1997, p. 7). Holocaust survivor and Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel stepped out as keynote speaker, and the conference had to be relocated. These are examples of what Richard Hovannisian (1997) calls “the strategies of denialists, rationalisers, relativisers, and trivialisers” (p. 52). In his comparison of the denial of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, he details the identical methods of each and the equal danger they present to academic integrity as well as human rights. Denialists conceal certain facts, and distort and exaggerate others to make their claims convincing. To deny any genocide proven by historical fact is to allow for the denial of them all; this behaviour creates a precedent for future genocide denialists to exploit. Hovannisian also argues that allowing anyone to deny the Armenian genocide, or allowing it to be forgotten by history, is collusion in ongoing Turkish crimes (1997).

These examples of Turkish government efforts to maintain and promote the denial speak to a collaborative repression of historical truth. This represses not only the historical facts of violence against the Armenians, but also individual stories of Turkish and Kurdish heroism, of individuals and families who risked their lives to help Armenians survive and escape (for
example, see Bedrosyan, 2013). The Turkish government cannot maintain its denial alone if others do not agree to go along with this, particularly its own citizens. Yet others continue to go along with it. The Australian federal government, for example, has not officially recognized the Armenian genocide. Australian history writers pay little attention to their nation’s close connection to the genocide despite some suggestions that the Allied invasion of Gallipoli by British, Australian and New Zealand troops on April 25, 1915 precipitated the start of the Armenian genocide (Manne, 2011). The Allied attack likely heightened the Turkish siege-mentality and fueled a mania for ridding the empire of Armenians, according to historian Jay Winter (in Balakian, 2003, p. 178). Australia’s failure to link the two events in the national consciousness or even actively address their connection has been described as a “cult of forgetfulness on a national scale” (W.E.H. Stanner in Manne, 2011, p. 324). This suits the Turkish government’s purposes and maintains the genocide’s goals.

The significance and impact of Turkish denial are complex. Beyond the points illustrated above, Henry Theriault (2003) describes four ways the denial is not only collusion of the crime against the Armenian people, but also an extension of it. Deniers are “accessories after the fact” by assisting those responsible in evading guilt (p. 242). Denial is also a form of grave desecration, in the sense that writing about the genocide serves to remember those whose graves remain unknown or whose bodies were left unburied (p. 248). Armenian identity and culture come under attack by deniers as well, because of the genocide’s essential role in contemporary Armenian identity – to deny the genocide is to deny a significant part of the Armenian historical experience (p. 247). Theriault’s analysis reflects on the denial from the Armenian point of view, but the denial has had significant impact on Turkish citizens as well. The Turkish government’s human rights abuses include incarceration and prosecution of journalists, writers and activists and excessive force on the part of the police, who are immune to accountability (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The repression of journalists, writers and activists is the attempt to repress witnesses, alternative voices, truth, and inevitably, memory.

The denial also causes psychological harm because it is a celebration of the violent destruction of Armenians and a further rubbing of “salt in their already gaping wounds” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 30). In Consequences of Denial, a psychological assessment of Armenian post-genocide trauma, Aida Alayarian details the psychological effects of the Turkish denial on Armenians. She argues that, psychologically, the Armenian history of trauma has gone largely unacknowledged and undiagnosed. Alayarian describes silence as a further kind of trauma causing acute mental distress: for decades the Armenian genocide existed largely in “a kind of
conspiracy of silence” (p. 118) which made it that much harder for Armenians to risk stigmatisation and humiliation by speaking about it; this only began to change in the 1990s (pp. 116-119). Armenian culture is too often solely associated with the violence of the genocide, and as a result, “the way in which they relate to their cultural origins is often influenced by feelings associated with loss, anger and rage at having lost their culture” (p. xxviii). This point is particularly salient for diasporans, who may be disconnected from the Armenian language and religion and thus have little other connection to or understanding of Armenianness.

When trauma is experienced on such a mass scale and left unaddressed, it is passed from one generation to the next. Subsequent generations can experience similar psychological effects without the capacity to express their origins (Alayarian, 2008, p. 46). The genocide, as a key aspect of pan-Armenian consciousness, has entrapped Armenian identity: Armenians cannot turn away from the genocide even momentarily, but must guard it against the continued attacks of denial. Ironically, Turkish identity is similarly trapped by the need to perpetuate the denial; the people of Turkey would benefit from mourning the events of the genocide, as a way of moving beyond it (Göçek, 2003).

