Peace and Conflict Studies

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Economic Aid and Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland and the Border Area: Respondents’ Perceptions of Awareness, Fairness, Trust Building, and Sustainability

Peter Karari, Sean Byrne, Olga Skarlato, and Kawser Ahmed

Abstract

Intractable ethnopolitical conflicts emanate from the social, political, cultural, and economic marginalization of some community groups. To address these conflicts, the affected groups are often provided with life changing opportunities to enhance justice, equality, dignity and freedom. In the past, Northern Ireland has been a turbulent sea of violent conflict between Unionists and Nationalists. To address the underlying root causes of the conflict, economic aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and the European Union (EU) Peace II Fund is aimed at facilitating sustainable peacebuilding, reconciliation and community development. In this study, 95 community group leaders, civil servants, and community development officers in Derry, Belfast and the Border Area were interviewed to explore their perceptions about the impact of economic aid in terms of fairness of the application criteria, awareness of both funds, trust building and sustainability. The findings inform future conflict transformation interventions geared towards sustainable peacebuilding, reconciliation and community development in Northern Ireland.

Introduction

The ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland has deep roots dating back to the seventeenth century when British settlers occupied the Irish natives’ land during the Ulster plantation (Bew, Patterson, and Gibbon 2002). The 1919 War of Independence and the resulting ongoing violence between Protestants (Unionists) and Catholics (Nationalists) intensified, leading to the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 that formalized the partition of the island.
into Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State (Ryan 2007). The 1922 Special Powers Act gave the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) excessive powers to maintain law and order that led to the further marginalization and vulnerability of the Nationalist community (Dohonue 1998). A new turbulent wave of violence popularly known as the Troubles erupted in the 1960s when the Civil Rights Movement agitated for equal access to resources and services such as education, jobs, housing and voting rights among others (Arthur 2000). The Troubles can be linked to the nature of zero sum territorialism in Northern Irish politics (Senehi 2008). The 1980 Hunger Strikes resulted in the escalation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (PIRAs) armed struggle. According to O’Leary and McGarry (1993, 2007) the Troubles led to the death of approximately 3,000 and injured more than 30,000 people. However, the declaration of reciprocal ceasefires by Republicans and Loyalists in 1994 saw the winding down of the Troubles and a reduction in violence culminating in the 1998 Belfast Agreement (BA).

Despite the end of violent conflict, the social and economic impact of the Troubles was devastating (The Portland Trust, 2009). There is a high level of structural inequality in the social, political and economic sectors and unemployment is chronic and pervasive (Ibid). Catholic male unemployment is nearly three times greater than unemployment among Protestant males (Byrne and Irvin 2001). Further, between 1979 and 1988 employment in manufacturing fell by 40 percent (The Portland Trust 2009). Economic disparity was a source of deep resentment, mistrust and suspicion between Unionists and Nationalists. For example, Senehi (2008) asserts that historical injustices, stereotyping and destructive stories are deeply rooted in the world view of both groups and are passed transgenerationally. Civil wars are not only caused by ethnic hatred but also by social, economic and political marginalization (O’Dowd and McCall 2008).
Moreover, Northern Ireland is described as consciously underdeveloped (Coakley and O’ Dowd 2007), as inhabited by opposing forces of Unionists and Nationalists (McGarry and O’ Leary 1995), characterized by deep rooted and complex conflicts (Arthur 2000), and resentful generations (Kaufman 2006) that are linked to the laborious, slow and grueling peace process (Gallagher 2007; McEvoy 2006). Northern Ireland’s people are in need of new economic opportunities. According to Ho-Won Jeong (2005), economic aid is a means of addressing resource-based ethnopolitical conflicts. Economic aid can facilitate equality thereby helping to address historical injustices and structural violence and enhancing sustainable development. Economic aid is perceived by the international community as essential in addressing the emotional and symbolic roots of protracted conflicts by putting community grievances aside and focusing instead on the conditions that have perpetuated the conflict (The Portland Trust 2009).

As Kaufman (2006) asserts, constructive community engagements can nurture fertile opportunities for peacebuilding. However, Byrne and Ayulo (1998) note that the goals of economic aid are not always compatible with conflict resolution. Reconciliation is not always directly proportional to the economic injection of external funds (Kaufman 2006; Kumar 1997; Ryan 2007; Mac Ginty 2008). Sustainable reconciliation depends on the building of meaningful relationships between opposing forces (Lederach 2006) and the introduction of social capital (McCall and O’Dowd 2008; O’Dowd and McCall 2008). Consequently, Byrne and Irvin (2001 describe how single identity funded projects can be a springboard toward the enhancement of meaningful social relationships. If the conflict-nurturing conditions are addressed, then cross-cultural conflict resolution projects can lead to sustainable peacebuilding (Byrne 2001).

The IFI, the EU Peace 1 (1994-1999) and Peace II (2000-06) Funds were meant to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by
increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-Border cooperation, and extending social economic inclusion (Buchanan 2008; Byrne 2001; McCall and O’Dowd 2008; Racioppi and Sullivan 2007). Byrne and Irvin (2001) also contend that economic aid is a vital bridge in transforming the Northern Ireland conflict because it enhances cross-community contacts and reduces social isolation that results from economic inequalities. Moreover, Jeong (2005) relates peaceful reconciliation to holistic or comprehensive peacebuilding strategies. External economic aid also enhances local networks and community homogeneity, balances structural inequalities, and relates sustainable peace to genuine reconciliation (Lederach 2006).

Consequently, this article investigates the perceptions of 98 respondents in Belfast, Derry, and the Border Area about the extent to which the EU Peace II Fund and the IFI have promoted peacebuilding efforts. These images and perceptions are important in analyzing the impact of economic aid in trust building, creating awareness about both funds, and the sustainability of projects and funding application criteria. An overview of development aid, ethnopolitical conflicts, and peacebuilding and conflict transformation is now provided to build a platform for the analysis of our respondents’ perceptions.

**Economic Aid, Ethnopolitical Conflicts, Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation**

Ethnic violence can be traced to fear, rage, resentment and hatred, and justified as revenge for past injustices (Petersen 2002). Moreover, symbolism, rituals, collective and social memory and history also promote intractable conflicts (Horowitz 1985; Cairns and Roe 2003). Violence is justified as revenge for past injustices as well as for an ethnic group’s political and economic exclusion. Social memories are immortalized through rituals and ceremonies (Arthur 2000). The fear of domination by the “other” draws groups into violent conflicts in a bid to preserve their identity. Ethnic hatred and animosity among long-time neighbours can be traced to stories, myths and symbols of identity (Kaufman 2001).
Education can also be important in reducing or erasing the negative effects of collective memories (Cairns and Roe 2003). A case in point is the integrated school movement in Northern Ireland where the school curriculum facilitates gradual peacebuilding and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that addressed bitter memories through forgiveness or Ubuntu (Ibid). Hence, dealing with memory is complex and requires patience, the building of trust, confidence, tolerance and social integration of the once marginalized and vulnerable groups (Arthur 2000).

The Rwandan example demonstrates that ethnic conflicts can also be linked to colonial history, ethnonationalism, polarization and political realignments that culminated in the 1994 genocide (Mamdani 2001). Sustainable peace should address the root causes of these political and ethnic polarizations. Intractable conflict can also be linked to polarization between the centre and the periphery (Galtung 1971). In such a case violent conflict becomes an avenue for the marginalized to fight for justice and equality. Similarly, the human needs approach indicates that conflicts arise due to unmet basic human needs (Burton 1997). Social institutions should be restructured to facilitate effective and equitable service delivery to mitigate such conflicts (Lederach 2006). The greed and grievance approach relates protracted ethnic conflict to the war economy in which the elites sustain war for profit (Berdal and Malone 2000). Economic motives that nurture intractable ethnic conflicts should be addressed to facilitate sustainable peace.

Home-grown approaches rather than unilateral western models can address intractable conflicts in communities (Argenti-Pillen 2003; Mac Ginty 2008). Peacebuilding is an art and a skill that is learned and can be achieved through our own creativity so that moral imaginations can be devised to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives (Lederach 2005). Sustainable peace requires an integrated approach to conflict resolution because there is no one single method for conflict resolution when the nature of conflicts is different (Reychler 2000).
Understanding the nature of conflicts facilitates informed interventions towards conflict management (Ross and Rothman 1999). Intractable conflict can be transformed from adversarial to integrative using a “piece by piece” approach that follows four levels of facilitating dialogue, namely: the positional dialogue approach, the activist approach, the problem solving approach, and the human relations approach (Rothman 1992).

Sustainable peace is beyond conflict resolution and must involve reconciliation (Bar-Siman-Tov 2006). Reconciliation addresses the root causes of problems, expressed needs, and the building of trust and confidence to nurture sustainable peace (Lederach 2006). Contemporary conflict resolution goes beyond state diplomacy and requires reconciliation involving all sectors of the society in the peacebuilding process. Sustainable peace requires the restoration of impaired relationships through the creation of a dynamic, conflict responsive peacebuilding infrastructure (Ibid). Reparations and legal systems cannot address deep resentments among the victims of atrocities. Reconciliation through testimonies and forgiveness among the victims and the perpetrators institutes the healing of victims and the restoration of their lost dignity (Minow 1998).

External economic aid and economic policy are also an integral part of the peace and nation building process in states emerging from conflicts through resource mobilization and the revival of essential institutions that meet the basic needs of peripheral populations (Kriesberg and Dayton 2009). Sustainable peace requires the building of strong socioeconomic institutions to replace the Wilsonian liberal democracy approach and market-based economies (Paris 2004). Demilitarization and incentives provided by elections can be an alternative to continued violent conflicts (Lyons 2005) while powersharing through international mediation facilitates inclusiveness, self-determination and provides an alternative to protracted conflicts (Sisk 1996). Effective powersharing depends on adequate
leadership, the equitable distribution of resources, home-grown decision-making, and the gradual integration of liberal approaches.

The aforementioned theories are important in explaining the nexus between economic aid, on the one hand, and trust-building, reconciliation, and community development in Northern Ireland on the other. The theories are also helpful in framing an analysis of the respondents’ perceptions about trust building, funds application criteria, project sustainability, and awareness.

**Methodology**

During the summer of 2006 the second author carried out in-depth semi-structured interviews with 98 respondents including community group leaders, civil servants, and community development officers in Derry, Belfast, and the Border Counties of Cavan, Fermanagh, Leitrim, Monaghan, and Tyrone. The time frame of data collection constituted approximately two months, and each interview lasted about 90-120 minutes. Purposive sampling was used to recruit the initial participants. The second author contacted the initial study population through letters, emails, and telephone calls. He knew some of the participants through previous research while others were new. Purposive sampling, which focuses on potential participants who meet the inclusion criteria, was chosen because it is less time consuming and less expensive, the level of accuracy is high and the sample is more representative of the study population (Daniel 2012). Snowball sampling was also used to recruit subsequent study participants and the procedure was carefully administered to ensure that the final study sample was representative of the target study area.

The study focused on the respondents’ awareness of the IFI and the EU Peace II Fund, the fairness of the application criteria, sustainability, and the building of community trust and goodwill that constitute the cornerstone of sustainable peace, reconciliation and development in Northern Ireland and the Border region. Direct quotations from the interviewees are used
to preserve the originality and authenticity of the respondents’ voices. A coding schema was used to differentiate the views from various respondents, to facilitate the cross-referencing of data, and to accommodate the multiplicity of interviews. For example B, D, and BA are used to refer to the study areas of Belfast, Derry and Border Area respectively while numbers such as 1, 2, and 3 are used to distinguish different respondents within a study area. For example B1, D1, and BA1 refer to respondents 1 from Belfast, Derry, and the Border Area respectively. This coding ensures that cross-referencing of the data is done without compromising the anonymity of the respondents.

The following research questions guided this study:

1. How aware are you of the roles of European Union Peace and Reconciliation Fund and the IFI in peacebuilding and community development?

2. Did you find the funds application process fairly straightforward matching your local and expressed needs?

3. Is your funded project sustainable beyond the five-year term of funded support? Has the fund support for your project economically empowered you or your community?

4. Have the EU fund for Peace and Reconciliation and the IFI helped generate an atmosphere of trust and goodwill in Northern Ireland?

The rationale for using semi-structured interviews is that interviewing facilitates the ability of people to symbolize their experience through language (Seidman 2006). Interviewing facilitates access to people’s consciousness, behaviour, feelings, and thoughts, allows them to share their world, to find out what is going on, why people do what they do, and how they understand their world (Rubin and Rubin 1995). This process provides a safe space that allows victims of structural violence and historical injustices to share their feelings that have been denied or suppressed and to reconstruct their life history (Gonzalez 2009). Interviewing accommodates interpretation of words, phrases, and gestures thereby
establishing genuine dialogue through which healing and conflict transformation is possible (Ibid). Interviewing also facilitates social advocacy in which critical social researchers endeavor to explore, discover, understand, reveal and act on social problems (Rubin and Rubin 1995). The interpretive feature of interviewing accommodates the complexity of human life and the diversity of realities in the social world (Rubin and Rubin 1995). These qualities justify why interviewing was used in our research in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. The second author comes from the island of Ireland, has written extensively on this topic, and he experienced the Troubles. The other authors come from countries emerging from protracted conflicts including Kenya, Russia, and Bangladesh and have firsthand experiences of ethnopolitical conflicts.

**Findings**

The following section presents the results of this study. Four major guiding themes are used to describe the findings: (1) awareness about the roles of the EU Peace and Reconciliation Fund and the IFI in peacebuilding and community development; (2) the straightforwardness of the funds application criteria; (3) the sustainability of community peace projects after the funds end in 2013; and (4) the impact of the EU Peace II Fund and IFI in generating an atmosphere of trust and goodwill in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties.

**The Funding Application Criteria**

The application criteria for both funds are important in the process of peacemaking, reconciliation and community development because our respondents perceived it as the basis of either inclusion or exclusion. This study indicates that the criteria/process used in the application process to both funds was exclusively predetermined, overly top-down, and virtually disconnected with the expressed needs and realities of local communities. The respondents’ perceptions indicate that the criteria should be community focused in terms of
the expressed needs of the target groups and the overall goal/s of their peace projects. The participants indicated that criteria founded on exclusion would nurture continued tensions and misperceptions among community members, which may jeopardize the peace process. A Belfast community group leader (B7) described the criteria not only as bulky, frustrating, and bureaucratic but also as challenging in terms of its link to the peace process:

The criteria were often unrelated to the realities on the ground. It’s hard…virtually impossible…very bureaucratic…abstract, convoluting sometimes-even contradictory. Some of the smaller organisations… had neither the know-how or the money to pay for professionals to fill in these application forms for them…the heavily bureaucratic administrative approach…set the bar far too high for people. Sometimes that resulted in people…offering to deliver a programme that was way beyond their capacity…consequently not being able to deliver it and that sort of led to funding being withdrawn, and on some occasions it led to a lack of credibility…there was an issue about the fit between those who compiled the criteria and those of us who are actually working on the ground. There were also very difficult notions about evidence of change. For instance, how do you quantify attitude change, how do you take people that have been nurtured in a sectarianism mentality all their lives, bring them through a sectarian awareness course and then quantify, at the other end of that six week course, that all bigotry, and sectarian discrimination has been removed, from their hearts…I don’t think the European methodology for doing it was particularly helpful…it was bureaucratic, top heavy…did not fit the reality on the ground.

A Border Area community group leader (BA9) decried the marginalization of small community-based organizations by the application criteria due to their lack of financial organizational skills:

I mean the process is quite complex…for a small organisation looking for a small amount of support it is a daunting task, and in particular where they have only voluntary people in voluntary organisation and they have nobody with time to do it…. For a group that is looking for a fairly large amount of money I suppose the end justifies the means, but if you are looking for a small amount for something and not exactly sure what you are looking for, and maybe a group that is not very strong, that is the problem I would see with it, that it is more user friendly to groups that have the experience of dealing with it, and who have been through the mill before.
The respondents indicate that both funds’ application criteria are detached from the actual reality on the ground. They express an immediate need to actively involve the community in the design, planning and the dissemination of the application criteria that reflect the expressed needs of the target communities. The respondents perceive inclusion as a great foundation towards the ownership of the peace process by the communities living in Northern Ireland, and the Border Area. For example, a Derry community group leader (D3) describes the current criteria as a top down approach that limits the fulfilment of the target beneficiaries’ expectations:

Well…it’s bulky…it seemed to me that some questions were repetitive... So it is a bit frustrating...their requirements that you have this jargon in this particular box ...So overly bureaucratic would be one of my comments. What was engaging was how are we who are applying going to deliver the peacebuilding, the reconciliation agenda that we are saying that we are going to do.

The way forward towards building sustainable peace in Northern Ireland, as perceived by the respondents, is to localize the criteria design and involve local people actively in designing the criteria that are community friendly to promote their ownership of and adaptability to the peace process. Thus, the application form criteria may prioritize some segments of the community while marginalizing others, aggravating suspicion and animosity that both funds are supposed to address. For example, a Border Area community group leader (BA10) articulates that the criteria should be based on the expressed needs of the target communities not one that is imposed by the funding agencies.

The victims…that suffered most from the conflict….Those were the very people in those areas who had a lack of investment; they didn’t have the capacity to complete the application forms. They were left disenfranchised, disempowered from the very programme that they were meant to be for them…a lot of them have ended up spending five thousand pounds, to secure fifty thousand pounds, on consultancy….I have seen groups…running around looking for five Protestants or five Catholics to create an inter community programme….To me that is institutionalising sectarianism….Jesus if I come
up with this component and that component to meet their criteria, I’ll get funded. So people get inventive but the original objective is lost, and then as soon as the funding ends everybody morphs back to where they came from.

Similarly, a Belfast group leader (B17) indicates that sectarianism and discrimination in the allocation of both funds could jeopardize the peace process in Northern Ireland:

It is very orientated towards the majoritarian community, the Protestant and the Catholic, even the language used in it would be very orientated towards those communities…minority ethnic communities have been affected by the Troubles and have been here all through the Troubles…and should be part of any sort of new peacebuilding initiatives. This organisation was present for the whole notion of community relations to be widened in Northern Ireland to take into consideration the minorities communities as well.

Consequently, the respondents express a need to simplify the application criteria and to consult with the community to come up with criteria that are acceptable to, and command ownership among members of the community. The participants indicate that the criteria should be designed with the active involvement of the community’s gatekeepers who are aware of the expressed needs of the people. They observe that the criteria should also be inclusive of Northern Ireland’s multi-cultural society. Hence, the participants observe that the application criteria need to be revised to be people friendly and focused on the goals of peacebuilding, reconciliation and community development. These perceptions indicate that the final application forms are misguided leading to wrong implementations and perhaps poor results in some cases.

Prospects of Future Project Sustainability after the Phasing out of Both Funds

Some of the respondents are pessimistic about the prospects of their future project sustainability. The meaning of sustainability should be understood from a vertical rather than from a hierarchical perspective. For example, a Belfast community group leader (B2) articulates that the target communities have experienced and survived past suffering and must be actively involved in finding a lasting solution to the challenges they face:
There’s been this fuss about what sustainability is…it needs to be mainstreamed, where people recognise that there is an overall responsibility from the Assembly, to victims of the conflict, to ex-prisoners who are trying to get their lives back, and their families return to getting their lives back together, or to communities like this, disproportionately affected by the conflict. There is a long-term investment needed by Government in that. And that is going to require taxpayer money. There is no point in falsifying this whole thing and putting in the word sustainable, in as much as pensions, health service…has to be publicly funded…you only start to begin to scratch the surface and then the money is pulled. Like our youth project…absolutely brilliant, growing and growing, using drama and art, as a way of therapeutically intervening in the families of who have lost brothers, sisters or parents through violent circumstances. They’re at it for two years and then the funding are pulled…We didn’t have a sustainable exit plan…So then those kids that are affected by violent trauma during the conflict, where are they going to go, they are going to go and re-enact the violence they have seen in their past.

The future sustainability of peace projects in Northern Ireland is quite elusive. Consequently, the participants indicate a need to genuinely consult with community groups towards initiating meaningful and purposeful sustainability projects. The participants’ perceptions indicate that both funding agencies may have overly concentrated more on economic development rather than on social sustainability. A Derry community group leader (D2), for example, observes that community sustainability should be viewed from a holistic perspective—from both an economic and a social basis:

If we are looking at community sustainability purely on economic measures, then quite a number of these projects will not be sustainable. But if you are looking at community sustainability around active citizenship, community confidence, and peacebuilding, these are things that also need to be measured....Tying into the system is another instrument, normally when people talk about community sustainability they tick your sort of annual report, the financial report. I also think we need to be looking at a social report. We need social indicators, we need to be looking at social auditing, and if we could have, community sustainability, as opposed to financial sustainability, that means that communities are going to become at ease with themselves…networking with each other…supporting the small businesses there. It is going to make the place more attractive to bring investment…a good place to live, work and play and educate children….I think the community development process was sacrificed on the altar of commercial viability…that does not help peacebuilding and community sustainability.
Another community group leader from Derry (D9) who observes that sustainability would not be possible without funding voices this view. Instead of dependence on non-sustainable economic aid, he argues that skills training including reforms in the education curriculum could provide an impetus for future sustainability of the peace process:

Where it is sustainable is in giving people skills through the training process and giving people skills to take beyond what they have learned here and beyond the value of the funding application and to keep using them. Also a lot of the resources we have developed that we have tried to tie in through the department of education to the national curriculum so that they are sustainable beyond any development money.

Consequently, the participants indicate a need for community self-determination and independence if sustainable peace and community development is to be achieved. For example, a Belfast community group leader (B9) feels that community dependency on both funds has compromised the sustainability of community projects. He argues that there is a need to break the cycle of dependency and venture into productive activities that would generate alternative income and facilitate the future sustainability of community projects:

People have become dependent upon EU funding to actually do their work...the legacy of the EU money has been that it has created jobs and now people are under pressure to sustain and they can’t...So I think there is a responsibility for centres such as ourselves...to actually draw people into our work and not necessarily through giving them funding, but to help resource them in other ways...to sort of develop services and sell their services, but that takes time...there is a real gap there I think for developing what we know and what we have learned so that people don’t have to start from scratch again.

These respondents’ perceptions indicate that both funding agencies and the devolved Northern Ireland government need to integrate the sustainability component into the peace process to ensure sustainability after 2013 when the funding ends.

**Generation of Trust and Goodwill between Communities**

The generation of trust and goodwill promoted by both external funds constitute a vital springboard towards building sustainable peace, reconciliation and community
development in Northern Ireland. However, some respondents felt that both funds constitute an effort by foreign agencies to “buy” peace rather than to build genuine peace between both communities. For example, a Border Area community group leader (BA11) perceived trust and goodwill in the following way:

I don’t know if money can ever create trust… there were some areas there that don’t want to change or whatever, and there would be others seeing money being poured into these organisations, why should it be poured into them, people would be saying, its peace money and reconciliation money and they are not trying to reconcile…Sometimes it can create distrust as in well why did they get it, they are not doing with it, what is meant to be done with it. I think trust will take time…money, right jobs and better prospects will relax people more and trust will come with that….But it’s not just the money it will be time and that money used the right way.

This observation indicates that the generation of trust and goodwill is a process that builds in time so that as the expressed needs of the communities are met, relationships are built and maintained. Money alone cannot buy trust but if it is invested wisely as per the wishes, hopes, and expressed needs of the target beneficiaries, there is the possibility of achieving eventual economic growth, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and peacebuilding. This observation is shared by a Derry group community leader (D13) who is unsure about the validity or sincerity of building trust and goodwill through both funds:

I do believe that they are genuinely trying to get people to think clearly and strategically as to how this should work. The difficulty I am having with it is that they want to give work on that their money is giving a result, that they will see peace at the end of it. The difficulty I have is that they now have put restrictions and constraints on it, as well, which means that you can only do certain thing within the mindset of the funder….I know we have to be accountable and I know that a lot of the money has been abused, but the reality of it is that we have actually ended up tying our hands in some way.

