Peace and Conflict Studies

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THE EMPEROR NEEDS NEW CLOTHES: 
SEcurITIZING THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Volker Franke

Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11 brought to a head change that had been underway since the end of the Cold War in how we think about security: (1) there is no longer consensus about who or what constitutes the “enemy”; (2) Realism as the dominating paradigm for studying international relations is collapsing; (3) domestic factors are gaining importance for devising security policies; and (4) with increasing globalization these domestic factors attain impact beyond national borders. In this article, I examine the nature of these developments and illustrate that the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain and/or to justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or perceived threats. Comparing various conceptions of security, I analyze the dangers resulting from oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat traditional policy issues as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the need to more clearly define the distinction between nonexistential and existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical security complex theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security sectors and can be applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing between those issues that should be securitized and those that can be addressed through existing policy channels.

On that tragic morning of September 11, 2001 when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, the world had changed forever. Or at least, so we learned from politicians and pundits, security experts and pollsters. In his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, President George W. Bush described this change:

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night
fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.¹

While that September morning brought the most vicious attack on U.S. homeland in history, the world had already begun to change more than a decade earlier. Speaking about the implications of the end of the Cold War, then President George H. W. Bush celebrated “a very real prospect of a new world order” in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1990. The United Nations, freed from the cold war stalemate, was finally in a position to fulfill “the historic vision of its founders” (quoted in Gregg 1993, p. 135) and “unite [its] strength to maintain international peace and security” (Preamble of the UN Charter).

Although the threat of global thermonuclear war has virtually vanished, the world has not yet become a safer place. Since George Bush’s UN speech, we have been witnessing growing ethnic strife and violent quests for self-determination, incidents of genocide, mass migration and floods of refugees, and repeated acts of terrorism. September 11 brought to a tragic head change that had already been underway for more than a decade. Since the Cold War ended: (1) there has been no clear consensus about who or what constitutes the “enemy”; (2) Realism has been losing its stronghold as the dominating paradigm for studying international relations; (3) domestic factors are gaining importance for devising security policies; and (4) with increasing globalization these domestic factors attain impact beyond national borders.

In this article, I examine more closely the nature of these developments and illustrate that the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain and/or to justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or perceived threats. Comparing various conceptions of security, I analyze the dangers resulting from oversecuritization, which is the propensity to treat traditional policy issues as existential threats to security, and demonstrate the need to more clearly define the distinction between nonexistential and existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. Expanding on classical security complex theory, I propose a conceptual model that links security sectors and can be applied to develop measurable criteria for distinguishing between those issues that should be securitized and those that can be addressed through existing policy channels.

The Dilemma

Traditionally, studying security has meant focusing on issues such as national defense, military power, and the use of force. Stephen Walt (1991), for instance, defined security studies as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (p. 212). This fairly narrow definition worked well

for scholars working under the shadow of the nuclear threat. Attention focused primarily on analyzing military hardware and nuclear deterrence and on doctrines about their use (see Kriesberg 2002). However, over the past decade the field of security studies has been forced to accommodate new realities. The relatively peaceful protests and mass anti-government demonstrations in Prague, Budapest, and East Berlin in the fall of 1989 showed the ability of non-state actors to shape international relations. The early 1990s also demonstrated that security can no longer be expressed solely in military terms, as the world has become more interdependent economically, politically, socially, and culturally. At the same time, a series of global problems has brought the international community closer together. Widespread violations of human rights, threats to biodiversity, global warming, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and, recently, the looming threat of terrorism, have severely reduced the ability of states to solve problems on a purely national basis (Dierks 2001; Lechner & Boli 2000; Rosenau 1992; Scholte 2000).

Defining Security

Students of international relations have traditionally focused their inquiries on the study of war and peace. For Realists, threats to the security of a state manifested themselves in the form of wars. Hobbes’ state of nature, and by extension, the anarchical structure of the international system, is characterized by inherent competition over scarce resources and, ultimately, by states’ inherent quest for power. By nature, human beings (and by extension states), Realists argue, unconstrained by government and law, exhibit motives and behaviors that will inevitably lead to war, thereby threatening the security of all. Consequently, imposing one’s will on the enemy (before he can subject others to his will) becomes the “natural” means for gaining and maintaining power and, subsequently, for ensuring safety. Of course, military might—along with the threat to use it—still proves in many instances an effective tool of conventional power politics. However, Realists have conceded that power can also stem from economic capabilities (Keohane 1984; Keohane & Nye 1977; Waltz 1979). Dependency theorists went even further and argued that economic inequality itself may be a root cause for security threats since for as long as “hunger rules peace cannot prevail. He who wants to ban war must also ban mass poverty” (see Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980, p. 6; see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank 1984).

Security Sectors
In his classical security complex theory, Buzan (1991) recognized five distinct yet overlapping security sectors, each characterized by unique types of interactions. The military sector revolves around relationships of forceful coercion; the political sector around authority, governing, and recognition; the economic sector around relations of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector around relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector around issues related to the planetary biosphere (see also Buzan et al. 1998).

More specifically, military security describes the interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Stability of governance is seen, for instance, in the democratic ideals of free and equal opportunity for all citizens to participate, open and fair procedures for gaining power, and stable structures for the peaceful transfer of power.

Economic security depicts the access to resources and technology, and the finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Economic security may be threatened by a widening gap between rich and poor (states, individuals, classes), modified dependencies (from the dependency on single or limited commodity trade to service dependencies ranging from tourism to sex (see Enloe 1990; Steans 1998) and a growing new divide between the technologically connected and disconnected (see Rifkin 2000).

Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. The main security objective lies in establishing peaceful relations among diverse collective identities, i.e., in answering the questions how can various ethnic, religious, national, or other groups sharing a common identity live together peacefully (see Rawls 1993)?

Finally, environmental security relates to the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system for human existence. Threats to the environment include global warming, pollution, depletion of resources, energy and food shortages, extinction of species, and uncontrolled population growth. More generally, Barnett (2001) explained that environmental degradation and insecurity are a “product of meta-processes of development in the industrialized North at the expense of underdevelopment in the industrializing South” (p. 13, see also Galtung 1971; Gunder Frank 1984). Consequently, environmental insecurity stems from people’s vulnerability to the effects of environmental degradation, including how that degradation affects human welfare.

In the mid 1990s the United Nations attempted to broaden the idea of security to encompass virtually all threats to human existence. Human security means, “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in
communities” (United Nations Development Programme 1994, p. 23). The 1994 UN Development Report specified the following security areas (see also Paris 2001):

- economic security (e.g., freedom from poverty);
- food security (e.g., access to food);
- health security (e.g., access to health care and protection from diseases);
- environmental security (e.g., protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and resource depletion);
- personal security (e.g., physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents);
- community security (e.g., survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups, and the physical security of these groups);
- political security (e.g., enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression).

Given the plethora of security concerns circumscribed by the umbrella term “human security,” Paris (2001), understandably frustrated, concluded that while “as a political campaign, the human security coalition has…been successful in a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the landmines convention,” as a new conceptualization of security or as a framework for understanding the sources of conflict, human security “is so vague that it verges on meaninglessness—and consequently offers little practical guidance…to policymakers whose responsibility it is to prioritize among competing policy goals” (p. 16).

Despite frustration regarding a comprehensive conception of security, a growing number of observers recognize the need for rethinking what security means (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 1991; Kriesberg 2002; Paris 2001), while others still attempt to hold on to traditional conceptions of security (Mearsheimer 2001, 1990). Cold War security strategies—shaped by predictable fears of Communism and Soviet nuclear prowess and an American determination to control both—promoted deterrence, containment, military strength, and interventionism. Ironically, America’s “victory” in the Cold War has removed many of the cornerstones that had imposed structure and a sense of order in world politics (see Gaddis 1999; Mearsheimer 1990). Consequently, some authors have bemoaned the collapse of the Cold War order that had provided somewhat calculable levels of certainty and predictability. Three texts stand out in this context, all of which share rather pessimistic predictions for our future.

**Three Marker Texts**
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama jubilantly proclaimed the “end of history” (1992, 1989). He argued that the West’s victory in the Cold War had once and for all settled ideological differences. According to Fukuyama, the grand ideological debate was over and there was nothing more to be discussed. “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (1989, p. 4). Fukuyama was convinced that the expanding number of democratic states would help overcome the conflictual nature of international anarchy (an assessment widely shared among Democratic Peace theorists. See Doyle 1986; Müller forthcoming).

Given standard Realist Cold War argumentation, one should have expected unqualified excitement about the predicted global spread of Western values and capitalistic market principles. Instead, Fukuyama concluded his article by lamenting that the end of history was a very sad time that left him longing for “the time when history existed.” Fukuyama explained:

The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. (1989, p. 18)

Half a decade later, Robert Kaplan (2000, first published 1994) published his notes collected from travels through Eastern Europe and Africa, suggesting that West Africa was a window for things to come worldwide. His “coming anarchy” contained “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels” (p. 7). From these observations, Kaplan concluded that “[w]e are entering a bifurcated world,” some parts “inhabited by Hegel’s and Fukuyama’s Last Man, healthy, well-fed, and pampered by technology.” The other, “larger part is inhabited by Hobbes’s First Man, condemned to a life that is ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the Last Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not (p. 24).” Although Kaplan acknowledged and vividly illustrated the severity and global reach of emerging security threats in the environmental, societal, and political sectors, he bemoaned a loss of Western control and argued that “in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence” (p. 45). The Hobbesian
nature of the international system is inescapable and aggression and self-interest will continue to dominate relations between “us” and “them.”

Extending Fukuyama’s conclusion that with the end of the Cold War the ideological bases for conflict had lost meaning, Samuel Huntington (1993) argued in his famous *Clash of Civilizations* that “the great division among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations” (p. 22). Huntington predicted that the clash of civilizations would dominate global politics after the Cold War and that conflict between civilizations would be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and broadest cultural identity short of what distinguishes humans from other species. In the post Cold War world, he argued, people would define their identity in ethnic and religious terms. The ideological divide that had characterized the Cold War was giving way to “us” vs. “them” relations between people and members of different cultures, ultimately pitting the West against the Rest.

**What To Do…**

The “end of history” and the “coming anarchy” signify not only the emergence of new security threats, but also manifest a profound assault on those theoretical premises that have served Realists well for explaining international relations for more than 2,000 years. Understandably, Realists attempt to develop solutions for emerging problems based on their time-tested assumptions. Huntington, for instance, provides a number of recommendations for what the West should do to address civilizational security threats (notice, all of them presume the conflictual nature of human relations and promote the “us” versus “them” dichotomy that has traditionally informed Realist scholarship). His recommendations include: (1) maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; (2) exploit differences among other civilizations; (3) support civilization groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; (4) strengthen international institutions that reflect Western values and interests; and (5) promote involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

The clash of civilizations presents Huntington’s attempt to save Western identity for which Realism has traditionally provided the normative framework. Now that the Cold War is over and the enemy has vanished, Huntington wonders who the next enemy might be. After all, since human relations are, by their very nature, conflictual, we need a new enemy to continue our competition over scarce resources. Therefore, constructing “threats” becomes part of constructing the “other.” Effective “othering” oftentimes involves the use of stereotypes, which are often thrust upon those (the “other” or the enemy) whom we wish to silence, dehumanize, or
securitize (see Allport 1971; Abrams & Hogg 1999; Prins 1998; Tajfel 1978). While a more detailed examination of the dynamic between securitization, stereotyping and enemy imaging is beyond the scope of this article, future research should explore conflict strategies based on securitization of the “other” and examine the extent to which politicized (instead of securitized) response mechanisms could deescalate conflict.

What Else To Do…

As this brief excursion demonstrates, the most prominent policy recommendations derived over the past decade have left intact the very assumptions that informed the prevalent theoretical explanations and policy options of the Cold War. Yet, global security in the aftermath of thermonuclear threat is about more than just advanced weapons technology and military competition. But we can no longer simply add new security sectors and still make our explanations stick. Rather, it is essential to profoundly revise the premises and the scope, and to overcome the stereotypes that have informed our thinking about security. Security threats are not universal nor do they apply objectively to actors worldwide.

Security today encompasses a wide array of sectors and actors. Buzan and colleagues (1998) argued that security is about survival, meaning the level at which an issue poses “an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (p. 21). Traditionally, the referent object of security has been the state, threatened primarily militarily by some peer competitor (see Schwarz & Layne 2002; Mearsheimer 2001; Keohane & Nye 1977). Politically, existential threats may be viewed as challenges to constituting principles, especially sovereignty and perhaps even state ideology. The state may also be a referent object in the other sectors, but is much less likely to be threatened in its very existence. Economically, for instance, firms are the most common referent objects—threatened by bankruptcy. Crises to a national economy absent a war are only rare occasions. In fact, the largest bankruptcies in American history (Enron, Worldcom) have not threatened the survival of the American economy.

The primary referent object in the societal sector are collectivities formed around a shared identity independent of the state. The recent events in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia illustrate this. Under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo became an autonomous province within Serbia. From the late 1980s Kosovo faced growing Serb nationalist sentiments. Slobodan Milosevic, who had gained power in Serbia in 1987, revoked Kosovar autonomy in 1990, dissolved the Kosovo Provincial Assembly and Government, removed Kosovo Albanians from important state posts, and declared a state of emergency. Growing Albanian resistance to rule from Belgrade led to attacks against Serbian security forces by the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) in the mid-1990s. Belgrade responded with military repression of the Kosovar population as a whole. By mid September 1998 an estimated 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes and some 50,000 were still in the open as the winter approached. It was clear many might die. Despite the extent of the human tragedy, the international community waited until the spring of 1999 before it recognized the potential security implications for the European Community (legitimized as a traditional state actor referent object) and responded with air strikes which eventually lead to the capitulation of the Milosovic regime.

These examples illustrate that security takes “politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 23). Any issue, so the upshot of this argument, can be securitized, i.e., presented as an existential threat that requires immediate attention, oftentimes in form of emergency measures. According to classical complex security theory (see Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan 1991), any public issue can be located along a spectrum (see Figure 1) ranging from non-politicized (i.e., the state does not deal with the issue and is not made part of the public discourse on the issue) through politicized (i.e., the issue is part of public policy and thus requires government decision and resource allocations or, in some cases, some form of communal governance) to securitized (i.e., the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside normal political procedure).

![Figure 1: Spectrum of Securitization](http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/intro.htm)

For example, religion is politicized in some states (e.g., Iran, Saudi-Arabia) but not in others (e.g., Germany, France); some states securitize culture (Iran, the former Soviet Union) while others don’t (the United Kingdom or the Netherlands). Similarly, the writers of our three marker texts have clearly securitized culture or civilization. Using speech act theory (see Austin 1975; Bourdieu 1991), Buzan et al. (1998) argued that a discourse that presents something as an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization, but is only a securitizing move. The issue is securitized if and when the audience accepts it as such. Buzan et al. identified two dangers: (1) opportunities for power holders to exploit threats for domestic purposes (e.g., Reagan’s invasion of Grenada following the 1983 suicide

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2 A detailed account of the events can be found at [http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/intro.htm](http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/account/intro.htm).
truck bomb that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut bombing or, concomitant the Lewinski scandal, Clinton’s bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998); and (2) attempts to securitize not because an immediate existential threat exists, but merely to gain “tactical attention,” e.g., for environmental problems. The danger lies in the fact that issues may be securitized whenever there is a failure to address them (at least with the desired outcome) through normal politics.

**The Danger of Oversecuritization**

Securitizing everything from nuclear missiles to miniskirts and pop music (as is the case in the former Soviet Union, Iran, or the Taliban’s Afghanistan) suffocates civil society, jeopardizes democracy, and creates coercive states whose only legitimacy stems from countering ever increasing security threats (see Buzan et al. 1998). Therefore, avoiding excessive securitization becomes as important as widening our understanding of what security means. The tendency to oversecuritize issues of public policy is quite common as a few examples from the American context illustrate. These examples show the intricate overlap between security sectors and suggest that the perceived need to securitize an issue in one sector may produce a threat in another sector.

*SEMATECH.* Capitalism strives on the fact that the main actors—firms and workers/employees—feel insecure. After all, insecurity in terms of market shares and employment produces market efficiencies. But what happens when the forces present in a global free market produce outcomes that threaten the security of the state? By the mid-1980s, the U.S. electronics industry had lost its global market dominance partially due to government supported research and development activities by overseas competitors. Concerned about the growing dependence on foreign supplied semiconductors and components for advanced weaponry, the Reagan Administration supported industrial policy efforts to reinvigorate the U.S. semiconductor industry, recapture the market, and assure that the American military could rely on domestic chip manufacturers. The government promoted the establishment of a non-profit consortium of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers, known as SEMATECH (SEMiconductor MAnufacturing TECHnology), which, in conjunction with government agencies and universities were to sponsor and conduct research aimed at assuring U.S. leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology (see O’Keefe & Franke 2002). While the most prominent manufacturers joined the consortium, some 200 smaller chip-makers stayed out, steered off by the financial requirements or because they feared the larger companies would dominate the research agenda. In addition, some critics argued, by helping one set of companies, SEMATECH effectively shut out those manufacturers whose products and research ideas it opted not to support.
TRP. Convinced that SEMATECH had been a success, the Clinton administration modeled its 1993 Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) initiative for developing dual-use defense technology largely after that experience (see O’Keefe & Franke 2002). The perceived earlier success of merging private and public resources into the SEMATECH consortium to produce internationally competitive semiconductors encouraged the Clinton administration in its efforts to pursue the development of dual-use technology through partnering arrangements between the public and private sectors. Quickly TRP renewed the controversy over the economic priorities of government policies, raising questions of whether the government should directly interfere in domestic market competition by sponsoring specific R&D efforts to help promote the competitiveness of the U.S. defense industry in the global marketplace. While one can easily point to increased levels of military security by reducing dependencies on imported technologies, government interference in the market presents a direct threat to firms or entire industrial sectors that do not benefit from government contracting.

The International Space Station. As the Clinton administration took power in 1993, national security officials became aware that Russia was about to transfer rocket technology to India. It appeared that the U.S. might well have to impose severe trade sanctions to head off or punish Russia for missile proliferation. However, instead, the Clinton administration decided to bring Russia aboard international efforts to build a space station, thereby linking business relations with the requirement that Russia would abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and economic downturn accompanied by continuous deficit spending, space policy was declining both in national prominence and in its importance for national security (as a symbol of global technological dominance). What would justify multi-billion dollar expenditures absent superpower rivalry? Would exploration for science’s sake be enough? The decision for space cooperation securitized the space station by linking it directly with U.S. foreign policy objectives and, at the same time aided NASA in gaining funding to keep the program alive (see Lambright 2001).

The State of the Union. Most recently the Bush administration has attempted to link domestic policy objectives with efforts to curb terrorism. Unquestionably the Bush administration is preoccupied with waging war on terrorism, thereby running the risk of oversecuritizing policy issues that present neither an existential threat nor require extraordinary measures. In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President Bush focused

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3 This meant specifically that Russia could provide India with rocket engines (the product), but not with the know-how of how to make them (the process). See Lambright 2001.
primarily on his administration’s efforts to “win the war on terror.” Conveniently, since public support for his foreign policy performance is at an unprecedented high, the president linked his domestic policy agenda directly to his war efforts, stating that “…we will win this war, we will protect our homeland, and we will revive our economy.” From his discussion of military and homeland security, Bush moved directly to promoting his economic security plan, which he “summed up in one word: jobs. Good jobs begin with good schools, and here we’ve made a fine start…”

Bush continued his address with a call for a new culture of responsibility, culminating in the unveiling of the USA Freedom Corps, designed to focus on “three areas of need: responding in case of crisis at home, rebuilding our communities, and extending American compassion throughout the world.” As discussed above, societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. The main security objective lies in establishing peaceful relations among diverse collective identities. Instead of promoting cultural diversity, securitizing values threatens the legitimacy of non-Western normative and cultural societal frames, directly translating the “us” versus “them” mentality that inspired our three marker texts into political praxis. President Bush suggested that “America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.” He continued, and this demonstrates the reach of oversecuritization, “we have no intention of imposing our culture, but America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.” Again, by securitizing everything security looses its substantive meaning.

The War on Drugs. During the 2002 Super Bowl, the president’s Office of National Drug Control Policy aired a commercial linking illegal narcotics trade to terrorism. While previous anti-drug messages focused on how users harm themselves, the Super Bowl commercial claimed that money to purchase drugs is likely to end up in the hands of terrorists and narco-criminals. Focus groups conducted before the add aired revealed a “strong decline in intention to use” among teenagers and showed considerable support among parents who found the commercials a “powerful way to initiate conversations’ with their children” (Ahrens 2002, p. A3).

Farm Subsidies. Speaking to a convention of ranchers in February 2002, President Bush declared crop and cattle production to be a national security issue, providing a fresh rationale for continuing farm subsidies. “This nation has got to eat,” Bush told the crowd. “It’s in our national security interests that we be able to feed ourselves. Thank goodness, we don’t have to rely on somebody else’s meat to make sure our people are healthy and well-fed”

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Bush’s attempt to securitize cattle farming lead even staunch conservative commentators like George F. Will (2002) to remark that “President Bush tiptoed to the edge of parody” (p. A33).

**The Budget.** The Bush Administration’s tendency to oversecuritize government policy objectives can be seen in its FY 2003 budget that shows significant increases in proposed expenditures for homeland security efforts. While this is to be expected in the aftermath of September 11, some budget experts caution that “spending could get out of hand as agency heads rush to seek more money by cloaking their mission in the mantle of homeland security” (Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7). As Robert Bixby of the budget watchdog group Concord Coalition explained, “It will be very tempting for agencies to redefine their missions under homeland security and for almost any member of Congress to explain an add-on or earmark as a matter of homeland security” (quoted in Pianin & Miller 2002, p. A7).

**What This Means…**

The Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict, the nuclear muscle-flexing by India, Pakistan, and North Korea, Argentina’s economic collapse and continuing European integration, global warming and ozone depletion, drug trafficking and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, and, most recently, America’s war on terrorism illustrate that threats to security in the 21st century will take on various forms and will require interdependent responses that both link security sectors and bring together the range of actors shaping international politics. In these pages, I have argued that in a world that admittedly is becoming more dangerous in many areas, the concept of security is often misapplied for political gain and/or to justify extraordinary measures for countering impending or perceived threats. The examples above illustrate the dangers of oversecuritization and demonstrate the need to more clearly define the distinction between nonexistential and existential threats that justify extraordinary measures. In the following section I attempt to develop a framework for determining the existentiality of threats and for deciding on appropriate responses (either through existing policy response mechanisms or extraordinary measures).

