Peace and Conflict Studies

Special Issue:
Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation: Voices from the Canada–EU Conflict Resolution Student Exchange Consortium

Edited by Jessica Senehi, Stephen Ryan, and Sean Byrne

Introduction: Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation

Jessica Senehi, Stephen Ryan, and Sean Byrne

“The Problem from Hell”: Examining the Role of Peace and Conflict Studies for Genocide Intervention and Prevention

Paul Cormier, Peter Karari, Alka Kumar, Robin Neustaeter, Jodi Read, and Jessica Senehi

Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: The Past, Present and Future

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Localizing Peace: An Agenda for Sustainable Peacebuilding

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Rethinking Reconciliation: The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa

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The Role of the European Union as a Peace Builder: Northern Ireland as a Case Study

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A Hermeneutics of Blessing as a Meta-Requisite for Reconciliation: John E. Toews’ Romans Paradigm as a Case Study

Vern Neufeld Redekop
Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS—ISSN1082-7307) is committed to interdisciplinary explorations on conflict resolution, peace building, humanitarian assistance, and other alternative mechanisms that seek to prevent and control violence. PCS is also interested in articles focusing on social change and nonviolence: sustainable development, ecological balance, community revitalization, reflective practice, action research, social justice, human rights, gender equality, intercultural relations, grassroots movements and organizational transformations. Manuscripts may address various human experiences, social issues, and policy agendas that are connected to the research literature, practice, and experiential learning in the fields. As a semiannual academic journal, PCS is published in an online format (http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/). Views expressed in articles and other contributions that appear in PCS may not necessarily reflect endorsement by the Editorial Board or Staff. PCS provides opportunities and forums for dialogs over various ideas, assessments, recommendations, and critiques.

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Introduction to the Special Issues:
Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation

Edited by
Jessica Senehi, Stephen Ryan and Sean Byrne

Abstract
This introductory article in the special issue on Peacebuilding, Reconciliation, and Transformation highlights some of the central themes within the emergent field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS). The article discusses how this transdisciplinary field contributes to our understanding of some of the key issues that confront the PACS field in terms of analysis, theory building, and praxis. The contributors to this special issue provide a broad array of perspectives that explores conflicts and its transformation from a multidimensional perspective.

Introduction

The EU–Canada Conflict Analysis and Resolution Program: A Cross-Cultural, Transdisciplinary Experiment in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding is a highly innovative and interdisciplinary project, which commenced on October 1, 2007, that will end on September 30, 2010. The program addresses six themes, each intellectually challenging and vitally important to European Union (EU) and Canadian citizens. It explores conflicts in the EU and Canada related to family and community, business, the environment, gender, ethnicity and foreign policy. The latter theme also opens up possibilities for
participants to learn about the actions and attitudes of both regions towards conflict in other parts of the world.

In the course of examining these themes, the Program’s student participants have contended with an array of complicating factors. For example, quite apart from skills and training, one’s language, experiences and world view all influence how one perceives and reacts to conflict. The Program participants had the unique opportunity to experience and learn to contend with these cultural challenges. Within the EU-Canada context, issues of race, ethnicity, class, and gender are often addition complicating factors. Thus, student participants in the Program explored these differing attitudes, assumptions, values, and approaches that characterize negotiation within the different EU-Canadian cultures and postulated ways to deal effectively with cultural differences.

The objectives of this project was to create a student-exchange program aimed at creating citizens of the EU and Canada equipped to assess and handle conflict skillfully, peacefully and effectively. The primary field of study and training was Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, however the program also dealt with senior undergraduate and graduate students in a wide variety of disciplines including Social Sciences, Political Science, Sociology, Economics, Psychology, Social Work, International Relations, Performing Arts, Environmental Science, Languages, Law, Communication, Journalism and Business Studies among others.

Participants included 36 undergraduate seniors and graduate students: 18 each from Canada and the EU, and 6 per university have participated in the student mobility experience. Students participated in one semester (approximately four months abroad). The Consortium included the following institutions: in the EU, (1) the University of
Ulster (United Kingdom), (2) the University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), and (3) the Irish School of Ecumenics–Trinity College Dublin (Republic of Ireland); and, in Canada, (1) the University of Manitoba (Manitoba), (2) Conrad Grebel University College–University of Waterloo (Ontario), and (3) Saint Paul University (Ontario). This special issue of the *Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* arises from the many conversations we have had over the past three years on cutting edge issues in the field. The following article discusses a number of these issues while the contributors to this special issue outline the ideas in more detail in their individual essays.

**Social Justice and Peacemaking**

Gandhi (1992) believed that peace begins internally within the self. One can only search for the truth (satyagraha) non-violently (ahimsa) by breaking out of the cycle of one’s oppression. Gandhi sought to empower the individual and to provide a sense of hope to get a commitment to non-violent action based on *ahimsa*, or truth, in the external world (Burrowes, 1996). Every individual has a personal responsibility and a duty to contribute to world peace, or to “be” the peace they wish to see. People can make a decision to forge transformative change within society (Barash and Webel, 2002). We can imagine and believe in the possibility of peace by reprogramming the mind to a new way of thinking and by developing a paradigm of “power with” rather than “power over” (Boulding, 1990b, 2000). Can we rebuild our world by thinking globally and acting locally? Positive peace or social justice can be built upon peace education and structural change (Brock-Utne, 1985; Byrne, 1997).
Thus, peacemaking and social justice is an interdisciplinary inquiry, which addresses the issues of peace and war, violence, and nonviolence in contemporary world society (Jeong, 2008). It addresses, in particular, three main questions: (1) What are the roots and sources of destructive conflicts, and can they be prevented and, if so, in what circumstances? (2) What is peace, and what are the means of achieving peace, social justice, and peaceful change? And (3) what means are there of transforming violent structures into peaceful structures?

Thus, there is a need to provide a more in-depth understanding of peacemaking and peacebuilding strategies within different arenas in the world context. For example, it is necessary to focus on the realist “power-over” model and the origins or prevention (e.g., deterrence) of war, the social milieu in which a number of military strategists functioned, and how that environment influenced the tactics, operations, strategies, leadership, and political processes that were most crucial in their decision to use threats or applications of force as a conflict management mechanism (Burrowes, 1996). It is important to understand the dynamics and factors that contribute to war if we are to comprehend and, instead, promote the waging of peace (Enloe, 2001). In other words, peace is not the antitheses of war because both elements co-exist on a continuum that is constantly impacted by a number of socio-economic, cultural, psychological, and political factors that influence what strategy will be adopted as peacemaking and peacebuilding instruments (Boulding, 1990b).

The conflict intervener needs to know about power relations and the origins of war if she or he is to develop analytical tools to successfully intervene in conflict situations. Consequently, HoWon Jeong (2010) poses a number of important questions:
How does one see the future? Must one accept the realist counsel that trends are destiny, that is, trends in physical, structural, ecological and cultural violence? What makes more sense, fatalistically accepting the future as a fixed path, or the engagement of active citizenship in proactive responses in peacemaking and peacebuilding? Alternatives to violence and ecologically unsustainable forms of development must be explored if we are to empower people to change their world (Jeong, 2005).

Consequently, every religious tradition conveys its own distinctive resources for peacemaking, social justice, and human rights advocacy and also for applications of force as in “just war” theory (Abu-Nimer, 2003; Kaldor, 2007). While no single religious tradition or cultural institution has ever demonstrated adequate competence or proficiency with regard to its own chronic conflicts and inhumanity (Appleby, 2000; Gopin, 2000), collectively these wisdom traditions (some would call them hokum) convey an invaluable supplement to each other’s (and secular society’s) peacemaking, social justice, and human rights resources (Sampson and Lederach, 2000; Smock, 1995, 2002).

Interdependence is a means of conflict prevention—but as the latest world economic woes have shown—also grounds for increased tension and resentment. Political, economic, and environmental problems increasingly cross geographical boundaries and require international cooperation, rather than competition, to be resolved (Homer-Dixon, 2009). Identity factors, while a source of great strength inside communities, are also often an obstacle to the achievement of inter-communal peace (Byrne, 2001b). We need to understand the various theoretical approaches to the conceptualisation of ethnicity, nationalism, and identity, and to ask if and, if so, under what circumstances, identity-based politics poses a threat to peace; the findings are mixed.
(Irvin, 1999; O'Leary and McGarry, 1993). If this is the case, then can the PACS field offer a serious alternative?

Further, as Alice Ackerman (200b) succinctly argues we need to look at the role of the media and information transmission in society, in both peace and war, and their relationship to governments and public opinion. There is a need to know whether or not the media (in its various forms) promotes an objective view of peace (Strobel, 2001). Important here is the concept of ‘peace journalism’ (McGoldrick and Lynch, 2005). We also need to look at the changing nature and role of the media within contemporary society (Ackerman 2000b). For example, symbols are important in peace and in war, and they can be used as weapons in the pursuit of both (Ackerman, 2000b). Third-party interveners need to understand the invention, adoption, and use of symbols, whether signage, territory, people, or events, and assess their impact in relation to specific conflicts (Schirch, 2004). How do symbols adopt an intrinsic (political) worth of their own and how have they been modified across time? Moreover, media people need more training in the precursors, roots, and remedies of conflict as well as exploring the role of the Internet and other new technologies in spreading peaceful (or not) ideas (Webel and Galtung, 2007).

In addition, we need to examine the role of warlords and peacemakers in the contemporary international system. It is thus critical to assess the role of political and community leadership in peacebuilding processes and examine the salience of the warrior model of leadership (Ackerman 2000a; Enloe, 2001; Sylvester, 1987). We also need to understand how to address the ‘spoiler’ problem, when warlords are prepared to use violence to resist peace processes (Stedman, 1997; Darby, 2001). With reference to
particular leaders, we need to examine changing styles of leadership, and the obstacles that they have faced in making the transition from protagonist to pragmatist (Pearson and Olson-Lounsbery, 2009). We should attempt to answer the question about whether gender really matters predictably as a leadership factor (Ackerman, 2000b).

Drawing on experiences in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia there has been a proliferation of studies in the past decade that examine post-violence peacebuilding and conflict prevention (see, for example, Maynard, 1999; Paris, 2004; Pugh, 2000; Rupesinghe, 1998). We need to look at the roles, reputations, and possible futures of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and NATO, and their ability to build peace in the 21st century. In the aftermath of protracted ethnic conflicts, can peace be developed without reconciling the perpetrator and the victim (Power, 2003)? We need to understand the issues surrounding the nature of “victims” in conflict and the role of “justice” in peace processes, and the efforts at achieving reconciliation and justice, which have been central aspects of peacebuilding efforts in protracted ethnopolitical conflicts.

**The Peace and Conflict Studies Field**

It is nearly a cliché that “the world is getting smaller.” Increasingly, through processes such as immigration and conglomeration, people from different backgrounds are coming together and interacting in communities and in the workplace. Global dangers such as climate change and nuclear war require multinational cooperation. As in all human history conflict is being defined along religious, gender, and ethnic lines.
Throughout the world, violence and human rights abuses abound. Where peace accords have been signed, the critical work of reconciliation, healing, and peacebuilding remain (Lederach, 2005). At no time has the need to resolve conflict peacefully while promoting justice and reconciliation been greater. In this nuclear age, the future of the world could well depend upon the ability to meet this need. The interdisciplinary study of PACS has emerged in recent decades to bring people of diverse theoretical and experiential backgrounds together to: (1) research these complex social problems in a systematic way, and also (2) to develop and promote strategies, policies, and skill sets for addressing these issues.

In 1957, Kenneth Boulding and others, to provide a rigorous international and interdisciplinary approach to conflict resolution, established the Journal of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan (Barash and Webel, 2002). In 1963, in Oslo, Johan Galtung established the Journal of Peace Research and broadened the focus of the field to encompass not only nuclear deterrence, but also issues of structural violence, development, human rights, and social justice (Boulding, 1977; Galtung, 1975ab, 1985, 1987). In 1965, the International Peace Research Association was formed, bringing together international scholars from diverse disciplines that share a preoccupation with goals of peace, justice, respect for diversity, and the need for sustained environmental viability. In 1985, the Canadian government established the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and in 1984, the U.S. Institute of Peace was established in the United States to support scholarship in PACS. In Europe important work has been done inter alia by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, INCORE, and the Berghof Foundation. An increasing number of
journals have been dedicated to PACS. The sum total of all these efforts is to expand knowledge in the field.

PACS has emerged as a field within the contexts of the Anti-War, Civil Rights, Women’s, and Community Empowerment movements of the 1960s in the United States, which have advocated for the just and nonviolent transformation of protracted social conflicts (Byrne and Senehi, 2009). In addition, conflict resolution scholar-practitioners—such as Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Edward Azar, John Burton, Ronald Fisher, John Groom, Neil Katz, Herbert Kelman Louis Kriesberg, Janie Leatherman, John Paul Lederach, Christopher Mitchell, Susan Allan Nan, Joyce Neu, Thania Paffenholz, Betty Reardon, Jay Rothman, Nadim Rouhana, Anna Snyder, among others—have developed many skills and processes that were used by mediators in local communities to do peacemaking work in larger regional, ethnic, and international conflicts.

In the 1980s, the PACS field move in the direction of certification as law schools began to teach Alternative or Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) courses such as mediation, arbitration, group problem-solving, adjudication, international law, and negotiation. ADR surfaced in many settings, from interpersonal to international relations, in the recognition in both the legal and policy fields that dispute resolution, or conflict management as it is called in some circles, has become a matter of national importance and an area demanding a high level of professionalism (Umbreit, 2006).

In the United States, partly out of concern for the overburdened court system, the American Bar Association (ABA) became heavily involved during the early seventies with the development of alternative, often grassroots centres for resolving citizen and community conflicts (Kriesberg, 1997). This development paralleled an information
explosion generated by social scientists, lawyers, community organizers, negotiators, and mediators regarding how and why various racial, communal, and public policy disputes of the 1960s and 1970s were being, or had been, resolved (Duffy and others, 1991). By 1980, a national professional organization, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), had been formed; community dispute resolution centres existed in every major American city on a model of trained volunteers intervening locally; and the ADR movement among lawyers and professionals had changed the curriculum of various law schools and the issues to which the ABA would be attuned (Kriesberg, 2001). Issues such as victim-offender reconciliation came to prominence, with international application, as in South Africa’s “truth and reconciliation” processes (Minnow, 1998).

ACR was launched in January 2001, when the Academy of Family Mediators (AFM), the Conflict Resolution Education Network (CREnet), and the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) merged into one organization.

Also in the 1970s and 1980s, undergraduate majors and master’s programs in peace studies and conflict resolution sprung up in universities in North America, Europe, South East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in response to student demands to better understand the analysis and resolution of conflicts (Kriesberg, 1997). For example, as early as 1965, Wayne State University’s Center for Teaching About War and Peace (later the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies) was established in Detroit; in 1973, the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford awarded graduate degrees in Peace Studies. In 1987, the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University began offering a Ph.D. program in Conflict Resolution. In
1984, UNESCO established the European Peace University in Austria, and a new M.A. Program in Peace Studies.

The role of International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) at the United Nations also focused the international community’s attention on humanitarian, refugee, and protracted civil war issues around the globe (Snyder, 2003). Hence, countries such as Canada, Norway, Ireland, Sweden, and others began to advocate for the human rights and human needs of global citizens as political and socioeconomic resources were put to the analysis, resolution and intervention in conflicts (Kriesberg, 2001). These moves resulted in breakthroughs such as the international Ottawa Treaty to ban landmines in 1999.

Today academic programs in this new field, as well as government supported institutes such as Canada’s Lester B. Pearson Centre and the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, are teaching students and supplying curricular materials concerning the analytical, theoretical, and practice skills necessary to study violence and design appropriate interventions in violent conflicts at multiple levels of analysis (Kriesberg, 2001).

Faculty and students are discussing human needs, minority rights, human rights, human security, violence prevention, restorative justice, cultural and gender identities, environmental sustainability, appropriate technologies for development, creativity and peacemaking, and peace education (Jeong, 2010). Violence and social conflicts in a variety of domains and at different levels are examined, including, among others, international war, ethnic and intercultural conflicts, community conflicts, environmental conflict, and conflict in businesses, health care institutions, inter-personal violence, and schools (Jeong, 2010). The PACS field examines direct, cultural, and structural violence that encompasses war, genocide, hate crimes, family violence, and violence against
children (Polkinghorn and Byrne, 2001). Social cleavages such as those along class, race, religious, gender, ethnic, or linguistic divides are also studied. The goal is to identify, analyze, and promote diverse nonviolent approaches for addressing the various forms of violent conflict in ways that are sustainable, meet the needs of all parties, and attend to social justice. The assumption of the PACS field is that—although violent conflicts differ and each conflict has unique aspects—there are common theoretical ideas for understanding and responding to violent conflicts at different levels and in different contexts. Clearly, the PACS field is an important emerging area of study. There is a large demand for study in this area both in North America and internationally, including students from countries where there have been protracted violent conflicts in recent decades.

The PACS field also gives the “pracademic” the tools not only to analyze the deep causes of violent conflict across socio-economic, cultural, political, psychological, historical, and environmental dimensions, but also to determine how diverse peacemaking tools can manage and prevent them. This has resulted in practical guides to peace work in areas of peacemaking (for example, Galtung and others, 2002; Banks and Mitchell, 1996) and peacebuilding (for example, Reychler and Paffenholz, 2001). Analysis and practice in the PACS field seek to uncover “the relationships between inequality, injustice and power asymmetry on the one hand and violence on the other” and “provide various strategies for achieving peace” (Jeong, 2000, p.1). The PACS field is relevant to improvement in human wellbeing and the future survival of humanity (what Johan Galtung, 1996 calls “positive peace”) and encompasses a variety of themes ranging from peace pedagogies, environmental policies, cultural norms, development practice,
inter-religious dialogue, nonviolence, social justice, human rights, and indigenous peacemaking among others (Jeong, 2010). A PACS perspective, therefore, seeks to broaden our concerns beyond peacemaking (i.e., conflict resolution and conflict management) to include peacekeeping, human rights, and peacebuilding.

**Conflict Analysis and Resolution**

Conflict analysis and resolution expands beyond the state system to include additional actors, especially formal and informal mediators and third-party interveners, and it frames broader issues of culture, violence, ethnicity, identity, human rights, the environment, proliferation, sexism, development, and ethnocentrism among others (Cheldin, Druckman and Fast, 2003; Jeong, 2000). Thus, philosophical foundations of conflict knowledge influence: (1) how we analyze violent conflicts, (2) how we intervene in violent conflicts and, (3) how we ultimately decide which conflict processes are most appropriate for a given conflict situation (Sandole, Byrne, Sandole-Staroste, and Senehi, 2009). The relationship of both of these components is very important when one analyzes social conflict issues. One learns not only to understand and analyze the perceptions and worldviews of others but ones own views and how both may affect ones intervention activities in any conflict environment (Weeks, 1992).

Conflicts occur within different ecological contexts and cultural systems, which stem from a variety of needs and interests. Theories about the origins and emergence of conflicts at all levels (interpersonal through international) are the starting point of the conflict resolution component of the field (Jeong, 2008). The argument is that once scholars and conflict resolution practitioners understand where conflict comes from, they...
can focus on the possibilities for conflict resolution (Ross, 1993, 2007). In other words, one needs to know the basic theoretical concepts of the field and seek to apply this knowledge as we learn practice skills for intervening in and resolving conflicts (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1988; Gray, 1989). Practical strategies for identifying and resolving sources of conflict necessitate that conflict interveners or practitioners receive practical training at the introductory and advanced levels in mediation, negotiation, facilitation, problem-solving, and storytelling and narrative methods (Byrne, 2000; Schwarz, 1994; Senehi, 2009ab; Ury, Brett and Goldberg, 1993). Skills training is placed in the wider context of academic research on social conflict, mediation, conflict resolution, and on group processes. Conflict resolution skills assist the third-party intervener in conflict to wage conflicts productively and to resolve them. Paul Wehr’s conflict mapping idea illustrates this point too.

The conflict resolution scholar and practitioner seek to answer the following questions at both the theoretical level and the level of personal action: What are the causes and consequences of social conflict? How do we come to know and understand what conflict is? How do our assumptions about conflict affect our strategies for management or resolution? What methods are available for waging and resolving conflicts productively rather than destructively?

The conflict resolution component of the PACS field also explores the cultural dimensions of conflict, including the role of culture in defining and understanding conflict for individuals and groups, by looking at the cultural dimensions of conflict in three ways: the dynamics of interpersonal beliefs and socialization, academic theory, and international conflict (Avruch, 1998). Certain cultures handle conflict differently, have different conflict
resolution styles, and that remedies prescribed from outside might or might not fit those norms (Rice, 2009). Our understanding of these issues has been deepened by anthropological studies of war zones (Nordstrom, 2004; Loizos, 2008). Third-party interveners—such as mediators, facilitators, or negotiators—must explore their own personal biases and learn how to recognize and elicit the biases of others (Lederach, 1995). In particular, interveners’ values, perceptions, experiences, and assumptions are related to their own cultural background, so that a self assessment of “blind spots” and cultural and gender assumptions that play a role in conflict perception and assessment must be recognized (Kolb and Coolidge, 1991). It is critical to be aware of variables related to the definition and processing of conflicts across cultures; the effects of child rearing practices, language, family structure, racism, sexism, kinship, and other cultural variables on levels of conflict and violence in a society; the role of culturally sensitive assessment as a requirement for conflict intervention; and the ways of gaining insight into the perspectives of others in conflict situations (Cohen, 1995; Senehi, 2002).

Just as culture is critical to the analysis and resolution of conflicts, communication styles are also critical to understanding, analyzing, and managing conflict (Bolton, 1986; Tannen, 1990). The human and emotional aspects of conflict include the influence of anger, gender, and culture, which in turn impact the practice-based approaches to mediation and negotiation (Kriesberg, 1998, Lewiki, Saunders and Minton, 1999). For example, gender roles matter in conflict, and conflict is experienced and perceived differently by men and women (Northrup, 1996; Stephens, 1994). The process of mediation is used to resolve civil, commercial, family, public, and workplace disputes (Moore, 1996). Mediation principles and skills, different approaches to mediation, and...
current research in mediation are now quite sophisticated with a number of states in the U.S., for example, requiring board certification before a mediator can establish a private practice (Hocker and Wilmot, 1995; Katz and Lawyer, 1992). Communication theory speaks of the importance of “face” in some societies, as well as high and low context cultures that generate misunderstandings (Broome, 2009), as when the US “demands” that Japan abide by “fair trade” rules or that North Korea cease its nuclear research.

Third parties are also used for resolving unproductive negotiations influencing the dynamics, quality, and outcomes of the negotiation process. Third-party interveners need to blend theory and skill practice that will help them recognize the relation between theoretical principles and actual behaviour and will prepare them to negotiate more effectively (Deutsch and Coleman, 2000). In particular, third-party interveners must be aware of the basics of competitive, distributive, and positional (win-lose) negotiation; collaborative, integrative, and mutual gains bargaining; and the use of power and negotiation in unequal power relations (Kolb, 1994; Lewecki, Saunders and Minton, 1999). Transformational conflict resolution and peacebuilding is also an important component of the PACS field.

**Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding**

Moving beyond negotiated agreements, the concept of conflict transformation explores the possibilities for achieving justice, reconciliation, and sustainable peace in societies where deep-rooted and persistent (or recurrent) violent conflicts have had a devastating impact economically, politically, and socially (Byrne, 2001a; McCandless, 1999; Rupesinghe, 1995). The nature of deep-rooted conflicts focus on the interpersonal,
relational, structural, and cultural shifts that must take place for people to move out of and away from complex, protracted, violent, or potentially violent social conflict (Ryan, 2007). The practices of peacebuilding and conflict transformation seek to mobilize people and resources to transform unjust structures and relationships (Senehi, 1996, 2000, 2002). Transformation can range from “reframing” disputes to seek common ground between adversaries, to fully reconciling previously distrustful and vengeful adversaries. Specific attention must be given to the key issues of human security, identity, justice, human rights, and reconciliation (Axworthy, 2003; Lederach, 1997), all caught up in what John Burton (1990) referred to as “human needs” theory. The conflict transformation practitioner at the community level has to adopt and learn from the key concepts, techniques, and innovative approaches of conflict revolvers at the international level to develop a more humanistic, transformative approach to conflict analysis and resolution, and peacebuilding (Bloomfield, 1997; Hughes, 1998).

Moreover, ethnic- and community-based conflicts are an emerging area of inquiry in PACS, especially since the end of the Cold War (Olson-Lounsbery and Pearson, 2009; Pearson and Olson-Lounsbery, 2009; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2005; Darby and MacGinty, 2003; Gurr, 2000) as the international “community” has more often intervened and intervened in multilateral formats to attempt to end civil disputes (Talentino, 2005). PACS scholars and practitioners are now illuminating the merits and limitations of a variety of prescriptions for regulating and resolving ethnic- and community-based conflicts (Byrne and others, 2000; Hume, 1996). We need to understand how individuals, groups, and countries struggle to achieve justice, reparations, and, on occasion, reconciliation in the aftermath of mass violence, torture, forced
relocation, ethnic cleansing, rape warfare, and genocide (Carter, Irani and Volkan, 2008; Volkan, 1998). Conflict specialists can connect, work with, and influence humanitarian aid efforts, capacity building, democratization efforts, and conflict transformation projects (Leatherman and Nadezhda Griffin, 2009). Difficulties encountered by western interventions in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan have also led some to challenge the assumptions of the so-called ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ when applied to situations of civil war (MacGinty and Richmond, 2009; Rieff, 2005; Chandler, 2002; Snyder, 2000)

Conflict resolution practitioners also need to understand the multiple types of post-conflict trauma, recognize the symptoms of trauma and violence, and assess the types of interventions that may be needed, both short- and long- term (Byrne and Keashly, 2000). Relief and assistance programs from refugee rescue to humanitarian relief, the international Red Cross, UN programs, Rotary International, Mennonite and Quaker NGOs, and Christian relief efforts need to address the ethical and practical dimensions of dealing with traumatized individuals in a variety of settings (Snyder, 2003). We have also witnessed the welcome emergence of professionals in varied fields who have turned their attention to peacemaking, beginning with Vietnamera Scientists and Physicians against War groups, to latter day Medecins sans Frontiers and Engineers Without Borders initiatives.

In addition, reconciliation is a multi-dimensional process that envelops truth, mercy, justice, and peace (Lederach, 1997, 1999) building relationships, and promoting justice so that people can heal form the past (Galtung, 1996; Ryan, 2007). Liberation education uses local cultural resources to get people to think critically about self in context (Friere, 1999). Indigenous knowledge systems of local people inform conflict

Linking personal involvement at the micro to the macro political level creates “empowerment and recognition” (Bush and Folger, 1995). Personal involvement in local grassroots organizations teaches organizational skills and builds self-esteem and self-efficacy (Schwerin, 1995). Implemented correctly this might negate the notorious problem of the extremist “spoiler” or rejectionists which undercut peace negotiations and agreements (e.g., the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Israel and President Anwar Sadat in Egypt). Transformational conflict resolution is organic and nonviolent (Ury, 2000, p. 4), and involves the whole community working for social justice for all (Knox and Hughes, 1996; Vayrynen, 1991).

“Imagining a shared future” (Boulding, 1990a) allows people to think creatively outside of the box to create a new way of doing (Lederach, 2005), i.e., an ongoing momentum of mutual conciliation rather than mutual antagonism. Participation in encounter groups to build trust and dialogue groups and problem-solving workshops assist people in forging mutual understanding (Kelman, 1997; Rothman, 1997), to transform and transcend “chosen traumas of the past” (Volkan, 1998). Transformation praxis integrates middle-range leaders and the grassroots to create a myriad of opportunities to address the direct, cultural and structural roots of conflicts (Lederach, 1997). Involving all of the stakeholders in the negotiation and peace-making process...
builds trust and a commitment to peacemaking (Byrne, 1995; Kelman, 1997; Rothman, 1997; Yang, 1998).

Moreover, human development empowers people to develop their own capacities (Curle, 1990). Properly targeted socio-economic resources can build a sustainable infrastructure of peace (Diamond and McDonald, 1996) including people in their cultural context (Lederach, 1997). For some, spiritual transformation also provides the individual with a sense of meaning and motivation to strive nonviolently for truth and justice (Gandhi, 1992; Lentz, 1976), to transform structures and relationships.

The transformation conflict resolution process moves people from a destructive mode toward accommodation and coexistence (Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson, 1989; Yang, 1998). A multi-modal and multi-level intervention approach that encompasses a plethora of social factors that escalate conflict has to coordinate the cross-level peacebuilding efforts (Byrne and Carter, 1996; Byrne, Carter and Senehi, 2003) that also ensures that negotiated agreements are implemented on the ground (Kriesberg, 1999). Stepping outside of the box to imagine peace is also a critical component of the PACS field.

**Imagining Peace**

Worldwide and domestic events demonstrate to the efficacy of power to overwhelm goodwill and trust in the short term, but also substantiate the power of nonviolent struggle in the long term. The continued use of violence on all levels raises our awareness of its cost in psychological damage and human life (Sharp, 2005). As we become increasingly conscious of the urgent need for alternatives to violence, more
scholars, educators, and institutions are working to refine our thinking and practice in nonviolence.

Reducing the momentum of a conflict is more difficult than taking early preventive measures to forestall violence by addressing the dynamics and sources not the symptoms (Jeong, 2008). Thus, the PACS field can assist in early warning; the effective transition though to early response can make all of the difference regarding peace and war (Arthur, 2009). Unfortunately response is often muted or delayed for actors’ individual interests, as in the failure of the international community to intervene in genocide in Rwandan politics of the 1990s.

The PACS field embraces envisioning and the creative imagination, as well as institutionalizing legal and political processes to invent and envisage and to uphold an alternative more peaceful approach to world politics. For instance, Warren Ziegler (1995) has designed workshops to envision a world without weapons to develop participants’ capacity to envisage alternative futures. Given the opportunity to invent, through envisioning, a different world, student participants in the workshops had new tools to work to make it happen. The use of the imagination through directed visioning is an ideal tool to use in the peacemaking and conflict resolution process. For example, storytelling is an intervention process that benefits from the empowerment given to participants through visioning (Senehi, 2000, 2002, 2009ab).

The use of visioning allows the parties to imagine a future and not be stuck in the present, even to imagine more effective institutions to address and prevent violence. The ability to envision a future without violent conflict and/or violence encourages the parties to work toward transforming their relationships and addressing the deep roots of the
conflict (Ruane and Todd, 1996). As Elise Boulding (1990a) noted, “people are empowered to action by their own sense of the possible” (p. 380). The envisioning process is used to enhance cognitive and analytical skills in resolving conflicts. Being able to envision a difference can allow the individual to make that difference a reality. Elise Boulding (1992) notes, “It has been empirically demonstrated in all sorts of experiments that people with the same capacities, but with different aspiration levels perform according to their aspirations levels, not according to their capacities” (p. 380). The use of visioning is an extension of the creative process that leads directly to the establishment of values and needs, and in individuals’ actions and reactions to their surroundings.

Meanwhile, the creative use of the imagination has been stymied through technology and repression (Boulding, 1990a). Elise Boulding (1990a) holds out hope for the power of creative imagination: “It is clear…that the human capacity for imaging…is not lost, only weakened. It can be nurtured back to vigorousness and liveliness. Vigor in imagery leads to vigor in social action” (p. 386). Thus, visioning is a process used to imagine new and more creative resolutions to conflicts, and is an important intervention tool within the PACS field.

**Human Rights and Peace and Conflict Studies**

Applied research on how human rights and PACS are related in significant ways is critical as human rights abuses often emerge in the context of social conflicts and war. It has also become a central issue for societies in the transition stage from violence to
peace (Bell, 2003). Peace is defined as not only the absence of war, but also the presence of human rights, social justice, and human security (Byrne and Senehi, 2009a). The issues of power, culture, and meaning, which are central to PACS must be a part of the study of human rights. Also, PACS focuses not only on theory, but also on practice, including approaches for effective communication, positive social change, social justice, peacemaking, and addressing the root causes of conflict—all of which are essential for addressing human rights. Often, the definition of particular human rights is a serious source of conflict—for example, genocide, the death penalty, abortion, conscientious objection, or cultural factors in human rights (Byrne and Senehi, 2009b; Power, 2003; Wiesel, 1961). Negotiating such contentious issues require techniques and skills associated with PACS, and is part of the process of democracy and human rights.

Applied research on the theoretical and practical connections of human rights to PACS includes the consideration that to theorize human rights, it is important to develop a body of scholars who share a vocabulary and a central focus on the breadth of issues relevant in human rights (O’Byrne, 2003). While each discipline has ideas related to human rights, they may be so specific that they preclude making the connection between the micro and macro levels of society, or between theory and practice, or synthesizing the knowledge of the various courses in order to develop general skills in addressing human rights as a contemporary problem (Byrne and Senehi, 2009b).

This would include human rights and issues addressed in PACS that involve critical contemporary social problems relevant to every dimension of society. Every discipline has a wealth of theoretical approaches that can inform problem-solving. As students develop specialized research areas, they need to bring a theoretical depth that
might be offered, for example, in specific disciplinary traditions. Such specialization helps the Ph.D. graduate find a job in a department other than one specifically in human rights or in PACS. This would include evaluative research on PACS practitioners, with a particular focus on those working in the area of human rights and in peace and justice organizations.

**Young People and Peace Education**

Research to describe the motivation of students with human rights and peace education is extremely relevant. This includes research on students’ hunger to have critical questions addressed: Why is there violence in our society? Why is there conflict between, and violence toward, identity groups? And, importantly, what can be done about it? Increasingly, our students have experienced violence first-hand in their communities, families, or life experience, making these topics highly relevant. To not make these issues central in our education may be experienced by young people as a form of denial or silencing (Beah, 2007; Greenspan, 2003).

Research and practice focuses on nurturing global citizens, future leaders, and peacemakers. Our students are tomorrow’s leaders. Many young people have an idealism that should be recognized and supported. Youth have an important role to play in creating a culture of peace that supports human rights in their workplaces, communities, and in the world (Helsing and others, 2006, Senehi and Byrne, 2006, McEvoy-Levy, 2006). Students will bring their human rights knowledge into their various disciplines and professions. Basic research on promoting a positive civil culture in the classroom as
educators who have included human rights education in their curriculum have reported a more positive class culture in their schools (Sapon-Shevin, 1999).