The above quote illustrates that some beneficiaries to temporarily fulfill the funds application criteria that have unilaterally been imposed on the community by both funding agencies could falsify their efforts in building trust and goodwill. As a consequence, there is
fear that the peace initiatives will fall apart and the society will relapse into political violence once the bond that holds the community together, both external funds, ends.

A Belfast community group leader (B7) perceives that people know what they want and it is always fair to facilitate community-based consultations to nurture goodwill and trust:

> Trust and goodwill, they are rare because the legacy of hurt is palpable. We are a highly traumatised community…so the issue of trust could relate to a mass issue…it’s an illusion to believe that we will end this historical issue by just creating jobs. We have a capacity for schizophrenia here where people can work in the work place together and return to total sectarianized communities. We can take our school children away on holiday, ten Catholics and ten Protestants to Disney World, they’ll love it and they come back home to segregated communities….There is better work on the ground…building of trust and relationships between real people and real communities, the relation work, the network….Let’s look at the structures of society and do the political right thing…the quality of that society will only be reflected in the quality of life that is in the hearts of the individuals, at the heart of that family, at the heart of community and the heart of that relationship.

As the above observation indicates, the generation of trust and goodwill can only be founded locally on genuine and real relationships among real people. The “real person” is hidden in the hearts of individuals and must be sought through genuine and localized outreach. However, a community group leader from Derry (D15) believes that to some limited extent, trust and goodwill are being achieved in the grassroots:

> Well in those areas where they have given people the opportunity of talking and working together, definitely yes, but it’s a very narrow field, generally I don’t think they have made any serious difference. In the big ball game it doesn’t matter. The conflict is so deep and it’s so intense and what has happened is that the Protestants have lost most of the day, and I was having it that people who shot their soldiers and shot the policemen are now going to be in charge of the country and that has no end to me.

While talking and working together has nurtured trust building to some extent, the above quotation indicates that building and sustaining deep trust and goodwill remains elusive due to the protracted nature of the conflict. These respondents’ perceptions indicate that reaching
out to the aggrieved communities is essential if viable transformations towards achieving sustainable peace are to be made. The metaphor “We have lost and they have gained” has sustained deep mistrust, tensions and resentment in the society. However, the same community group leader from Derry (D15) believes that there is still some hope for the future:

I work well with the Protestants and I don’t have a problem, and they work well with me. But it is not in the area of good politics. If there is a project you might be involved with Protestants and it is grand, you know, and there is some kind of movement in trying to get Catholics and Protestants to be educated together in quite a number of schools and that is part of a process. Hopefully that has to help some in the future, children coming together and working together.

This observation indicates the need of a more inclusive peace process, a process that actively involves both communities and actively listens to them in a deep and profound way to deconstruct their concealed thoughts towards working together to implement an informed, meaningful and purposeful peace process. Our respondents’ perceptions indicate that both funding agencies must “work with” and not “work against” both communities to promote grassroots ownership of the peace process culminating in the building of sustainable peace, reconciliation and community development.

**Awareness of the IFI and EU Peace II Fund in Peacebuilding and Development**

Having knowledge of something may be general rather than purposeful or meaningful to the subject. As a consequence, it would be significant to deconstruct awareness in relation to the impact of the IFI and the EU Peace II Fund in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. Does awareness simply entail that both communities know about the existence of both funds or that the community has informed knowledge about the meaning and purpose of both funds? This critical view is better understood through the observation of a Border Area community group leader (BA1) who articulated the following in her story:
I would be aware of I suppose more through the logos that I see around the place and stuff like that would be across the Border Area from Sligo, Donegal, various places that you would go and you would see various initiatives funded by IFI and I have also seen initiatives in Mayo funded as well.

Thus, the awareness of the existence of both funds through their logos may not be interpreted as knowing the meaning, goals and objectives of both funds. Instead, it may indicate the need for both funding agencies to educate and give appropriate information to the beneficiaries about the meaning of both funds to facilitate informed involvement and ownership of the peace process.

A Belfast community group leader (B2) attributes the people’s lack of awareness of the IFI to its bureaucracy and inaccessibility:

For us we would be quite aware of the European Peace program and less aware of the IFI as a funding body. It is often seen as quite elite and separate to grassroots and community organisations from our perspective and very difficult to access so we know less about it. The European Peace programme because of its inception being about grassroots led by good people in touch with the community certainly meant that there is much more access, much more knowledge about the programme.

Consequently, the IFI needs to be accessible and to reach out to the beneficiaries. The respondents hold the view that awareness of both IFI and EU Peace II Fund initiatives can only be facilitated if a direct link with the community is established thus facilitating local communities’ acceptance and ownership of the peacemaking process. In addition, a community group leader from Derry (D3) perceives that the awareness of both funds is more centralized among the funds’ administrators but peripheral among the target beneficiaries:

How aware am I of them? I would say, in particular given my job, which includes capacity building, training and therefore it beholds me to know about funding streams. So there is that aspect of it I would know about Peace 1, 2 and potentially Peace 3 through as part of my job description to know about them and them and to know about the International Fund for Ireland.

These respondents’ perceptions indicate that the awareness of both funds should be decentralized to reach out to all beneficiaries on the ground. However, the participants
indicate that there is less awareness among the new minority ethnic groups than among Unionists and Nationalists (the two majority communities). A Belfast community group leader (B2) observed that community groups not working directly with Unionists and Nationalists seemed to be excluded from the funding process:

To be honest I am not totally familiar with the whole differences...And this is the first time that our organisation received peace funding...originally it was assigned to projects and organisations working with the two majority communities, so ours was the first project to receive this Peace money working on minority ethnic issues. So honestly I am not aware of the whole ins and outs and the details of the differences between the two.

This observation indicates that if sustainable peace, reconciliation and community development are to be achieved in Northern Ireland and the Border Area, both funding agencies must reach out to all groups hence bridging the gap between the majority and the visible minority communities. Our respondents indicate the need to break down the barriers of sectarianism and exclusion and embrace inclusion while creating more public awareness about the meaning and the goals of both funds.

According to Figure 1 below, 68 percent of the respondents feel that the application criteria are not straight forward while only 16 percent feel that the process is fair. Moreover, a further 16 percent of the respondents are unsure about whether the process is straightforward or not. In relation to prospects for future sustainability of the peace process, 50 percent of the respondents are pessimistic while only 19 percent are optimistic, and 31 percent are unsure about the sustainability process.
Figure 1 further indicates that 64 percent of the respondents feel that both funds encourage trust building among the disputants in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. However, 12 percent of the respondents feel that trust building cannot be “bought” by aid while 24 percent are unsure if both funds actually facilitate trust building. In relation to the awareness of both funds Figure 1 indicates that the majority of the target beneficiaries know about the funds while only 4 percent are unsure about the existence of both funds.

This study was not without challenges. The main challenge in this study was to cope with perceived neutrality. The second author had first-hand experience of the Troubles, and had to take this issue into account. While interviewing the interviewees, he struggled with neutrality as an ethical principle in data collection and analysis. While he identified with both communities, his ethical convictions shaped his interpretations of the respondents’ stories.
Discussion

The aforementioned interviews indicate a variety of perceptions and images pertaining to trust building, project sustainability, awareness, and funding criteria. The following discussion centres on some analysis including recommendations about the way forward. Several observations can be made from the respondents’ perceptions about the impact of external economic funding on the peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. In particular our observations are based on the interpretation of the respondents’ perceptions about the straightforwardness of the application criteria, trust building, awareness of funds, and sustainability.

First, while an overwhelming majority of the respondents are aware of the existence of both funds, there is a general lack of informed knowledge about the meaning of the funds. There is a need for both funding agencies to collaborate with community leaders and other stakeholders to educate the local people about the objectives, the mission and the vision of both funds. Both funders should reach out to visible minorities by breaking down the barriers of sectarianism and exclusion to ensure indigenous ownership and local adaptability to the peace process. In a case study of a Protestant and Catholic community in the highly segregated area of West Belfast, Knox (2010) observed, for example, that shared social economic policy is important in promoting community cohesion, integration and the social transformation of community groups. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009, 92-121) also articulate that effective conflict transformation should involve the provision of appropriate and innovative methods and approaches and assistance to those who experience violence to change individual attitudes and address structural reforms. Moreover, Jeong (2005) notes that economic aid should be geared towards facilitating equality, addressing structural violence and ultimately sustainable development. Conflict transformation can also be nurtured by constructive community engagements (Kaufman 2006) and equal access to social economic
benefits (Byrne and Irvin 2001). Consequently both donors and community leaders should embrace community education, sensitization, and awareness about community peace projects to facilitate a sense of inclusion, ownership, and sustainability of peace initiatives.

Second, this study indicates that the funds application criteria are bureaucratic, hierarchical, complex and detached from both communities. The funds criteria have nurtured continued tension and suspicion among the community that could jeopardize their participation in the peace process. Community leaders, donors and other actors in the peacebuilding process should involve and include the community in the design, planning, and dissemination of the application criteria to facilitate embracing realities on the ground as well as the expressed needs of the community. For example, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009, 72-91) observe that while local participation, ownership and partnership are important to legitimacy and sustainability, international organizations are elite led and nonparticipatory. In many circumstances local communities are passive actors in predetermined liberal paradigms. External funding agencies should facilitate a participatory approach that actively involves peripheral populations as active agents in shaping and controlling their destinies and engagement with the outside world. The active involvement and participation of peripheral populations in conflict transformation and development assist in giving local meaning to new ideas and institutions, hence, facilitating the ownership and sustainability of the peace process (Mac Ginty 2008; Mac Ginty and Williams 2009).

Some respondents interpret the funder’s bureaucratic application criteria as a symbol of exclusion, which defeats the desired ideal of goodwill and trust building. The donors, community leaders, and other stakeholders, in order to facilitate trust building, goodwill, and the ownership and sustainability of the peace process, should embrace the inclusion and active participation of all the beneficiaries. Local communities have indeed power to absorb, negotiate, subvert and resist external pressure, which is a sign of people’s participation in
development, as well as conflict resolution processes (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009). Sustainable conflict transformation and reconciliation is also promoted by building meaningful relationships between opposing forces (Lederach 2006), social capital (McCall and O’Dowd 2008; O’Dowd and McCall 2008), and single identity projects (Byrne and Irvin 2001. The respondents in this study emphasize the need for social and community auditing as core values in genuine trust building and reconciliation. In addition, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) deconstruct the concept of social capital and observe that while war torn societies exhibit strong social capital, there is a need for a bridging social capital (social ties and shared beliefs that encompass multiple groups) rather than a bonding social capital (social ties and shared beliefs among a single group). In other words, the “right” form of social capital is directly proportional to effective peacebuilding and conflict transformation in countries that exhibit intractable conflicts. Again, the important lesson here for the donors and community leaders is that the inclusion, involvement, and participation of the local community in local peace projects is key in the sustainability, and in their ownership of the process.

Third, some of the interviews indicate the existence of a lot of pessimism among the target beneficiaries with regards to the sustainability of the Northern Ireland peace process. Consequently, both funding agencies should deconstruct sustainability by adopting a vertical rather than a hierarchical perspective of understanding that hails from the community’s point of view. Meaningful, genuine and purposeful consultations should be made with the local community if viable long-term sustainability is to be achieved. The self-determination of the community is vital in promoting a meaningful sustainability of grassroots and home-grown peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The role of civil society as the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values is pivotal in promoting self-determination, political freedom and in resisting oppressive foreign development policies.
The tools of civil society activism such as the media, trade unions, business, professional associations, and voluntary and church groups constitute key voices within the community especially in supporting or challenging the government and other development organisations (Ibid).

The respondents in this study clearly indicate that sustainability cannot be measured via economic indicators alone; rather it also needs to be monitored and evaluated through social indicators. Effective evaluation of sustainability in terms of trust building, reconciliation, and community development requires a multi-level approach. Thus, a multimodal and multi-level peacebuilding approach is essential in reconciling western and indigenous models of peacebuilding and conflict transformation (Byrne and Keashly 2000).

The multi-track multimodal approach assists various actors to recognize that: (1) complex and dynamic conflict milieus demand a flexible and sensitive approach to building theoretical models based on practitioner and protagonist input; (2) conflict resolution and peacebuilding necessitate a multi-modal complementarity approach at multiple levels; (3) a variety of intervention activities and actors must be considered; and (4) local and external agencies are needed to select and coordinate a series of efforts to fit the specific conflict context (Ibid).

Moreover, Jeong (2005) observes that peacebuilding in post-conflict societies requires a holistic approach encompassing: design, security and demilitarization, political transition, development, reconciliation and social rehabilitation. Central to this approach is “coordination,” which acts as a fabric to bond various endeavours in the peacemaking and conflict transformation process (Byrne and Keashly 2000). Coordination is essential due to complexities and specialities involved in peacemaking and conflict resolution processes (Jeong 2005). Consequently, the donors and community leaders should embrace an integrative, holistic, multi-level or multimodal approach to accommodate the expressed needs.
of all stakeholders, to create a sense of inclusion, and facilitate the ownership of sustainable conflict transformation, reconciliation, and peacebuilding.

Fourth, many respondents observe that unilateralism, exclusion and a rigid bureaucracy combined with the underlying assumption that peace can be “bought” with funds has resulted in the promotion of some “synthetic” peace projects and a likelihood of a relapse into chaos after the funding ends. Since 2007, major political milestones in Northern Ireland such as power sharing and devolution have concealed a highly polarised society characterised by sectarianism, community divisions and the legacy of protracted conflict (Knox 2010: 13-28). The Freudian “talking cure” is especially important in facilitating the ventilation of grievances and the establishment of history (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009: 46-71). The liberal peace facilitated through market, policy, and institutional reforms are a springboard towards the transition to democracy and are especially important in addressing structural violence and historical injustices (Ibid). However, international organizations are mere “empty vessels” driven by the strategic, political and economic interests of the superpowers as they are caught up in the “soft power” struggle that makes them act in prescribed ways to reinforce the position of power holders and thwart attempts by power seekers to achieve a more egalitarian share of resources (Mac Ginty and Williams 2009, 46-71). Trust building and goodwill go beyond political realignments; they entail community leaders, donors, and other stakeholders reaching out and engaging in sincere and honest deliberations about the past and the future. Donors and community leaders must nurture trust building and goodwill by facilitating genuine consultations and cross-community relationships driven by mutual understanding and accommodation of bi-communal expressed needs and the willingness to address them.

Consequently, we need to question the role of third parties such as external funding agencies in conflict resolution and the transformational peacebuilding process in developing
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countries. For example, did the signing of the BA make any significant contribution to trust building, reconciliation and development prospects in Northern Ireland? Quoting Darby (2006), Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) observe that the signing of a multiparty peace accord is unlikely to end violence and that trust building, reconciliation, and community development requires looking beyond institutional concepts such as conflict settlement and management, democratization, reconstruction, disarmament and reintegration. Instead, deeper home-grown mechanisms that actively involve whole populations in finding long-term solutions to protracted conflicts should be the focus of the intervention (Ibid). There is a need to bridge the gap between consociationalists who argue that opposing identities cannot be integrated and social transformationists who advocate for active participation and involvement of the civil society in greater peacebuilding initiatives (Knox 2010). The local community and their leaders should be empowered to appraise and monitor the impact of the western peace paradigms and to reject them if they do not resonate with their local realities (Mac Ginty 2008). Donors should respect the expressed needs of the local people and accommodate their ideas in local peace projects.

The unilateral, forcefully imposed and predetermined script of donor-driven peace leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Do we dismiss the liberal peace approaches altogether and persevere with its implications or do we embrace the liberal peace paradigm and continue to swallow the bitter pill? Lederach (2005), in his Moral Imagination, notes that while foreign aid has partially failed to facilitate sustainable peacebuilding initiatives, human beings have the capacity to imagine responses that while rooted in the chaotic nature of the real world are capable of rising above the destructive patterns and produce constructive patterns that do not yet exist. Consequently, foreign aid should not entirely be dismissed; instead, the donors, community leaders, and other actors involved in peacebuilding initiatives in Northern Ireland should be capable of working together to rise above and rehabilitate the
destructive patterns of the liberal peace paradigm towards nurturing a more people-friendly
approach. Other scholars who share a similar perspective observe that properly targeted
foreign aid has the potential of addressing structural violence and facilitating conflict
transformation, reconciliation, and peacebuilding (Jeong 2005; McGarry and O’Leary, 2006a,
2006b).

Trust building and reconciliation are pivotal in reconstruction and community
development (Mac Ginty 2008). However, “reconstruction” encompasses short-term relief
and long-term development and extends far beyond physical reconstruction to include the
 provision of livelihoods, reformed types of governance, and the repairing of fractured societal
relationships (Ibid). As illustrated by the respondents in this study, community development
should not merely be a technocratic exercise of rebuilding shattered infrastructure but a
political activity with the potential to effect profound social and cultural change and to
remodel the nature of interaction between and among the affected groups. Conflicts are
complex and require multiple lenses that focus on the immediate situation, underlying
patterns and context, and the conceptual framework towards effective transformation
(Lederach 2003). In other words, different lenses are required to see a particular portion of
reality, and need to be integrated together in order to see the whole picture. Hence, as
Lederach (2005, 2006) observes, while multiple lenses address specific aspects of conflict,
they should be integrated together in order to see the whole conflict.

The civil society has a key role to play in bringing into focus the whole picture of a
conflict, and is a catalyst for social inclusion and renewal of the political economy (Little
2002). Through civil society, the hegemony of unilateral political economy is challenged,
thereby enabling public spaces that accommodate the voices of the marginalized and the
vulnerable communities in the society to thrive (Ibid). The civil society constitutes a
differentiated space in which a diversity of actors engage in a multiplicity of activities and in
which the construction of an alternative political economy is essential to challenge the
bureaucratic structures and to accommodate the expressed needs of the vulnerable and
marginalized groups (Little 2002).

In sum, while the beneficiaries perceive both funds in Northern Ireland to be
bureaucratic and detached from the local reality, they also believe there is a need to embrace
a grassroots-up approach that accommodates the expressed needs of the target beneficiaries to
nurture trust building, reconciliation, and community development. The donors, civil society,
community leaders, politicians, and other actors in the peacebuilding process must embrace
shared perspectives towards the definition of the conflict, interventions, and the
implementation of peace initiatives. Such an inclusive process will nurture understanding,
forgiveness, reconciliation, conflict transformation and the mutual envisioning of a peaceful
future.

Conclusion

This article indicates that the building of trust and goodwill in Northern Ireland and
the Border Area still lies on a shaky foundation. The impact of both funds’ bureaucracies
continues to nurture suspicion and tension among the community. Rather than encouraging
genuine participation in the peace process, the funds may have nurtured some synthetic cross-
community projects that threaten the enormous investment that has been made in building a
lasting peace in Northern Ireland and the Border Area. The sustainability of the peace process
can be achieved through an authentic and meaningful dialogue and purposeful consultations
with the community that would promote local ownership and sustainability of the Northern
Ireland peace process.

Scholars have suggested different interventions in post-accord societies including:
liberal peace (Paris 2004; Gamba 2006), listening to local populations (Mac Ginty 2008),
economic development (Nordstrom 2004), nation building (Williams 2006), cultural
promotion (Cramer 2006; Chabal and Daloz 1999, 2006), and giving war a chance (Luttwark 1999). However, it is important to note that not all of these recommendations may be applicable everywhere. Many have indeed failed to build peace or transform conflicts. So, what is the way forward? Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) observe that a sustainable impact would be achieved by focusing more on what is specific to any reconstruction “event” and less on what is generic. In the case of Northern Ireland, it is important that the expressed needs of the target beneficiaries be accommodated in the peacebuilding initiatives that would promote ownership and sustainability of the peace process.

In sum, it is important to note that people’s reaction to uncertainty impacts the quality of relationships and the peace process as defined by a law of diminishing expectations. Participatory decision making and democratic planning empower peripheral populations to promote their ownership over the peace process (Lederach 2006). One minor change can lead to a difference in the dynamic of conflict as self-realization and self-healing then radiate out to include forgiveness of self and nurture the necessary agency to take risks for peace. Sustainable conflict transformation and peacebuilding need different conceptual lenses that are culturally determined in a process that encourages and nurtures consensual agreement, relationship repair, “gentle action creativity,” trauma reduction, and a new kind of truth telling centred around healing and forgiving, promoting human dignity not humiliation, and hearing other constructive stories of peaceful relations (Senehi 2008). This discussion has indicated that economic aid is not a panacea for conflict transformation (MacGinty 2008; Ryan 2007). On the contrary, social and community capital is important in facilitating trust building, reconciliation, community development, and possible conflict transformation.
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References


Redefining Sovereignty: An Analysis of U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s Rhetoric on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

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Abstract

This essay examines United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric concerning the responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P). This essay seeks to rhetorically map the arguments concerning the nature of R2P and what its specific components are. Specifically, I argue that Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric serves to redefine and update sovereignty and the responsibilities of statehood for a twenty-first century world. The rhetoric of R2P has important implications for the debates surrounding military intervention on “humanitarian” grounds.

On September 20, 1999, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the U.N. General Assembly, imploring his colleagues to codify parameters which would authorize the United Nations to intervene through Security Council resolution, potentially militarily, in the internal affairs of another state if it is engaged in extreme criminal behavior, such as crimes against humanity. As Annan put it, “if states bent on criminal behavior know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes against humanity, then they will not embark on such a course of action in expectation of sovereign immunity” (quoted in Smith 2007, 167). The key phrase from this quotation was “sovereign immunity.” Under the United Nations Charter all states are guaranteed the right of territorial integrity. States may not militarily intervene in the internal affairs of others unless that particular nation engages in external actions that would warrant such a use of force. The non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states has been a pillar of international law since the Treaty of Westphalia.
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in 1648. Annan’s use of the phrase of “sovereign immunity,” in the context of the above quotation, was a plea to redefine this pillar for a twenty-first century world.

In the decade since Annan made his request, there has been a good deal of movement on the subject of “sovereign immunity.” In 2000, the government of Canada, along with other Western European governments and with the blessing of the United Nations, set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). As a result of the commission’s work, a set of guidelines for judging a state’s internal behavior toward its populace was produced and entitled: The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (also known as R2P). In 2005, the World Summit produced a document that endorsed responsibility to protect and later unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Bellamy 2008). United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has stated that codifying and operationalizing the principles of R2P will be one of his fundamental objectives while in office. In a May 2008 speech, given at a conference on R2P in Berlin, the Secretary General kicked off his campaign to promote this objective. Ban Ki-Moon’s oration is the subject of this essay. This address is an exemplar of the arguments made by R2P advocates, like the Secretary General, as to what the responsibility to protect doctrine constitutes, what are its components, and what are its limits. In other words, I use this speech as a means to rhetorically map the arguments for enshrining the responsibility to protect doctrine. Through this rhetorical map, we find that the responsibility to protect doctrine promoted by Secretary Ban fundamentally redefines the concept of sovereignty for a twenty-first century world.

Scholars should be interested in the Secretary General’s argument and this larger debate for a variety of reasons, but three that are most fundamental to this study. First, the rhetoric of the U.N. Secretary General has received little attention from academics across the humanities and social sciences, particularly rhetorical scholars (for exceptions see Edwards 2008). Unlike other executives, the Secretary General has little power to control the behavior
of U.N. member states. However, the Secretary General is the face of the United Nations. His discourse can set a broad agenda for the U.N. to accomplish various courses of action. Because of Ban Ki-Moon’s promotion of responsibility to protect, there have been and continue to be major debates within the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council as to how it should go about enacting its various principles. His discourse sets the parameters for how R2P will play out into the near future. It serves as a rhetorical map for the larger debates that have been occurring in the United Nations on this issue.