**A New Framework for Determining Threats**

Measuring the respective impact of various issues threatening sustainability, Dovers (1995) developed a framework for assessing the magnitude of security threats that can be adapted to examining the severity or existentiality of possible challenges across security sectors and to determining the most appropriate types of responses. According to Dovers’ model, three parameters—time, space, and impact—help determine the magnitude of security threats. More specifically, Dovers identified six problem-framing attributes that are useful for developing criteria for
distinguishing between issues that should be securitized and those that could be handled through existing political response mechanisms. The more highly problems rate across parameters, the more severely they are thought to impact upon security:

1. **Spatial scale of cause and effect**, describing the “spread” of the issue across political boundaries, assuming that the more diffuse causes and/or effects are, the more difficult it will be to rely on clearly defined political response mechanisms. For instance, climate change is a much more diffuse policy issue (and potential security threat) than solid waste management or weapons proliferation.

2. **Magnitude of possible impacts**, referring to “the degree of ‘damage’ in a worst-case scenario relative to the whole of the entity impacted upon” (Dovers 1995, p. 96). For instance, smaller changes in economic productivity (due to seasonal variations) are less serious than larger changes (due to recession or a stock market crash).

3. **Temporal scale of possible impacts**, distinguishing on the one hand between immediate, near-term impacts and very far-off impacts and, on the other hand, between discrete, short-term effects and long-term, lasting impacts (of, for instance, storage of nuclear waste or preemptively striking Iraq).

4. **Reversibility** and the assumption that irreversible or very costly impacts (e.g., the loss of a particular species or the effects of nuclear war) are more severe than more easily reversible and less costly impacts (e.g., development of alternative energy sources or adjustment of consumer behavior).

5. **Mensurability**, describing the degree to which we actually comprehend and can measure relevant impacts and processes pertinent to the problem. Dovers distinguishes between “well-known” cause-effect associations; “risk” where we can at least assign trustworthy probabilities to possible outcomes; “uncertainty” where only the general nature and direction of outcomes are understood; and “ignorance” where outcomes are “unknown, unguessable, or can only be speculated upon” (p. 97).

6. **Degree of complexity and connectivity**, establishing a continuum ranging from discrete issues to highly complex issues featuring multiple feedbacks and possible threshold effects. Issues scoring highly on this attribute include, for instance, climate change, population-environment linkages, or globalization and the democratization-development dynamic.

In addition to these problem-framing attributes, Dovers provides a further filter for identifying the magnitude of problems and prioritizing policy responses. He distinguishes problems at three levels:

1. **Micro-problems** are “spatially and temporally discrete; not overly complex or fraught with uncertainty; not requiring large resource commitment or the development of new mechanisms or policy
processes for redress; and, if particularly topical, then only on a local or sectoral scale or are so despite lack of substantive evidence” (p. 100). Problems on the micro-level can typically be resolved on a case-by-case basis within existing institutional arrangements and policy processes (e.g., settling of labor disputes, trade negotiations, crime prevention).

2. *Meso-problems* are significant and may be prominent on the public agenda, but “do not pose systemic threats to the present pattern of production and consumption, or overwhelming challenges to existing policy processes” (p. 100). Major issues fully addressable within one country may fall into this category (e.g., national air pollution emission standards, social security provisions).

3. *Macro-problems* present threats that are “multifaceted, complex, fraught with uncertainties and ignorances, spatially and temporally diffuse, highly connected to other issues (or security sectors, VF) and threaten major possible disruption of human or natural systems” (p. 100). Again, climate change, resource scarcity, the spread of infectious diseases, the widening gap between rich and poor, developed and underdeveloped, technologically connected and the disconnected, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and wars of all kinds (in an increasingly interdependent world) present macro-problems of varying magnitude.

Applying both problem-framing attributes and problem levels to the examples discussed above illustrate the threat distortion caused by oversecuritization. Both SEMATECH and TRP addressed national-scale meso-level issues by employing problem-resolution mechanisms based on existing or easily adaptable industrial policy strategies. Overall, global market competition and the significant defense drawdown of the early 1990s presented moderate, near- to medium-term, and fairly easily reversible threats to the economic (and by extension military) security of the United States, and risks were fairly well-known in each case. Although the issues of dual-use technology and, more generally, industrial policy are fairly complex and can span across security sectors, these examples show that remedies were found through existing policy channels.

The Missile Technology Control Regime and the International Space Station provided bilateral/international policy responses to threats whose potential impact can be judged as moderate to severe and medium (in terms of timing) and medium to long-term (in terms of longevity), difficult and certainly expensive to reverse, with somewhat uncertain risks and a high degree of complexity and connectivity. Still, the U.S. and Russia were able to address the security threat (weapons technology proliferation) through establishing a new regime for dealing with this issue. Therefore, the ISS can be viewed as an instance of a fairly typical international policy resolution mechanism, but not as an extraordinary measure.
The war on drugs and farm subsidies differ in their spatial impact (regional versus national), but both policies respond to minor threats with short-term and fairly obvious impacts. Interestingly, attempts to reduce the influx of illegal drugs into the United States, Plan Colombia, the U.S. backed and partially funded Colombian government initiative is pushing indigenous peoples toward the brink. U.S. military aid has intensified militarization and provoked a surge in rural violence. At the same time, U.S. backed crop fumigation is destroying small-scale agriculture and highly biodiverse rainforest ecosystems (see Lloyd & Soltani 2001; Wilson 2001). Thus, policy measures designed to boost U.S. security pose immediate and severe threats to the economic, political and environmental security of the population in that region.

By contrast to the examples discussed above, climate change, sustainability, nuclear war, and terrorism present threats that are international to global in scale, with long-term, potentially catastrophic and irreversible impacts on both natural and human systems and high levels of measurability and complexity. As the war on terrorism and the recent conference on sustainability in South Africa illustrate, no policy channels are currently in place to effectively counter these threats and, given the severity of these threats, extraordinary measures may be called for.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

The purpose of this article was to sketch a preliminary model for distinguishing between existential and nonexistential threats and, consequently, to provide suggestions for how to decide which threats can to be addressed using existing policy mechanisms and which may require extraordinary measures. While a more specific quantification of threat potentials is beyond the scope of this article, future research should develop more concrete measures for operationalizing threats. For instance, building further on Dovers (1995) sustainability framework, such research could weigh the various impacts and apply the emerging measures to very specific security threats. Such research could be of great benefit for scholars interested in tracking and predicting potential security threats and policymakers charged with appropriating finite resources to deterring, preventing or, when necessary, countering threats.

During the Cold War international relations were overshadowed by the threat of thermonuclear war. As existential as this threat was, it forced states to cooperate not only with regard to strategic arms limitations but also in political and economic sectors. The end of the Cold War has not ridded the world of existential threats. In fact, the threat of a nuclear holocaust merely masked other existential threats during the Cold War (every other threat received a lower ranking on the security continuum, see Figure 1). With the end of the Cold War we can now shift our focus to those neglected threats, reassess their importance, and decide whether to respond through existing or
develop new policy mechanisms or whether a threat requires extraordinary response measures. It should be in states’ interest to cooperate on tackling those security problems that present existential threats to all of them. A non-exclusive list includes: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stability of governance, the ever-widening gap between rich and poor (states, individuals, classes), the emerging divide between the technologically connected and the disconnected (see Rifkin 2000), global warming, pollution, depletion of resources, increasing energy demands, improving education and health, and population control and food security.

Security can no longer be defined in state-only terms. International relations are shaped by non-state actors and security concerns span across sectors and link various security communities. International actors (states, groups, firms, organizations, individuals) of various types may share the same existential concerns and may find that cooperating alongside others who share those concerns may benefit all of them. During the Cold War, everybody shared the fear of thermonuclear war. Today, in a world characterized by globalization and interdependence, actors may share common interests in preserving the biosphere, safeguarding the free market, preventing the further spread of infectious diseases, and, most visibly since September 11, combating terrorism.

The more it will be possible to promote communication and build cooperation among actors (state and non-state) and across sectors, the more regularized patterns of behavior and relationships will become and, consequently, the more actors may focus on shared interests. As a result, the more trust may be established and the closer we may come to attaining peace as a goal in international relations.

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EXPLORING the RELEVANCE and CONTRIBUTION OF MEDIATION TO PEACE-BUILDING

Jacob Bercovitch and Ayse Kadayifci

Abstract

The paper considers the nature and characteristics of peace-building as an approach to conflict. It suggests that mediation should be seen as a particularly important aspect of peace-building efforts, and one that may be used at different phases of a conflict. The paper develops a framework for analyzing the circumstances under which mediation may contribute to peace-building. The framework lays emphasis on contextual and perceptual dimensions. The paper argues that mediation, properly utilized, can achieve not just a settlement of a conflict, but facilitate, in the longer run, a full transformation of relations. Any successful program of peace-building requires some form of mediation.

Introduction

As the Cold War system collapsed in 1991, we witnessed an increase in ethnic and religious intrastate conflicts (e.g. Indonesia, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, etc.), as well as the persistence of long-standing inter-state conflicts (e.g. India-Pakistan). Scholars in the fields of international relations and conflict resolution are faced with new and challenging questions relating to the nature of conflicts, particularly their prevention and termination. Within this context, new concepts such as ‘peace-building’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘conflict transformation’, ‘second track diplomacy’, and ‘citizen diplomacy’ have been introduced to address these challenges and to complement more traditional conflict management mechanisms such as deterrence and coercion.

One of the emerging concepts in international peace and conflict resolution studies is “peace-building.” This term attracted attention after the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a document titled “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992. In this document, Boutros-Ghali suggested that the responsibilities and actions of the UN and the international community should focus on four major areas of activity, including preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, and post-conflict peace-building. In “An Agenda for Peace”, Boutros-Ghali suggested that “preventive diplomacy” aims at preventing the escalation of conflict into violent confrontation, or preventing its spread should it arise; “peace-making” aims at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and the creation of a framework that will allow the
disputants to pursue nonviolent solutions; ‘peace-keeping’ aims to separate disputing parties and maintain a state of non-violence between them; and ‘peace-building’ purports to establish the conditions for a sustainable settlement. In this paper we would like to focus on peace building mechanisms and, in particular, the relevance of mediation in this process.

Definitions of Peace-Building

Peace-building has become one of the central themes in conflict studies, so defining it is an important first step. Based on an analysis of UN experience in conflicts in Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia, Doyle and Sambanis see peace-building as the fourth phase in the United Nations strategy for conflict resolution (Doyle & Sambanis 1999), following conflict prevention, peace-making and peace-keeping. According to Doyle and Sambanis, peace-building involves identifying and supporting those structures that can strengthen and solidify peace in the aftermath of peace-making and peace-keeping (Doyle & Sambanis 1999). The distinction between peace-building, peace-keeping, and peace-making was first made by Johan Galtung (1975), who emphasized conflict prevention and resolution at grass root and global levels. He is critical of so-called “elitist” peace-building efforts that take place at the official level and suggests instead that peace-building efforts are necessary at the grass roots level if the community at large is going to accept them. Bierbrauwer and van Tongeren, on the other hand, perceive peace-building as part of conflict prevention framework that takes place mostly at the official state level (Bierbrauwer & van Tongeren 2002).

Thus, peace-building may take place at the group, community, or state level. More than the signing of an agreement between officials of rival parties, it offers an approach that includes economic reconstruction that may lead to institutional transformation of society (e.g., reforming the police, the army, and the legal system, and re-building civil society). Peace-building becomes especially important in intractable conflicts, where a history of hostility and frequent eruption of violence disrupts the normal functioning of societies. Within this context peace-building can transform the war-like behaviors of communities. According to John Paul Lederach, peace-building is more than a post-conflict reconstruction; it encompasses, generates, and sustains a full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform a conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships (Lederach 1997). In that sense, peace building involves a range of activities and structures before, during, and after formal peace agreements between parties are signed.

Here we use the term ‘peace-building” to refer to a whole host of activities and modalities of intervention designed to bring about a state of peaceful relations by conflicting parties. Peace-building is a dynamic process of resolving conflict and rebuilding societies, and it refers to mechanisms and structures that can prevent, terminate, transform, or resolve a conflict. It also refers to mechanisms and structures that can strengthen the capacity of a
society to manage change without violence. This may involve addressing the root causes of the conflict through long-term economic and social provisions as well as policies of reconciliation.

One crucial aspect of peace-building efforts is the recognition of the role played by various informal and local conflict resolution mechanisms and structures, (e.g., indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms and second track diplomacy) and unofficial actors (e.g., local, regional and international grassroots organizations, and nongovernmental organization) in peace-building. This perception is an acknowledgement that for peace to last, it has to be sustained in various local social and cultural contexts, and that efforts at the official level (formal mediation, for example) must be supported by informal efforts such as second track diplomacy, along with local peace making efforts by various NGO’s and other groups.

**Characteristics of Peace-Building**

The following are the main characteristics of peace-building efforts:

1. Peace-building is a non-coercive process in which the willingness and commitment of participating parties is key to its success (Galtung, 1975).
2. Peace-building is broader than other conflict management approaches as it involves long-term political, economic, and social provisions to address the root causes of a conflict (Galtung, 1975).
3. Peace-building is an interdependent effort that involves not only the official diplomats but also civilians, NGOs, and grassroots organizations. One of the guiding principles of peace-building, especially in intra-state conflicts, is to mobilize existing indigenous capacities for peace. For that reason, coordination of peace-building activities at different levels of society is of utmost importance (Heinrich 1997; Biewbrauwe & von Tongeren 2002).
4. Peace-building focuses on prevention. Ultimately, the purpose of peace-building activities is “to insure against and to prevent a relapse into a violent conflict” (Doyle & Sambanis 1999, p.5).

**Outcomes and Methods**

A successful peace-building effort must lead to certain outcomes. Utilizing the list developed by Search for Common Ground (2002), we suggest that a successful peace-building program may be exemplified by any one of the following desirable outcomes:

1) Conflict resolution that involves community-based initiatives and second track diplomacy.
2) Civilian participation in the policy process.
3) Physical security that includes demobilization, disarmament, demining, protection of the civilian population, and police and security force reform.
4) Environmental security that includes options such as minimal threat to resource depletion or human migration.
5) Economic reconstruction that includes infrastructure development, market reform, economic and financial institutions, small business and micro-enterprises, and credit assistance.
6) Personal security that includes human rights and the reduction of all forms of racial and communal violence.
7) Institutional/civil capacity building that includes government capacity building, NGO capacity building, implementation of peace accords, and dealing with probity/corruption.
8) Government and democratic development that includes electoral assistance, civic education and training, judicial reform and training, and media development and training.
9) Meeting basic needs such as food, shelter, health, and relief of suffering.
10) Social reconstruction that includes reintegration of refugees/combatants, social services such as health and education, peace education, and access to information.

Having identified the desirable outcomes of peace-building, we need to ask how best to devise strategies to reach these desired outcomes. A large number of activities may lead to these outcomes. For example, Search for Common Ground identified 24 operational methods for peace-building. These methods include mediation and facilitation, dialogue workshops, conflict resolution institution building and training, policy forums, joint action projects, cross-ethnic cooperation within professions, back-channel negotiations, domestic shuttle diplomacy, community organizing, court-based mediation, education in schools, storytelling forums, inter-ethnic kindergartens, reduction of stereotypes, radio programs, TV programs, children’s TV programs, video-based dialogue, journalist training, cross-ethnic team reporting, publications, arts and culture, sports, and awards.

In this paper, we argue that mediation is one of the most effective peace-building strategies to produce the desired outcomes mentioned above. Mediation is flexible and adaptive, and these very features make it an effective strategy of peace-building in all phases of conflict. Mediation can be used to prevent escalation of conflict into violence (preventive diplomacy); it can be used to terminate violence (conflict management); or it can be utilized during the post-conflict phase (post-conflict reconstruction). In short, mediation can advance the cause of peace-building in a way that other strategies can not. To understand the relevance of mediation in peace-building, we have to understand its nature and the factors that influence its success.

Peace-Building and Mediation
The relationship between mediation and a successful transition from war-like behavior to more cooperative interactions is frequently mentioned, rarely defined, and widely misunderstood (Bercovitch, 1989). Intervention in conflict situations can be preemptive or reactive. As a multi-dimensional process, peace-building involves various conflict management attempts at different levels of society. These management attempts usually relate to some aspect of mediation or other forms of non-coercive intervention by a third party.

Mediation is one of the most extensively utilized conflict resolution tools. Although the underlying assumptions and values that inform the process may differ significantly from place to place, various communities with different cultural traditions have resorted to mediation in their efforts of building peace between them (Bercovitch, 1992). This cross-cultural application of mediation makes it an acceptable and familiar peace-building tool and adds to its strength as an effective mechanism to lay the foundations for peaceful relations (Bercovitch & Houston, 1993).

Despite being one of the most frequently employed conflict management mechanisms, different scholars have defined mediation differently, focusing on its various dimensions. Chris Mitchell defines mediation as any “intermediary activity... undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior” (Mitchell 1981, p. 287). Chris Moore defines it as “an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntary reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement” (Moore 1986, p.6).

Mediation is a complex and dynamic interaction between mediators who have resources and an interest in the conflict or its outcome, and an interest in the protagonists or their representatives. Mediation may take place between states, within states, or between groups of states, organizations, or individuals. Mediators enter conflict to help those involved achieve a better outcome than they would be able to achieve by themselves. What mediators do, can do, or are permitted to do in their efforts to resolve a conflict may depend largely on who they are and what resources and competencies they can bring to bear. Furthermore, mediation efforts in the context of peace-building are highly dependent on who the parties are, the nature of their interaction, the context of the conflict, and what is at stake.

Much of the work on mediation identifies it merely as a reactive process in which mediators can help in the post violent phase with a cease-fire, a peace settlement, or the implementation of some dissociative arrangements. However, mediation can be utilized at other stages of the conflict. It can be initiated: before the actual fighting takes place (preventive diplomacy); at the early stages of the conflict when the casualties are still low; later in the conflict when the casualties are high, to terminate violence; or even after the
signing of an agreement to facilitate transition from war-like behavior to establishing peaceful relations and reconstruction of the social fabric of communities (post-conflict reconstruction).

Within the context of peace-building efforts, successful mediation requires not only a cessation of fighting, but also comprehensive peace-building efforts that aim at reviving a country’s economy, establishing participatory systems of government and accountability of the administration, improving judicial and police systems, disarmament, and demobilization of former combatants and their sustainable social, psychological and economic rehabilitation, among others (Heinrich 1997). To understand how mediation can reach the desired outcomes of peace-building identified in this paper, we must understand the factors that influence the mediation process.

All conflicts respond differently to different conflict resolution mechanisms. A conflict resolution approach that is sensitive to the particular requirements of a conflict and aims at determining the right context, the proper strategy to be adopted, and the right timing would help us understand when mediation may be successful. We therefore propose to analyze the role mediation plays in peace-building from the perspective of a contingency approach.

Mediation is clearly affected by the context and characteristics of each conflict situation. The specific rules and strategies of each context, the beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and symbols that make up an international conflict affect the mode of behavior adopted by a mediator, and to a large extent explain the success or failure of mediation. There is a contingent, reciprocal relation between the nature of conflict, the performance of mediators, and conflict outcomes. Each influences, and is in turn, influenced by, the other. Contingency approaches take into consideration these aspects of the conflict resolution process and attempt to identify factors that influence the success of mediation under particular conditions. This approach treats the outcomes of mediation efforts (be they successful or not) as dependent, or contingent, upon the context of a conflict and the manner of behavior, the process, within its environment.

Within the framework of the contingency approach, factors that influence the outcome of mediation can be divided into two main categories. The first focuses on subjective aspects of the mediation process such as motivation and behavior of the parties and the mediator, as well as the resources that third parties can bring to the process. The second category focuses on structural factors, such as the nature of the dispute, power parity, internal cohesiveness of affected communities, international and regional environments, and coordination between different initiatives. Let us examine these factors.
A. Subjective Factors

A-1. Willingness, Commitment, and Motivation of the Parties and the Mediator: For mediation to be successful in reaching the desired outcomes of peace-building, parties to a conflict must be willing, committed, and motivated to accept and engage in mediation. When disputants are not receptive to mediation or believe that they can get what they want through unilateral action, the likelihood of a successful outcome is very low. Effective mediation requires consent, high motivation, and active participation. When peace-building is seen as a continuing process to transform the societies of conflicting parties towards peaceful relationships, willingness and motivation become crucial for the sustainability of the process. Motivation in mediation can be further divided into two categories: disputant motivation and mediator motivation.

A 1 (i) Disputant Motivation in Peace Building

From the perspective of a mediator, a number of features can indicate the parties’ genuine interest in the process. If both parties request mediation, the chance that mediation will be successful is higher then when only one party requests mediation (Bercovitch 1984: Hiltrop 1989). Third parties also have important roles to play. Adversaries in conflict have a number of motives for desiring mediation: (a) mediation may actually help them reduce the risks of an escalating conflict and get them closer to a settlement; (b) each party may embrace mediation in the expectation that the mediator will actually nudge or influence the other party; (c) both parties may see mediation as a public expression of their commitment to an international norm of peaceful conflict management; (d) they may want an outsider to take much of the blame should their efforts fail; or (e) they may desire mediation because a mediator can be used to monitor, verify, and guarantee any eventual agreement. One way or another, parties in conflict have pretty compelling reasons for accepting, initiating, or desiring mediation.

A 1 (ii). Mediator Motivation in Peace Building

Traditional approaches to mediation assume that parties to a conflict and the mediator share one compelling reason for initiating mediation: a desire to reduce, abate, or resolve a conflict. This shared humanitarian interest may be genuine in only a few instances of mediation, but normally even this interest intertwines with other, less altruistic, motivations. Different mediators have different interests in a mediation outcome. When the mediator is an unofficial individual (e.g., President Carter in North Korea in 1994), the motives for initiating mediation may include a desire to: (a) be instrumental in changing the course of a long-standing or escalating conflict; (b) gain access to major political leaders and open channels of communication; (c)
put into practice a set of ideas on conflict management; and (d) spread one’s own ideas and thus enhance personal stature and professional status. The presence of one or more of these motives (which may be conscious or unconscious) in an opportune situation provides a very strong rationale for an individual to initiate unofficial mediation.