**Women, Human Rights, and Peacebuilding**

Recent research has alerted us to the absence of women in all areas of peace work. This includes peacekeeping (Mazurana and others, 2005), peacemaking, and peacebuilding (Porter, 2007). That this is a problem has now been recognised by the U.N. in its groundbreaking Resolution 1325. Yet much more work needs to be done in relation to the contribution women can make in the areas covered by this special edition. Applied research focuses on some of the consequences of the more than 200 “identity” wars throughout the world that are the biggest challenge to human rights, and global and human security (Leatherman and Griffin, 2009). This includes research on the impact of war on women who are killed, maimed, brutalized, orphaned, traumatized, and/or impoverished (Mortenson and Relin, 2008). Such research resonates with Canada’s identity as a global leader in promoting world peace, human rights, and collective security, and serving as a model of how people from different backgrounds and with different histories can live together in relative peace.

This includes research on reflexive praxis that has practitioners analyzing complex conflicts through multidimensional lenses to design appropriate intervention processes so that they can intervene more effectively in social conflicts and as scholars develop better theory (Byrne and Keashly, 2000). Systems and structures involve stakeholders with different goals, interests, power, and worldviews. Research to identify
the parties, issues, relationships, and the source of conflict, and focus on the human and emotional aspects of conflict, which includes the influence and intervention of anger, gender, class, religion, culture, and human rights (Enloe, 2007). Identifying sources of conflict may not be as a simple task when the causes are embedded in an institution’s structure and operating systems. Consequently, if the rules, roles, or responsibilities are designed to produce conflict, then resolving conflicts often requires some structural or systemic changes which may produce unintended, and non obvious consequences (Kriesberg, 2002). Research is important to evaluate and assess how theory and practice work or collide when dealing with complex problems in human systems and structures in our interdisciplinary approach to practice and theory building. For example, defining key theoretical concepts such as transformation, human rights, and social justice may lead to confusion in both theory-building and in praxis rather than more informed and effective practice and theory-building (Ryan, 2007).

Conclusions

It is easy to forget how young PACS is as an area of academic study. The students who have participated in the EU-Canada Conflict Analysis and Resolution may be just the second generation who have had an opportunity to be educated in this field. They will have to grapple with perennial problems of violence and peace in a world that is changing rapidly. Some have been addressed in the following contributions and others, such as global poverty, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the threats to the environment have not. It is our belief that the PACS field offers an effective and
inspiring methodology to those working for social change to create a just and peaceful world, especially when it provides them with the opportunity to travel to new places and be exposed to new perspectives. PACS empowers individuals and communities to work together to transform relationships and society to build a culture of peace and a just and fair society.

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Genocide is one of the most challenging problems of our age. In her book, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power (2002) argues that the United States, while in a position to intervene in genocide, has lacked the will to do so, and therefore it is incumbent on the U.S. citizenry to pressure their government to act. This article reviews how the topic of genocide raises questions along the fault lines of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS). In this article, a framework is provided to examine genocide and responses to it. This includes a review of a multiplicity of factors that (a) facilitate genocide, (b) constrain action in the face of it, and (c) facilitate intervention. In this analysis, further consideration is given to the location of the actor either within the region of the conflict or external to it. Our goal is to situate the study of genocide in the PACS field and promote to the articulation of possibilities for intervention by individuals, organizations, and policymakers.
Introduction


We found that the book resonated powerfully and fundamentally with our commitment to peace and social justice, and also raised questions along the fault lines of the Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS) field: (a) Power focuses on decision-making to intervene militarily, and PACS examines effective nonviolent measures for achieving social justice. (b) These genocides are very direct and visible, but how do we name structural violence and indirect, invisible oppression—another face of genocide—within our own societies? (c) The language of human rights focuses on name-blame-and-shame
type approaches toward perpetrators of the crime of genocide whereas PACS methodologies emphasize mutual respect toward all parties and separating the people from the problem. And, finally, (d) in the face of the kind of brutality and victimization of whole groups of people that has occurred in the past centuries and continues to take place, how can we maintain the hope, optimism, and belief in human agency that is such a part of the PACS field, and is it realistic to do so?

We address these questions in the theoretical background of this paper. A general conclusion is that by fracturing the problem, we can perhaps find footholds and handholds for scaling this precipice. We do this in two ways: First, we address in turn, the factors that (a) facilitate genocide itself, (b) facilitate responses characterized by inaction, and (c) facilitate responses characterized by effective intervention and prevention. We further develop this analysis with a consideration of the intervener’s location either within the region of conflict or external to it. This analysis is a beginning sketch, and should be further developed and tested. This is significant for facing up to some of the cloudier areas in our field, and critically interrogating what this field can offer in situations that manifest extreme conflict and violence.

Dilemmas for the Field

Again, examining genocide in terms of our field and our reading of Power’s book raised some dilemmas for the PACS field—especially in the North American construction of the field—that are typically avoided. Here, we raise these issues and
discuss them briefly, but each one is worthy of a full-length article in itself. Further, we review some of the theoretical perspectives from PACS to the examination of this topic.

*Commitment to Nonviolence*

As A. J. Muste was famously quoted in the *New York Times* in 1967, “there is no way to peace, peace is the way”—that is, process and outcome are inextricable (Lederach, 1995). At the heart of the PACS field is a commitment to nonviolence: its moral authority (King, 1999), its transformative potential (Gandhi, 1962), and its strategic possibilities (Sharp, 2005). While Power exposes how genocide is a tool of political manoeuvring that hinders an effective response to people’s suffering and how genocide often occurs under the cover of war, she consistently affirms military or armed intervention to stop genocide. A concern is that the use of violence to stop violence increases harm to people, does not get to the root of the issues, and locates power in weapons rather than people.

In the PACS field, this gap between nonviolence and military intervention is rarely, if at all, bridged, nor discussed in length. Nonviolence typically encompasses the issues of war resistance, peace activism, and conscientious objection, as well as compelling critiques of militarization (for example, Enloe, 2000; Goldstein, 2001). While, recently, critiques of war are often accompanied by affirmation of the commitment and sacrifice of service men and women, in North America, there is an emotional history to this issue as well that has not been fully or publicly aired. For example, U.S. soldiers, often traumatized, returning from the U.S.-Vietnam war were
called “baby killers.” And young war resisters were labeled as “unpatriotic,” “disloyal,” “cowardly,” and often left their life in the U.S. behind to settle in Canada or abroad.

A fuller discussion and examination of these issues is important for the PACS field. Meanwhile, Powers offers many nonviolent approaches for the populace and government to consider. The analysis below only includes nonviolent interventions. There is a breadth of nonviolent interventions that can take place that may eliminate or mitigate the need for military intervention. It has often been observed that many important nonviolent responses to the Holocaust were not taken, for example, the admission of more Jewish refugees to Canada and the United States, or the acceptance, in 1939, rather than the turning away of the passenger ship The St. Louis, which carried 900 German Jewish refugees (Morse, 1968).

North American Genocide and Structural Violence

Another concern is how do we distinguish between the direct violence of genocidal wars of the past century with the settlement of Canada by colonial powers and the current violence many Aboriginal people face in North America. For example, colonial laws like the Indian Act in Canada were designed to destroy a racial group. Masked as assimilation and presented as the “glorious settlement” of Canada, the well-documented results have been: the Indigenous population disenfranchised from their homes, forced from their lands, children taken from their families and placed with non-Aboriginal people, entire populations wiped out, forced marches/relocations, a legacy of abuse from residential schools, and documented forced infection with deadly disease (for example, Churchill, 1997). Even as people stood in disbelief as acts of genocide unfolded
before their eyes around the word, aboriginal people in North America fought for, and continue to fight for their existence.

Using the word genocide to describe Aboriginal–non-Aboriginal relations in Canada and the United States can be unsettling. This is a difficult conversation that even the tireless activist Raphael Lemkin avoided (Power, 2002). However, the damage of an unacknowledged loss—what Kenneth Hardy (2005) calls a “dehumanized loss”—leads to rage, sadness, sorrow, and despair that leads to violence toward self and others. Such denial blocks, impedes, and constrains potential resolution, restitution, and restoration of dignity, respect, value, community, and health.

Therefore, it is our responsibility, in fact an immense weight, to address these issues. Perhaps a detailed and rich analysis of how to understand the intervention of genocide can lead to a cultural mind shift—even a global civic culture of peace as Boulding (1988) envisioned—and can help promote the capacity for both recognizing and changing destructive and dehumanizing power relations, structural inequalities, social and cultural devaluation, and ethnocide even when it is in our own society. Because it is typically harder and more risky to raise local human rights issues, perhaps considering the factor of location (within the conflict region or external to it) is an important consideration in identifying options and strategies of response.

“Name-Shame-Blame” versus “Win-Win” approaches

In the PACS field, there is recognition that conflict is a part of social life and can be handled constructively whereas violence is seen as something to be avoided. Typically, in the field of conflict resolution, identity-based conflict is addressed by
creating a space of equal safety and neutrality (for example, Rothman, 1997). This is required to keep the trust of the parties. When does that effort at balance belie justice or serve the purposes of the identity-group in power at the expense of the less powerful group? How, and at what point, do we address issues of power? Is “name-blame-and-shame” an alternative tool of conflict resolution or antithetical to conflict resolution approaches? Advocacy for justice and a balance of power has always been part of the peace and conflict studies field (for example, see Laue, 1982), but how does that fit in with the majority of work that emphasizes a “win-win” approach?

While the dilemma of whether peace serves the interests of or undermines justice is fairly well known (Lederach, 1995, 1997) and while the PACS field has always had social justice as a central aim, it is important to remember how subtle and enervating this dilemma might be. How does practice for peace and conflict resolution change, or need to change, when power differentials are steep and violence is happening? In the context of violent conflict, those who attempt to build peace or reach out to the “enemy” may be seen as sentimental at best or dangerously naive at worst.

It is not always clear when escalating layers of conflict gradually escalate to genocidal violence. Genocide is often perpetrated in the name of one identity group against a minority group, and not everyone in the dominant group can necessarily be seen as a perpetrator. Within the “bystander” populace, individuals and networks have worked in various ways to resist, sabotage, or overturn genocidal processes in their societies. Within the targeted group, there are varying ideas, strategies, and choices about how to resist. The identification of numerous means and points of intervention in intergroup and identity-based conflicts allows choices and creates possibilities for intervention of
intergroup divisions, hatred, and tolerance that helps individuals, groups, and policymakers position themselves to be of influence.

Despair Versus Agency

A significant insight that comes from both reading about genocide and Power’s analysis is the incredible sense of loss that genocide generates. Even the secondary trauma from reading about genocide or working with victims may be overwhelming. Direct trauma affects millions of survivors, including the many refugees who have settled in North America from other parts of the world. Most people in North America have been affected by genocide, political violence, or war—if not in their generation then in their parents’ or grandparents’ family. For this reason as well, studying genocide may trigger deep feelings of personal loss or loss of community. Power (2002) quotes the words of observers: “infuriating,” “maddening” (Henry Morganthau Sr., p. 7), “frustrated” (an Associated Press correspondent, p. 10), “angrier” (Theodore Roosevelt, p. 11), “appalled,” “livid.” (Lemkin, p. 19), “grief-stricken” (Szmul Zygielbojm, p. 31, committed suicide), “pain and anguish” (Arthur Goldberg, U.S. intelligence, p. 36), “obviously a man in pain” (lawyer’s description of Raphael Lemkin, p. 49).

Stepping into this emotional terrain is risky. How do we keep ourselves safe, resilient, and effective as peace workers in the face of even vicarious trauma? It is difficult to raise these issues because they can be so disturbing and because we may become agents of vicarious trauma when we discuss them. Discussing these issues may be re-traumatizing for those who are affected by these issues, and, at the least, we need to consider how to respond to profound emotions that emerge when these issues are
discussed. Clearly, peace and human rights education is important, but what information at what age is appropriate to share? How do we process our own feelings around these issues so that our own buttons do not get triggered in our work? For the peacemaker whose work is based on the belief that it is possible for people to create peace, such a sense of loss could potentially lead to despair and burn-out.

At the same time, we can see where people have acted successfully to find inspiration, courage, and hope. One of the most moving aspects of Power’s work is the focus on personal narratives that bear testimony to the faith, courage, and perseverance of individuals to act for the collective good even in the face of state power, and speak to human agency and possibility—often relying on naming the problem. Raphael Lemkin devoted his life to the scholarly articulation and international legislation of genocide. U.S. Senator William Proxmire was a leader in persuading the U.S. Senate to ratify the Convention and for 19 years, beginning in 1967, he gave more than 3,211 speeches on this topic, no two the same. Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, whose appeals to the U.N. for reinforcements in Rwanda were unheeded, became a spokesperson who spoke and wrote about his painful experience in order that people become more aware of the pain of genocide and the responsibility to protect. In 1998, African American prosecutor Pierre Prosper argued in the first case before an international criminal tribunal, that in the context of Rwanda, sexual violence against women carried intent of genocide, that is, to “destroy the very foundation of a group” (p. 485). Fragmenting this monolithic problem into smaller components—for example, recognizing the things that have been accomplished—creates more possibilities to see how action, including our own, can be effective.
Framework

Theorists have often preferred “elegant” theories and “Occam’s razor” where the simplest and most obvious explanations are the most likely to be true. But in the complex network of social problems, a multiplicity of factors interconnect in complex, and, often, unpredictable ways. This complexity makes social problems harder to understand and resistant to change as systems have a way of absorbing shock and returning to a kind of homeostasis. This complexity also opens up possibilities for myriad points of entry and myriad roles for interveners as agents of problem-solving, healing, and change. Ultimately, resolution of broad social conflicts and social problems requires social movement and social change, which can be seen as a long-term process of social healing. Perhaps all interventions make an impact though they are hard to see when looking at the big picture—until eventually a tipping point is reached, and the momentum for change becomes more powerful than the pull of history.

PACS approaches embrace conflicts’ complexity, and provide a consideration of many factors. The intensity and development stage of a conflict impacts how it is approached (Byrne and Keashly, 2000). External guarantors, allies, and other external parties can have a critical role in the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts and political violence (Byrne, 2007). There are different types of mediators who bring varying degrees of power to leverage sources or credibility, for example, high-profile “primary mediators,” such as U.S. Presidents, and low-profile, “secondary mediators,” such as religiously-based mediators, often Quakers or Mennonites (Princen, 1992). Conflicts are
understood to be driven by a complexity of material as well as intangible interests (Ross 1993, 2009). Further, a multitude of social dimensions can drive conflict: demographic, economic, political, historical, linguistic, and psychocultural. Conflicts further play themselves out and are driven by dynamics at multiple levels of analysis: for example, elites, middle-tier elites, and the grassroots (Lederach, 1997). That is, the personal is political (Millet, 1970) and global dynamics affect domestic relations (Tifft and Markham, 1991). This also means that conflict resolution can take place at these different levels and everyone can and should be involved. Age is a consideration, and while high proportions of youth in a society can be associated with revolution, young people can also be peacemakers and drive positive social change (McEvoy-Levy, 2006). Conflict mitigation can and should occur in different social arenas, or tracks, including government; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizens; research, training, and education; religious approaches; funding; and public opinion and communication (Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

Taking into account conflict complexity, this analysis sketches a framework that examines the situational, interest-based, ideological, and emotional factors that (a) shape human action to initiate and escalate genocide, (b) inhibit, constrain, or deter human action to intervene in genocide, and (c) promote human action to not engage in or to intervene against genocide. The notion that there are situational, interest-based, ideological, or emotional factors is an analytical categorization only as these types of factors influence each other in complex and significant ways. The term “ideological” is used to refer to cognitive factors, keeping in mind that knowledge is socially constructed. In any particular case, not all of these factors may be in play, and not all those factors in
play are equally salient. The goal of this analysis is to identify as many factors as possible in order to clarify different avenues for intervention and thereby to promote the agency of individuals, groups, and policymakers at various stages of violence escalation and de-escalation: early, intervention, post-genocide work, and prevention of future genocides.

Escalation of Genocide

Within the Conflict Zone

Situational. Situational factors that might facilitate genocide include autocratic political systems, economic conditions, as well as a prostrate populace (for example, Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009). War itself can serve as a cover for genocide. Law can serve the interests of genocide. For example, numerous laws were developed by the Nazi regime to control and segregate Jews during the Holocaust. By legal act, governments have restricted, relocated, and defined the identity of indigenous peoples (for example, Churchill, 1997). Momentum towards genocide builds with the escalation of dehumanizing practices: for example, in Armenia: disarmament of the population, the rounding up and killing of 250 intellectuals, Turkish notables killed in every province, Armenian workers no longer used, churches desecrated, schools closed, teachers who refused to convert were killed, deportation of civilians to Syria, lack of facilities contributing to death, and property seized (for example, Power, 2002). Genocide is progressive violence.
“The Problem from Hell”

**Interests.** The political and economic interests of the perpetrators may drive the genocide of a group. Removing populations may be driven by elites’ greed, mistrust, and expansionism, and be a strategy for securing power and ownership of a territory. The victims of genocide are seen as obstacles to the agenda of the perpetrators.

**Ideology.** Nationalism at the exclusion of minority groups may fuel genocidal violence characterized as “ethnic cleansing.” While history may be situational, interpretations and the use of history may be manipulated to motivate genocide. Folklore and cultural narratives may demonize minority groups (for example, Snyder, 1978). Propaganda and media may justify or mask what is happening within a country. For four years leading up to the Serbian Army’s invasion of Bosnia, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic waged a disinformation campaign, including staged films of Bosnian men raping Serbian women, to infuriate Serbian soldiers against Bosnian Muslims (Hedges, 2003).

**Emotional.** Ethnic hatred, and a destructive re-channeling of a society’s fears, humiliation, unresolved shame, and sense of devaluation can fuel the intense emotions required for genocide. Love of country and countrymen can be manipulated with propaganda that inflames these negative emotions. During the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, in the early 1990s, Serbian President Slobodan Milosovic and Bosnian leader Radovan Karadzic used the historic Battle of Kosovo and the death of Prince Lazar in the 14th century, among other propaganda, to rally Serbs to the process of so-called “ethnic cleansing” of Muslims in Bosnia to the point of crating a sense of “time collapse” (Volkan, 1997). Fear of being seen as an outsider may motivate people to be active perpetrators to prove their loyalty in order to save themselves (for example, Gross. 2001).
External to the Conflict Zone

Situational. External states may have historical ties to regional parties and act as their “external ethno-guarantors” (Byrne, 2007). Many observers feared that the regional wars that were the break-up of the former Yugoslavia could lead to a devastating global war if Russia became involved to support the Serbs, Turkey became involved to support the Bosnian Muslims, and Germany or Western Europe came to the aid of the Croats.

Interests. Greed and economic desire may motivate other state actors in the global community to provide weapons (Pearson and Sislin, 2001). For example, Germany provided the chemicals that were used by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds. Small states such as land-locked Switzerland are vulnerable and may claim neutrality. In World War II, by providing a banking centre to Nazi Germany, Switzerland may arguably have facilitated genocide while creating a disincentive for the Allies to bomb or invade their nation.

Ideology. Belief in the balance of power may motivate external actors to support a country that is perpetrating genocide in order not to disrupt what is seen as a global balance of power. For example, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia received the tacit support of China and the USSR. In Rwanda, radio had a critical role in the planned genocide in Rwanda when Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) disseminated propaganda portraying Tutsis as “cockroaches,” a threat, and outsiders along with popular music and scripted programming that was purported to be the real conversations of Rwandans (Strobel, 1997).
Emotional. Emotions of ethnic hatred or devaluation as well as indifference to human suffering may deter intervention.

Lack of Intervention against Genocide

Within the Conflict Zone

This section refers to constraints to intervention of both victims and those not directly targeted in the conflict zone. It may not always be clear who is in which group, and both groups make choices at early stages in the escalation to genocide regarding their responses to the situation.

Situation. The reality of power makes action difficult. Ineffective human rights laws fail to protect people. Separation, segregation, control of movement, and control of means of communication seriously constrain or prevent people’s ability to gather, strategize, or even understand what is going on.

Interests. Those who may not have directly instigated genocide may still be willing to benefit economically, socially, or politically as a result of it. People at the grassroots level may seize the opportunity of genocide to increase their possessions. In the Polish town of Jedwabne where 1,600 Jews were murdered by their neighbors, some of the worst perpetrators seized the property of the victims for themselves (Gross, 2001). During the Rwandan genocide, hungry landless impoverished young people seized the opportunity of the chaos to kill land-owning men, usually older than 50, and seize their farms (Diamond, 2005).
Ideology. Media and propaganda may convince those not targeted that nothing is wrong. There may be a belief that the victims have brought the situation on themselves, and it is the responsibility of the victims to correct the situation. Victims and those not directly targeted may believe there is nothing they can do. When Lemkin tried to bring his family to the United States in advance of the Holocaust, they were complacent and felt the escalating violence was simply the price of martyrdom and their fate (Power 2002). A sense of defeatism pervades the situation.

Emotions. Both victims and those not directly targeted may feel paralyzing and realistic fear in the face of the violence (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2009). Those who are not targeted may harbour ethnic hatreds themselves, be indifferent to the pain of others, or experience passivity.

External to the Conflict Zone

Situation. Problems of such magnitude and complexity are really quite challenging. Outside governments weigh the financial and human costs of intervention. The outcome of intervention is unpredictable and raises concerns about unintended consequences.

Interests. For governments, intervention may entail political, security, and economic risks, and can seriously jeopardize strategic economic interests. Even intervention such as economic sanctions might be resisted if it affects business sectors in the sanctioning country. When arguing for the passage of the U.N. Convention on Genocide, Sen. Proxmire argued that lawmakers were more responsive to constituent pressure and profit than human dignity as there were more than a hundred treaties and
conventions on economic issues such as the Tuna Convention with Costa Rica, a Halibut Convention with Canada, and a Road Traffic Convention allowing licensed American drivers to drive on European highways, among others (Power, 2002).

Ideology. The notion of “gentleman’s bias” (Power, p. 260) demands that ambassador’s refrain from critiquing or undermining the governments where they are stationed. There may be a lack of knowledge or agreement about what to do, and a sense of futility and defeatism. Or, there may be serious concerns about the financial, time, and human cost of intervention, as well as unintended consequences of such intervention.

Often outsiders do not believe stories about the escalating atrocities when they hear them. They dismiss reports as “propaganda,” “exaggerated,” “hoaxes,” “unbelievable,” “unsupported with evidence” (Power, pp. 8–9). Outsiders may be relatively complacent about the violence because they believe that there are atrocities on both sides, and that brutality is part of war. Devaluation or dehumanization of the victim leads to inaction and may be combined with a sense that the region of conflict is characterized by primitiveness and tribalism and has a natural propensity for violence (Wolff, 2006). Outsiders may believe that it is happening on both sides and not recognize the acts of murder that are taking place. Disbelief in the possibility for evil actions and that things could get so much worse than they are at a given point inhibits intervention. There may be a sense that the problem belongs to the victim and there is no responsibility to protect or intervene. In general, while knowledge of the violence might be getting out to government, the general public may be largely ignorant of what is going on, or not understand it. Denial of the problem may set in as a defense mechanism.
The media may play a critical role in how conflict and intervention is understood by the public (Strobel, 1997). In the current age of Google, Yahoo, Twitter, CNN, and 24/7 news feeds, the public is constantly exposed to information on both extraordinary and frivolous world events. Everyone becomes a spectator to everything that is going on in the world. How do persons interpret, respond to, or make sense of issues that are happening across the world or next door? The amount of information can overwhelm one’s ability to process and understand, to make sense of, and to act on this information.

**Emotions.** Thinly masked ethnic hatred, prejudice, or devaluation of the other may contribute to inaction. Outsiders who fail to act may be accused of indifference to pain. Counter-intuitively, increased news coverage and awareness of a multiplicity of horrific social issues throughout the world can engender issue fatigue, even hopelessness and despair, or the desire for isolationism.

**Genocide Intervention**

*Within the Conflict Zone*

This section refers to those factors which facilitate genocide prevention and intervention by both victims and those not directly targeted in the conflict zone.

**Situation.** A vibrant civil society and thriving business sector and economy make a society resilient to genocide (van Tongeren and others, 2005). Good leaders are able to work constructively for peace. Getting people together to discuss issues and create networks and crosscutting ties provide communication links. Effective and enforceable laws are a deterrent to political misconduct, corruption, and abuse.
Interests. Thriving trade and interdependent economic and social relations may provide a disincentive for war. Business is an important track of diplomacy and aspect of civil society (Diamond and McDonald, 1997).

Ideology. Nonviolent protest challenges prevailing ideas about violence and initiates, sustains, and gives form to a social process of making meaning. To be in a position to influence, it is important to demonstrate the case for, and to educate for, peace and tolerance. It is important to get out the story of what is happening and the atrocities that are occurring, and to name what is happening. The media has a role in getting this information to the public. For oppressed groups, the homeplace can be a site of resistance where grandmothers, grandfathers, mothers, fathers, aunts, and uncles provide socialization that maintains a group’s culture, identity, and history, often encoded in folklore; strategies for survival; as well as comfort and re-humanization (Hooks, 1990).

Emotions. Impatience with the status quo drives people to resist and take action. Sometimes people call up the strength to resist when there is no way. Power describes a busload of Kurdish men who resisted after lengthy rides in inhumane conditions to their would-be mass graves in Iraq. In the tumult that arose as a result, only one man, Ozer, was able to survive undetected under a mound of bodies when they were shot in retribution, and eventually crawl out and find refuge. Ozer’s story and what happened to all of those men is now told in Power’s book. During the genocide in Rwanda, when the girls from a Catholic school were taken to a field, and shot, one girl was able to persuade one of the men to save her, and was a sole survivor (Kayitesi, 2008).

External to the Conflict Zones
Situation. Power (2002) refers to the International Criminal Court as “a giant without arms” (p. 491). Restructuring and empowering the U.N. is a possibility that needs to be seriously investigated. Early warning systems can facilitate international mediation before conflict escalates further. Power emphasizes that many perpetrators weigh daily how far they can go, and therefore it is essential for the U.S. and others states to immediately and forcefully condemn racially-based violence when it erupts. Naming and condemning the reprehensible action and the individuals responsible for it are important steps. Getting experts together—including academics from the PACS field—for consultations during a crisis is critical.

Interests. It is important to name the interests in the region, and to seek clarification of U.S. national interests in particular nations. Public dialogue can be a process of interrogating, lobbying, and reshaping arguments to clarify how stopping genocide is a U.S. interest.

Ideology. Lobbying and advocacy is perhaps one of the most important interventions. Education can promote widespread understanding of genocide and ways to address it. Peace education can build a culture of human rights that is resilient to genocide and prepared to respond. Education about current affairs can also provide early warning and alert governments and people to what may need to be addressed. Stories about current and past genocides need to be told. Credible sources and eyewitnesses who report atrocities are important for building awareness and compassion. When journalists or government officials are dispersed or murdered, civilians fleeing the massacres tell their stories. They must be heard. Again, the media has a role in this. Nonviolent action and protest is part of a public discourse that can affect policy, raise consciousness of the
issues and build solidarity at local and international levels. Constructive narratives can chart pathways to peace. The decision to make the prevention of genocide a priority can build the momentum for change; this requires international condemnation when massacres, political violence, and genocide occur. It is important for outsiders to listen for what victims and those attempting to intervene on the ground are requesting when making policy decisions.

Emotions. A broader conception of sacrifice may be needed to address global problems, and global inequality that fuels political greed and violence. It is painful to absorb survivors’ stories of horror, and there must be the capacity to believe the unbelievable. We must also recognize the emotions of the perpetrator and not always expect rational actors. Impatience and courage are critical for working for social justice and peace.
**Figure 1.**
Factors that Contribute to Genocide, Lack of Intervention, and Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERVENOR POSITION</th>
<th>TYPE OF FACTOR</th>
<th>Escalation of Genocide</th>
<th>Lack of Intervention</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within the Conflict Zone</strong></td>
<td>SITUATIONAL</td>
<td>Autocratic political systems • Poor economic conditions • Prostrate populace • War as a cover • Laws legitimating violence • Escalating dehumanization</td>
<td>Ineffective human rights laws • Separation • Segregation • Control of movement and control of communication hamper resistance</td>
<td>Vibrant civil society and economy • Leaders build peace and share power • Effective and enforceable laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTEREST-BASED</td>
<td>Political and economic interests • Greed • Security Expansionism</td>
<td>Potential interveners exploit perceived economic, social, and political benefits of genocide rather than intervene</td>
<td>Thriving democracy, trade, and business that promote diplomacy and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL</td>
<td>Folklore, cultural narratives, and interpretations of history that justify genocide</td>
<td>Media and propaganda mask and hide the facts of genocide, or justify it • Belief that the victims brought it on themselves</td>
<td>Culture of nonviolence, peace, and tolerance • Humanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMOTIONAL</td>
<td>Ethnic hatred • Fear • Humiliation • Unresolved shame • Propaganda that inflames these emotions toward the Other</td>
<td>Paralyzing fear • Ethnic hatred • Indifference • Acceptance and resignation</td>
<td>Compassion • Resistance • Courage • Impatience with the status quo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External to the Conflict Zone</strong></td>
<td>SITUATIONAL</td>
<td>Historical ties to regional parties based on ethno-alliances</td>
<td>Actual magnitude and complexity of the problem • Unknowable direct and indirect financial and human risks and costs</td>
<td>Strong and enforceable international law • Early warning systems • Practices in place related to the responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTEREST-BASED</td>
<td>Greed and economic interests • Larger political interests, e.g., the global balance of power</td>
<td>Political, security, and economic risks</td>
<td>Clarification of how stopping genocide serves interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL</td>
<td>Belief in maintaining the strategic global balance of power, and desire to maintain it despite actions of allies</td>
<td>The notion of “gentleman’s diplomacy” • Magnitude and potential for evil is unbelievable • Atrocities believed to be both sides • Idea problem is the victims’ Disbelief • Unawareness</td>
<td>Education • Lobbying • Activism • Peace education • Human rights education • Current affairs education • Vibrant public discourse • Peace journalism and constructive media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EMOTIONAL</td>
<td>Indifference • Othering • Ethnic hatred</td>
<td>Indifference • Overwhelmed by horror • Prejudice and Othering • Issue fatigue • Hopelessness and despair</td>
<td>Build capacity to the believe the unbelievable • Impatience • Courage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The study of genocide must be central to the PACS field. Alternatives to violence have defined the PACS field, and more work needs to be done to examine and evaluate nonviolent alternatives to genocide by different types of actors and at every stage of the escalating violence, the de-escalation of violence and so called “post-conflict” phases, as well as prevention. Social justice and civil rights have been central to the development of the field, and this works also needs to be further developed in order to address the many faces of genocide, including the forms of the cultural devaluation and murder that harms devastates whole groups of peoples, including indigenous peoples throughout the world, violence against women (femicide), violence against children (infanticide), and all people who face extraordinary material deprivation (modern slavery, extreme poverty). While anger, rage, and hatred might be an understandable and normal response to genocide adn violence—what Kenneth Hardy (2005) calls de-humanized loss—it remains critical to explore a breadth of strategies and possibilities to re-channel this anger, make sense of the past, and use past experience to create better societies.

The PACS field is distinguished by its commitment both theory and practice, and their interconnection. Praxis, as Paulo Friere (1970) put it, is “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (p 75). It is not enough to critically analyze, but to also chart paths and break paths toward peace. This analysis seeks to provide a framework that might promote action and de-facilitate the bystander position by providing insight and options. An important variable is location relative to the conflict and violence.
There is also a group of people that move between the conflict zone and locations distant to it. These are often diplomats (such as Hans Morgenthau in Armenia); journalists (such as Samantha Power herself); military personnel (such as Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda); refugee survivors; and scholars who through research, or because they are from a conflict zone, travel internationally. Raphael Lemkin was such as scholar. He was also a refugee. While growing up in the Bialystock region of Poland, during the World War I period, when Germany and Russia were battling in Poland, his family fled their farm to hide in the neighbouring forests. In September 1939, six days after the Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland, he fled, at first on foot, and eventually made his way to the U.S. where, with the help of a professor for whom he had translated the Polish criminal code, he obtained a position at Duke University. Such cultural go-betweens are in a unique, if often bedevilled position, as mediators between knowledge systems, who may be able to be effective advocates for victims of political violence and genocide.

While people far from the violence might easily not act nor intervene for numerous reasons, including lack of awareness, as outsiders they may also have more security and capacity to speak out, bring resources, and provide refuge during crises. The great thinkers and peacemakers who, over the past five decades, have inspired the field of peace and conflict studies, have been leaders in addressing power relations, social injustice, and violence. But there is much more work that needs to be done, and, as Power argues, it means involving civil society. This includes finding inspiration—sometimes even in the forms of songs and stories—to sustain us on the journey, which is really the journey of humanity, to a world with peace and justice for everybody.
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“The Problem from Hell”


Kayitesi, B. Public Lecture, Winnipeg International Storytelling Festival, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May 9, 2008.


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“The Problem from Hell”


Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland: The Past, Present and Future

Stephen Ryan

Abstract

This article explores the reasons for the slow progress being made in the Northern Ireland peace process. It examines complications that exist in dealing with the past, present, and future of the conflict between the two main communities whilst also arguing that it is hard to separate these time frames in practice. In terms of the present, some well known difficulties with the consociational approach are identified. Recent studies have also demonstrated a failure to address sectarianism at the grass-roots level and there has been a resurgence in activity by spoilers and rejectionists. When thinking about the future the two communities still have competing views about the final constitutional destiny of Northern Ireland and this inhibits the development of a sense of a shared future.

Although there have been a plethora of initiatives for dealing with the past and for truth recovery, there does not appear to have been a satisfactory approach to this important dimension of peacebuilding. The article concludes by advocating two key strategies. The first is the development of initiatives based on the pursuit of superordinate goals. The second endorses Rorty’s idea of sentimental education as a way of building greater solidarity.

“Wars don’t simply end. And wars don’t end simply” (Enloe 2004: 193)
Introduction

The great Irish poet William Butler Yeats might have been astute to state in the *Lake Isle of Innisfree* that peace “comes dropping slow,” but even he might have been dismayed by the dawdling pace at which Northern Ireland has moved away from violent conflict since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in April 1998. Of course, Yeats was writing about inner peace—to “live alone in the bee-loud glade”—rather than the much more difficult task of creating a peaceful and democratic multi-cultural society. Yet even if we factor in the complex nature of this undertaking, it seems that the various parties to the conflict have adopted what Nietzsche called the “gospel of the tortoise”: a mentality that creates “as little as possible in the longest time possible” (Nietzsche, 2008, p. 83). A striking example of this is that even though they had been partners in the executive since May 2007, the First Minister (from the Protestant DUP) and the Deputy First Minister (from the Catholic Sinn Fein) did not shake hands until January 2010—and even this took place in private (*Sunday Times* 17 January 2010).