Second, the responsibility to protect doctrine offers a new orientation for military intervention in the twenty-first century. Rationales for the use of force have been evolving, albeit slowly since the end of the Cold War. Feste (2003) argues that a new paradigm of military intervention has emerged since the end of the Cold War. This new paradigm reflected a, as she put it, “positive, offensive strategic thinking to shape the new environment: create internal order, build civil society in failed states, neutralize rogue states and/or their leaders, and alleviate human suffering in refugee populations” (p. 3). The responsibility to protect doctrine is the ultimate fulfilment of this new paradigm. It has implications for when, how, and why various states can use military conflict to achieve a variety of goals. Peace and conflict studies scholars should find this new orientation of interest because it collapses the artificial (if there was any) dichotomy between peace and conflict. One of the primary ways to think of the responsibility to protect doctrine is that it grants states permission to intervene militarily into the internal affairs of other nations that would engage in activities (a subject I will discuss in a later section) that would endanger their populations. In other words, military intervention can become a means to achieve and maintain peace. This new orientation toward military intervention offers a whole slew of theoretical possibilities, opportunities, and dilemmas that scholars and practitioners will have to grapple with in the near and long term.
Finally, the responsibility to protect doctrine has the potential to fundamentally alter three hundred years of what the concept of “sovereignty” actually means. The concept of sovereignty is an important aspect in understanding how states deal with arguments for and/or against dealing with societies embedded in conflict (Evans 2009; Thakur 2011). For example, nation-states, based upon traditional definitions of sovereignty, may deny access to aid workers, U.N. peacekeepers, or other entities that may attempt to help to resolve conflict in a particular state (e.g. the current problems that aid workers are having entering Somalia to deal with the famine). The responsibility to protect doctrine opens up a space where proponents of peacekeeping or peacebuilding can provide a counter logic to traditional sovereignty arguments. These counter logics can potentially create even greater legitimacy for those who want to provide outside assistance to people in need. This greater legitimacy creates more pressure upon nation-states to succumb to the viewpoints of the global community. While the state may still resist such pressure, the alternative definition of sovereignty put forth by different groups takes a greater step toward becoming an international norm. Thus, in future operations, those that invoke the responsibility to protect make it easier to legitimize operations in that particular state in the future and/or in other states, while making it more difficult for states to resist such an intervention.

To that end, this essay moves in four parts. First, I provide a methodology section where I discuss briefly rhetorical criticism and textual analysis. Second, I then offer a discussion concerning the subject of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect doctrine. Third, I then analyze the rhetorical dimensions of R2P. Finally, I draw implications from this analysis.

**Methodology**

The subject of this essay is Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon’s rhetoric concerning the responsibility to protect doctrine. My goal is to map the rhetorical dimensions of this
doctrine and analyze how Secretary Ban’s rhetoric and R2P alter the definition of sovereignty. Specifically, I examine his July 15, 2008 address at the “Responsible Sovereignty” conference in Berlin, Germany. This address is exemplary because it contains, outlines, and defines the responsibility to protect doctrine. In order to complete this task, I conducted a textual analysis of the Secretary General’s rhetoric. Textual analysis is where the researcher attempts to make sense of and interpret a text, paying attention to what the author wanted to communicate, interpreting intended meanings and considering those texts in differing contexts such as cultural and/or intellectual (Brummett 2010; Foss 2004; Patton 2002). The relevant context would be determined based upon the goals of the research. Because the goal of this essay is largely to make sense of how Ban Ki-Moon defined the responsibility to protect doctrine, I outlined the intellectual context in which R2P was created. That context is the next section of this essay.

Textual analysis is often conducted in either a deductive or inductive format. In a deductive format, the critic may use a specific form of rhetorical method that has already been established to look at a text or a set of texts. For example, one of the more popular forms of textual analysis, particularly for those that study discourse, is genre criticism. There are a variety of textual genres that exist (i.e. apologias, State of the Union addresses, etc.). In their book, Presidents Crafting the Presidency, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (2008) examine how the institution of the presidency has evolved by examining presidential rhetoric genres such as presidential inaugurals, war addresses, state of the unions, veto addresses, farewell addresses, and more. If one wanted to examine the inaugural address of future presidents they could use the generic characteristics outlined by Campbell and Jamieson to elucidate how future presidents maintain and change various aspects of the inaugural. In other words, one way of conducting a deductive form of textual analysis is to
impose specific generic requirements upon a text and see if that particular text or set of texts meets those generic requirements and what are the implications of said analysis.

Textual analysis can also be conducted inductively. In this type of textual criticism, a researcher approaches a text or set of texts where s/he lets the texts “speak” to him or her. In other words, the analyst does not have a predetermined set of ideas of what s/he is looking for, but uses the text to help elucidate specific ideas. That does not mean that a critic examines a set of texts without some kind of theoretical knowledge. Rather, it merely means that the critic does not approach a set of texts with a predetermined outcome. For example, Vanessa Beasley (2004) examined how American presidents had constructed the identity of the United States over a hundred year period in the United States. For this task, Beasley examined every single inaugural address of the United States over this hundred year period, proceeding to mark and note how the notion of U.S. identity evolved over time. After she was done with this analysis, she assembled this analysis around a specific set of arguments she made about how American presidents constitute identity. The key to inductive textual analysis was her argument. Indeed, argument is the key to good textual criticism. Wayne Brockreide (1974) explained that textual criticism functions as argument. The most significant argument is one that explains. The critic proceeds inductively by selecting concepts, categories, and dimensions of the discourse in question. Then the critic, with no commitment to an a priori statement of criticism, evaluates or explains a particular experience or accounts for rhetoric by relating it to larger concepts and principles. Similarly, James Darsey (1994) noted the critic’s job is to tell us something worthwhile that clarifies and illuminates dark places in our science, our histories, and our souls, something that increases “our understanding and facilitates our functioning within the world” (p. 176). Thus the goal of criticism is to increase understanding of how the world functions and to evaluate...
those functions. The authority of the criticism comes through in the argument that has been made.

In this particular essay, I approached Secretary General Ban’s address in an inductive manner. While I approached it with some theoretical knowledge about R2P and sovereignty, I imposed no specific theoretical outcomes on the subject. Rather, my goal has been to increase an understanding of how Secretary General Ban constructs the idea of R2P doctrine, constructs the idea of sovereignty and how it might function in further discussions of military intervention within the United Nations. To that end, the next section provides an understanding of sovereignty and R2P and then analyzes the Secretary General’s discourse.

Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect

The concept of sovereignty has been a subject of contentious debate for hundreds of years. Philosophers such as Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Carl Schmitt have all iterated their own principles of defining sovereignty. For my purposes here, I am interested in how the concept of sovereignty has been debated in the realm of international relations. For over three hundred years, the boundaries of sovereignty were largely the same. Specifically, the focus has been on external sovereignty or the relationship between sovereign power (a national government) and other states. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 established that all states had a right to territorial sovereignty. Governments possess full control over their own internal affairs within a specific territorial or geographic area. Outside entities have no right to interfere with the internal affairs of another state unless it is engaging in some nefarious activity that would directly endanger another state. Territorial sovereignty has been further codified within the United Nations. According to the U.N. Charter, article 2, paragraph 7, nothing in international law allows another state to “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (United Nations, 1945, ¶ 12). For over forty years, since it was ratified by member states and for
three hundred years prior to that, the happening within the “domestic jurisdiction of any state” has been a sacrosanct aspect of international law.

However, a series of developments after the Cold War made many argue that it was time to update or at the very least have a serious debate on redefining the parameters of sovereignty. Specifically, the inability of the international community to generate the political will to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and the NATO intervention into Kosovo to stop ethnic cleansing; served as an impetus for a new debate on the responsibilities that sovereign governments have toward their populations; and what would be the grounds to intervene, if any, to assist populations who were threatened by their own governments. As noted in the introduction, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged the 1999 General Assembly, as well as in 2000, to resolve this tension between sovereignty and human rights (Bellamy 2008; Luck 2010; Pattison 2010). In 2000, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty would be established to create a broader framework for legitimizing humanitarian intervention. The commission’s mandate was to “build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty, and more specifically, to try to develop a global political consensus how to move from polemics . . . towards action” (ICISS 2001, 2).

In 2001, the ICISS published its final report, *The Responsibility to Protect*. The ICISS report argued that in order to build international consensus on the protection of human populations and resolve the tension between human rights and sovereignty two new strategies were needed. First, *Responsibility to Protect* defined the circumstances under which international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency. Those initial circumstances were mass killings and ethnic cleansing. Only under those two circumstances would states be allowed to intervene in the
domestic affairs of other states. Second, the language of “humanitarian intervention” must be changed. In fact, the ICISS document recommended that the concept of “humanitarian intervention” be dropped completely for two reasons. First, the concept of a humanitarian military operation always deeply concerned humanitarian aid organizations; how can “military” intervention be truly “humanitarian” was the question many aid organizations were asking (Bain 2011; Benjamin 2009; Bellamy 2010; Chandler 2004; Evans 2009; ICISS 2001). The answer: it cannot. The conflict in terms damaged the mission of humanitarian aid agencies; thus, the need for a change in language. Additionally, many states that intervened on “humanitarian” grounds did so to serve their own interests (Chandler 2002; Doyle 2011). These states declared their missions as “humanitarian,” while they intervened to secure more territory, resources, or concessions from a weaker state. This specific definition of circumstances and changing the language from “intervention” to “protection” had the effect of, according to former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and U.N. Secretary General Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun (2002), changing:

The essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility . . . Indeed even the strongest supporters of state sovereignty will admit today that no state holds unlimited power to do what it wants to its own people. It is now commonly acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. (103)

The concept of “responsibility to protect” that emerged from the ICISS report served to alter and update the characteristics of sovereignty for the twenty-first century.

When The Responsibility to Protect was released it was received favorably by many states including Argentina, Australia, Canada, Columbia, Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Norway, South Korea, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, as well as other countries (Bellamy 2006;
Bellamy 2009). Yet, there was a hefty bit of skepticism from a variety of parties. For example, aside from Great Britain, the permanent members of the Security Council (United States, China, France, and Russia) voiced opposition to the concept of responsibility to protect because it might undermine the U.N. Charter and/or take away power from the Security Council when making decisions about intervening in other states (Benjamin 2010; Welsh 2004). Additionally, the Non-Aligned Movement of countries (e.g. Egypt and India) rejected the concept because they argued that mechanisms were already built into the United Nations to prevent mass killing and ethnic cleansing. Moreover, they were concerned about how it might undercut the traditional principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty (Bellamy 2006, 2009, 2010; Bain 2011). They did not want the Great Powers dictating rules to small and developing nations.

Despite this skepticism, the ICISS and Secretary General Kofi Annan continued to promote R2P, trying to achieve an international consensus of the issue. From 2002-2005, these actors held regional roundtables, attempting to address many of the concerns raised by members of the Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement countries, and international aid organizations (Bellamy 2006). The important item here was that a large international consensus was reached, at least conceptually, on R2P. In the outcome document produced from the 2005 World Summit, paragraphs 138 and 139 outlined this accord. While these paragraphs are long, they are worth quoting at length. They stated:

138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, though appropriate and necessary means. We accept responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help
States to exercise their responsibilities and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capacity.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use the diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and its implications, bearing in mind, the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. (quoted in Bellamy 2008, 622-623)

It is important to note an evolution in the responsibility to protect from the ICISS report to the World Summit document. The ICISS report argued that intervention into the domestic affairs of states could be justified based upon mass killing and ethnic cleansing. However, the concept of “mass killing” is somewhat amorphous; what constitutes “mass killing” in international law? That language changed in the 2005 World Summit outcome report, where violations of a state’s sovereignty could be justified only on four crimes: genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. On its surface, this may appear to be an expansion of the responsibility to protect from the ICISS report. In reality, the World Summit document narrows the possibility of intervention because genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity all have fairly precise definitions and characteristics that have been inscribed by international law. Thus, the circumstances that would have allowed intervention under the ICISS document have been clarified extensively.

The World Summit outcome document outlined a consensus on the parameters of the responsibility to protect concept. However, operationalizing that concept has become difficult since 2005. When Ban Ki-Moon became Secretary General in 2006, he stated that translating “R2P from ‘words into deeds’ as one of the cornerstones of his Secretary-Generalship” (Bellamy 2008, 615). Since 2008, the Secretary General has attempted a rhetorical campaign to promote and operationalize the concept. In the next section, I examine this campaign by focusing on one major address on this subject. This speech is representative of smaller statements he has made on R2P over the past two years.

Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s Rhetorical Campaign for R2P

Since he became the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon has been on a campaign to take the 2005 World Summit consensus about the responsibility to protect doctrine and turn it into specific action or as he put it “turning lofty words into practical deeds . . . it is high time to turn the responsibility to protect into practice” (2009 ¶ 9). On July 15, 2008, Secretary General Ban began this campaign with an address at the “Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World” event in Berlin, Germany.

The Nature of 21st Century Sovereignty

In his Berlin address, Ban sought to clarify and defend the responsibility to protect concept. Secretary General Ban began his address with the traditional pleasantries to his audience, declaring how “fitting it was that we address these matters in Berlin, where the
twentieth century learned such hard lessons about the dangers of unbridled and irresponsible sovereignty” (¶ 2). In the next sentence, he juxtaposed that idea by stating, “Today, Germany stands as a model of the responsible sovereign, at home and abroad” because it stands for the “curative properties of the principles of human rights, tolerance and the rule of law, for which the world body proudly stands” (¶ 2). The “irresponsible sovereignty” to which the Secretary General referred to was most certainly a reference to the Holocaust, where the German Nazis attempted to destroy a significant portion of their own populace; whereas, the modern Germany was a “model of the responsible sovereign” because it protected its populations from harm. By offering a quick analogy between Nazi Germany and the modern version, Ban Ki-Moon began to redefine and reformulate how the concept of sovereignty should be approached. Sovereignty claims were not merely relegated to external territorial claims, but involved the internal affairs of a state.

From there, Secretary General Ban began to articulate R2P in more specific terms. Initially, he did so by describing what the responsibility to protect was not. Olson (1989) noted that describing what something is not leads to greater clarity and gives arguers clearer and potentially firmer argumentative grounds to stand upon. In his description of the nature of R2P, Ban Ki-Moon stated that “R2P is not a new code for humanitarian intervention” (¶ 4). Additionally, “R2P should also be distinguished from its conceptual cousin, human security. The latter, which is broader, posits that policy should take into account the security of people, not just of States, the whole range of interests” (¶ 4). If responsibility to protect was not humanitarian intervention or human security then what was it? According to the Secretary General, the responsibility to protect is “built on a more positive and affirmative concept of sovereignty as responsibility” (¶ 4). In declaring R2P, as “sovereignty as responsibility” Secretary General Ban, similar to his German analogy, reformulated and redefined traditional notions of sovereignty. As noted earlier, since the Treaty of Westphalia,
as a concept sovereignty’s dimensions dealt with external issues. Internally, states were allowed to pursue policies as they pleased, as long as they did not interfere with the internal affairs of other states. When Ban Ki-Moon constructed the responsibility to protect as a synonym for responsible sovereignty, he argued that the definition of sovereignty for the twenty-first century must be expanded to where the internal affairs of a state are just as important as its external affairs. In essence, Ban Ki-Moon turned sovereignty on its head. When a state did not or could not protect their populations, then the international community had an obligation to step in and help.

Despite this redefinition of sovereignty, Secretary General Ban asserted, later on in his address, that R2P actually reinforced and extended traditional conceptions of sovereignty. As he put it:

Equally incorrect is the assumption that the responsibility to protect is in contradiction to sovereignty. Properly understood, R2P is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. Strong states protect their people, while weak ones are either unwilling or unable to do so. Protection was one of the core purposes of the formation of States and the Westphalian system. By helping states meet one of their core responsibilities, RtoP seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it (¶ 16).

The key to understanding how R2P reinforces sovereignty is Ban’s logic behind the term “ally.” According to Ban, the “formation of States and the Westphalian system” were set up to “protect their people.” The strength of a state is determined by how well its people are treated. The responsibility to protect, as I will demonstrate shortly, sets up mechanisms for the international community to recognize and act preventatively in the internal affairs of “weak states.” Accordingly, these states can correct their problems, protect their populations, and take their place amongst strong states. By operationalizing R2P, the strength of a nation-
state based international system can be extended and the core of the Westphalian system is left intact.

At the same time that Secretary Ban perpetuated the Westphalian system, he also reconstructed it for a twenty-first century world. Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric re-constructed what a true nation-state is within the international system. Under the old U.N. charter, all states are guaranteed territorial sovereignty, whether you protect your population or not. Under the responsibility to protect doctrine only states that protect their citizens, “strong states,” can be considered true members of the international community. States that do not protect their citizens and violate their fundamental human rights are outside the Westphalian system. These states are not true nation-states. Thus, the responsibility to protect doctrine updates the nature of what constitutes a nation-state in the twenty-first century. Those that are outside those parameters cannot be considered full-fledged members of the international community. Considering that no rational state and/or leader of a state want to be the outcasts of the international community, which could cause them to lose benefits that come with such a membership (i.e. free trade) and avoiding punishment (U.N. sanctions), implies states will cooperate with the new standard of sovereignty to protect one’s population.

Throughout his address the Secretary General reinforced his definition of R2P and redefinition of sovereignty with the constant invocation of the 2005 World Summit. The Secretary General used phrases such as “adopted by the World Summit,” “Governments unanimously affirmed,” “The Summit underscored,” and “as the 2005 recognized,” while also quoting from the World Summit outcome document. Recall that the World Summit outcome document laid out a clear consensus on the responsibility to protect doctrine and the responsibilities states have to their populations. By invoking the World Summit, the Secretary General demonstrated that his rhetorical vision was in line with the sentiments of the international community. His invocation of that document functioned as a source of
authority for his definition of R2P, creating argumentative grounds that make it difficult for R2P opponents to disrupt the Secretary General’s reformulation of sovereignty. In order to generate opposition to R2P, those critics would have to make arguments against the understanding of R2P within the world document, a task that would probably prove to be quite difficult. Accordingly, the Secretary General’s vision really becomes the de facto position on the subject, moving his overall goal of operationalizing R2P one step closer to fruition.

The Ingredients of Responsibility to Protect

After defining the nature of responsibility to protect as responsible sovereignty, Ban Ki-Moon went onto define and describe the essential components of R2P. For the Secretary General, R2P “rests” on three pillars. First, R2P deals with only four specific crimes “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (¶ 4). A few paragraphs later he reinforced the specifics of R2P by stating “our conception of RtoP, then, is narrow but deep . . . extending the principle to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility” (¶ 9). In a short 1600 word address, Ban continually emphasized this point—that R2P was only concerned with four specific crimes. Why? Certainly, his assertion that if you extended R2P to other calamities, it would “stretch the concept” beyond utility is part of his reasoning, but I believe there is a deeper logic. By specifically articulating when R2P would be invoked, the Secretary General circumscribed the grounds upon which he can argue, but more importantly he circumscribed the grounds upon which his opponents could argue. In order to oppose responsibility to protect, opponents would have to engage his arguments. Additionally, these four crimes make it much easier to agree in what circumstances they should agree. Considering that no truly rational nation-state would endorse genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity, it makes it much more difficult for opponents of R2P to mount serious opposition and induces cooperation amongst U.N. member states. Accordingly, the Secretary General positioned his rhetorical worldview of what sovereignty constituted and the responsibility to protect to be widely adopted by the international community.

The second “pillar” of R2P was the international community’s commitment to help states that might be in danger of meeting their protection obligations. The Secretary General noted:

our goal is to help States succeed, not just to react once they have failed to meet their prevention and protection obligations. It would be neither sound morality, nor wise policy, to limit the world’s options to watching the slaughter of innocents to send in the marines. The magnitude of these four crimes and violations demands early, preventative steps—and these steps should require neither unanimity in the Security Council nor pictures of unfolding atrocities that shock the conscience of the world. (¶ 7)

Ban Ki-Moon spoke to a fundamental problem that has plagued the international community and the United Nations for decades: the lack of political will to intervene to prevent great human tragedy, like genocide. The United Nations has been constantly criticized as an organization that is reactive instead of proactive and preventative. And when it has reacted, it typically has taken a Security Council resolution, which is an arduous process in and of itself, to get the international community to do something. When it was founded, it was thought that it would be a place where states could bring their disputes and settle them in an environment of diplomacy and collaboration, while great international tragedies could be prevented because of increased cooperation. However, the expectations of the United Nations have never been fulfilled.
Initially, the forty years of the Cold War prevented this vision from moving forward because the U.S. and Soviet Union focused on their own interests instead of the international communities. After the Cold War, there were high hopes that the U.N. would become a driving force in changing the international environment. Since the end of the Cold War, Secretary Generals Boutros-Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan have waxed eloquently and fought to transform the United Nations from a large debating society to an organization that can respond in a timely manner in preventing the loss of massive life. However, states, including the United States, focused on their own interests first, instead of the international community’s. And when states did intervene (e.g. Kosovo and Darfur) the United Nations was bypassed in favor of regional organizations where consensus and cooperation could be handled more quickly. Thus, in the post-Cold War world, the United Nations continues to have a perception problem as an organization that does not have the will or the capacity to act in serving humanity. For Secretary General Ban, R2P is the mechanism to fulfill the original vision of its founders. Because R2P focuses on such a small subset of calamities and there is a larger consensus that something needs to be done to prevent these crimes, as evidenced by the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, there should be less of a problem getting the international community to act. In this sense, Ban Ki-Moon not was not only attempting to redefine sovereignty in this speech, but the United Nations itself.

The final ingredient of R2P was “much discussed, but generally understood too narrowly” (¶ 8). It encompassed “member states’ acceptance of their responsibility to respond in a timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to help protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations” (¶ 8). That response involved a range of UN tools including diplomatic, economic, and potentially armed intervention to prevent war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. For Ban Ki-Moon, the key was “in an early and flexible response, tailored to the specific
needs of each situation” (¶ 8). Here, Ban Ki-Moon attempted to clear up fundamental misconceptions of R2P. Recall that one significant misgiving of R2P critics was that they felt it would promote military intervention as the primary option in cases of genocide and/or those states also asserted, if they signed onto, R2P they would be forced to participate in a military mission. Because of those fallacies the Secretary General argued that this pillar had been “much discussed, but understood too narrowly.” What R2P really contained was a range of options—economic, diplomatic, and potentially armed intervention—that would be “tailored to the specific needs of each situation.” For Secretary General Ban, there was no one-size-fits-all situation. R2P provided the United Nations with a “flexible response,” replacing the old system where the “the world’s options” were limited “to watching the slaughter of innocents or to send in the marines.” Because R2P received widespread consensus and commitment from the global community at the World Summit, giving the United Nations a range of options to use, R2P was more progressive. By clarifying R2P, Ban negated a fundamental argument of his opponents, while at the same time promoting his vision for the future of the United Nations.

Ultimately, Secretary General Ban argued that R2P could have profound implications. If states could “summon the will to act collectively” then it might deter other states from committing atrocities. Moreover, if:

United Nations rules, procedures and practices are developed . . . then there is less likelihood of RtoP principles being used to justify extra legal interventions for other purposes. In other words, the responsibility to protect does not alter the legal obligation of Member States to refrain from the use of force in conformity with the Charter. Rather, it reinforces this obligation. By bolstering United Nations prevention, protection, response, and rebuilding mechanisms, RtoP seeks to enhance the rule of law and expand multilateral options. (¶ 14-15)
Certainly, the responsibility to protect doctrine was contingent upon U.N. member states to “summon the will to act collectively.” However, R2P, according to the Secretary General’s logic, was vastly superior to the current system of “humanitarian intervention.” Recall that one of the conflicts with the term “humanitarian intervention” was that many states intervened in other states, not for humanitarian interests, but for “other purposes.” Because R2P was relegated to a small subset of crimes, the potential to abuse the concept was significantly lessened. Moreover, R2P was more than a mere military response to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing. Rather, it was a range of options whose primary purpose was to engage with weak states that might be susceptible to such behavior. These options gave the U.N. member states more options than merely “watching the slaughter of innocents or sending in the marines.” Therefore, R2P acts as a basis to redefine humanitarian intervention from a stark dichotomy of choices to a range of options that the U.N. could attempt to use at varying stages of an international crisis. By operationalizing R2P, the United Nations could enhance its mission to protect populations from their governments, weak states could become strong states, and the United Nations could regain its moral voice in the international community. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s strategy of definition put forward a set of arguments about R2P that may make his rhetorical vision possible.