Where a mediator is an official representative of a government or an organization, as is often the case, another set of motives may prevail. Such persons may wish to initiate mediation because: (a) they have a clear mandate to intervene in disputes (e.g., the charters of the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity [now the Africa Union], and the Organization of American States each contain an explicit clause mandating that their members seek mediation in regional disputes); (b) they may want to do something about a conflict whose continuance could adversely affect their own political interests; (c) they may be directly requested by one or both parties to mediate; (d) they may wish to preserve intact a structure of which they are a part (e.g., the frequent mediation attempts by the United States in disputes between Greece and Turkey, two valued NATO member-states); or (e) they may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict or by gaining the gratitude (and presumably the political goodwill) of one or both protagonists (e.g., the frequent efforts by the United States to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict).

A.2. Mediator Strategies and Behavior: Considerable attention has been devoted to mediation strategies and behavior, since scholars see these aspects as the most useful criteria for evaluating the success of mediation. Mediator activities were organized conceptually to describe mediator behavior in terms of various preordained roles and tactics (Gulliver 1979; Laue 1990; Mitchell 1993; Rubin 1981; Stulberg 1981, 1982) or phases (Folber & Taylor 1984; Mitchell 1981; Moore 1986). In an exhaustive review of the literature, Wall (1981) identified more than a hundred specific mediation functions and behaviors. All these forms of behavior arise from negotiators’ concerns about being unable to reach an agreement, and their stated purpose is to change, modify, settle, or resolve a conflict. Enacting these behaviors constitutes the “heart” of mediation.

The most useful taxonomy of mediator behavior that can be applied to international mediation analysis is based on the identification of three strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high intervention (Bercovitch 2000). These are communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive strategies (see Bercovitch 1992, 2000; Bercovitch & Wells 1993, Bercovitch et al. 1991). These strategies are based on assumptions derived from Sheppard’s (1984) taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the content, process and procedure of conflict management.

The choice of any form of mediation behavior or strategy is rarely random. Rather, it is influenced by factors peculiar to the conflict and internal to the
mediator. Mediators try to vary their behavior to reflect the conflict at hand. In low-intensity conflicts, for instance, communication strategies may be more effective; high-intensity conflicts may call for more active, manipulative strategies. Time pressure, mediator rank, and previous relations between the parties all may determine the choice of a strategy. To be effective, mediation strategies and behavior must be truly congruent with the nature of a conflict and the objectives and interests of a mediator. Although the parties are key factors in conflict management, Bercovitch finds the mediation environment to be the strongest indicator of mediation behavior, followed by the nature of the actual mediation event (Bercovitch 2000).

Whichever strategy mediators use, their underlying objectives in any conflict are to change: (a) the physical environment of conflict management (e.g., by maintaining secrecy, or imposing time limits, as President Carter did at Camp David); (b) the perception of what is at stake (e.g., by structuring an agenda and/or identifying and packaging new issues); and (c) the parties’ motivation to reach a peaceful outcome by, for example, using subtle pressure. Any international conflict presents opportunities for some form of mediation and peace-building. To be effective, however, mediation and the broader process of peace-building must reflect the reality of the conflict and the resources of the parties involved. In the context of peace-building efforts, mediator strategies and behavior must take into consideration other conflict resolution initiatives and activities at different levels of society. Coordinating of these different efforts and establishing a dialogue with other actors (i.e. NGOs and other local actors) becomes crucial. To that extent international mediation is truly a contingent and reciprocal political activity.

A.3. History of Enmity Between Rivals: When heavy losses had been experienced during previous conflict behavior, lessons may be drawn by each state regarding the efficacy of coercion as a way of dealing with conflict. If coercive methods were successful in achieving basic objectives in the past, there is good reason to believe that decision makers may find it an attractive option in their present conflict. This will have a major negative impact on mediation and peace-building. If, on the other hand, mediation takes place within a context of two states or actors who traditionally have dealt with their conflicts non-coercively, it seems self-evident to suggest that the chances of a successful mediation would be that much higher.

Deutsch claims that states involved in a negative interdependence, as states in an enduring conflict typically are, tend to use coercion to manage their conflicts (Deutsch 1973, 1994). Leng demonstrated empirically that states in repeated conflicts develop a power orientation and use increasingly more coercive methods for dealing with their conflict in each successive flare up (Leng 1983). Neither the attitudes nor the conflict management behavior of such actors in conflict are likely to change much. Mediation in this kind of context can have little impact, with peace-building efforts hampered by enormous obstacles.
Based on their data, Bercovitch and Houston suggest that the history of enmity between conflicting parties can be evaluated under three categories: the number of disputes with other parties, parties’ previous relationships, and the level of hostility (use of force, threat of force, war) (Bercovitch and Houston 1996). Findings from their research suggest that history of hostility and use of force have a negative impact on conflict management efforts, and under these circumstances mediation is less likely to be successful. Thus, mediation in the context of peace-building efforts must take the history of hostility into account, address grievances, and suggest ways to move forward. To have any chance of success, mediation must be complemented by initiatives (e.g., dialogue groups, interethnic and interfaith groups, healing workshops, problem solving workshops, and so on) that aim to overcome the burden of history and establish peaceful relations.

A.4. Timing: One of the most important aspects of mediation in the context of peace-building is the timing of the mediation effort. If initiated at the right or ripe time, mediation attempts have a greater chance of success. For that reason, determining the right time for mediation in conflict situations has triggered intense and arduous study. Northedge and Donelan stated that mediation attempts can be successful “when there exists a concatenation of circumstances already tending toward an improvement of the situation” (Northedge & Donelan 1971, p. 308). Zartman, on the other hand, suggested that a distinct moment of ripeness could be assessed according to the dynamics of a conflict, specifically its combination of plateaus, precipices, deadlocks, and deadlines (Zartman 1985). This argument is supported by Touval (1982), Edmead (1971), Kriesberg and Thorson (1991), while others such as Ott (1972), Pruitt (1981), Rubin (1981), and Moore (1986) suggested that mediation will be more successful if it is initiated well into a conflict, when costs have become intolerable and both parties accept that they may lose too much by continuing their dispute.

When we talk about the duration of the conflict we refer to the period after the dispute has been transformed into violent conflict and open hostilities have started. However, ripe moments in conflicts do not necessarily correspond to a linear conception of time, but are rather linked to the number of fatalities and the belief that the continuation of violence will lead nowhere but deadlock. Ripeness is thus “associated with conditions where parties realize that their attempts to solve the problem and pursue their goals alone are unlikely to succeed at an unacceptable cost” (Zartman 1985, p. 219). This situation, which is long term and characterized with no prospect of escape through escalation of the conflict, has been referred to as “mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman 1985, p. 216).

Bercovitch and Houston find that most mediation efforts are undertaken approximately 36 months after the violence erupts. However, their data also suggest that mediation efforts have a 75 percent chance of success if it takes place during the fourth and sixth weeks of the fighting (Bercovitch and
Houston 1996). As stated earlier, however, mediation can be undertaken at all phases of a conflict. The ripe moments in conflicts provide “windows of opportunity”, usually short-term instances in which signing an agreement such as the Oslo Accords is considered sufficient. However, sustaining the window of opportunity is also crucial for peace-building efforts to be successful in the long run. For that to happen, mediators should closely monitor developments on the ground that can undermine the implementation of the agreements such as activities of opposition groups, and develop strategies to keep the “window of opportunity” open by supporting actors and activities working toward building peace.

B. Structural Factors

B.1. Identity of the Mediator and Resources Available: Parties to a conflict and mediators may invest considerable personnel, time, and resources to mediation. Given the inevitability and omnipresence of conflict, a limited range of widely accepted procedures for dealing with it, and the unwelcome reality of the scope of its potential destructiveness, it is hardly surprising that so many actors, each adopting different strategies and tactics, are keen to mediate and undertake peacemaking activities.

Mediators can range from individuals, states, regional or international organizations. Individuals who are not government officials or political incumbents can carry out individual mediations. Although individual mediation exhibits greater variety and experimentation than other forms of mediation, it essentially consists of only two kinds: formal and informal. Informal mediation refers to the efforts of mediators who have a long-standing experience with, and a deep commitment to, international conflict resolution (e.g., Carter in North Korea in 1994) or to the efforts of knowledgeable scholars whose background, attitudes, and professional experience give them the opportunity to engage in mediation with real conflict parties (Burton, 1968; Doob, 1971; and Kelman, 1992). Such individuals approach a conflict as private citizens, not as official representatives. They utilize their academic competence, credibility, and experience to facilitate communications, gain a better understanding of the conflict, and work toward its resolution.

Formal mediation, on the other hand, takes place when a political incumbent, a government representative, or a high-level decision maker acts in an individual capacity to mediate a conflict between the official representatives of other states (e.g., Dennis Ross in his role as the State Department’s Special Middle East Coordinator, and Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia). Though formal mediation is less susceptible to the impact of personality, its loss of flexibility is more than matched by its immediacy of access to influential decision makers. As such, formal mediation is often indistinguishable from diplomatic intercourse; its range of roles is more limited than that of informal mediation but its impact on outcomes is more direct.
Institutions and organizations may also serve as mediators. Three kinds of organizations play an important role in the area of peacemaking and conflict resolution: regional, international, and transnational. Regional and international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), and the United Nations represent ensembles of states that have signified their intention to fulfill the obligations—including those of formal mediation—of membership as set forth in a formal treaty. Transnational organizations (e.g., Amnesty International) represent individuals from different countries who have similar knowledge, skills, or interests, and who meet on a regular basis to promote their common interests through various means, including informal mediation. In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation in the mediation of institutions and organizations such as the UN or the European Union (EU). These organizations have also become, in the modern international system, very active participants in the processes of mediation, peace-making, and peace-building.

Mediation by states can be distinguished along the lines of small states and large states. Each claims legitimacy and authority on the basis of different attributes. Small states such as Algeria, Switzerland, New Zealand and Austria (Slim, 1992) have facilitated a disproportionate number of international mediations. Their size and presumed lack of clout make them appear non-threatening and ideally positioned to carry out mediations between adversaries. Small states usually wait for an invitation to mediate. When they do intervene, their efforts tend to be confined to regional conflicts, and their strategies tend to be mostly low-profile strategies of dialogue and communication. This is where small states can be most useful in mediation efforts.

**B.2. The Internal Characteristics of the States Involved:** The internal characteristics of the actors involved affect the peace building activities significantly. The internal characteristics of parties refer to structural properties of states and how these affect their predisposition to engage in coercive or non-coercive forms of conflict management. The nature of the political system has attracted the most attention recently (Maoz & Russett 1992; Ember, Ember & Russett 1992; Dixon 1993). Democratic states are more inclined to use peaceful methods of conflict management (because of internal cultural and political norms, liberal experience or electoral constraints) unless their direct security interests are threatened, whereas non-democratic states are more likely to utilize coercive methods of management. Mediation between two democratic actors is therefore more likely to be effective than mediation between other kinds of polities. Much of peace-building and mediation takes place in regions where democracy is not the norm. This is a major complicating factor.

Another factor that may have major influence on mediation in the context of peace-building is the internal coherence of each party. A mediator's job is
hardly likely to prove easier if the incumbent government of one of the adversaries is experiencing an insurgency, rebellion, or other serious internal threat. Mediation has a better chance of success when adversaries are recognized as the legitimate spokesmen for their parties. Disunity or lack of cohesion within a state make it difficult for both the adversaries as well as the mediator to engage in meaningful forms of conflict settlement because a state's representatives lack power or authority to make decisions or concessions. Failures of many conflict management attempts in Lebanon, Cyprus, Angola, and Somalia illustrate this point only too well. The more clearly identifiable and united the parties are, the higher the chances of successful mediation and peace-building (Modelski 1964; Burton 1968).

B.3. The Nature of the Dispute: There is a general agreement in the literature that "the success or failure of mediation is largely determined by the nature of the dispute" (Ott 1972, p.597). The importance that adversaries attach to the issues in dispute will naturally affect the choices of conflict management modes and the chances of a successful mediation. When vital interests are affected (for example, issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity), intermediaries will be unlikely to have much impact on the dispute.

The nature of a conflict or the characteristics of its issues are clearly crucial in determining how it can be managed (Diehl 1992). Certain issues such as beliefs, core values, and territorial integrity have a high saliency, and are apt to encourage decision makers to accept higher levels of costs. This makes it much more difficult to manage such conflicts through traditional diplomatic methods (Snyder & Diesing 1977). Conflicts over salient issues are likely to be long lasting and to entail the use of coercive methods as a way of reaching an outcome. Other aspects such as the number of issues in a conflict, the rigidity with which they are perceived, whether they relate to tangible interests (e.g., conflicts over resources) or intangible ones (e.g., conflicts over values) may also affect both the duration and the method of termination (Deutsch 1994). In their analysis, Bercovitch et al found that 76.1 percent of these conflicts involve tangible issues such as territory and resources (Bercovitch et al, 1991).

The literature also links the effectiveness of mediation to the nature of the issues in dispute. Ott sees the "absence of vital national security interests, particularly questions of territorial control" as a necessary precondition for successful mediation (Ott 1972, p.616). Randle contends that "should a dispute affect vital security interests of the parties, no amount of mediation by a third party is likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities" (Randle 1973, p.49). Lall argues that "it is one of the principles of international negotiation that when territory is at stake, the party in possession tends to resist third party involvement" (Lall 1966, p.100). They all indicate that the parties' perceptions of the issues are a key factor in determining whether or not to accept a mediation initiative and whether or not it will have much success.
When rivals are divided across religious or ethnic lines, it becomes much harder to resolve the conflict and initiate a peace-building process, as these issues touch on the identities of the parties. When that is the case, mediators should make an effort to address these issues and redefine the conflict as a ‘positive-sum’ rather than a ‘zero-sum’. Incorporating traditional and religious leaders, and widening the sphere of peace-building activities become particularly important in these types of conflicts.

One of the important factors related to the nature of a conflict is the amount of fatalities involved. The number of fatalities in conflicts has a direct affect on the mediation attempts. Bercovitch et. al found that when fatalities in a conflict are less then 500 people mediation efforts are more likely to be successful (32.4 percent) (Bercovitch et. al 1991). When fatalities are between 5001 and 10000, the success rate was 14.4 percent. This finding lends support to the “hurting stalemate” argument.

**B.4. Power Capabilities:** Power capabilities of states can be linked to different conflict management behaviors. A conflict between two equally strong countries may be prolonged, for example, because both have the material and human resources to carry on and the willingness to tolerate high costs. These contextual factors directly affect a party’s disposition to engage in different forms of conflict management, and the manner in which a conflict will terminate.

The effects of some contextual factors on the origin, character and evolution of a conflict have been documented quite extensively (Stoll, 1993). A number of propositions linking the duration, intensity, fatalities, and issue prominence to effective mediations (Bercovitch 1989; Bercovitch & Langley 1993) received considerable theoretical and empirical support. Other studies linked the parties’ internal characteristics (Gregory 1994) or power capabilities between them to different forms of conflict management by third parties.

Bercovitch et al suggest that 46 percent of conflicts take place when there is low power disparity between the parties (Bercovitch et al, 1991). Most mediation efforts take place when the parties have different levels of power. The success rate of mediation was lowest (4.3 percent) between two countries with high levels of power disparity, while in mediation that takes place between two large powers indicates a mediation success rate of 50 percent. Power disparity is an important factor that affects both the process and outcome of mediation. When there is a power disparity between conflicting parties, it becomes important to create a balance between the disputants, at least in the mediation process. Furthermore, empowering the weaker party through strengthening its civil society is crucial to the peace-building process (Bercovitch & Wells, 1993).
C. Coordination Between Different Initiatives and Different Actors

One of the significant characteristics of peace-building is that it is an interdependent process in which various conflict management mechanisms and various actors can be involved. In addition to official and nonofficial mediation efforts, conflict resolution scholars recognize that establish a sustainable cooperation and peaceful relations between rival communities, there is a need to work within and across communities. This requires a ‘multi-track’ approach to ending violent conflict, especially in intractable conflicts. These tracks include, but are not limited to: a) governmental peace making through diplomacy; b) non-governmental peace-making through conflict resolution; c) business peace-making through commerce; d) private citizen peace-making through personal involvement; e) research, training and education for peace-making through learning; f) activist peace-making through advocacy; g) religious peace making through faith in action; h) funded peace-making through resource provision; and, j) communication and media peace-making through information (Diamond & McDonald 1996; Merkel, 1994).

What is evident in these works is the recognition and utilization of local structures that can contribute to peace-building. Thus, developing familiarity with cultural and local structures and actors become an important aspect of peace-building efforts. External actors such as non-local NGOs and human rights groups, humanitarian aid agencies, regional non-governmental structures, international humanitarian and development agencies, research institutes and voluntary associations, government actors, and the UN should work with various local actors and structures. These local structures and actors may include traditional authoritative personalities such as elders or religious leaders; associations, women’s groups, youth groups, local NGOs, and human rights organizations; local institutions such as religious communities, the courts, the police force; or local governmental structures such as district and regional councils, executive officers (Heinrich 1997). All this will make peace-building more inclusive and thus more likely to succeed.

This approach suggests that mediation must not be seen solely as a short-term, isolated event, but as one of the dimensions of peace-building efforts in general. Integrating peace-building efforts at different levels of the society is crucial for it to be successful. For that reason, establishing a sustainable dialogue between different groups and coordinating conflict resolution and peace-building efforts is of the utmost importance. This requires mediators to follow developments concerning peace-building efforts at different levels of the society and to incorporate these developments into its process.

Conclusion

Often the talk about conflict management through negotiation or mediation focuses on one isolated instance only. We study that instance and draw
lessons from it. In reality, conflict management should be thought of much more as a seamless process in which various actors play different parts, and the whole experience coheres into one whole process. The importance of peace-building is that it forces us to think in terms of multiple efforts of conflict management and to take a longer term perspective. Thinking about peace-building means thinking about structural changes, not de-escalation or violence abatement only. Peace-building connotes a more generic, longer term approach designed to undo a cycle of violence, not just break its pattern.

In this paper we have argued that a number of measures may be undertaken to implement a program of peace-building. These measures include intervention, humanitarian assistance, truth commissions, economic restructuring, multi-track diplomacy and many other forms. One of the most important of these measures is mediation, which is central to peace-building. Mediation may be undertaken at any phase of a conflict, and it can be used to undo the damage of violence or as a precursor to a more sustained dialogue. It can help to institutionalize a more cooperative pattern of interaction and be instrumental in developing more democratic institutions. Many of us normally see mediation only as a process that brings about a ceasefire or a political agreement, but mediation is part and parcel of a more holistic peace-building approach.

We should see mediation as a broad process that supplements other processes of conflict management. Rather than treat each process in isolation, we should look at them within the overall framework of peace-building. To do so, we need to understand how mediation works, the factors that influence it, and how best to utilize it. Once we appreciate these issues, we can see how crucial mediation is to the viability of any peace-building program. In the current international environment there could be few more urgent tasks.

References


CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING:
A PEACE PROCESS

Jessica Senehi

Having said having done
What pleases me
I go right I go left
And I love the marigold.

These lines were written by Robert Desnos, a leading poet of the French surrealist movement. Surrealism was an artistic movement of 1924–1936 which valued the imagination, plumbing the wisdom of the unconscious, and a creativity unfettered by reason and convention. Desnos was known for his agile imagination and his experimental style. He was also a journalist, produced radio shows, and wrote advertising jingles.

During WWII, Desnos was active in the French Resistance. In 1994, he was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to Buchenwald. Despite being tortured, he refused to give up the names of fellow resistance fighters. He joined the other prisoners in the camp who had been taken from their homes, stripped of their possessions and clothes, separated from their families, and denied basic human rights.

One afternoon, Desnos and other prisoners were taken by some camp guards and crowded onto the bed of a truck. Everyone knew they were being taken to their death. Traumatized and weakened by lack of food, the prisoners were mostly silent. The guards did not look at the faces or into the eyes of the prisoners.

After the prisoners had been taken off the truck at the place where they were to be killed, suddenly and with enthusiasm, Desnos seized the hand of one of the prisoners, a young woman, and said that he would read her palm. With exuberance, he foretold a wonderful romance, children, and a long life. The young woman laughed, and others put their hands forward. Desnos began to tell other fortunes filled with joy and promise. The prisoners became animated and began talking among each other about the romances, children, and hopes that they did have. They laughed and cried.

One guard began to cry. Hearing these stories, the guards could no longer deny the prisoners’ humanity, and were unable to go through with the executions. They put the prisoners back on the truck and returned them unharmed for the time being, and some lives were saved.
Desnos, however, died of typhoid in 1945 at age 45, at Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia, shortly before the camps were liberated.\(^5\)

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\text{Having said having done}
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\text{What pleases me}
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\text{I go right I go left}
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\text{And I love the marigold.}
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**Peace and Conflict Studies and the Humanities**

Since the inception of the peace studies and conflict resolution fields, theorists and practitioners have recognized the significance of both imagination and an analysis of culture for understanding social conflicts and their resolution. In 1976, Theodore Lentz called for generating a *great moral imagination* to promote loyalty—not only to one’s own nation—but to the people of all nations and the future. Elise Boulding (1990) argues we need to *imagine a global civic culture* in order to attain it, and John Paul Lederach (1999) writes that *imagination for peace-building* requires *courage*, implying that we are constrained in significant ways by conventional modes of thought. Thus, Johan Galtung (1990) calls for analyzing the cultural justifications of violence, and John Burton and Frank Dukes (1990) call for questioning the underlying assumptions that drive social thought and action in order to effect social transformation. Valuing so-called “folk” culture and subaltern voices is also important. John Paul Lederach (1996) argues that it is critical to value indigenous knowledge and modes of cultural representation in order to appropriately intervene in cross-cultural contexts. Recently, Johan Galtung (2002) stated that one of the main goals for peace activists is to facilitate and amplify the voices of those who are not being heard.