Indeed, it would be reasonable to say that for the past eleven years Northern Ireland has been a society stuck in a transitional stage. Or to use the language of conflict research, it has achieved a conflict settlement, but not a resolution of conflict. The distinction between the two concepts was made clear by Burton (1988):

For our purposes here, conflict resolution means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and that get to the roots of the problem. Conflict resolution, as
opposed to mere management or “settlement”, points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is a permanent solution to a problem (p. 2).

The slow progress is a little surprising because one would have thought, when compared with some other intractable conflicts, that Northern Ireland enjoys certain comparative advantages. Of course no intractable conflict is ever going to be resolved quickly or straightforwardly. Loizos, in an analysis of Cyprus, warns against the “attractive idiom of conflict resolution workshop...which assumes that everything, even political hostility, has its appropriate duration, after which it can transform” (2008, p. 183). The experience of violence is always going to haunt the present in a number of ways. It results in militarization, increased ethnocentrism and the sharpening of the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, more residential segregation, the construction of the “enemy image,” economic and political underdevelopment, and a strong sense of victimhood (Ryan, 2007). But we should also note some aspects of the conflict in Northern Ireland that might have made it easier to move towards peace. There is, for example, no significant refugee issue to complicate the peace process as has been the case in the Israeli-Palestinian, Bosnian, and Cyprus conflicts. There was no wholesale destruction of infrastructure that had to be rebuilt. There are differences in wealth between the two communities, but they are nowhere near as large as those between black and white South Africans or Israelis and Palestinians. There is also an existing democratic culture and all that comes with this: a strong civil society, an independent media, the capacity to organise free and fair elections, and a commitment to human rights.
Cultural differences are also not as severe as in other conflicts. The use of Irish in Northern Ireland has become less contentious since the Belfast Agreement and the language issue has never been as divisive as it is in Belgium or the Basque country. Both of the main communities use English as their primary means of communication. Most members of the two main communities also regard themselves as Christian. Of course, some might argue that it is the close similarities between the two main communities that might explain the depth of their mutual hostility. It was Sigmund Freud who referred to the “narcissism of minor difference” in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. He wrote that “it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each other” (Freud, 1985, p. 305). Freud thought this was a “relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression” (p. 305) but Volkan believes it to be a more serious problem and notes that “people will kill to reinforce their ethnic or national group’s distinction from the enemy group, however minuscule that distinction may be” (1997, p. 109).

Finally, we should note that there has been significant external financial support for the peace process from the European Union (EU) and the U.S. (see, for example, Arthur, 2000; Buchanan, 2008; Byrne, Irvin, Fissuh and Cunningham, 2006; Byrne, 2009). The EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, usually called Peace I and Peace II, has delivered financial assistance for projects in the whole of Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Irish Republic. Peace II, for example, spent 425 million euro on areas such as economic renewal, social integration, development and regeneration, and cross border cooperation. The third stage of funding, Peace III, will spend another 333 million euros to carry forward key parts of the previous
Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

rounds with a renewed emphasis on reconciliation. An additional £630 million has been committed to the International Fund for Ireland to “tackle the underlying causes of sectarianism and violence and to build reconciliation between people and within and between communities throughout the island of Ireland” (International Fund for Ireland, 2010). The Fund has received donations from the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the European Union.

This article will attempt an answer to the question why has the peace process in Northern Ireland been less than smooth despite the relatively advantageous starting point when compared to some other protracted intercommunal conflicts? In so doing, it will try to assess the peacebuilding process in Northern Ireland in terms of how, and to what extent, it has developed the capacity to deal with a divided past and present, and in all likelihood with a disputed future. It is not a comprehensive analysis by any means, but it seeks to identify some key issues that might throw some light on this topic.

Before we do this it is important to say two things. Firstly, we cannot understand any situation of protracted violent conflict in terms of simple, linear time. Several recent studies of violence and upheaval demonstrate this. For example, Das (2007) in an exploration of subjectivity and time asks what she calls the “haunting question”: is there “one duration or are there many?” (Das, 2007, p. 98). In exploring how the memory of traumatic past events is “folded” into social relationships she points to the need to grasp phenomenal time where events far apart in physical time can be imagined as simultaneous. Nordstrom (2000), in a chapter entitled “The Tomorrow of Violence,” notes that the impact of violence does not stop with “physical carnage” because it “reconfigures its victims and the social milieu that hosts them....It isn’t a passing
phenomenon that momentarily challenges a stable system, leaving a scar but no lasting effects....Violence becomes a determining fact in shaping reality as people will know it in the future” (p. 223).

Secondly, we are not arguing that there are no positive aspects to the Northern Ireland situation. Despite the slow progress there have always been those who have held up the Northern Ireland process as a positive example others could follow. Since the St. Andrews agreement the odd-couple power sharing arrangement between the DUP and Sinn Fein has delivered a period of stable government. But even when the peace process was stalled it was never paralysed and it never collapsed (Halliday, 2000, p. 287). The tortoise always kept moving forward. Indeed, the real achievements in Northern Ireland should not be under-estimated. There is the considerable accomplishment of a devolved power-sharing government. The main paramilitary organizations in both communities seem to have rejected violence. The British army has all but disappeared from the streets and many bases have been closed. The RUC has transformed into the Police Service of Northern Ireland, district policing partnerships have been introduced and a Police Ombudsman has been created. The parades issue, so contentious in the past, is now being managed in a peaceful way. However, the undoubted positive developments that flowed out of the Belfast Agreement should not blind us to some negative aspects and there are surely lessons to be learnt from looking at these as well.

The Trouble with Consociationalism
In March 2007 elections to the devolved Assembly at Stormont returned 36 DUP and 28 Sinn Fein MLAs confirming their status as the largest Unionist and Nationalist parties in the resurrected devolved government. Two years later, in May 2009, it could be claimed that Northern Ireland had experienced the longest spell of stable, pluralist, and democratic government in its history though we should note that the executive did not meet for four months during this period because of disagreements over the devolution of policing and justice powers. This has replaced the decommissioning issue as the factor most likely to disrupt the peace process, as recent events have demonstrated.

O’Leary (1999) has described the devolved administration as “consociation plus.” It undoubtedly makes use of some classical strategies proposed by the theory of consociational engineering devised by Lijphart (1977), but it also contains supranational elements. These are found in Strands 2 and 3 of the Belfast Agreement, which set up a North-South Ministerial Council, cross border implementation bodies, and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. Furthermore, it “was the first consociational settlement endorsed by a referendum that required concurrent majorities in jurisdictions in different states” (O’Leary 2001, p. 49).

There seem to be at least four problems we can identify with the current system of government. The first is the failure to confirm the final constitutional status of Northern Ireland. This will be examined in the next section. Secondly, there are well-known weaknesses with the consociational approach, including claims that it deepens cultural divisions, establishes complex arrangements that can easily be paralysed, and concentrates too much on the elite level of politics. Thirdly, linked to this, is the failure to
move beyond sectarianism at the grass-roots level. Fourthly, there is the inability to neutralise all rejectionists and “spoilers.”

The issue of whether consociationalism is a cause or a consequence of cultural divisions is still debated. The evidence from Northern Ireland would seem to suggest that it might result in greater polarization because the main beneficiaries in political terms to date have been the “hard-line” parties in both communities. This move away from the moderate ground, which was evident in the 2003 Assembly elections, has resulted in the Ulster Unionist Party being replaced by the Democratic Unionist Party as the main Protestant party and Sinn Fein has replaced the SDLP as the main Catholic party.

The claim that consociationalism can entrench communalism is a critique often associated with Horowitz (1985), who believes that in divided societies there is a need for structural approaches that provide incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. In particular he explored how electoral systems either block or encourage such cooperation. Unlike consociationalism, the best types of electoral systems will reduce competition between ethnic groups by, *inter alia*, encouraging the majority to behave more moderately towards the minority and encouraging voluntary multi-ethnic coalitions. They can also avoid a rigid bifurcation by preserving fluidity. He accepts that the electoral system is just one component in what must be a larger framework, but he also argues that an electoral system can produce positive change in a relatively short time.

Critics also point to other weaknesses of consociationalism as a long-term device for resolving inter-communal conflicts. It can be rigid and unable to adapt to social changes, as was the case in Lebanon. This is something Horowitz has called the “frozen quota” problem (Horowitz, 1985, p. 586). Consociational arrangements set up
complicated forms of government that can be paralysed relatively easily if one of the groups decides to withdraw cooperation over issues such as how complex arrangements are to be implemented, as was the case in Cyprus between 1960–63. This has also been the experience in Northern Ireland since 1998. Finally, the approach has been criticised for being too elitist and this has led Byrne (2001) to call for a stronger integration of consociation ideas with civil society approaches.

Several commentators have noted that the progress made at the elite level in the late 1990s did not always transfer to the grassroots. This is a problem, because the Belfast Agreement was a political bargain made in the absence of “interethic reconciliation” and this “creates serious problems for the success of consociation in the long term” (Kerr, 2005, p. 192). Certainly, a number of interface flashpoints remained between the residential estates of the two communities (Heatley, 2004). Furthermore, the number of “Peace Lines” in Belfast, which separate Catholic and Protestant residential areas, have not been drastically reduced since 1998. A recent study has found that whereas there were eighteen barriers in the early 1990s there were eighty-eight in 2008 and only five barriers had been removed during the entire Troubles (Community Relations Council 2008). Another report on segregation in six areas of Northern Ireland by the Institute for Conflict Research found that although there was a diversity of experiences there was a continuing legacy of the troubles and in some areas levels of sectarianism and segregation had increased (Hamilton and others, 2008). The report concludes:

In some areas there are greater levels of mixing, sharing and integrating, while in others the legacy of the past, of hostility, fear and mistrust dominate the wider
social environment. In most social environments the process of avoidance still appears to dominate interactions between members of the two main communities (p. 154).

Such findings seem to be confirmed by a 2009 report based on a consultation with 130 young men, which found that “very little seems to have changed in spite of the peace process” and that “many young men appear to be stuck inhabiting a ceasefire world” (Centre for Young Men’s Studies, 2009, p. 2). In addition these young men stated that the paramilitaries were still active in both communities and that “conflict and violence impacted on their lives on most days” (p. 2). The Guardian offers support for such a view, and reported on 2 June 2009 that for 2007–8 and 2008–9 just over 1,500 “sectarian incidents” a year were reported to the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Another study has found that in the mixed area of the Waterside in Derry the segregation of Protestants and Catholic communities has increased (Shirlow and others, 2005). Finally, from a Loyalist perspective, Gary McMichael has noted the lack of consultation with grassroots within the UDA, commenting that:

Those of us in the negotiations had evolved and shifted in our attitudes....But those outside did not follow us and we weren’t able to bring them with us. They had not had the same opportunity to evolve as we had. A big reason for that was that we didn’t have the infrastructure (Quoted in Spencer, 2008, p. 183).
Or as another insider noted, the pro-Agreement Ulster Democratic Party failed because it “left the foot soldiers behind” (Spencer, 2008, p. 186). All of this suggests that the pro-Agreement elites might have been moving too fast and failed to bring their supporters with them (Dixon, 2001, p. 305).

The sense that the elites have not done enough to energise the grass roots is reinforced by the fate of the Civic Forum. This consultative body was included in the Belfast Agreement as a result of work by the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. It had 60 members representing different sectors of society including 18 from the voluntary sector, 7 from business and the trade unions, 5 from the churches and 2 from victims groups. It first met in October 2000 but could not sit when the Assembly was suspended and is now the subject of a review by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).

Given the difficulties that remain at the grass-roots level one would have expected priority would be given to strategies to help address this problem. Yet this has not been the case. The OFMDFM was meant to produce a draft programme for cohesion, sharing and integration (CSI strategy) before the end of October 2008, but there is still no sign of a final document, though the DUP and Sinn Fein have produced separate drafts. This failure to agree to what, in essence, would be a community relation’s strategy has frustrated many working in this area.

The final issue that has affected the trajectory of the peace process is the “spoiler” and rejectionist problem. The term spoiler was introduced by Stedman (1997), though there are some who point out that it has a negative connotation and might be used to delegitimize those who have genuine grievance towards a peace agreement. However, as
the term has become widely used it is retained for the purposes of this analysis. Stedman defined spoilers in a way that only included those willing to use violence to bring down a peace process. Therefore we have to distinguish them from rejectionists, who may also have strong feelings against an agreement, but who restrict themselves to political means.

After a period when the process here was relatively untroubled by spoilers, they have now returned to complicate the peace process. Today they are restricted to the Republican community, and are made up of three main groups: the Real IRA (RIRA), the Continuity IRA and Oglaigh na hEireann. They have emerged as a more serious threat in the past year, leading the outgoing Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, to state in March 2009 that the threat from such groups was at a “critical level” (McDonald, 2009a). A month later, two senior pro-Agreement republicans are reported to have told the Irish Government that the IRA had “lost control of Ardoyne” in Belfast (McDonald, 2009b). In 2009, the rejectionist groups killed two soldiers and a policeman (and tried to kill several others), took over the village of Meigh and tried to blow up the Policing Board Headquarters in Belfast. It therefore came as no surprise when the International Monitoring Commission noted that armed attacks committed by rejectionist Republican groups was at its highest level for six years (The Guardian editorial, 31 December 2009).

Stedman (1997) argues that some spoilers can be managed, and the strategy depends on their goals. However, it would be wise to note a comment by Nietzsche (2008):

One can divide those who are intent on overthrowing society into the ones who want to gain something for themselves and the ones who want to gain it for their
children and grandchildren. The latter are the more dangerous; for they have faith and the good conscience of selflessness. The others can be diverted: the ruling society is still rich and clever enough for that. Danger begins when goals become impersonal (p. 92).

As several writers have noted, there were many features of the Belfast Agreement that did not appeal to Unionists (see, for example, Aughey, 2001; Farrington, 2008; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004; Murray, 2000; Spencer, 2008; Tonge, 2004). In the immediate post-Agreement stage it was the opposition to it from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and from certain elements within the loyalist community that appeared to put the agreement most at risk. Today, the most significant opposition to the Belfast–St. Andrews peace process comes from the new Unionist group called the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). The former DUP European MEP Jim Allister who performed above most observers’ expectations in the 2009 European Elections leads this. Allister has been scathing about the current peace process, calling the Executive a “wretched, useless government” and a “miserable, failing government.” Sniping from the margins, Allister (2009) is likely to exploit the recent deal on policing and justice by an administration he characterises as “terrorists in government, spongers in parliament” by claiming that the DUP is appeasing Sinn Fein and will not collapse the Assembly because it fears an electoral contest with the TUV.

The threat to the peace process presented by the TUV is the same as the one that the DUP presented in the immediate post-Agreement era, though, of course it would be
wrong at present to place the former in the same category as the latter when it comes to popular support. Nonetheless, as O’Leary (2001) points out:

Where any bloc is divided over the merits of such a settlement, and where its leaders respond more to the threat of being outflanked than they do to the imperative of making the new (tacit) cross-ethnic coalition work, it may prove impossible to implement the agreement (p. 79).

There is also one major shock on the horizon that threatens to make the general political environment less benign. The Executive’s *Building a Better Future: Draft Programme for Government 2008–11*, aims to make Northern Ireland a “peaceful, fair and prosperous society.” The linking of peace and prosperity is now going to be put to the test. Since 1998, Northern Ireland has experienced an economic boom that has produced a tide that has raised all boats. Many began to feel wealthier even if a lot of this was based on unearned credit, inflated house prices and a strong pound when measured against the euro. This, of course, has now changed. The banking crisis has forced the British and Irish governments as well as Stormont to plan for big cuts in public spending, and the Northern Ireland economy is very dependent on the public sector. The big question is how will a rise in unemployment and increased economic insecurity impact on intercommunal relations? This is a disputed area, and disagreements still exist about the relationship between the state of the economy and violence. The worry is that Gellner (1997), one of most important theorists of nationalism, might have been correct when he claimed that individuals who “are affluent and, above all, who believe themselves to be in
a situation which will fairly soon improve and continue to do so are much less likely to be tempted into violent conduct” (p. 106). The implication is that if the situation is reversed, and the economy starts to decline along with peoples’ expectation, then violence might become more attractive again.

The Future and the Problem of Contradictory Optimism

Geoffrey Blainey (1988), in his stimulating analysis of the causes of war, once noted that they are always the product of contradictory optimism—since each side starts a war believing it can win, but all sides cannot be correct in this assessment. Now peace is characterized by the move away from zero-sum, win-lose thinking to a positive sum, win-win mentality, but it is not at all clear that this has happened in Northern Ireland. Indeed, what we have here, if we adapt Blainey’s observation, is a peace process based on contradictory optimism. On the one hand Unionists were informed that the Belfast Agreement would make the link with the UK stronger whilst Republicans were told that this was an important first step on the road to a united Ireland. Indeed, O’Leary (2001) argues that the main reason that the pro-Agreement Unionists were willing to do a deal with republicans was to protect their position with regards to the constitutional status quo because “only by being generous now could they reconcile nationalists to the Union” (p. 73). This is not the way most nationalists viewed it. They have a different view on the legitimacy of the partition of the island of Ireland that draws on one of the most powerful political discourses of the twentieth century—that of conquest, colonization, expropriation of land, resistance, and claims to self-determination
When the DUP agreed to enter a power-sharing arrangement with Sinn Fein after the St Andrews Agreement, its leader, the Rev. Ian Paisley also claimed this made the Union with Britain stronger. In a “devolution consultation” the party leader called on Unionists to support the agreement and claimed:

If you want to save the Union and have a devolved democratic government then the changes which the DUP fought for and obtained in this new Agreement, to safeguard your British and democratic rights, must be made [emphasis added] (DUP, 2006, p. 1).

To support this interpretation the DUP pointed out that Sinn Fein would now have to support the police and the criminal justice system, that “all North/Southery is fully accountable to Northern Ireland’s elected representatives,” that power-sharing will only take place after an end to IRA paramilitary activity is proven, and that “no significant decisions can be taken without Unionist approval” (p. 3). Needless to say, Sinn Fein continues to adhere to an all-Ireland strategy and remain committed to Irish unity.

So when it comes to answering the “sovereignty question” we have mutually incompatible objectives within the terms of reference established by the sovereign state system—Northern Ireland couldn’t be both British and Irish in a constitutional sense. But does this matter? Clearly, if all sides are at ease with this ambiguity about the direction they are heading in constitutional terms then this may not be a significant drawback. If individuals and communities can be British or Irish in a cultural sense then maybe the “territorial destiny” of the province is less important.
However, there at least two problems with this slightly schizophrenic situation. The first is that if there is no general consensus about the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland, then how can everyone work for a shared future that has yet to be defined and would probably not be supported by both communities if it could be explicitly stated? In this way, Northern Ireland is different from, for example, South Africa where there is now a general agreement as to what this entity is as a single sovereign state. So the vast majority of South Africans were able to work together for a new South Africa clear about what this was to be in a constitutional sense. This is not the case in Northern Ireland, where the two dominant parties still have radically different visions about the ultimate direction they are taking.

This is why it is hard to accept the idea that what Northern Ireland needs is a “shared future” that can be agreed through rational inter-communal dialogue. Instead, what the society should be working towards is a modus vivendi, which Gray identifies as “liberal toleration adapted to the historical fact of pluralism” (2009, p. 25). It is an approach that “has no truck with the notion of an ideal regime” and “aims to find terms on which different ways of life can live well together” (p. 25). The end is “not any supreme good— even peace.” Rather it is “reconciling conflicting goods” (Gray, 2009, p. 44).

The second problem that arises out of the absence of an agreed final destination for Northern Ireland concerns the willingness to accept an agreement that leaves this issue unresolved. Lack of clarity might be acceptable at some stages of a peace process, especially when communities are weary of violence. But living with the “creative
ambiguity” enshrined in the Belfast Agreement depends on a strong sense of security and contentment with the status quo that might not always be present.

**The Past Is Not Another Country**

Dealing with the legacy of the past is often considered to be a vital part of the transformation of society from violence to peace. Yet there are those who point out the inadequate way that this has been addressed in Northern Ireland. The observation by Peatling (2004) that “dimensions of bereavement, forgiveness, trauma and remorse, remain among the thorniest and most poorly addressed issues in the peace process” (p. 42) remains relevant today. In fact, there have been a number of diverse approaches that indicate uncertainty and maybe fundamental divisions as to how best to approach this issue. These have been detailed by Albert (2009), who offers a comprehensive description of initiatives since 1998. Indeed the British government began addressing this topic even before the Belfast Agreement was signed with two important innovations. The first was the creation of the Victims Commissioner, Sir Derek Bloomfield, in October 1997 (see Smyth, 2000). In the same year the Blair government set up a judicial inquiry into the shooting dead of fourteen civil rights protestors in Derry in January 1971.

Post-agreement initiatives in this area include: the 20 recommendations in the Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner in May 1998; the creation of a Minister for Victims in June 1998; the creation of a Victims Liaison Unit in 1998 (later incorporated into the Victims Unit in the Office of the First Minster and Deputy First Minister); the numerous actions set out in the 2002 Executive strategy for victims entitled...
Reshape, Rebuild, Achieve; the appointment of Bertha McDougall as the Interim Commissioner for Victims and Survivors between 2005 and 2007; the 36 recommendations of her 2007 Report called Support for Victims and Survivors: Addressing the Human Legacy; the creation of four Victims Commissioners in 2008 (after a failure to agree on the name of a single Commissioner); and the creation of a Consultative Group on the Past in June 2007 that produced a controversial report in early 2009. This became the basis of a public consultation on 94 questions devised by the Northern Ireland Office in response to the report’s recommendations. In addition, Albert points to a number of other initiatives. These include official bodies such as the Historical Enquiries Team that is re-investigating deaths between 1968 and 1998 and numerous non-governmental groups engaged in archiving, storytelling or the creation of museums (Albert, 2009, pp. 132–137).

The difficult issues that exist in trying to “neutralize history” in Northern Ireland is illustrated by the public reception of the recommendations contained within the recent report of the Consultative Group on the Past, usually referred to as the Eames-Bradley report after the co-Chairs (available at www.cgpni.org). This made 31 recommendations in six areas: the creation of a legacy commission with a fixed lifetime of five years, remembering, victims and survivors, societal issues (addressing wider sectarianism and reintegrating former paramilitaries with criminal convictions), processes of justice and information recovery, and the legacy of the past and reconciliation. However, when the report was made public on 28 January 2009 all attention was directed at one proposal—that one of payment of £12,000 should be made for everyone who died as a result of “the Troubles,” irrespective of the cause of death. This was the idea that all victims of
violence should receive a “recognition payment” and it raised objections that “terrorists”
killed by the security forces did not deserve the same level of sympathy as innocent
victims murdered by paramilitaries.

Here we might be witnessing the phenomenon that Mack termed “egoism of
victimization” (1990), which exists when one traumatised group lacks the capacity to
empathize with the suffering of other groups. There are at least two responses to this
phenomenon. The first is to argue that it is wrong to deny or underestimate the validity of
other people’s feelings. So Das (2007) writes that “to deny someone else’s claim that she
is in pain is not an intellectual failure, it is a spiritual failure—the future between us is at
stake” (p. 90). The second response is to point out that it is extremely difficult to draw a
clear line between victims and victimizers because of the way that one reinforces the
other. Victimizers often feel themselves to be the victims and are caught up in the victim-
revenge dynamic.

The British government’s response to Eames-Bradley was to initiate yet another
round of consultations with the people of Northern Ireland about the 31 recommendations
To encourage a strong response a website was created that produced an “Response Aid
Document” and detailed guidance notes for its completion (available at
healingthroughremembering.info). However, given that there are at least 60 victims and
survivor groups in Northern Ireland and the strong passions that the issue of remembering
the past still evokes, it is unlikely that any consultation will find the consensus that has
eluded the communities until now.

A Way Forward?
Maybe the best way to think of the Northern Ireland peace process is not as a single process at all, but as a series of interlinked issues. This is a point made by Jarman (2008) who argues that the nature of the peace process—no clear victor, no agreement about what to do next, and no real conciliation between the communities—meant that the post-agreement transition phase “progressed along a number of interlinked but distinctive paths.” These paths, the author claims, were “rarely synchronized” (p. 134). Or, as Darby (2001) put it, the conflict is “a tangle of interrelated questions” (2001, p. 15).

The complex nature of the process makes it hard to evaluate in a decisive manner. It is a place where citizens have liberty and there is much more equality between the communities than in the past, but it is one that still seems to lack a degree of fraternity across the intercommunal divide. Although the communities have moved towards the extremes in electoral terms, the majority would like to live in mixed neighbourhoods, be employed in mixed workplaces and send their children to integrated schools. The majority live in segregated estates but also believe relations will be better in five years time (Albert, 2009, pp. 174–183).

In a very useful audit of the peacebuilding elements after 1998, Albert, using a transformation framework, argues that there have been positive transformations of the context (end of Cold War, deepening of EU integration), structures (new institutions), relationships (reduced social injustice), issues (e.g. in the area of language), actors (changing attitudes within Sinn Fein and the DUP), and rules and norms (a stronger human rights framework) (Albert, 2009). However, as she also notes, Northern Ireland remains a highly segregated society where, if anything, the “two communities seem to be
drifting further apart” (Albert, 2009, p. 351). To this we should note that the spoiler problem has not disappeared, and the assumption that the peace process will be linked to generalised increase in wealth is no longer tenable though it is not clear what impact this will have. A major concern is that the lack of sustained and meaningful inter-communal discourse and the preference for segregated living has produced not a multicultural society, but is closer to one that Sen (2006) has termed “plural monoculturalism,” which refers to “two traditions co-existing side by side, without the twain meeting.”

Yet there are also hints of what Galtung has called “transcending possibilities,” based on the potential of the “moderate majority” (2004), which, he believes, makes up perhaps 85 percent of the population of Ulster. So one of the conclusions of the report on segregation mentioned earlier claims:

The legacy of the Troubles and recent experiences of violence remain factors in how people act as social beings, but people are not solely constrained by their past and there is some evidence of positive change and greater levels of mixing in some aspects of social life in many areas across the north (Hamilton and others, 2008, p. 154).

There are, of course, many ideas as to how to reinforce this positive trend. However, here we can focus on two strategies. The first relates to in-groups and out-groups. It appears that the nation-state/sovereignty/territorial mentality associated with what International Relations specialists call the Westphalian system seems incapable of
resolving (as opposed to settling) the Northern Ireland conflict.¹ This is because it seems to encourage zero-sum thinking—Northern Ireland is *either* British or Irish, and it is hard to imagine oneself as *both* British *and* Irish. How to we move away from such thinking? One course might be to stress the way that cooperation over the fulfilment of material and non-material needs can change attitudes and behaviour.

Here we can mention Mitrany’s functionalist idea of a *Working Peace System* (Mitrany, 1943). Written during the Second World War it proposed the erosion of the destructive European nation-state state system through the creation of supranational bodies dedicated to fulfilling material needs in key areas—an idea that is today found in the European Commission. There are echoes of this thinking in Burton’s (1982) idea that true resolution requires a paradigm shift to human needs thinking, though his wish to portray these needs as objective and universal has provoked opposition. Nonetheless his idea that protracted social conflicts, such as that found in Northern Ireland, can find win-win outcomes by moving from the realm of power politics or legal approaches to basic needs fulfilment has a lot to commend it. He claims:

> The fact that universal human needs include non-material goals that are in infinite supply, opens up means of resolving apparent zero-sum conflicts of interest, including problems of change by positive-sum outcomes and, therefore, without violence or coercion (p. 132).

¹ My thanks to Toshio Kadokura for this point.
Also of interest here is Sherif’s (1967) concept of superordinate goals. Sherif and his co-experimenters were trying to answer the question how can two groups “with hostile attitudes and negative images of the other and each desiring to keep the members of the detested out-group at a safe distance, be brought into cooperative interaction and friendly intercourse”? (pp. 5–6). As a result of his experiments he concluded that the best method for improved relations was the pursuit of what he called superordinate goals—which are “compelling for the groups involved, but cannot be achieved by a single group through its own efforts and resources” (pp. 5–6) Superordinate goals can be found in everything from the pursuit of greater European unity, to actions to protect the environment, to joint sporting teams or music groups. Several interesting examples exist in Northern Ireland, but there is room for many more initiatives around this strategy.

There is some evidence, therefore, that hostile groups working together in the pursuit of mutually advantageous goals, whether this is at the micro or the macro level, can reduce hostile feelings and create new imagined communities. For those who believe that such ideas are unrealistic, it might be valuable to reflect on research for the 2007 *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey* that found that an increasing number of people in the Province are choosing to describe themselves as “Northern Irish” or “equally Irish and British”—a hopeful sign that the British-Irish dualism can be transcended. As the report notes, “an increasing number of people are moving away from the traditional labels” (*University of Ulster News*, December 2, 2008).

The second interesting strategy draws on the work of Richard Rorty (1989, 1999) and, in particular, his idea of sentimental education. This is not the place to investigate his ideas in depth, but, in essence, what Rorty is calling for is greater inter-subjective
understanding through the arts. He believes that when faced with cruel behaviour we need to move from “rigorous rationality” to “flexible sentimentiality.” It has been argued elsewhere that the marrying of Rorty’s idea of sentimental education with Boulding’s idea of “learning sites” offers some interesting avenues that could be taken to address the deconstruction of negative attitudes, especially if such initiatives could be incorporated within major agents of cultural reproduction in Northern Ireland (Ryan, 2007). These would include the media (incorporating the insights of peace journalism), the Arts, education, and the family. Linked to this is Sen’s idea that children should live “examined lives” when they grow up in multicultural settings, and should be encouraged to explore cultural freedom rather than faith-based separatism (Sen, 2006).

Without the development of significant actions to address the dangers posed by an intolerant plural monoculturalism in a society where the communities retain a win-lose mentality about the present, have failed to neutralise the hurts of the past and have incompatible visions of the future we cannot guarantee the peace process will continue to move forward. This should be a cause for concern because, as someone once pointed out, no one ever forgets where he or she buries the hatchet.

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Localizing Peace:

An Agenda for Sustainable Peacebuilding

Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said

Abstract

The sophistication of peace operations and complex humanitarian missions has increased in recent decades, resulting in increased international capacity to mitigate organized violence and provide relief to suffering populations. With respect to other indicators of success, however, international peace strategies still leave much to be desired. By their very nature, externally driven efforts tend to leave local actors feeling marginalized and disempowered, and unable to fulfill aspirations for cumulative and sustainable transformations in the quality of life. The peace that local populations genuinely hope for may fail to take root, and dynamics associated with interventionism may replace one set of problems with another. To address such problems within existing peace processes and to provide a framework for broader preventive action, this paper identifies “localizing peace” as a central challenge for twenty-first century peacebuilding efforts. International and cross-cultural cooperation remain vital for tackling border-spanning problems and structural inequalities, yet the advancement of global peace depends in no small part on the enhancement of local peace capacities. Ultimately, peace must be defined and constructed locally, and peacebuilding efforts become energetic and sustainable only to the extent that they tap local resources, empower local constituencies, and achieve legitimacy within particular cultural and religious contexts. By appreciating these
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realities, international actors can discover more effective means of partnering with local organizations and movements, while also deriving new insights into the unity and diversity of peacemaking.

Introduction

It has become commonplace for commentators on world affairs to observe that we are entering a period of profound social stress and of extreme pressures on often ineffective national as well as international governance systems. Globalized patterns of inequality, economic volatility, and resource scarcity are exacerbating localized social cleavages among ethnocultural groups, in ways that often outstrip the capacities of already-weak states to preserve social peace and stability. In some world regions, local and national conflicts increasingly spill over borders, presenting severe challenges to multilateral initiatives charged with containing violence and establishing security.

While ambitious and multi-faceted peace operations have helped stabilize deeply fractured societies and reduce direct violence (Bellamy and Williams, 2010), few have proved capable of addressing root causes of conflict or sustainably empowering the local population. Critics of contemporary stabilization and reconstruction missions have observed that the top-down nature of major international missions mirrors imbalances within the larger world order, and frequently results in a low-quality or “stalled” peace (Mac Ginty, 2006). The introduction of a large foreign presence to a conflict zone tends to engender dependence on outsiders, friction between “internationals” and “locals,” and ambivalence about the trajectory of political change. Because the psychological residues
as well as social and economic correlates of violent conflict persist despite the brokering of accords by external actors and the initiation of standardized institutional reforms, contemporary peace processes often suffer from deficits in the areas of local empowerment, ownership, and legitimacy (Donais, 2009). Peace becomes a series of events that happen to the general population rather than a participatory initiative that enables members of a divided society to tap local resources, rediscover their own vernacular language for peacebuilding, and become active agents in the construction of a new reality.

To meet the peacebuilding needs of the 21st century and create a more sound and equitable basis for addressing global governance challenges, genuinely empowering forms of grassroots mobilization and local-international partnership are needed. Though humanitarian missions endorsed by the United Nations and backed by leading states are likely to remain necessary, practitioners and scholars of peacebuilding must be careful not to resign themselves to a “trouble-shooter” role within a largely Western, “liberal peace” (Richmond, 2008) framework that narrows discussion of international conflict issues and under-represents actual as well as potential contributions to peace from non-Western cultures. Instead, they must explore ways of broadening and deepening international dialogue about the nature and sources of peace, and underscore the value of context-sensitive peacebuilding efforts that seek to activate local resources and revitalize indigenous peacemaking capacities.

As global conversations about peace, governance, and human security move forward, there is a vital need to reassert the value of local solutions. In a world of diverse, non-interchangeable cultural and religious contexts, there can be no singular, formulaic
approach to sustainable international peacebuilding. Where homogenizing, generic approaches are at best indifferent to local culture and are premised on the need for a clean break with the conflict-afflicted past, newer approaches must adopt a humbler attitude which regards conflict resolution as a cultural activity and seeks forms of partnership that energize and support local efforts. This means rethinking the role of context in shaping peacemaking practice, balancing the need for innovation with the necessity of historical continuity, and emphasizing the renewable and potentially dynamic nature of local cultural resources.

**Etic and Emic Approaches to Peace**

During the last two decades, increasing numbers of researchers have recognized that theories and practices of conflict resolution are culturally constructed and, to some extent, context specific. Although modes of training that presuppose universally applicable techniques and methods persist, many scholars and practitioners have come to appreciate the reality that there are no culture-free approaches to conflict mediation (Abu-Nimer, 1996; Augsburger, 1992), international negotiation (Cohen, 1991), problem solving (Avruch, 1998), or peacebuilding capacity development (Lederach, 1995). Emergent, self-critical voices within the field have sought to reframe conflict resolution as a cultural activity rather than a technical specialization that transcends culture, and have recognized that cultural assumptions are present even in basic constructs of the field. Implicit in much of this critical analysis is the notion that, while disciplined inquiry may succeed in identifying general principles that apply in multiple contexts, specific
applications are not culturally neutral (Avruch and Black, 1994). In the domain of international peacebuilding practice, the call to take culture seriously has helped open the door to reconsideration of traditional and indigenous methods of peacemaking (MacGinty, 2008; Malan, 2005)—forms of peacemaking that generally predate modern North American methods of conflict resolution, and that are often present in the living memory of populations experiencing protracted social conflict.