**Conclusions**

In this essay, I have examined U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s rhetoric on the responsibility to protect. Specifically, I examined an address he gave in Berlin in July 2008 that began his campaign to codify and operationalize R2P principles in U.N. practices. I did so to rhetorically map how he constructed the nature of twenty-first century sovereignty, as well as the specific components of R2P. Ultimately, R2P serves to redefine and update the parameters of sovereignty and humanitarian intervention for the twenty-first century. In turn,
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the Secretary General’s rhetoric set the agenda for the larger U.N. debate that is currently
taking place over the responsibility to protect doctrine. While this was an initial exploration
into the larger debate on the responsibility to protect doctrine, we can draw larger
implications for this analysis.

First, longstanding definitions of sovereignty are rapidly changing in a globalized
environment. The creation of R2P, the consensus of the World Summit, and the recent
attempts to codify the principles of responsibility to protect suggests that slowly, but surely,
an international norm on internal sovereignty is developing. Evidence of this norm can be
found in NATO’s Kosovo intervention to stop ethnic cleansing, the intervention by Australia
into East Timor in 1999, and the African Union force trying to keep the peace within Darfur.
More recently, the intervention by NATO forces into Libya to stop Moammar Gaddafi’s
attacks on citizens was characterized as an important first step for the responsibility to protect
doctrine (Thakur 2011). In giving approval for the Libya intervention by the United Nations
Security Council, the language of the resolution they put forth strongly resembled the
principles of R2P. In addition, more and more states have been putting the welfare of the
individual, an emphasis on human security instead of state territorial sovereignty, into their
foreign policy platforms (e.g. Canada). The action of the Security Council, coupled with
initiatives by individual nations, suggests that the concern of individual populations will
become more prominent in international affairs. It may be that the international community is
more willing to care for those populations if they are abused by sovereign governments.
Future research could examine how governments have instituted the policies of R2P within
their foreign policy platforms and also its conceptual cousin human security. As more
governments adopt these ideas, they will create greater acceptance of this international norm
(see Prantl and Nakono, 2011 for an excellent study). Moreover, a full discussion of how the
debate over R2P affected and/or is affecting the decision to intervene in Libya and continue
that military campaign would lay important groundwork as to how R2P may be operationalized in the future.

Second, there appears to be a developing consensus regarding specific circumstances that would invite intervention into the internal affairs of nation-states. The narrow parameters of R2P make it easier for governments to make arguments that they should intervene—diplomatically, economically, and militarily—where genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing are taking place. While this is no guarantee that the international community will create the political will to stop genocide or ethnic cleansing, the fact that this issue has received so much attention demonstrates that there is a subtle, positive shift in how armed force should be used, as Feste (2003) argued, in dealing with outlaw regimes that severely abuse their people. Examining how political leaders have justified their intervention into places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Darfur would illuminate how these leaders are constructing this issue and the rhetorical *topoi* they use in making the case for the commitment of their armed forces.

Finally, it has been the claim of this paper that Ban Ki-Moon’s definition of R2P and redefinition of sovereignty have set the agenda for the larger debate that is taking place within the U.N. General Assembly. A comparison study of the Secretary General’s discourse and those that support the operationalization of responsibility to protect would be interesting to see if his ideas have taken hold. Additionally, looking at how the opposition frames this debate will help us unlock its overall contours. A major debate on the subject of R2P occurred in the fall of 2009. That debate would be a good place to start where scholars could compare the different arguments that people used supporting, opposing, or being neutral toward this new doctrine.

Despite these implications and the potential for further research there are limitations for this study; two of which I would like to highlight here. First, this study is merely an
exploratory essay. The Secretary General’s rhetoric can help set the parameters of R2P for future debates, but that does not mean it can and/or will not be modified by the United Nations. In outlining the parameters of R2P and how it may alter definitions of sovereignty for a twenty-first century, I cannot make any claims that other nation-states support the Secretary General’s ideas or that there might not be severe push-back by several powerful states including the United States and China (see Prantl and Nakano 2010; Teffit 2011). Despite some initial traction for R2P gaining force as a doctrine of international behavior (such as in the Libya intervention) there is no guarantee that R2P will continue to be used by nation-states for other problem spots around the world. It also does not answer the discussion of the specific decisions where, how, and why states might intervene under the auspices of the responsibility to protect doctrine, but not intervene in others (for example, Darfur—see Benjamin, 2010). That is a problem this study cannot answer and may never be answered fully.

Second, while the study of rhetoric is a valuable tool for understanding how intellectual ideas evolve (it is my area of academic expertise), studying the rhetoric of any political figure cannot specifically discern an effect on the foreign policies of nation-states. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether or not nation-states are altering how they conduct their foreign policy because of the rhetoric of the Secretary General. Thus, trying to develop causal links between rhetoric and potential effects are problematic. Along similar lines, rhetoric is an important tool in public diplomacy, but it is a tool that can be totally ignored by states who may disagree with such rhetoric. It does not have the force of economic sanctions or some kind of military intervention. Thus, the power of words may have little impact on a state’s behavior, even if they subscribe to the viewpoint put forth by the Secretary General.
That said, the responsibility to protect doctrine has the potential to be one of the great advancements in international law within the last one hundred years. Whether nation-states act on the principles they uphold will be the ultimate test for these principles. Considering that there will almost assuredly be a state that commits acts that fall under R2P, how the international community reacts will determine whether or not a global consensus has really been met on this issue. This area of research will no doubt be a fruitful line of research for scholars in rhetoric, political science, history, sociology, reconciliation, and peace and conflict studies for years to come.

References


The Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Process: A Prenegotiation Perspective

Amira Schiff

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the prenegotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which extended over eight months in 1993 and ended with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September of that year. During this period, the parties committed to recognize each other and conduct future negotiations with the aim of ending a century of conflict. The DOP was considered a significant breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Scholars of Conflict Resolution typically view the discussions that led to the DOP as a positive example of how antagonists in ethno-national conflicts begin a course of constructive dialogue and conciliation. Applying prenegotiation theory, I question this assumption and argue that the prenegotiation process that took place between January and August 1993 leading the parties to commit to official negotiations and sign the DOP was in fact no more than a means of conflict management adjusting to contemporary circumstances. The research will uncover the factors that brought the leaders of both parties to consider negotiation and move towards accepting it as the best option at their disposal. I explore the functions that the prenegotiation performed and discuss how both parties failed to ensure that the necessary prenegotiation functions of the process were exhausted. Thus, my analysis indicates that the failure of the Oslo process, which began with the signing of the DOP, was inherent in the process's flawed basis.

Introduction

The basic premise of the “process school” in the conflict resolution (CR) field – that effective execution of the prenegotiation stage functions is critical for successful negotiations...
(Zartman 2000)– highlights the importance of studying the prenegotiation process (which initially brings the parties to the negotiating table) in failed negotiations. Understanding the prenegotiation process can be particularly important because official negotiations between parties in ethno-national conflicts often reach a deadlock, and in retrospect, the parties’ consent to sit together at the negotiating table cannot be considered more than a technical achievement. Nevertheless, and despite the vast literature that discusses the factors influencing parties’ willingness to negotiate (Zartman 1985, 1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989; Pruitt 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), only a few scholars have studied the characteristics of prenegotiation in specific case studies (e.g., Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989). Moreover, even fewer attempts have been made to empirically study and assess the success of the prenegotiation process in bringing about strategic changes in the parties’ beliefs and expectations of one another and of the negotiation process itself (Schiff 2008).

This study explores the prenegotiation process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which extended over eight months in 1993 and ended with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September of that year. During this period, the parties committed to recognize each other and conduct future negotiations with the aim of terminating a century of conflict. For the first time in Israeli-Arab negotiations, the DOP noted the PLO as Israel’s partner for negotiation over the future of the Palestinian people. Indeed, the DOP was considered a significant breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian relations (Bercovitch 1997; Kelman 1997b; Pruitt 1997). Scholars of CR typically view the discussions that led to the DOP as a positive example of how parties to ethno-national conflicts begin a course of constructive dialogue and conciliation (Kelman 1997b; 1998). In the present research, I question this assumption by arguing that the prenegotiation process that took place between January and August 1993 and led to the signing of the DOP was no more than a means of conflict management adjusting to contemporary circumstances. I
illustrate this contention by investigating the unofficial process that ultimately led the parties to commit to official negotiations and sign the DOP. I examine this process first by uncovering the factors bringing both parties’ leaders to consider negotiation and move towards accepting it as the best option at their disposal. I then explore the functions that the prenegotiation performed and discuss how both parties failed to ensure that the necessary prenegotiation functions of the process were exhausted. Thus, my analysis indicates that the failure of the Oslo process, which began with the signing of the DOP, was inherent in the process’s flawed basis.

The basic premise of this study is that prenegotiation achievement in bringing the parties to the negotiation table does not necessarily reflect a strategic change in the parties’ perceptions and their belief in the feasibility of a mutually acceptable settlement. At times, the parties’ agreement to enter negotiation should be viewed as merely a technical accomplishment of the prenegotiation stage. Moreover, based on the assertion expressed in the literature that effective execution of the prenegotiation stage functions is critical for successful negotiations, I suggest that a systematic analysis of the factors that contribute to the parties’ decision to initiate official negotiations – including their motives and the functions of the prenegotiation process – may help identify indications of a genuine strategic change in the parties’ political attitudes at the conclusion of the prenegotiation process. Such analysis may shed light on whether by agreeing to negotiate, the parties in fact embarked on a new path leading to win-win conflict resolution, or whether their agreement was merely tactical.

Given the importance prenegotiation theory attaches to effective performance of the prenegotiation functions in affecting the ultimate success of negotiations, I argue that the prenegotiation stage should be considered the foundation of the entire negotiation process; thus, its proper construction is critical for the negotiation to end in agreement. Clearly,
however, even if the prenegotiation stage proceeds as planned, negotiations may still fail, due to inefficient management of the bargaining process or failure to implement the agreement. Furthermore, I do not contend that negotiations should be avoided when elements in the prenegotiation are identified as presaging potential problems that may emerge at a later stage in the process. Rather, the aim of this study is to propose a mechanism of checks that may warn parties against adopting far-reaching concessions in a negotiation process that has a poor chance of success.

The article consists of three main sections. First, I present a review of the literature on pre-negotiations, followed by a brief description of the study’s methodology. The next section discusses the case study of the Oslo Process’ prenegotiation phase, providing a brief background and analysis of Oslo and specifically addressing the factors underlying the leaders’ agreement to negotiate, the functions of the prenegotiation process, and the changes that occurred in the parties’ perceptions of the conflict. Finally, I present the conclusions drawn from the findings to sharpen our understanding of the role of the prenegotiation process.

**Theoretical Framework**

The basic assertions of the “process school” approach to conflict resolution serve as the starting point of this study, specifically: (1) negotiation is a problem-solving process comprised of several stages and turning points; (2) the different stages of the negotiation process are inter-related; and (3) the goal of the first stage of the process – the prenegotiation stage – is to trigger the parties to change their perceptions concerning the potential of arriving at a satisfactory solution through negotiations (Bercovitch 1991; Druckman 1986; Druckman and Hopmann 1989; Rothman 1991; Saunders 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989; Zartman 1989, 1996; Zartman and Berman 1982).
Within the process approach, a sub-discipline focusing on prenegotiation developed, defining the stage as a complex process that begins with changes in at least one of the parties’ perceptions of the situation. This change allows the parties to consider conflict resolution through negotiations as an alternative to unilateral action. The prenegotiation stage commences when the parties consider the negotiation option and signal to each other intentions to negotiate. The phase culminates with the parties’ agreement to initiate official negotiations or, alternatively, with at least one party’s abandonment of the negotiations option (Zartman 1989). At the conclusion of the prenegotiation, the parties should reach a “turning point of seriousness” (Zartman and Berman 1982, 87), when they come to perceive each other as serious about finding a negotiated solution and view their opponents as willing to make some compromises in order to achieve their interests.

Before further elaborating on the functions that prenegotiation performs in order to assist the parties in reaching the “turning point of seriousness,” we must first consider a more initial attribute of establishing a negotiation process: the factors that trigger the parties to consider the negotiation. Process school scholars originally focused on the contextual conditions that prompt parties to consider and agree to negotiation (Zartman and Berman 1982; Zartman 1985, 1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989). Researchers offer vast discussions of the factors that influence parties’ willingness to negotiate (Zartman 1985, 1989, 1996, 1999; Stein 1989; Tomlin 1989; Pruitt 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). Zartman’s “ripeness theory” is one of the first and the most comprehensive efforts to deal with this issue by highlighting the connection between the contextual conditions of prenegotiation and the successful inauguration of negotiations (1985, 1996, 2000, 2001), and thus warrants elaboration. Ripeness theory outlines the necessary (albeit insufficient) conditions that lead parties to consider and choose negotiation over unilateral action (Zartman 1985, 2000, 2001). According to this theory, the timing is right for productive negotiations to begin when the
following three elements exist, in descending order of importance: first, the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), “optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe” (Zartman 2000, 228); second, the perception of a “way out” (Zartman 2000, 228); and third, the presence of a valid spokesman for each side (Zartman 2000, 235). The first two elements are perceptual, while the third is structural. Both parties should demonstrate all three elements (but not necessarily to the same extent) in order for them to be ready for constructive negotiation. Beyond ripeness theory, other factors that may lead parties to consider negotiation as indicated by Stein (1989) include recent or anticipated crisis, a paired perception of threat and opportunity, the promise of prenegotiation to reduce some of the risks associated with negotiation and anticipated benefits from the process that might be realized even if it does not culminate in agreement (Stein 1989, 247).

Scholars of pre-negotiations claim that the prenegotiation stage is intended to change the beliefs and expectations of decision makers, thereby enabling them to consider options entailing negotiations and compromise. According to Zartman (1989) and Stein (1989), this essential change in beliefs and expectations must be the outcome of a successful prenegotiation stage, achieved through several functions during the prenegotiation process. Some functions involve substantial issues such as a joint exploration of risks and costs involved in agreement, a search for alternative resolution arrangements to be addressed by the parties during the negotiation, development of the understanding that negotiation concessions will be reciprocated by the other party, establishment of mechanisms that facilitate perceptual changes, and mobilization of domestic support for the settlement. Other functions, such as defining the agenda for negotiations or choosing representatives for the negotiation, are of a procedural nature.

Prenegotiation theory asserts that during the prenegotiation, the parties should clarify the risks embodied in cooperation. Exchange of information reduces uncertainty and
consequently diminishes the perceived risks of concessions made as part of the joint effort. According to this theory, prenegotiation also allows the parties to assess and come to terms with the costs of the agreement and various concessions, as well as the cost of the failure of the process. During prenegotiation, the parties must generate alternative definitions of the problem, while retaining several alternative agreements for them to address in the official negotiations. Moreover, the parties must develop an understanding that the negotiations will involve mutual concessions and contemplate their future situation after mutual concessions are made. The process should also allow each party to assess and establish domestic support for a settlement, and to invest efforts to mobilize support for the settlement among the opponent’s public (Stein 1989; Zartman 1989).

Furthermore, the parties should use the prenegotiation period to establish mechanisms that facilitate the desired perceptual change from a perception of a zero-sum conflict to a win-win mentality. Such mechanisms may include a temporary suspension of hostilities in order to create a sense of security. The political psychology approach attributes special significance to prenegotiation actions designed to transform the adversarial relationship (Kelman 1997a), with emphasis on a strategy of “mutual responsiveness” (Kelman 1997a) to the concerns of the other party through mutual exploration of needs and fears. The key element in such strategies is mutual reassurance, which includes mutual recognition, mutual gestures, and actions that build mutual trust by addressing the parties’ respective needs and concerns (Kelman 1997a). Finally, the agenda and the resolution boundary limits should be defined in the prenegotiation stage. This process reduces the negotiation process’s uncertainty and risks. Ultimately, noting these issues, scholars emphasize that execution of prenegotiation functions is crucial for negotiation success, as Zartman contends: “Unless the uncertainties covered by these…functions of prenegotiation are reduced, negotiations…cannot begin and cannot come to a conclusion” (1996, 275).
Methodology

In this research, I employ an enhanced case study method for interpretive and analytical purposes (Druckman 2005, 167). The exploration of the factors underlying the decisions of Israel and the PLO to enter negotiations on September 13, 1993 through the lens of prenegotiation theory expands our understanding of the path leading to signing of the DOP. I address the changes in the leaders’ preferences concerning an agreement in the prenegotiation period and the factors underlying such changes or the absence thereof. I review the strategic and internal factors that led each party to implement certain strategies in the prenegotiation stage and examine whether the parties’ political commitment to official negotiations was merely a tactical change or constituted what Zartman and Berman (1982) would call a “turning point of seriousness” in their perceptions of each other and the negotiation process. Specifically, I explore the factors leading to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to abandon his former position and initiate direct negotiations with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Did Rabin’s agreement to negotiate with the PLO as an official negotiating partner imply a change in his conceptualization of the conflict and the issues involved? Did the talks in Oslo lead to a change in Rabin's perception of his adversary, leading him to view PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat as a potential partner in the process who is worthy of some degree of trust? I also address the factors that led Yasser Arafat to agree to the DOP, whose provisions constituted a substantial departure from the principles he previously propounded.

Clearly, the process leading to the DOP’s signing was characterized by some unique features. However, it shares the following common attributes with other ethno-national conflicts in which the peace process reached a deadlock and therefore can serve as an example of the application of those concepts (Druckman 2005, 167): the conflict is protracted and intractable, characterized by asymmetric power relations between a state (Israel) and a
non-state actor (the PLO) representing an ethnic group with national aspirations; and similar to other ethno-national conflicts, the issue of non-recognition played a major role in both parties’ unwillingness to reach a settlement for many years. Based on these common features, this specific case can help us gain a better understanding of the dynamics taking place during such prenegotiations and their implications regarding strategic changes in the parties’ perceptions and willingness to negotiate a “wise agreement” (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991) not only in future negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but also in similar ethno-national conflicts.

The research involved a qualitative content analysis of various sources, including speeches, declarations, written records of the events of figures who took part in the process, media and personal interviews, and media coverage of the events.

Case Study: Arriving at the Declaration of Principles (DOP)

Background

In Israel’s 13th Knesset (Israeli Parliament) election campaign, Yitzhak Rabin pledged to change national priorities and reach an autonomy agreement with the Palestinians within six to nine months. His election platform also created Palestinian expectations that the Labor party’s rise to power would lead to a change in the Israeli position on negotiations with the Palestinians and with the PLO. After Rabin’s victory in the June 1992 elections, the PLO leadership called on the new government in Israel to begin direct discussions to promote the peace process, which had been caught in an impasse, but these calls went unanswered. Rabin believed that Israel should not negotiate with the PLO, but rather preferred to negotiate Palestinian autonomy with a delegation of the local leadership of the Territories, regardless of who their advisors might be. Despite the Israeli change of government and Israel’s awareness of the window of opportunity for progress toward peace, the parties retained their
fundamental conflicting positions during the Washington talks held towards the end of 1992 and blamed the failure of these talks on each other (Shlaim 1994).

In early January 1993, a group of Israeli individuals including Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak, headed by Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister, promoted a direct dialogue with PLO officials through secret, unofficial dialogue in Norway. They understood that direct talks with PLO leadership in Tunis were the only way to break through the impasse of the Washington talks (Beilin 1997). This unofficial channel was intended as a platform for joint explorations of how to overcome the problems in the Washington discussions. In the first months of the dialogue, Rabin only reluctantly agreed to the talks (Peres 1995) and prohibited Israeli participants from confirming that he supported the talks (Beilin 1997). During the eight months of dialogue, the parties formed a commitment to recognize each other and conduct future negotiations. The exchange of recognition letters between Arafat and Rabin on the September 9, 1993, facilitated the signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993 (Ministry of Education and Culture 1993).

**Analysis: Factors Underlying the Leaders’ Agreement to Negotiate**

Rabin’s decision to conduct negotiations with the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians resulted from the elimination of other alternatives during the period between January 1993 and September 1993 against the backdrop of the failing Washington talks and growing perceptions of risk. After his election in June 1992, Rabin – a realist whose position was considered hawkish by his own Labor party – viewed the achievement of peace during his administration as a means to obtain the supreme national priority of security for the State of Israel (Inbar 1999). In this period, Rabin’s perception of an acceptable agreement was comprised of five main conditions, as follows: signing an agreement with the local leadership of the Territories (and not with the PLO, which was perceived as an extremely adverse factor); reaching a settlement in two stages; opposing the establishment of an independent...
Palestinian state, which Rabin viewed as a significant security threat; maintaining sovereignty over a united Jerusalem; and ruling out Israel’s retreat to pre-June 1967 borders (Agid-Ben Yehuda and Auerbach 1991; Die Welt 1993; Inbar 1999; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992; Rabin 1995). Yet despite his reluctance to do so, five main factors drove Rabin to agree to negotiate with the PLO as the Palestinian representative:

**A Sense of Impending Crisis or Catastrophe Caused by a Third Party**

The perception of an existential threat from Iran was heightened in the summer of 1993, with the failure of both the talks with the Palestinians in Washington and the talks with Syria (Aluf 1993; Inbar 1999; Ross 2004).

**A Dual Perception of Opportunity and Threat**

The inability to break through the stalemate in the Washington talks following the Hamas activists’ deportation from Gaza to Lebanon in December 1992 was a turning point for Rabin who, in contrast to his election promise of a “year of peace,” was no longer certain of the ability of the Israeli delegation to Washington to reach an agreement with the Palestinians within the desired timeframe (Al-Hayat 1992; Beilin 1997; Die Welt 1993; Makovsky 1996; Shalev 1993; Time Magazine 1992). Nevertheless, at this point, Rabin viewed the Oslo talks as an opportunity to renew the deadlocked Washington talks, to which he attributed high priority (Beilin 1997; Peres 1995).

**Perceptions of a Hurting Stalemate and Impending Catastrophe**

Rabin’s perceptions of a hurting stalemate and an impending catastrophe drove him to urgently seek a way out of the impasse in Washington. Rabin’s perception of terror being an urgent issue reached a climax in March 1993, when the wave of murderous acts by Palestinians peaked and exacerbated the sense of personal danger perceived by Rabin and by the Israeli public (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993a, 1993b; Rabin 1995; Shalev
Rabin’s fear of an impending catastrophe was reinforced by the growing influence of the Hamas, an extremist organization, in the Territories.

**Internal Ripeness**

In the first months of his term in office, Rabin’s “win-set” (Putnam 1993, 439) changed, as manifested in a government bill that permitted meetings between private citizens and PLO representatives, as well as in public opinion polls, which indicated the Israeli public’s growing tolerance of the idea of direct negotiations with the PLO. Towards July 1993, Rabin’s “win set” expanded significantly, when members of the Labor and Meretz parties demanded a revision of Israel’s position on negotiations with the PLO in view of the impasse in the Washington talks. These changes found expression in Rabin’s revised strategies toward the PLO in late July and early August 1993 because they matched Rabin’s own threat perceptions (personal communication, Haber 2003). Failure of the tenth round of talks in Washington in July 1993 reinforced Rabin’s steadfast belief that Arafat intended to prevent any progress in Washington in his absence (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c; Peres 1995, 298). In view of the threat to Israel, as Rabin perceived it, and the impasse in the Washington talks, some breakthrough in the Palestinian or Syrian option appeared essential. The Syrian option, however, had failed (Lesch Mosely 1995, 111–128; Ross 2004, 109-111).

In mid-August 1993, yet another factor contributed to “internal ripeness” (Mitchell 1996, 12), as Rabin felt mounting pressure to achieve an agreement with the Palestinians as quickly as possible (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c; Peres 1995, 298). His party was about to leave the coalition; as a result, any governmental decision on cardinal security issues, including an agreement with the PLO, would be more difficult to achieve (Beilin 1997, 133).
Devising a Way Out through Oslo

Rabin’s decision to send Uri Savir, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, to Oslo in May 1993 was driven by the perceptions discussed above and by the success of the Oslo talks in generating a draft agreement (Peres 1995, 295). Yet Rabin maintained his low expectations of the Oslo option, and Savir’s involvement simply formed part of Rabin’s intent to explore the option of negotiations (Amit 2003, 40; Beilin 1997, 104, 109, 111; Peres 1995, 295). Rabin’s agreement to pursue the Oslo talks by sending his confidante, Joel Zinger, in mid-June 1993, significantly contributed to Rabin’s understanding that Oslo had become a serious option (Hirschfeld 2000, 127; Zinger 1998). Nevertheless, at that point, despite Zinger’s progress, Rabin still clung to his hopes that an agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would be signed in Washington (Beilin 1997, 119-121).