This paper examines the role of cultural production—specifically, storytelling—in the processes of social conflicts and their transformation. *Social conflicts* are broadly conceived to encompass conflicts at various levels (between states, within states, and within communities) as well as social divisions characterized by inequality, oppression, and/or a lack of mutual recognition (for example, divisions along the lines of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, social class, or global regions). This paper is based on an understanding of intergroup conflicts as complex—that is, involving both objective and subjective components that interdepend. We must examine the powerful economic, political, and institutional forces that shape persons’ lives in ways that are often oppressive and dehumanizing. But we must also see persons as meaning-makers and agents in order to understand how social

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\(^5\) In her 1996 article in *Utne Reader*, “Can Imagination Save Us?” Susan Griffin reports hearing about this incident from her friend Odette and cites these lines of poetry. I retell this story here in my own words. Similar reports can be found elsewhere although they do not refer to this exact incident (see, for example, Hirsch, 1998).
systems and identities are created, interpreted, accepted, resisted, and changed. This is also critical because intergroup conflicts, while usually about tangible interests, always involve a crisis of meaning. As Lederach (1996) puts it: “Conflict emerges through an interactive process based on the search for and creation of shared meaning” (p. 9). In this paper, I address the role of what I call constructive storytelling in peace-making and peace-building by (1) defining constructive storytelling, (2) examining storytelling in relation to several factors in intergroup conflicts—knowledge, identity, socialization and education, emotion, morality, memory and time, and geographic space, and (3) identifying transcultural storytelling.

**Constructive Storytelling**

Storytelling is language. Encompassing vocabulary, grammar rules, norms of communicative behavior, and narrative forms—language is society’s most complex symbolic system. As such, language encodes the culture of a particular community, including shared understandings of identity, power, history, values, and utopian visions.

Storytelling is also narrative. A subset of language, narrative is both simple and complex. While they can be distinguished by several features (e.g., Burke, 1945), narratives can simply and sufficiently be defined as “someone telling someone else that something happened” (Smith, 1981), and narratives can be recognized and constructed by children as young as three-and-a-half years old (Peterson and McCabe, 1991).

Narratives may relate events or be explicitly fictional. But narratives are not pure fact or pure fiction. A fictional narrative may be used to persuasively express an idea that the narrative sees as true. Appalachian storyteller Kathy Coleman (1996) reports her grandmother’s saying about stories: “Well, if they ain’t true, they oughta be.” Meanwhile, personal and group’s histories are constructed and interpretive. Historical accounts are selected, framed, and used—often to make a point about the present and the future (e.g., Consentino, 1982; Scheub, 1996; Tonkin, 1992). While the relationship between narrative and truth is complex, not all narratives are equal; they may be evaluated, and some deemed better than others (Haraway, 1989). Within a particular context, meaning is negotiated through narratives and certain versions will not have currency with the group and will not be circulated (Myerhoff, 1992; Urban, 1996).

Narratives serve as a rationale for action. Because cultural narratives encode the knowledge that everyone in the group buys into, they can be reframed to comment critically and persuasively on social life. Narratives operate in the world and get results; they have narrative potency (Raheja and Gold, 1994). Because access to this process of meaning-making is so significant and so unequal, Foucault argued that power precedes politics. Those who generate narratives—storytellers broadly conceived—are in a
position of relative control in the process of the social construction of meaning (Bauman, 1986); they have narrator potency.6

Narratives can be related in a number of media such as books, periodicals, film, and video have the ability to disseminate knowledge widely. However, access to expression in these media is restricted and difficult. Storytelling, as I use it here, refers specifically to a sub-type of narration—the relating of narratives in person, orally (or by signing), to an audience of at least one (Ryan, 1995). The medium of storytelling is potentially available to everyone because everyone is able to tell a story and no equipment is required. Thus storytelling is a readily attainable means whereby persons can access at least some narrator potency. In Central America, for example, for a prostrate populace, testimonio literature—based on the spoken narrative of life experience—both expressed and effected resistance to oppressive regimes (Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Harlow, 1987; Menchu, 1984; Zimmerman, 1995). While storytelling may seem by definition small-scale and therefore insignificant, storytelling has the potential to be empowering because it is profoundly accessible.

First, the storyteller is accessible to her or his audience in ways that the narrator of a textbook, a film, or TV news is not. Unlike an interview in a video documentary, for example, storytelling is a direct interpersonal interaction, and can generate and sustain person-to-person relationships in immediate and dynamic ways. The proximity of the storyteller to the listener can engender feelings of closeness, community, and security. Post-storytelling dialogue among storyteller and listeners is often a part of the storytelling process. The audience may directly challenge or critique the storyteller. In the medium of storytelling, the power relationship between the narrator and audience is more in balance and allows for the possibility of a collaborative process of meaning-making.

Second, stories are intellectually accessible. Literacy is not required. Special training or experience is not required to appreciate stories. Children as young as three-and-a-half years old and persons with severe cognitive deficits can understand stories (e.g., Peterson and McCabe, 1991). This may make stories seem infantile and far afield from weighty affairs of state, but rather this is a clue to stories’ significance. Storytelling (as narrative) is a methodology for both apprehending and presenting knowledge; that is, storytelling is an analytical methodology that almost everyone can employ to some degree. Stories are a means of socializing and educating youth in all societies. Information necessary for survival and making society has to be able to be understood by and communicated by all members of the community. The ability to tell and understand stories is probably a critical capacity with which humans are innately endowed.

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6 I make a distinction between the potency of the narrative itself and the power of the narrator’s ability to narrate. This is to clarify that Raheja and Gold’s (1994) concept of narrative potency encompassed both of these.
Third, stories are accessible because they are low-tech. No special equipment or training is required so access to storytelling is not restricted by economic class. Even in the restricted circumstances of oppression and slavery; storytelling can be a means of comfort, survival, resistance, and maintaining cultural identity.

What was related about Robert Desnos at the beginning of this paper is a story about stories. For me, it illustrates two ways in which storytelling can be significant for conflict resolution, peace-making, and peace-building. First, the storytelling described above invites a paradigm shift; it catalyzes a transformation. Second, because it requires no special equipment or training, storytelling is technically and intellectually accessible, and therefore potentially empowering. Storytelling is a resource even when stripped of all possessions and in the face of overwhelming power; as James Scott (1990) puts it: “short of killing its bearer, the human voice is irressible” (p. 163).

This is not to diminish the power of social and political violence to cause trauma and death to individuals and whole groups of people. Such violence may threaten the security and integrity of persons’ identities and psyches that results in fear and internalized oppression that suppresses the human voice (e.g., Fanon, 1963). But the boundary of one’s mind may also be the last stand—a place that remains illegible and uncontrollable to the dominator. Therefore, the individual voice—expressing one’s own experience and possibly also representing the similar experience of others—has the potential to be a critical means of empowerment.

Also, of course, storytelling and other forms of discourse do not always generate peaceful relationships among and within communities. Storytelling and other modes of expression may, in fact, intensify social cleavages and mistrust and perpetuate structural violence. Thus, I make a distinction between destructive versus constructive storytelling. Based on a review of literature in the field, the cornerstones of peace are understood to be power balance, mutual recognition, critical awareness, and sometimes acts of resistance (Senehi, 2000). Constructive storytelling is associated with positive peace; destructive storytelling is associated with its antithesis. Destructive storytelling is associated with coercive power (“power over” rather than “power with”), exclusionary practices, a lack of mutual recognition, dishonesty, and a lack of awareness. Destructive storytelling sustains mistrust and denial. Constructive storytelling is inclusive and fosters collaborative power and mutual recognition; creates opportunities for openness, dialogue, and insight; a means to bring issues to consciousness; and a means of resistance. Such storytelling builds understanding and awareness, and fosters voice.

It may not always be immediately evident whether a particular instance of storytelling is more or less exclusionary. Sometimes a particular group might create a closed setting where they can feel free to air certain experiences without retribution, for example, at an all-lesbian gathering. Such environments may seem exclusionary, but paradoxically allow for the
inclusion of these voices in a public—although not fully public—
conversation. And it might not always be clear whether or not storytelling is
emancipatory. What is critical is to examine how storytelling takes place—
for example, who creates the stories and whose interests do they serve?

Factors in Intergroup Conflicts

This paper is based on an understanding of intergroup conflicts as
complex—that is, involving both objective and subjective components that
interdepend. Structural violence engenders cultural violence, and cultural
violence engenders structural violence (Galtung, 1990). Protracted social
conflicts play themselves out on multiple social planes: geographically, in the
economic system, in politics, in law, in educational access and curricula, in
interpretations of history, linguistically, and in religious and cultural
practices. The dynamics of conflict in these numerous social arena intersect
and reinforce each other to perpetuate the conflict and the negative
relationship between groups (Byrne and Carter, 1996). Intermunal
conflicts can become encoded in each group’s identity and culture in an
intensifying cycle of rigidification, separation, and distortion (Northrup,

To recognize the complexity of intercommunal conflicts is not only
analytically sound, but has practical implications. Conflicts’ complexity is
double-edged. Complexity contributes to conflict perpetuation and
intractability. But simultaneously, this suggests multiple arenas for
intervention, multiple agents of intervention, and multiple intervention tasks
in a dynamic process of social change (e.g., Kriesberg, 1991). Improving the
relationship between groups facilitates sustainable problem-solving, and
successful problem-solving builds mutual trust and confidence and improves
intergroup relationships (e.g., Kelman, 1998; Rothman, 1997). Interventions
directed at one factor in a conflict can affect other factors as well.
Consciousness-raising and efforts to change attitudes can lead to new
policies, laws, and institutions; and new policies, laws, and institutions can
lead to new cultural norms in a dialectical process of social change. By
naming in detail the ways in which intergroup conflicts are driven and
perpetuated makes it possible for people at all strata of society to participate
more consciously to determine their own culture, address critical concerns,
and conceive of modes of resolution.

In this section, the significance of storytelling for seven factors in
intergroup conflicts are examined. Throughout the discussion, a distinction is
made between destructive discourses (encompassing all narrative media,
including storytelling) and constructive storytelling (focusing only on the
medium of storytelling) with the emphasis on constructive storytelling
because that is the focus of this paper. What is always at issue in this
distinction are processes of domination versus peace—that is, coercive power
versus shared power, dehumanization of the other versus mutual recognition,
dishonesty and unawareness versus honesty and a critical consciousness, and
resistance and agency versus passivity and hopelessness in the face of social
injustice.

Knowledge
Language is a means through which communities develop and articulate
their worldview. The knowledge encoded in language and culture facilitate
common understandings of experience and form the naturalized truths for a
particular community (Narayan, 1989). These norms make life predictable
and secure rather than frighteningly random (Northrup, 1989). The social
process of constructing meaning is critical to peace-making and peace-
building because conflicts can be understood as a contestation of meaning
(Lederach, 1996). In the case of intractable inter-communal conflicts, the
conflict becomes encoded in each communities’ cultural knowledge,
involving understandings of self and other, interpretations of history, goals
for the future, and norms regarding how to go about addressing conflicts.

DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Power relations between and within
communities are encoded in language (e.g., Foucault, 1972). These power
relations are often reflected in what are seen as more legitimate or politically
powerful discourses: mass media versus what has a lesser audience or no
audience (Randall, 1991), discourses from within academia versus from
without (Foucault, 1972; Franklin, 1978), and “high culture” and “literature”
versus “low culture” and “folklore” (Bakhtin, 1986; Franklin, 1978; Gates,
1988; Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Roberts, 1989). Only those in power
may have access to producing knowledge, and therefore authoritative
discourses may serve the interests of power rather than truth. As a result,
cultural knowledge and history may exclude or misrepresent whole groups of
people, and collective trauma may remain unacknowledged and therefore
unhealed.

CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. In a peaceful community, all persons have
access to processes for developing knowledge, and research goals serve the
interests of all groups. In peace, all feel their story is told and heard. Because
storytelling is accessible, story-based interventions and projects can be a
means for facilitating more voices into the public transcript.

Storytelling as the spoken narrative of life experience has given a voice of
resistance to whole groups otherwise excluded from the “authoritative”
discourse of First World journalism, academia, and literature (e.g.,
Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Randall, 1991). For example, in Central
America, for a prostrate populace, testimonio literature—based on the spoken
narrative of life experience—both expressed and effected resistance to
oppressive regimes (Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Menchu, 1984;
Harlow, 1987; Zimmerman, 1995). This body of social and political history
includes the 1984 autobiography of Guatemalan social activist and Nobel Peace Prize (1992) winner Rigoberta Menchu Tum.

Sometimes there is silence or unawareness around conflict issues. Groups sharing a certain difficult situation or set of experiences may literally establish a community-base, power-base, and knowledge-base through sharing their stories (Plummer, 1995). This knowledge, embraced and shared by group members, literally builds a sense of community. Such community-building is a means of empowering individuals and groups to address problems that were previously latent. In the 1960s, through small consciousness-raising groups, middle-class white women recognized that their individual experiences were not idiosyncratic but were shared by others and shaped in significant ways by social factors. Women saw themselves as connected in a common struggle and were able to mobilize for political and social change. In this kind of process, the personal story becomes the political story. This may change how groups think about themselves, each other, and the world.

In 1946 in the aftermath of WWII, the Caux Palace Hotel in the Swiss Alps became Mountain House, a setting for reconciliation and peace-making, and since that time more than 250,000 persons have attended conferences or encounters there (Henderson, 1996). Increasingly, citizen-diplomats are coming together across profound divides to understand social conflicts through interpersonal conversations—whether in the context of “study circles,” “public conversations,” “dialogue groups,” “problem-solving workshops,” or other encounters. Such interventions involve personal storytelling and inevitably become a process of collaboratively developing mutual recognition and social knowledge (e.g., Schwartz, 1989). Harold Saunders (1999) argues that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process of 1993 would not have been possible without interpersonal dialogue directed at addressing conflict issues as well as everyday intergroup interactions involving “countless Israelis and Palestinians” over the preceding 20 years (p. xx).

Identity

Stories create and give expression to personal and group identity. The very process of storytelling and narration fosters empathy as listeners identify with the characters in a story. Elizabeth Fine and Jean Haskell Speer (1992) discuss the power of performance to shape and model identity. The principle of performance, they argue, is identification—the sharing of identity—rather than rhetorical deliberation: “Cultural performance both imitates cultural identities and perpetuates identities as a web” (p. 10).

Cultural production is crucial to national identity because it articulates and engenders the nation’s identity, history, and vision (Anderson, 1983). A community’s expressive traditions encode a body of shared knowledge to which persons are intellectually and emotionally—even morally—committed. Because they are accessible, fluid, and used contextually, stories
can be a means of reformulating cultural notions in order to comment critically and persuasively on social life. Thus, group narratives have political import. Usually, intergroup conflicts are framed in identity terms. In long-standing intractable conflicts, the conflict itself becomes a part of group identity (Northrup, 1989). Identity-based violence may involve forced assimilation or punishment by murder, expulsion, marginalization, or oppression based on one’s identity (Galtung, 1990).

DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Because political domination depends on culturally-defined social difference, high literature is used by dominant classes to make social difference appear natural or justified (e.g., Gugelberger and Kearney, 1991; Said, 1993). As a result, social conflicts can be rendered less visible and are therefore less easy to address, and people may participate in the oppression of others and even in their own oppression in ways of which they are unaware. A community’s folk stories can encode highly negative images of the enemy (Snyder, 1978; Volkan, 1988, 1996). In Nazi Germany, folklore studies became an instrument of racist state ideology (Dow and Lixfeld, 1994; Lixfeld and Dow, 1994). Minority groups may be stereotyped in film, television, books, and other media portrayals. When there is social inequality among groups in a society, disempowered groups may not have access to dominant and powerful media of cultural production, and in this way their identity within the wider community is made invisible or threatened with erasure.

CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. However, because the process of listening to a story involves walking in the narrators’ shoes and because stories translate well across culture, mutual recognition is fostered when people listen to each other’s stories—even across cultural divides and in the context of social conflicts. Mutual recognition does not refer to a universalizing view where one party embraces another party as essentially the same as the self. Claims of a common humanity can rationalize an assimilationist position that subordinates particularities to dominant prototypes (West, 1990). Rather, the concept of mutual recognition encompasses the willingness of parties to engage in dialogue. This should include a struggle to articulate and examine differences. While developing understanding across boundaries of cultural difference may never be complete or unproblematic, it seems that trusting relationships require a desire on the part of all parties to recognize the dignity and experiences of the other.

For example, in Burundi, contemporary poetry and storytelling performance provide a means for developing a shared culture “as a necessary first step” in ending and recovering from cycles of severe intergroup violence there (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser, 1997). In the case of long-standing intercommunal conflicts, developing a shared historical narrative may be a means for bridging conflict and developing a shared identity that encompasses diversity without erasing it (Kelman, 1998). Dan Bar-On (2000) and others have brought people from different sides of divides together in seminars called “To Trust and Reflect” where persons’ shared their personal
experiences and listened to those of others. Evaluations of these seminars emphasized the value of the storytelling that this space made possible: “Hearing the stories of the ‘other’ and learning more about their pain and suffering, something that left an impact on me. Storytelling and the care, support, safety and protection of the TRT group to others which made it easy to open up and trust” (Maoz, 2000, p. 152).

Persons’ telling stories about their experience is also a means through which identity groups may come into existence as part of a process of consciousness-raising and political mobilization to address a latent conflict. Kenneth Plummer (1995) argues that an interaction between telling sexual stories—e.g., coming out stories and rape stories—have helped create and build communities where these stories can be told. At the same time, this storytelling leads to political action, and when it occurs in more public settings (such as TV talk shows), it challenges the social order by increasing acceptance for and understanding of marginalized persons and groups.

Socialization

Stories are a means of socializing children in all cultures. Stories told in childhood may be connected with intense bonds of love that the child has for her or his caregiver(s) during the time of life when she or he is most helpless. Such storytelling is also a process of political socialization and teaches about identity, power, and inter-group relations. Family storytelling is also a means through which inter-communal conflicts and identity-based prejudice are transmitted through the generations.

DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE. Images of the enemy and political information, encoded in cultural parades and festivals attended by families, may be fused with childhood affections that would make them hard to question or challenge (Wadley, 1995). For example, a poor white boy growing up in Durham, North Carolina, during the 1940s longed for closeness with his remote alcoholic father, a closeness that was only achieved when his father talked to him about the organization that he loved—the Ku Klux Klan (Davidson, 1996). That boy, Claiborne Paul Ellis eventually became a leading member of that white supremacist organization although he later renounced the KKK after participating in sustained dialogue and befriending black civil rights advocate and his previous enemy Ann Atwater.

Stories encode and transmit everyday understandings of conflict and what to do about it. Stories may glorify and/or justify violence to recruit military volunteers, child soldiers, and martyrs. Militarism is so endemic to U.S. culture that the end of the Cold War alone could not alter this political culture (Enloe, 1993). Louis Snyder (1978) argues that the Grimms’ Fairy Tales (1812) influenced the construction of twentieth-century German nationalism and militarism. Snyder argues that whether consciously or unconsciously, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm emphasized in their recrafting of the tales a set of values that played a significant role in the socialization of future generations and the acceptance of Nazism by many German people.
nearly a century later. These values included “respect for order, belief in the desirability of obedience, subservience to authority, respect for the leader and the hero, veneration of courage and the military spirit, acceptance without protest of cruelty, violence and atrocity, fear of and hatred for the outsider, and virulent anti-Semitism” (p. 51).

Modern educational institutions may deny identity needs in ways that are exclusionary. Educational curriculum may omit the achievements and perspectives of certain groups of people. Textbooks may misrepresent history or the experience of particular groups. Sometimes public education is a harsh means for resocializing indigenous persons and immigrants. In educational institutions, silence of faculty and administration around issues such as dropout rates and the lack of job opportunities may confuse students and prevent a critical awareness (Fine, 1989).

CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING. Many have called for peace education as an alternative means of political socialization to create alternative visions of conflict resolution and to promote the development of a peaceful world (e.g., Brock-Utne, 1985; Reardon, 1993). Storytelling, which is a significant means of socializing children across cultures, can play an important role in this process. In Mozambique, the UNICEF-funded “Circle of Peace,” used traditional music, art, and drama to teach peace-building to children (Kolucki, 1993; Lederach, 1997). In response to the U.S.-Iraq war in 1991, storyteller Margaret Read MacDonald (1992) collected Peace Tales: World Folktales to Talk About. Interestingly, MacDonald (2001)—who had traveled throughout the world telling stories, collecting stories, and doing collaborative storytelling projects—reports that it was difficult to find “peace tales” because stories throughout the world tend more often to be about triumph and militarism. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., New York City storyteller Laura Simms (2002) collected traditional stories in her book, Stories to Nourish Our Children in a Time of Crisis. Sometimes new stories are developed: in Germany’s Weimar Republic (1919-1933), political activists wrote alternative utopian fairy tales (Zipes 1989).

Children and youth may take part in crafting these stories themselves and articulating their experiences of conflict as part of a process of healing and envisioning a better future. Recent conflicts throughout the world have impacted child survivors—including the children of systematic rape in the former Yugoslavia; child soldiers; and children who have witness the deaths of family, friends, and neighbors. Mladi Most, which means “Youth Bridge,” is a community center in Mostar, Bosnia, for Bosniak and Croat youth between the ages of 16 and 25; there, Austrian photographer Uli Loskot mentored youths in a collaborative project of photographing images of war resulting in an international exhibit of their work, “Crucible of War 2000.” Child survivors of the genocidal violence in Rwanda tell their stories through drawings in Witness to Genocide put together by Richard Salem (2000), a mediator and former journalist after visiting Rwanda’s National Trauma Center in Kigali in 1997.
Peace education also encompasses developing awareness regarding the causes of conflicts and modes of conflict resolution, both interpersonally and for wider social contexts. Peace education may also involve “teaching tolerance”—to quote the title of the Southern Poverty Law Center magazine for teachers—and teaching about interpersonal and social conflicts and what to do about them. Importantly, curriculum and teaching practices should reflect the interests and needs of students, and not be a means of reproducing oppression (e.g., Bourdieu and Passerson, 1977; Freire, 1970). For groups who feel they are not represented within educational institutions and curricula, storytelling at home is an alternative means of education and a means of resistance (e.g., Cruikshank, 1998; Parks, 1994; Roberts, 1989).