To date, discussion concerning the diversity of peacemaking processes has progressed somewhat more rapidly than reflection on cultural variations in the way in which peace itself can be understood. Given the extent to which the field of peace research derives intellectual coherence and a normative mandate from foundational “negative” and “positive” peace concepts, this is not altogether surprising. The field of peace and conflict studies has developed a compelling vocabulary for reflecting on the substantive as well as value-laden dimensions of peace, contributing a vital distinction between formulations of peace as a mere absence of overt violence (“negative peace”) and peace concepts that are linked to the presence of conditions for human flourishing (“positive peace”). Through such distinctions, peace researchers have begun to develop what anthropologists call an etic language for the diagnosis and evaluation of large-scale patterns of human behaviour. In contrast to the emic, ethnographic language of “thick description,” which privileges the local, vernacular terminology used by “insiders” over exogenous analytical concepts, etic language aspires to provide a basis for comparative analysis and theoretical generalization (Avruch, 1998, pp. 57–72; Harris, 1968; Headland and others, 1990). The relatively new and specialized etic language of peace research has
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added greater intellectual discipline to academic discussions of topics pertaining to “war and peace” while also opening space for the evaluation of existing practices.

By highlighting the possibility of deliberate efforts to advance a “positive” peace among nations and systematically analyzing ways in which the contemporary international system falls short of this standard, peace researchers have helped expose a common dynamic of power politics, according to which dominant powers attribute universal validity to their own conceptions of peace, and invoke these conceptions to validate the order over which they have come to preside. As Mac Ginty (2006) notes,

[Peace is universal in the sense that virtually all social communities profess a notion of peace, but these notions of peace do not comprise a discrete and coherent set of ideas that can claim unanimous allegiance. Yet, the view that there is just one universal peace is persistent, particularly among hegemonic states and organizations (p. 17).]

Although the language of strategists and statesmen often presents peace as a mere absence of war secured through the robust deterrence of military preparedness (a useful stance for deflecting calls to demilitarize politics or move towards a more collaboratively governed international order), this “minimalist,” status quo peace discourse tends to exist symbiotically with other notions that equate “real peace” with “our way of life,” conceived in positive and substantive (if also idealized or ideological) terms. While this latter tendency may be as commonplace among politically marginalized communities as it is among the powerful, the temptation for those who wield great influence is to equate
peace with predominance—a stance which excludes alternative perspectives on the existing world order, and readily legitimizes war to defend, secure, or extend a hegemonic peace. By highlighting the normative shortcomings of “negative,” militarized understandings of international peacekeeping and issuing a cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic call for cooperative efforts to establish peace as a presence (for example, inclusive security, equitable international development, social justice, cultural coexistence, and participatory politics), academically based peace advocates have mounted a challenge to traditional security politics. They have sought to discipline self-referential and self-serving notions of peace, and reorganize thought and practice to meet the needs of an increasingly interdependent world rendered insecure by the steady advance of technological capacities for destruction.

Given the urgent nature of peace and security debates throughout the Cold War era, most peace researchers devoted only limited attention to the cultural foundations and resonances of “positive peace” concepts, emphasizing the universal significance of their transnational enterprise rather than the underlying diversity of peace constructs among the world’s manifold cultural and religious communities. By highlighting the shortcomings of militarized approaches to peacemaking and calling for transnational commitment to more holistic ways of understanding and advancing peace, modern peace researchers have sought to bypass ethnocentric nationalism and foster consensus on the bases of a more just, stable, and humane international order. In the process, they have provided globally engaged activists and leaders with a genuinely new language for talking about peace as something more than the “peace for us” of bounded cultural communities and the “peace our way” of hegemonic orders ancient and modern, from
Pax Romana and the Chinese Middle Kingdom to Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.

While peace researchers’ contributions are considerable and there is a need for a further refinement and diffusion of the etic language of peace and conflict studies, recent developments in international affairs suggest a concomitant need to revisit the emic dimension of peacemaking. Although past tendencies to analytically bypass emic peace concepts have been ameliorated by the decline of Cold War ideological polarization and the concomitant rise in awareness of conflict as well as peacebuilding potential inherent in ethnic and communal identities, the rich and subtle diversity of cultural and religious peace concepts remains an open area for further inquiry.

**The Limits of Interventionism**

In a world plagued by new identity conflict formations and persistent divides between world regions, a search for the universals of peacemaking is no longer sufficient. For a growing number of thinkers, the current salience of ethnic and religious identity in disputes and the uneven results of international interventions signal a need to abandon simplistic dichotomies that oppose the “universal” to the “particular,” and to more fully embrace the challenges posed by human diversity. As perceptive observers of indigenous as well as religious peacemaking have argued, identities that appear to divide can also provide wellsprings of motivation for building bridges (ter Haar and Busuttil, 2005); every boundary between people provides a potential line of conflict, yet the character of particularistic identities can vary profoundly and there is no inevitability to destructive intercommunal strife.
To encourage a proper stance of cultural humility and underscore the importance of local empowerment and sustainability as well as cross-cultural learning, peace research needs to highlight both the unity and diversity of peace and peacemaking. The field’s overriding normative aspirations and evolving etic constructs can continue to provide a sense of unity, even as researchers more fully engage the diversity of emic approaches—that is, the vernacular languages through which particular communities discuss and comprehend peace, and the local resources through which they might more sustainably ground it in their lived environments and immediate contexts of experience.

Immersion in local, emic conceptions of peace heightens awareness of the extent to which peace is and always has been a contested concept with manifold cultural, political, and indeed religious resonances. If we engage in dialogue and listen closely for substantive peace constructs with which diverse cultural communities feel a sense of historical affinity, it quickly becomes apparent that people in most parts of the world intuitively associate peace with their own idealized forms of everyday life, in a manner consistent with a larger cultural cosmology (Galtung, 1996). Substantively, peace is often equated with “our civilization,” or “our cultural norms, rightly understood.” As a culture-specific, emic concept expressed in vernacular languages, peace is inextricably tied to ideas about sacred values, time-honoured institutions, exemplary individuals, and ideal ways of handling differences within a context of shared community. Taken together, such elements constitute “local common sense” about peace. This “local common sense” can often be instrumentalized within a context of conflict, and transformed into a symbolic “way of life” that needs to be defended or propagated throughout the larger world. Nonetheless, the “received wisdom” that constitutes a group of people’s implicit
knowledge (Lederach, 1995, pp. 44–45) about peace is also a seedbed for creative and empowering responses to social strain, inequality, and traumatic historical events.

In a very real sense, the history of international politics is not merely a struggle for power, but also a process of intercultural communication. In the past, this process has too often been characterized by open rejection of the value syntheses and peace constructs of other cultures, combined with an attempt to supplant or subordinate alternative modes of life. As noted previously, there is a tendency for the most politically influential states and peoples of every era to assume their own worldview is (or ought to be) universal. This perception is linked to a further assumption that “we” have arrived at an understanding of peace and social virtue that is superior to competing conceptions, and which provides a basis for pacifying as well as “civilizing” missions.

Differences of time, space, and underlying political motivation notwithstanding, similar patterns of self-justification have informed the conquests of imperial Rome, earnest nineteenth century belief in the “white man’s burden” or mission civilisatrice, and native residential school policies in North America and Australia (Bond, 2008). Despite the fact that most of these ventures did not go exactly as planned, there is a valid sense in which they were nonetheless “about peace”—at least for their leading protagonists. A fairly consistent theme of imperial ventures ancient and modern is the assumption that the values which make possible a decent way of life—the peaceful life, understood in particularistic terms—are scarce and unevenly distributed rather than abundant and accessible to all. The historical prevalence of this perspective on cultural diversity, which corresponds with the lower rungs on contemporary instruments to assess cultural competence (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman, 2003), provides an understandable sense
of self-justification to many contemporary thinkers who would rather avoid the subject of culture altogether than seek to open up dialogue about similarities and differences between ways of life and conceptions of peace.

If deliberate effort to supplant, subordinate, or repel competing worldviews has long been the staple of international politics, less egregious but nonetheless problematic efforts to universalize the particular are still commonplace. While the era of open and intentional colonialism has passed, the early twenty-first century world order remains rather starkly differentiated into zones of affluence and zones of scarcity, with most ongoing armed conflicts transpiring in the latter areas. Contemporary forms of global governance are underpinned by normative models of development and democratization that have been informed primarily by the historical experiences of industrialized countries, and multilateral interventions intended to stabilize and reconstruct countries afflicted by protracted social conflict that now offer a standardized package of authoritative prescriptions linked to democratization, free market reform, human rights, civil society promotion, and the rule of law (Richmond and Franks, 2009).

Despite credible claims that international capacity for complex humanitarian missions has increased in recent decades (Human Security Centre, 2006), there are also compelling reasons to subject the current formulas for “liberal peacebuilding” to critical scrutiny. The difficulties faced by international missions in contexts as diverse as Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, Somalia, and Sudan raise profound questions about the limits of “outside-in” or “top-down” approaches to peace consolidation and reconstruction. Noting that efforts to “export” peace from one context to another can make things worse or merely replace one problem with another, scholars such as Mac Ginty (2006, 2008) and
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Donais (2009) have called for critical re-examination of new, “one-size-fits-all” prescriptions that seek to introduce the same technical, institutional, political, and economic solutions in every context, without tapping local social capital and cultural imagination, or responding to authentically local priorities. MacGinty and Donais suggest that current peacebuilding orthodoxies prevent more flexible responses to local conditions and perpetuate the historical dialogue deficit between North and South, West and non-West. They liken the liberal peace to an inflexible regimen of reforms and institutional fixes that are exported to areas of conflict and implanted without local roots, in ways that reflect a serious power imbalance between outsiders and insiders, accompanied by paternalism and dependency. Only in the face of setbacks, including serious problems pertaining to a lack of local ownership, legitimacy, fit, and empowerment (Donais, 2009), have sponsors of international interventions and peace support operations begun to consider more focused engagement with existing cultural resources, including indigenous approaches to peacemaking, that were hitherto ignored or regarded as obstacles (Mac Ginty, 2008).

**Tensions between Western and Indigenous Practices**

Critiques of current international peacebuilding practice suggest the existence of serious and abiding tensions between prevalent, largely Western modes of operation and the indigenous norms of societies grappling with protracted conflict, poverty, and unfavorable structural positions in the global economy. Not all of the attendant problems are amendable to a “quick fix,” but possible solutions and remedial measures are more
likely to be effective and sustainable if they relate to local visions and priorities and draw upon capacities embedded in indigenous culture. Unfortunately, current predominant approaches to peacebuilding and reconstruction often fail to develop dynamic partnerships between local and international actors. Awareness of cultural differences and sensitivity to power imbalances is necessary to create space for approaches that foster genuine intercultural collaboration and complementarity rather than a one-way transfer of expertise and prescriptions.

Western approaches to peace are by no means monolithic, yet exhibit a number of characteristics that are distinct from traditional approaches to peace in many non-Western societies. In academic thought, a preponderant emphasis has traditionally been placed on states and institutions. The end of the Cold War prompted partial intellectual retooling to address an apparent resurgence of intrastate conflict organized around ethnic identity, but the solutions to problems posed by armed violence are still presumed to be largely institutional in nature. Particularly in the American context, peace has generally been conceptualized in narrow terms as an absence of war or violence secured largely through deterrence, albeit with strong conflict mitigating functions attributed to economic liberalism, constitutionalism, and political pluralism. Peacemaking has more often than not been approached through an analytical mode of problem solving that seeks to disaggregate and isolate different elements of a conflict so as to deal with them separately from one another.

The Western peace research and conflict resolution traditions have never been fully integrated into official thinking about international conflict, yet these traditions also manifest some recognizable features that differ from common patterns in Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and minority North American settings (Abu-Nimer, 1996; Augsburger, 1992; Keashly and Warters, 2008, pp. 58–61). In approaches to applied conflict resolution, the instrumental dimension of conflict receives far more analytical attention and applied consideration than relational and identity dimensions. Ideally, conflict resolution efforts are intended to foster direct communication between the disputants, if necessary with the assistance of a neutral and professional third party. Constructive communication is characterized by self-disclosure of underlying interests and needs as well as by problem solving that seeks to “separate the person from the problem.” Whereas emotional ventilation is acknowledged as a potentially useful prelude to conciliatory behaviour, emotion is largely viewed as a distorting factor that must be controlled or reduced. Solutions to conflict are sought through abstractive, analytical thinking, leading to the rational and perhaps also imaginative formulation of cooperative mutual gains (“win-win”) agreements that advance or integrate the most important individual interests and needs of the disputants. It is acknowledged that there may be multiple stakeholders, but preserving the autonomy and self-determination of the principal parties takes priority over more diffuse notions of community interest or social harmony. Mutual satisfaction with an agreement is understood to be the most important factor determining sustainability, and the needs driving conflict behaviour are presumed to be universal and culturally invariant rather than culturally conditioned or prioritized (Burton, 1990).

Another strong emphasis of Western conflict resolution theory and practice is technique. Successful conflict resolution is presumed to be less a matter of character or personality than of acquired skill in using methods, procedures, and formal process steps.
that are understood to be context neutral and potentially universal in application. Enhancing capacity for conflict resolution requires development of professional specialization and formal training or certification. Because mediator impartiality and process neutrality are vitally important, the third party is expected to be an outside professional, equally distanced from each disputant. Relatively little attention is typically devoted to the social identities (for example, status, ethnicity, race, class, caste) of disputants and mediators; the parties to the conflict meet as individuals, and evaluate the fairness of a process in terms of its more or less formal and symmetrical character. It is generally assumed that all parties have basically the same capacity to narrate their own story, without the need for extra facilitative effort or engagement to give voice to marginalized persons or vulnerable groups (Wing, 2008). The identity or worldview of the mediator (and its resonance or dissonance with the identities and worldviews of disputants) is not flagged as a key determinant of outcomes. Age, wisdom, and life experience are less important for effective peacemaking than good communication skills and creative, “outside the box” thinking; in principle, anyone can become a mediator.

While the emphases Western peacemakers place on institutional reform, multiple advocacy, analytical problem-solving, individual self-determination, formal procedure, and skill development are not altogether unwelcome in changing non-Western contexts (young urban professionals may be highly receptive), there are usually strong currents of countervailing opinion about the bases for social peace. Traditional non-Western coexistence models, for example, place considerably less emphasis on individual choice and political pluralism than on regulated forms of cultural pluralism – that is, on regimes for mutual accommodation among the particular, discrete identity groups to which
individuals in society are held accountable. Self-expression, direct communication, and personal authenticity are valued less than consideration for face saving in a context of long-term social relationship (Augsburger, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1994). Criteria for selecting mediators are often strikingly different, and tend to value formal training far less than other qualities and characteristics (Abu-Nimer, 1996).

Although most cultures define contexts in which conflict is functional, positive, or necessary, preserving or restoring communal harmony is a central consideration in traditional dispute resolution processes throughout much of the world (Augsburger, 1992). Peacemaking is generally understood to be a highly communitarian process, in which trusted leaders or go-betweens are used rather than outsiders with whom disputants have no relational history. In cases of serious conflict, broader community involvement is typically deemed vital—not only to witness solemn oaths or contribute to deliberations, but also to bring appropriate social sanctions of disapproval/approval and pressure/support to bear on the situation, ensuring that the peace will be kept. The loss of face associated with publicly recognized wrongdoing serves as a key deterrent for misbehaviour, yet cooperation with communal processes of accountability, reparation, forgiveness, and reconciliation provides a powerful means of reintegrating offenders. Positive responses to appeals by mediators and the community to forgive or forgo retaliation may enhance honour and social prestige.

The worldviews within which traditional conflict resolution processes are embedded often attribute a central role to spirituality. Whereas in contemporary Western contexts spirituality is a largely private affair to which public discourse may at times allude (as in the “value talk” of North American politicians), non-Western cultures are
more likely to regard spirituality as a legitimate and even necessary aspect of public expression that applies quite directly to conflict resolution. Whether the process in question is a Middle Eastern sulha (reconciliation) ritual (Abu-Nimer, 2003, pp. 92–100; Funk and Said, 2009) or a South African truth commission inspired by theological precepts as well as a social solidarity ethic of ubuntu (Tutu, 1999), shared beliefs are readily invoked and traditional wisdom provides peacemakers with proverbs and other reference points for counselling disputants (Lederach, 1995, pp. 78–81). Peacemaking is not first and foremost a cerebral, analytical process; emotional engagement, symbolism, and ritual play a significant and openly acknowledged role. Relevant ceremonies, religious observances, and symbolic objects or actions create a context within which relational transformation becomes both possible and expected (Schirch, 2005).

Third-party roles vary in accordance with the severity of the conflict, but traditional cultures have “dispute resolution spectrums” that are similar in some respects to those present in industrialized societies. In simple disputes, effort to redress a wrong or resolve a conflict may start with an informal go-between (direct confrontation being less desirable than in individualistic cultures). For higher-stakes conflicts, mediation-arbitration hybrids are common; in many instances, religious, community, or political leaders act as judges. Large-scale conflicts require intervention by more distinguished and authoritative third parties, but at all levels of social organization and in virtually all processes certain basic qualifications for a would-be peacemaker tend to be similar, such as maturity in age, knowledge of precedents and traditions (oral as well as written), and reputation for good judgment. Agents of reconciliation make active use of narrative and storytelling as well as various forms of persuasion and emotional appeal, yet the idea of
“skills training” is less central to preparation for a third party role than emulation of exemplary figures and assimilation of collective wisdom.

Non-Western approaches, of course, are neither static nor monolithic. While traditional processes are still actively utilized in many contexts, indigenous peacemaking practices change over time and are in some cases rendered inoperative by social change. Whereas many tight-knit, communitarian cultures once relied heavily on systems of conflict management in which one of the greater penalties was banishment, the threat of being ostracized or expelled carries less weight in a context of rapid urbanization. In many world regions, the combined impacts of colonialism, cross-cultural encounter, modernization, and conflict have disrupted traditional social relations and corresponding modes of dispute resolution, creating an anomic situation in which old methods of conflict regulation have become attenuated but not fully displaced by functional and culturally valid alternatives. Quite frequently, “old” and “new” procedures for handling conflict coexist, with state legal institutions based on Western models developing alongside traditional and customary institutions.

The role that traditional and indigenous approaches to conflict resolution play in many societies is too important to either romanticize or discount. In some settings, such as the Acholi region of northern Uganda, tradition provides a framework for meeting grave new challenges such as the reintegration of child soldiers through a well-established ritual known as mato oput (Wasonga, 2009). In Somaliland, customary dispute resolution processes provided an indispensable means for mobilizing elders to restore dialogue and social order, even as the rest of Somalia fell into disarray (Yusuf and Le Mare, 2005). In many cases, however, emerging social strata regard traditional
methods as marginal to their modern, urban existence, and associate them with beliefs and forms of authority that are no longer embraced and trusted. Nonetheless, when the subject of reconciliation or “restorative justice” is broached, traditional approaches can provide powerful metaphors with authentic cultural resonance, together with a repertoire of principles and symbolic practices that might be adapted to new circumstances.

Even when authentically traditional methods cannot easily be applied, cultural realities often dictate locally grounded, indigenous responses to conflict that differ from Western and North American methods, and which fall beyond the purview of standard peacebuilding practices. In tight-knit societies accustomed to protracted intercommunal conflict and relational approaches to conflict resolution, injunctions to “separate the person from the problem” or focus on universal human needs often fail to resonate. Even if traditional methods must undergo considerable adaptation to meet new challenges, they nonetheless offer cultural resources that are familiar, and that give attention to affective issues such as trust and emotional transformation as well as to larger matters of group affiliation, shared values, social duty, and collective memory.

**Emergent Themes**

To truly privilege the local in international peacebuilding, a great deal of new thinking will be required. The challenges are both intellectual and practical, and will require innovative research and theoretical synthesis as well as reflection on the policy frameworks of governments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. The idea of giving more weight to the local, however, is not altogether new, and has precedents in a
number of different strands of thought in peace research and development studies. It is even possible to speak of a number of emergent themes in the peacebuilding field that can contribute to a new agenda of “localizing peace,” in which peace-promoting activities are conducted as much as possible with local materials and resources, in a manner that activates latent cultural energies, creates a genuine sense of ownership and empowerment, and heightens prospects for sustainability. These emergent themes include: (1) understanding peace as a locally constructed reality, (2) viewing culture as a resource rather than as a constraint or afterthought, and (3) recognizing that outsiders are most likely to make positive contributions when they act as facilitators rather than as directive, all-knowing headmasters.

Peace as a locally constructed reality

Since the publication of Lederach’s *Preparing for Peace*, scholars and practitioners of international peacebuilding have demonstrated increasing appreciation for the premise that “understanding conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural knowledge of a people” (1995, p. 10). While this wisdom has by no means been integrated in all peace and reconstruction practices, analysts of grassroots social peacebuilding have increasingly recognized that peace has a cultural dimension and that commitments to peace take shape within the collective imagination and historical traditions of a people (Boulding, 2000; de Rivera, 2009). While ideas about peace and conflict need not be locally rooted and completely indigenous to be of use to individuals and groups in any given context, it remains true that every cultural community has its own vernacular language for conflict and conflict resolution, along with its own set of commonsense
values and standards which give the concept of peace substance and legitimacy (Oetzel, and others, 2006). Exogenous concepts must always be related to indigenous understandings and aspirations if peacebuilding is to become something more than a foreign enterprise implemented from the top down with little popular participation and buy-in.

In every language and culture, peace-related words take on distinctive meanings and overtones as a result of historical experiences, ongoing public conversations, and (in many if not most cases) associations with religious texts and traditions. Because this vocabulary supplies locally rooted understandings of what peace is, drawn from a cosmology or worldview with which people resonate, it is among the most basic of raw materials for peacebuilding. Fortunately for advocates of comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding, indigenous peace vocabulary often denotes far more than a mere absence of war or violence, by suggesting an existential condition characterized not just by basic physical security, but also a presence of factors conducive to human flourishing. In the Abrahamic religious context, for example, Semitic words such as *shalom* and *salam* embrace a range of meanings that includes safety as well as right relationship, well-being, and wholeness. In South Asia, the Sanskrit word *shanti* emphasizes the inward dimension of peace, while still evoking a presence of positive conditions associated with physical health, wellness, and sound action. Such terms do not determine the operative meaning of peace in political discourse, but they do provide the “deep context” for thinking about and generating commitment to peace at a grassroots as well as individual level. They establish potential connections between external processes and the deeper aspirations of a people, and may also provide a litmus test through which local populations evaluate the
authenticity and worthiness of a peace process.

A broad, intercultural approach to peacebuilding seeks to engage rather than bypass or ignore local meanings of peace. Far from being a distraction from applied work or an invitation to cultural stasis, exploring traditional peace vocabulary and its current significance for members of a society can provide a vital way of eliciting shared visions and value priorities, and relating them to realities of conflict in a manner that is conducive to action. Engaging *emic* peace concepts can be part of a larger process that involves tapping local knowledge (Lederach, 1995) and establishing collaborative local-international relationships that empower rather than impose (Donais, 2009).

Sound peacebuilding practice begins with recognition that there are limits to the extent to which any external cultural group or political entity can bring peace to another community or polity. While there are many ways in which external actors can and should provide needed support to societies emerging from violent conflict (Jeong, 2005), stable and lasting peace cannot be enforced on or built for others. Whatever role external coalitions may play in mitigating destructive conflict, sharing expertise, or reforming international policies that place strain on fragile social ecologies, peace must ultimately be constructed locally on a foundation that is recognized as legitimate. Ideally, peace ought to be built in accordance with a locally negotiated plan using as many local materials and skills as possible, so that the population in question acquires a sense of ownership, need satisfaction, and capacity for continued upkeep. In horticultural terms, a viable and sustainable peace in any given context is a peace with local roots that springs from its own native soil and receives care from skilled and committed local cultivators. While in some cases international support may be necessary to create a provisional
greenhouse or even to supply water and fertilizer to survive drought and soil depletion, long-term prospects for growth remain poor if the tree itself is not well-adapted to the climate and regarded as a desirable species.

In light of these considerations, agents of peacebuilding must guard against a culture-blind epistemology that over-generalizes from particular experiences (Walker, 2004), and against the unwitting cultural imperialism that inheres not only in “have technique will travel” approaches to conflict resolution practice but also in efforts to prescribe and export the same institutional solutions to all societies (Mac Ginty, 2006). Genuinely respectful and productive partnerships are likely to be informed by use of cultural empathy as a tool of analysis, and by efforts to use discussion of cultural particularities as a bridge to strategizing about appropriate ways and means. Such partnerships recognize that local actors must own the peace that is to be built, and are only likely to be committed to the result if it reflects their own priorities, meanings, and aspirations.

Culture as a Resource

Sophisticated analysts of culture recognize that, while it is the matrix within which peacebuilding practices take form, it is not a static, monolithic, or deterministic structure (Avruch, 1998). When people become self-aware with respect to their cultural inheritance, it can be understood and engaged as a resource rather than construed as an obstacle or as an unchanging whole to be defended at any cost (Lederach, 1995; Donais, 2009). Authenticity and continuity with the past can be maintained, even as some traditions are consciously maintained and others are subjected to critique or adaptation.
In many respects, peacebuilding is a process of cultural introspection and reconstruction – a process of generating social dialogue that encourages critical reflection on existing realities, re-evaluation of present value priorities, and initiation of new, shared projects that reduce the gap between real and ideal. An essential part of peacebuilding projects, therefore, is balancing cultural innovation with cultural continuity. There is a need for change, but it must proceed on an authentic and locally valid basis or rationale. It must discover new meaning, relevance, and applicability in known values and beliefs (Richards and Swanger, 2009).

Utilizing culture as a resource can begin with recognition that cultural and religious heritages are multivalent, and provide complex sets of practices, values, and precedents that can be applied in divergent (including peaceful as well as combative) ways (Appleby, 2000). For example, any cultural community with deep historical roots is likely to discover multiple precedents for relations with outsiders or for processes of collective decision-making. Viewing culture as a resource provides the basis for a dynamic view, freeing groups of practitioners to “seek the best” within their heritage and thereby avoid the alienation that ensues when cultural traditions are either suppressed in the pursuit of forced modernization or not allowed to grow and change. It also creates scope for empowerment through critical reappraisal of the past, re-appropriation of life-affirming values, utilization of existing skill sets, and broad-based participation in communal dialogue.

When culture is understood as a resource and source of inspiration but not as a rigid mold or invariant template, the potential for genuinely sustainable, effective, and empowering peacebuilding initiatives increases dramatically. The sustainability of
contextually grounded peace efforts is a function of the fact that indigenous cultural and religious resources (in contrast to resources brought by intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations, or by development agencies from foreign nations) are intrinsically renewable through the application of local skills and knowledge. They have greater prospects for effectiveness, because local materials are more likely to be accepted and to have a multiplier effect than imports which are regarded as foreign. They are empowering because they enable local change agents to advance peace using tools and symbols that are immediately accessible, familiar, and culturally legitimate.

The pursuit of local solutions to the problems of peacebuilding need not exclude external involvement, resources, and support, nor does it presume that local traditions are not in need of refinement. Indeed, if local resources were fully developed and operational, the local peace would already be made. “Localizing peace” should not be confused with “turning back the clock” or fully restoring traditional institutions that no longer command a broad social consensus. Insofar as large-scale violent conflict has a destabilizing effect on social institutions, damaging the networks that were once responsible for conflict management, cultural resources may have to undergo considerable adaptation or revitalization before they can become operative in a changing social milieu (Jeong, 2005, pp. 182–184). Moreover, some local traditions may exclude or marginalize voices—for example, those of women, children, or members of outcaste groups— that are vital to the consolidation of a high-quality, sustainable peace (Anderlini, 2007). In such cases it is crucial for outside parties to become familiar with indigenous currents of dissent and proposals for change and renewal. No society is perfect or completely harmonious, to such an extent that it has nothing to learn from
others, or from internal critics. Culture is inherently contested, open-ended, and interpretive, and the pursuit of complete cultural autarky is no more the way to peace than narrowly focused efforts to implant standardized solutions from other societies.

**Outsider as Facilitator**

As Donais (2009) has observed, “outsiders too often take the legitimacy of themselves and their programs as self-evident without seriously considering the degree to which, for local actors, legitimacy must be rooted in their own history and political culture” (p. 20). While it is true that outsiders often possess knowledge and experience that has much potential value, it is also true that locals possess an expertise relative to their own situation that no outsider can fully encompass. Much of this expertise may be intuitive or based on “folk knowledge” (Boulding, 1978, p. 124) that is subject to bias, but it is nonetheless knowledge and it is not necessarily more fallible than academic or policy models derived from the experiences of foreign nations and cultures.

Given these realities, there is wisdom in Lederach’s (1995) counsel to balance prescriptive and elicitive modes of training and to direct consultations organized by outsiders towards the identification and development of locally resonant models. The point is not to abolish the role of the outside expert or consultant, but rather to develop a humbler mode of operation in which the outsider functions as a facilitator or midwife whose overriding goal is to help local actors discover their own resources, abilities, and context-specific solutions. In this respect, the international peacebuilding practitioner can adopt elements of a maieutic or Socratic approach to pedagogy, in which dialogue is at the core of a mutual learning process and there is no assumption that the person speaking
is necessarily wiser or more capable of profound reflection on vital issues than those who are being engaged.

When outsiders share their own models for peace and peacebuilding, it is important to clarify also the historical experiences and cultural assumptions from which these models emerge, so as to better encourage discussion of how practices might be specially tailored to the given context. The experiences of reflective practitioners indicate that there is no set of conflict resolution practices that works equally well in every setting; while general principles may translate, methods and techniques are often culture-specific. Moreover, people are more likely to become empowered when drawing upon their own cultural vocabulary and discovering indigenous resources that can be applied to meet local needs. In this respect, the peacebuilding field can benefit from insights of the appropriate technology movement, which seeks to make development practice more innovatively responsive to the immediately experienced needs, available resources, and existing knowledge of people living in modest circumstances, and less centered around the transfer of gadgets and technologies from industrialized countries – technologies which often require an extensive support infrastructure and may offer little immediate benefit to the majority of people in a subsistence economy (Lederach, 1995, pp. 27–29; Schumacher, 1966, 1973). Similarly, the most appropriate peacebuilding methods in a given cultural context may be updates of traditional or indigenous methods rather than imported Western or North American models predicated on a number of culture-specific assumptions about social interaction.

By acting as a facilitator rather than as a headmaster, the international practitioner can create a space within which new applications of known principles might emerge.
Because these applications build upon that which is familiar, they stand a greater chance of being diffused throughout a social setting than foreign imports. Moreover, because the models being tapped and refined are of indigenous origin, they are more likely to be in harmony with local culture and to contribute to the strengthening of social capacity.

Activating Local Resources

At the core of the “localizing peace” agenda is concerted effort to activate local cultural resources in response to locally felt needs and aspirations. A key premise of the approach is that both international peacebuilders and local populations often underestimate or neglect local resources, and fail to appreciate ways in which capacity to deal with conflict constructively might be enhanced through a process of cultural introspection and renewal. While the principle of localism should not be applied with ideological purism or excessive rigidity—peacemakers in all parts of the world can benefit from cross-cultural learning—there is a need for further thinking about the nature of readily available “local materials” and resources, and for reflection on the many different types of resources that can be constructively utilized to enhance the vitality, sustainability, legitimacy, and resilience of peacebuilding efforts.

Though religious and cultural identities often serve as markers of “difference” and are at least partially co-opted by the systems of confrontation that develop amidst protracted conflict, they are also sources of values, beliefs, and narratives that can be of profound importance for peacemaking (Coward and Smith, 2004). In many parts of the world, the vernacular language for speaking about peace and conflict is infused with
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religious content, and conversations about aspirations toward peace and reconciliation almost inevitably lead toward discussion of religious values, texts, and traditions. Indigenous peacemaking events regularly feature references to religious scriptures and to the words of exemplary spiritual figures, and may also—like the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission—evoke a sense of religious symbolism and ritual (Shore, 2009).

The broader sweep of historical experience should also be recognized as a local peace resource. Mining this experience can bring to the surface not only memories of past conflicts and traumas, but also narratives of conflicts resolved, stories of peacemaking, and knowledge of indigenous (and often informal) processes of community dispute resolution. People’s familiarity with traditional peacemaking stories and methods may provide a basis for rich dialogue with respect to the values, skills, and processes that are required to make peace, articulated in the cultural vernacular rather than in the vocabulary of international social science or diplomacy. In some settings, such dialogue may direct attention to past peacemaking methods that have been marginalized during a current conflict, but which nonetheless constitute a valuable frame of reference for renewed efforts. As Lederach (1995) notes, the language, metaphors, and proverbs people use to describe their reality can be an especially rich source of insight into implicit knowledge, and can provide a basis for surfacing local models of peacemaking.

Local social capital and commonsense knowledge should also be regarded as resources. When taking inventory of local assets, a wide variety of existing institutions, organizations, social movements, skilled individuals, and stakeholders merit recognition. On-the-ground experience with the dynamics of a unique political situation is also an
identifiable resource that newcomers do not possess, as is the detailed, fine-grained knowledge that people have of their own reality, needs, and immediately available means.

Awareness of the value inherent in local cultural resources has begun to increase in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities, yet there remains a profound need for research-backed efforts to develop practical frameworks for identifying, tapping, and harnessing these resources to enhance capacity for local solutions to challenges of social conflict and human security. Because every culture has unique strengths when compared to other cultures, attention to diverse peace traditions has the capacity to enrich peacemaking at a global level. Comparing the peace traditions of multiple societies can contribute to the discovery of cross-cutting themes as well as positive precedents that might help reinvigorate peace practices in other contexts (Fry and others, 2009).

In some cases local resources may need to be rediscovered or revalorized. The legacy of Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy (1900–1989) provides a powerful illustration of what is possible when a profound and dynamic concern for human needs—in particular the needs and dignity of the poorest—provides motivation for active partnerships grounded in respect for traditional materials, motifs, values, and skills (Serageldin, 1985). Fathy, now recognized for his considerable contributions to the appropriate technology movement and to forms of architecture that creatively synthesize traditional and modern elements, found motivation for his work in a learned scepticism of homogenizing tendencies within modernist architectural practices that sought to universalize Western styles of building, without regard to local culture, climate, and needs. Rather than follow a larger trend toward embracing imported, standardized forms
of design, Fathy sought inspiration in the “vernacular architecture” of his own society—architecture which was not only culturally authentic, but also uniquely adapted to environmental conditions and built with readily available, energy-efficient materials, such as mud brick. Entering into a mutually rewarding partnership with rural communities, Fathy endeavoured to update traditional designs to suit the needs of contemporary Egyptians, while continuing to draw upon traditional materials and existing skill sets that could be applied to the task at hand in a manner conducive to self-reliance.