Developed against the backdrop of the failure of the tenth round of talks in Washington and the crisis in the Oslo negotiations in late July, the secret talks conducted between mid-July and mid-August through Haim Ramon – one of the ministers closest to Rabin – and Ahmad Tibbi – Arafat’s emissary and political advisor – significantly contributed to Rabin’s conclusion that it was possible to make a deal with Arafat on behalf of the Palestinians (Ramon 2004). Rabin, who was suspicious of Peres and his confidants in Oslo, utilized this channel as a direct and profound means to explore Arafat’s intentions in formulating the emerging agreement (Ramon 2004). Rabin would not commit to signing the document until he was convinced that the PLO was willing to make the necessary concessions in accordance with Israel's interests. Indeed, following the Ramon-Tibi contacts, Rabin reached what Zartman and Berman (1982) coined the “turning point of seriousness.”

In light of the perceived threats and the emerging understanding with Arafat through the Oslo and Ramon-Tibi channel, Rabin assessed that the consequences of failure to sign the
DOP were worse than those of reaching an agreement with the PLO. Referring to an agreement with the PLO, Rabin stated, “I must look at the general picture; we have no other alternative” (Tal 1993). Furthermore, Rabin assumed that a breakthrough with the Palestinians that involved no territorial concessions in the interim stage would lead to a resolution of the Israel-Arab conflict and a breakthrough with the Arab bloc headed by Syria (Barnea and Shifer 1993).

In conjunction with the changes that led Rabin to agree to direct talks with the PLO, a parallel process was taking place on the Palestinian side that led Arafat to decide upon engaging in negotiation during that period. Prior to the summer of 1993, Arafat’s position represented both the PLO and the majority of the Palestinian population of the Territories. Starting in the summer of 1992, Arafat called on Rabin to enter into a “peace of the brave” (Ashrawi 1995, 184; Rosenblum, Nir, and Eldar 1993), based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for the exchange of land for peace; the right of return, self-determination and an independent Palestinian state, as part of a just solution to the Palestinian problem; acknowledgement of Jerusalem as the capital of the independent Palestinian state; a clear linkage between the interim agreements and the final stage, including the permanent settlement and establishment of an independent Palestinian state; elections for a legislative council with broad administrative and legislative authority and recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian nation in negotiations with Israel. Arafat was driven in the process by two main perceptions: a perceived threat due to failed policies and a perception of opportunity. The perceived threat emanated from failed policies resulting from several factors, namely:

**Declining Eco-Political Status of the PLO**

In 1992, the PLO was in a dire financial position (Heikal 1996, 428-431; Rubin 1994, 193). In the summer of 1993, the PLO’s financial and political position took another turn for
the worse. The PLO sank into millions of dollars of debt, while internal protest rose within
the organization regarding its difficult financial situation, the problematic economic situation
in the Territories, and the Palestinian negotiating policy with the Israelis. In addition, Arafat’s
leadership was increasingly threatened by the Hamas, which had opposed Palestinian
participation in the Madrid process from the beginning and now exploited the lack of
progress in the Washington talks to reinforce its own position in the Territories (Gowers and
Walker 1994, 500). Moreover, in late 1993, the organization risked losing its base in Tunis.

**Threats to Personal Safety and Leadership Status**

After approximately twenty months of negotiations, criticism from within the PLO
increased, targeting Arafat’s leadership per se (Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near
East and South Asia:FBIS-NES-93-153; FBIS-NES-93-166). Arafat’s sense of urgency was
also fed by his fear for his personal safety. In the early 1990s, Israel assassinated several PLO
leaders who were close to Arafat. Unwelcomed in Arab countries and fearful for his life,

**Failure of the Talks in Washington and Other Channels to the Rabin Government**

Arafat’s frustration grew with the lack of any significant change in the Israeli position
in the Washington talks. Furthermore, all of Arafat’s attempts to initiate unofficial channels
with Israel under the auspices of Cairo or Europe proved to be ineffective (Abbas 1995, 92;

**Perception of Hurting Stalemate**

The conditions in the Territories worsened as time passed. The Palestinians’ situation
appeared to be bleak (Abbas 1995, 95). Arafat’s statements from that time onward clearly
reflected disappointment, despair, and a sense of urgency. The perception of a hurting
stalemate was highlighted by the failure of the tenth round of talks in Washington, in June
Yet beyond these circumstances, Arafat also demonstrated that he perceived an opportunity that emerged from the dialogue taking place during this period. The Oslo channel proved itself to be different from all the other informal channels that Arafat had attempted to use to communicate with Rabin. Arafat’s sense of opportunity increased as the Oslo talks progressed (Abbas 1995, 114). In late July 1993, the perception of opportunity became a major motive underlying Arafat’s actions when two key issues were added to the agenda in the Oslo track: the establishment of the PLO leadership in the Gaza Strip (Peres 1995, 286-288; Savir 1998, 56; Zinger 1998) and Israel’s recognition of the PLO as a partner in the negotiations, on the condition that the organization make certain concessions toward Israel and its position (Zinger 1998). Arafat’s fierce desire to fortify his status and the PLO’s control over the Palestinian territories when Israel withdrew from Gaza and Jericho was a major motivating factor in his signing the DOP (Savir 1998, 56). And as Mahmoud Abbas noted in his memoirs, it appears that Arafat considered the remaining details of the agreement to be of secondary importance (Abbas 1995, 202).

The Ramon-Tibbi exchange played a significant role in leading Arafat to sign the DOP. Through this channel, Arafat sought Rabin’s personal confirmation of the ideas discussed in the Oslo talks (Abbas 1995, 156). Following this exchange, Arafat reached a “turning point of seriousness” (Zartman and Berman 1982), realizing that there was a way out of the stalemate.

Two other elements exacerbated Arafat’s decision in early August 1993 to agree to the proposed formula. First, Arafat received a signal from Peres, indicating that Israel believed that the negotiations had been exhausted (FBIS-NES-93-169). Second, Arafat understood that if he failed to make a deal with Israel very quickly, he might be left behind while Jordan, Lebanon and Syria make progress toward understandings with Israel (Savir 1998, 72). Thus, Arafat consented to sign the DOP with Israel when his options were reduced.
to a single course of action – agreement (Heikal 1996, 463). Under these circumstances, in early August, Arafat instructed the Washington delegation to show more flexibility in its positions by accepting the concept of “Gaza and Jericho first” and agreeing to postpone discussions on Jerusalem to the future negotiations on a permanent status agreement.

Ultimately, the perception of a hurting stalemate in the parties’ relationship was of secondary importance to Arafat’s agreement to the DOP, as analysis of statements by Arafat and the responses of the Palestinian members of the Washington delegation indicates (Ashrawi 1995, 259-260). In his public statements, Arafat tended to emphasize the distressful situation of the population in the Territories, but his statements in inner-circle discussions in the prenegotiation stage clearly reflected his concern over the organization's status and his own status as the leader of the Palestinian people (FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-NES-93-163). Furthermore, the criticism Territory representatives to the Washington talks hurled at Arafat and his actions reflected the problematic considerations that drove PLO leadership to sign the agreement. Ashrawi (1995, 260) has argued that by consenting to articles of the DOP in Oslo, PLO representatives disregarded the issues that were genuinely important for the population in the Territories, and instead responded to the inter- organizational political and economic pressure to which they were subject.

**The Functions of the Pre-Negotiation Process**

The following analysis indicates that the Oslo prenegotiation failed to perform its critical functions.

**Risks Assessment and Exploration of the Costs of Negotiation**

It appears that no real exploration of the risks and costs involved in agreement took place in the Oslo prenegotiation process. The Israeli side in the Oslo talks conducted no discussions or systematic analysis of future events (Barnea and Shifer 1993; Rahat and Bofman 1993) and ignored the cost implications of the agreement. On one hand, Rabin
insisted that any understanding with the Palestinians be based on a phased process comprising two independent stages. On the other hand, Rabin – who was eager to reach an interim settlement that would put an end to what he felt was the country’s deplorable situation – seemed to have repressed the implications of Palestinian compliance with the terms of the DOP, which would obligate Israel to discuss a permanent status agreement (Israeli Television 1995; Rabin 1995, 90, 97-98). Rabin was aware of the potential problems that could arise in the permanent status agreement negotiations; therefore, he decided to postpone discussions on these issues to the third year of the interim agreement, under the assumption that the disputes could be resolved with time (Rabin 1995, 90). Thus, the Israeli side preferred to blur the real implications of the issues that would be discussed as part of the permanent status agreement, and to present the prenegotiation agreement reached as if for Israel, all options remain open for the negotiation process to follow. Thus, for example, at the end of August, Rabin said that the DOP does not discuss a Palestinian State, but rather “it is about interim agreement for five years. Our opinion against a state is well known. Any attempt to connect the Interim agreement to the permanent Status agreement is nonsense” (Barnea 1993). And while presenting the DOP at the Knesset, Rabin also said, “All issues connected to the permanent solution will be left to the negotiations that will take place two years after the date that was determined in the agreement, while preserving the freedom of the Israeli government to determine its stand regarding the shape of the permanent status agreement. This means that the DOP leaves all options open for us in this realm” (Rabin 1995, 90).

In contrast to the Israelis, the Palestinians accepted the DOP as an interim agreement in the hope of reaching the final status negotiations. By defining both the agenda and the time-line of the permanent status negotiations, the Palestinians believed that the DOP firmly connected the interim agreement and the permanent settlement (FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-
By the end of the prenegotiation, Arafat believed that the situation following the proposed agreement would be more favorable than the current one was, for both the Palestinians and himself. The agreement would allow Arafat to obtain what Israel is willing to concede in the present, without relinquishing the possible attainment of his goals, which remained unchanged, in the future (Ashrawi 1995, 259).

Exploring the Alternatives and Defining the Problem

The DOP prenegotiation process failed to produce a satisfactory joint redefinition of the problem. Saunders (1999, 100) notes that a joint definition of the problem is an essential condition for the success of negotiations. In his view, the manner in which policymakers define the problem to be discussed is the primary factor that affects how they deal with the problem. Although the parties to the Oslo process agreed regarding what would be discussed, their joint re-definition of the problems during the talks was minimal and failed to satisfy the parties’ most important needs. The Oslo process indicates that while a joint re-definition of a problem may be essential for the initiation of formal negotiations, the extent to which the redefinition of the problem offers an adequate solution to both parties’ needs significantly affects the success of the prenegotiation process in transforming the parties’ orientation toward resolution.

At the onset and throughout the prenegotiation process, both parties maintained different definitions of the problem. For Arafat, the problem was two-fold: 1) Israel’s non-recognition of the PLO as a partner to negotiations and as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. This problem was aggravated by the organization’s declining financial and political status; 2) Israel’s non-recognition of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination and to an independent state. Nevertheless, as the perceptions of threats grew in early 1991, the organization directed its efforts to resolving the first problem and gaining recognition as a partner to negotiations. In contrast, Rabin defined the problem in terms of perceived threats.
described above, with no reference to either the recognition of the PLO or the establishment of a Palestinian state. Yet in late June 1993, he reframed the problem. The change involved an issue on which Rabin had been previously uncompromising. Rabin understood that recognition of the PLO as the Palestinian representative and reinforcement of Arafat’s status in the Territories were the most crucial points for Arafat (Heikal 1996, 471). Therefore, Israel offered its rapid evacuation of Gaza and Jericho and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and placed the issue of recognition on the agenda in exchange for some flexibility on the part of Arafat.

It appears that the parties managed to reach an agreement because they effectively appealed to one another’s interests by focusing on the minimal common denominator of the problem while intentionally, given the circumstances, disregarding the substantial differences in their respective problem definitions, as well as their respective needs and perceptions of the preferred agreement. In Oslo, Arafat aimed to achieve the maximal tactical gain possible at the time and to implement the elements of the permanent settlement as soon as possible, while Rabin’s desire in these talks was to reach an agreement on a phased settlement that would allow him to carefully implement each stage at a time. Rabin hoped that a gradual implementation would eventually lead to the parties’ agreement on other elements of the permanent settlement. The perceptions of crisis that motivated the parties also led them, either consciously or unconsciously, to minimize their true differences (Heikal 1996, 473). Still, after signing the DOP, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state formed a significant part of the definition of the problem for Arafat (Ashrawi 1995, 259). Rabin, however, remained unwilling to accept the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, he supported the existence of a Palestinian entity – not an independent state – which covered only part of the territories that Israel held since 1967 (Kol Israel 1995a, 1995b). Indeed, the minimal joint re-definition of the problem – the definition
that the parties agreed on, which enabled them to sign the DOP – actually *preserved* the
dispute regarding many issues, and later became among the key stumbling blocks in the
negotiations that commenced after the DOP was signed. As Saunders notes: “…if
negotiations do begin, those holding widely different definitions of the problem will use
delaying tactics in the negotiation as another instrument for blocking movement” (1999, 64).

**The Agenda**

Another important function of prenegotiation is determining a joint agenda for
negotiations. Although the parties had agreed on an agenda, the subsequent negotiations
reached an impasse because of the specific manner in which the agenda was defined. Indeed,
the DOP restricted the negotiations agenda on the interim agreement. Discussion of disputed
issues was postponed, presumably to reduce the risks involved in the commitment to
negotiate. However, the issues that were excluded from the negotiating table were pivotal to
the main interests and needs of the parties. These include, for example, the deferral of
discussions on the permanent status agreement, Jerusalem and the refugees. In fact, these
issues formed the main obstacles to the resolution of the conflict, which both parties defined
as the goal of the entire process. Moreover, due to the constructive ambiguity (Bell and
Cavanaugh 1999, 1356) in several sections of the DOP, even issues that were in fact agreed
upon for inclusion in the agenda were formulated in an ambiguous manner. This strategy was
pursued, for example, in applying UN Resolutions 242 and 338 to the refugee issue, in
discussing the control over the border passages between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho
and Jordan, and in covering the issue of transportation from the two different Autonomous
Territories (Beilin 1997: 128-129; FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-NES-93-
177; Peres 1995: 293-294, 311-313; Tal 1993). Thus, the constructive ambiguity enabled the
parties a space for different interpretations of the articles in the DOP. At this point in the
conflict, the Israeli side needed an interim agreement that could be portrayed to the Israeli
public as a minimal costs agreement that brings it many advantages, while Arafat needed an agreement that would allow him reclaim his own importance and full political control while presenting some achievement that would be considered a breakthrough on the road to a Palestinian state. However, the advantages this technique held for the parties in enabling them to conclude the agreement ultimately backfired as they consequently impeded the negotiations on the interim agreement (Heikal 1996, 471, 473). Thus, it appears that even when conflicting parties agree to an agenda, it is important to identify the factors underlying the agenda and how both parties interpret the issues placed on the table (as well as those that were excluded).

**Establishing Mechanisms that Facilitate Perceptual Changes**

Defaults are also evident in prenegotiation elements that might have served to facilitate changes in perception and created paths to reconciliation. Arafat refused, during the prenegotiation phase, to order the cessation of the Intifada violent uprising (an essential interest for Rabin) or to assume responsibility for the violent acts of Palestinians who were not PLO members (FBIS-NES-93-169). Israel considered his position on this issue to be an endorsement of continued violence against its citizens undertaken by the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad – two organizations that later strove to undermine the fragile trust that was built between the parties in Oslo.

**Consolidating Internal Support for Negotiations**

Arafat’s acceptance of the DOP implied a departure from what he, the PLO, and the Palestinian representatives from the Territories had previously perceived as an acceptable agreement with Israel. The DOP included no agreement on the structure of the Palestinian legislative council or other issues such as Jerusalem, Israel’s evacuation of the remainder of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the right of return for 1967 refugees. Nevertheless, Arafat emphasized to his Palestinian and Arab audiences that the agreement did not represent
a significant change in the Palestinian position. After initializing the DOP, Arafat stressed
that he viewed the “Gaza and Jericho first” settlement as the first step in implementing
Resolutions 242 and 338, as part of his “take whatever you can” strategy; and that in the
permanent status agreement, these resolutions would be fully realized and an independent
Palestinian state would be established (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b; Pinkas
1993; Shahaf 1993). Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in several DOP clauses served
Arafat’s interests effectively, as he himself noted: “The Israelis have the right to say whatever
they want and we have the right to say whatever we want…” (FBIS-NES-93-154; FBIS-
NES-93-170). In the short term, this strategy productively allowed Arafat and the PLO to
mobilize public support for the DOP. In the long run, however, it was damaging to the peace
process because the Palestinian public developed unrealistic expectations that exacerbated the
parties’ distrust during the official negotiations.

Rabin, on his part, took no steps to influence public support for negotiations with the
PLO until the communications between Ramon and Tibbi clarified that Arafat was ready to
show flexibility on the issues included in the DOP. However, from mid-August onward,
Rabin’s statements were directed to change the Israeli public image of the PLO by
representing the organization as a moderate and pragmatic element in the Arab world and a
potential negotiating partner (Pinkas 1993; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993c).

Exploring Reciprocity

Finally, indications exist that Israel engaged in an inadequate exploration of
reciprocity. Rabin agreed to sign the DOP and recognize the PLO, while accepting as a given
Arafat’s refusal to order the end of the Intifada or commit to a specific schedule for the
amendment of certain articles of Palestinian National Covenant, as well as Arafat’s insistence
on restricting the cessation of terror to the PLO. The contents of Rabin’s conversation with
Beilin dated August 22, 1993, following the initialization of the DOP, point in this direction.
Rabin asked if the agreement contained reference to the PLO’s renunciation of terror. When Beilin replied that it did not, Rabin said that it was inconceivable that Israel would sign an agreement with the PLO without the organization making a commitment to renounce terror (Barnea and Shifer 1993; Shahaf 1993). This raises the critical question: What made Rabin fail to confirm that Israel’s demands on this issue – which he perceived as Israel’s essential interest – would be met before signing the agreement?

**Prenegotiation Outcomes: Lack of Significant Change in Perceptions and Expectations**

The signing of the DOP and the mutual recognition represented the end of the prenegotiation. The DOP was meant to serve as a road map outlining the future negotiation that would bring about the final resolution of the conflict. The purpose of the Oslo prenegotiation process was to make the parties recognize that overlap might in fact be created in their respectively acceptable terms, where a zone of possible agreement can be found. Nevertheless, as described above, analysis of the prenegotiation functions indicates that the changes that Rabin and Arafat underwent regarding their respective acceptable terms of agreement and regarding each other were in fact rather minor.

By the end of the prenegotiation, the only change in Rabin’s acceptable terms of agreement was his willingness to reach what he stressed to be “an understanding with Palestinian representatives from the Diaspora” (Barnea 1993). As indicated in the analysis, his agreement to accept the PLO as a negotiating partner at this stage reflected his evaluation that Israel was facing worse alternatives. Indeed, Rabin thought that the DOP better served the Israeli national interests than any alternative would. As Rabin put it: “I entered the process with a clear mind because the alternative is either to find a Palestinian partner with its limitations or, if the situation stayed as it is, the extremist elements would have gotten the upper hand and we wouldn’t have any chance for political solution” (Kol Israel 1995a). Although his dislike of the PLO remained firm (Tal 1993), Rabin now described the PLO as a
pragmatic organization with which a resolution of the conflict could be negotiated (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993d; Israeli Television 1995). Yet Rabin remained realistic; his trust in the PLO and his expectations of the organization as a productive negotiating partner were limited (Barnea and Shifer 1993; Pinkas 1993; Rabin 1995: 86-90; Shahaf 1993). As Rabin phrased it a month after signing the DOP: “[The PLO is] committed to renounce terrorism… but, at this phase, I don't expect them to demonstrate such heroism. We know with whom we are dealing…” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993d).

Moreover, aside from coming to view Arafat as a negotiating partner, Rabin clearly did not change his perception. Rabin took every opportunity to emphasize that although the DOP does include recognition of the PLO as a partner for talks and the evacuation of “Gaza and Jericho first,” it leaves the defence of the autonomy in Israel’s hands. Additionally, Rabin noted that the DOP does not call for settlements to be evacuated and affirmed his continuing refusal to negotiate on Jerusalem and the refugees (Shahaf 1993). He also asserted that the DOP is in fact only an interim agreement and that any attempt to draw a connection between the interim agreement and the final status agreement is a farce.

Arafat as well, apparently, did not experience any strategic changes in his terms of potential agreement through the process that led to the signing of the DOP. The terms he agreed to in endorsing the DOP and mutual recognition reflect no more than a brief diversion on route to an unwavering target. They were a means to create a breakthrough to reinforce his status as PLO leader and the status of his organization, as well as to break the impasse at the Washington negotiation. Despite the introduction of the DOP and the mutual recognition letters, the difficult issues in contention were postponed to future discussion in the framework of the permanent status negotiation. Indeed, on various occasions from August 1992 onward, Arafat emphasized to the Palestinian and Arab audiences that there was no substantive change in his approach. Thus, for example, after initialling the DOP, Arafat stressed that he...
considered the “Gaza and Jericho first” agreement a start to the implementation of Security Council Decisions 242 and 338, while it is clear that the final status agreement’s outcome will be an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital (FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-NES-93-177, FBIS-NES-93-181). In Arafat’s view, the DOP in fact served as implementation of the decision of the Palestinian National Council from 1974, which permitted the establishment of Palestinian Authority on every piece of land from which Israel will withdraw while the final goal remains constant: an independent Palestinian state (Bechor 1993; FBIS-NES-93-169; FBIS-NES-93-170). This was clearly not what Rabin had in mind when he signed the DOP.

Arafat continued to view the Israeli-Palestinian relationship as a zero-sum game (Heikal 1996, 473), with diplomacy being just one of several fronts on which the battle for independence was fought (Elmatzur 1993; FBIS-NES-93-156; FBIS-NES-93-175; FBIS-NES-93-177; FBIS-NES-93-181; Pipes and Stillman 1995). He kept presenting any agreement with Israel as a temporary cease-fire adopted only in view of the circumstances that prevented the enemy’s defeat, rather than based on a need to recognize the other party as a partner in negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (FBIS-NES-92-159; Pipes and Stillman 1995; Transcript of Speech 1994). Arafat persistently endorsed a military struggle that should continue until an independent Palestinian state is established on the entire Territories. All of the above indicate that from Arafat’s point of view, the DOP was no more than a temporary tactic to achieve specific goals, and not a means to resolve the conflict peacefully.

**Conclusions**

Application of prenegotiation theory to the process leading to the signing of the DOP points to several conclusions that warrant consideration. First, progress of the prenegotiation in this case was characterized by the gradual elimination of alternatives. Apparently, the same
factors that drove the parties to the negotiation table also hastened them to make decisions without insisting on an exploration of the important issues, and pushed them to define the problem in a way that enabled them to sign the DOP agreement but that would not be constructive in a final-stage negotiation. Thus, both parties failed to ensure that the functions of the process were exhausted.

The Israeli negotiators erred with the following mistakes: lack of in-depth exploration or examination of the Palestinian interests, disregard for the implications and costs of the agreement, employing constructive ambiguity and ignoring substantial disagreements, willingness to accept an agreement based on the lowest common denominator in the joint definition of the problem, restriction of the agenda and postponing discussions on disputed issues to the future, and, finally, conducting an incomplete exploration of mutuality in the process.

On the Palestinian side, the two elements relating to the prenegotiation stage whose absence was most glaring were adequate mutuality and development of a sound base of popular Palestinian support for a process that would lead to the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, Arafat’s strategic goals had not changed through the prenegotiation process. His agreement to a joint definition based on the lowest common denominator served his desire to reap the gains available at the moment while continuing to pursue his original goals.