**Emotions**

Stories simultaneously engage mind and heart. Through storytelling and other cultural rituals, information and argument is conveyed, but gains added power through the emotional impact of the story that is sensed and felt by participants (Urban, 1991). However, because of their ability to arouse emotions, stories are often suspect and associated with the irrational.

In conflict, emotions may get in the way of addressing a problem or conflict cautiously and morally. Intergroup conflicts and violence are fueled by powerful emotions of fear, mistrust, anger, hatred, and grief as well as self-loathing. Such emotions reflect a negative and destructive relationship between self and other.

**DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE.** When political debates about present needs become associated with symbols and narratives of national identity, they become harder to challenge (Horowitz, 1986). Stories may tap into intense emotions—for example, the love, grief, and anger associated with the violent death of a loved one—in order to foment hatred. Or, narratives justifying violent interventions may draw on memories of past humiliations. When collective trauma (and all the emotions subsumed therein) remain unacknowledged, fear and mistrust intensify; this can serve as an obstacle to a group’s healing and moving forward.

**CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING.** Addressing emotions is critical in post-conflict peace-building. When a collective historical trauma remains unacknowledged, this can be an obstacle to the traumatized group’s healing and inter-group rapprochement (Brooks, 1999). Storytelling—in the context of truth commissions, dialogue groups, or interpersonally—can be a means of facing history and healing in the aftermath of inter-communal violence (e.g., Bar-On, 2000; Belton, 1999; Minow, 1998; Saunders, 1999). In a Tanzanian camp for Rwandan refugees where refugees were told not to discuss their experiences, women cured their insomnia by telling the stories of the atrocities they had experienced to a “story tree” at the suggestion of a psychologist working there (Anderson and Foley, 1988).

Storytelling in a safe place, such as the home, among persons who share a common hardship or experience of oppression, can be an occasion when their
perspectives, silenced elsewhere, become prominent. This can be both emotionally comforting and a form of resistance. Such a safe place becomes a site where people are no longer objects, but rather can regain their “human-ness” and engage in subject-subject dialogue in order to comment upon, interpret, strategize about, and heal from their difficulties (hooks, 1990).

Stories’ ability to touch the heart makes them a powerful tool for social change (Henderson, 1996). Thus, stories can exert moral pressure (Coles, 1989). Gandhi argued that to encourage personal transformation in others “you must not merely satisfy reason, but you must move the heart also” (cited in Barash, 1991, p. 560).

Storytelling also connects people in ways that bring individuals and groups affirmation and pleasure. Professional U.S. storyteller Bill Harley (1996) stated that even more profound than stories’ role in education or protest, is the “joy” experienced in the storytelling interaction. This builds bonds of community among people as they share laughter and tears. This kind of community-building occurs in dialogue groups and similar encounters (e.g., Bar-On, 2000). Storytelling can be a means of comfort and hope during hardship. It is a powerful means of community building that can help create bonds among people during post-conflict peace-building.

**Morality**

Stories, even personal stories, always imply how things should be. They have moral import. All religions encompass a body of stories that encode understandings of right and wrong. Storyteller and theologian Megan McKenna (1998) states that all stories have the purpose of “transformation, conversion, or change.” Stories are about envisioning what should be in order to shape social thought and action to bring that about.

Issues of morality are relevant to conflict in several ways. Conflicts framed in moral terms are particularly difficult to resolve. When the opposing party is viewed as immoral, this affects the willingness to resolve and choices regarding how a particular conflict will be addressed. On the other hand, a moral vision is often what compels persons to serve in conflict as intermediaries, advocates for the disempowered, and voices for peace, often in the face of physical threat and at great personal cost.

**DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE.** Cultural violence is that which justifies structural and direct violence (Galtung, 1990). Powerful narratives can make ideology appear natural in order to rationalize social injustice. Framing a conflict in moral terms without an effort to understand the perspectives of the other party can be a part of the process of demonizing the enemy.

**CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING.** Robert Coles (1989) argues that stories can evoke a “moral imagination” that calls persons to question their assumptions and make choices that are motivated by unselfish ends. Such stories can be a means of resistance and a compelling call for the redress of wrongs. They might describe moral approaches to conflict resolution and problem-solving. Coles (1993) writes about how one black nine-year-old girl, Ruby Bridges,
empowered by the biblical stories told to her by her aunt, was able to face angry crowds of white parents with courage and forgiveness to be the first (and, for several months, the only) black child in a school desegregated by court order but not yet by practice. This storytelling is also part of a complex process of knowledge production, socialization, and even emotion, and it involved the personal agency of both Ruby and her aunt. The stories Ruby’s aunt told were selected from among many biblical stories, were told in the context of a loving relationship between the child and her elder relative, and discussed in relationship to the significant social events that were affecting their lives.

**Time and memory**

Stories, as narrative, have a dimension of time that mimics the dimension of time in life (Narayan, 1989). However, stories can also be understood to disrupt the linearity of time. Through stories, persons visit the past; this may involve, for example, remembering a loved one. Also, narratives draw on the past in order to envision the future—in the context of present needs and intentions (Sheub, 1996; Tonkin, 1992). The past, present, and future mutually determine one another as parts of a whole (Carr, 1996).

Issues of time, memory, and history are significant in intergroup conflicts because the conflict is often framed as being about past events that have disrupted relationships. Memories of past conflict are passed from generation to generation by means of stories. Conflicts may involve a claim to a glorious or at least different past. Reconciliation and post-conflict peace-building may involve coming to terms with and healing from the past. Through stories, we visit, interpret, mourn, and treasure the past. Meanwhile, at stake may be the future. When memories are shared in public setting, they become part of a historical record and culture, and they can have moral and political import.

**DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE.** During times of political crisis, narrative’s disruption of time can be part of a process of “time collapse”—where the antagonisms, injustice, and violence of even centuries past are experienced intensely in the present—and exacerbate intergroup conflict (Volkan, 1998). In Northern Ireland, Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries draw on stories of historical victories and massacres to legitimate political violence. Interpretations of history may be inaccurate or incomplete in ways that justify inequality, dismiss groups of people, or foment intergroup tensions.

**CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING.** During years of apartheid in South Africa, oral historians and storytellers drew on the past in conscious ways in order to articulate various social and political arguments for the Xhosa people in resistance to their government in the present and with specific objectives for the future (Scheub, 1996). This expressive and analytical tradition created a channel of meaning that kept awareness and consciousness of the conflict high. Individuals’ interpretations of experience and actions informed the stories, and the stories affected individuals’ interpretations and actions.
Beginning in April 1996, the amnesty hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have been a process of developing historical knowledge in the aftermath of political, intergroup violence. In these hearings, persons report their experiences, which is a process of interpersonal storytelling. While the trials were attended mostly by black South Africans, they have been aired on national TV. An ongoing cultural backdrop, the trials could be seen on TV monitors in hotel lobbies. While this process may have several limitations and is not wholly satisfactory, the TRC has provided the space for survivors of political terrorism and violence to include their experience as part of a very public record. It will be difficult—if not impossible—to dismiss these testimonies in the future. As of November 2000, the TRC recorded tens of thousands of statements, received 7,112 applications for amnesty, rejected 5,392 applications, and granted 849. The material bases of the conflict were also addressed by the TRC, which included in its report a call for big business to offset past poverty caused by apartheid policies through a one-time levy of one percent of their capital.

Long-standing intergroup conflicts—such as in South Africa, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and in Northern Ireland—the perspectives of each group are grounded in historical narratives with divergent meanings. Developing a shared historical narrative may be necessary for transforming the intergroup conflict and allowing for a shared vision of the future (Kelman 1995).

**Geographic space**

Geography (so tangible) and stories (so intangible) at first may seem unrelated. But stories are often tied to geographic places which have cultural and symbolic significance for persons and particular communities (e.g., Lane 1988). Particular locations figure prominently in religious, national, and historical narratives. Narratives also encode cultural norms regarding the relationship between humans and the natural environment.

Geography, of course, is significant for intergroup conflicts as many involve overlapping claims for sovereignty over a particular territory. Conflicts occur between persons and settlers, and between waves of settlers to a region, all of whom over time develop powerful ties to place. Arguably, such conflict bases are especially resistant—if not wholly resistant—to anything but a zero-sum outcome (Agnew, 1989).

**DESTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE.** Identity and geography are often fused in a group’s historical narrative. Such narratives may justify territorial claims in us/them terms. Different cultural worldviews, encoded in narratives, may reflect wholly different ways of looking at the environment, leading to conflicts about environmental issues.

**CONSTRUCTIVE STORYTELLING.** Storytelling as a conflict resolution method to promote a reinterpretation of space is certainly a very unexplored area. However, a recent issue of the journal *Orion* contained examples of how storytelling (in both written and oral forms) was being used for restoration of local communities and natural areas. In an urban Tuscon
neighborhood, youths gathered local stories from the past and present about their community (Eisele 2001). As part of this process, for these youths, an increase of regard for the locality went hand-in-hand with an increase of self-regard; again, identity and geography intertwine. Increasingly in the U.S., communities are consciously defining and affirming their knowledge about their region—both drawing on the knowledge of naturalists; the spoken narratives of elder residents; and the efforts of local writers, poets, and artists—in order to inspire and shape future decisions regarding the lands (e.g., Adams 2001, Nelson and Klasky 2001, Teter 2001, Wilson 2001.) As Constance Mears, the book designer of At Home on Fidalgo (Adams, 1999) about Fidalgo Island in Washington State, put it: “Our stories are threads that anchor us into the land. They’re like invisible roots that go deep in and when people have those, they take care of their place” (cited in Adams, 2001, p. 11). As groups in long-standing conflict begin to craft shared historical narratives, they may simultaneously develop shared identities and a cooperative vision of place.

**Transcultural Storytellers**

Storytellers are typically seen as addressing their own cultural audience: Walter Benjamin (1868) characterized storytellers as either *farmers*, who relate the knowledge of the local community, or *seafarers*, who share the stories of their adventures when they come back home. But it is possible to also conceive of a storyteller who enters into an environment where she or he is largely an outsider and tells stories of her or his community of origin; such storytellers represent their community to others. And, in fact, throughout history, storytellers have often served as ambassadors and diplomats (e.g., Hale, 1999).

Such storytelling is relevant to understanding conflict practice. This paper is a call to recognize, value, examine, and invent such interventions. There is no one formula. Storytelling—a particularly flexible and available medium—lends itself to perhaps an infinite variety of applications.

In Belfast, both Catholics and Protestants are part of a yarnspinners’ group (or, storytelling guild) established by storyteller Liz Weir to help build community across the sectarian divide. Weir (1996) believes that in the modern world, storytelling is critical for bringing people together on a personal level: “You don’t ask a person who they are when they come to a storytelling group. But you know. The stories we tell show who we are.” The storytelling guild provides a context where people can build relationships on a personal level by simply telling tales or stories about their lives. Ireland is known for its storytelling. But, in this situation, in a community characterized by sectarian separation and conflict, Weir is using the indigenous storytelling tradition in a new, transcultural context. Through this process, a broader, shared identity is developed.
Conflict resolution practitioner, scholar, and educator John Paul Lederach has also taken on the role of storyteller. Lederach and his friend and colleague Herm Weaver, a college professor and singer, have used a story and song as “a small response” to terrorism and war in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. (Shenk, 2002). The story tells about how a high school changed the world by reaching out to Middle Easterners in their community. Lederach stated, “This is a true story except for the parts that haven’t happened yet” (cited in Shenk, 2002). As a result of hearing this story performed by Lederach with musical accompaniment and singing by Weaver, high school students took action: they began learning the Arabic language, established a sister-school relationship with a high school in the Middle East, invited Arab community members to speak, and gathered blankets for Afghan refugees.

Conclusion

Stories have power. They operate in the world and get results (Raheja and Gold, 1994). However, power and stories are also constrained. Stories operate within a context of ideological, economic, and power constraints. We must examine how we can facilitate cultural spaces where people—faced with social upheaval and conflicts or in the aftermath of violence and tragedy—can participate in building communities and inter-communal relationships characterized by shared power, mutual recognition, and awareness in order to work together to shape the future.

Storyteller and theologian Megan McKenna (1998) states that all stories have the purpose of transformation, conversion, or change: “Stories were meant to, first, tell you the truth. But to posit it in such a way that you must decide whether that’s the truth you abide by, and whether that’s the truth you tell with your life, and that’s that story that makes you come true. When it comes down to it: Stories—even when they just confirm something that we already believe and feel—are about making us make that a reality. So I mean we talk about “happily ever after.” It only gets to be “happy ever after” if you do something with it.”

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ENVIRONMENTAL WORK AND PEACE WORK: 
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CASE

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Abstract

This paper, based on a larger study that was carried out by a joint Palestinian – Israeli research team before and during the Al Aqsa Intifada, examines Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have worked on joint environmental projects. We focus here on three jointly run Palestinian – Israeli NGOs, 16 Israeli organizations and 12 Palestinian organizations that engaged in cooperative work, looking at the kind of work they did, their perceptions of the causes of environmental damage and its connection to the conflict, their perceptions of the roles of NGOs within their societies, and obstacles encountered in cooperative work. Data about the NGOs were collected through face-to-face audio taped interviews, their publications, and from their websites. Results showed that while the Israeli and Palestinian NGOs agree that joint work is needed to address ecological problems, they differ in their reasons for working together, their perceptions of the sources of environmental deterioration, the roles that NGOs should be taking within their society, the relationship of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict to the state of the environment, and the effect that a final peace agreement would have on solving these problems. It was concluded that the “environmental narratives” of the two sides differ greatly, and that the establishment of a “culture of peace” is a very long-term process.

Introduction

The Palestinian – Israeli conflict has torn apart the Middle East for over one hundred years, since the beginning of modern Zionism when European Jews began immigrating to the region (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002). While most of the joint Israeli - Palestinian history has been one of bloodshed, after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, it appeared as if there was a real move toward peace. The outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada at the end of September 2000, however, brought to the limelight the anger and frustrations felt by Palestinians concerning their perception of the peace process. The renewed cycle of extreme violence has resulted, at the time of this writing, in the deaths of close to 1300 Palestinians and 500 Israelis (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: B’tselem, 2002).

This paper looks at a different kind of “casualty” of the peace process – Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that, during
the peace era, worked together on projects aimed at enhancing not only the regional environment but also the development of peaceful relationships between the neighbors as well. After the outbreak of the Intifada, most of this work came to a standstill.

In this paper, we look at results of a pilot study undertaken by a research team of two Palestinians and two Israelis from PRIME (Peace Research Institute in the Middle East) – a jointly-run Palestinian – Israeli non-governmental organization (NGO) that carries out research aimed at enhancing reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. We offer here an overview of jointly run NGOs and separate Palestinian and Israeli NGOs that have engaged in cooperative environmental work. We present the perceptions of these organizations regarding the connection between the environment and the conflict and peace process. We look at the issues and activities on which they focused, their understandings of their roles in their respective societies, their perceptions of the causes of environmental damage and its connection to the conflict, and obstacles encountered in cooperative work. We also offer some theoretical understandings and practical aspects of NGO work relevant for the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. We will begin with a short review of the literature concerning the role of NGOs, in general, in societies in conflict, and in Israel and the Palestinian Authority in particular.

**The Role of NGOs in Recent Years**

Since the 1980’s, there has been an increase in the work and influence of non-governmental organizations across the globe. While these organizations have no legal control over territory or peoples, many government officials accept and recognize their worth. The definitions of NGOs vary, as do their appearance (Weiss & Gordenker 1996). Here we define NGOs as non-profit organizations that abstain from participation in state power, identifying four ideal types: *Campaign organizations*, that concentrate on mobilization of its members and the public; *Expert organizations*, that provide consultation services and public dissemination of information; *Humanitarian organizations*, that directly support people in need; and *Grassroots organizations*, comprised of self-organizing citizens who undertake local projects. While this is a useful categorization tool, in reality it is often difficult to clearly differentiate the types.

There are close to twenty five thousand known NGOs in the world, in all political fields (Union of International Associations 2002). While NGOs mostly originated in Western democracies, they later emerged in societies with more totalitarian systems of government. While today they are a culturally transcendent universal phenomenon, NGOs have not lost their local and regional specifics, in part due to their ability to adopt endogenous traditions of self-organization (Dardy de Oliveira & Tandon 1994).
NGOs attempt to deter institutions from acting in ways perceived as being detrimental to society and they can work in ways that are either “top down” or “bottom up”. They do so in the forms of: (a) "internationalising politics", in which NGOs pressure their governments to pressure other governments to change attitudes and practices on certain issues; (b)"trans-national politics", in which NGOs form networks to simultaneously achieve similar changes in other states and to influence international debates (Keck & Sikkink 1998) and; (c) "supranational politics", in which the organization assumes a multinational form and establishes its own head office.

There is consensus among researchers that NGOs often succeed in exerting political influence (Clark 1995; Spiro 1995) by introducing topics into international debate, by agenda setting, fighting for new norms, proposing and facilitating negotiations, or pressuring reluctant governments to make changes. Through such means as "second track" processes, NGOs also try to bring about changes in behavior of government or citizens by taking direct action themselves, such as providing aid for people in need through humanitarian and development organizations.

Environmental and Social Justice NGOs

NGOs specializing in environmental and social justice issues have become visible in the world arena. For example, there are “expert” NGOs that have won over state bureaucracies and the public to their causes after determining the need for a specific environmental action. NGOs also provide information or apply pressure (Rucht 1996; Lahusen 1996) to steer negotiation processes over environmental issues into certain directions, then translate their aims into action and into a tightening up of regulations (Gehring 1994; Haas 1992).

There is evidence that social justice NGOs working within their societies have been successful in fighting for the human rights of indigenous peoples. For example, the Guatemalan umbrella NGO, Unidad de Accion Sindical y Popular (UASP), has undertaken activities on a number of social justice issues, including lobbying for the rights of Mayan groups (McCleary, 1996). Other research on human rights NGOs has shown that cooperative networks of international, national and local organizations have often contributed to a change of political and legal circumstances in states in which human rights have been systematically violated (e.g., Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999).

The effectiveness of local organizations working on these issues is difficult to measure. Since these NGOs work on a smaller scale and are far less documented than the big and supra-national organizations, they are often out of the public eye. This makes it especially important to concentrate more research on this type of organization.
Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace Work

Peace NGOs involved in global networks develop “value communities” to pursue objectives in a culturally transcendent way (Muller 1998). For example, while human rights organizations may differ in the importance they place on individual and collective political and social rights, they all demand habeas corpus rights. Consensus concerning core rights and objectives that are jointly pursued is the first element needed for the emergence of such a value community. The second element is rooted in practice. NGOs hold to the principle that ordinary citizens, and not only official power holders, have the right to act for public issues. This orientation cuts across specific political preferences, transcending the cultural differences between them. The third element is the pursuit of intercultural dialogue, which is necessary for successful networking, which can create a common reference system and a basis for discourse from the different groups' value repertories.

These elements show that people are able to adjust values, perceptions and language from different environments and historical experiences, and to overcome cultural and ethno-specific images of the “enemy”. This is necessary if NGOs are to play a role in peace building (Lane 1995) and in the development of a "culture of peace" - a value orientation and practice of dialogue directed towards bridging gaps (Ropers 1995). NGOs can help conflicting parties by serving in a mediating function. This is especially important when the actors are either unable or unwilling to engage in dialogue, often the case in acute phases of a conflict (Weiss & Nazarenko 1996). NGOs that develop in societies ripped by conflict often try to first cooperate with NGOs from the other side, and then bring back their experiences to their own societies (Lederach 1994).

In different phases of violent conflicts, NGOs engage in other kinds of activity (Weiss & Nazarenko 1996). During the acute phase of a conflict, NGOs usually pressure political leaderships to end the violence, to enter into negotiations, and counter lack of connections on the political level with the beginnings of a social dialogue. During the peace-building phase, NGOs try to increase their societies’ abilities for peace and to strengthen dialogue with the conflict partner. This is difficult since cooperation entails coping with obstacles such as: cultural differences between the partners and different delimiting identities rooted in contrary narratives of the conflict and its history (Faure & Rubin 1993; Wedge 1986); asymmetric relations between the partners with regard to power, competence and resources; security problems facing both sides (Posen 1993); and calculations of costs and benefits unfavourable for cooperation (Holl 1993).

An example of how NGOs can aid peace-building efforts in a society recovering from an ethnic conflict comes from the case of Bosnia – Herzegovina. Gagnon (1998) reports that international and local NGOs have used four strategies to work toward the prevention of further violence: changing the political structures and institutions of the society; party building and civic education; building local non-political party NGO capacity; and...
reconstruction and development as a means of strengthening the community and civil society. He also notes that more successes occurred when international NGOs funded activities developed by local NGOs that reflected the people’s real needs and concerns. However, Demichilis (1998), who also studied NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reported that international NGOs often failed in their work, due to their tendency to become embroiled in local politics, their constant advertisement of their work – which often caused bad feelings among the population who felt that reconstruction of their society was being taken out of their hands and orchestrated by international organizations – and due to competition among the organizations to be “number one.” Demichilis notes that for NGOs to be successful, there is a need for a concerted coordination of activities, and that they must support local NGOs and people so they will be able to continue with the work once the internationals have gone home.

There are other ways in which NGOs can also help in peace-building work. NGOs working toward dialogue enhancement can engage in conflict management and in joint social projects to demonstrate the material benefits of peace to society and to change its calculations of benefits (Weiss & Nazarenko 1996). As soon as the conflict partner is no longer perceived as a threat, but rather as a partner with common interests, peace becomes attractive. This enlarges the "Peace Constituency" (Lederach 1995) - the circle of those who support peace. This strategy, which makes it easier for the sides to reconcile their interests (Senghass 1992), parallels knowledge gained from mediation research that has shown that it is important to distinguish between positions that are often tied to identities and interests in a conflict.

However, scholars/practitioners are not in complete agreement on whether separation is possible when it comes to issues of one’s identity. This is because one’s identity is seen as being deeply connected to the relationship that exists between partners. As a result, some researchers aver that issues of identity cannot be marginalized; they must be tackled (Bar-On 2000 a). This is especially true of the Palestinian - Israeli case, since the identities of the two peoples are interdependent; neither side appears able to define its own separate identity without relating to the “enemy” (Kelman 1999).