Amidst his creative efforts to make architecture serve human needs, restore cultural pride, and advance universally significant values, Fathy was fond of pointing out that “human beings are not interchangeable” (Serageldin, 1985, p. 17)—there is no single mode of design that can work for all societies and all individuals. In addition, he found significance in the fact that the word “tradition” comes from the Latin *tradere*, which literally means “to carry forward” or “to transfer,” and suggests a “cyclical renewal of life” (Steele, 1997).

Examples such as Fathy’s provide a compelling illustration of what might be gained by more consciously embracing diversity and the principle of localization in peace research and applied peacebuilding. Affirming the desirability of multiple “nodes” for theorizing and practice – and for non-identical yet mutually relevant ways of working for peace – holds potential for making the field more creatively responsive to peacebuilding challenges. It also opens space for new advancements in peacemaking knowledge: every cultural community arguably has values, insights, and practices that can contribute to the development of peace within their own cultural milieus, and which can arguably contribute to a larger, “mosaic” approach to international or global peace based on
inclusive intercultural dialogue. Different communities have the potential to contribute their own “local exceptionalisms”—that is, their own distinctive ways of operationalizing universally recognizable values such as peace, human dignity, communal solidarity, and harmony with the natural environment—to a shared and richly cosmopolitan inquiry into the unity and diversity of peacemaking.

**Implications for Practice**

The potential value of localized peacemaking approaches is already receiving recognition in the field of transitional justice, and is generating new conversations about possibilities for complementarity between Western and indigenous practices. As Mac Ginty (2008, pp. 128–129) has noted, traditional and indigenous approaches to peace have the potential to address deficiencies in “orthodox Western approaches,” by engaging the “affective dimension of peacemaking” in a culturally appropriate manner, and by balancing the top-down, elite-focused aspect of conventional intervention programs with a more genuinely participatory and bottom-up dynamic. In settings as diverse as Rwanda, East Timor, and Afghanistan, many international missions have recognized limits to the reach and practicality of conventional methods, and have sought to learn about, create space for, and encourage adapted applications of traditional dispute resolution, mediation, and consensus building practices. To the extent that practices such as Rwanda’s village-level gacaca courts (Villa-Vicencio, and others, 2005), East Timor’s Nahe Biti community reconciliation process (Mac Ginty, 2008, pp. 127–128), and Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga (“Grand Council”) are now receiving recognition by Western diplomats and
policy thinkers, new conversations are emerging about the most appropriate way to tap the strengths of the indigenous without depriving it of authenticity and legitimacy through co-optation or contamination (Mac Ginty, 2008). The subject appears to defy simple, formulaic solutions, yet any prospectively fruitful effort to mainstream “the local” in peacebuilding practice must begin with an effort to identify guidelines and criteria. The following suggestions are necessarily preliminary and incomplete, and are offered in the hope that they will inspire further discussion about how best to advance the development of a “localizing peace” agenda for sustainable peacebuilding.

Arguably the most important prerequisite for locally empowering peace practice is a compelling and dynamic vision. The operational implications of ideas such as “peace as a locally constructed reality,” “culture as a resource,” and “outsider as facilitator” need to be articulated in greater detail, in relation to the types of time commitment and results criteria that are appropriate to this type of engagement. Concepts such as sustainability, capacity building, appropriate technology, and local ownership are not alien to peacebuilding and development practice, yet pressure to show quick, measurable results often subverts efforts to pursue these goals through long-term relationship building and the pursuit of custom-built, context-specific solutions to local problems. Making the case for a “local-friendly” approach to international peace and development work, on the grounds that it genuinely is practical and effective, will no doubt require considerable effort by on the part of researchers, as well as political courage and communicative competence on the part of administrators. The fact that local resources are more “renewable” and predictably available than international resources bears repeating, as
does the commonsense insight that lasting cultural change is the work of viable grassroots movements and not a matter of short-term service delivery.

Localizing peace also requires considerable forethought about how international personnel—be they employees of intergovernmental organizations or NGOs—are trained and prepared for service in culturally diverse contexts. Working effectively within another cultural frame requires not just familiarity with models of cultural competence or incentives for learning local language and history, but also forms of training that utilize suitable case study materials. Organizations will also need to develop guidelines for work in the field that enumerate principles for localizing peace—for example, exploring local cultural and religious traditions with interest and respect, applying cultural empathy as a tool of analysis, using culture as a bridge by asking about how things would “normally” or “ideally” be done, linking localized needs assessments to elicitive exercises intended to access implicit cultural knowledge and promote empowerment, initiating a “cultural inventory” of resources for peacebuilding, fostering discussion about how to strengthen a local culture of peace by adapting and updating past practices; and so forth.

In addition to following such general principles of preparation for culturally competent and empowering peace practice, it is also important for international practitioners to carefully consider ways in which they might use their own resources—including culture, status, and networks as well as material assets—to bolster local efforts that already show promise. While there are certainly cases in which a local NGO’s relationships with external parties create suspicion on the part of local and national governments, there are also cases in which the respect or concern shown by internationals can strengthen the hand of local organizations and create more space in which to move
and pursue peacebuilding, development, and social service activities. In such situations, the added visibility and profile associated with international partnerships can be enabling.

While it is crucial that local peace initiatives develop a genuinely local base of support, individuals and organizations from North America or Europe can nonetheless play a mediating role between local projects and international sources of project funding, assistance, and information. In addition to providing relevant contacts, internationals can consciously choose to redirect the media spotlight so that local efforts are illuminated for a larger audience. They can expedite access to international conferences and workshops, thereby creating opportunities to share local experiences and expertise with a larger audience, for the benefit of all. Helping local partners connect with or build regional and global networks is another valuable contribution. With respect to regionalism, local movements that operate within the same overarching cultural and political milieu can learn from and support one another over the long term, while also benefitting from contacts with regional intergovernmental organizations and with region-specific offices of the United Nations. At the global level, local movements can derive considerable inspiration from affiliations and communications with like-minded groups in other world regions. Some local organizations allow overseas partners to open “friends of” offices to share their story with a wider audience and provide various forms of assistance and solidarity.

Concern to tap authentic cultural resources should not distract international peacebuilders from opportunities to share varieties of expertise that are genuinely desired, in a spirit of cultural exchange (Donais, 2009). With respect to conflict resolution methods and approaches as well as other types of knowledge (for example,
communications and media strategy, fundraising, evaluation), models and experiences should be shared with the caveat that what works in one cultural milieu or organization probably will not apply in all contexts. Training in conflict resolution can be used as an opportunity for two-way learning, as can discussion of matters such as approaches to strategic planning and public education. Opportunities can also be sought to build bridges between local organizations and actors operating in different world regions. In the 1990s, for example, members of an emerging Lebanese Conflict Resolution Network (assisted at the time by the US-based NGO, Search for Common Ground) found great meaning in an opportunity to explore conflict resolution with a South African trainer.

Yet another way in which internationals can support local partners is by assisting with the publication of relevant materials. Expediting the printing of locally contextualized or produced training materials, for example, can be highly beneficial. In some cases, translations of materials from the local language into English or another major international language can also be helpful, as a means to sharing local experiences more widely and generating greater profile for distinctive peacemaking efforts. This can be part of a broader effort to help give voice to local partners in international as well as national forums.

Not all local practices, of course, are an aid to peace. Efforts to support the localization of peace must acknowledge that some local practices may no longer be experienced as positive, relevant, and life-giving. The local is not always better than the non-local, and workable solutions are often a result of cross-fertilization among cultures. In addition, the intrinsically interpretive nature of culture can present many opportunities for creativity and dynamism. Processes of reform in any culture almost always involve
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sifting through traditions for foundational values that can be understood and applied in new ways, providing a bridge between past and future.

Conclusion

For internationally mobile peacebuilders from contexts such as North America and Europe, localizing peace means being willing to learn and to be enriched by what “the local” has to offer. This necessarily begins with cultural self-awareness, but leads towards an attitude of complementarity, within which there is recognition that there can be no generic solutions to conflict and development challenges. Even within the same world region, one locality’s solutions may not transfer effectively another. Nonetheless, the sharing of one’s own solutions can provide an impetus to creativity for others, and may even inspire a principled form of cultural eclecticism.

As an agenda for research and practice, localizing peace underscores the limits of standardized Western approaches to peacebuilding without negating the necessity of global engagement, responsibility, and collaboration. International and cross-cultural cooperation remain vital for addressing the border-spanning problems of the 21st century. However, the process of seeking greater consensus on the character of global peace cannot proceed independently from efforts to support the grounded construction of diverse “local peaces”—contextually viable peace capacities which reflect the cultural distinctiveness of lived human experience, and which will ultimately make up the foundation stones for a more genuinely inclusive and multicultural global peace project. Insofar as successful peacebuilding is rooted in shared meaning and purpose and not in
techniques and institutions alone, peacebuilding efforts are likely to become energetic and sustainable only to the extent that they tap local resources, build community, and respond directly to locally felt needs for dignity, authenticity, and well-being.

By more fully appreciating and engaging local resources for peace, practitioners of international conflict resolution stand not only to become more effective agents of cultural empowerment and to enhance the vitality of peace processes, but also to benefit from discoveries of resonance and complementarity among diverse peacemaking traditions. Rather than encouraging isolationism in the pursuit of peace, the aspiration to localize peace constitutes an effort to make peace real at the level of lived human experience as well as at a broader, more global level. It invites theorists and practitioners alike to broaden the cultural parameters of their field, with the understanding that bringing more voices to the table is itself a peace process—a process of acknowledging and respecting the many parts, without which a greater whole cannot be envisioned or realized.

References


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Rethinking Reconciliation:
The Lessons from the Balkans and South Africa

Mitja Žagar

Abstract

Reconciliation, described as coming to terms with the past, is considered an important component of normalization and development in post-conflict societies. The international community and some political elites promote it as a desired approach to (re)establishing trust and cooperation, ideally leading to clean slate situation, which might be possible only if all sides are fully committed to the process and unconditionally accept its outcomes. Reality, however, is often different. Exploring concepts, practices and experiences in the Balkans and South Africa the contribution studies successes, problems and failures of reconciliation. It attempts to rethink and re-conceptualize reconciliation and develop alternative approaches.

Introduction

Often reconciliation is viewed as an important (if not necessary) component of successful processes of normalization and reconstruction in post-conflict societies, particularly as a tool that might help in healing painful psychological wounds by promoting justice, responsibility and re-establishing trust and cooperation in post-traumatic situations. Particularly since World War II and its tragic experiences, the
international community, some political elites and several nongovernmental organizations have also shared this view and have promoted and favored reconciliation as a preferred approach to the management and resolution of crises and conflicts. It is also viewed as an adequate foundation for the future development of diverse and asymmetric post-conflict societies, particularly those that were characterized as divided societies. Consequently, in different parts of the world and in diverse situations reconciliation was initiated, introduced and carried out or—at least—attempted with various degrees of success.

These cases offer opportunities to study specific situations and backgrounds, expectations, concepts, approaches and practices that were employed, as well as their impacts in both shorter and longer terms. This should be considered particularly important in cases that initially are declared successes, while in a longer term deficiencies, shortcomings and problems of the processes might become evident. Consequently, one needs be aware of the time dimension in any assessment of reconciliation as well as the historic dynamics and consequences that it might generate in time. My research into reconciliation and diversity management in post-conflict situations followed such an approach and focused on the testing of the working hypothesis that reconciliation can be a useful approach to normalization, reconstruction and development in post-conflict societies, which can be successful only if all relevant actors in a certain environment agree with it, truly accept it with all consequences and fully commit to the process and its success. However, in my view reconciliation cannot replace legal justice and the role of police and judiciary in the prosecution of perpetrators.
of crimes and atrocities, but can only complement them taking into account the cultural specificities of a certain environment.

Considering the limitations mentioned above the traditional concepts, nature and contents of reconciliation need to be reexamined and rethought, as well as (new) alternative concepts and approaches developed. My research, particularly in the Western Balkans but also in other post-conflict societies, shows that it is especially important to (re)establish communication, (re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure and trust, as well as develop and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for the future common existence, cooperation and development of all distinct communities in those environments. Consequently my second working hypothesis is that if reconciliation can contribute to these goals it should be embraced and introduced. However, if reconciliation does not contribute to these short and medium term goals and particularly if it proves to harm their realization, it is not productive to insist on it or introduce it. In other words, I would consider reconciliation an approach and a possible tool for the realization of goals specified above that contribute to normalization and strengthening stability in post-conflict situations.

This article explores the diverse concepts, backgrounds and practices of reconciliation in the Balkans considering also cases and experiences from other parts of the world, particularly from South Africa. It combines qualitative and quantitative approaches and methods and draws on official documents, media reports, other materials, and scholarly works on reconciliation. To a large extent my research and interpretation of its results are based on a considerable number of (in-depth) interviews (in the past two decades more than two hundred interviews in all countries of the Balkans, more than
twenty with interviewees from South Africa and a considerable number from other
countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, East Timor, USA etc.). It also draws on
several hundred conversations world-wide with scholars, politicians, public officials,
civic society activists and public opinion leaders, particularly those who were in different
capacities involved in reconciliation, as well as with a few individuals who directly
participated in the processes of reconciliation in different environments. These interviews
and conversations provide very interesting insights into reconciliation in specific
environments. They illustrate the diverse views and evaluations of those processes and
their outcomes and impacts in respective societies. These complement and often
contradict traditional views, approaches and evaluations, including those presented by the
scholarly literature.

To provide the point of reference and establish the basis and framework for the
analysis of reconciliation in specific environments this article continues with the
elaboration of (simple) working definitions of reconstruction, normalization and
reconciliation (as social phenomena and processes). The following section discusses
specific situations and conditions in the Western Balkans considering the existence of
necessary preconditions for reconciliation, particularly the readiness and commitment of
relevant actors, as well as existing questions regarding the possible nature and contents,
procedures, institutions and actors, results and consequences of reconciliation.

Comparison with other environments and cases of reconciliation, particularly with South
Africa is used to analyze why initiatives and attempts to start and successfully complete
reconciliation processes in the Balkans failed and continue to fail. Testing the hypotheses
the article also explores possible modifications and evolutions of the current concepts of
reconciliation as well as alternatives to reconciliation that would contribute to the successful normalization, reconstruction and diversity management in post-conflict societies.

**Normalization, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Societies: Concepts, Definitions and Their Characteristics**

The very title of this section includes a few complex concepts (describing even more complex social phenomena) that need to be explained and defined to avoid possible misunderstandings and to provide an adequate point of reference and theoretical framework for my further analysis. What follows are simple working definitions of those concepts that I presented also to my interviewees and partners in conversations after I had asked them for their own descriptions and/or definitions of those phenomena. This way they were better able to understand and answer my questions as well as to explain their perceptions and views regarding respective concepts and phenomena. Simultaneously, these working definitions, based on the available scholarly literature as well as my previous and current research findings were (and still are) instrumental in making my research more focused and operational. These working definitions evolved throughout my study and still continue to evolve in the light of new information and findings. The same is true also for the methodology.

The first concept that requires definition and additional explanation is the concept of post-conflict societies, used in this text to describe those societies in which conflicts of high intensity, and particularly violent conflicts, have just been terminated or (at least) deescalated and frozen. Although it is problematic to speak of post-conflict situations...
and/or societies, since conflicts can always (re)appear in every diverse/plural environment, this term is often used by international organizations (for example, UN, World Bank, OSCE etc.), diverse projects (for example, United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research and their Global Governance and Conflict project, Social Science Research Network – SSRN) and in scholarly literature. (See, for example: Brinkerhoff, ed., 2007; Fairbanks and Brennan, 2005; Lambach, 2007; Making Peace Work, 2004) From the analysis of conflicts and diversity management, and considering the probability of diverse conflicts in all plural environments as well as the life-cycles of specific conflicts and the likelihood of their escalation, I would suggest that every internally diverse society can be observed and determined simultaneously as a pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict society. However, traumatic experiences of violent conflicts, particularly wars, large scale violence, atrocities (against civilian population) and war crimes dramatically interrupts the normal life of people and tend to influence and transform societies that have experienced them. Consequently, rather than using a general concept of “post-conflict societies” in such cases it might be more appropriate and precise to speak of “post-violent-conflict societies” at a certain historic time immediately following the cessation and/or end of respective violent conflicts. Such an approach would indicate that in every society several diverse (low intensity, protracted, emerging) conflicts still exist and – if they are not managed and/or resolved adequately – may escalate and even transform into high intensity violent conflicts. In other words, we could say that “post-(violent)-conflict societies”—if they do not manage diversities, crises and conflicts properly—could be just a transitory pre-conflict stage before the new escalation of conflicts in a certain plural/diverse environment.
The concept of a post-conflict (particularly post-violent-conflict) situation and/or society can be a useful analytical tool for the analysis and classification of conflicts in diverse environments. In the context of conflict management and resolution it can be used in determining, analyzing and explaining the phases in life-cycles (processes) of particular conflicts in diverse environments that are instrumental for the elaboration and development of effective long(er)-term strategies for diversity management at all levels. These diversity management strategies should provide for stability and peace in those environments by setting the frameworks for the engagement and coordination of all relevant actors (states and their institutions, international organization, civic society and its actors as well as individuals) that can contribute to the prevention of possible (uncontrolled) escalations and intensification of conflicts and their transformation into violent conflicts as well as to the successful and possibly democratic management and resolution of crises and conflicts. (Žagar, 2009, pp. 463–472)

Normalization can be described simply as a process of restoring and developing (the feeling and perception of) normalcy in environments affected by intense, escalated and particularly violent conflicts that in different ways can impact upon every dimension of (human) beings and relations and the very fabric of societies. This process encompasses all activities, programs, policies and strategies that can reduce the possible negative consequences of escalated conflicts, and can contribute to stability, peace and development in their respective environments. In this context reconstruction and reconciliation can be important components of normalization.

As a component of the process of normalization the process and concept of reconstruction can be defined simply as the rebuilding, reparation and reconstruction of
damage in all spheres of life and societies caused by violent and particularly military conflicts. Usually, reconstruction in a particular environment is framed and materialized in several concrete policies, programs and projects. Although the focus is usually initially on immediate humanitarian aid and later on economic and material reconstruction and rebuilding to establish the necessary economic and social infrastructure (such as transportation, energy, housing, public services – including health and education), I insist that the process of reconstruction should encompass all spheres of life and societies that are damaged by intense conflicts. (See, for example: Anderlinia and El-Bushra, 2004/2007). My research shows that, frequently, nonmaterial damage(s) caused by conflicts might be more difficult and time consuming to repair and/or compensate than any material damage. Often it proves impossible to rebuild and reconstruct relations and social structures destroyed and/or damaged by intense and violent conflicts in particular environments, which then requires building and development of new ones that, hopefully, can replace (or ideally even improve) those that were destroyed. The necessary preconditions for such processes of (re)construction, (re)building and development include functional and open communication (with information-sharing that improves adequate knowledge about other distinct communities), mutual trust and the cooperation of all relevant actors.

In this context, transitional and post-conflict justice should be mentioned as an important factor in restoring and preserving peace and stability, as well as of trust and cooperation building in post-conflict societies. Transitional and post-conflict justice can encompass various efforts, forms and activities such as the prosecution of perpetrators of war and other crimes and atrocities, purges, banishment and expulsion, as well as non-
retributive justice, such as restitution, reparations to victims, rehabilitation, and diverse forms of reconciliation, particularly truth commissions. Ideally these actions should be based on the principle of the rule of law in democratic settings or in societies that are committed to democratic development and democratization, and all forms of post-conflict justice should be based on laws passed by competent democratic representative institutions (parliaments, legislative bodies). These should precisely define and regulate material law, procedures and institutional frameworks including the powers, rights and duties of the competent institutions. Although amnesty and exile can contribute to de-escalation of conflicts’ intensity and can help in establishing peace in certain environments and historic circumstances, abstaining from post-conflict justice might have destabilizing effects in a longer term. (See, for example: de Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez and Aguilar (eds.), 2001; Elster, 2004; Galtung, 2001; Lie, Binningsbø and Gates, 2007; McAdams, 1997)

From this perspective reconciliation could be described simply as a specific form of non-retributive post-conflict justice that might be a useful tool in the process of normalization. However, concepts and practices of reconciliation are far more complex and, in many ways, problematic in their efforts to reach a broad agreement (particularly of those sides opposing each other in the conflict) regarding the (historic) “truth”. Consequently, in search of a compromise acceptable to all involved parties, processes and efforts of reconciliation should attempt to consider, recognize and reconcile diverse views and perceptions of history, the role of history, history teaching and various interpretations of history. (Marko-Stöckl, 2008, pp. 3–4)
The concept of reconciliation as a possible component of the process of normalization and “social reconstruction” in post-conflict societies can be described as “a process that reaffirms and develops a society and its institutions based on shared values and human rights” thereby enabling former belligerent groups and individuals to find and develop new ways of living together peacefully, based on mutual respect, tolerance, cooperation and inclusiveness. (Weinstein, and Stover, 2004, p. 5) In other words, peaceful coexistence and restoration of normalcy in a diverse society that was torn apart by a conflict requires the ‘building of (working and cooperative) relationship’ that corresponds to Lederach’s minimal definition of reconciliation as a process that includes critical components such as truth, justice, mercy, and peace. (Lederach, 2004, p. 151) To stress the temporal dimension and complexity of the process of reconciliation, it can be said that:

Reconciliation is not an event but a process. It is not a linear process. It is a difficult, long and unpredictable one, involving various steps and stages… the first stage is replacing fear with non-violent co-existence; the second step is building confidence and trust, and the third step is achieving empathy. (Ilievski, 2008, 6)

Galtung summarizes reconciliation after violence in a simple equation: “Reconciliation = Closure + Healing; closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated” (2001, p. 4) In his view the best results can be achieved when all parties in a certain environment, especially those that were involved in a conflict, agree to cooperate in resolution and reconstruction.
My research findings confirm such a view. The full agreement of all relevant actors that participate in the process as its parties, particularly their full acceptance and commitment to reconciliation, are the necessary—although not always sufficient—(pre)conditions for its success. In other words, based on the views of my interviewees, every successful attempt of reconciliation requires that before the formal and actual start of the process all participating parties should agree, at the very least on:

- The reasons for reconciliation, as well as the principles and declared main goals of reconciliation,
- The parties that should participate in the process,
- The content(s), particularly on precisely defined historic period(s) and (traumatic) events that are to be addressed by the process of reconciliation,
- The institutional framework, structure and organization, most frequently in the form of Truth Commissions (or, possibly, public hearings/meetings) that might be given administrative and expert support by diverse state and public institutions, for example by public administration, judiciary and police (particularly in the phase of investigation), as well as by civic society and its actors (such as NGOs, churches, as well as others, including economic enterprises),
- The exact competences, rights and duties of the institutional structure and its institutions,
- The procedural and material rules of reconciliation, particularly the rules of procedure and conduct of participating parties, procedures and criteria for the establishment of individual responsibility of perpetrators, as well as the conduct of individuals—both perpetrators and victims—including the formal and symbolic
acts of confession of perpetrators, acceptance of individual’s guilt and responsibility, and forgiveness expressed by victims,

- The formal consequences of confessions and acceptance of individual guilt and responsibility, particularly formal criminal amnesty of perpetrators,
- The time-frame (duration of reconciliation), particularly the deadline when the process of reconciliation and all activities within it should be completed,
- The process of reporting and evaluation in particular phases and at the end of the process of reconciliation.

The likelihood that such agreements would provide an adequate basis for reconciliation depends on the specific situation, the relations between the parties and the balance of power in the post-conflict environment. It is believed that this likelihood increases in environments committed to (re)building democracy, tolerance, peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Reconciliation might be more likely in post-conflict situations and societies where a clear-cut division between parties exists and where victorious sides request and promote such a process. On the other hand, reconciliation is less likely in environments and post-conflict situations where it is impossible to identify victors and losers clearly, where there are diverse and opposing interpretations of history and traumatic experiences, where there are several opposing interests, and where one or some sides oppose reconciliation or demand concessions (such as exculpation or amnesty) that are unacceptable to other parties. Reconciliation might be even less likely or, at least, more complex and uncertain in ethnically plural post-conflict societies, where ethnicity becomes a dividing line and the process is perceived as interethnic reconciliation, particularly in cases when certain parties reject it. Namely, reconciliation
is impossible without the consent and participation of all parties that need to agree “to face recent past objectively” (Petričušić, Kmezić, and Žagar, 2008, 5).

Taking into account possible social impacts, my research developed a working definition of reconciliation that saw it as a tool for diversity, crisis and conflict management that could contribute to normalization and stability in internally diverse societies, particularly those considered divided-societies. As such,

reconciliation is a specific process that leads to the commonly acceptable and accepted (re)interpretation of the past, especially of specific shared traumatic past developments. In a way it is a past-oriented and usually painful process of healing that, however, has several present- and future-oriented goals and impacts. Ideally, it can create the formal basis and conditions for peace, coexistence and cooperation in the present and future and for the necessary social cohesion that enables elaboration and realization of common interests (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 401).

In this context the importance of the temporal dimensions and limitations of reconciliation should be stressed—both in terms of exactly defining and agreeing upon the historic periods it addresses, as well as in determining the exact duration of the formal processes of reconciliation and their deadlines. Traditionally, all temporal dimensions of reconciliation should be exactly defined and, normally, limited to a certain, relatively short period. Reconciliation should follow conceptual, procedural, material and institutional frameworks and foundations as well as time-frames determined by the legislation and political decisions that should be agreed upon and accepted by all relevant
actors. Often we can detect fears that processes of reconciliation can result in possible threats to stability if they are not limited to a relatively short time. There are also fears that reconciliation “can become a never-ending, permanent process that constantly reinforces certain historic traumas.” (Žagar, 2007/8 ©2010, p. 401) However, successful diversity management in plural and particularly divided societies demands the development and utilization of effective approaches, mechanisms and procedures that can address, prevent, manage and resolve problems and tensions in intercommunal and interethnic relations. If this can be done in peaceful and democratic ways, it might prevent escalations of crises and conflicts, and particularly their traumatic consequences. In this context revised and transformed concepts of permanent reconciliation, as well as other adequate alternative solutions that can successfully address and manage interethnic and other intercommunal relations and problems, would be particularly welcome. (See also: Redekop, 2002)

The consensus reached by the parties that participate in reconciliation regarding the process of reconciliation—its nature, principles and contents, formal, procedural and institutional framework, procedural and material rules, as well as its goals and outcomes—can serve as the basis for future coexistence and cooperation in internally diverse post-conflict societies. In the process of reconciliation perpetrators should: come forward and confess their wrongdoings (usually violence, crimes and/or atrocities); express and accept their guilt, responsibility and remorse; and ask their victims for forgiveness, which, ideally, the victims are expected to accept at least formally. Such reconciliation can be viewed as a process of purification and consensus building that
could contribute to the reduction of social tensions and historic traumas in post-conflict societies.

**Potentials, Expectations, Successes, and Problems of Reconciliation: Experiences from the Balkans and South Africa**

My research in reconciliation started in the second half of the 1980s when I entered the field of peace and conflict studies and focused my research on the theory and practice of crises and conflicts, the determination of their life-cycles, and the responses of particular environments to crises and conflicts, particularly into their prevention, management and/or resolution. In this context I examined reconciliation as a possible tool of conflict analysis, prevention, management and resolution, as well as diversity management in plural societies that can be used effectively especially in the phase(s) of de-escalation of high-intensity and particularly violent conflicts. (Žagar, 2007) Soon I discovered that regardless of certain communalities and similarities each crisis and conflict was a specific and unique case that should be analyzed, treated and managed as such. Although these specific cases can be studied comparatively in order to determine specific differences and communalities among them, one should be very careful in interpreting and generalizing the findings. Detected differences and specificities often prove more important and decisive than similarities and communalities. Additionally, in every environment that I studied I detected a substantial gap between the normative framework on the one hand and the actual situation and practice on the other hand which further complicates comparison and makes any generalization rather inadequate or even impossible. Considering all the problems and weaknesses as well as limitations of the
research findings, however, comparative research still proves to be the most applicable and useful approach.

These considerations and limitations apply also to my case studies and comparative studies of reconciliation in different environments in the Balkans (particularly in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia) and in South Africa, as well as to my presentations, interpretations and generalization of research results in this article. Consequently, this text should not be treated as a detailed analysis and presentation of reconciliation in respective states, but rather an attempt to present a common framework, adequate tools and yardsticks for analysis in these environments.

If there was the will, consensus and commitment to start, and successfully bring to completion, the process of reconciliation in South Africa immediately after the abolition of apartheid, they have not existed and still do not exist in the Balkans. Of course, there are still discussions about reconciliation in different circles and environments, as well as many initiatives—particularly external (including those of the international community)—to try to start it. This is the reason that [r]econciliation often appears in political declarations and diverse documents from the region and related to the Western Balkans. Usually, these documents speak of reconciliation in the context of human rights, protection of minorities, refugee return, reconstruction, post-conflict development, democratization and consolidation of democracy, peace and stability, etc., and state that reconciliation could contribute to these goals. However, not only do they fail to define
reconciliation’s principles and goals, but they also fail to define the process and procedure of reconciliation (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 402).

Consequently, my initial consideration is that there is no consensus regarding reconciliation in the region. Although it is often being discussed as the desired and even necessary precondition for “normalization” and long-term peace and stability, nobody has defined precisely what reconciliation in the Balkans and in every individual state in the region should be and in which way it should be implemented. Aside from general political statements of international and national leaders there are no substantive and/or institutional conditions in place that are necessary for a successful process of reconciliation. There is no consensus about the historic developments, events, issues, actors and periods that should be addressed by such a process. As indicated, we could question the very existence of the basic preconditions for reconciliation—the willingness, agreement and readiness of all relevant factors to engage in the process. For, “there is neither adequate legislation nor informal agreements on procedure, institutions and criteria for the evaluation and reconciliation. Additionally, general and specific goals and expected outcomes (consequences) of reconciliation are not adequately determined” (Žagar, 2007/8, p. 404).

High hopes that the international community and a part of civic society in the Balkan countries and outside the region will invest in initializing reconciliation at least in individual countries do not seem to be very realistic. It seems that they ignore past experiences from different environments and historic circumstances in all parts of the world that inform us that reconciliation failed to produce expected results if the internal
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will and consensus regarding it and commitment to it did not exist or were weak. This is particularly true when reconciliation was initiated, imported or even imposed from outside.

Not surprisingly, such criticisms appeared in many interviews in which interviewees expressed their views that successful retributive post-conflict justice, particularly effective criminal justice—expressed in effective, strict and consistent prosecution and conviction of all perpetrators of war and other crimes, regardless of their background and position—would be the preferred and necessary precondition for (re)establishing peace and stability, tolerance, trust, coexistence and cooperation in individual countries as well as in the region. They also expressed fears that reconciliation might cement and legitimize (in their view illegitimate) gains and spoils of war(s), but particularly the existing situation of a balance of power based on ethnic divisions.

Although it is believed that successful reconciliation contributes to community relations, peace and stability in an environment that was torn by a conflict, it might produce exactly opposite results. Paradoxically, reconciliation that is perceived as a tool for ensuring peace and stability (as its preconditions) requires an already stable situation and a mutual acceptance by all sides involved in the process of communication, tolerance and coexistence. Portrayed as a two way process, reconciliation inherently presupposes certain missionary elements deriving from Christian theologies and requires forgiveness (on behalf of victims). Consequently, sometimes reconciliation might be perceived as an institutional design that rewards the bad guys (perpetrators of wrongdoings) and does not ensure adequate justice for victims. These characteristics, along with the ideological nature of reconciliation, might be particularly problematic in multiethnic, multicultural
and multi-religious environments. Here diverse cultures, ideologies and religions might have different views of justice and forgiveness, but particularly of confession and absolution. Furthermore, failed reconciliation might become an important additional generator of conflicts.

The current concepts and practices of reconciliation can be problematic and even counterproductive if they are attempted in environments where it is unclear which sides were victorious and which were losers, where several diverse and even opposing interpretations of history and past traumatic experiences exist, and where all sides committed certain wrongdoings in the time of intense and violent conflicts, particularly if there is a dispute which of the sides involved were the victims and which perpetrators of certain wrongdoings. In such cases it is often almost impossible to reach a consensus or even compromise regarding the past and commonly acceptable interpretations of this past. The task is even more difficult if reconciliation is attempted simultaneously with the process of (democratic) transition in a post-conflict society, faced also with the dilemmas of transitional justice and a still unstable democratic set up of the society. Additionally, in such situations there might be several kinds and dimensions of justice and truth, often several truths—such as judicial, political and moral justice and truth. (See, Žagar, 2007/8, p. 402)

In the circumstances that existed in the Balkan countries it proved impossible to reach consensus regarding the procedural and institutional framework of reconciliation. Consequently, no adequate formal framework and no organizational structure were determined and established in these countries. Usually, in such situations “Truth Commissions”, which have the mission to establish the truth and responsibility of
perpetrators, are formed and function as key reconciliation institutions. Their compositions, modes of operation, roles, powers and competences can differ in different environments and should be adjusted to specific circumstances and needs in these environments. Regardless of the existence of a collective blame associated with a certain party or collective entity that is seen as the main perpetrator of wrong-doings and/or atrocities in a certain environment, reconciliation requires the establishment of individual (or at least individualized) personal responsibility and accountability. Consequently, reconciliation can be viewed as the undoing of past wrong-doings through the perpetrator’s recognition of responsibility and accountability and remorse on the one side, and through victims’ forgiveness on the other side. Among the main preconditions for a possible success of the process we could list (at least) a certain level of normalization and the beginning of reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the introduction of adequate measures for the protection of minorities.

In comparison with other environments where reconciliation has been attempted and carried out with various levels of success, particularly South Africa that is often considered a model case, I would conclude that reconciliation failed and does not exist in the Balkans. Moreover, reconciliation has not even been started—regardless of the diverse initiatives and aspirations, including those of the international community. My research findings show no enthusiasm from relevant actors who are expected to participate as parties (with diverse roles) in the process of reconciliation. Often they doubt that reconciliation could bring any positive results in their respective environments and sometimes express their fears of possible negative outcomes and consequences for their distinct communities and/or themselves personally. Particularly they fear that
reconciliation, because of its likely failure, would not contribute to peace, stability and normalization in respective societies, but rather to instability and the escalation of conflicts. In any case, as also many interviewees pointed out, their fears and opposition to reconciliation seem to be stronger than possible incentives to start it and/or expectations of its potential benefits.