I have demonstrated through this study that the factors which motivated Rabin to consider negotiation with the PLO influenced both the manner in which the process was conducted and the timing of Israel’s agreement with the PLO. Ultimately, Rabin’s perception and image of his opponent changed to some extent. However, the factors that drove Arafat to participate in the process prevented any change in Arafat’s perception of his opponent or of the conflict. This context continued to cast a shadow on the parties' relationship and their subsequent discussions. The prenegotiation process is designed to serve as a transition period.
that allows the parties to shift from adversarial to collaborative perceptions and behaviors. And in fact, Rabin became willing to accept his opponent as a partner to the future negotiations. Rabin’s image of his opponent changed as well. Arafat, on the other hand, underwent a tactical change in his terms of agreement, while no substantial change took place in his perception of the conflict or the way to achieve his goals.

Analysis of the factors that brought the parties to the decision to accept the DOP shows that Zartman’s ripeness theory – which underscores the conditions that may bring parties to the negotiating table by centring on the concept of mutually hurting stalemate in the parties’ relations – is not able to explain all factors affecting this specific case. Clearly, both parties held a perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. However, these perceptions failed to create intentions to negotiate toward a result that would serve both their interests. Apparently, the perceptions of threat and catastrophe that affected Arafat’s conduct in the process – perceptions that were external to the parties’ relationship – were reflected in the tactical changes in his perception and positions at the end of the prenegotiations. Rabin was similarly driven by a perceived impending threat that was external to Israeli-Palestinian relations – the threat of Iran. It was this perception of threat and hurting stalemate that led to the change in Rabin’s positions during this period. Moreover, from Rabin’s point of view, the internal ripeness element accelerated the process, determining its specific timing, as well as the identity of his negotiating partner.

The prenegotiation stage described herein was intended to constitute the beginning of a process of problem solving, in which the parties would jointly address the problem based on mutual recognition and empathy. In reality, however, the Oslo prenegotiation process – particularly from the Palestinian perspective – was no more than a means of conflict management and adjustment to contemporary circumstances.
In this study, I have identified factors that might predict future developments; specifically, problems that undermine the subsequent negotiation process. Quite likely, these problems might have become evident even during the course of the prenegotiation process, had the participating actors been aware of the factors, functions, and perceptions discussed in this study rather than led by the wishful thinking that over time, adherence to a faulty process would prove beneficial and outweigh the costs of any concessions.

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Faith-Based Peacebuilding:
A Case Study of the National Council of Churches of Kenya

John Mwangi Githigaro

Abstract
This article explores the peacebuilding contribution of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), following the post-2007 election violence in Kenya. Faith-based organizations are increasingly taking an active role in peacebuilding in conflict prone and affected societies. The paper presents research findings that the NCCK perceived that it was positively involved in areas of humanitarian assistance and building of bridges among communities divided by the violence. The paper contextualizes the triggers or the causes of the post-election violence in Kenya after the December 2007 elections and offers suggestions for peaceful co-existence.

Introduction

The Context of the Post-Election Violence in 2007

Kenya witnessed sporadic and systematic violence following the December 2007 general election. Whereas the disputed presidential elections served as a trigger to the violence, at the root of it were inherent structural inequalities that aggravated the situation. As it has been observed by Human Rights Watch (2008) the violence occurred in a country that was seen as a bastion of economic and political stability in a volatile region. The results of the violence were that after two months of bloodshed over 1000 people were dead and up to 500,000 thousand Kenyans became internally displaced. This study highlights the peacebuilding efforts undertaken by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK).
Historical Background of Kenya

Kenya is a former British colony and attained her independence in 1963. Currently the population stands at slightly over 40 million. The major ethnic groups in Kenya are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kamba (11%) and Kisii (6%). According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book, Kenya’s population as of 2010 statistics stood at slightly over 40 million. Kenya lies south of Ethiopia, east of Uganda, and north of Tanzania. A revolution assisted Kenya in gaining her independence in 1963. Jomo Kenyatta became the President and was elected three times in a government that was viewed as being stable and conservative for 15 years. This aspect of stability and conservatism is said to have led to increased progress and prosperity but drew criticisms from those who had strong socialist underpinnings. During Kenyatta’s tenure, the focus of country development issues centered on land ownership and land reform, as the question of land had been an issue in domestic politics. This aspect continued under Moi’s presidency, but his regime came to focus on “corruption, crony capitalism, and autocratic rule, the land issue was ever present” (Roy and De Blij 2007, 477). In the 2002 general elections, Moi after 24 years was replaced by Mwai Kibaki who ran on a reformist, anti-corruption platform that advocated economic liberalization (Roy and De Blij).

Post-election violence is not a new phenomenon in Kenya. Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991, violence has recurred every election year since then. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the post-2007 elections was shocking and almost transformed the country into the abyss of failed states. Various scholars and commentators of the post-election violence (e.g., Kanyinga 2009; Rutten and Owour 2009) point to a multiplicity of factors as being responsible for the post-election violence. The above authors all agree that the land debate in Kenya was a contributing factor to the pre- and post-election violence experienced in late 2007 and early 2008. As Human Rights Watch (2008) noted, the fact that
no Kenyan government had ever made an effort to address the long simmering grievances over land that have persisted since independence was a probable trigger. Furthermore, politicians who had been implicated in organizing political violence since the 1990s have never been brought to book and continue to operate with impunity (Human Rights Watch 2008). Widespread failures of governance became the core of the explosive anger exposed in the wake of electoral fraud. Biegon (2009) attributes the causes of the post-2007 violence to deep-seated ethnic divisions and years of economic frustration which almost led to the collapse of the country.

The international community is to be appreciated in helping Kenya reach a political settlement in the form of the National Accord signed on the 28th of February, 2008, between President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity and the Prime Minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement. Consequently a coalition government was formed with the sharing of government positions on a 50-50 basis between the two parties. The coalition government is in existence up to this date, and it is hoped it will last until August 2012—the date set for general elections in the new constitution that was adopted by the Kenyans and consequently promulgated on August 27, 2010. In the recent past the exact date of the general elections has been a debate in the legal and political circles.

**Contextualizing Peacebuilding and Faith-based Organizations**

**Defining Peacebuilding**

In 1992, the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace publication defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (quoted in Muriithi 2009, 3). Over time this conceptualization has been used to refer to different approaches to address violent conflict at various phases in the conflict cycle (Muriithi). Peacebuilding involves the process of reconstructing the political, social and economic dimensions of
society emerging from conflict. Peacebuilding further involves addressing the root causes of conflict and bringing warring parties to negotiation and mediation if the situation so demands. Peacebuilding also includes initiating the process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) as well as Security Sector Reforms (SSR). Furthermore, peacebuilding requires the enhancement of economic and social justice as well as setting up or the reform of political governance structures and the rule of law (Muriithi).

Religion and Peacebuilding

The involvement of faith-based actors in conflict resolution is not a new trend and in the past, faith-based actors, clergy, religious movements and organizations have played a part in resolving conflicts (Bercovitch and Orellana 2009, 176). Johnston (2005, 210) says that because many of today’s conflicts overrun the grasp of traditional diplomacy, religious actors all over the globe are getting involved in peacemaking. In offering an explanation of this state of affairs, he argues that religious reconciliation matched with official or unofficial diplomacy is seen by many to offer alternatives for dealing with identity based conflicts to the real political approaches characteristic of the Cold War era. While appreciating that past efforts to resolving some of these crises have been in the form of diplomatic efforts by government and inter-governmental bodies, the role of religious leaders and spiritual leaders in conflict management and resolution has been neglected in the study of international relations (Johnston 1994, 4). According to Johnston (2005, 210) faith-based diplomacy refers to the blending of religious concerns in the conduct of international politics. The religious leaders have the potential to access people at the individual and the sub-national group where inequities and insecurities are mostly felt. This study aims to contribute to this ongoing debate.

Bercovitch and Orellana (2009, 177) acknowledge that research in conflict resolution has failed to focus significantly on the role that religion plays in peacemaking (as opposed to...
its role in making conflicts intractable). One reason they cite for this state of affairs is that the secular, rational problem-solving approaches and methodological, epistemological perspectives propounded by conflict resolution scholars viewed religion either as being an instigator of conflict or dismissed it altogether, because religious issues involved in conflict cannot be addressed from an empirical or positivist perspective. Abu-Nimer (2001, 2) posits that since the end of the Cold War, many scholars have argued that most conflicts are driven from “clashes of communal identity based on race, ethnicity, or religious affiliations.” Abu-Nimer consequently argues that religion therefore has an effect on the conflict causes, dynamics and resolution. He further notes that religious values and norms are critical aspects of the cultural identity of many people involved in conflict dynamics. Consequently he posits that religion can bring social, moral and spiritual resources to the peacebuilding process.

Bercovitch and Orellana (2009, 177), while acknowledging that in the last decade conflict resolution scholars have produced serious literature on the interplay between religion, conflict and peacemaking, point out that a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the conditions under which faith-based and religious actors are more effective in resolving conflicts is yet to be undertaken.

**Defining Faith-Based Organizations**

There is generally no accepted definition of a faith-based organization (FBO) as used by government, academia or the faith-based sector. The ambiguity of the term is due in part to the wide variety of organizations that call themselves “faith-based” organizations and the fact that these organizations vary widely in size, mission, services provided, degree of religiosity and ties to religious institutions. An FBO can be characterized as an organization, with or without non-profit status, which provides social services and is either religiously motivated or religiously affiliated. Under this definition, at least four different types of faith based organizations can be identified: a) Religious congregations; b) Organizations or
projects sponsored by congregations; c) Incorporated non-profit organizations that are independent or affiliated with a congregation; and) Local and regional interfaith coalitions (Goldsmith, Eimicke, and Pineda 2006, 2-3).

Faith-based organizations in general schedule regular meetings of their representative members, specify their decision making procedures, have a permanent staff, and organize themselves through rational organizational models (Jacobson 1984; Wuthnow 2004 quoted in Santiago 2009, 94). Their membership tends to consist of individuals or private associations (Stephenson 2005 quoted in Santiago 2009, 94). According to Willets (2006) quoted in Santiago (2009, 94), one of the best respected principles that guide non-governmental organizations including faith-based ones is their commitment to nonviolence.

Individuals and faith communities have provided assistance to those afflicted by natural disasters, persecution, displacement and war long before international humanitarian law was formalized in treaty law. The theme of justice for the poor, the marginalized, the alien is central to the Hebrew Scriptures. The afflicted often sought help in temples and cities of refuge, and in later medieval period, monasteries became places of refuge and hospitality for strangers. Catholic orders were set up to provide charity to the poor, medical care to the sick, education for children and hospitality to strangers. In the Orthodox and Protestant traditions, a lay ministry, the deaconate, was set up to carry out Christian service. This service for others was premised not only on Christian values of charity and mercy but on the belief in the absolute value of the human person (Ferris 2005, 313).

Faith-based organizations play many different roles. They provide early warnings during humanitarian crises. They also integrate their experiences in humanitarian assistance with advocacy activities. FBOs partner with local organizations and facilitate partnership with national and international organizations. These partnerships are especially useful for advocacy and fundraising. FBOs are known to implement their activities in areas such as
conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, development, human rights and peacebuilding among others (Ferris 2005, 320-321).

**Challenges and Opportunities for Faith-Based Organizations in Peacebuilding**

A number of challenges have been put forward in the context of religious peacebuilding. One is that in some instances the religious leaders may lack the capacity of peacebuilding theory and practice and therefore may be ineffective. Secondly, some groups or individuals may have reservations about working with actors of a different religion or those opposed to the intersection of religion and peacebuilding. Thirdly, religious peace actors may be perceived to be proselytizing, by actively seeking to attract religious membership or conversion (Dubois 2008).

Faith-based organizations and individuals have increasingly taken a proactive role in various facets of peacebuilding on the African continent and beyond. FBOs and individuals are concerned with reconciling warring parties and engaging in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts (Bouta, Abu Nimer, and Kadayifci-Orellana 2005). Numerous examples suffice to demonstrate this important role. The Quakers were involved in mediation efforts in Nigeria in the 1967-70 Biafran war; the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in Sudan in mediation efforts between the south and the north that culminated in the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace agreements. In Mozambique in 1990 the community of Sant’ Egidio was instrumental in mediation efforts that put to an end the Mozambican Civil War (Johnston 2005; Bouta, Abu Nimer, and Kadayifci-Orellana 2005).

In South Africa, religion and most notably Christianity contributed a significant role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). TRC was the outcome of a political negotiation between Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) and Frederic William de Klerk’s National Party which ended over 40 years of apartheid. In 1995
Mandela’s newly-elected government promulgated into law the promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the legislation that set up the TRC. The TRC was tasked with investigating alleged atrocities committed in the apartheid era, granting amnesty where feasible as well as recommending compensations to victims (Shore 2008, 2-3). This has however been the subject of various critiques with accusation that the TRC leadership adopted “a religious – redemptive understanding of their mandate” (Shore and Kline 2006, 2). This is a view supported by Shore (2008) who argues that in TRC hearings there was a deliberate appeal to Christianity as a legitimate method of truth telling and promotion of reconciliation among enemies.

In northern Uganda, religious leaders have been important players in the peace process there with the involvement of two international faith-based groups in mediation efforts. They include Pax Christi (Netherlands) and the community of Sant ‘Egidio (a Catholic Lay organization) that have maintained contacts with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in working towards a settlement of the conflict and thus engaging in track two diplomacy (World Bank 2006, 271-273). In addition to these efforts, religious leaders in northern Uganda have been active through the Acholi Inter-Religious Peace Initiative (ARLPI), which was established between 1997 and 1998 and involved the Catholics, Church of Uganda, Orthodox and Muslim leaders in the peace process. The goal of this partnership was to work for peace through advocacy, training and community-level reconciliation. The initiative has been instrumental in, among other areas, the passage of the Amnesty Bill in the Ugandan Parliament (World Bank 2006).

Whereas a couple of religious-based peacemakers were at play in resolving the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, the most prominent role was undertaken by the Catholic Church and its various agencies, most notably the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Kraybill1994, 211). The primary contribution of the
Catholic Church was that of “truth-telling.” The church sought to tell the whole world and the nation what was happening in Rhodesia (Kraybill 1994, 212).

In Cambodia, Buddhism became a unifying factor after the ouster of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 in which a period of political instability ensued. An initially hesitant state began progressively to appreciate the continued cultural, social and religious salience of Buddhism. A popular initiative known as the Dhammayietra whose central underpinnings were compassion and non-violence was established. Dhammayietra translated as the “pilgrimage of truth” was the hope of peace to rebuild the war-torn country (Haynes 2009). The Dhammayietra—typically an annual 45 day walk of some 650 kilometers involving both monks and lay people—focused on areas that were still often divided by the conflict. The walks were aimed at building links between people divided by long periods of conflict. The walks were symbolic to the villagers as a return of Buddhism and Buddhist monks and also as an indicator that peace was becoming consolidated (Haynes).

Religious leaders are most likely to be successful when they: (1) have an international or a transnational reach; (2) consistently emphasize peace and avoidance of the use of force in resolving conflict; and; (3) have good relations between different religions in a conflict situation, as this will be key to a positive input from them (Appleby 2006 cited in Haynes 2009, 61). Faith-based actors have with varying levels of success contributed positively to peacebuilding. They have for example provided emotional and spiritual support to war-affected communities, have mobilized their communities and others for peace, have mediated between conflicting parties, and have promoted reconciliation, dialogue, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Bouta, Abu Nimer, and Kadayifci- Orellana, 2005, ix). Religion however can be used to abet conflict or to cause conflict as Johnston and Cox (2003) outline:
Religion as is becoming increasingly apparent is a double-edged sword. It can cause conflict or it can abate it. But even in those instances where a particular religion may be viewed as part of the problem (to the extent that it is either central to a conflict or has allowed itself to become a mobilizing vehicle for nationalism or ethnic passions), that religion will include within the core of its tradition extensive teachings that encourage neighbourly concerns and the settlement of humanity. (p. 15)

Whereas churches and faith-based organizations have contributed to post-conflict peacebuilding in many parts of the world, a number have been culpable in persecution of conflict. Kubai (2005) presents the view that the church in Rwanda has been haunted in its efforts to engage in healing and reconciliation in the country by its role in the 1994 genocide. Kubai further notes that not only were members from every denomination in Rwanda responsible for the most appalling of atrocities, but most significantly most of the massacres took place in church buildings where many targets of the genocide sought refuge. She points to the sad fact that the church enjoyed an indisputable moral authority and was deeply revered by the majority of their parishioners as she notes:

The church as part of its spiritual mandate is called to work for peace, justice and reconciliation, and thereby assist in creating an inclusive society where people can live together in dignity. The church that failed in its God-given task to transform its people from ethnic hatred to Christ must now pray and work towards ending centuries of hatred and strife, and seek to recover from the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Christians and live according to the Christian teaching of love, forgiveness and reconciliation. (Kubai 2005, 7)

Johnston and Cox (2003, 14) puts forward four attributes that give religious leaders and institutions sizeable influence in peacemaking: 1) a well-established and pervasive influence
in the community; 2) a reputation as an apolitical force for change based on a respected set of values; 3) unique leverage for reconciling conflicting parties including an ability to rehumanize relationships; 4) the capability to mobilize community, national and international support for a peace process.

The experience of ethno-religious conflicts since the end of the Cold War has made research on the nexus between religion and conflict resolution inevitable. Furthermore, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 brought the question of conflict and religion into play (Bercovitch and Orellana 2009). This paper is thus an attempt at contributing to the debate on religion and peacebuilding by examining to what extent faith-based organizations have contributed to peacebuilding efforts in one specific case. The next section proceeds with a short history of the National Council of Churches of Kenya and then presents research findings from this case study of the NCCK’s peacebuilding efforts in 2008.

The Historical Background of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)

The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) was founded in 1913 during the United Missionary Conference at the end of which representatives from four missionary organizations signed to a constitution to establish the federation of missions. The organizations were: Church Missionary Society (current day Anglican Church of Kenya), Church of Scotland Mission (current day Presbyterian Church of East Africa), United Methodist Mission (current day Methodist Church in Kenya) and African Inland Mission (current day African Inland Church). A fifth member, British and Foreign Bible Society (current day Bible Society of Kenya) was admitted in 1918. The core vision has remained unchanged since its inception and is anchored on the unity of the church in Kenya as reflected in the current mission statement. The mission statement of the Council is to: 1) Promote fellowship and ecumenism; 2) Nurture a common understanding of the Christian faith and
mission; 3) Build the capacities of the membership; and 4) Enhance the creation of a just and sustainable society. The Council has a national reach with its areas of operations divided into nine regions. They include Central, Lower Eastern, Upper Eastern, Nairobi, Coast, South Rift, North Rift, Western and Nyanza.

NCCK has vast experience in the area of peacebuilding and conflict management. Past interventions have included responses to resource-based conflicts, border conflicts as well as responses to the 1992, 1997 and the 2007 ethnic clashes. The Council portends that peace in Kenya has been immensely affected by ethnic animosity as a result of underlying causes such as “inequitable access to land, historical injustices, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons” (NCCK 2008).

Methodology

This research was conducted as a case study adopting a qualitative approach in social science research. The case study approach was selected because this was a unique situation for the Council to engage in (it has been involved in other peacebuilding interventions in the past but not in such aspects as mediation in Kenya) and as such the researcher felt it was an opportunity to study this particular phenomena to contribute to the ever-expanding literature on the role of faith-based organizations in peacebuilding. To the best of my knowledge nobody had studied this occurrence, and this study was adopted to bridge the literature gap. Research consent for the case study was obtained from the General Secretary with a research agreement being signed between the organization and the researcher.

This being a case study, participants were selected by virtue of the positions they held in NCCK and the role they played in various peacebuilding interventions undertaken by the organization. The researcher adopted both semi-structured in-depth interviews and document analysis as the study’s data collection methods. Key questions posed to the participants of the study included but were not limited to the following:
1. What do you consider to be the causes of the 2007/08 post-election violence?

2. What was the broad impact of the violence in the country?

3. What form of immediate responses did the council mount on the eruption of violence?

4. What sorts of partnerships did the council engage in in the areas of peace building and humanitarian assistance locally and internationally?

5. What challenges did you face in your peacebuilding efforts in 2008?

6. How would you evaluate your peacebuilding interventions following the post-poll violence in 2008? Were there lessons learnt?

Eleven interviews were conducted between February and March 2010. The interview responses were then coded and analyzed according to common themes that arose out of the research. A survey of relevant books, online resources and journals was undertaken to enrich the research. Primary and secondary data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis and interpretivism (Kelliher 2005). The researcher adopted a triangulation approach to ensure the validity and reliability of the research findings (Denscombe 2003).

**Findings**

This section examines the contribution of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) in post-conflict peacebuilding following the 2007/08 post-election violence through narratives shared by NCCK staff and also through content analysis of documents. The research findings are organized in themes. The key themes highlighted include: causes of the 2007/8 post-election violence and its impact; immediate responses to the post-election crisis; long-term programs for healing and reconciliation; partnerships engaged in peacebuilding and humanitarian response; the role of women in the peace process; policy advocacy; and strengths and challenges of faith-based peacebuilding.

An analysis from the participants’ responses concluded that whereas the violence was triggered by disputed presidential elections of 2007, a number of underlying issues had contributed to the violence. These issues included a cross section of Kenyan citizens’ feelings of being marginalized economically, tribalism, and unresolved issues such as land and youth unemployment. An NCCK senior official reflected on the causal factors of the 2007 post-poll violence:

The causes of the violence were multi-faceted. Key to the violence was ethnicity and tribalism. Competing political interests also contributed to the violence. In the Rift Valley, the violence was attributed to the land issue. The triggers of the violence however were electoral malpractices and the mishandling of the presidential elections vote tally at Kenyatta International Conference Center [KICC, Nairobi, Kenya where the national vote tallying process for the 2007 elections took place].

An NCCK Regional Coordinator said, “The cause of the violence among other reasons could be attributed to an election that was unfair, and besides that there were historical injustices and unemployment which triggered the violence.” Another NCCK Regional Coordinator attributed the violence to the following: “One of the causes of the violence was the feeling of marginalization by government. Some communities perceived themselves as being marginalized economically by the high poverty levels in their areas and as a result of feelings of hopelessness, they engaged in violence.”

Regarding the impact of the violence there was a widespread agreement that the violence had caused deaths, destruction of property, increased unemployment as a result of a slow economic growth, internal displacements, and gross human rights violation including sexual violence as well as contributing to heightened ethnic animosity. As one respondent an NCCK Regional Coordinator noted: “The violence resulted in the death of many Kenyans
hence increasing dependency. Further there was destruction of property thus increasing unemployment as well as displacements of families from their homes.”

The Immediate Responses to the Post Election Violence

The respondents were in agreement that that the steps they undertook initially after the eruption of violence were to mount a humanitarian response in the provision of food and non food items. Secondly, there was the provision of psychosocial support to address issues of trauma occasioned by loss of lives and infliction of emotional and physical harm. Progressively, community forums with the involvement of church leaders were held to restrain the youth in particular to stop engaging in violence. As an NCCK Regional Coordinator explained, “The immediate response was to provide humanitarian support in the form of both food and non food items, need assessment of the displaced, mobilizing church leaders and community leaders to restrain the youth from acts of violence.” Another NCCK Regional Coordinator commented, “An immediate response we undertook was to rescue those that had been marooned in the violence and ferry them to safety.”

The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) 2008 report documents incidences of sexual violence through interviews and media reports. These reports included tales of rape including gang rape, sexual mutilation and heinous deaths. Among others the Commission heard tales of family members being forced to stand by and witness their mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers and little children being raped, killed and maimed; innocent victims contracting HIV/AIDS after being sexually assaulted because the breakdown of law and order and the deteriorating security situation kept them from accessing medical care soon enough to prevent it; husbands abandoning their wives who had been defiled and the inevitable psychological burden of powerlessness and hopelessness that left individuals who had experienced sexual violence feeling alone, isolated and unable to cope, not just for one moment in time, but possibly forever (CIPEV 2008, 132).
gender based violence such as rape that was widespread during the post-election violence, NCCK officials made referrals to hospitals as well as the offering of psycho-social support. As an NCCK Regional Coordinator pointed out, “At the height of the violence, we liaised with the gender recovery centers within Nairobi to seek medical assistance for rape cases.”