The centrality of addressing issues of identity when undertaking peace work crucial to any approach we take. We believe that groups involved in a protracted and violent conflict that decide to enter into cooperation for their mutual benefit need to devote part of the time to a dialogue about their relationships. The repression of different experiences and points of view may pose a latent danger and destroy cooperation during critical points of the project (Francis & Ropers 1997).
Non-governmental organizations in peace projects in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

NGO peace work in the Palestinian Authority (PNA) and Israel has taken two forms: (a) the “peace movement”, whose activities are directly related to peace seeking, and (b) joint, practice-oriented projects in different social realms that pursue peace through indirect means. Before the Oslo agreements, NGOs tended to initiate contacts across the conflict line and exert pressure on their governments to begin negotiations. In the next stage, NGOs continued to act as pressure groups during the often-difficult peace process. However, it became more important for them to help prepare their societies for peaceful coexistence and mutual co-operation (Zartman 1998).

At a conference, organized by PRIME in 1999, over 40 Israeli and Palestinian NGOs convened, some of which had been involved in cooperative projects (Adwan & Bar-On 2000; Maoz 2000a). While most of these NGOs were working solely within their own societies, they showed willingness for cooperation. The NGOs that were engaged in cooperative projects were working in the educational, economic, human rights, and health, social, and environmental policy realms.

Adwan & Bar-On (2000) noted results in joint economic and political work that the cardinal problem was found to be the asymmetrical relations between the groups. Asymmetry between the NGOs, which reflects the distribution of power in the Israeli-Palestinian context, was evaluated by examining levels of experience within the organizations, degree of professionalism, availability of resources, and the degree to which organizations are embedded in a developed civil society (for a discussion of asymmetry, see Maoz 2000b, in press). The Israeli partners were found to have the advantage in all of these respects.

A second difficulty found in the joint work was rooted in the bad relations that have often existed between the two peoples. In joint projects, the Palestinian participants tended to focus on the low regard with which the Israelis often treat their people, and to make this the central issue during their work. This behavior often caused the Israeli side to become defensive, and as a result, the actual topic of cooperation often got lost.

The third problem concerned language. Since, in general, the Israelis and Palestinians do not know one another’s language, English remains the working language. Here the Israelis also tend to have the advantage, increasing asymmetric relations. Hidden behind this inability to speak the other’s language was a fourth problem, a deeper one of cultural differences. Israelis tend to be less aware of cultural differences than the Palestinians, and this ignorance causes them to make mistakes in joint projects, such as not being sensitive to Palestinian cultural norms concerning proper male – female public interaction. This has led to more misunderstandings and bad feelings.

The fifth problem concerning joint work was the Palestinians’ limited freedom of movement due to security measures imposed by the Israeli
government and military. This was connected to the difficult problem of disengaging the political disturbances from the joint work.

Based on the above knowledge, PRIME undertook a pilot study of Palestinian and Israeli environmental NGOs. We chose to focus on environmental NGOs since joint ecology work was seen as promising for peace building due to its ability to be a border-transcending objective for both Palestinians and Israelis. A second reason is connected to the ecological conditions of the region: the land is densely populated, semiarid, suffers from a water shortage, and has problematic waste management and sewage systems. In addition, although levels of development in Israel and in the PNA differ, intensive agriculture and industrial development have damaged the environment. From a theoretical point of view, we hoped that this study would lead to information important for civil society actors involved in the peace process. From a practical point of view, we assumed that if we found the environmental NGOs successful in their joint work, this could lead to the development of a culture of peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Due to limitations of space, we will focus here on NGOs that have worked on collaborative projects. We looked at their reasons for doing so, their understandings of the connection between the state of the environment and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process, and obstacles encountered in this work.

Method

In April 2000, we convened to plan the study. The research methods changed over time for two main reasons. First, as we gathered information, we learned which organizations were worthwhile to interview and how to better go about collecting the information we were interested in. More importantly, the outbreak of the Intifada made further data collection impossible, and made our regular joint staff meetings, almost an impossibility.

The Sample

The Joint Sample: We interviewed the three jointly run Palestinian-Israeli NGOs that deal with the environment. These included IPCRI – The Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information, FoEME – Friends of the Earth Middle East and PIES – Palestinian Israeli Environmental Secretariat.

The Palestinian Sample: Representatives from thirty-seven Palestinian NGOs from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, were interviewed face-to-face, in their offices, and/or by telephone. The Palestinian team obtained a list of environmental NGOs from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. During the interviews, the team asked their interviewees to suggest additional names of NGOs for interviewing. The Palestinian environmental NGOs were categorized accordingly:
• Organizations that have cooperated with Israeli NGOs.
• Organizations not-yet cooperating with Israeli NGOs, but willing to cooperate.
• Organizations unwilling to cooperate with the Israeli side in the meantime or in the near future.

Results from the 12 NGOs that have cooperated with Israeli partners, and that agreed to be written about, are presented here.

The Israeli Sample: In the overall Israeli sample, 19 NGOs, two academic institutions, and one Government Organization (The Parks Authority – interviewed due to its cooperative work with Palestinian partners) gave face-to-face, tape-recorded interviews. The criteria for choosing the organizations to be interviewed in depth were:

a) The organization engaged in cooperative work with Palestinians.
b) Other NGOs considered them important in the Israeli environmental context.
c) The organization had been in existence for many years and/or was well known in Israel for its work.
d) The NGO focused on different issues and/or different populations.

Most of the interviews were held in the offices of the organizations, but three took place in cafes (at the requests of the interviewees). Two key Israeli environmentalists were also interviewed to get an overall picture of the Israeli environmental movement. While the Israeli team conducted short interviews with an additional 10 organizations by telephone or electronic means, these NGOs are not presented here. This paper presents results on the 16 NGOs that have engaged in cooperative work. The joint organizations that were interviewed are presented in Table 1, the Palestinian NGOs are presented in Table 2 and the Israeli organizations are presented in Table 3.

Instruments:

Data Collection: To learn about the NGOs, we formulated an interview guide (see Table 4 for the questions posed to NGOs that engaged in joint work). While we usually succeeded in covering the issues in the guide, it was not always possible to do so, due to time limitations and/or requests of the participants to talk about topics they deemed important. In general, after explaining the study, the interviewers let the NGO representatives talk freely. Questions were asked when the interviewee brought up a subject, or at the end, if the questions had not been addressed. At the end of the interviews, participants were asked if they had any suggestions concerning people/organizations to interview. On the Palestinian side, the interviews were conducted in Arabic. On the Israeli side, 17 interviews were conducted in Hebrew and 5 in English. Both teams also learned about the NGOs by collecting written materials and publications from the organizations and by exploring their websites. These materials provided a “public” window into
the organization, and their utilization often saved time during the interview. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and four hours.

Data Analysis and Procedure: First, each team mapped the environmental NGOs in their societies (finding there to be approximately 100 on each side). We compiled our lists by using Internet searches, talking to umbrella organizations and the ministries of environment, and by getting information from environmentalists. Acting on this information, we then decided to carry out in-depth interviews with the jointly run NGOs and with approximately 40 organizations altogether (an equal number on each side). Although we used the interview guide developed for the study, we did not always receive answers to our questions about specifics of their joint activities. We attribute this to two main reasons. First, the NGO representatives, who were limited in the amount of time they could devote to the interview, wanted to present certain information about their organizations. We were consistently respectful of this request. Second, we were dealing with sensitive matters; if we did not receive detailed information about joint activities, we did not pressure the representatives to answer because we did not want them to feel that we were being critical of their work. Based on the interviewees’ tendencies to talk in generalities, we planned to do some joint observations of NGOs engaged in cooperative activities to see for ourselves what these projects looked like.

The teams gathered their information separately, meeting together every few weeks to exchange ideas and summaries of the interviews that had been prepared in English so all staff members could read them. These summaries included the interview conversation plus information about the NGO garnered from the organizations’ websites and/or publications. While these were not word-for-word transcripts, they were quite extensive and often contained direct quotes. This stage continued through September, 2000. When the Intifada began at the end of that month, further data collection, including our planned joint observations, became impossible.

After a month into the violence, when it became clear that there was not going to be a quick resolution of the conflict and that we could no longer continue on as planned, we decided that each team would analyze what they had managed to collect. As a result, the analysis processes were not identical for the two teams. While this was far from optimal, we believed that it was important to complete what we could. Even though we worked separately, we kept up some telephone and e-mail contact, sending our analyses to all team members for review and comment. We also succeeded in meeting twice in Jerusalem, since traveling to PRIME’s offices in Beit Jala was too dangerous.

Despite the differences in data analysis, each side wrote a one-page summary of each NGO, and compiled tables with descriptive information about the organizations. Each team also wrote a summary report of the NGOs it had interviewed, based on answers to the questions that the NGO representatives had given during the interview and on the information that we
had collected from their websites and publications. We also did more analytical work, trying to understand the NGOs’ views on the roles of their organizations within their societies, their perceptions of the “other”, and other issues related to the success or failure of their environmental – peace work (Adwan & Bar-On 2000).

In this paper, we focus on organizations that had engaged in cooperation. Using the sources of data collection noted above, we present the foci of their work, target populations, scope of activities and major projects, reasons for engaging in cooperative work, obstacles encountered in this joint work, perceptions of the state of the environment and its association to the ongoing conflict, and their perception of the influence of the peace agreement on the environment.

Results

We will begin with the jointly run NGOs, and then move on to the Palestinian and the Israeli NGOs. Due to the current very sensitive political situation in Israel/PNA, we will present the Palestinian and the Israeli results without identifying which specific NGOs made specific comments.

An Overview of Jointly Run NGOs (presented alphabetically)

Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME)

In our study, a number of interviewees from both sides stated that this organization was an important link for NGOs who wanted to work on joint projects. Since its inception in 1994, FoEME, an umbrella organization for environmental NGOs in the PNA, Israel, Egypt and Jordan, has focused on many environmental issues, all chosen jointly by their Middle Eastern partners. These projects are seen as having a social and economic impact for people of the region, reflecting FoEME’s manifest holistic view of the environment. This perspective was evident from their stated objectives, from their project diversity that aimed at improving the quality of the environment for different populations in the different countries, and from their extensive international networking. From the analysis of the interview, and from what was learned about FoEME from other environmentalists, FoEME appeared to be a creative organization in that it used a variety of methods and projects to further peace and help preserve the environment. We also found FoEME to have numerous links with government institutions, with organizations in all member countries, with universities and research centers, and with international NGOs. When our informants spoke of FoEME, they mentioned respect for their work and high level of professionalism.

FoEME has reached marginal populations to enhance capacity building, and the NGO appeared to be sensitive to their needs. An example of this type of work was their Renewable Energy Demonstration Program, a solar energy feasibility study that aimed at promoting sustainable communities by creating a “solar bridge for peace building” that would help develop clean energy for
domestic purposes, industrial needs and for water pumping. To reach different communities, FoEME established installations in Palestinian, Jordanian and Egyptian villages and in an Israeli kibbutz.

FoEME aimed to change the political status quo and to empower the Palestinians, as well as to strengthen the peace between Israel and Jordan, and Egypt. Evidence of this comes from their projects which took into account the needs of the member states such as their large scale Dead Sea Basin project and their study of the environmental impact that the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ) would have on the region.

Israeli-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)

IPCRI, a jointly run Palestinian-Israeli policy-making think tank that was established in 1989, has focused on environmental as well as social issues, seeing the two realms as connected to one another. This is evident in that the environmental section is one of 5 departments that work on a number of social and political issues. Environmental issues are selected on the basis of their perceived importance to both Palestinians and Israelis. Programs have developed based on information gained at three “Shared Environment” conferences, which were held between 1994 – 1996, in which Palestinian and Israeli environmentalists discussed issues such as water management, industrialization, hospital waste management, agricultural trade and management of open spaces.

An example of a creative project that meshes with the overall goals of IPCRI is their environmental resolution-mediation program. This program, during the year and half of violence, managed to bring the participants from both sides together at one meeting in Turkey, and is currently jointly training Israelis and Palestinians to become arbitrators in environmental conflicts. IPCRI’s environmental section also works at reaching populations that tend to be marginalized to enhance capacity building. For example, they are working on involving women’s groups in environmental work and they are training Palestinians to become environmental professionals.

IPCRI has always proclaimed that it aims to change the political status quo and to empower the Palestinians. To achieve this goal, they devote much of their time trying to influence decision-makers on both sides to work toward peaceful resolution of the conflict. Based on statements made by Israeli and Palestinian environmentalists, IPCRI is very well respected and perceived as experts at their work.

Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Secretariat (PIES)

Until the outbreak of violence, PIES dealt with issues that encompassed environmental and social components. Since their establishment in 1997, they developed over 20 programs – although not all of them received funding. Much of their work has been in education with student groups, summer camps, youth groups and school projects. However PIES has not limited itself to educational work; it also helped bring together Palestinian and Israeli businessmen to learn and implement ISO 14001 – internationally, environmentally safe production standards. PIES also instigated a
Palestinian – Israeli team to work on environmental policy initiatives that hopes one day to present their findings to decision-makers in both Israeli and Palestinian governments.

Based on information from other environmentalists and from PIES itself, we understood that, at times, the organizations experienced some difficulties in implementing their work. The reason for this appears to be tied to their relative inexperience: PIES is a younger organization – both organizationally and in the environmental field - than IPCRI and FoEME. PIES’ activities appear to be aimed at changing the status quo and at empowering the Palestinians. As in the above cases, other environmentalists noted their respect of PIES, stating that they did important work and that they were helpful in establishing contacts between environmental groups from the two societies.

The Effect of the Al Aqsa Intifada on the Joint NGOs

After the eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada, we contacted the jointly run NGOs to see if they were still continuing their work. We learned that the FoEME office in East Jerusalem closed soon after the start of the Intifada, while their office in Amman remained in full operation. After the staff worked from their homes for a while, they opened two offices in Tel-Aviv and Bethlehem and hired additional staff for their offices and their fieldwork – comprised of equal numbers of Palestinians and Israelis. Their experts from both sides continue to meet, with more public events taking place in parallel fashion. IPCRI continued its work to keep dialogue open between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Like FoEME, they too had to relocate their offices from war-torn Bethlehem, and moved temporarily to safer Jerusalem. In the beginning, the political situation made it impossible for joint environmental projects to proceed. However, as IPCRI adjusted itself to the new situation, they began to implement some projects, most notably their training of environmental mediators. Concerning PIES, we were informed that this NGO could not carry out their planned activities after the Intifada began, and that the Israeli director left the organization in February 2001 “…since there was no work….” However, the Palestinian director of PIES has remained with the organization and keeps in periodic contact with Israeli colleagues from environmental NGOs.

In summation, then, these jointly run NGOs were, on the whole, seen by Israeli and Palestinian environmentalists as being important players in the cooperative world. They aimed to change asymmetrical relations between the Israelis and Palestinians by working on a number of issues, with different populations, including marginal ones. However, the Al Aqsa Intifada had a major impact on the ways in which they could work. Offices had to be relocated, work often had to be done in parallel fashion, and there were changes in personnel. After the initial breakdown of peace talks and outbreak of violence, FoEME and IPCRI managed to continue on with their work to some degree, perhaps due to their ability to maintain their links with their
Palestinian and Israeli colleagues, their international contacts, and their diversity in activities.

**Overview of the Cooperating Palestinian Environmental NGOs**

Twelve NGOs that participated in joint work agreed to be included in this study. The oldest of these organizations was established in the fifties, but most were founded in the late eighties and nineties. These NGOs focus on a number of areas including: protection of environment and water resources; development of educational and training programs and programs for environmental awareness; clean-up campaigns, tree planting; development of the rural and agricultural sector; scientific studies of water, soil and energy; conservation of wildlife; and consultation services and lobbying. All of the NGOs stated that the biggest environmental problem for the Palestinians was water. This was seen as being tied to Israeli control of the water resources, preventing the conducting of adequate studies to diagnose specific problems and find feasible solutions. The NGOs targeted different groups: farmers and rural populations, children, women, and decision makers. All 12 of the Palestinian NGOs have cooperated on projects with the Israelis on the national level as well as on local ones, and three of these NGOs have ties to international organizations.

When representatives from the Palestinian NGOs that had engaged in joint work with Israeli environmentalists were asked why they did so, they all stated that such work was necessary for protection of the environment and for exchange of important ecological information. The conditions most often stated as being important for engaging in joint work with Israelis included: the Palestinians must be treated as peers; the project must meet the needs of both sides; the Israeli partners are expected to state that they are against settlements in the occupied territories and Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem; the Israelis must commit themselves to providing the Palestinians with environmental facts about Israel; the project is suitable for the current situation; and that the Israeli partners are able to demonstrate an ability to solve environmental problems. The NGOs in our study stated that, for the most part, they saw the experience as being positive and that it met the needs of both sides.

When asked whether the conflict had hurt the environment, the Palestinian representatives unanimously answered yes. A number of Israeli practices were noted as having harmed the environment. All of the NGOs stated that confiscation of Palestinian land for Jewish settlements was a major contributor to the deterioration of the environment. Since the 1967 war, all successive Israeli governments have either confiscated, or declared as closed areas, land in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The organizations remarked that Israeli settlements in the PNA have also led to the demolition of houses, uprooting of thousands of trees and construction of numerous by-pass roads, for the sole use of Israeli settlers to link them to one
another while avoiding contact with the Palestinians. These practices have fragmented both Palestinian land and people, leading to overcrowding of urban areas and loss of open space.

A second negative effect of the conflict, noted by 9 of the NGOs, is the depletion of water resources, such as over pumping of the Gaza coastal aquifer, redirection of the Jordan River, and the transportation of water from one water basin to another. Palestinian interviewees stated that while the Israelis are digging new wells, Palestinians are blocked from using existing ones and only have access to 15 percent of the water.

Pollution was the third problem cited by all of the NGOs. Eight NGOs noted that wastewater from at least 9 Israeli settlements had been discharged to the nearby valleys without treatment, with 11 Palestinian localities being harmed by these actions. Three NGOs stated that they knew of at least two Israeli settlements that released its sewage and chemical waste from industrial plants into Palestinian valleys in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that solid waste from Israelis was being dumped on Palestinian land, fields, and roads. Seven representatives from the Palestinian NGOs stated that the Israeli government had constructed at least seven industrial zones in the West Bank, which often result in the flow of industrial wastewater into adjacent Palestinian lands. They noted that industrial solid, and often hazardous, waste generated by these factories is often collected and dumped in areas near Palestinian villages.

Deforestation and uprooting of trees was another consequence of the conflict noted by 10 of the Palestinian interviewees. They said that a great percentage of forests had been cut down in the territories, usually as a consequence of Israeli establishment of military bases, settlements, and bypass roads. Four of our interviewees spoke about military practices in the agricultural areas inside Palestine and the destruction of agricultural lands, especially during the crop and harvesting seasons, which were also cited as a problem. The lack of an environmental infrastructure in the Palestinian lands was noted by three of the NGOs as one of the major consequences of the conflict. No sanitary systems, wastewater treatment systems, or sewage systems were built during the 30 years of occupation.

The Palestinian environmental NGOs unanimously asserted that a comprehensive peace process would help in bringing about a change for the better in the environment. However, 7 of the 12 organizations stated that the Oslo peace process had not helped this process. Six noted that it was not the current peace process, per se, that had had a positive effect on the environment, but rather the establishment of the PA that had been a result of the process. The reason given for the failure of the Oslo peace process to strengthen the environment was that during the period of interim agreements, the Palestinians saw the establishment of new Jewish settlements on their lands, and a continuation of the Israeli negative practices against the Palestinian environment. The Palestinian informants stated that they felt that the Israelis were not living up to the peace agreement commitments.
However, all of the NGOs agreed that a comprehensive peace would create trust for joint projects, and that these projects could be an instrument for the enhancement of peace.

**Overview of the Israeli Environmental NGOs**

All but one of the 16 Israeli NGOs that engaged in cooperative work with Palestinian partners were founded in the 1990s, most after the onset of the Oslo peace process. The organizations differed in size, scope, membership, and issues that they address, targeting many different populations such as children of all ages, students, minorities (such as Bedouin and Arab citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the occupied territories), and business people. The activities most often undertaken by these organizations center on: protection of beaches; sustainable development; management of water resources; empowerment of Palestinian populations; activities against the construction of the Trans-Israel highway; environmental awareness and educational programs; training programs for environmental professionals; activism; activities for business people; and studies of wildlife, desertification, water, pollutants, and health issues. All of the NGOs in this sub-sample engaged in networking on the international level. The critical environmental problems noted by these Israeli organizations included water quality and shortage, sustainable development, and public transportation. The NGOs cited two main problems: the importance of widening the circle of activists for the environment and of having more success at influencing policy makers.

When the Israeli representatives talked about their willingness to cooperate with Palestinian partners, 6 of the organizations stated that cooperative work was a major focus of their work, seeing it as important for achievement of peace and a cleaner environment. Eleven NGOs said that they see environmental protection as even more important than cooperation with the Palestinians, even though they did also highly value cooperative work. Therefore, when problems arise during cooperation, if these problems interfere with the environmental work, taking care for the environment should take precedence over carrying on the collaborative projects.

All of the Israeli NGOs that stressed cooperation as the main focus of their work noted that they see the Palestinian partners as their peers and that it is important that the project meets the needs of both sides. These organizations appeared to be attuned to the asymmetric power relations that exist between the Israelis and the Palestinians and they stated that they tried to create equal relations in their work. Palestinian problems were seen as being Israeli problems; for example, 5 of the NGOs stated that when their Palestinian partners had trouble getting permission from the border police to enter Israel, the Israeli partners would personally intervene to get that permission. The 10 NGOs that had engaged in cooperative projects, but that did not view these activities as being essential to their work, differed from the 6 NGOs that did,
in that they generally did not appear to be as aware that asymmetry between the Israelis and the Palestinians could explain why joint work was so difficult at times.

The representatives from the 6 Israeli NGOs who said that cooperative work was one of their major aims also noted their sensitivity to the political situation, acting in ways that suited the political climate. Fifteen of the 16 NGOs evaluated this work as being mostly positive. They noted the importance of having and keeping up personal contacts. However, the interviewees stated that while there was an opening up of dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians during the projects, they did not believe that enough real progress in solving environmental problems was being made.