Although each of the countries in the Balkans is a very specific and unique case, certain common observations, characteristics and similarities can be summarized in the following main conclusions:

- Political will and the readiness to start the process of reconciliation in most countries of the region do not exist or are very limited. Consequently, rare statements of politicians calling for reconciliation should be considered lip-service to please the international community and potential donors (who continue to promote the idea), rather than the actual desire to start the reconciliation.

- Consequently, there are no serious attempts to determine and agree upon the content(s), procedures and institutions, as well as the normative and institutional framework, which would be necessary to start the process.

- Frequently there is a dispute regarding the actors that should be involved in the process of reconciliation and their roles (conditioned by diverse perceptions and evaluations of historic events and their consequences, as well as by the lack of recognition of responsibility of diverse actors for their actions and their outcomes).
There is also disagreement regarding the necessity and role of post-conflict justice, particularly criminal justice and the necessity of possible abolition for those perpetrators who participate in reconciliation.

There is no consensus regarding the desired outcomes and long-term goals of reconciliation, which would provide the basis for peace, stability, normalization, and the future cooperation of all actors. (See, Žagar, 2007/8, 404-405)

In comparison with the Balkans, and regardless of certain problems with the process of reconciliation, South Africa has been and (largely) still is considered to be a success. (See, for example, Adam and Moodley, 1993; Adam, Moodley, and Slabbert, 1999; Gibson, 2002; Gibson, 2004; Gibson and Gouws, 1999; Gibson and Gouws, 2003)

In South Africa the volume of the work, the involvement of people and the results of the process presented and summarized in the reports of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are impressive. (See, THE TRC REPORT, 1998/2009) Although reconciliation did not fulfill all expectations, it is (still) believed that the process of reconciliation and its results contributed substantially to: reducing (in some cases rather intense) tensions and divisions; coming to terms with a traumatic past; building peace and stability; and the integration of all segments into post-Apartheid South African society. This is also the official position.

However, my interviews and several conversations in South Africa, including those with people in streets, showed that by 2010 much of the initial enthusiasm and optimism regarding reconciliation and the successful democratic transformation have disappeared to a large extent. There are more and more cracks in a once optimistic picture. No doubt, the elimination of Apartheid, reconciliation and process of democratic
transition changed, transformed, integrated and improved South Africa in the 1990s. Yet they did not eliminate deep divisions, social and economic injustice and inequality, exclusion and marginalization (particularly of poor, predominantly black populations in diverse environments) or racism (that exists in the forms of traditional, internal and reverse racism). These problems continue, sometimes with greater intensity. On the one hand many victims believe that the perpetrators of wrongdoings were not punished adequately, while the victims were not compensated adequately (both in material and nonmaterial sense). On the other hand, perpetrators seem to be less disappointed with the process, although a few considered it an unnecessary and nonproductive humiliation that did not produce the desired results.

It should be mentioned that the reconciliation process only addressed wrongdoings and injustices that were brought to its attention in the determined time period and, consequently, did not discuss all wrongdoings, crimes and injustices during this time. Additionally, diverse problems, wrongdoings, crimes and injustices have continued and the competent institutions of South Africa do not always address them properly and adequately. Obviously, it was impossible to continue reconciliation indefinitely or transform it into a permanent process that would deal with all relevant problems and injustices as they appear. Consequently, adequate alternative formal concepts, approaches and institutions/mechanisms that could complement and assist democratic institutions of the country in dealing properly with these problems should have been developed—which South Africa failed to do. Among the main problems that might need to be addressed Terry Bell listed: adequate social and economic development that should take into account the environment (including climate problems) and social
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justice; growing economic and social injustice and exclusion; gender and class issues; adequate integration; and a lack of social infrastructure and services, particularly the access of the poor to education, health and social security. He also mentioned corruption and crime that in many ways are the negative consequences of the inability to properly address all these problems. Luckily, he said the award of the 2010 World Cup and its positive economic effects to a certain extent helped in neutralizing a worse economic crisis.

Conclusion:

Reconciliation Rethought and Alternative Solutions

The discussion of reconciliation so far confirms the hypothesis that it can be a useful approach to and tool for normalization, reconstruction and development in post-conflict societies. However, this requires the full acceptance, agreement, and commitment of all parties. It can successfully complement state institutions in the prosecution of perpetrators of diverse wrongdoings in a certain historic time, but cannot replace them. In this context the temporal dimensions (the determined period that is addressed) and limitations (the exactly determined duration of the process of reconciliation) of traditional reconciliation reduce its applicability and efficiency as a tool of crisis and conflict prevention, management and reconciliation, particularly as an adequate tool for permanent diversity management in plural societies. I would argue that for such a role reconciliation should transform into a permanent ongoing process that takes into account
a broader social and historic context. It could become a permanent process for screening and evaluating social relations that would detect and point to undesired and problematic developments and actions in a certain environment. In this context, the process should constantly re-examine and confirm the will of all parties to participate in the process, as well as basic principles and values that are agreed upon in these environments. Simultaneously, it has to determine directions and strategies of future development.

Traditional reconciliation seems to be an appropriate tool for dealing with traumatic experiences and problems that should not be forgotten, but it should also consider important lessons that could contribute to the prevention of such and/or similar events in the future. Traditional concepts should also recognize that all historic events, including traumatic ones, have their prehistory and broader social contexts that are relevant for reconciliation. Additionally, such historic events might have several consequences in diverse spheres of life and society that might last for several generations. All this should be taken into consideration in determining the time frame.

I can confirm also the hypothesis that reconciliation should be introduced only when it is expected to contribute to peace and stability in a certain post-conflict environment. However, traditional concepts of reconciliation should be transformed and/or complemented by alternative approaches that can (re)establish communication, (re)build (at least) basic economic and social infrastructure and trust, as well as develop and constantly reconfirm common interests as the basis for the future common existence, cooperation and development of all distinct communities in those environments. Consequently, reconciliation should always be considered and evaluated as a possible tool for normalization and peace- and stability-building in post-conflict societies.
Among alternative and/or complementary approaches and mechanisms that can contribute to long-term peace, stability and democratic development in particular post-conflict societies I have mentioned normalization and diversity management, with the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts as key components. Normalization is a process of creating conditions of mutual recognition and acceptance, tolerance, coexistence and (hopefully equal) cooperation in a certain plural and diverse environment that should be the basis for determination and realization of common interests. It can include also different segments of diversity management and should stimulate the development of adequate procedures and mechanisms for the peaceful and democratic management and resolution of crises and conflicts based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and human rights—including minority rights. If normalization is a transitional approach and concept that can be utilized in crisis situations and post-conflict societies, diversity management represents a permanent process that addresses issues of recognition, regulation, management and adequate protection of all socially relevant diversities in a certain environment. It can be described “as a set of strategies, policies, concepts and approaches, programmes, measures and activities that should ensure equality, equal possibilities, participation and inclusion in all spheres of social, economic and political life (both public and private life) for all individuals and communities within a society, especially for immigrants, persons belonging to national and other minorities, marginalized individuals, minorities and other distinct communities.” (See, Žagar, 2006/7, 320)

My conclusion regarding reconciliation in the Balkans would be that it does not exist, since it is not even spelled out and accepted as a realistic goal. Considering the
rather negative attitude towards reconciliation by relevant social and political actors as well as people in the countries of the region it might be more productive to speak, instead, of normalization or a democratic political process that could provide a stable basis for power-sharing and cooperation, particularly in determining and realizing the common interests of all individuals and distinct communities in these environments. These elements are important components of diversity management that in the long term might prove to be the most adequate approach and mechanism for the region and its countries.

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The Role of the European Union as a Peace Builder: Northern Ireland as a Case Study

Paul Arthur

Abstract

The United Kingdom and Ireland joined the European Economic Community in 1973 at a time when bitter communal conflict engulfed Northern Ireland. It appeared to be a deviant case in a modernising Europe anxious to unleash the shackles of the first half of the twentieth century. In fact the unusual conjunction of conflict within a disputed region of the British/Irish archipelago and joint membership of the European Community offered an opportunity to move beyond the excessive intimacy of an ancient quarrel through different temporal and spatial lenses. This article addresses the issue of dealing with minority grievances in an inter- and intra-state dispute by analysing the role of functional regimes and the deliverance of “peace in parts” through the changing context of statehood within Europe where sovereignty may be divisible and borders more permeable. It will conclude that the EU has made an essential contribution to the changing relations between Britain and Ireland and to conflict management within Northern Ireland.

Introduction

In 1979 the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities published the Capotorti Report. It addressed the
desirability of bilateral treaties between states most directly concerned and deserves to be quoted at some length:

History shows that the minority problem can poison international relations. However, with the new standards set by the United Nations in the framework of human rights, minority groups can now play a positive role in international relations. When their rights are guaranteed and fully respected minority groups can serve as a link between States. The Special Rapporteur strongly believes that bilateral agreements dealing with minority rights concluded between States where minorities live and the States from which such minorities originate (especially between neighbouring countries) would be extremely useful. It must be stressed, however, that co-operation with regard to the rights of members of minority groups shall be based on mutual respect for the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States concerned and non-interference in their internal affairs (Para. 618, recommendation 10b).

This fits neatly with one conception of the EU’s approach to conflict resolution—its potential through practices of “Europeanization” that create a European public sphere in which incompatibilities can be peacefully communicated through creating a framework for a European identity that makes the cost of conflict across borders too high to continue and that feeds into the recognition of shared needs and the creation of common identities (cited in Hayward, 2006, p. 262).

Many of the contentious issues that are addressed in the 1998 Belfast Agreement are to be found in Recommendation 10 (b) and are an illustration of the extent to which
the British and Irish governments have dealt successfully with outstanding historic grievances within the European Union. After all, as Boyle and Hadden assert, the European Community was established “principally as a means of breaking down historic enmities. Member states are bound to recognize their existing boundaries and are expected, with the assistance of their fellow members, to resolve any outstanding difficulties by sharing resources across national frontiers and by channelling the potentially dangerous forces of traditional nationalism into a broader communal framework” (1986, p. 47). In the context of the Northern Ireland problem the Community offered two other advantages: one was the “changing context of statehood”; and the second was that the “EU system offered a far more benign external environment for small states, including Ireland, than traditional balance of powers systems or empire”. The result was that joint “membership of the EU altered the context of British/Irish relations in a radical manner by providing the Irish economy, polity and society with a highly-institutionalised and rule-bound context which it could adapt to economic and political internationalization” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008, pp. 198–9). One example concerns the pattern of Irish exports: “In 1971, the UK market absorbed 61 per cent of Irish exports; the proportion had fallen to 25 per cent by 1998” (p. 199). It also offered in part a route to a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. In one of the early interventions (the European Parliament’s (EP) 1984 Haagerup Report) it sought to address “one of the gravest political and social problems existing in the Community”—3,375 people were killed between 1969 and 1994 as a result of the conflict in a population of less than 1.7 million. That is precisely what this article will address by examining the period until the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement.
When Jean Blanchard described Ireland as an island behind an island he was alluding to the fact that the neighbouring island of Britain had had a disproportionate influence on Ireland, an influence based on a colonial history that stretched back to the seventeenth century at least. That state of mind is best encapsulated by Edmund Burke in his *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*, when he writes that when “any community is subordinately connected with another, the great danger of the connection is the extreme pride and self-complacency of the superior, which in all matters of controversy will probably decide in its own favour” (1777). It calls to mind the concept of the Prospero complex evolved by the radical French historian, Octave Mannoni, when he argued that the coloniser has created a neurotic sense of inferiority in the coloniser.

This theme is developed in Joseph Lee’s study of Irish politics and society in the twentieth century where he examines a dependency syndrome that curbed the Irish psyche and a collective mentality that strove after security. The former he said was quite natural in that a “small occupied country, with an alien ruling class, culturally penetrated by the language and many of the thought processes of the coloniser, was bound in large measure to imitate the example of the powerful and the prosperous” (Lee, 1989, p. 627). The result, Lee asserts, was that when allied to the “elusive but crucial psychological factors that inspired the instinct of inferiority, it shrivelled Irish perspectives on Irish potential” (629).

Lee was published in 1989 at a time when the Irish economy was in the doldrums; emigration (particularly of the educated young) was on the rise; and there was no sign of an end to the Northern Ireland conflict. Contrast that with a more recent publication where Ireland was judged to be the most globalized country that ever yet was seen and
the Economist ranked Ireland’s “quality of life” as the best in the world in 2004 (Foster, 2007, pp. 4–5). Admittedly the “Celtic Tiger” is in serious recession at the time of writing; but, on the other hand, the seemingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland has come to an end. Indeed some hold it up as a model of conflict resolution to be applied elsewhere in the world.

Various explanations have been adumbrated to explain the sloughing of fatalism in Ireland and a more expansive and inclusive approach to life. This article intends to look at one aspect of this relative success through an examination of the experience of nearly four decades of participation in “Europe”. When the United Kingdom (UK) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973 it was accompanied by the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ireland). Their joint accession was to change the British-Irish relationship fundamentally and was to contribute towards a greater understanding in their approach to solving the Northern Ireland problem. We will examine both of these aspects.

**Attitudes in the UK and Ireland to European accession**

**Ireland**

The UK and Ireland entered the EEC in different frames of mind. There is some evidence to suggest that Ireland entered more positively. In his first major policy speech in 1973 the Irish Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald told the Dail (Irish parliament) that it was time to formulate new general guidelines for future foreign policy because of the movement “towards greater interdependence” in the world economy; “the evolving situation in Northern Ireland”; and the “accession of membership to the European
Communities”. In a book he had published the previous year he stated that “although it would be wrong to look at this as a panacea for the Irish problem, which will always remain one to be settled by Irishmen in Ireland, such influence as membership of the (European Community) will have is likely to be uniformly directed towards the path to a united Ireland” (FitzGerald, 1972, p. 104).

“Interdependence” was the key word. The Irish were conscious of their humble position in the world economy and of the need to find new markets. Public opinion was strongly in favour of membership because it expected to benefit from the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and from European regional development funds. In a 1972 referendum 83 per cent endorsed the decision to join. At another level the Irish government indicated through a White Paper published in 1972 that its modest international profile enabled it to read the message of the effect of the progressive informal encroachments of international linkages on national autonomy, and so it drew the distinction between independence and sovereignty. It acknowledged that as “a very small country independent but with little or no capacity to influence events abroad that significantly affect us” Ireland enjoyed very little economic sovereignty.

That was a lesson that had been hard learnt during the course of twentieth century Anglo-Irish relations. An American analysis of the Irish economy in 1952 had concluded that the country’s dependence on Britain was so strong as to be incompatible with the status of political sovereignty. The era of protectionism was brought to a close with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement in 1965. Henceforth economic nationalism and self-sufficiency was to be replaced with close economic ties with the UK and ultimately within the EEC. The stark message was that “the national interest was the
only valid criterion in policy formulation. Everything else, even sovereignty, which was merely a means towards serving the national interest, must be subordinated to that decisive consideration. The other member states of the EEC had already “accepted the limitations involved on their own national freedom of action because they consider that their national interests are best being served by membership”” (Lee, pp. 463–4. All quotations from the 1972 White Paper are extracted from Lee). The Irish intended to be communitaire. They demonstrated this at an early stage when they decided that they would stay in the Community notwithstanding any decisions the British made when the UK held a referendum in 1975 to decide whether to remain or not. Similarly it joined the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 when the British did not. They did this despite the fact that it had “the potential to drive a wedge between the two parts of the island” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008, p. 200). The extent to which they were successful is acknowledged in the conclusion to an Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy (1996): “Irish people increasingly see the European Union not simply as an organisation to which Ireland belongs, but as an integral part of our future. We see ourselves increasingly as Europeans.” This was the response to Lee’s historic sense of inferiority. Garvin puts it in perspective when he comments that Ireland’s engagement with Europe was part of “a very deep longing for an alliance, a friendship that was non-imperial and psychologically satisfying, combined with a culturally determined wish to be self-sufficient and to be true to no one but one’s collective self” (p. 200).

It might be said Ireland was simply following an international system that recognised the erosion of boundaries based on the universal recognition of territorial sovereignty through growing interdependencies: “Thus, while political systems are
boundary- maintaining, markets—although dependent for their creation upon political power and economic networks—are not.” The result has seen contradictory traits in the international system where in place of *spheres of responsibility* and *of abstention* we now have *functional regimes*. They “unbundle” the “package of rights inherent in territorial sovereignty.…Functional regimes, it was hoped, would not only downgrade the importance of national boundaries, but could, through the expansion of transboundary co-operative networks, lead to ‘peace in parts’” (Kratochwil, 1986, pp. 43–50). In this and other respects “Europe” may serve as a new type of conflict management device.

*Great Britain*

There is little or no evidence that the UK entered the EEC with the same perspectives. According to Christopher Tugendhat, “the British entered the Community in an unemotional frame of mind” (1986, p. 33). It was not until a June 1975 referendum—an unusual occurrence in British constitutional practice—when in a large turnout the British voted 2:1 to accept the conditions of membership that it became clear that there was some enthusiasm for the idea of Europe. Nonetheless the poll disguises a culture of mistrust about “the continent”—evident in its refusal to get involved in the original European Coal and Steel Community in 1950 because, to quote Lord Plowden, “We’d won the war and we weren’t ready to form any special links with the continent” (p. 118). A change of mind and two rejected applications made during the 1960s did not enhance the UK’s love affair with the EEC. The Community was suspicious of the UK’s “Atlanticism” so that its 1962 application was vetoed by President de Gaulle because “in his view, Britain would constitute a Trojan horse for the United States, on the one hand
impeding Western Europe’s emergence as a unified entity under French leadership, and, on the other, leading ultimately to an Atlantic community under American “hegemony” (Jordan and Feld, 1986, p. 114). It underlines what William Wallace (1991, pp. 67–80) detects as a fundamental Anglo-Saxon/European faultline which cuts across the main British political parties.

In addition British (and Irish and Danish) entry to the Community occurred at a time when global economic conditions had deteriorated: “the first stage of the Community’s development coincided with the optimism and burgeoning prosperity of the 1960s. Britain’s accession, by contrast, came just as that boom was about to end with the first oil shock, and its first year of membership coincided with the worst recession since the 1930s” (Tugendhat, 1986, p. 117). Nor was she entirely satisfied with the cost of membership. The Community represented the UK’s first permanent peacetime engagement on the continent of Europe since the Reformation, and she was not in control. She was not tuned into the idealism that had launched the EEC; and, unlike her other alliances, the EEC was the only international organisation of which she was not a founder member. In these circumstances scepticism was not altogether unexpected.

**Northern Ireland**

The UK and Ireland joined the community at a time of worsening conditions in Northern Ireland and it was a factor in the negotiations leading to accession. Robert Ramsay, a senior Northern Ireland civil servant, was convinced that at this time “the threat from the French was decisive; the Stormont government was sacrificed on the altar of his [Heath’s] European ambitions.” This assertion is based on a key policy document.
drawn up for the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, in meetings he was having with the British and Irish in the spring of 1972. Ramsay quotes from the document at some length where the French are contemplating “the worsening situation and the appeals to us from Dublin...the deterioration in the situation in Northern Ireland, if it continues will be likely to weigh heavily on the good functioning of the Community and, consequently, will affect ourselves, even if indirectly. Moreover, we cannot easily show ourselves to be disinterested in a matter which brings into conflict two friendly neighbouring countries” (Ramsay, 2009, pp. 102–105). Ramsay was alluding to the imposition of direct rule by the Heath government in March 1972 on the back of a security disaster known as Bloody Sunday when British paratroopers killed thirteen unarmed civil rights’ marchers. The Northern Ireland government had vigorously opposed direct rule.

Indeed “Europe” was one of the fissures in the internal politics of Northern Ireland from the moment that the UK sought membership. Generally, nationalists placed greater emphasis on the political significance of Community integration and believed that EEC membership could internationalise the Irish question. During negotiations they were to attack the Northern Ireland government’s supine role when it came to crucial decisions taken by the UK government. They noted, for example, that during the negotiations of 1961-63 the chief British negotiator, Edward Heath, refused to countenance a permanent Northern Ireland observer in his delegation. On the other hand unionists distinguished between the economic and political effects. They took some comfort from the fact that Ireland had no choice but to apply once the UK had applied; and that rather than lead to a
united Ireland, membership would mean that the Republic was merging once again with
the rest of the archipelago (Aughey and Hainsworth, 1982, pp. 94–114).

More specifically there were four issues in the terms of entry that agitated the
local politicians: they were (a) about Northern Ireland’s peripherality—the “two seas”
problem; (b) concerns about the future of agriculture; (c) concerns about the cost of living
and especially the estimated rise in food costs; and (d) the Safeguarding of Employment
Act (1947). The first three were non-contentious. The last said much about the sectarian
nature of Northern Irish society and the “threat” from Europe. The Act had been passed
ostensibly to give preference to local people in an area of high unemployment as well as
“to keep out workers from the Irish Republic”. It acted as a sort of economic and political
cordon sanitaire “because unionists worried about being “swamped by southern workers.
In 1962 one unionist backbencher asked rhetorically “can anyone doubt that if our
Safeguarding of Employment Act is granted a few more years to live it will only be a few
years and that ultimately our British Ulster will crumble under peaceful penetration from
the south” (p. 102).

In many ways this was the nub of unionist objections to the European
adventure—it would expose the permeability of the Irish border. This sense of foreboding
would have been enhanced by the actuality of membership itself because it illustrated a
new asymmetry in Anglo-Irish relations whereby Ireland entered the Community with
precisely the same status as the UK—in place of the old subordination the luxury of
being a co-ordinate. But it was not a luxury which Northern Ireland was to enjoy. EEC
accession coincided with the imposition of direct rule. Both indicated the new impotence
of unionism.
The UK’s 1975 referendum demonstrated that scepticism was alive and well in Northern Ireland. Only one other region of the UK polled a higher negative attitude towards the Community—though it has to be said that a small majority in Northern Ireland endorsed membership. The UK “Yes” vote was 67.2 percent. Only Shetland and the Western Isles voted “No” although Northern Ireland’s yes” vote of 52.1 percent was the smallest pro-European vote among the national segments of the UK. That was an underlying trend. Its more strident voice was to be found in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) whose leader (and Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church), Rev. Ian Paisley, fought the first direct elections to the European Parliament as a “free and fearless Protestant and loyalist voice.” He topped the poll with an overwhelming vote which he attributed to a “twentieth century miracle” engineered by the mysterious providence of God. In a series of sermons, “The Common Marker Prophetically Considered,” his basic theme was that that the EEC was part of the “growth of the Antichrist and is in the political sphere what the Roman Church is in the religious. Its main purpose is to assist Romanism in its campaign for world domination.” Hence his opposition to continuing membership is part of the Free Presbyterian eschatology (Bruce, 1986, pp. 226–9). In addition the DUP was fundamentally opposed to British membership because it entailed, they believed, loss of sovereignty and it challenged the distinctive Christian moral standards of Northern Ireland.

While this view may have modified somewhat in more recent times it remains the fact that the DUP topped the polls for the European Parliament at every election until 2009—when it was badly split. The position of what was then the largest party in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), was slightly more complicated. It
made a tactical error in 1979 in running two candidates. Only one was elected and he occupied the third (and last) seat. As a result there is a sense that the UUP has played second fiddle to the DUP in Europe. Their views were closer to the British prime minister’s (Margaret Thatcher) Euroscepticism. In his foreword to the 1989 European election the party leader, James Molyneaux, identified with the “clear line [she drew] between cooperation and the surrender of sovereignty”; and he treated with contempt “Mr. Heath’s lofty dismissal of nation states and their replacement by a supranational Euro State”: his ambitions went no further than “improving economic cooperation and expanding commerce within a greater Europe and a wider world.”

Both unionist parties shared the sceptical camp with their arch rivals, Sinn Fein (SF), the political wing of the IRA. In 1979 it urged its supporters to boycott the election; in 1984 its candidate said that he would use the European Parliament to attack the British presence in Northern Ireland and to highlight instances of British injustice and repression; and in 1989 SF advised negotiated withdrawal from membership because it had been “a disaster for Ireland”. It was not until 2004 that SF won a seat—incidentally it won one in Dublin as well to add to its lustre as being an all-Ireland party and hence transcending partition.

SF’s victory in 2004 was at the expense of the SDLP, a party that had come second to the DUP in every election since 1979. Unionists were aware that when directly elected contests for the European Parliament were instigated the Irish government had lobbied successfully to ensure that Northern Ireland returned three MEPs and that elections were held under the STV system of proportional representation. The third seat was to ensure that the minority community was represented at the European Parliament.
The SDLP’s only candidate from 1979-2004 was John Hume, a committed European. At the 1994 European election he took 28.9 percent of the vote the highest the party had ever achieved; and in 1999 (on a higher turnout) he delivered the party’s highest tally.

Hume was noted for what he called his single transferable speech, a variation on the theme of unity in diversity or *e pluribus unum*, both of which he extracted from US and European constitutional evolution. It became known as “Humespeak” and was synonymous with “Eurospeak” “and has been conducted in terms of “post-nationalism,” “consent,” “community,” “interdependency,” and an “agreed Ireland” with increased frequency throughout the 1980s and 1990s” (McCall, 1999, p. 107). At the heart of Hume’s (1996) argument was that the Community was a highly successful model of conflict resolution and that its institutions could be replicated to assist in the British-Irish peace process:

Europe itself has suffered centuries of bloody conflict. In this century alone, the peoples of Europe have been locked in the savagery of two world wars with a bitterness and slaughter that go far beyond anything that we have experienced on this island. Yet, fifty years after World War II, as a result of an agreed process, that have been able to create one parliament to represent them, one community—and the Germans are still Germans, the French are still French. They have a unity in diversity (pp. 58–9).

The British-Irish quarrel was European in origin and Europe could help to find a solution. Further, Ireland had a contribution to make because as the only state in the EU
“to have been colonised rather than to have colonised, we should be able to promote an intelligent empathy with the under-developed countries whose people can benefit most effectively from European Union policies” (p. 117). He was attracted by an entity that had evolved from an agreement on coal and steel towards a Europe of the Regions, and one that had relevance to the Northern Ireland conflict. One was the growing integration of the European Union “based on the realisation that the democratic nation state is no longer a sufficient political entity to allow people to have adequate control over the economic and technological forces which affect people’s opportunities and circumstances.” The second was its expansion into Central and Eastern Europe “which has opened the prospect of the Common European Home” (p. 111).

He believed that Europe had contributed already to finding a solution to the Northern Ireland problem. The Anglo-Irish Agreement signed on 15 November 1985 brought much closer political and security cooperation between the two states and was registered at the United Nations as an international treaty. One of the most important aspects of the Agreement was the structures that had been agreed and these “reflected those of the European Union. That was no accident”:

The intergovernmental conference established by the Anglo-Irish Agreement was charged to address and resolve important problems in Northern Ireland and could work to promote co-operation and co-ordination of policies in both parts of Ireland for the benefit of the entire island. Comprised of ministers from both governments it was the equivalent of the European Council of Ministers. Its secretariat was analogous to the European Commission. The agreement also
provided for an inter-parliamentary tier comprising elected representatives of political parties in Britain, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Through this feature, broader considerations and criticisms than those of the two governments could enhance the operation and development of the process offered by the Anglo-Irish framework. This parliamentary tier had a role similar to that of the European parliament (p. 47).

While the structures may have replicated European institutions there is no evidence that Europe had officially endorsed such a policy. This became evident in the early 1990s when the British government was attempting to kick start serious negotiations among Northern Ireland’s political parties. The SDLP proposed a six-member Commission which would appoint a cabinet to run the various Northern Ireland departments. Three of the Commissioners were to be elected by a single transferable vote for a three-seat Northern Ireland constituency—shades of the system for direct elections to the European Parliament. The other three Commissioners were to be elected by the British government, the Irish government and the European Community. But Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, was not prepared to consider it: “… I don’t feel the European Commission has a duty to interfere in the internal problem of a country, of a province” (Murray, 1998, p. 191). We shall return to these competing perspectives.

**European Input into the Peace Process**

It is difficult to put precise dates on the life cycle of a peace process because much of what it entails is open to differing interpretations. One commentator has
suggested that the seeds were sown when Pope John Paul II visited Ireland in 1979. In a homily he delivered on 29 September before 250,000 people he pleaded “[O]n my knees I beg you to turn away from the paths of violence and return to the ways of peace” (Coogan, 1995, p. 194). Some time later a dialogue between a senior priest and Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams, was entered into. There is evidence in Adams’s *The Politics of Irish Freedom* (1986) that republicanism was contemplating moving away from armed struggle towards a political process; and in 1988 Sinn Fein and the SDLP entered into prolonged discussions on the means and the ends towards Irish unity. These talks did not succeed but the fact that Sinn Fein was prepared to engage in such activity suggested that it was moving beyond the status of sect (that entailed reinforcing ones moral certitude by talking only among the saved) towards a more inclusive consideration of wider political realities. This was to be followed by further discussions, some of them covert, with the British and Irish governments (discretely), and then at a personal level between John Hume and Gerry Adams. By 1994 enough trust had been garnered to enable the IRA to declare a cessation of violence on 30 August followed by loyalist paramilitaries on 13 October. But trust was not embedded and the IRA returned to violence in 1996. It was only a massive general election victory by Tony Blair’s Labour Party in 1997 that conditions were considered to be ripe enough for intense political negotiations. This culminated in the Agreement of April 1998 that led to Irish republicans in government with unionists for the first time in Northern Ireland’s history. Over a decade later there was not yet unanimity that a peace settlement had been delivered.

It is useful at this stage to consider the concept of the “ripe moment,” first devised by William Zartman (1989). One analyst suggests that it is “composed of a structural
element, a party element and a potential alternative outcome—that is, a mutually hurting stalemate, the presence of valid spokespersons, and a formula for a way out” (Schulze, 1997, p. 93). But she refines this by suggesting that “there probably is no such thing as one ‘ripe moment’ but that there are a number of ‘moments’ which makes resolution more likely than others…it is more useful to consider the ‘ripe moment’ as a process rather than a specific point in time—such as the ceasefires of 1994.” We want to examine some of these “moments” within a European context. In that respect it is worth while recalling some words from a speech given by European Commission President, Romano Prodi, in Paris in May 2001; “the genius of the founding fathers lay in translating extremely high political ambitions…into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. Rapprochement took place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration.”

To examine the role of joint membership of the EU on managing the conflict we need to pay some attention to political conditions on the ground. The imposition of direct rule in 1972 led to the short-lived experiment of power-sharing from January to May 1974. The British government was wary of any further bold constitutional innovations for the rest of the decade and the result was political stasis and continuing insecurity. A change of direction began in 1980 when a series of British-Irish summits (encouraged by U.S. diplomacy) were undertaken culminating in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. This marked the end of a decade of instability in British-Irish relations, the effects of which were felt even at the European level (as when Ireland refused to endorse EU trade sanctions during the Falklands/Malvinas war (Arthur, 1983,
p. 172). Yet meetings of the European Council were used to build positive and cooperative intergovernmental relationships: “The momentous Milan European Council in 1985 opened the way not only for the Single European Act (SEA) but also the Anglo-Irish Agreement” (Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008 p. 201).

The success of the Milan meeting demonstrated the new realism in Irish foreign policy that “involved elevating the economic dimension…and demoting the principles of nationalism, self-identity, the right to self-determination, anti-imperialism and religious liberty” (O’Corcora and Hill, 1982, p. 260). Common membership had removed much of the claustrophobic bilateralism of the ancient quarrel. One Irish official on the staff of the European Commission commented that the “effects of common United Kingdom and Irish membership of the Community and particularly their attitudes to the emerging Community are so great that Anglo-Irish relations can hardly usefully be discussed except in that context…it substitutes an agreeably wider embrace for what has been an excessive intimacy” (Gallagher, 1985, p. 35). In short, Europe created a positive psychological space shorn of negative historical baggage. It enabled the Northern Ireland problem to be internationalised.

The fruits were evident in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. It has been referred to as “a unique experiment [which] may itself serve as a future precedent for the protection of cross-border minorities and neighbouring States’ cooperation including the field of security”. He quotes an Irish academic lawyer’s opinion that “it will be seen by international lawyers as an important new legal model for consideration, adaptation and possible application in other similar international situations of disputed sovereignty over territory” (Symmons, 1990, pp. 221–2). The Agreement was a short document of only
thirteen articles and was boosted by a strong institutional framework (shades of Hume’s assertion earlier). Article 2 (a) established a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference which would be concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between “the two parts of the island of Ireland” and would deal “on a regular basis with: (i) political matters; (ii) security and related matters; (iii) legal matters including the administration of justice; (iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation”. Article 10 (a) realised the potential of promoting economic and social development to regenerate a beleaguered economy by “considering the possibility of securing international support for this work”. The governments of US, Canada and New Zealand contributed to an International Fund for Ireland (IFI)—Europe was to follow later. The sums were relatively small but, as an earnest of international good-will, the symbolism was significant. The special problems of the Northern Ireland conflict were recognised in the decision to spend approximately three-quarters of the resources there, with the remainder going to the six border counties of the Republic. In the fourteen years following its foundation the IFI was associated with investing £1.1 billion. The British and Irish parliaments ratified the Agreement in separate votes and it was registered under Article 102 of the UN Charter. In many respects it was a forerunner of the 1998 Belfast Agreement.

An impediment to the burgeoning British-Irish relationship could have been a report (Haagerup) from the previous year but that needs to be set in context. An EP Resolution of May 1981 had established the parameters of EU influence on the conflict when it recognized that the Community had “no competence to make proposals for changes in the Constitution of Northern Ireland”. That was of fundamental importance. Haagerup was concerned with modest ambitions—essentially to see how the EU could...
assist in addition to the economic support already rendered within its regional policy and
social fund. Its *sine qua non* was adumbrated on the importance of increasing cooperation
between the British and Irish governments. So it was concerned with recommending
power-sharing within Northern Ireland and in creating an integrated economic plan for
the region. In that respect it complemented the 1985 Agreement. Accordingly the only
unique and independent contribution the EU can make is to “provide the inspiration for
the people of Northern Ireland to oppose and reject violence” (Hayward, 2006, p. 272).

This was an important exhortatory message to send because with the passing of
the Agreement in 1985 and the British government’s determination to withstand unionist
rejection of the Agreement the conflict was entering into a new phase where the political
process was beginning to subordinate the armed struggle. The position of the Community
was unequivocal: it was not in the business of talking to the “extremes”: “[I]n contrast to
the Council of Europe, whose explicit focus on human rights led it to act in relation to
controversial issues in the Troubles such as the use of internment, the EU was unwilling
or unable to engage with those on the margins of the political sphere until the late 1990s”
(p. 279). The change is implicit in the 1998 Agreement when the “extremes” (SF and the
DUP) become part of a new Northern Ireland Executive; and after 2007 when those two
parties control the Office of First Minister/ Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).