**Long-term Programs for Healing and Reconciliation**

Study respondents reported that a number of interventions were undertaken by NCCK to promote healing and reconciliation following the Kenyan 2007 post poll violence. One was the mounting of a psychosocial support program to enable victims of the post-election violence to heal psychologically from the trauma they underwent. One such intervention particularly targeted the children in partnership with UNICEF. As an NCCK Regional Coordinator explained:

> We provided psychosocial support by establishing child-friendly spaces in such areas as Kariobangi, Kibera, Huruma, and Limuru to assist children in processing what had happened to them in efforts to relieve their trauma.

> Songs, art, dances were some of the strategies employed.

Secondly, capacity building workshops for church leaders were held to build their capacity in mediation and peacebuilding skills and this enabled them to preach reconciliation in their areas of operation. Thirdly, intra and inter-ethnic dialogue forums were held in areas identified as hotspots for the violence in efforts to bring reconciliation among bitterly divided communities. An NCCK Regional Coordinator noted, “NCCK held intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic dialogue with the aim of forgiving each other; reconciling and bringing about healing and reconciliation to enable communities to live together harmoniously.”

The Council had earlier in March 2007 in partnership with other religious institutions formed the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF) to respond to issues of national concerns such as the promotion of peaceful electoral campaigns in 2007. The IRF drew its membership from
Christians, Hindu, and Muslims, which are the three most dominant religions in Kenya. After the post-election violence the forum would be involved in humanitarian support, meeting the key protagonists of the Kenyan conflict (The Party of National Unity and the Orange Democratic Movement), as well as making their inputs to the Africa Union (AU)-led mediation efforts that were seeking a solution to the crisis (NCCK 2008). Under the IRF, a number of activities were held such as: dialogue forums, pastoral visits, exchange visits and ecumenical visits in different parts of the country that experienced post-election violence. As part of the dialogue forums, religious leaders were trained on conflict resolution and conflict management. Consequently, the participants would be expected to map out areas that were prone to conflict, map out the causes of the violence and propose solutions to the conflict. Exchange visits were undertaken to various parts of Kenya such as parts of the Rift Valley (Kuresoi, Molo, and Naivasha), Nairobi informal settlements of Kibera and Mathare among others to witness firsthand the consequences of the violence.

These visits served as solidarity visits to the internally displaced persons. These visits also served as part of advocacy in terms of monitoring the government initiative of returning the displaced to their homes in a Kenyan government resettlement program referred to as “Operation Rudi Nyumbani” loosely translated as returning home. These exchange visits also served as dialogue forums among communities that had previously engaged in conflict and involved community and opinion leaders, youth leaders, the religious leaders as well as government representatives drawn from the provincial administration. Ecumenical joint services were held incorporating the Christians, the Muslims and the Hindus. These served to reinforce the message of peace through various religious teachings. A key underlying theme was that the respective religions advocated for peaceful co-existence and that their followers would be expected to foster a culture of peace (NCCK 2008).
Participants pointed out that various partnerships were engaged locally and internationally in responding to the 2007/08 violence. The findings indicated that multiple actors were engaged in efforts to build bridges among bitterly divided communities and to alleviate human suffering. These actors included the Kenya Red Cross, churches, bodies such as United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and local and international NGOs, among others. Below are relevant narratives from respondents:

We coordinated the efforts of member churches such as the Anglican Church, Reformed Church, Presbyterian Church, Friends Church, PEFA Church, and partnered with the Red Cross and the government to provide humanitarian assistance and advocate for peaceful co-existence. (*NCCK Regional Coordinator*)

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There was partnership between the NCCK and provincial administration including the Administration Police and the outcome was in offering protection to the displaced as well as assisting in the logistics of ferrying relief supplies to the internally displaced persons. (*NCCK Regional Coordinator*)

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We partnered with UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNDP, religious bodies as well as professional bodies such as Amani Counseling Center and Eleka Counseling to provide humanitarian support, counseling and to promote reconciliation. (*NCCK Regional Coordinator*)

Ecumenical bodies outside of the country had facilitated the Council to address the crisis spiritually, morally, and financially. Ecumenical partners such as the World Council of Churches, Protestant Churches in Germany, United Church of Canada, Church World
Service, Norwegian Church Aid, and Diakonia Sweden among others provided financial and moral support to address the humanitarian crisis occasioned by the violence. This support went to the internally displaced and to the capacity building of church leaders to engage in the healing process.

The involvement of the World Council of Churches (WCC) is documented in an NCCK internal document published in 2008. The report highlights that in February 2008, the WCC sent a living letters delegation to the country at the height of the violence. The purpose of their visit was a fact finding mission on the violence and to express solidarity with the Kenyan Church. The delegation visited parts of Nairobi and the South Rift regions of the country (Molo, Kuresoi, Nakuru) that were hard hit by the violence. Further, the living letters team met separately with the leadership of the Orange Democratic Movement and the Party of National Unity to urge them to act fast to restore peace in the country.

The Role of Women in the Peace Process

From the analysis of respondents it emerged that the Council incorporated women in their peacebuilding efforts. The respondents pointed out that the contribution of women was significant to the issues of healing and reconciliation as women are badly affected in times of conflict. Women in times of conflict were often left to care for the children and were subjected to being “instruments of war” through rape among other violations. Below are two representative excerpts of respondents regarding the significance of involvement of women in peacebuilding in 2008:

Women used their networks to preach the message of peace because they suffered most during the post-election crisis. (*NCCK Regional Coordinator*)

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Women were more responsive in building bridges of peace. They were more willing to reach out to their sons and husbands, because they were concerned about their children and families’ future. *(NCCK Senior Official)*

Women in church leadership were also involved in a capacity-building training dubbed “Women as Agents of Peace” after the violence in 2008, to empower women leaders to engage in the national healing and reconciliation processes.

**Policy Advocacy**

The National Accord of 2008 put in place a power-sharing agreement between the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The signing of the accord was instrumental in halting the post-election violence and setting the reforms agenda framework. For the NCCK, policy advocacy was and continues to be a strategy for long-term healing and reconciliation. The Council was involved in influencing the passage of pieces of legislation such as the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, National Cohesion and Integration Act, The Constitutional Review Act of 2008, and the Witness Protection Act in the Kenyan Parliament *(NCCK 2008)*. The other facet of advocacy that the Council was involved in was in the domain of transitional justice. It has been documented by various reports and publications that there was widespread gross violation of human rights during the post-election violence *(KNCHR 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; and International Crisis Group 2008)*. The Council advocated that those who had the greatest responsibility for various human rights violations be taken to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague, Netherlands. An NCCK senior official noted the following on the ICC process:

*We have been advocating for the ICC process for those that bear the greatest responsibility for the violence. This is informed by the culture of impunity in this country that is occasioned by the lack of respect for the rule of law. If the*
ICC can deal with this category of people, then others in the country will respect the rule of law.

Six alleged perpetrators of the post poll violence made initial appearances at the ICC in April 2011 and appeared on diverse dates in September 2011 for either a confirmation or a drop of the charges that included among others crimes against humanity. Four of the suspects’ cases were confirmed on the 23rd of January 2012 by the ICC pre-trial II chambers and will proceed to trial unless their cases are quashed at the appeal process, which the suspects embarked on thereafter.

Additionally, as part of advocacy, NCCK was involved in monitoring the process of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Project (KNDR) as parts of efforts to ensure that the reform process was underway following the signing of the National Accord on February 28, 2008, a process that laid the framework for a coalition government for the sake of national unity. Among other issues, the Council continued to lobby the government to address the plight of internally displaced persons in areas such as compensation and resettlement (NCCK 2008). Immediately after the eruption of violence, the Council under the umbrella of the Inter-Religious Forum (IRF) launched the Kenya Thabiti taskforce and mandated it to conduct research on the causes of the post-election violence in 2007/08 and its implications for national unity. This enabled the Council in collaboration with the other members of the IRF to engage with the government and a variety of partners on the approaches needed to address the issues that had resulted in widespread violence (Inter-Religious Forum Report 2009).

The media was a tool that the NCCK and the IRF utilized at the height of the post-poll violence to point out the repercussions of the violence and to suggest solutions to revert from the crisis. Even after the stop of the post-election violence, there was a sustained push for the government to implement key reforms to stabilize the country. This was in the form of press
statements that were published and broadcasted in local media. These statements would be issued by NCCK or under the aegis of the IRF. Below are two excerpts of the press statements issued reflecting the advocacy role of the NCCK:

We strongly urge every Kenyan to exercise restraint from [violent] acts… as we await the outcome of the ongoing mediation efforts. (IRF press statement 2008)

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We remind the government and the mediation teams that the root causes of the violence that rocked our country have not been resolved as yet. (NCCK 2008)

These press statements reflected the NCCK’s commitment to ensuring an amicable settlement of the conflict and to urging the government to address the root causes of the violence through appropriate interventions.

Strengths and Challenges of Faith-Based Peacebuilding

One goal of the study was to gauge the perception of the respondents on what they considered to be the strengths of faith-based peacebuilding. Respondents were in agreement that FBOs have credibility and command the respect of their faithful. NCCK Regional Coordinators noted their perceptions that FBOS “command respect [because] they have been mandated by God to be peacemakers and to live in as far as it is possible at peace with all men” and that “FBOs have the credibility from the community as they are considered better than other institutions.” At the same time, respondents noted significant challenges faced by FBOs in their peacebuilding efforts. These observations pertain not to challenges to peacebuilding in general, but challenges related to the role of FBOs in peacebuilding efforts.

A major challenge identified was the lack of financial resources to meet the high demand for peacebuilding interventions. They noted that funding for peacebuilding programs was short term and this negatively impacted the sustainability of those efforts. Another
challenge identified by respondents was the fact that the church was itself divided prior to
and after the violence and therefore the church needed to go through a period of internal
healing before it could be effective in building the bridges of peace among bitterly divided
communities. An NCCK senior official noted, “The church was divided and therefore it
needed to go through internal healing. One of the first responses to this crisis of legitimacy
was to apologize to the nation and put in place processes to undergo healing.” As one of the
strategies to address this challenge, the Council in August 2008 organized a National Pastor’s
Conference at Kabarak University, Nakuru, Kenya that brought about 1500 church leaders
together with the aim of internal healing among clergy and lay leaders drawn from its
membership. It was a period of deep reflection on the role that the church would be taking in
its effort to promote national healing and reconciliation (NCCK 2008).

Discussion

The findings of this study relate to the role of the NCCK in peacebuilding efforts as
narrated by its officials after the 2007 post-election violence. The participants of this study
were consistent in their perception that whereas the trigger of the post-poll violence was a
widely disputed presidential poll, there were a number of factors that were responsible for
this crisis. The question of land especially in the Rift Valley, highly pitched ethnic politics,
and the crisis of youth unemployment were touted as explanatory factors. This finding
supports the argument of Kanyinga (2009) who sees the land question as having played a
major role in the violence. He notes that the land reform program in Kenya has not been
sensitive to inter-ethnic relations and it remains a hot spot for violence if not well addressed.
Indeed a majority of the respondents argued that the land question was a contributing factor
to the violence and has to be addressed with finality to address a recurrence of violence in
future election cycles.
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights report (2008, 22) points to a number of probable causes of the 2007 post-poll violence. One was the widespread poverty and radical inequalities. Furthermore, the report argues that ethnic based politics was a trigger due to the view that the winner of a presidential poll gets to benefit his community and therefore communities fight to have one of their own ascend to the presidency. This account is consistent with the participants’ analysis of the causes of the violence, with the significant view being that politics in Kenya is highly ethnicized and that those who were left out of power felt marginalized and as a result engaged in violence. These perceptions are supported by Human Rights Watch (2008, 3) which argues that whereas the post-election violence was triggered by fraud, many of the tensions that exploded in December 2007 were years or even decades old. In the 2002 general elections, Kenyans overwhelmingly voted to put an end to dictatorships, inequality, political violence and systemic abuse of office. The NARC Coalition headed by Mwai Kibaki had pledged a new constitution, commissions to address large scale corruption and land grabbing by the elite, as well as initiating measures to tackle landlessness, unemployment and police reforms. These reforms would be abandoned as the NARC Coalition disintegrated with impunity and corruption being entrenched (Human Rights Watch 2008).

The NCCK members reported that the Council was involved in various facets of peacebuilding, including humanitarian assistance such as the provision of food and non food items to those who were internally displaced and psychosocial support to relieve trauma to those affected by the violence through counseling and performing arts. In efforts to promote peaceful co-existence at the local levels, the council forged partnerships with other religious leaders such as the Hindu and the Muslim communities to promote peaceful co-existence among warring communities through peace meetings and dialogue forums. At the national level the council was involved in various peacebuilding efforts, such as engaging in dialogue
with the two key disputants of the crisis and being involved in the African Union led mediation efforts, as well as advocating for transitional justice mechanisms. Key among their suggestions was the establishment of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to enable healing of communities and well as ensuring justice was meted out to those who organized or were complicit in acts of violence. Transitional justice is conceptualized by Kaminski, Nalepa and Barry (2006) as the formal or informal procedures adopted by a group or an institution of accepted legitimacy after periods of oppressive social order and is concerned with meting out justice to perpetrators and their collaborators and as well as to their victims. Justice is seen as an overarching goal for victims and may take various forms depending on the circumstances. Scholars of transitional justice generally agree that forms of truth commissions are necessary in mediating the peace/justice divide as a form of accountability for past abuses (Sriram 2007). Notably, Truth Commissions have been helpful in the past in reconciling groups hitherto engaged in conflict. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in South Africa in 1995 was particularly helpful in enabling a relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy (Shore 2008, 2-3).

A key finding of this paper is that partnerships are important in times of crisis and conflict such as the violence in Kenya in early 2008. Religious unity for instance through the Inter-Religious Forum served to promote unity for the purpose of preaching peaceful co-existence. The involvement of local and international bodies and ecumenical organizations made the intervention of the Council a success because material, financial and human resources were pulled together to address the various needs of the populace ranging from peacebuilding to humanitarian assistance. The findings suggest that FBOs are key players in such partnerships because they tend to have credibility among the population and can be trusted to mount long-term healing and reconciliation programs among communities. It was the respondents’ perception that these are some of the strengths of faith-based peacebuilding.
Various scholars and commentators on faith-based peacebuilding point to unique strengths of faith-based peacebuilding (Johnston 1994; Johnston and Cox 2003). As pointed out by Bouta, Abu Nimer, and Kadafiyici-Orellana (2005, 39-40), some possible strengths of faith-based peace building include: 1) strong faith-based motivation for peacebuilding; 2) long-term history and/or involvement in the societies they serve; 3) long-term commitment of international faith-based actors; and 4) moral and spiritual authority.

The study also indicates that the Council made deliberate steps to include women in the national healing and reconciliation processes. International actors such as the UN Security Council, The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Women Waging Peace, International Alert, among others have called for the involvement of women in peacebuilding activities and noted that women must be equal participants in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation programs (Anderlini 2000 cited in De la Rey and McKay 2006, 144). The UN Security Council in October 2000 adopted Resolution 1325, calling for the participation of women in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It impressed upon all actors who negotiate and implement peace agreements to consider the needs of women and girls in post-conflict periods and to support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms (Anderlini 2000 quoted in De la Rey and McKay 2006, 144). El-Bushra (2007, 14) notes that war should not be seen as a violation of women by men but rather it should be acknowledged that men and women are “differently violated by war.”

Going forward, the government of Kenya and other actors in the peace process (such as the civil society, international organizations, foreign governments) would be wise to draw upon the goodwill and the wide networks of the NCCK in Kenya to promote the sustainability of the peace currently being experienced in Kenya as the nation seeks to engage in structural and institutional reforms. This engagement is important to ensure that the
country does not find itself in another cycle of violence considering that 2012 general elections are fast approaching.

References


Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quantitative Analysis

D. Dustin Berna

Abstract

Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western politicians, practitioners, the media, and the general public is a basic understanding of Islamic fundamentalism; specifically, the causes. This is the first quantitative analysis of potential causes of Islamic fundamentalism. I have created a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. This fundamentalist data set has a total number of 16,072 fundamentalist movements. I will utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and maximum score.

Introduction

The field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is one of the most unique fields found within the social sciences in part because of its inherent multidisciplinary roots where multiple academic schools of thought have found a common objective of analyzing and resolving many types of conflicts. The Matrix of Conflict Analysis and Resolution is growing and its scholarly canon is expanding with great robustness; however, there are voids. One such gap in the literature is research that deals with the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its potential
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causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Also, anti-system social movements are reactive in nature and occur in reaction to events and forces in the socio-economic, political, and cultural arenas. Islamic fundamentalism forms in reaction to and in defense against the results and consequences of forced assimilation, modernization, industrialization, globalization, Americanization, and westernization, all of which have penetrated the larger Islamic community. There is no consensus as to what causes the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or an explanation as to why some states have more Islamic fundamentalist movements than other states. This article provides preliminary answers by quantitatively measuring an Islamic-majority nation-state’s degree of fundamentalism in relation to conditions which can cause social movement formation. To do this, Islamic fundamentalist movements are treated as social movements. Classic social movement theory consists of four schools of thought: resource mobilization theory, political process theory, Marxist theory, and new social movement theory. The fundamental conditions associated with each classical social movement school of thought have been quantified and are used as independent variables.

This article is divided into five parts. First, I look at the causes of Islamic fundamentalism as explained by the existing literature. In the second section, I propose my theory that Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently social movements and are best explained through an amalgamation of the four classic social movement schools of thought. I also hypothesize that the fundamental conditions associated with each classical school of thought are positively associated with the degree of Islamic fundamentalism. Third, I explain my analytic design and rationale behind using the negative binomial fixed effects regression
model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and maximum score. The fourth part is an explanation of my data and both independent and dependent variables. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. The fundamentalist data set I created has a total N (total number of fundamentalist movements) of 16,072. Finally, I explain the results, which indicate a strong correlation between Islamic fundamentalism and the fundamental conditions associated with the classical schools of social movement thought.

**The Causes of Islamic Fundamentalism**

Scholars offer five significant reasons explaining the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. First, some argue that worsening economics, unemployment, and poverty facilitate fundamentalism (the socioeconomic arguments). A second prevalent reason found in the literature is that cultural tension between Islam and the West, which is the result of modernization, Westernization, and Americanization, is facilitating fundamentalism. Third, many scholars argue that fundamentalism is a result of the Soviet Empire imploding and the political/social vacuum left in its place. Fourth, some argue that individuals become Islamic fundamentalists in personal times of crisis in order to be closer to God. Fifth, some of the literature explains fundamentalism as the result of a specific catalyst, such as the Palestinian refugee problem, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the radicalization of Egyptian society, or the assassination of Sadat.

The first prevalent argument explains the underpinning causes of Islamic fundamentalism as directly related to socioeconomic issues and assumes that worsening economies facilitate fundamentalism. Chibber (1996) attributes the electoral achievements of fundamentalist political parties to national economic factors. Throughout the Muslim world,
organized Muslim extremists have kept states’ infrastructures working during periods of economic hardships or national disaster. Political alienation incited by economic deprivation influence fundamentalist movements which may seek to rectify perceived or real alienation through the creation of either armed or political groups and sometimes through both (Walz 1986; Keddie 1988, 2003; Jaber 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002; and Mortimer 1991). However, Grasso (1995) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of more than just simple economic factors and can be explained by Islamic social structure; specifically, the level of development, degree of urbanization, the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, and differences in patterns of consumption. These factors create a multilayered look into the role economics and related factors play in the development of fundamentalist groups. Dillman (1992) argues that in many post-colonial societies, a single party came to power following independence from colonizing nations, and he asserts those parties instigated the movement to gain independence from colonizers. However, as socioeconomic conditions worsen in post-colonial nations, fundamentalist political parties arise and achieve significant electoral success. Although post-colonial independence movements and subsequent economic conditions influence the development of fundamentalist groups, Almond, Appleby, and Sivan (2003) argue that the uneven distribution of economic development and natural resources in fact are the root causes of fundamentalist group development. They assert that recessions, depressions, inflation, strikes, unemployment, and famine create attitudes and grievances expressed by feelings of relative deprivation among particular groups in the population leading to a rise in fundamentalism.

A second prevalent argument in the literature is that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the loss of traditional Islamic culture because of Westernization, Americanization, and modernization. Many scholars have explained the rise of religion as a political force creating the tensions associated with modernization (Ayoob 1981; Dessouki 1982; Esposito
Pipe (1983) and Tibi (2002) argue that Muslims suffer from a double crisis, which facilitates Islamic fundamentalism. First, Muslims suffer from socioeconomic and political crises deriving from the imposed integration of Islamic civilization into a world dominated by the West. Secondly, Muslims suffer from an identity crisis brought on by exposure to cultural modernity. The general feeling among Islamic fundamentalists is that since the Crusades, the Western world has engaged in a campaign to destroy Islam. In response, Islamic fundamentalists have formed groups as a method of standing up to the Western world (Zarzar 2001). Almond, Appleby and Sivan (2003), and Wickham (2002) argue that it is imperative not to underestimate the importance of Western imperialism in explaining the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. As numerous scholars have cited, the disappearance of traditional Islamic civil society over the last century via Western imperialism has led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism (Weinberg and Pedahzur 2004; Berman 2003).

The third explanation for the cause of Islamic fundamentalism is the implosion of the Soviet Empire. With the end of the Cold War, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a global security issue that poses serious challenges to state authority in the Middle East (Khashan 2000). The demise of the bipolar international structure associated with the Cold War facilitated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism because the two superpowers had effectively contained the escalation of existing conflicts (Tibi 2002). The bipolar Cold War world was synonymous with global stability; when the Cold War ended, that global stability evaporated. During the Cold War, regional and domestic conflicts within the Islamic world were subordinated via the American-Soviet rivalry. However, with the end of global bipolarity, there is no adequate international political security structure to manage international changes which resulted in the increase of Islamic fundamentalism (Horsman and Marshall 1994). Hilal Khashan (1997) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to Islamic
militancy in three ways. First, extremists saw the fall communism as clear proof of the unworkability of man-made laws. Second, the breakup of Yugoslavia, a by-product of the Soviet collapse, triggered the Bosnia-Herzegovina War which led to the mass execution of tens of thousands of Muslims, and Western governments did very little to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing. As a result, much of the Islamic world became frustrated with Western apathy and the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to human rights. Third, the end of East-West ideological rivalry created a vacuum in international relations whose balance hinged in sustaining balanced conflict. The United States found itself without a major enemy. Finally, Bernard Lewis (1990) argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the Soviet Union’s invasion into Afghanistan in 1979 and the formation of the Mujahedeen.

The fourth explanation of Islamic fundamentalism is interconnected with the arguments above. The fourth explanation is that individuals turn to Islamic fundamentalism in personal times of crisis and to be closer to God. Phebe Marr (1994) argues that when facing serious socioeconomic problems, crises of cultural identity, government ineptitude, and rapid and disruptive change, the Middle East has turned increasingly to Islam for solace and solutions. Muslims are just like Christians or Jews, during hard times individuals turn to their sacred teachings and religious leaders for guidance and solace.

The remaining explanations argue that fundamentalism is the result of an outside catalyzing event. Specifically, Islamic fundamentalism is the direct result of the displacement of Palestinians after the establishment of the state of Israel. According to Khashan (1997), Islamic fundamentalism results from the decline of Arab nationalism which took its most significant blow after the Arabs lost the 1967 Six-Day War. In fact, the Egyptian Brotherhood claims that the lack of spirituality caused Egypt’s defeat. However, Voll (2004a, 2004b) argues that the birth of modern Islamic fundamentalism began in Egypt in 1928 with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was the result of
socioeconomic inequality facilitated by imperialism. Lia (1998), Sagiv (1995), and Kepel (1985a, 1985b) argue that modern Islamic fundamentalism emerged after the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. The assassins were identified as Islamic fundamentalists, members of a group called al-Jihad, who hoped to spark an Islamic revolution in Egypt. Finally, many scholars have argued that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. This position has been particularly argued by Abrahamian (1982, 1989, 1993), Khomeini (1989), and Keddie (1988, 2003). Each of these scholars systematically notes the Iranian Revolution’s success as the direct result of the Shah’s restrictive political institutions that started opening (or cracking) religious ideology, socioeconomic inequality, and poverty.