**Collaborative Struggles for Turkish Acknowledgment**

The genocide is an historical event of which many Turks remain largely ignorant, a result of successful government efforts with this intention (Akçam in Balakian, 2003, p. 375). As part of this effort, the history of Armenians as a once-significant community within the borders of modern Turkey has been actively erased (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 225). However, in recent years there have been indications that an increasing number of Turkish citizens are becoming aware of this history (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). A significant turning point within Turkey was the murder of Turkish Armenian journalist and Editor, Hrant Dink, who had written articles urging recognition of the Armenian genocide. Dink was shot outside his Istanbul office on January 19, 2007. The killer, a seventeen-year-old “ultranationalist,” claimed his motivation was Dink’s offense of Turkish honour (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). As the documentary *Aghet – a genocide* (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009) depicts, Dink’s murder sparked a demonstration march of “hundreds of thousands” of Turks wanting to honour his efforts. The marchers carried signs reading “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians.” A former Turkish ambassador described the march as “very unusual,” and Dink’s daughter, Delal, said of the march,

Nobody could imagine that in Turkey, that many people would go on the street and say “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians.” There is this public who are
really raising their voice and, well, the state has to hear it at some point and I think they are hearing it. (In Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009)

The march has since become an annual event in Istanbul. In January 2012, it grew into a protest involving “tens of thousands of Turks” who used the occasion to contest Turkey’s lack of media freedom and corrupt justice system (Albayrak, 2012). The willingness of some Turkish citizens to protest may stem from an empathetic stance for the repression of Turkey’s fourteen million Kurdish citizens and their desire for an independent or autonomous Kurdish state (“Turkey and its rebel Kurds,” 2010). This also dates back to the end of the Ottoman Empire, when Kurds believed in a realistic opportunity for an independent nation based on their close relationship with the Young Turk government – a relationship so close that many Kurds had an active role in the Armenian genocide (Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 225-226). It is an irony of history that after Kurds helped rid eastern Turkey of Armenians and other Christians, they then became subjects of Turkish repression. Now, their struggles against Turkey’s government are also drawing attention to the historic treatment of the Armenians and the genocide denial. Kurdish leaders in Diyarbakir, Turkey have recently issued a recognition and apology for the role Kurdish communities played in the Armenian and Assyrian genocides, and called on Turkish authorities to recognize the genocide and take steps towards atonement (Akkum, 2013).

Collaboration has been a factor in some recent efforts for Turkish recognition, particularly at the academic level. In 2000, 126 international holocaust scholars signed an affirmation of the Armenian genocide as historical fact and published it in The New York Times (“Centre for Holocaust,” n.d.). The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute (n.d.) (“Public Petitions”) also has a petition of 150 scholars and writers who condemn the denial and urge governments and media to recognize and refer to the Armenian genocide as such. Under the heading “Recognition,” the website for the 2009 genocide documentary Aghet – a genocide (n.d.) lists 15 Turkish scholars who have recognized the Armenian genocide. One of these, historian Taner Akçam, situates himself within this struggle in describing his writing as “a call to the people of Turkey to consider the suffering inflicted in their name” (2006, p. 2). Akçam used his access to Turkey’s state archive to publicize nationally “self-incriminating documents” (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216). In The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity, Akçam (2012) uniquely draws together both Muslim Turkish historical perspectives and those of other ethnic religious groups present during the era of the genocide, including the Ottoman Armenians (p. xiii). Akçam and others emphasize the importance of acknowledgment of responsibility for
mass acts of violence and hatred in order to prevent their future recurrence (Akçam, 2006, p. 2; Coloroso, 2008).

Equally important to Akçam’s research is the fact that a Turkish historian had the desire and courage to use official Turkish sources to further document and definitively prove the genocide, although this has meant he is no longer able to live in Turkey (Akçam, 2006, n.p.) and has been listed as a target for assassination by the same terrorist group that assassinated Hrant Dink in Istanbul (Akçam, 2012, p. xii). When Akçam, together with sociologist Fatma Müge Göçek and novelist Elif Şafak, spoke about the genocide at a University of California conference in 2005, it was the first time Turkish professors acknowledged the genocide in an international conference dedicated to Armenian history. Garin Hovannisian, an Armenian American writer, described the conference as the beginning of a new movement: “Finally, an alliance of Armenian and Turkish intellectuals was preparing to confront the original sin of modern history” (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216).