If we can assume that the life cycle of a conflict entails analysis, negotiation and
implementation and that the Northern Ireland conflict enjoys a new political dispensation
it is helpful to analyse the continuing role of the EU’s indirect incremental approach
“under four headings: the EU as a political arena, EU policies and reports on Northern
Ireland, the EU as a model of negotiated governance and the EU in Northern Ireland”
(Laffan and O’Mahony, p. 202). It may not be surprising that the three political parties who consistently returned members to the EP (DUP, SDLP and UUP) retained their initial positions toward the Community in the years after 1979. John Hume did most to appropriate the idealism of the European founding fathers through his membership of the EP’s Socialist Grouping whereas the unionist parties displayed differing levels of scepticism. But that could not disguise the fact that the “EU was not just an external party to Northern Ireland but an additional arena of politics above the UK and Irish states; Northern Ireland was part of this evolving and increasingly complex layer of politics and economics” (p. 203). So, one of the more heartening aspects of membership of the EP was the degree of collaboration among the three MEPs on policy issues relevant to Northern Ireland such as agriculture and programmes of social and economic improvement in Belfast and Londonderry. One of their more notable collaborations centred on the creation of the Peace and Reconciliation fund, an issue to which we shall return. One of the less publicised ventures was an exercise in Track Two Diplomacy that led to the establishment of a Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE) in 1991 following two discreet meetings (under the auspices of academics) in the US and France in January and August 1990 with the four constitutional parties in the run up to the establishment of the SEA. NICE was a proactive exercise, an example of civil society at work and the product of positive engagement by politicians who were reputed to be ruled solely by negative instincts (Arthur in Popiolkowski and Cull, 2009, pp. 24–9).

Policies, reports and debates fall loosely into three categories—the controversial, politically sensitive cross-border issues, and the functional—none of which are totally self-contained. We have discussed the impact of the Haagerup Report that caused some
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controversy among unionists. Earlier debates and decisions indicated that the Parliament was paying closer attention to aspects of the conflict. One was a debate on the hunger strikes in 1981, and the second was a condemnation of the use of plastic bullets in 1982. The cross-border dimension was in place as early as 1975 with the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and an EU regional policy keen to alleviate obstacles to the development of border areas. Hence a 1983 Economic and Social Committee (ESC) report on Irish Border Areas recommended a strengthening of cross-border initiatives. In addition the Commission ranked Northern Ireland and the Republic as priority areas for structural fund monies, and Northern Ireland was recognized as a region deserving of special treatment (Objective One status). By the 1990s a Community Initiative called INTERREG was designed specifically to promote cross-border cooperation and integration across the Community. We shall discuss its implications later.

In addition to the rhetoric of integration Laffan and O’Mahony (p. 211) suggest that participation in the EU offered alternative models of politics and political order. Since these go to the heart of much of what is discussed in this article it deserves to be quoted at length:

First, the iterative and intensive EU Treaty negotiations, with no final settlement in prospect, underlined the adequacy of partial agreement. Second, the investment in the EU in building institutions drew attention to the importance of institutional innovation in promoting collective action and in socializing political actors into new procedures and norms of policy-making. Third, the emphasis in the Union of
problem-solving pragmatic politics was a useful antidote to the zero-sum bargaining of politics in Northern Ireland. Fourth, the sharing of sovereignty in the EU highlighted the divisibility of sovereignty in contemporary Europe. The language and style of politics in the EU—partnership, problem-solving, innovation, unending negotiations—offered a way of doing things which characterises the implementation of the [1998] Agreement as it becomes a living settlement. The institutions of the Good Friday Agreement...echo a number of the institutional and procedural features of the EU.

This is as pithy a statement on the changing *mores*, political culture, political institutions that have overtaken Northern Ireland as one is likely to find. It has released opportunities for the identification of areas. The Peace and Reconciliation Fund (1995–99) “enabled people to see the potential for cooperation when the dynamic was changed. It was an important validation and endorsement of the ceasefires and created political space for new developments. It forced politicians and wider civil society to take on the responsibility of resource allocation” (p. 212).

The 1998 Agreement was about inclusivity, about process, about setting the conflict in its wider temporal and spatial context to fashion a solution. The implementation period has not been without its problems but the actors have learnt from their past mistakes and their new understandings. They have resorted to the use of technical committees to deal with highly contentious issues such as a root and branch reform of policing. They have engaged in constant negotiation and renegotiation. They have made use of investment opportunities such as the IFI and have built on those...
through the creation of the EU Peace programmes in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties—the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace 1) and the Programme for Peace and Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II)—that were designed to complement the political efforts at peacebuilding but also were a specifically designed conflict transformation tool providing all levels of society, but particularly those at the grassroots ‘with an unprecedented opportunity for meaningful involvement in the transformation of the Northern Ireland conflict. Peace 1 and II ran from 1995 until 2006 and delivered 1062 Euromillions through the use of a social inclusion agenda and decentralised local delivery mechanisms (Buchanan, 2008, pp. 387–409). Peace III is designed to run until 2013. That demonstrates above all the tenacity and commitment of the European project and fulfils Romano Prodi’s assertion for the founding fathers’ genius for the indirect approach.

Conclusion

In 1973 a Brussels think tank Pro Mundi Vita perceived the Northern Ireland conflict as a bitter communal struggle based on religion and national identity: “One has to go back to the seventeenth century to find [a war] in which both sides find their focus of cohesion and of antagonism in a version of the Christian faith.” The language is bewildered and forlorn. This was a conflict that did not belong to the modernising thrust of the new Europe recently escaped from the horrors of the two great European wars. In the intervening years other conflicts on the European mainland surfaced, testimony to the entrapped and frozen violence of deeply entrenched ethnic divisions.
The intractability of the Northern Ireland conflict seemed to fit that pattern. But through the pursuit of a policy of “peace in parts” and recognising the changing nature of statehood in Europe policies and attitudes were revisioned and reformed; the political lexicon was adjusted; the political culture restructured; and there was a fundamental shift from zero-sum to win/win. This article has attempted to identify some of the factors that induced a new realism and pragmatism. It is aware that some of the more significant dynamics have been ignored—not least the role of American diplomacy and the lessons learned from other conflicts— but it is impossible to disagree with the conclusion of Laffan and O’Mahony (p. 217):

Without the embeddedness of both states in the wider system of European integration and without the model of politics offered by the EU, it is unlikely that both states and other political actors could have found the political capacity and institutional models to craft the Good Friday Agreement. The EU made an essential contribution to the changing relations between Britain and Ireland and to conflict management in Northern Ireland.

There are those that maintain that Europe is “turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Emmanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” (Kagan, 2003). This is meant to be a critique. In fact it can be read as a perfectly reasonable
appreciation of the positive role that Europe can play—and has played in relation to the
Northern Ireland conflict.

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Rethinking Reconciliation


The Perception of Economic Assistance in
the Northern Ireland Peace Process:
The Impact of IFI and EU Peace I on Equity and Awareness

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Abstract

Most international donors believe that promoting economic development deescalates ethnic conflict, thus enhancing the prospects for peace as ethnic communities negotiate settlements and bridge their political divisions. However, little empirical research has addressed the potential effects of external economic assistance in the rebuilding of those societies. This study explores the perceptions of a representative sample of Northern Irish citizens on their awareness of the activities of International Fund for Ireland and the European Peace I fund toward economic development, the perceived equity of its distribution, and its contribution to building peace in Northern Ireland.

Introduction

Economic assistance is an accepted mode of conflict intervention to build the peace dividend in divided societies (Galtung, Jacobson, and Brand-Jacobson, 2002; Pearson, 2001). Economic assistance can serve as an important component of eclectic peacebuilding models to win the peace, empower the grassroots, and build sustainable development in post-conflict societies (Byrne, 2001). However, economic assistance on
its own is not a panacea to resolve deep-rooted protracted ethnopolitical conflicts (Byrne, 2008). Within the context of the Northern Ireland peacebuilding process, economic assistance from the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and European Union (EU) Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation or Peace I fund, is attempting to tackle structural inequalities, bridge the sectarian wall, and transform the civic culture by drawing grassroots support for the peace process (Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002).

This article covers an important subject, given that the statistical measurement of people’s perceptions of both funding agencies in Northern Ireland had not been undertaken before our survey. The objective of this article is to examine the public’s awareness of external economic assistance on economic development, as well as the perceived equity of its distribution. This article presents univariate and multivariate statistical analysis on the issues of public awareness of external economic assistance in Northern Ireland, as well as the perceived equity of its distribution. The importance of this study is not being overemphasized. We have little empirical evidence of the impact of the economic resources from both funding agencies to transform the conflict (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995). This article finds that public awareness of external economic assistance on economic development, as well as perceived equity of its distribution varies across religion, gender and political affiliation of respondents in Northern Ireland.

The article employs data from a public opinion survey. In 1997, before the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland, we commissioned Ulster Marketing (now Millward Brown Ulster) to conduct our public opinion survey as part of its omnibus series to assess the public’s perceptions of both funds. Ulster Marketing has carried out frequent public opinion polls in Northern Ireland.
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over the past 20 years to elicit people’s opinions on a broad array of socioeconomic and political issues (Irwin, 2001). Our survey focuses on public awareness of external economic assistance in Northern Ireland, the perceived equity of its distribution, and its effectiveness in mitigating political violence.

The article is organized as follows: The first section discusses external economic assistance and the Northern Ireland conflict followed by a brief methodological note. The second section presents the statistical analyses of the data. Section three presents a discussion of the results from section two, and section four concludes.

**Economic Assistance and the Northern Ireland Conflict**

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding will not be successful unless it promotes human and socioeconomic development (Pearson, 2001). The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have made economic aid conditional on post-conflict states integrating democratic values into the civic culture as well as promoting liberal economic policies (Lederach, 1997). Socioeconomic development is needed to tackle chronic unemployment, a root cause of protracted ethnic conflict (Byrne, 2001). Economic aid is not a panacea, however, and may in fact serve to heighten group egotism, not reduce it (Ryan, 1996). Foreign investment rebuilds the economic infrastructure creating employment opportunities, but often ignores relationship-building skills, thus potentially heightening destructive stories (Senehi and Byrne, 2006). During the 1920s, populist Unionist policies increased unemployment among alienated Nationalists, and prevented a
working class alliance across ethnic divisions (Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson, 1979, 1995). Any redistribution of political power or economic resources was perceived as a threat to the hegemonic position of Unionists (Maney, 2005). The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) protested to level the playing field for Catholic Nationalists to have fair access to employment and housing opportunities (Maney and others, 2006). The resulting Loyalist violence against NICRA escalated the conflict, which spiraled into ultimate chaos (Wright, 1987). The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) eventually attacked British troops sent to Northern Ireland to restore order.

Northern Ireland’s economy is public sector dependent, subsidized, and reliant on the British Exchequer (Dixon, 2001). British economic policy sought to stabilize and manage, rather than tackle the underlying roots of the conflict (Bew and Patterson, 1985). Alienation, unemployment, sectarianism, and lack of hope left Republican and Loyalist working class males feeling despondent and distrustful of British government intentions, serving to burgeon the ranks of rival paramilitary groups (Irvin, 1999).

In 1994 after reciprocal ceasefires by the PIRA and the Combined Loyalist Military Command, the EU established the EU Peace I program to lay the foundations for sustainable and durable peace (McCall and O’Dowd, 2008). The IFI was set-up in the wake of the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) to encourage economic development, and to promote contact, dialogue and reconciliation between Unionists and Nationalists. The EU Peace I fund (1994-1999) was replaced by EU Peace II funding, which was phased out in 2006. The Special EU Programs Body (SEUPB) was established to administer all EU aid under the peace programs.

The EU Peace I fund and the IFI has worked to reduce structural inequalities and
uncertainty, empower the grassroots in disadvantaged areas, and has, in general, supported the peace process (Byrne and Ayulo, 1998). Both funding agencies have also sought to promote reconciliation and social inclusion by nurturing socioeconomic and rural regeneration in a sustainable way that consolidates the peace process (Byrne and others, 2006; Irvin and Byrne, 2002). The peace through development approach in Northern Ireland, however, has met with mixed results (Byrne and Irvin, 2001, 2002).

Is there a link in Northern Ireland between prosperity and the fact that peace is the end of the long war? The role of economic assistance coupled with the cooperative partnership of both governments and the international community that resulted in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) is critical to building peace over the long-term. The British and Irish Governments built confidence-building mechanisms into the GFA to address the distrust felt by both communities such as: (1) reform of policing, (2) decommissioning of paramilitary arms, (3) prison release, and (4) emergency legislation and the withdrawal of the British military (Wilford, 2000). In 1994, the EU created the Peace I fund to shore-up the political process and build the peace dividend. In addition, the provision of economic assistance through the IFI, President Clinton’s visits to Northern Ireland, and his appointment of Senator George Mitchell to facilitate a mediation of all of the political parties and paramilitaries, resulted in the Catholic community and a slight majority of Protestants supporting the 1998 GFA (Byrne, 2007). While he was President, “Bill Clinton acting as a primary mediator set-up political inducements to get all of the parties to the table, as well as expanding the economic pie by providing economic aid for impoverished areas through the IFI” (Byrne, 2002, p.139).
The most difficult stumbling block in the current stalemate is overall mistrust of the process, indicative of mainstream Unionist distrust of the decommissioning of paramilitary arms, the restructuring of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the prisoner release of convicted paramilitaries, and shrinking confidence in the pro-agreement Unionism of the UUP (Aughey, 2000; Dixon, 2001). The GFA includes one community negotiating with a political party that has been vilified as terrorists in the past, and another community that has abandoned support for political violence in pursuit of the goal it has been fighting to achieve over the past thirty years (Cox, Guelke and Stephen, 2000, p.5). In addition, deprivation and poverty are a deep-rooted cause of the conflict. We argue that if external economic assistance is to assist in reducing poverty and inequality, popular awareness about these funds should be expanded. The first step towards the road to development is to make people aware of the opportunities for funding their projects, and make sure the distribution of the funds is equitable across community groups. Unbalanced distribution of international funds could further escalate the tension between the two major communities in Northern Ireland.

Data and Methodology

A representative sample of 610 adults (18+) were interviewed from August 6 to 8, 1997 by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the definitive quality standards of the Interviewer Quality Control Scheme (IQCS). All interviewing was carried out face-to-face at 50 sampling points selected at random throughout Northern Ireland. Interviews normally took place in the respondent’s home. The sample was
controlled by gender, age, class, and religion. The sample yielded motorists, housewives and/or heads of households, and city and rural residents. 52 percent of the sample is female and 48 percent is male, while 62 percent of the sample is Protestant, and 34 percent is Catholic. Further, 45 percent of the sample is in the professional class category, 21 percent is in the skilled labor category, and 34 percent is in the unskilled labor category. We employ univariate analysis and discrete choice regression models (binary probit/logit and ordered probit/logit) to analyze our sample. We use discrete choice models in our regression analysis because our dependent variables are categorical variables.

**Perceived Equity of IFI**

This section presents the perception of respondents toward the fairness of the IFI fund across the whole sample. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of perceived fairness of the IFI funds across both communities. It is interesting to note that 49 percent of the sample did not respond or were unsure about the fair distribution of the IFI across both communities. According to Figure 1, about 50 percent of the respondents abstained from expressing an attitude toward the equity of these funds, which could be as a result of unfamiliarity with
the funds or hostility toward one or more of the funding agencies. In the past, Protestants perceived the IFI as an agency that provided U.S. blood money to the people of Northern Ireland (Byrne and others, 2006). Figure 1 suggests that about 30 percent of the respondents perceive that the distribution of the IFI funds were fair. Among the sample, 20 percent expressed that the distribution was not fair, and 10 percent assessed the distribution to be neither fair nor unfair.

Next we report the distribution of perceived fairness of the IFI funds across different categories of the society. Table 1 reports the relative frequency distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds between the communities by religion, economic class and gender. As far as the distribution across economic class is concerned, respondents from the professional class are more likely than respondents from other groups to rate the distribution of the IFI fund across communities to be fair. The P-value of the Pearson chi-square is below 0.05, which indicates that the rows and columns of the contingencies are independent and it is worthwhile to interpret the cells in the contingency table.

Table 1.  
Distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds by religion, economic class and gender.
Table 1 suggests that male respondents are not more likely to perceive the distribution of the IFI funds as fair compared to their female counterparts. The p-value of Pearson’s Chi-square is higher than 10 percent, which implies that the distribution of perceived fairness across gender is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that there is no statistical difference in the perception of the fairness of the IFI funds across gender. As far as the perception of the fairness of the IFI funds across religious affiliation is concerned, the Chi-square test in Table 1 indicates that more Catholics, in terms of percentages, rate the fairness of the distribution to be “very fair” and “quite fair” than Protestants. Protestants may be of the opinion that the U.S. and the EU are interfering in their internal affairs through both funding agencies, whereas Catholics perceive the aid as critical to tackling poverty and alienation. On aggregate, Protestants are more likely than Catholics to rate
the distribution as unfair. These conclusions of the univariate analysis are also reinforced by the multivariate analysis we conduct in the subsequent sections.

**Table 2.**
**Distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds between communities by political party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Very fair</th>
<th>Quite fair</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Not very fair</th>
<th>Not fair</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Unionist Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist Democratic Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK unionist (UKUP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided/not sure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pearson chi2(60)** 90.063  \(Pr = 0.005\)

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey

Table 2 reports a Chi-square test for the distribution of perceived fairness of IFI funds between communities by political party. The Pearson chi-square suggests that the rows and columns of the contingencies are independent. The supporters of the Unionist/Loyalist block are far more likely to view the distribution of monetary funds from the IFI as more unfair, than those supporting the non-confessional Alliance Party and the now defunct Women’s Coalition block or the Nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Republican Sinn Fein (SF) block. In other words, on average the supporters of SDLP and SF seem to rate the distribution to be fairer than the others. One would assume that the Loyalist Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), and the now...
defunct Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) supporters would also rate the
distribution of the funding to be fair.

Table 3 reports the ordered logit model for perceived equity of the IFI. Note that
in the ordered logit model estimated in Table 3, the sample size is reduced to 309 because
of the exclusion of respondents who did not want to express their views on the fairness of
IFI, and the “don’t know” responses. Fortunately, the exclusion of the non-responses
does not alter the main conclusions. The regression analysis suggests that not all of the
variables are correlated with perceived equity. More specifically, perceived fairness is
positively correlated with those voting for the Alliance Party than for the other political
parties. Further, the perceived equity of these funds is negatively correlated with those
respondents with UUP and PUP party affiliations. That is to say, all things remaining
constant, the supporters of UUP and PUP political parties have a relatively negative
attitude towards the distribution of IFI funds. By and large, the probability of rating the
fairness of the IFI funds is positively associated with SDLP and SF party membership.

As far as the coefficients of the economic class variables are concerned, Table 3
reports that the coefficient for the dummy variable for respondents from the professional
class is negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance, suggesting that the
respondents from the professional economic class are more likely to perceive the
distribution of the IFI fund as fair, compared to respondents from the semi-skilled class.
Moreover, the results in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of gender is not statistically
significant at less than the 10 percent level of significance. Overall, the results from the
regression analysis tend to support the conclusions from the chi-square analyses in the
previous sections.
Table 3.  
Ordered logit models of fairness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IFI Fund</th>
<th>EU Peace I Fund</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>-1.115</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>1.742</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKUP</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>1.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>-0.944</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>-1.628</td>
<td>0.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Coal</td>
<td>-2.042</td>
<td>1.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancillary parameters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Point 1</td>
<td>-3.129</td>
<td>0.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Point 2</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Point 3</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut Point 4</td>
<td>1.479</td>
<td>0.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>309</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lr Chi 2(14)</td>
<td>71.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>-407.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey

**Perceived equity of EU peace I fund**

So far we have considered the perceived equity of IFI funded projects. Now we turn to the EU Peace I funded projects. Table 4 depicts the distribution of perceived equity towards the EU funded projects by religion, gender and economic class. As in the case of the perceived fairness of IFI funds, Table 4 clearly demonstrates that there is a large number of “don’t know” responses.
Table 4.
Perceived fairness of EU Peace I fund by religion, gender and economic class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Fair</th>
<th>Quite Fair</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Not Very Fair</th>
<th>Not Fair</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/refused</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi2(10)</td>
<td>22.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi2(5)</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(P=0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi Skilled</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson chi2(10)</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(P=0.702)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey

Table 5 reports that the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund is not free of the religious affiliation of respondents. The data in Table 5 suggests that the percentage of Catholics who perceive the distribution of the EU Peace I fund to be fair is higher than the percentage of Protestants who perceive the distribution of the EU Peace I fund to be fair. As far as gender is concerned, more male respondents seem to rate the distribution of the EU Peace I fund to be relatively fair, compared to their female counterparts. The data in Table 5 also indicates that the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund does not seem to vary across the economic class of respondents. The Chi-square test shows that the differences across economic class are not statistically significant at less than the 20 percent level of significance.
The Perception of Economic Assistance

Table 5 reports the Chi-square test for perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund between communities by political party. The Chi-square test shows that there is a statistically significant variation in the distribution of perceived fairness across the political party spectrum. The supporters of the SDLP seem to rate the distribution as “quite fair” more than any other group. The other cells can also be interpreted likewise. Also notice that the non-response rate is more than 50 percent; more correctly, 3 respondents preferred to respond “I don’t know”. Besides, there are many people who would not vote and don’t know how to rate the fairness of the EU funded projects.

Table 5.
The distribution of perceived fairness of EU Peace I fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Very fair</th>
<th>Quite fair</th>
<th>Neither fair nor unfair</th>
<th>Not very fair</th>
<th>Not fair</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Unionist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist Democratic Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Unionist (UKUP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided/not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Reply</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson $\chi^2(40) = 70.8353$ Pr $= 0$

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey
The Perception of Economic Assistance

Next we examine the perceived fairness of the EU Peace I fund across religion, gender, political party affiliation, and economic class by employing multivariate analysis in Table 6. Before discussing the results in Table 6 an explanation on the effective sample size is in order. The “I don’t know” responses were excluded from the effective sample. We only use the responses that make sense for regression analysis. Besides, the fact that the dependent variable is a categorical variable makes the ordered logit/probit model more appropriate for the multivariate analysis.

The second column of Table 3 reports the marginal effects of an ordered probit model at mean values. The interpretation of the marginal effects is straightforward. For instance, the probability of a male person perceiving the EU Peace I fund to be fair is more than 22 percent higher than a female counterpart. As far as one’s political affiliation is concerned the supporters of PUP, DUP, and UUP are more likely to perceive the distribution to be unfair than the supporters of other political parties. Table 3 suggests that the supporters of the SDLP and SF are more likely to perceive the distribution to be fair, than the supporters of other political parties. Note that gender was a significant variable in the case of the IFI funds, but not in the perceived distribution of the EU Peace I fund. The cut points are also significant suggesting that there is a reasonable ordering in the responses.

Perceived Awareness of the IFI and the EU Peace I Fund

In this section we present the perceived popular awareness of both the IFI and EU Peace I fund in our sample. Table 6 reports the perceived awareness of the IFI funds
The Perception of Economic Assistance

across religion, gender and economic class. As far as gender is concerned Table 6 suggests that

Table 6.
Perceived awareness of IFI Fund by religion, gender and economic class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/refused</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi2(10)</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi22(5)</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>(P=0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson chi2(10)</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>(P=0.702)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey

males are more likely to be aware of the IFI program than females. This can be explained in part by the network effect that men enjoy by assuming leadership positions in society, such as leadership of NGOs. Table 6 reports the Chi-square test for the distribution of awareness of the IFI across class is also statistically significant which implies that respondents from the Professional class are more likely to be aware of the IFI than the other classes. Likewise respondents from the DE (semi-skilled) class are less likely to be aware of the IFI than the respondents from the other two classes. Moreover, Table 6 indicates that the distribution of the perceived awareness of the IFI Fund is not the same across different religious groups. Catholics are less likely to be aware of the IFI funds

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than Protestants. Overall, Table 6 suggests that more than 70 percent of the respondents are aware of IFI funds in Northern Ireland.

Next we present the results from a probit model to examine any systematic association of awareness of the IFI with respect to the different variables. In other words, this section examines the determinants of the awareness of the IFI in Northern Ireland. The explanatory variables in the regression analysis are: class, religion, political party affiliation, gender, and age. As is common knowledge in the econometrics literature, the coefficients of the probit model are not marginal effects, and for this reason we report the marginal effects in Table 7.

Table 7.
Probit model of awareness of IFI Fund

| Variable          | dF/dx | Std. | Z    | P>|z| |
|-------------------|-------|------|------|-----|
| Professional      | 0.149 | 0.039| 3.830| 0.000 |
| Skilled           | 0.103 | 0.054| 2.050| 0.040 |
| CATHOLIC*        | 0.276 | 0.108| 2.540| 0.011 |
| GENDER            | 0.018 | 0.032| 0.580| 0.562 |
| Political Party   |       |      |      |     |
| UUP               | 0.074 | 0.052| 1.520| 0.129 |
| DUP               | 0.028 | 0.072| 0.410| 0.681 |
| ALLIANCE          | 0.143 | 0.087| 1.870| 0.062 |
| PUP               | 0.113 | 0.113| 1.130| 0.260 |
| UDP               | -0.108| 0.070| -1.080| 0.278 |
| UKUP              | 0.080 | 0.197| 0.450| 0.652 |
| CONSERVE          | 0.064 | 0.140| 0.500| 0.621 |
| SDLP              | 0.158 | 0.060| 2.940| 0.003 |
| SINN FEIN         | 0.166 | 0.085| 2.220| 0.026 |
| Woman Coalition   | 0.334 | 0.242| 1.580| 0.114 |

Log Likelihood: -275.5
LR Chi (15): 44.5
N: 608

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey
Note: $dy/dx$ refers to marginal effects. The marginal effect for a dummy variable is a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.

According to Table 7, the probability of being aware of the IFI is about 15 percent higher for SDLP and SF supporters than supporters of other political parties. Recall that the SF variable was also significant in the regression analysis in Table 3, suggesting that SF supporters are more likely to perceive the distribution to be fair than supporters of other political parties. As far as the class identifiers are concerned, both the dummy variable for professional class and that of a skilled economic class are significant at less than the 5 percent level of significance. The probability of being aware of the IFI fund is about 11 percent higher for a respondent from the professional class than the respondents from the semi-skilled class. When we look at the dummy variables for religious groups Catholics have a higher probability of being aware of the IFI, by about 27 percent than non-Catholics. The other coefficients can be interpreted likewise.

So far the analysis has focused on the awareness of the IFI funds. Now we turn to the respondents’ awareness of EU Peace I fund. The relative frequency distribution of the perceived awareness of respondents about the EU Peace I fund by religion, political affiliation and gender. Overall, Table 8 indicates that there was a low level of perceived awareness of the EU Peace I fund in Northern Ireland. Note that unlike the low level of overall awareness of the EU Peace I fund, the overall level of awareness of IFI funds was about 70 percent. According to the data in Table 8, there is no statistically significant difference on the awareness of the EU Peace I fund across economic class and religious affiliation. The variations in the perceived awareness of the EU Peace I fund across economic class and religious affiliation could be attributed mainly to a chance process.

Table 8.
Perceived awareness of EU Peace I fund
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>N0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Party</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Unionist Party</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist Democratic Party</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Unionist (UKUP)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Fein</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Coalition</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided/not sure</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reply</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>33.47</td>
<td>Pr = 0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/refused</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi square</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>Pr = 0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Class</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC1</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>1152.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>155.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi square</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>Pr = 0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>8.9342</td>
<td>Pr = 0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: August 1997 Ulster Marketing Survey

However, Table 8 indicates that the null hypothesis of no dependency between gender and awareness of EU Peace I economic assistance could be rejected at less than 5 percent level of significance and that the percentage of males who are aware of the EU Peace I fund is higher than that of females. As far as political party affiliation is concerned, Table 9 suggests that there is a noticeable difference in the awareness of the EU Peace I fund.
with regards to the political party affiliation of the respondents. Among all the respondents the supporters of UK Unionist Party register the highest level of awareness about the EU Peace I fund, followed by supporters of Women’s Coalition and the Conservatives.

Next we present the results of the multivariate analysis. Table 9 reports the probit model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which indicates the respondent’s awareness of the EU Peace I fund. If a respondent is aware of the EU Peace I fund, then the value of the dependent variable is one, otherwise it is zero. Table 9 indicates that a male respondent has a higher probability of being aware of the EU Peace I fund than a female counterpart, *ceteris paribus*. Moreover, Table 10 shows that the probability of one’s awareness of the EU Peace I fund is not free of political affiliation. More specifically, the supporters of UUP, UKUP, Alliance, UDP, and the Women’s Coalition parties are more likely to be aware of the EU Peace I fund than other political party supporters. What is more interesting is that the Women’s Coalition and UKUP are significant only for the EU Peace I fund. Recall that the coefficients of UKUP and the Women’s Coalition party were not significant in the regression model for awareness of IFI funded projects.

### Table 9.

**Probit model for the awareness of EU Peace I fund**

|            | dF/dX | Standard Error | Z    | P>|z| |
|------------|-------|----------------|------|-----|
| AGE        | 0.001 | 0.001          | 1.54 | 0.123 |
| Gender     | 0.069 | 0.024          | 2.96 | 0.003 |
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| Party                                | Odds Ratio | Std Err | z     | Pr(>|z|) |
|--------------------------------------|------------|---------|-------|----------|
| Ulster Unionist Party                | 0.001      | 0.030   | 0.03  | 0.973    |
| Alliance Party                       | 0.088      | 0.069   | 1.64  | 0.101    |
| Democratic Unionist Party            | 0.127      | 0.104   | 1.67  | 0.095    |
| UK Unionist (UKUP)                   | 0.233      | 0.198   | 1.71  | 0.086    |
| Conservative                         | 0.116      | 0.122   | 1.28  | 0.199    |
| SDLP                                 | 0.023      | 0.036   | 0.69  | 0.489    |
| Sinn Fein                            | 0.004      | 0.045   | 0.08  | 0.934    |
| Women’s Coalition                    | 0.288      | 0.237   | 1.77  | 0.077    |
| Catholic                             | 0.053      | 0.070   | 0.76  | 0.45     |
| Economic class                       |            |         |       |          |
| Professional                         | 0.029      | 0.026   | 1.16  | 0.246    |
| Skilled                              | -0.026     | 0.027   | -0.86 | 0.389    |
| Log Likelihood                       | -136.54    |         |       |          |
| LR Chi(14)                           | 26.51      |         |       |          |
| Pseudo R2                            | = 0.09     |         |       |          |
| N                                    | 537        |         |       |          |

Observed P = 0.08
Predicted P = 0.06 (at x-bar)

(*) dF/dX is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. X-bar is mean value of the variable Z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
Dependent variable awareEU1 = 1 if a person is aware of EU Peace I funds, 0 otherwise.

Discussions

Economic assistance skilfully administered, may play a pivotal role in nurturing a milieu conducive to the political rather than violent transformation of conflict (Byrne, 2008). Our hypotheses that Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists equally perceive that economic assistance from both funds is fairly distributed across both communities and that both communities have equal awareness of these funds is rejected. When we look across the gender spectrum, our analyses show that more males are aware of, and perceive the distribution of funds as fair, than females. This could be explained by...
men’s access to, and knowledge of, the funding agencies, more men are in positions of power and privilege in society and are in “the know” than women, suggesting that women must be empowered to take on more leadership roles in society to build a culture of peace.

Both aid programs have played a role in building support for the peace process itself among previously deprived segments of the population, such as the Catholic Nationalist community, which may impact their level of support for the emerging new Northern Irish institutions. Catholic Nationalists see more positive economic assistance that may be a result of their economic status, their relatively greater support of peace, or both, and may impact their perceptions of the Protestant Unionist community, and the peace process. This may be the reason why Catholics are more aware of and seem to perceive the distribution of resources as more fair relative to Protestants.

Further, a lower level of recognition of the EU Peace I fund by Protestant Unionist respondents may suggest that the lower level of EU funding in Protestant areas could be due to a lack of a comprehensive community infrastructure in comparison to similar Catholic communities. Moreover, fewer unemployed Protestants than Catholics perceived the distribution of IFI funds between both communities to be very fair. This finding is especially pronounced when comparing the Unionist-Loyalist block to supporters of the Nationalist-Republican block. Protestants initially boycotted the IFI post-1985 Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) on the grounds it represented blood money from the U.S. (Guelke, 2000).

In general, Protestants find the distribution of the EU Peace I fund and the IFI to be unfair perceiving Catholics to be receiving all of the benefits (Arthur, 2001). This
finding may also be related to the accessibility of the application process. The Protestant Unionist community’s perceived injustice of EU Peace I funding resulted in an assertion that the funding was going into Catholic Nationalist areas (Byrne, Thiessen, and Fissuh, 2007; Matic, Byrne, and Fissuh, 2007). The EU responded that Catholic Nationalist areas were more organized and had greater civic capacity, and hence made more successful bids (O’Dowd and McCall, 2008).

This may suggest that there is a potential for ideological conflict that could be driven by these funds. Instead of resolving the conflict, these funds may spur another round of conflicts in Northern Ireland (McCall and O’Dowd, 2008). Economic gains for Protestants must not perceive Catholics as deficits that promote isolation and sectarianism rather than intergroup cooperation (Honaker, 2005). For example, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents in a post-2003 Northern Ireland Election Survey found that Unionists shared a strong belief that the 1998 GFA benefits Nationalists at the expense of Unionists (Dowds, Hayes, and McAllister, 2005). These disillusioned respondents pointed to the dysfunctional nature of the Executive and the Belfast Assembly as a critical cause of their dissent. Moreover, Unionists are coupled with a drive for survival, exemplified by Paisleyism and a “historic culture of fatalism, a culture of suspicions of the intentions of those outside that Unionist family and even more suspicious of the intentions, even the best intentions of those within it” (Aughey, 2000, p. 185). By 2002, only one-third of Protestants supported the GFA (MacGinty, 2003).

In 1994, the EU involved extensive community group consultation in the development of the peace package. Yet, far fewer respondents are aware of either the EU
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Peace I or IFI funded projects within their respective communities. The professional and skilled classes demonstrate a greater awareness of both funds suggesting perhaps that the skills to access the allocation of economic assistance remains confined to certain classes. The bureaucratization of the process was certainly borne out in interviews with community leaders. Both funding agencies are committed to targeting the areas of greatest needs. The empowerment of the grassroots is critical to the longevity of the overall peace process (Fitzduff and O’Hagan, 2002). Thus, the funders need to streamline the application process in a user-friendly way.