All of the cooperating NGOs agreed that there is a connection between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the damage that has been caused to the environment. However, none of the organizations saw the conflict as being the main reason for neglect. Eleven interviewees stated that Israelis tend to have such low regard and understanding for potential environmental dangers that even if there was no conflict, Israel would not be in a much different place environmentally then where it is today. While the conflict, therefore, was definitely seen as having a negative impact on the ecology, it could not carry the primary blame for environmental problems faced by Israel and Palestine today.

There were a number of reasons given for the connection between the conflict and the negative impact on the environment. These reasons included the Israeli governments’ overriding concern with problems of security over other social issues (noted by 6 organizations). This means that much money has gone to defence instead of to other purposes – including environmental issues. Four NGOs stated that the military has also caused damage, both in Israel and in the PNA, for example, when the IDF has uprooted trees in the territories in the name of security, or has left potentially toxic waste in open areas. Four NGOs also noted that expansion of settlements was detrimental to the shared environment; nature has been destroyed to build houses and roads that circumvent Palestinian villages. Water has also been poorly managed, often leaving Palestinians without enough good water while the Israeli government overextends the water supply in the settlements. Another reason given for disregard and/or damaging of the environment, which was noted by 11 NGOs, was unchecked “modern” development, which did not take the needs of the environment into consideration.

The Israeli representatives from the NGOs were asked how they thought a peace agreement would affect the environment. Six organizations believed that it would have both a positive and negative effect, 6 believed that it would positively help and four stated that they believed that a peace agreement could lead to further deterioration. This was based on the belief that a peace agreement would bring about more unchecked development, such as an increase in private cars that would travel between both countries,
causing increased air pollution, and an expansion of environmentally bad joint industries.

**Obstacles Encountered in Joint Work**

**Obstacles Encountered by the Palestinians**

Despite the overall positive evaluation, the NGOs stated that they did face obstacles in their joint work. According to the Palestinian interviewees, these included: lack of real dialogue between the sides; cultural differences; political disturbances, which often affected their freedom of movement; lack of information from Israelis concerning environmental problems within Israeli borders; attitudes toward publicizing of activities; and, finally, psychological problems.

When speaking about dialogue problems, 9 cooperating Palestinian NGOs noted that they often felt that each side “had its own agenda”, especially when working on applied studies. As a result, each side worked according to its own schedule and plans, basically only meeting at the end, in order to combine their data. This kind of working relationship often resulted in an imbalance not only in the work patterns, but also, in turn, in the final project results.

Another difficulty encountered in joint work was termed cultural differences, especially problematic in environmental summer camps held for Israeli and Palestinian youth, in which teenage boys and girls interacted with one another. The spokespeople for three of the Palestinian NGOs noted that Palestinian society tends to be conservative, and this is not always the case with Israeli society. For the Palestinians, the Israeli girl and boy adolescents appeared to be more open in their behavior with one another, than is normative for the Palestinians, engaging, at times, in practices that are considered to be shameful, prohibited and/or unacceptable in their society and culture. The Palestinian interviewees who had this experience felt that the Israelis were insensitive to this cultural difference, and that this caused an undercurrent of problems during the joint activities.

Five NGOs noted that political disturbances, closure of PNA areas, and outbreaks of the conflict negatively affected the cooperative projects in two main ways: the Israeli authorities often limited the Palestinians’ freedom of movement and the Palestinian Authority often issued directives to the Palestinian NGOs to cease joint work with the Israelis until the tense and violent period had passed. Another obstacle to be overcome was lack of information. One Palestinian NGO stated that they had problems completing their projects since they felt that the Israelis were not always forthright concerning environmental facts within Israel. This lack of information prevented them from carrying out their work in a manner they believed would truly benefit the environment.

A differing perspective on the publicizing of joint projects was yet another obstacle mentioned by most of the cooperating Palestinian NGOs. Ten NGOs
said that they saw the Israelis as being interested in publicizing joint projects in order to show the world that the two sides were cooperating, even during tense political times. In doing so, the Palestinian NGOs, in this study, stated that they thought that the Israelis were trying to influence international opinion, and at times, they found this disturbing.

Finally, 10 of the Palestinian interviewees noted that there were psychological obstacles that needed to be overcome. They stated that the years of occupation have made it very difficult for them to see the Israelis as anything else but occupiers and confiscators of their land, and demolishers of houses. Therefore, they believed that it would take time before they could truly see them in a different light and that while it was important for the Israelis to understand this, they did not appear to be sensitive to this issue.

**Obstacles Encountered by the Israelis**

The obstacles to joint work mentioned by the Israeli NGOs included: political disturbances and problems with freedom of movement for the Palestinians, security measures which negatively affected the smooth running of activities, problems around “talking environment” or “talking conflict”, language barriers, instability in keeping up long-term partnerships, and different cultural norms when it came to taking action.

Eleven of the cooperating Israeli NGOs noted that upsurges of violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis often disrupted their work. This would lead to closures or curfews of PNA areas, and to a restriction in movement for the Palestinian partners, either because the Israeli military would not let them pass or because PNA officials issued orders to the NGOs to desist working with Israelis. When freedom of movement was obstructed, Israeli representatives said that they often intervened personally at the borders, in order to get military permission for their partners to enter Israel. During very violent times, activities were postponed or cancelled – either because the Palestinian partners were unwilling or unable to participate. Three NGOs also noted that venues of conferences were changed to neutral regions (e.g., Turkey) in order to solve this problem.

Tied to the first problem is the general issue of security. Eight of our Israeli informants told us that, at times, activities had to be planned and re-planned in order to meet security demands set forth by Israeli authorities and requirements of Palestinian and Israeli organizations involved in the activities. This problem was especially acute when children were involved; given security measures, it was often very difficult to find a venue for group activities that would be acceptable and suitable for the activities planned.

A more serious obstacle to undertaking joint activities was the issue of content of the meetings. Seven of the Israeli NGOs felt that the Palestinians were often more interested in talking about the conflict, stressing Israel’s responsibility for infringement of their human and civil rights, than on the environment – the manifest reason for meeting. While the environmentalists understood this need on the part of the Palestinians, seeing the importance of
dedicating part of their time together to discussing these issues, they felt that 
this had the effect of limiting the amount of real work on the environment 
that needed to be done, and that, at times, also put them on the defensive. 
A language barrier was another obstacle mentioned by 5 of the 
o rganizations. Most of the activities had to be conducted in English in order 
to make communication possible. This proved to be very difficult when the 
activities centered on children or people who came from rural areas and/or 
 had limited formal education. Often the participants would speak through a 
translator, which slowed down the process and made cross communication 
extremely difficult. This often led to participants working side-by-side, rather 
than together on a given project. Three of the Israeli interviewees also noted 
that an additional obstacle to joint work was that the Palestinian partners 
often changed on them. For example, they would hold one seminar, and 
when they met again to continue their work, a new group of Palestinian 
participants would come to the meeting. This lack of continuity was cited as 
limiting environmental progress. 
The last obstacle, noted by 5 of our Israeli interviewees, was the difference 
in norms accepted by the Israelis and those accepted by Palestinians 
concerning the role of NGOs in civil society. While the Israelis tended to see 
themselves as willing to partake in “civil disobedience” and to protest 
government actions and policies detrimental to the environment, they 
mentioned that the Palestinians tended to “toe the PNA government line” – 
behavior that they found to be at odds with the essence of NGO work. While 
some of the Israeli participants understood that the Palestinians’ political and 
social situation did not permit them to be as outspoken as they could, at times 
– even noting that this had been the case for Israelis in the early days of 
statehood – they felt that this behavior kept the parties from undertaking the 
environmental work they had set out to do. 

Discussion and Conclusions

We embarked on our study of environmental NGOs in Israeli and the PNA 
in order to learn not only what issues interest regional environmentalists, and 
how they deal with them, but also to learn how their work relates to the 
conflict and peace building efforts. The renewal of violence between the 
sides prevented us from completing our data collection and analysis as we 
would have liked, leaving many questions unanswered. In spite of this, we 
see a number of points and tentative conclusions that can be put forth. 
To begin with, it is fair to say that the environment has become an 
important issue for civil actors in both societies. This has led to the 
establishment of many NGOs on each side, many since the mid 1990s, when 
the Oslo peace process opened the door for many new ventures. We found 
that the sides agree, that for too many years, significant damage has been 
done to the environment and that immediate steps must be taken to forcibly 
address these issues. Furthermore, there is also consensus among these
NGOs that the issues that affect one country affect the other. Therefore, sharing of knowledge and pooling of resources is needed, to at least some extent, if the problems are to be solved. This assumption, reminiscent of the claim made by Holl (1993) and the UNESCO reports (1998) concerning the benefit of pursuing joint goals, as opposed to unilateral interests, made it possible for Israeli and Palestinian NGOs to work together on a variety of projects that reached a variety of populations.

In spite of the agreement that the environment needs serious looking after, the Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, which were presented in this paper, did not wholly agree on the sources of the ecological deterioration, or on the ways that this deterioration could be stopped, including their part in these efforts. While the Palestinian NGOs did not believe that it is possible to disengage the conflict and the state of the environment from one another, the Israeli environmentalists did not always hold this view. These differences in perception have led to different explanations concerning the roots of environmental deterioration, the willingness to work with the other side on joint environmental projects, the obstacles to be overcome in joint work, and the connection between resolution of the conflict and improvement of the environment. We also experienced the consequences of these differences firsthand as we worked on our study. For example, the Palestinian team was confronted with over 10 NGOs that refused to participate in our study when they were told that it was a joint Israeli–Palestinian venture. They stated that participation would legitimize the asymmetric relationships between the two peoples, something that they were not yet prepared to do. Furthermore, after the onset of the Al Aqsa Intifada, none of the Palestinian NGOs that had participated in our study agreed to provide any more information. While the Israeli team did not succeed in securing interviews with all of the NGOs that it approached, these were never the reasons given for non-participation, neither before nor during the Al Aqsa Intifada.

Perceptions of environmental issues are reminiscent of other issues connected to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Scholars, working from a variety of disciplines on the conflict (e.g. Adwan & Firer 2000; Bar-On 2000b; Bickerton & Klausner 2002; Kelman 1999; Said 1990), have noted that the Palestinian and Israeli narratives concerning the history of the region, legitimate claims to the land, roots of the conflict and the reasons for its insolvability are diametrically opposed to one another. As a result of these opposite perceptions, Palestinian environmentalists see the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, and their general disregard for the Palestinian people, as being the reasons that so much damage has been caused to the environment, whereas Israeli environmentalists see deterioration of the environment as being a result of general ignorance, disregard and low priorities on the part of state institutions.

This difference in understanding does not remain solely on the theoretical level, but affects the practical level as well. Cooperating Palestinian NGOs do not see the point of “talking environment” without “talking occupation”.
The Israelis, however, tend to see “talking conflict” as a detour from “talking environment.” In our opinion, these differences not only reflect problems in communication between the two sides but also reflect the asymmetric power relationships that exist between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Gidron & Katz 1998; Rouhana & Kelman 1994; Suleiman 1997) and can be explained in the following way.

When the organizations were engaged in their joint work, during the last years of the 1990s, the Israeli NGOs enjoyed a social-political context very different from that of their Palestinian counterparts. They had emerged from, and were embedded in, a developed civil society that had a stable economy and an established infrastructure. Furthermore, Israel still retained a great degree of military and civil control over Palestinian people and lands. The social environment was different for the Palestinian NGOs, however; the PNA was in the throes of nation building, it had just begun to build its infrastructure and much of its land, peoples and institutions were still under Israeli occupation. Of the two sides, the Israeli NGOs were clearly the dominant party and, at times, some of them appeared to be oblivious to the life conditions of their Palestinian partners. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that during cooperative projects, the sides often held different conceptions of “reality”, especially concerning whether or not the conflict was nearing its end, and how they should go about their joint work. This can help account for the tendency of the Israeli NGOs to perceive the conflict as near its end, almost part of the past, and for their desire to address other issues, such as the environment, that had been overlooked for years, without dwelling on the occupation. On the Palestinian side, however, the organizations still saw their societies as being embroiled in the conflict, with its end still out of reach. Therefore, they tended to object to Israeli NGO behavior that appeared to them to be trivialization and/or ignoring of problems of oppression and inequality that still affected their everyday lives and did not see the point in talking about improving the environment that without discussing the continuing occupation.

This asymmetry in beliefs, practices, and realities can help explain why the Israelis were unable, at times, to understand the importance of making time for the Palestinians to openly talk about their negative feelings and experiences that they encountered over the years of occupation (Shikaki 1998). In addition, we believe that the differences mirrored great unease, on the part of the Israeli environmentalists, when Palestinian partners accused Israelis of having purposely harmed the Palestinian environment. Therefore, while we believe that the reasons given by the Israeli NGOs for the poor state of the environment definitely capture many truisms, their relative minimization of the effects of the conflict on the environment may be a defense mechanism that they employed when confronted with the Palestinian allegations.

As Gidron and Katz found in their 1998 study, the Palestinian environmental NGOs interviewed for our study constituted the minority
group in their relationships with the Israeli organizations. They possessed less resources, influence, and experience than the Israelis, and they were working in a society that is in a very different developmental stage. It is no wonder, therefore, that these differences in power relations and life circumstances lead the Palestinians to see the Israeli occupation of their lands as being tied to the poor state of their environment while they lead the Israelis to attributing other factors to environmental damage and neglect. This may also explain the differences in foci of environmental work; whereas the Palestinian NGOs tended to focus on issues directly connected to the occupation, such as land confiscation, the Israeli NGOs focused on more “neutral” and post-conflict issues, such as public transportation.

Our results also showed that when the two sides came together for joint work, they tended to do so for different reasons. The Palestinian NGOs emphasized that they engaged in cooperative projects with Israelis, not mainly because this work was important for the furthering of peace efforts, but because it was necessary for combating environmental damage and for preventing further deterioration. The Israeli NGOs, however, tended to link environmental work to peace work, seeing it as a boundary transcending process that could help solidify the peace process (Lane et al. 1995; Muller 1998). From this, we tentatively conclude here that, in spite of the effort and hard work that went into the projects carried out by the environmental NGOs from both sides, they did not really succeed in building “value communities” that helped them pursue their environmental objectives in culturally transcendent ways (Muller 1998). Furthermore, they had also not yet achieved a “culture of peace” (Ropers 1995) – a condition that may be important for NGOs working in societies in conflict that are trying to help the peace process along. This becomes even clearer when we note that since the renewal of violence, there have been very few instances of joint environmental/peace work.

As a final point, we will relate to the different perceptions that the Palestinian and Israeli NGOs appeared to hold concerning their role within their societies. Whereas the Israelis tended to hold a more traditional view of NGOs (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Weiss & Gordenker 1996), as organizations that work outside the realm of state power, and are often at odds with official power holders, the Palestinian NGOs appeared to distinguish to a much lesser degree their work from that of the PNA government. This was evident in their avoidance of criticizing their government, of acting in accordance with directives handed down by the Authority during times of crisis, and their reticence about engaging in acts of civil disobedience. This result leads us to the understanding that, at the present, the social structures of the two societies differ so much from one another that environmentalists working within Israel and the PNA hold essentially different definitions of the role that NGOs should be playing. We see this difference as not merely a semantic one, but as one that also demands to be jointly explored by parties engaged in cooperative work.
Perhaps after the PNA achieves official statehood, the Israeli occupation is ended, and a significant reduction in violence occurs, the Palestinian NGOs will reassess their role, adopting the more commonly held definition of NGOs.

Endnote

Attempting to complete this study during the Al Aqsa Intifada was very difficult for us, from both a professional and emotional standpoint. The Palestinian researchers often found themselves in life-threatening and frightening situations and the Israelis could offer little more than small words of comfort. We were all exposed to the violence, which surrounded us, and to the intransigence of political leaders on both sides. As a result, the importance of our project paled in comparison to the meaning that the daily killings, maiming and destruction was having for our region. Perhaps the main conclusions that we have reached from this joint venture is that the good relationships, which appeared to characterize the Palestinian and Israeli environmental partners, were so fragile, that once there was a renewed eruption of violence, the desire and ability to keep up any level of cooperative work virtually disappeared. This has led us to the deeper understanding that achievement of peace between Palestinians and Israelis is a very long, difficult and multi-layered process. It is a process that not only demands time, but also deep long-lasting changes in perception concerning the other side. As long as the social and political relationships do not significantly change between the two peoples, then these joint ventures will remain susceptible to the forces that would pull them apart.

References


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organizations by type (Table 1). *Yearbook of International Organizations* 1999/2000 edition. URL http://www.uia.org/uiastats/ytb199.htm


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**Table 1: Jointly Run Palestinian and Israeli NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Main activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME) – umbrella organization for NGOs in Israel, PNA, Jordan and Egypt</td>
<td>Furthering regional sustainable development &amp; peace; protection of the environment; creation of necessary conditions for lasting peace; capacity building &amp; information sharing</td>
<td>Networking, conferences &amp; workshops, projects focusing on transboundary ecosystems (e.g., Dead Sea Basic, sustainable tourism for the Gulf of Aqaba); renewable energy project; environmental impact of the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone, renewable energy demonstration program, environmental awareness programs; Middle Eastern environmental newsletter; independent environmental assessments of new projects associated with the peace process; evaluation of relationship between investments &amp; sustainable peace with governments, private investors, financial institutions &amp; the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI)</strong></td>
<td>Work toward peace through dialogue &amp; negotiation, development of mechanisms for attainment &amp; sustainability of peace, influencing policy &amp; decision-makers. Objectives of environment section -- concentration on joint preservation of environment, equality in knowledge, management of resources &amp; resolution of environmental conflicts.</td>
<td>Conferences on water management, hospital waste management, agricultural trade, industrialization, management of open spaces; expert meetings, research on air pollution, lead emissions, hazardous waste &amp; micro-nutrient deficiency, publications, extension of library and data-base, involvement of women in environmental projects, courses on environmental issues, Environmental Mediation Center, small projects for water and waste management</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestinian Israeli Environmental Secretariat (PIES)</strong></td>
<td>To forge Palestinian-Israeli commitment to joint environmental protection by bringing together people from different sectors; to develop shared discourse &amp; re-orientation of attitudes concerning the &quot;other&quot;; to promote sustainable development; to create mechanism for development of joint environmental projects that will upgrade the environmental infrastructure; to support Palestinian &amp; Israeli NGOs in carrying out joint projects; to influence decision makers</td>
<td>Educational Programs – environmental summer schools for Palestinian and Israeli youth, Nature Knows No Boundaries, One Blue Sky Above Us; training courses for teachers; sustainable environmental Programs – ISO 9000 &amp; ISO 14001 for Israeli and Palestinian business people; Student-to-Student Projects; Palestinian-Israeli Environmental Policy Initiative; Community Environmental Advocacy; Palestinian center for environmental research in Jericho.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 – Cooperating Palestinian Organizations and Areas of Interest (alphabetically ordered)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Main areas of interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Soil, water, air &amp; other environmental elements studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Environment Protection</td>
<td>Environmental awareness programs &amp; environmental summer camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Agricultural Services</td>
<td>Developing the agricultural sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection and Research Institute</td>
<td>Research &amp; development programs in environmental and public health issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Peace Association</td>
<td>Environmental awareness campaigns, Marine &amp; fishery research programs, waste management &amp; protection of natural reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees</td>
<td>Developing the agricultural sector &amp; improving rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Hydrology Group</td>
<td>Groundwater, surface water, public awareness training programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Society for the Protection of Environment and Nature</td>
<td>Environmental awareness programs &amp; environmental summer camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil, Water and Environment Institute</td>
<td>Water, wastewater &amp; soil analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Environmental Development Organization</td>
<td>Research in the environmental field, consultancy, training &amp; education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Environment Studies Center</td>
<td>Applied research in the fields of water, wastewater &amp; soil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife Palestine Society</td>
<td>Conservation &amp; management of biodiversity, education &amp; promotion of wildlife and nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Classification of Cooperating Israeli Organizations with their Main Activities (alphabetically ordered in each category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation Not the Main Focus</th>
<th>Cooperation Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B’tselem</strong> – water study of the Occupied Territories</td>
<td><strong>Arava Institute for Environmental Studies (AIES)</strong> – training of environmental professionals, scientific research, environmental awareness, policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition for Public Transportation</strong> – activities against construction of trans-Israel highway</td>
<td><strong>Blaustein Institute for Desert Research (Ben Gurion University)</strong> – Rangeland Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Galilee Society</strong> – health related environmental issues among Palestinian-Israeli population, data collection, advocacy</td>
<td><strong>Hebrew University</strong> – Joint Palestinian – Israeli management of aquifer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green Action</strong> – civil disobedience actions against globalization, trans-Israel highway, waste management, beach deterioration</td>
<td><strong>International Center for Bird Studies (Migratory Birds Know No Boundaries)</strong> – research &amp; educational activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greencourse</strong> – national university student organization involved in activities against trans-Israel highway construction, waste management, globalization</td>
<td><strong>Living Weave</strong> – educational wildlife projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heschel Center</strong> – educational center, training of environmental professionals</td>
<td><strong>Negev Institute for Peace and Development</strong> – empowerment of Palestinian people in many different areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel Economic Forum for the Environment</strong> – “green standards” for Israeli &amp; Palestinian businesses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life &amp; Environment</strong> – umbrella organization of Israeli environmental &amp; social NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Jerusalem</strong> – sustainable development in greater Jerusalem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Negev</strong> – sustainable development of the Negev, joint water project with Palestinian partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Environmental NGO Questionnaire Guide

**Information and background about the director/interviewee**

- Who are they?      
- Profession      
- Experience in environmental issues 
- Full/part time employment

**Part 1 - General information about the NGO:**

- Organization name      
- Address      
- Phone & fax numbers      
- E-mail & web site addresses

- Contact People      
- Date of foundation      
- Objectives of this NGO

**Main activities**

- Completed projects and projects for near future.

**Funding sources**

**Scope**

- Experience with cooperation? If yes move to part 2, if no move to part 3.

**Part 2 – Questions for NGOs that have experienced cooperation**

- What are the reasons that made this organization dedicated to protect the environment?

- Who were/are your partners?

- How long have you been cooperating?