Other examples of collaborative efforts include the “Armenians, Forgive Us” campaign, an online petition launched by 200 Turkish intellectuals, journalists, and public and cultural figures (Abrahamyan, 2010). The petition offered acknowledgment of and apology for the denial of what it referred to as the “Great Catastrophe.” Approximately 30,000 people signed the petition in its first ten days online (Aghet n.d.). This seems to be an optimistic indication of Turkish citizens’ growing awareness of their national history from perspectives beyond their own government’s, and their willingness to acknowledge the past and push for a more honest and reflective future.

Armenians and Turks also need to engage in dialogue, a healing strategy Alayarian feels is essential to both groups’ ability to renounce culturally embedded hatred and “humanize de-humanized actions” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 143). Dialogue between descendants of victims and perpetrators is necessary to move past the trauma suffered by both (Schwab, 2004, pp. 177-95). The Armenian diaspora can offer a “neutral” starting place for dialogue, particularly in communities that are home to both Armenians and Turks. Susan Arpajian Jolley, a third generation Armenian American teacher, provides an excellent example of this when she describes the process of memoir writing she undertook with her high school class, which included three recent Turkish immigrants (Jolley, 2004). Many organisations have also begun creating opportunities for Turks and Armenians to meet and collaborate, such as the international non-profit organisation Internews, which organised the creation of collaborative
documentaries with filmmakers from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border (“Cross-Border film,” 2012).

Theriault (2001) has warned, “Denial is becoming the inevitable future of genocide” (p. 241). The global recognition and remembrance of the Armenian genocide is an issue that has personal significance for Armenians, but also political significance for the world community as a human rights issue. In their identity negotiation, Armenians have to reconcile the violent deaths of family members, neighbours and entire communities; the permanent removal of Armenians from much of their traditional homelands; and the ongoing and virulent effort to permanently erase those events from world history. In light of this, it seems imperative for Armenians to continue to not only advocate for genocide recognition and Turkish admittance of responsibility, but to consider the most effective ways of doing so, even if this may require overcoming uncomfortable barriers such as those of representational force.

April 24, 2015 will mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. In the lead up to this event and the commemorations themselves, Armenians and human rights activists have the opportunity to draw increasing attention to the issue of Turkish denial. The 2013 Taksim Square protests in Istanbul were also helpful in drawing international attention to the democratic failings of Turkey’s government and its repressive tactics against free speech. Activists should use the opportunity to tie the protests, which began as a way to protect Gezi Park from demolition, to the issue of Armenian repression in Turkey – Gezi Park was, for several centuries, an Armenian cemetery, but it was destroyed in the period of Turkification and Armenia erasure after World War I (Greenhouse, 2013). Just as during the Taksim Square protests, Turkish activists can continue to draw attention to their government’s ongoing failures of justice, and make genocide recognition part of this platform. Diasporans in the United States, Europe, Australia and elsewhere would benefit by joining in solidarity with Turkish activists, both in their home nations and in Turkey.

As Akçam and other Turkish scholars have demonstrated by working together with Armenian scholars, a collaborative approach changes the debate from one of Turks versus Armenians to one of repression versus human rights. Armenian diasporan communities have many international community organizations, such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union and the Armenian National Committee. These organizations serve their Armenian communities and support recognition efforts, as success in recognizing countries and other state bodies, and near success in the United States demonstrates. Turning some of these efforts specifically to working with Turkish activists may strengthen the already growing awareness movement in
Turkey, as demonstrated by the Armenians, Forgive Us campaign and the marches commemorating Hrant Dink. It seems that for advocacy to finally succeed in shifting Turkish public and government perception to bring recognition by Turkey, it needs to, at least in part, come from within Turkey in a collaborative struggle of both victims’ and perpetrators’ descendants.

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Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World

Faruk Ekmekci

Abstract

This paper aims to test the capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world. Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world. It tests the capitalist and democratic peace arguments through statistical analysis (logistic regression) of the militarized interstate disputes in the developing world between 1951 and 2000. The results support the “capitalist peace” argument and suggest that, within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas democracy does not. The findings are robust to different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development.