Conclusions

Economic assistance from both funds may be making a difference in addressing social exclusion, poverty, inclusiveness, cross-community contact, and sustainable economic development. However, the people of Northern Ireland should be aware of these funds and perceive that they are evenly distributed across the protagonist communities. It is worth remembering that the people of Northern Ireland have to deal with their past as the transgenerational oral transmission of historical traumas perpetuate the conflict and become the basis for “retaliatory mimetic violence” (Wright, 1987). Similar to what occurred in South Africa with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the people of Northern Ireland need to recognize their suffering and use new cross-cultural rituals to heal from these traumas, or sow the seeds of future conflict (Byrne, 2008; Senehi, 2008). As part of this mechanism, both communities should perceive that these funds are fairly distributed and none of them should feel neglected. Moreover, transformational conflict resolution or peacebuilding can also help the public learn about
the root causes of conflict (identity, culture, poverty) and society’s unequal power structure, as well as to develop civic education skills (Galtung, Jacobson, and Brand-Jacobson, 2002). Thus, the process is psychologically, socially, and politically empowering for the participants because it builds self-esteem, self-confidence and self-efficacy, teaches problem-solving and listening skills, and forges a critical consciousness (Schwerin 1995). Reconciliation and cooperative relationships must embed changes at the personal, relational and structural levels to fulfill the basic human needs of the people (Lederach, 1997). Equality in opportunities should be part of any intervention mechanism.

Acknowledgements

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A Hermeneutics of Blessing as a Meta-Requisite for Reconciliation:

John E. Toews’ Romans Paradigm as a Case Study

Vern Neufeld Redekop

Abstract

Within an overall framework of reconciliation as a transformation of mimetic structures of violence to mimetic structures of blessing, teachings of blessing are needed throughout the process. “Teachings” are considered as paradigmatic stories, principles, insights, and practical wisdom that are derived both from religious traditions and the human sciences. “Blessing” refers to that which contributes to sustained human well-being at the individual, collective and relational levels. A hermeneutics of blessing is a deliberate interpretive endeavour directed toward the generation of teachings of blessing. It can be used with any particular source and the insights can be both direct and inverse, identifying what is helpful and not helpful for reconciliation processes. John E. Toews, biblical scholar specializing on the book of Romans in the New Testament, is examined as someone practicing a hermeneutics of blessing. His paradigm of Romans shows how it can be viewed as a letter addressing an identity-based conflict involving Jews and Gentiles. A set of practical teachings of blessing is synthesized from Romans 12 to 15, using the Toews hermeneutical paradigm.
Introduction

A paradox of reconciliation is that it appears wonderfully simple when it happens but is profoundly complex when its structure is considered as a whole. If one tries to force reconciliation at the wrong time one can do further violence to those already hurt through destructive deep-rooted conflict. However, it is possible to advance reconciliation as a process and as a goal (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004), but to do so demands wisdom, sensitivity, and insight. In extraordinary cases, certain people, like Nelson Mandela, develop the wisdom, sensitivity, and insight to advance reconciliation in particular contexts. My hypothesis is that a methodology grounded in a hermeneutics of blessing will generate the requisite understandings, attitudes, and spirit to provide the impetus for reconciliation in particular contexts. I would further argue in corollary fashion that the results of an exercise of a hermeneutics of blessing in one context will produce results that are heuristically and practically useful in other contexts.

The argument for a hermeneutics of blessing builds on a concept of reconciliation I advanced in From Violence to Blessing (Redekop, 2002), a framework for reconciliation I applied to Rwanda (Redekop, 2008), and development of the concept of teachings of blessing (Redekop, 2007a). The conceptual progression will be as follows. First I will develop the concept of reconciliation as a transformation of mimetic structures of violence to mimetic structures of blessing. (“Mimetic” is derived from the Greek word mimesis from which we get “imitation”; my use is derived from the work of René Girard.) I will then offer a framework for reconciliation, one component of which will be meta-requisites. One of these meta-requisites will be shown to be teachings of blessing,
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which I will define. Second, I will develop the concept of a hermeneutics of blessing, showing how it functions within an ethical vision of blessing. Third, I will show how a hermeneutics of blessing is manifest in the exegetical work of John E. Toews in relation to the book of Romans of the Christian New Testament. Significantly, he frames the book of Romans as a conflict resolving text. Fourth, I will show how Toews paradigm can be used to identify teachings of blessing and how these might have application in different contexts.

Allow me to position this research within the field: I am writing as a scholar-practitioner in the field of conflict studies. I am also a practical theologian in the context of deep-rooted conflict and reconciliation. As such, I recognize the scandal, for some, of attempting to draw insights from a religious text within a largely secular field. In the light of this recognition, I offer the following caveat. Methodologically I am not arguing on the basis of the authority of a biblical text; rather I am suggesting that within the field of conflict studies we look for relevant insights where they can be found and that if archaic texts offer archetypal narratives and teachings, we should learn what we can from them. The results should stand on their own within the fields of conflict and peace studies; however, they could have a surplus of meaning for those interested in religious-based conflict in general and those interested in a theology of peace in particular.

Since I am arguing for a particular methodology, let me offer a definition so that we are all on the same page to start out with. “Methodology” comes from the Greek words meta, hodos, and logos. Meta introduces the ideas of attendant circumstances, that which is in relationship to something else, and that which comes after or lies behind (Bauer, 1958, s.v. meta). Hodos means “way,” in fact, on Greek street signs it is used as
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the equivalent of “street” or “avenue.” Logos speaks of reckoning or a reasoned approach to something. Putting these together we have the concept of methodology as a reasoned reflection about the way in which we proceed, including what lies behind our approach to doing research or discovering truth. Methodology then concerns itself with what it is we are trying to find out, the kinds of questions we ask in our heuristic endeavour, and what we do to get answers to these questions. Each discipline or field has well developed questions that are posed about social phenomena; for example, social psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science, in confronting social conflict, would ask questions about ethno-narratives, group dynamics, cultural values and governance structures respectively. I am suggesting that in the field of identity-based conflict and reconciliation, an interpretive framework that asks questions about how one grounds the impulse toward reconciliation and what principles guide its processes are central to its methodology. In other words, a hermeneutics of blessing will be shown to be methodologically significant for the study of reconciliation. With this in mind we will turn to a definition of and framework for reconciliation.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation I conceptualize as the transformation of mimetic structures of violence to mimetic structures of blessing. Mimetic structures are diachronic patterns in which the actions, orientation and attitudes of those in relational systems are mutually reciprocated (Redekop, 2002; note at this point that I am offering a concise summary of From Violence to Blessing). Within a mimetic structure of violence, parties are each
oriented to value the diminution of the other. They wish to hurt the other, attack the
dignity of the other, take from the other, or get ahead at the expense of the other.
Violence, as René Girard argues (1987), is mimetically returned with interest. Hence
mimetic structures of violence tend to grow in intensity until one side or the other is
vanquished; or both are sufficiently diminished that they lose energy and impetus to
continue; or they become locked in a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman and Faure,
2005).

Mimetic structures of blessing entail mutual contributions to each other’s well
being. There is an orientation that manifests itself in attitudes of mutual respect and in
actions that are mutually empowering. Mimetic structures of blessing are dynamic,
constantly changing and sometimes conflictual. Because of the basic orientation toward
blessing, conflicts are used as occasions for creativity.

Mimetic structures are found within relational systems. They are complex; the
complexity can be deconstructed through the use of a theoretical framework that includes
identity needs, mimetic desire, scapegoating, hegemonic structures, and social
psychological concepts such as chosen traumas and chosen glories (Redekop, 2002). A
change in mimetic structures implies a reframing of identity narratives in relation to the
other and a new imagination of future horizons.

Less abstractly, reconciliation can be conceptualized as a coherent set of
relationships among a number of elements, arranged as follows (Redekop, 2008, with
modifications).
At the heart of reconciliation are discursive and symbolic processes, indicated by the diamond. These processes include presentations of narratives; eliciting and validating truth-claims; expressions of emotion, remorse, apology, and commitment to make amends; indications of forgiveness; and symbolic actions and rituals to reinforce transformations. In order for these to take place there are pre-requisites such as safety and vision, mandate and resources for reconciliation initiatives. Key result areas are transcendence, personal healing, a change of structures, new relationships, and a sense of justice.

Meta-requisites are those things that are connected to reconciliation, are needed throughout the process, at times lie behind actions taken, and play an empowering role. They include:
1. **GRIT—Gradual Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction:** a dance of making safe concessions which, if mimetically followed by the other lead to a gradual thawing of relationships (Osgoode, 1966).

2. **Institutions:** reconciliation processes usually happen in the context of institutions which may range from circle and dialogue processes to quasi-legal institutions such as truth and reconciliation commissions.

3. **Process leadership skills:** skilled third parties can expedite the various phases of the total process.

4. **Support from the Third Side:** Ervin Staub has argued persuasively that bystanders can make a big difference in a conflict (1988) and William Ury has identified nine different roles for members of the third side, that is, a community of people not directly involved with the conflict (1999).

5. **Teachings of Blessing:** these are stories, values, principles, analyses, and frameworks that establish and feed the impulse, vision, motivation and capacity to proceed with reconciliation.

We will now examine the concept of teachings of blessing more closely.

**Teachings of Blessing**

Previously, I did a critical examination of the concept of teachings of blessing by doing a hermeneutical circle inquiry around the Hebrew words **ברכה**—blessing and **תורה**—teaching (Redekop, 2007a). The four steps to the inquiry included: 1) an examination of the meaning of the word in the context of the Hebrew Bible; 2) a hermeneutics of suspicion in which I enumerated reasons why it was inappropriate to use
such a concept in the field of conflict studies; 3) looking at opportunities that open up with the use of the concept, probing ways in which new possibilities introduced by the use of the word that would be lost without it; 4) returning to the meaning of the word, giving it a new definition for use in the field. I will provide highlights of my conclusion with regard to each concept. “Blessing,” I concluded,

is used to connote a life-oriented, creative impulse oriented toward the mutual well-being of Self and Other. Within a mimetic structure of blessing Self and Other feed one another at many different levels of reality. If blessing becomes mimetic, both parties are at the same time receptive and generous. Symptoms of blessing are joy, confidence, self-esteem, peace, dignity and respect (Redekop, 2007a, p.145).

I identified other concepts associated with blessing that fill out its meaning. The root metaphor of berikah is the verb to kneel. The connection is that people kneel to receive a blessing. This indicates an attitude of receptivity reminiscent of the Taoist concept of ying. Receptivity, contrasted with a power orientation, yang, is an openness to receive from others and reciprocally a willingness to give generously. In the context of the Hebrew Bible, blessing is associated with land (Brueggeman, 2002; Martens, 1981) suggesting the need to care for the environment. The ancient Hebrew understanding of blessings extending through the generations resonates with Indigenous teachings that decisions ought to be made for the benefit of the next seven generations (Ross, 1996). The discursive field of blessing includes compassion, patience, mercy and forgiveness (Bole and others, 2004; Lederach, 1997; Volf, 2005).
I was initially led to the concept of “teachings” as significant when I conducted a structural analysis of the Exodus, an archetypal story of liberation—freedom from slavery to positive freedom to enter the promised land (Redekop, 1995). My question was “How can people who were oppressed avoid oppressing others when they get into a position of power?” I noted that between the time of leaving Egypt where they were slaves to entering Canaan was a period of 40 years during which time they received Torah understood as normative teachings. Examining the law codes embedded within the Torah, understood as the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, I discovered a number of teachings that addressed the matter of avoiding exploitation of slaves. Among them, for example was the admonition to “remember that you were slaves in Egypt” every week on Shabbat (Deuteronomy 5:15) The realization that Torah as teachings was important in personal and collective transformation led me to adopt the concept for use in understanding reconciliation.

Here are some conclusions about the concept of teaching from my subsequent work:

The concept of teaching assumes that there is something deliberate about the generation of appropriate value-laden insights and the passing on of these insights to others. If there are “teachings,” there must be teachers. The Torah was linked with the person of Moses who received teachings but who also taught the people. Insofar as the teachings helped to restore both order and mutual well-being in the face of harmful activity, he functioned as a judge to arbitrate; but at the same time with the arbitration he established precedents and demonstrated how to navigate the
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complexities of applying principles to ambiguous contexts. Furthermore, he literally taught other judges (please note here that I am lifting ideas from the story line, this does not imply a literal uncritical reading, as I argued elsewhere, even if these stories are retrojected back in time they still convey a particular approach to life.) All this is to say that in the Hebrew Bible it is impossible to isolate the teachings from the teacher. That is to say that the teachings take on the value that is needed to impact how people live in large measure on the basis of them coming from particular teachers. The same point could be made in Islam in relation to Prophet Mohammed being the teacher both as recipient of the Qur’an as well as the one who brought the teachings of the Quran to life in Mecca and Medina… Given the basic mimetic nature of humankind, the idea that effective teachers are those who bring a certain presence to the teaching process but that they also model what the teachings are all about. Among Canada’s First Nations and Inuit peoples, elders play the role of teachers. In academia, professors not only teach, they model academic life and the value of a pursuit of truth through their research. This concept starts to connect with the insight regarding mediation that the presence and modelling action of a particular mediator can be determinative of positive outcomes (Redekop, 2007a, p. 139).

Along with Michael Polanyi, we note that academic disciplines have rules of rightness, teachings if you like, that help to distinguish what is vital to the discipline from that which is misleading, false or spurious (1964).
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As we develop a self-awareness of the teachings that guide in a given endeavour, we have a basis for self-reflection, validation, questioning and evaluation. That is, the teachings help bring to light what is happening, they assist in re-framing, and they hold a standard by which we compare our own reality with what could potentially be the case. The moment of self-reflection in the light of teachings is a heuristic moment, it is a time of discovery of new insights, direct or inverse, and a time to open up new possibilities that go beyond what is included in the teachings per se but are the result of the creative engagement of teachings with lived reality.

With Thomas Mooren, we note that at least the Abrahamic religions have texts of violence that can be used to legitimate violence (2002). This means that the hermeneutic orientation becomes very important. I would like to argue for a hermeneutics of blessing such that the orientation of the serious interpreter of texts uses texts to find nuggets of truth and direction that can enhance the process of reconciliation and the creation of mimetic structures of blessing. We will now examine more closely what might be involved in a hermeneutics of blessing before examining Toews approach to Romans as an example of such an endeavour.

Hermeneutics of Blessing

Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpreting; that is, to find meaning in communicative acts which may be oral, conveyed through a particular medium or which may result in texts. There are many technical aspects of interpretation texts resulting in many questions. These include questions related to language, metaphor, genre, form,
A Hermeneutics of Blessing

context, intended recipient of the communication, emotional components of the communication, intended impact, changes of meaning structures through time, history of interpretation, the connection with the interpreter, the impact on the interpreter, the mental models or paradigms that the interpreter uses to generate meaning, etc. These all have validity but for the present moment the specificity associated with them goes beyond what can be dealt with in this article. What we wish to begin with is the hermeneutical impulse which includes the question, why choose a text to interpret? Which text is chosen? And which questions will be answered through the hermeneutical exercise?

In response to these questions, we have already established an interest in reconciliation and in mimetic structures of blessing. (Reflexively, I can observe that my own interest in these concepts is the result of a hermeneutical exploration that has been described in part above.) Our heuristic quest is for something that is both practical, that is, associated with action, and normative, in that it highlights values. In other words, the interpretive impulse is of an ethical nature. Ethics we take in its teleological sense of having an end, a goal, a desired outcome (Ricoeur, 1992); this, recognizing a secondary deontological sense of having to do with principles or value statements that invoke a duty to abide by them. We are thinking then of an ethical vision akin to Ricoeur’s positive sense of utopia as an achievable vision of a practical horizon of the future (1984). In particular, we start with an ethical vision of blessing; that is, we hope we can find a way of taking action such that we can create and nurture mimetic structures of blessing—mutually satisfying relationships. This is a particular challenge when the starting point is the constellation of resentment, hatred, envy, greed and other passions (emotions, backed
by understandings and orientation) that are concomitant with mimetic structures of violence (Redekop, 2002; Girard, 1990; Sites, 1990; Murphy and Hampton, 1988).

Figure 2. Ethical Vision of Blessing

As we can see in Figure 2, the ethical vision of blessing gives a particular hermeneutical orientation to the endeavour. This orientation asks the question, “Is there something in this text that contributes to our understanding, imagination and requisite values in order to develop and sustain positive relationships with our Other?” This can be a very conscious goal. With that orientation we develop a methodology, understood as a deliberate reflection on the way to proceed in our hermeneutical endeavour. The methodology includes the kinds of questions we bring to the enterprise, including the broad questions around what are the mimetic structures of violence and what indicates
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the potential for transformation and the more operational questions of author, intention, context, intended audience, intended impact. As we interact with the text we engage in a heuristic action that leads to insights (Melchin and Picard, 2008). This is a reflexive and reciprocal action in which we read the text and the text reads us. That is, we develop new realizations about ourselves as we read the text; these realizations help us mimaetically enter into the world of the author, the text and the initial recipients. Out of this heuristic endeavour, we start to get insights into the very real conflict situation we face and wish to address—we start to find some tentative answers to the broad question of how can we affect a transformative process of reconciliation. These become the teachings we are looking for. These tentative answers then need to be scrutinized and validated by and with our interactions with others. They also are fed back into the heuristic enterprise for internal validation within the world of the text. As they become clearer, they result in paradigms that enable us to see and discover new aspects to reality. The paradigms, or higher level teachings, can then eventually inform specific actions and even action practices in the form of policies and programs. The very concept of a mimetic structure of blessing is one of these paradigmatic developments that is itself in the process of being validated within the field.

Note in the diagram above that there is a circular development in that the discoveries that lead to certain teachings are fed back into the hermeneutical orientation, helping to refine and nuance the questions that are being posed of the text.

The foregoing has introduced a paradigmatic framework within which we can place a hermeneutics of blessing. It shows that this hermeneutical impulse and orientation is needed to discern and formulate teachings of blessing that might motivate and guide
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processes of reconciliation in a given context. Teachings of blessing are but one of a
number of elements of reconciliation, but one that could be significant throughout the
process; indeed they help to define the goal of reconciliation.

We will now turn to the work of John E. Toews, a biblical exegete who devoted
his academic career to a study of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, one of the books in

Toews’ hermeneutics of blessing applied to Romans

The heuristic operation is depicted in Figure 3 and involves my interpretation of
the work of John E. Toews in developing a new paradigm to interpret the letter of Paul to
the Roman house churches around 55 CE. Drawing on a body of scholarship around this
new paradigm he included insights from biblical scholars such as J. C. Beker, E. P.
Sanders, Krister Stendahl, and N. T. Wright. In this operation, the work of Toews is
presented as an exercise of a hermeneutics of blessing. Subsequently I will synthesize
particular teachings of blessing from the book of Romans using the Toews paradigm.
These teachings of blessing will be shown to have a double valence: first, they functioned
as teachings of blessing in the first century to their primary audience; second, they can
serve a useful purpose in the interests of reconciliation in the contemporary world.
John E. Toews is a Mennonite biblical scholar. Back in the 1970s when he did his doctoral studies in New Testament, most Mennonite academics were concentrating on the Sermon on the Mount and the Gospels in their endeavour to develop a peace theology. Toews thought it might be interesting to do something different—to look to the Apostle Paul as the grounding for a peace theology and to focus on the book of Romans in particular. As a responsible exegete, he mastered the history of Pauline studies and Romans scholarship. He then undertook his own analysis of the book of Romans (Toews, 1977). What he discovered was quite extraordinary.

For those not familiar with biblical scholarship, particularly in the Protestant tradition, it is important to note that the book of Romans played a pivotal role in the
development of Martin Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith. In brief, Luther inherited a sin problem from his Catholic tradition. This manifested itself in a belief that humans were destined for hell on account of their sinfulness but that because of Jesus there was respite from this prognosis of the human condition. To appropriate forgiveness of sins and a place in heaven, one could be justified, in Luther’s terms through faith in Jesus—faith alone was deemed sufficient. This became a cornerstone for subsequent Protestant theology for centuries after Luther. Romans was read as a theological treatise meant to develop this particular doctrine. Corollary to this was a negative reading of Judaism, which was construed as “works righteousness” based on legalism. Hence Romans was read in a way that offered a polemic against Judaism. This was the dominant paradigm (Toews, 2004, p.30).

Toews did a historical reconstruction and a structural analysis which introduced a radically different paradigm. It became clear to him that the basic problem addressed in Romans was a conflict between Jews and Gentiles. The earliest church in Rome was a network of house churches that emerged from a significant network of house synagogues. These synagogues included God-fearers—Gentiles who wished to participate in the life of the Jewish community, but did not fully convert (Toews, 2004, pp. 22-23). Christianity had not yet established an identity separate from that of Judaism but the house church gatherings of followers of Jesus included God-fearers and other Gentiles who were attracted to this movement. Romans 16 is the conclusion of the book of Romans in which Paul greets each of the house groups by the name of the person in whose house they meet. There is an extensive list, indicating a large number of house churches.
Significant debates were taking place concerning the degree to which Gentiles had to become Jews first before being part of these early churches, circumcision being a significant point. Within this network of churches were many conflicts over ethics, lifestyle, diet, sacred days, and basic theological understandings. People had woven different customs into their identities; to forge a new community with people tied to radically different lifestyles was a major challenge. Paul, recognizing both the strategic importance of a church in Rome as well as its vulnerability to falling apart because of internal conflicts, wrote his longest letter to the Romans. It more than any other has been considered the best developed theological statement coming from Paul.

The new paradigm advocated by Toews posits that Romans was meant to provide a framework for Jews and Gentiles to be part of a new inclusive community. This can be seen in the structure and the themes. The argument of Paul, as developed by Toews, runs something like this. God is presented as having the twin characteristics of being angry about things that are not right in the world and being passionate about making them right. The anger is directed at both Gentiles and Jews; neither group can claim perfection and neither can pull moral rank. The sense of things going wrong is linked to a force field of sin that pulls people into destructive ways of being. God’s transformative action (righteousness of God) is directed at both groups to their respective benefit; hence, in this enlarged frame of reference, they are in a similar state in relation to God. This argument is made in Romans 1 to 8 and sets up the central argument according to Toews.

The problematique leading to the conflict includes a context in which the Jews have an awareness of a covenant with God, that is, a relationship of solidarity in which they are to be agents of goodness within the world. As part of this covenant, they are to
live according to the Torah. As they define a Torah-oriented lifestyle, it sets them apart from the surrounding community. Their lifestyle becomes a boundary marker that sets out their identity. A key problem for Paul, who would like to see an inclusive community, becomes the issue of how to frame the teachings (Torah) and the self-understanding of the Jewish followers of Jesus such that Gentiles will be welcome without becoming Jews first. On the other hand, how can he convince the Gentiles to truly honour the Jewish heritage within which the Jesus movement is emerging? Having established that both are susceptible to the force-field of sin as well as the transformative work of God, Paul uses a metaphor to advance his argument.

In Romans 9 to 11, Paul uses the metaphor of a tree to create a new level of consciousness concerning the respective identities of the Jews and Gentiles in the Jesus movement. The tree represents Judaism. It is a strong and healthy tree. It is not cut down or destroyed. Rather, it is honoured. However, a new branch is grafted in—the Gentile branch. It is the reality of the life and work of Jesus that makes this possible. By using this metaphor, Paul argues to the Gentiles that they need to respect the life-giving tradition of the Jews. The Jews for their part have to welcome the Gentile branch as an integral part of the now expanded tree. Both are part of the same organism. But how can they make this work? Each group has its own baggage—baggage that creates conflict between the two groups.

Romans 12 to 15 is identified by Toews as the set of teachings that show both the Gentiles and Jews of the movement how practically they can flourish together. We will return to this text in the following section.
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Framing the work of Toews as exemplifying a hermeneutics of blessing, we can make the following observations. First, this new paradigm enables us to see the degree to which there was a social identity-based conflict in first century Rome and the creativity of the Apostle Paul in addressing it. Second, this work shows how a previous reading of Paul provided a paradigm among Christians that depreciated the religious standing of Jewish people; conversely Toews’ reading provides an impetus among Christians to honour the Jewish tradition in a new way. Third, by developing this particular paradigm, Toews raises the question, How exactly did Paul creatively address the conflict and what can we learn from his efforts? A question we will now attend to in the fourth section.

Teachings of blessing in Romans

We are now ready to identify teachings of blessing in Romans. As is shown in Figure 4, this happens through a reflection on the book of Romans based on the Toews paradigm but with a particular question in mind: what are the teachings of blessing within this ancient text? More practically, how did Paul manage to set forth a framework and agenda that kept a fledging movement intact?

The teachings of blessing identified in this section are of a threefold nature. First, we will look at Paul’s reconciling methodology. Second, we will look at the teachings on Torah as an instructive dimension of Paul’s approach. Third, we will identify the specific principles that Paul developed in Roman 12 to 15. Finally, in relation to these principles, I will describe some action research undertaken to validate these as teachings of blessing.
Paul as a Third Party Neutral—His Reconciling Methodology

In analyzing Romans as a conflict transformation document, one can discover a number of methodological elements that point to Paul’s passion to bring the two sides together. First, he identified with both groups, saying in the first chapter that he is a debtor to both. Second, Paul shows commonality between them as has been pointed out. Third, the language of “all” is used 68 times throughout the book in an attempt to be inclusive (Redekop, 1980). Fourth, the central metaphorical argument of the tree becomes a creative way of developing a new consciousness. Fifth, as will emerge in the section below, Paul is attentive to the vulnerabilities of the weakest members of the movement.

Teachings about Teachings

A very tricky point for Paul was how to regard Torah. For Jewish people, Torah is at the center of their faith and has different valences (Neusner, 1993; Martens, 1981). First, it designates the first five books of the Hebrew Bible known traditionally as the books of Moses. Second, it refers to the instructions given to Moses during the 40 years in the wilderness. Third, it designates eternal principles; there is a Jewish tradition that
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Torah existed before the creation of the world. Fourth, the concept of oral Torah designates the living tradition that has been passed down through a community that has lived continuously since the written Torah was established. Fifth, Torah is associated with wisdom, as providing the source of insights needed to live well. Within Judaism, there has been constant questioning and debate about how to interpret the Torah and what it means to live by its teachings.

Given this high regard for Torah on the one hand, and the manner in which it was interpreted to create boundaries, on the other, Paul was left in quite a predicament. If he only affirmed everything in the Torah as it was understood and practiced, he could not reconcile the inclusion of Gentiles into a community still dominated by Jews and rooted in the Jewish tradition. If he dismissed it, he would be undercutting the ground of his own being. There are three ways in which he works his way through this paradox.

First, Paul makes a distinction in his use of the Greek word nomos, which is the word used to translate the Hebrew Torah. It is the word for law; this in itself is misleading because it misses the connotation of teaching embedded within Torah. When Paul is critical of how the Torah is used, he refers to it simply as nomos, without a definite article. When Paul is speaking of the Torah as a gift from the Divine, he uses a definite article, ho, referring to the nomos. Periodically he asks rhetorically, “Does this mean that the nomos is abrogated?” He then answers with the most emphatic negative possible in Greek.

Second, Paul argues that something that is essentially good can be subverted by the force-field of sin and death. This subversion he sees happening when the Torah is used to substantiate violence through a legalism that removes principle and practice from
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the spirit of Torah, which is good and pure. In other words, he exposes a hermeneutics of violence and argues for a hermeneutics of blessing when it comes to Torah. His same arguments could be used against those who in later Christian contexts used his very words to develop a new kind of legalism that was used to justify such things as Anti-Semitism.

Third, as we will see below, Paul synthesized from the Torah a number of teachings meant to engender positive orientations, values, and attitudes among the people to whom his letter was addressed. Paul’s methodology could be useful in deconstructing the subversive way in which religion is used to legitimate acts of violence (terrorism) by people who frame their motivation in legalistic terms, which demonize an Other (Juergensmeyer, 2001).

Practical Teachings of Blessing—Principles which Paul Developed

The overall point Paul is working towards is expressed in Romans 14:19. In the Jerusalem Bible it is expressed: “So let us adopt any custom that leads to peace and our mutual improvement.” In the NRSV it is translated, “Let us then pursue what makes for peace and for mutual upbuilding.” In Greek the two phrases in this verse are Eirenes diokomen which means eagerly pursue peace and ta tes oikodomes tes eis allelous meaning literally pursue the things that build up one another. The first key word, oikodomes, introduces a root metaphor connoting initial house construction or renovation; in either case it makes things better. Allelous is the reflexive pronoun referring to one another; it implies mutuality. Let us look now at a series of teachings within the text—teachings to build up one another. In other words, we are identifying
teachings that promote mimetic structures of blessing from Romans 12-15:6. I will synthesize the themes as they emerge consecutively.

1. Recognize that your actions are to be directed toward a higher good. (12:1)
2. Do not let your minds be mimetically moulded according to current trends in thinking but transform your way of thinking through creative renewal. (12:2)
3. Do not be hyper-concerned about your own importance but think reasonably about your distinct role and gifts in relation to the community as a whole. (12:3,4-8)
4. Establish structures of mutual reciprocity around care and recognition. (12:10)
5. Participate in meeting the needs of others. (12:13)
6. Delight in welcoming those different from you into your homes. (12:13)
7. Say upbuilding things about those who are working against you (persecuting, scapegoating, picking on you.) (12:14)
8. Show empathy to one another through a range of emotions from celebration to mourning. (12:15)
9. Mimesis of evil is out; do not return harm or bitterness when it has been directed to you. (12:17; 13:8-10)
10. Thoughtfully look out for the well-being of all people. (12:17b)
11. As much as is possible, respecting the fact that relationships are two-sided, live peacefully with all people. (12:18)
12. Do not take revenge; find a safe place to put your anger; feed your enemies. (12:19)
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13. Don’t let mimetic structures of violence overtake you but defeat these structures with good. (12:21)


15. Fulfill the Torah by practicing love. (13:8-10)

16. Do not judge the thoughts, action and lifestyles of others. (14:1-19)

17. Those who are strong ought to assist those with certain weaknesses to bear their burdens. (15:1-2)

Two particular points of contention addressed by the principles were eating food offered to idols and honouring specific feast days. For Paul, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with food offered to idols. Food is food. Idols have no power. Materially there is no reason why this could not be done. However, for those coming from a Pagan environment this is a big deal. Hence Paul argues that out of respect for those who might be offended it is best not to indulge when in their presence. Similarly he argues for mutual respect when it comes to feast days.

*Validating the Teachings*

The challenge for me was to see whether a hermeneutics of blessing could be used with a group of Jews, Christians, Muslims and those not committed to any theistic faith to discern and validate teachings of blessing derived from the New Testament to their mutual heuristic and personal benefit. This involved first creating a dialogical space, then presenting a framework, and then presenting a list of teachings derived from Romans 12-15 and asking them to engage in dialogue on these teachings. This list was presented to a group of about twenty people in a workshop at the Colloquium on Violence and Religion.
at Purdue University in June 2002. After talking about the list in pairs participants voted for the top three teachings. A similar process was used with three different classes of graduate students studying conflict resolution. Within the four groups were Jews, Muslims, Christians and non-theists. In each case people participated willingly in the exercise after receiving the introductory information presented in the case study. These cases show that people from divergent backgrounds were prepared to engage on a set of teachings drawn from the Christian Testament. The results of their votes are presented in the table below.

**Table 1. Top 5 Teachings from Each Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 Teachings from Each Group</th>
<th>Group 1 Rank (votes)</th>
<th>Group 2 Rank (votes)</th>
<th>Group 3 Rank (votes)</th>
<th>Group 4 Rank (votes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Fulfill the Torah by practicing love. (13:8-10)</td>
<td>1 (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Do not let your minds be mimetically moulded according to current trends in thinking, but transform your way of thinking through creative renewal. (12:2)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Mimesis of evil is out; do not return harm or bitterness when it has been directed to you. (12:17; 13:8-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Do not take revenge, find a safe place to put your anger; feed your enemies. (12:19)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>3 (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Say upbuilding things about those who are working against you (persecuting, scapegoating, picking on you.) (12:14)</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Do not judge the thoughts, action and lifestyles of others. (14:1-19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (9)</td>
<td>1(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Do not be hyper-concerned about your own importance but think reasonably about your distinct role and gifts in relation to the community as a whole. (12:3,4-8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (7)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Those who are strong ought to assist those with certain weaknesses to bear</td>
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<td>2(6)</td>
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</table>
The top seven teachings, when considering all of the results, are all directed toward establishing and maintaining mimetic structures of blessing. Of these, a,b, and g concentrated on the Self; f concentrated on the Other; c,d, and e concentrated on responses to conflictual dynamics. Of those concentrating on the Self, “b” could be seen as a corrective to aliuscentricism, an over-emphasis on the Other, and “g” as a corrective to egocentricism, an over emphasis of the Self. Of the three that the three groups have in common, “b” is inclined to develop a strong healthy sense of Self and “d” and “e” provide one negative and one positive response to the kind of behaviour that would normally prompt mimetic violence. Significantly, the first group voted for the affirmation of love as central to Torah. Taken as a whole, these eight teachings, if acted upon would help to build, maintain and strengthen mimetic structures of blessing.

At the end of the first process, one member of the first group mentioned that the session had been nourishing to his heart, to his whole being. At the end of the second process, one of the participants asked about the place of people outside of Religion. Her question prompted an affirmation of those without a belief in God who care about the
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earth (cf. Harrington, 1985) and the potential for finding teachings of blessing within texts and stories generated by non-theists.

Relevance to Reconciliation

I have made the argument that those interested in furthering reconciliation would do well to exercise a hermeneutics of blessing to generate teachings of blessing. This approach could be used with any text relevant to a given context. Where religion is involved in a conflict, this principle should be brought to bear on the study of religious texts. Doing so would help to elicit the potentially positive contribution of religion (Appleby, 2000; Bole, and others 2004; Johnstone & Sampson, 1994; Sampson & Lederach, Silva, 2001). What is significant is that an eirenic text written in one context can be shown to produce positive results at many levels when interpreted with a hermeneutics of blessing. In this case, the book of Romans, which was shown to address an identity conflict in the first century, can be interpreted to undergird Jewish-Christian dialogue in the twenty-first century and argue against Christian anti-Semitism. It can generate principles that appeal to people of many different backgrounds, showing the potential for what works in one context to work in others as well. To further corroborate this point, it would be interesting to see how these particular teachings could be constructively drawn upon in a conflict situation. Also worthy of further study would be to show how conflict resolvers follow a methodology similar to that of the Apostle Paul.
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