**Social Movements and Fundamentalism**

The best way to understand the causes of Islamic fundamentalism is to view fundamentalist movements as social movements. Each classic social movement school of thought has competing assumptions associated with the formation and duration of social movements. Interestingly, each of these conditions is positively associated with the degree of fundamentalism as measured by the number of fundamentalist movements found within majority Islamic-based nation-states. The fundamental conditions associated with each of the classic schools of thought include the elements found in resource mobilization theory, socioeconomic structural inequality found in Marxism, political institutions and the sociopolitical structures found in political process theory, and the post-modern ideas found in the new social movement theory.

The first group of conditions are those associated with Marxism. Karl Marx (1978) had a legitimate argument when he asserted that when the state oppresses, enslaves, and ignores the masses long enough, they will revolt. Marx was correct when he argued that individuals get involved in collective action when their social class has reached its breaking
point; they will then unite against their antagonists and forcibly change both the socioeconomic and sociopolitical institutions of the state. However, it did not occur to Marx to ask what makes individuals engage in collective action; he simply assumed that collective action was a direct result of society’s structural development rather than individual choice. This is a legitimate argument; however, it does not explain why Muslims join fundamentalist movements. In this aspect, the resource mobilization theorists (the second classic social movement theory) are correct in their critique of the Marxists; resources, of both the group and at state levels, are imperative for a movement’s formation and success. What makes resource mobilization theory different from Marxist explanations of social movements is that it focuses on societal breakdown(s). In order to mobilize politically, groups require resources and they must mobilize these resources, that is, use them or put them into effect (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Freeman 1979). I define resources here as money and population; however, I deviate from the resource mobilization theorists by also including education as a resource. Also, resource mobilization theory is based on the idea that participants in social movements are inherently rational.

The third classical social movement theory is political process. Political process theory is a response to resource mobilization theory. Political process theory criticizes resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in both sociopolitical arenas and governmental institutions which significantly influence the trajectories of social movements (Eisinger 1974; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1982, 1986, 1988; and Tarrow 1989). Political process theorists argue that resource mobilization theory falls short because it assumes that social organization, integration, and resources, rather than grievances, discontent, and sociopolitical institutions are most important to a social movement’s participants. In other words, resource mobilization theorists are putting the cart before the horse; a movement cannot have resources until it has grievances. The foundation
of political process theory is that political institutions play an integral role in social movement development.

The final classical social movement theory is the new social movement theory. New social theory emerged in the advanced industrial world after the social protests of the 1960s and 1970s subsided. New social movement theorists argue that recent social movements represent an entirely new form of social protest and reflect new goals and values. New social movements are interested in intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society (Kitschelt 1981; Melucci 1996; Offe 1985). New social movement theorists assert that one of the most important differences between new and old movements lies in the tactics that each relies on to achieve its goals.

**Hypotheses**

Based on the literature discussing each of these social movement theories, I derived the following four hypotheses to examine how conditions associated with each social movement school of thought influence the degree of fundamentalism:

**H1:** Socioeconomic inequality as described by Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

**H2:** Resources as described by resource mobilization social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

**H3:** The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in systems which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic.

**H4:** Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.
Analytic Design

The goal of this article is to determine the conditions that are influencing the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements in Islamic-majority nation-states by utilizing quantitative methods. To do this, I utilize the negative binomial fixed effects regression model and a comparison of each independent variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by looking at each independent variable’s minimum, mean, and maximum score. My findings show that each of the social movement conditions is positively associated with the degree of fundamentalism, as measured by the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. My data on the number of fundamentalist movements are in the form of yearly counts; therefore, I use negative binomial regression. The negative binomial model incorporates observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean (Long 1997). Thus, the conditional variance of my dependent variable (number of fundamentalist movements) becomes larger than its conditional mean, which remains unchanged. Negative binomial regressions are designed to handle continuous variables with distributions containing zero values and large positive skews, which explain my fundamentalist data. According to Robinson, Lawton, and Taylor (2003) negative binomial regressions effectively control for over dispersion by adding a stochastic component to the model. If the numbers of observations within a year are not independent, the variance may be greater than the mean. If such an over dispersion exists, as it does in counting fundamentalist movements, negative binomial models are more appropriate (Cameron 1990), but pooling multiple observations over time for each fundamentalist group violates the independence assumptions required for unbiased parameter estimates. This can be corrected by clustering data through random effects (Guo 1996) or fixed effects models.

Often, as in my data, the variance exceeds the conditional mean, resulting in what is called over dispersion. The negative-binomial model actually accounts for over dispersion.
It is essentially a negative binomial model (a variant of the Poisson model) that is commonly used to deal with over dispersion parameter that varies across states. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) suggested further refinement that starts with the negative multinomial model and makes additional assumptions about the distribution of the random effect that effectively allow the over distribution parameter to vary across both regions and time. This approach, called the negative-binomial model with random effects, does not work with my data. After running the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects, I was able to determine that random effects models were inappropriate; therefore, I decided to run fixed effects models. Standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and that error terms are not correlated. These models are inadequate for complex sampling designs, such as my fundamentalist movement data. Finally, I used the Xtnbreg regression command in Stata. Xtnbreg is a convenience command for population-averaged models by using xtgee, family (nbreg) link (log) to obtain estimates.

**Data and Variables**

**Dependent Variable**

I have created a data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist movement that is, or has been, in operation from 1970 through 2008. If the group, political party, or issue-oriented movement meets the following conditions it was included in my data set: First, the movement, group, political party, or issue-oriented militant movement must be non-secular in its beliefs, ideas, or dogmas. Second, it also must encourage, sponsor, or condone the lack of separation of church and state within government, state institutions, education, or educational institutions. Third, for a movement to be considered fundamentalist it must have socio-political objectives, and not just religious ones. The theoretical justification behind this definition of a fundamentalist movement must be broad enough to encompass multiple types of movements; thus I use words such as *group*, *political party* and *issue-oriented militant*.
movement. This terminology is broad enough to catch most organized movements of people without excluding any. No fundamentalist movement is secular and their proponents do not have to believe in the lack of separation between church and governmental institutions. Finally, to separate religious movements from fundamentalist movements, I note that the movements must have socio-political objectives and not just religious ones.

In the fundamentalist data set I created, there is a total N (total number of fundamentalist movement-years) of 16,072. I obtained this number by taking each Islamic nation-state and counting every fundamentalist movement present for every year, and then summing the years. However, a problem that has arisen with counting the number of fundamentalist movements is that the size of the fundamentalist movement is not taken into account; this could have significant ramifications for the reliability of my data. To rectify this, I counted large movements (over 900 members) three times. I chose 900 because most small fundamentalist movements throughout the Islamic world have less than 400 active members and medium-sized Islamic movements have no more than 700 members. Furthermore, based on my findings there are virtually no differences between a small and medium sized fundamentalist movements. However, there are significant differences between small or medium movements and that of a large movements, specifically influence, membership, resources, and power.

Independent Variables

I only looked at nation-states with a 50% or more Muslim population. All population statistics were obtained from the Department of State’s Country Study webpage. This is a 39-year study covering the years from 1970-2008. The following nation-states are included in this paper: Iran, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain (1971), Bangladesh (1972), Brunei (1984), Djibouti (1977), Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Pakistan (1972), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan (1991), Tunisia,

The following are the total numbers of fundamentalist movements in each nation-state included in this paper. The total number of movements is shown with the number of unique groups in parenthesis: Iran 1329 (76); Algeria 452 (35); Azerbaijan 8 (4); Bahrain 212 (12); Bangladesh 803 (39); Brunei 0; Djibouti 0; Egypt 616 (45); Indonesia 1125 (66); Jordan 434 (22); Kuwait 22 (6); Oman 35 (2); Saudi Arabia 421 (37); Syria 872 (35); Tajikistan 168 (9); Tunisia 159 (9); Turkey 435 (25); Turkmenistan 7 (2); United Arab Emirates 32 (2); Uzbekistan 96 (8); Yemen 208 (17); Kazakhstan 24 (5); Eritrea 30 (5); Lebanon 1748 (92); Libya 542 (24); Iraq 1283 (149); Mauritania 49 (3); Morocco 224 (10); Qatar 2 (1); Pakistan 1203 (67); Ethiopia 437 (7); Afghanistan 728 (27); Somalia 349 (10); Sudan 667 (29); Kyrgyzstan 81 (4); Palestine 1261 (62).

Outside Ideological Force

What I also add here is the presence of an outside ideological force. The presence of outside ideological force plays a significant role in determining how many fundamentalist movements a state will have. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iran and Saudi Arabia do what I call group facilitate. Group facilitate is when Iran or Saudi Arabia operates clandestine operations within different Islamic states via sponsoring domestic movements found within other states in order to facilitate their own interests and force other governments into compliance. The United States, on the other hand, does not group facilitate; instead, it influences the state leadership via economic and/or military aid and the presence of U.S. troops. Theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than that of Iranian or Saudi Arabian. American ideological inference is top-down, meaning the aid is
given to the state, not individual Islamic groups or movements. On the other hand, Iranian and Saudi Arabian ideological influence is, for the most part, bottom-up; they give aid directly to movements. There are a few exceptions to my argument concerning the U.S. and its top-down influence, specifically the Taliban and Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and the current aid it gives to Sunni groups in the Iraq.

During the last twenty-nine years, the international community has seen Iran emerge as an ideological hegemon that has significantly influenced domestic politics and domestic development of Shiite Muslims. Furthermore, during the same period, the international community has seen Saudi Arabia achieve the same ideological hegemonic standing as Iran but with the Sunni Muslims. Both enjoy a unique position in the world of Islam due to their strategic locations, natural resources, and historical and cultural role in the development of the Islamic civilization. I theoretically define a significant outside ideological force as an outside influence that meets each of the six criteria: firstly, the outside support must be in the form of financial, military, or humanitarian aid from a state other than where the fundamentalist group is located. Secondly, there must be a physical presence of the ideological force within the country via state representatives, scholars, religious leaders, state sponsored militia, military, or any group representing the ideological state. Or, the members of the fundamentalist group must be trained in or educated in the foreign state. Thirdly to be considered significant, more than one group must receive the above explained influence. Fourthly, the ideological force cannot be working with, for, or influenced by the state in which the fundamentalist group is working. Fifthly, the ideological force must influence a fundamentalist group for two or more consecutive years. Sixthly, the United States ideological influence is excluded from this variable because U.S. influence is captured in the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. aid.
The Marxist variables included here are the nation-state’s total percentage of the population’s poverty level and unemployment. The World Bank’s data on unemployment and poverty are very limited. To rectify this, I have used the CIA World Fact Book From 1989-2007. For data prior to 1989 I used numerous sources which include books and articles concerning Middle Eastern poverty and unemployment. The Resource Mobilization variables include the total population (thousands), total GDP (millions of dollars), total ODA (millions of dollars), total American financial aid (millions of dollars), and secondary school enrollment (ratio of the total enrolment in secondary education). All data from the above independent variables were obtained from the World Bank’s World data set. The Political Process variables include the polity variables from the Polity IV Project, specifically, Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints, and Political Competition. Also used to measure Political Process are the variables from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project and they include: Political Rights, Extrajudicial Killings, Disappearances, Political Imprisonment, and Torture. The following variables were used to measure the post-modern ideas associated with New Social Movement theory: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Women’s Political Rights, and Workers Rights; all of which were obtained from the CIRI data project. Finally, the presence of an Outside Ideological Force which is a dichotomous variable that looks at whether there is a significant outside ideological force present. Also used to measure ideas are the number of United States troops in each nation-state included here (data was obtained from the Global U.S. Troop Development).

Results

Marxist Theory

The socioeconomic inequality variables associated with Marxist theory suggest a positive and significant relationship between socioeconomic inequality and the number of
fundamentalist movements within the nation-state. The percentage of the total population within the nation-state living below the poverty is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Also, the percentage of the total population unemployed within the nation-state is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results, we see that socioeconomic inequality is a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypothesis number one, which argues socioeconomic inequality as described by the Marxist social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

For every percentage increase in total poverty there was a .008 increase in Islamic fundamentalism. This indicates that states with more poverty will have more Islamic fundamentalist movements. To confirm this, I looked at the poverty variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score. When the percentage of the total population living in poverty was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 3.89, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.34, up from the average of 5.06. These results show that states with significant poverty have a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements.

The total percentage of the state’s population living in poverty only represents half of the significant variables that make up the Marxist arm of my fundamentalist labyrinth; the second half of it consists of the total percentage of the state’s unemployed population. Just as with the total poverty level, the unemployment coefficients were positive and significant. This indicates that unemployment is positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the percent of the nation-state’s unemployed population increases, the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation-state also increases.
The model results indicate that every percentage increase in total unemployment was a .011 significance level. To confirm this, I examine the poverty variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the percentage of the total unemployed was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.07, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 9.07, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is still larger than the mean; this indicates that unemployment has an effect on the number of fundamentalist movements.

Resource Mobilization Theory

Regarding Resource Mobilization theory, my results suggest a positive and significant relationship between resources and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state. Interestingly, my results indicate that only total population and education were positive and highly significant. In other words, as the total population increases so do the total number of fundamentalist movements. Also, as the percentage of the total population’s education level increases, so does the number of fundamentalist movements. Given these results we see that resources are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypotheses number two, which argues: Resources as described by the resource mobilization social movement theory is positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.

The population coefficients were positive and significant in all regressions when I ran the model using the logged value of the total population. This indicates that the total population was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. As the size of the nation-state’s population increases by ten thousand, the
number of fundamentalist movements increases by .0001046; this increase is relatively small. These results suggest that increases in a nation-state’s population facilitate more fundamentalist movements. Alone, these results do not indicate a significant amount of information. However, taken with the other variables associated with resource mobilization theory, it is apparent that resources are positively associated with fundamentalism. I looked at the total population variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When the state’s total population was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.34, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 13.8, up from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state’s population increases, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

The education/school enrollment coefficients were positive and significant. The education coefficients were significantly larger than that of the population variables. The results reveal that for every percentage increase in school enrollment there was a significance level of .003. These results indicate that education was positively associated with an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements. In other words, the more educated the population, the more fundamentalist movements there will be within the nation-state. Just as with the state’s total population, I looked at the education level variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When secondary school enrollment was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.08, down from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 8.73, up from the average of
5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as population and education increase, so do the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements.

**Political Process Theory**

The results associated the conditions associated with Political Process theory are twofold. First, there are two linear relationships between perfect autocracies and the perfect democracies and the number of fundamentalist groups. The definition of a perfect autocracy is obtained from the Polity IV data set that ranges from -10 (a perfect autocracy) and +10 (a perfect democracy). These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, whereas states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. When governments disdainfully kill or torture their citizens with no regard to basic human rights, there will be a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist groups. On the other hand, the more freedom of speech a nation-state has, the fewer fundamentalist movements. Second, there is an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The number of movements is the strongest in systems which are neither perfect democracies nor perfect autocracies. In order to prove hypotheses number three: The degree of openness of political institutions as described by the political process social movement theorists has an inverted-U shaped relationship with the number and success of Islamic fundamentalist movements; the number of movements should be the strongest in system which are neither highly democratic nor highly autocratic, I ran different sets of models utilizing the CIRI human rights data and the Polity IV data sets.

Extrajudicial killings are negative and significant, as expected. Extrajudicial killing is the killing of citizens within the perspective nation-state by government officials without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal
suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. The model indicates that the more individuals a state
kills, there will be a .05 decrease in the significance level of the number of fundamentalist
movements. From here, I looked at the extrajudicial killing variable’s effect on the number
of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum
score that indicates the number of fundamentalist groups expected at each setting. When
extrajudicial killings were set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 7.33, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected
number of fundamentalist movements is 3.42, down from the average of 5.06. These results
confirm that the more citizens the state either murders or facilitates the murder of, there will
be a significant decline in the number of fundamentalist movements.

State sponsored acts of torture were also negative and significant, as expected. State
sponsored acts of torture refer to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or
physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government
officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards
that is cruel, inhumane, or degrading. This also includes deaths in custody due to negligence
by government officials. The results reveal that the more individuals a state tortures, there
will be a significance level decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .11. I
looked at the state sponsored acts of torture variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist
movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score which
indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When state
sponsored acts of torture were set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist
movements is 6.28, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected
number of movements is 5.49, down from the average of 5.06. These results confirm that the
more the state tortures its citizens, the fewer fundamentalist movements.
Thus far, I have not proven an inverted-U relationship exists between political institutions and the number of fundamentalist movements. I have shown that two linear relationships exist between very perfect democracies/autocracies and the number of fundamentalist movements. These findings indicate that both perfect democracies and perfect autocracies experience lower numbers of fundamentalist movements, while states with opening political institutions experience more fundamentalist movements. However, I suspect a much more complex relationship between political institutions and Islamic fundamentalism. Specifically, an inverted-U relationship; that is, there will be more Islamic fundamentalist movements in nation-states that are not either perfect democracies or perfect autocracies. According to Davenport and Armstrong (2004, 545), polity stands as the best comparative indicator of procedural democracy because of its incorporation of structural constraints on political participation and contestation. It is also one of the most utilized comparative measures of democracy and the best variable to determine inverted-U shaped relationships. Therefore, I squared all variables associated with polity. If the polity variables have a significant positive effect and the squared term has a significant negative effect, then I prove that an inverted-U relationship exists. My polity variable was not significant. This does not necessarily disprove my hypothesis because two of the three multi-dimensional polity variables and their square terms were significant.

Concerning the multidimensional polity variables, executive recruitment was positive and significant. Executive recruitment, which was first conceptualized by Eckstein and Gurr (1975), involves the ways in which social superordinants come to occupy their positions of political authority. In other words, how open, institutionalized and competitive are the political institutions that are used in selecting political leaders. The executive recruitment score ranges from 1 to 8, 1 being the most restricted and 8 being the most open. My analysis of executive recruitment provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship.
between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive recruitment is significantly positive while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship exists between executive recruitment and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. In other words, the relationship between fundamentalism and political institutions is nonlinear; political systems with open political institutions facilitate fundamentalism. The executive recruitment coefficient results reveal that the more politically free a state is, the number of fundamentalist movement significance level increases by .013. On the other hand, the squared executive recruitment coefficients reveal that the more politically closed a state is, there will be a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023.

Executive constraints were positive and significant and refer to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. The degree of checks and balances between the veto players in the government is coded on a 7-point scale which ranges from the unlimited executive authority (1) to executive subordination (7). Under unlimited executive authority, there would be only one veto player and under executive subordination there would be numerous veto players. My analysis of executive constraints provides evidence that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the openness of the political system and the number of fundamentalist groups. Executive constraints are positively significant while its squared term is negatively significant, proving that an inverted-U relationship between executive constraints and the number of fundamentalist movements present within the nation-state. As for the executive constraint coefficients, the results reveal that the more veto players in a state means there will be a significance level increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .023. On the other hand, the squared executive constraint coefficients reveal that more veto players in a state will cause a decrease in the number of fundamentalist movements of .002.
The results of my executive constraints and executive recruitment variables were similar to that of Regan and Henderson (2002) and Fein (1995), who found that there would be more repression in the middle of the political spectrum and that both democracies and autocracies experience lower levels of repression while semi-democracies experience more fundamentalist groups. I have proven that my inverted-U hypothesis is valid and there will be a significant increase in the number of fundamentalist movements in opening political systems, just as the political process theorist theory predicts.

**New Social Movement Theory**

The post-modern ideas associated with the New Social Movement theory, results suggest a positive and significant relationship between ideas and the number of fundamentalist movements within the nation state; specifically, religious ideas or ideas associated with an outside ideological force. Interestingly, my results indicate that the presences of an outside ideological force, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion are significant. Given these results we see that ideas are a key predictor of fundamentalist movements, thus helping to prove hypotheses number four, which argues: *Ideas as described by the new social movement theorists are positively associated with the number and success Islamic fundamentalist groups present within the nation-state.*

The results reveal that if there is a presence of an outside ideological force, there is an increase in the number of fundamentalist movements of .35. To confirm this, I looked at the outside ideological force variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When the variable is set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.61, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 11.0, up from the average of 5.06. These results are very interesting because set at its maximum, the
expected number of fundamentalist movements is twice as much as it is when set at the mean; this and the above statistical results indicate that the presence of an outside ideological force is a significant determinant in the number of fundamentalist movements. There are three significant outside ideological forces in the Islamic world that operate within Islamic nation-states: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. As I explained before, theoretically, American ideological influence is inherently different than either Iranian or Saudi Arabian. For the most part, the outside ideological variable only incorporates the influence of Iran or Saudi Arabia. U.S. ideological influence was excluded from this variable but captured with two additional variables: U.S. aid and the presence of U.S. troops. In not in a single model was U.S. aid or the presence of U.S. troops significant.

Religious freedom is positive and significant. Religious freedom measures the extent to which individuals living within the nation-state are able to exercise and practice their own religious beliefs without government restrictions. When governments restrict religious freedom, there is an increase in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts religious freedom then there will be a .0014 significance level. From here, I looked at the freedom of religion variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist groups by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When religious freedom was set at its minimum the expected number of fundamentalist groups is 5.81, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 4.77, down from the average of 5.06. These results further confirm all previous results and indicate that as the state restricts religious freedom, individuals will turn to fundamentalist movements.

Freedom of speech is negative and significant, as expected. Freedom of speech measures the extent to which the government censors an individual’s freedoms of speech and
press. When governments restrict freedom of speech we see a decrease in the number Islamic fundamentalist movements by .019. In other words, in nation-states with more freedom of speech and press, there will be more ideas and thus more fundamentalist movements. The results reveal that if the state restricts freedom of speech, then there will be a significance level decrease of in the number of fundamentalist movements of .09. From here, I looked at the freedom of speech variable’s effect on the number of fundamentalist movements by setting the variable at its minimum, mean, and maximum score that indicates the number of fundamentalist movements expected at each setting. When freedom of speech was set at its minimum, the expected number of fundamentalist movement is 5.18, up from the average of 5.06. When set at its maximum, the expected number of fundamentalist movements is 5.42, up from the average of 5.06.

Conclusion

Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism on religion. What is lacking in the mindset of many Western politicians, practitioners, and the general public is a basic understanding of the causes of Islamic fundamentalism. This paper helps rectify this by quantitatively analyzing the causes of Islamic fundamentalist movements. As a dependent variable, I used a unique data set that contains every Islamic fundamentalist group that is or has been in operation from 1970 through 2008. As independent variables I quantified the fundamental conditions associated with each of the classic social movement theoretical schools of thought and my results indicates that each are positively associated with the number of Islamic fundamentalist movements found within Islamic-Majority nation states.
To fully understand Islamic fundamentalism it is essential that we figure out its potential causes. Islamic fundamentalist movements are inherently anti-system social movements. An anti-system social movement is designed to criticize governmental institutions and the political mainstream while mobilizing disaffected individuals against the existing sociopolitical and socioeconomic institutions. An anti-system fundamentalist movement does this while basing its criticism in religion. Furthermore, it is becoming extremely difficult to determine the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and no phenomena blurs this point more than the rise and actions of Islamic fundamentalists. Currently, Islamic fundamentalism is the greatest threat to the international community and, arguably, the negative results of liberalism, globalization, and the Americanization of global politics have facilitated the growth and success of such movements. The study of social movements is a major subfield in comparative politics, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the most recent of the social movements. The global effects of fundamentalism and their acts of terror have a major impact on the global economy and the state which inherently impacts international relations. This latest threat to the harmony of the international system is created via domestic political systems and is a direct result of the foundations of comparative politics. This paper further blurred the point of demarcation between international relations and comparative politics and in doing so has added to the field of Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

References