Introduction

“Democratic peace” has been one of the most extensively studied phenomena of international relations in the last three decades. The proponents of the democratic peace theory argued that democratic norms and institutions have rendered militarized conflicts among democratic countries unprecedentedly rare, if not obsolete. Yet the theory has been criticized on a variety of grounds as well. Two recent challenges to the democratic peace theory are the “capitalist peace” and “non-universality” arguments. The former argues that it is capitalism, rather than democracy, that accounts for the rarity of conflicts among contemporary democracies, while the latter contends that democracy’s peaceful effects on interstate relations are limited to Western Europe and North America.

This article aims to make a simultaneous test of these two challenges to the democratic peace theory as well as the theory itself. It tests the capitalist and democratic
peace arguments through statistical analysis of the militarized interstate disputes in the developing world between 1951 and 2000. In the remainder of this paper, I first provide a brief summary of the literature on democratic and capitalist peace. Then, I make a case for the need for separate statistical analysis of interstate conflict in the developing world. Subsequently, using logistic regression, I test democratic and capitalist arguments for peace through analyzing the dyadic militarized interstate disputes of developing countries between 1951 and 2000. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings and highlight their importance for future research.

**Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace**

Since Small and Singer (1976) reported that democracies have not fought each other in the modern era, numerous empirical studies have been published in influential political science journals to confirm this “democratic peace”. By mid 1990s, some proponents of the democratic peace had already awarded the phenomenon a “law-like status” (Levy, 1994, p. 352). Even the critics of the democratic peace theory conceded that democratic peace has been the “preeminent nontrivial fact of international relations” (Mousseau, 2002, p. 137) and the democratic peace theory has been “probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace” (Rosato, 2003, p. 585).

The “Kantian liberals” have introduced two alternative explanations for the relative peace among democracies: one institutional and the other normative. The institutional account of the democratic peace argued that the institutional structure of democratic countries restrains them from waging costly wars, in particular against other democracies, thereby leading the decision-makers to settle their international disputes peacefully (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Lake, 1992; Russett, 1993). As Maoz and Russett explain it,

> due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs. (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 626)

The normative account, on the other hand, argued that democratic countries perceive each other as friends sharing common values and norms, and this mutual perception results in the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Owen, 1994). In Owen’s words, “once liberals accept a foreign state as a democracy, they adamantly oppose war against that state” (Owen, 1994, p. 95).
The democratic peace theory also had its dissidents since its inception and has been widely criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Realist, Marxist, and power-transitionist scholars of international relations argued from different perspectives that it was convergence of interests and policy, rather than norms and institutions, which created a relative peace among Western democracies in the post-WWII era (see e.g. Barkawi & Laffey, 1999; Farber & Gowa, 1995; Layne, 1994; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Oren, 1995; Rosato, 2003; Spiro, 1994).

A recent challenge to the democratic peace theory is the argument that the correlation between democracy and peace is spurious and it is capitalism, rather than democracy, which has created a relative “zone of peace” among democratic countries (Gartzke & Hewitt, 2010; Gartzke, 2007; McDonald, 2010; Mousseau, 2009). According to the proponents of the capitalist peace theory, capitalism reduces the use of force in interstate relations by de-emphasizing land and minerals (Gartzke, 2007), establishing contract-intensive economies (Mousseau, 2009), and reducing the state’s role in the economy (McDonald, 2010), thereby leading to “capitalist peace”.

The “capitalist peace” argument currently suffers a weakness that the democratic peace argument suffered until recently, namely an unsubstantiated universality claim. Despite the presence of considerable empirical evidence which indicates that democracy’s (and several other variables’) effect on interstate conflict varies in developing and developed worlds (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 2003, 2009; Mousseau, 2002), the proponents of the “capitalist peace” argument as well as the scholars who challenged them via statistical refutations (Choi, 2011; Dafoe, 2011) have not taken into account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This article aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world.

**Studying Interstate Conflict in the Developing World**

The importance of context in international politics is well studied by scholars of International Relations (IR) (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Goertz, 1994; Kacowicz, 1998). Contextual analysis of international relations refers to a study that takes into account the categorical differences between two or more “groups of states” and can be based on differences in region, history, regime-type, major-minor power status, economic development, and many others. The differences between the developed and developing states were one of the primary systematic differences that struck the critics of the mainstream IR.
theories. Some (Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Jackson, 1993) have questioned the relevance of the very concept of “the state” to the developing world and argued that many third world states lack central features of a standard Western state, such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and self-sustenance. Wallerstein (1974) contended that whereas the economic development of the Western countries and the increasing wealth and power of the bourgeoisie were accompanied by the construction of “strong” states, the dependent situation of the Third World countries and their openness and vulnerability to the manipulations of the core countries resulted in the creation of “weak” states. Somewhat as an elaboration on these arguments, some others argued that the “insecurity dilemma”, which derives from the internal “weakness” of the Third World countries, rather than the oft-argued security dilemma, shapes the security strategies of the Third World countries (Ayoob, 1995; Glenn, 1997; Job, 1992). There were also other scholars who problematized the “independence” of Third World states (Clapham, 1999; Escude, 1998; Hey, 1995) and maintained that the economic and political dependence of the Third World countries to the developed world render the “hierarchical” nature of the international system more relevant to the foreign policy behavior of developing states than its “anarchical” structure. Neuman (1998) makes an interesting summary of these arguments:

For many LDCs [less developed countries], then, the realist focus on a sharp boundary between domestic “order” and international “anarchy” may be applicable, but in reverse. It is the hierarchical structure of the world that provides them with an ordered reality, and a “condition of unsettled rules” that afflict them at home. (p. 3)

In line with these theoretical concerns, some recent empirical research also suggested a categorical difference between certain regions of the world. Henderson (2003) and Goldsmith (2006) tested the regional contingency of the prominent democratic peace argument and found that democracy loses its conflict-dampening effect outside the developed West (Western Europe and North America). Similarly, other studies found democracy has no or miniscule peaceful effect in poor countries (Mousseau, 2000, 2002; Mousseau, Hegre, & Oneal, 2003). These empirical findings suggest that the purported categorical differences between the developed world and the developing world are not mere constructs of the minds of critical IR theorists. Thus, I believe that it is appropriate and necessary to make separate tests for the developing world if we are to gauge the effects of capitalism and democracy on international conflicts of developing countries.

**Empirical Analyses: Militarized Interstate Disputes in the Developing World**
Methodology.

This research aims to test the democratic and capitalist explanations of peace within the developing world by analyzing the dyadic conflict behavior of “developing states” only. Consequently, dyads with two “developed” countries will be excluded from my analysis. I analyze only dyads with two developing states and the ones that include a developing state and a developed one.

Identifying “developed” countries entails some degree of arbitrariness, especially when we study a long time period rather than a single point in time. Some of the 35 countries that are currently identified a developed country by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were not developed countries in large sections of this study’s time period and gained their “developed country” status towards the end of this period. Thus, I do not consider all current developed countries as a developed country in this study. Countries that have been identified as “developed” in this study are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries during the period I analyze except Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. I considered the latter countries “developing states” given their relatively lower Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita and industrialization levels before the 1990s. As a general rule, I considered a country a “developed country” if its GDP per capita was at least 50 percent of the U.S. GDP per capita in more than half of the years between 1951 and 2000. Following the general practice, I did not consider oil-rich countries developed countries. Thus, the following countries are considered developed countries in this study: the US, Canada, Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland, (West) Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. Any dyad that includes two of these developed countries was excluded from my analysis.

The temporal domain of this research is the period between 1951 and 2000. Rarity of “independent” states before 1950 as well as lack of reliable economic data for pre-1950 years resulted in the exclusion of earlier years from the sample. Also, because most developing states lack the capability to reach non-neighboring states, I analyzed contiguous dyads only in order to avoid possible estimation problems that might result from artificial inflation of the sample size with the inclusion of “irrelevant” cases. Two states are considered contiguous if they share a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water.

The Dependent Variable.
The dependent variable of this study is the occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a given dyad-year. Following Russett and Oneal (2001) and many others, onset and continuation of MIDs are treated the same. A MID is defined as an event where the government or citizens of at least one state threatened, displayed, or used force against the government or citizens of at least one other state worldwide (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996). The dependent variable equals 1 if in a given year a dyad involves a MID, 0 otherwise. I use Zeev Maoz’s (2005) dyadic MID data, which is a refined version of the Correlates of War (COW) data on MIDs (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004). Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use logistic regression (logit) in my estimations.

**Explanatory Variables.**

**Economic Development:** Economic development is the major component of the “capitalist peace”. In measuring the economic development level of a country, I use its real gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) measured in purchasing power parities (thousands) and constant (1996) dollars. Data availability becomes a serious problem in analyzing the economies of developing countries, though. In the most frequently used economic dataset *Penn World Table* (Version 6.1) (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002), economic data are unavailable sporadically for many countries and there is no GDP data at all for eleven countries until 1990s. Consequently, about 25% of observations in *Penn World Table*’s GDPpc dataset are missing. However, Gleditsch (2002) introduces some measures to reduce the number of missing observations in *Penn World Table*’s GDP as well as in International Monetary Fund’s trade data and manages to have a complete dataset of GDP and GDP per capita for years between 1945 and 2000. I follow Dixon’s (1993) “weak link” principle, which assumes that the likelihood of conflict is primarily a function of the degree of constraints experienced by the less constrained state in each dyad, and consider the level of development of the less-developed state for each dyad-year, a variable I call *development low*. To minimize the direction of causality problems, all data on economic development are lagged one year.

**Democracy:** To determine national levels of democracy and autocracy, I use Polity IV (Marshall & Jaggers, 2004) data, which has become the standard for measuring institutional democracy, particularly in the study of international conflicts. The Polity IV dataset provides an 11-point scale (0-10) of autocracy and an 11-point scale (0-10) of democracy. To determine the “net” democracy score of a country, I subtract its autocracy score from its democracy score, which yields a range of -10 to 10. I add 11 points to each score and
construct a scale of 1-21. I adopt the “weak link” principle in determining the effects of regime type on conflict as well and create a *democracy low* variable. As in the economic development variable, all data are lagged by one year.

**Control Variables.**

*Capability ratio:* To determine the capabilities of each country, I use the Correlates of War (COW) data (Singer & Small, 1995), which gauges the National Capabilities of states from their population, industry, and military forces. Capability ratio is calculated by taking the ratio of the stronger state’s military capability index to that of the weaker member in each dyad. A higher score indicates higher power discrepancy, or less power parity, in a dyad. The final variable *Logcapratio*, is the natural log of the capability ratio in a dyad.

*Alliance:* The variable alliance equals one if countries A and B are formally allied through either a defense pact, entente, or non-aggression pact; it is zero otherwise. I use COW’s data on alliances.

*Major power:* To control for the higher conflict-proneness of major powers, I use a *major power* variable, which equals 1 if a dyad includes at least one major power and 0 otherwise. The US, the USSR, Britain, France, and China are considered as major powers for the entire period I analyze; Germany and Japan are regarded as major powers after 1989.

*State age (longevity):* Several developing countries gained their independence during the time period covered by this research. Younger states are expected to focus on state building and internal problems and to avoid external conflicts. To control for lower conflict propensity in early statehood, I create a *state age* variable, which equals the number of years since independence for each state. As in other variables, I use the state age of the younger state in each dyad. The COW’s “state system” data specifies the dates for each state’s entry into the international system.

*Developed state:* Lastly, to control for the possible distinct relationship between all-developing-state dyads and the mixed (developing-developed) ones, I include a developed state dummy, which equals 1 if a dyad includes a developed state and 0 otherwise.

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Because my data have a cross-sectional time-series nature, I introduce measures to correct or relieve temporal autocorrelation and cross-sectional heterogeneity. Following Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) suggestion to correct temporal dependence and using Tucker’s (1999) *btscs* program, I created a *peaceyears* variable, which counts the years since the last MID, and three cubic splines. Finally, I report robust standard errors clustered on
Thus, my final equation on militarized interstate disputes of developing countries is as follows:

\[ \text{MID}_{ijt} = a + b_1 \text{DEVlow}_{i-1} + b_2 \text{DEMlow}_{i-1} + b_3 \text{LogCAPRATIO}_{ijt} + b_4 \text{ALLIANCE}_{ijt} + b_5 \text{DEVELOPED}_t + b_6 \text{MAJOR}_t + b_7 \text{STATE-AGE}_t + b_8 \text{Peaceyears}_t + b_9 \text{Splines} + e. \]

**Results.**

Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a militarized interstate dispute in a developing-state dyad. To start with the control variables, all but the developed-state variable have statistically significant effects on the relations within a developing-state dyad. Whereas formal dyadic alliances of developing states and increasing power discrepancy in a developing-state dyad were found to decrease the likelihood of a MID, inclusion of a major power or an older state in a developing-state dyad was found to increase the likelihood of a dyadic MID.

Table I: Logit Estimates of the Probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute in a Developing-state Dyad, 1951-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy\textsubscript{low}</td>
<td>-0.0096</td>
<td>0.0113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development\textsubscript{low}</td>
<td>-0.0743***</td>
<td>0.0238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability ratio ((log))</td>
<td>-0.1597***</td>
<td>0.0451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-0.5023***</td>
<td>0.1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>0.2940*</td>
<td>0.1677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>0.0063</td>
<td>0.2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State age\textsubscript{low}</td>
<td>0.0070***</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceyears</td>
<td>-0.1089***</td>
<td>0.0272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N \(12175\)

Log likelihood \(-3108.8653\)

Wald chi\(^2\)(11) \(552.26\)

Prob>chi\(^2\) \(0.0000\)

Pseudo R\(^2\) \(0.2365\)

P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.

As for the theoretical variables in Table I, development low's coefficient had a negative sign and is significant at 99% significance level \((p<.002)\). However, the effect of
democracy low was statistically insignificant even at 90% level. Thus, higher economic development is found to decrease the likelihood of a dyadic MID in the developing world, whereas democracy’s effect on the same likelihood was insignificant. These findings counter the democratic peace argument and support the central argument of the more recent “capitalist peace” literature, which contends that it is capitalism, rather than democracy, that leads to peace among states.

Table II displays the substantive effects of development (low), capability ratio, alliance, major power, and state age (low) variables on the probability of a dyadic MID in a developing-state dyad. An increase from 3,000 dollars (mean value) by a standard deviation of 3,150 dollars in the GDPpc of the poorer country in a developing-state dyad decreases the likelihood of a MID in that dyad by almost 20%. Graph I below displays the marginal effect of economic development (low) in the probability of a MID in a developing-state dyad. The likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, which is almost 7% when the GDPpc of the poorer state in the dyad is 1,000 US dollars, declines to below 2% when the GDPpc of the poorer state in that dyad reaches to 20,000 US dollars.

Table II: Changes in the Predicted Probability of a MID in a Developing-state Dyad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Change in p(MID)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>economic development</td>
<td>-19.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capability ratio</td>
<td>-25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alliance</td>
<td>-38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>major power</td>
<td>+31.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state age</td>
<td>+30 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Changes in predicted probabilities are changes from the base predicted probability of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute in Table I (which was 0.06). In this and all other calculations of predicted probabilities, the dyad is assumed to be non-allied and include no developed country or major power; all other variables are set at their mean values.

As for the control variables, a dyadic alliance reduces the probability of a dyadic MID by 38%, whereas major power inclusion increases the same probability by 31.5%. When power disparity in a dyad is doubled from its mean value, the probability of a MID in that dyad decreases by 25%. Lastly, doubling of the age of the younger state in a dyad from 40 (mean value) to 80 increases the probability of a dyadic MID by 30%.
Robustness Tests.

The results of statistical analyses are sensitive to choices regarding variables, sample, and measurement. To test the robustness of my findings above, I reran my original model with different dependent variables, different measurements of the explanatory variables, and within different sub-samples. Table III displays these six replication models. Model 1 in Table III is a replication of the original model, which treated the onset and continuation of MIDs as the same, with onset MIDs only. Model 2 is a replication with a severer and more specific dependent variable: MIDs in which use of force materialized. Not all MIDs have equal seriousness and violence. Some remain as mere threats, some include actual use of force, and some escalate to full-scale wars. The dependent variable -useforce- equaled 1 if a dyad in a given year had a MID in which military force was actually used, and 0 otherwise. Model 3 replicates the original model within a sample that includes developing countries only. Dyads with a developed country are excluded. Model 4 is a replication of the original model within a smaller sample, which excludes dyads that include two of the six Middle Eastern oil-rich states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Oil-rich countries are rich but mostly not industrialized and therefore might deserve special attention when testing “capitalist peace” arguments. Model 5 is a replication with a dichotomous measure of democracy. A group of scholars argue that democracy should
be measured dichotomously, rather than continuously (see Elkins (2000) for a discussion of continuous vs. dichotomous measures of democracy). In Model 5, a state is considered a democracy if it had a “democracy – autocracy” score of 6 or higher in the original scale (or 17 or higher in my converted scale). Finally, Model 6 replicates the original model with a relative, rather than absolute measure of development. Nominal values of indicators such as gross domestic product per capita in time-series settings might be problematic because even when using constant dollars we cannot avoid the problem of “rising average”. In measuring relative economic development, I accepted the US GDP per capita as baseline (100) and compared other states’ development levels with that of the US, i.e. Relative Development, = $(\text{GDPpc}_a/\text{GDPpc}_{us}) \times 100$.

Table III: Replications of the original model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>MEASUREMENT</th>
<th>CONFLICT TYPE &amp; SEVERITY</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D.V.: Onset only</td>
<td>D.V.: Use of force</td>
<td>NO Developed</td>
<td>NO Oil-rich Dyad</td>
<td>Dichotomous Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy$_{low}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0041</td>
<td>-0.0133</td>
<td>-0.0070</td>
<td>-0.0111</td>
<td>-0.1594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development$_{low}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0517***</td>
<td>-0.1052***</td>
<td>-0.0669***</td>
<td>-0.0656**</td>
<td>-0.0745***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability Ratio (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1124***</td>
<td>-0.1474***</td>
<td>-0.1514***</td>
<td>-0.1600***</td>
<td>-0.1619***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.3092***</td>
<td>-0.5841***</td>
<td>-0.4989***</td>
<td>-0.4887***</td>
<td>-0.4979***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3559**</td>
<td>0.0611</td>
<td>0.2007</td>
<td>0.2948*</td>
<td>0.2992*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1670</td>
<td>0.1430</td>
<td>-0.0164</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Age$_{low}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0063***</td>
<td>0.0067***</td>
<td>0.0069***</td>
<td>0.0068***</td>
<td>0.0069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceyears</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0484***</td>
<td>-0.1122***</td>
<td>-0.1077***</td>
<td>-0.1084***</td>
<td>-0.1091***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>12175</td>
<td>12175</td>
<td>10991</td>
<td>11933</td>
<td>12175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-2698.4385</td>
<td>-2651.4177</td>
<td>-2806.9213</td>
<td>-3091.1491</td>
<td>-3109.0604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wald chi$^2$(11)</td>
<td>476.72</td>
<td>508.40</td>
<td>462.39</td>
<td>554.40</td>
<td>561.21</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prob&gt;chi$^2$</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>0.1289</td>
<td>0.2331</td>
<td>0.2312</td>
<td>0.2346</td>
<td>0.2365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. ***$p<0.01$; **$p<0.05$; *$p<0.10$.
Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.

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The results did not show any substantial change in any replication model so far as the two explanatory variables are concerned. The signs and the statistical significance (or lack thereof) of the development (low) and democracy (low) variables remained the same in all six models in Table III. Development (low)’s effect on the likelihood of conflict was always negative and statistically significant in all models; whereas that of democracy (low) never achieved statistical significance even at 90% level. Thus, the earlier findings in Table I are found to be robust. Within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate peace, democracy does not.

**Concluding Remarks**

Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study aimed to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing world.

My empirical results provided support to the “capitalist peace” argument and countered the “democratic peace” argument. Economic development was found have a negative, substantial, and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID in the developing world. By contrast, democracy’s effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID never achieved statistical significance even at 90% significance level. These findings were robust to different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development. Thus, within the developing world, it seems economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas democracy does not. This result suggests that, in the developing world, economic development is not just an issue of economic or humanitarian concern, but also a fundamental security issue. To achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic development in the developing world ought to be encouraged and supported.

This finding counters the “law-like status” argument for democratic peace (Levy, 1994) and supports the earlier research which suggested that the peaceful effect of democracy is limited to Western Europe and North America (Goldstein, 2006; Henderson, 2003). As such, what has so far been theorized as “democratic peace” might actually be “developed democratic peace.” Thus, current overly-confident expectations about the peaceful consequences of democratization in the developing world should be re-evaluated.
Democratization in the developing world does not seem to bring international peace unless it is coupled with economic development.

A major implication of this study for future research is that there seems to be some qualitative differences between developing countries and the developed ones and it seems these differences matter so far as involvement in militarized interstate disputes are concerned. There is no reason to not expect that the qualitative differences between the developing and the developed world would be relevant to other research programs in the field of international conflicts, such as the purported peaceful effects of international trade or international organizations. Scholars of international conflict are advised to be more cautious in pooling all dyads and making universal claims.

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