- List of completed work and projects you have done together

- Describe a project(s) that you have done together. How was it initiated & contact made? Who was responsible for the planning (one side, two sides, together)? How many people from each side participated? Describe the actual event – did people work together or separately? What was good about the activity? What was problematic? Based on your experience, would you like to plan a future joint project with the group? Do you have any projects planned with these partners in the near future?

- What were the motivations and reasons of this cooperation?

- Did you publicize your interests in cooperation? If yes, how? If no, why not?

- In general, do you sum up your experiences with joint projects as negative or positive? Please explain.

- What obstacles have you encountered during your cooperation? How did you deal with them?

- What events have been helpful?

- Do you intend to continue this cooperation or expand it?
What were the advantages and disadvantages of this cooperation?

Part 3 – Questions for all

Does your NGO have a mechanism for evaluating projects? If so, what is it? If not, how do you evaluate your work?

Do you think that there is a connection between the conflict and the damage that has been done to the environment? If yes, please explain why, giving examples if possible.

Do you think that resolution of the conflict will help improve the environment? If yes, please explain how you think this will happen. If no, why not?

Do you think that joint ecological project will enhance the peace process? How?

Contact information: Dr. Julia Chaitin, Kibbutz Urim, D.N. Hanegev, ISRAEL. e-mail: jchaitin@bgumail.bgu.ac.il

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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEBANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD PALESTINIAN RESETTLEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA

Simon Haddad

Abstract

A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social distance on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using comprehensive cross-cultural survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all Lebanese sub-groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes toward resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social distance is inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes toward the prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. These findings indicate on one hand, that the majority of Sunnis and Druze respondents endorse communal ties with Palestinians and approve their permanent economic, social and political integration. However, social distance influence political attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement, namely in the case of Christian and Shi' groups. Hence, for most Lebanese the question is about their own political survival not Palestinian resettlement If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will create a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of the society.

Introduction

After half a century in the shadows, the Palestinian refugee issue has assumed a central place in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the initiation of the Middle East peace process in 1991. Following the discussions in Madrid, it has become clear that a satisfactory solution regarding the future of Palestinian refugees residing in Arab host countries is imperative for a durable peace in the Middle East. Pending a political solution that determines their fate, more than five million Palestinians continue to be refugees in various Arab countries. Although host population-refugee interaction vary proportionally to rights and restrictions accorded to Palestinians, Palestinians living in most parts of the Arab world have been considerably integrated (Aruri and Farsoun 1981; Brand 1988; Davis 1996; Arneberg 1997).

An exception is Lebanon, which continues to be the most reluctant of hosts. Lebanese officials seem concerned that Peace with Israel would eventually lead to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in the country. They worry that this cannot take place without further eroding the country’s precarious
demographic composition. After two decades of civil war, Palestinian presence has been the subject of much controversial debate ranging from statements calling for their comprehensive deportation to more careful and pragmatic propositions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure form of permanent residence. And while almost all segments of society-politicians, religious leaders, political parties and scholars- joined the discussion, it is important to devote attention to public attitudes vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the prospect of their permanent settlement in Lebanon.

Debate regarding the fate of Palestinians residing in Lebanon resurfaced with the confirmation in the Oslo Agreement that there is an agreement to settle the Palestinians in the countries where they actually reside. If a solution is reached regarding the Palestinians' presence, it will not provide for their return. Lebanese positions range from statements calling for their wholesale removal to more measured and accommodating suggestions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure form of residency. Not only the permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is outlawed under Lebanon’s constitution, but also public statements by Lebanese officials continue to itinerate a refusal to permanently integrate the refugees. Lebanese President Emile Lahoud confirmed this point when addressing a conference for Francophone countries in Canada that “all the Lebanese people agree that the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees is a time bomb” (Blanford 1999, p.18). Other examples of this common political position are a remark by a prominent Shii Lebanese politician, Abdallah Al-Amin (Al-Majallah 1995): "The talk about settling the Palestinians does not concern us in any way. We say that the Palestinians must return to Palestine, as we are unable to absorb or settle anyone." Former Minister of Education Michel Eddeh (Al-Nahar November, 1999) concludes: "Lebanon refuses the implantation of the Palestinians on its territories, since this foreshadows the country's division." Sunni MP Ahmed Karami (Al-Nahar July, 1999) expressed his categorical opposition “While the foreign media have been suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese, we think that the Lebanese people, because of their unity and solidarity, can stop any resettlement plan”.

Although writings about Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon are numerous, most of them tend to be first, very much descriptive or mainly concerned about the refugees legal and socio-political standing (Salam 1994; Sayigh 1994; Arzt 1996; El-Khazen 1997). Second, only rarely are studies nationwide and cross-cultural, with a concern of discovering what conditions social and political relationships. Third, and perhaps most important, there has been little research in which the individual Lebanese is the unit of analysis, and accordingly very few systematic database investigations that focus on the link between the social and political orientations of ordinary Lebanese citizens toward Palestinian presence (Khashan 1994; Haddad 2000).
To these deficiencies may be added the dearth of information about the relationship between social attitudes held by the Lebanese towards Palestinians and their indefinite settlement in Lebanon. In order for Palestinian resettlement to be feasible, there needs to be general consensus in the country, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of this position among the different sectarian groups. In a multi-confessional state that recognizes the primacy of religious communities, any decision or policy must satisfy all communities to be workable. Second, there should be overall low levels of intolerance for Palestinians in the population. In our view, minimal social integration and weak inter-communal bonds between Lebanese and Palestinian groups are a major obstacle to achieving resettlement without disrupting peaceful coexistence in the country. These two elements constitute a conceptualization of social distance that is appropriate to the Lebanese. Accordingly, to contribute to an understanding of whether and how social distance toward Palestinians influence the way that ordinary Lebanese think about resettlement, this study uses cross-sectional survey data from Lebanon to examine the degree to which social distance account for variance in attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon.

Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Study

a-Relevant Theoretical Considerations

Immigration, involving long-term relocations of people across national borders, is a timely issue of sensible and academic importance. The act of leaving one's native country and settling in another country has immediate and long-term consequences for both immigrants and members of immigrant-receiving nations. Immigration presents a range of challenges, and the challenge of managing immigration successfully—in ways that facilitate the achievement and well being of immigrants, that benefit the country collectively, and that produce the cooperation and support of members of the receiving society—is critical for nations and individuals (Dovidio and Esses 2001). These issues have been framed academically largely in terms of economics, politics, and resource management. As a consequence, they have been studied extensively by economists, sociologists, political scientists, demographers, historians, and geographers (e.g., Borjas 1999; Cohen & Layton-Henry 1997; Hirschman, Kasinitz, & DeWind 1999; Rumbaut, Foner, & Gold 1999).

While an estimated 80 million migrants, almost 2 percent of the world's population, live permanently or for long periods of time outside their countries of origin (Castles 1993, p. 18) in most cases, and even European nations have seen harsh, often violent, reactions to these new minorities (Pettigrew 1998, p. 77). As Solomos and Wrench (1993) indicate, "In many societies in contemporary Europe, questions about migration and the position of minorities are amongst the most hotly contested areas of social and
political debate. Developments in Britain, France and Germany over the past decade have highlighted the volatility of the phenomenon and the ease with which it can lead to violent conflict" (p. 4). Even immigration that clearly and objectively benefits a nation as a whole does not necessarily have the same consequences for all segments of the population (Borjas 1999; Castells 1997). Immigration may thus be perceived as threatening and undesirable by subsets of a population (Cohen 1997). Opposition to immigration may vary systematically as a function of perceived competition across time and for different segments of the receiving society (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong 1998). Many continue to view the new minorities as not belonging - even the growing numbers of the second- and third-generation who have lived only in the host nation. They view the new minorities as "a people apart" who violate traditional values and for whom they feel little sympathy or admiration and tend to discriminate against them (MacEwen 1995). Discrimination comes about only when individuals or groups are denied equal treatment (Allport 1954, p.51)

Both direct and indirect discrimination are involved (Pettigrew 1998, p. 79). Direct discrimination, where blatantly prejudiced people may oppose immigration categorically, is straightforward and sets up spatial boundaries of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of immigrants. It occurs at points where inequality is generated, often intentionally. That is when steps to exclude members of a certain group from our neighborhood, school, occupation or country are taken. A classical example is provided by surveys of Black/White interracial contact in the United States. Scholars assert that White acceptance of Blacks across a range of formal and informal settings. Preferred social distance or pro-integration sentiments among Whites measured their acceptance concerning bringing a Black person home for dinner, allowing Blacks into the neighborhood, and permitting interracial marriage (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner 1996).

Indirect discrimination involves people with more subtle biases who may oppose the immigration of certain groups of people (i.e., stigmatized racial or ethnic groups) but justify their exclusion on the basis of reasons other than prejudice, such as economic reasons (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). It operates when the inability to obtain citizenship restricts the opportunities of non-EU minorities in most institutions. It restricts their ability to get suitable housing, employment, and schooling for children. A visa is required for travel to other EU countries. In short, the lives of non-citizens are severely circumscribed (Wilpert 1993). Castles (1984) contends that the newcomers are established as a problematic and stigmatized outgroup, suitable for low-status jobs but not for citizenship. Wilpert goes further. She asserts that Germany's institutions are based on "a dominant ideology, which distributes rights according to ethnic origins..." (Wilpert 1993, p. 70). The revealing comparison is between the almost two million Aussiedler and the Gastarbeiter. Officials regard the former as kin often on the thinnest of evidence, though since 1996 a language test must be taken. Aussiedler
readily become citizens and receive favorable government treatment. Yet even third-generation Turks, who are at least as culturally "German" as the Aussiedler, are largely denied citizenship and given unfavorable treatment.

*b-Obstacles to Palestinian Integration in Lebanon*

There are no definitive figures concerning the number of Palestinians in Lebanon today but estimates suggest that the actual size of the Palestinian community is close or even 400 thousand or more than 10 percent of the country’s population. Because of the lack of census data and civil status records, political motives tend to distort accurate figures.

For the first few years following their arrival in 1948, Palestinians refugees were given material and moral support, but since then their treatment has deteriorated. Early governmental response was that the Palestinians are not allowed to stay indefinitely in the country and Lebanese authorities refused to discuss any solution that would open the door for the Palestinians to become assimilated or naturalized. In fact, the Lebanese government has made every effort to make life uncomfortable, and Lebanon unwelcoming, for the Palestinian community (Natour 1996, p.60). This policy is practiced consistently and with obsessive fervor to make sure that those Palestinians wishing to remain in Lebanon are unable to do so, under unbearable economic and political circumstances (Sayigh 2001).

Consequently, not only Palestinians were denied basic refugee or immigrant rights (Westin 2001), but also they have been in most cases the victim of official discrimination, social derogation and exclusion: First, restrictions on political rights and naturalization have ensured that Palestinians have been excluded from public institutions of social life and from the legal rights and protections the state affords to its citizens. Officially, the Palestinian community does not call for Lebanese citizenship, but those who can acquire it do so. In the past several years, around 50,000 Palestinians have been naturalized in Lebanon. In 1994, citizenship has been granted to another 27,000 who were mostly Shii residents of Southern border villages who had Palestinian refugee status (Shaml 1997); the rest were Sunnis who, for reasons not made public, were naturalized in 1995, perhaps to balance out the Shii naturalization. Maronite protest ensured that the few remaining Palestinian Christians without Lebanese citizenship were then naturalized (Peteet 1999). In addition, travel restrictions on Palestinians were always tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents issued by the government were temporary. Accordingly, the greatest majority remains stateless and is treated as foreigners, since Lebanese law prevents Palestinians from buying property.

This leads us to the second type of governmental restraints, which has to do with economic integration in the labor market. This is where Lebanese and Palestinians meet, interact, and develop mutual interdependence. Palestinians are classified as special case category foreigners along with Sri Lankans, Thais, Filipinos, Kurds and Syrians, who together constitute
Lebanon’s imported working class. A harsh policy referred to as “strangulation” of Palestinians is accomplished by extremely restrictive options that provides for employment only by permit and the near-total absence of social welfare provisions (Peteet 1997). Obtaining a work permit remains a complex and lengthy process that offers neither social security nor insurance benefits nor a regular wage increase, and becomes invalid when its holder is laid off the job. Moreover, employment in large institutions is largely closed to Palestinians because it is governed by sectarian rules. Palestinians, however, explicitly are forbidden to work in virtually more than 70 qualified professions such as medicine and law. These restrictions force them to work in the informal sector with low wages, insecurity and no benefits. On the other hand, and as a preventive measure to discourage them from remaining in the country, official policy has made it difficult for the younger generation to continue post-compulsory school studies, even if international assistance has helped to provide secondary school places for some. The normal public schools are closed to Palestinians, while private schools charge fees that are often beyond their means (Hammarberg 2000).

Third, legally enforced segregation in housing ensures that not only are Palestinians in Lebanon confined to well defined, circumscribed and surveilled camps but they are also prevented from urgent reconstruction work in the camps, which contribute to their insecurity. Restrictions on building and reconstruction in the camps have resulted in severe overcrowding. Refugees have been banned since 1992 from bringing in any kind of building material into camps “Not even stones to cover our graves, says a camp official” (The Economist 2000). Since the government did not show the slightest interest in integrating the refugees, Lebanon remains the only host country where the quota of camp inhabitants is still higher than 50 percent.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Lebanese prejudice put into practice receives additional evidence from Palestinians’ perceptions of their situation in Lebanon. By definition, Palestinians are held in low regard by Lebanese and are often subject of negative stereotypes, hatred and hostility. Palestinians also recognized the differences between Lebanese and Palestinians in social prestige and socio-economic conditions. According to Peteet “there are several problems in distinguishing Palestinians from Lebanese and confining them to homogeneous enclaves” (Peteet 1996, p.28). However, until the late 1960s, the majority of Lebanese citizens did not manifest blatant prejudice or outright rejection for Palestinian refugees who came to Lebanon in 1948 and who share language and culture with their Lebanese hosts. In fact, many Palestinians have formed strong social and economic ties, through a long history of intermarriage and trade, to their host country. According to one Lebanese official (Brynen 1997), for example, fully one-quarter of third generation Palestinians in Lebanon has one Lebanese parent.

Although, urban Palestinian camps, which were scattered allover Lebanese territory had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas by the mid-seventies,
Lebanon’s official policy contributed, through deliberate spatial containment, to create and sharpen communal distinctions. During the 1950s, tight vigil by the army curtailed movement for Palestinians. Later, with the dissolution of state authority in the 1970s and 1980s, local Lebanese militias crafted and imposed boundaries where a fluidity of space and social relations once prevailed between Lebanese and Palestinians (Cutting 1988). In postwar Lebanon, Palestinian refugees describe their lives in terms of abnormality. Aside from shortages of shelter, food, safety and access to medical care and education, they have constant doubts about the security of residence. In fact, not only were Palestinians landscaped out of Palestine, but also the erasure continues in exile. A Palestinian lawyer, echoing popular sentiment, has written, "that there are those who believe that the group known as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will stop existing within a few years (Al-Natour 1993, p.41).” The refugee experience did not include the usual minority attributes of difference in language, religion and culture. Palestinian marginality is contingent, to some extent, on the concept of a Lebanese nation and society, however problematic, that excludes them. This negative identity held by their hosts prompted some observers to characterize the Lebanese society as minestrone rather than a melting pot, and encouraged the Palestinians to stress their culture, tradition and own identity (Koltermann 1997).

c-Basic Views on Palestinian Resettlement

Despite growing opposition to Palestinian resettlement, many think that Lebanon will have to face the reality of settling the Palestinians in it. Under the best circumstances, it might be possible to ensure that 250,000 to 300,000 of them leave, but Lebanon will find itself compelled to absorb at least 100,000 of them (Abd-al-Samad 1995; Khoury 2000). At the same time, there is very little support in Lebanon, at either the official or popular level, for the permanent resettlement of a significant number of Palestinians. In general, Lebanese authorities avoid raising this issue because it causes internal divisions, not about the principle of rejecting the settlement of Palestinians, but about the way in which this policy should be carried out. Some people in Lebanon believe that the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon will created demographic, economic, social, and sectarian disorders. More specifically, Lebanon’s opposition to resettlement rests on three major perceived political and historical arguments (Solh 1999):

* Economic: Lebanon's geographical area is very small in relation to its population. The Lebanese area that can be settled and exploited, after eliminating the mountains and deep valleys, is very small. This makes it unable to assimilate the Palestinian refugees, especially following the devastation inflicted by the civil war. Former Minister Michel Edde adds that it is “impossible” for Palestinian refugees to settle in Lebanon. “The economic situation is very difficult and people are emigrating due to the high rate of unemployment” (Daily Star, 30/12/2000).
* **Political and Historical:** Granting the refugees sanctuary was undertaken as a humane, emergency measure; it was never intended to be permanent, the situation of the Palestinian refugees in the existing camps in Lebanon is basically different from their situation in some Arab countries where they live, work, and enjoy medical and educational security (Boueiz 1994). After more than 50 years, Lebanese see themselves as having paid a much higher price for the Palestinian cause than any other country. There are harsh memories of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s in which the Palestinians were blamed for dragging the country into bloodshed. Lebanese feel they cannot be asked to pay more in the form of the consequences incumbent on settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.

* **Demographic:** Lebanon is a multi-confessional country with seventeen officially recognized sects. Lebanese belong to three main sects: Muslim, Christian and Druze. The Lebanese sectarian structure is very delicate. Palestinians citizenship would further skew the already shaky balance both between Christians and Muslims, and between Sunni and Shia Muslims$. Any imbalance will have a political, social, economical, and security impact on it. Ever since, Lebanon found himself host to a large and overwhelmingly Muslim refugee population, the Christians anticipated that the largely Muslim refugees might threaten their economic and political dominance, and assumed demographic majority. They feared and still fear their presence could upset the sectarian balance and political status quo by serving as a focal point for the growing discontent of Lebanon's Muslims and their eventual political mobilization for a greater share of power and national resources. Lebanon's Shis concur; out of fear that Palestinians will tilt the Muslim Lebanese balance in the wrong direction. (The Economist 1992, p.45)

In fact the government still proclaimed the Palestinian refugees to constitute the greatest menace to national security. In this context, the immense number of mostly Muslim refugees was seen as highly explosive, threatening to blow up the entire political system of their host country.

The intensity of anti-Palestinian feelings, judged by the intensity and salience of hostile attitudes publicly expressed, prompted a journalist to characterize Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians as ranging between two poles: indifference at one level and negativity at the other, with negativism varying between active hostility and passive dislike (Zeine 1994). Notwithstanding more concrete evidence are provided from cross sectional surveys of Lebanese groups (Khashan 1994; Haddad 2000). Previous research findings on the permanent settlement of Palestinian in Lebanon have pointed out that attitudes expressed by the Lebanese have been found to be highly non-supportive of resettlement, attitudes towards the Palestinians are variable, but usually negative. However, the relationship between attitudes towards the Palestinians as individuals or group and support for resettlement, which is the focus of the present report, has not been examined.
Methodology

In all, 1073 adult individuals, 688 male and 385 female respondents responded to these questions. The survey was carried out in late December 1999 and January 2000, using a face-to-face interviewing procedure. The response rate (based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared with households contacted) was 80 percent.

The sample included five occupational sub-groups, selected on the basis of quota sampling necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not possible due to lack of accurate demographic data pertaining to the characteristics and the urban distribution of the population. Because the sample is non-probabilistic, it is important to describe its characteristics and to note that, in some respects, they differ from those of the larger Lebanese population over the age of 18. The sex distribution of the sample consisted of 64 percent male and 36 percent female. The lower proportion of women in the study reflects their marginal position in the Lebanese society dominated by males as well as their limited professional role. The sample had an age range of 18-66 years and a mean age of 33 years. The representation of each confessional group is, as close as possible, in proportion to its actual size in Lebanon's population: 29 percent Maronites, 10 percent Greek-Catholics, 9 percent Greek-Orthodox, 27 percent Shi`is, 18 percent Sunnis, and 7 percent Druze. In terms of educational level, the sample was found to be over-represented in the college-educated level with 58 percent having achieved college education. Less-educated Lebanese generally have a problem in forming political opinions. In terms of occupational groupings the sample somewhat over-represented people with professional and managerial occupations, and underrepresented people in the trades and labor category.

Despite some limitations, including the non-representative composition and the relatively small size of the sample, this data constitutes an empirical foundation possessing considerable strength. First, the availability of opinion data dealing with socio-political issues is itself a very notable strength because surveys dealing with political attitudes are extremely rare in the Arab world and also in Lebanon. Lebanese people in general are cooperative but have deep concern about their security. They suspect that most of such surveys are conducted to serve government objectives or a deceitful political organization. In responding to questionnaires what they think or write could be used against them. Second, the respondents were interviewed in an atmosphere of strict confidentiality, and well-trained interviewers of the same religious background interviewed the respondents in their native language (Arabic). The author maintained close contact with the field workers during the entire period of data collection and personally supervised the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation and presentation. Third, given the precarious nature of survey research in a conflictual environment three reliability test measures were imposed on the data: pre-testing, internal consistency and response bias. Consequently,
proper additions, deletions, and adjustments were made on the final version. In general, respondents attested that the questions were easily understood.

**Survey Instrument**

In developing the survey instrument, an initial pool of items was constructed from two sources. Approximately half of the items were adapted from existing instruments (Allport 1954; Khashan 1994; Bettancourt & Dorr 1998; Labianca et al. 1998; Tuch et al. 1999). The remaining items were developed anew by the investigator. Many of the items adapted from previous instruments were reworded to simplify their readability. Items were selected or developed to assess social distance and attitude toward resettlement, which represents the single dependent variable in this study. English and Arabic language versions were prepared. A copy of the interview schedule is available from the author.

**Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and Dependent Variables by Religious Sect**

### Christian Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maronites</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Coeff*</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR scale°</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD scale°</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Muslim Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sunnis</th>
<th>Shi’is</th>
<th>Druze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Coeff*</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATR scale°</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD scale°</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Full Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Coeff*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATR scaleª</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD scale°</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B: *Attitudes toward Resettlement  
  o Social Distance  
  *Cornbach’s Alpha coefficient

Independent Variable

The present analysis seeks to determine the role of social distance established between Lebanese and Palestinians in accounting for variance in attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. A scale to determine the level of social distance was constructed from seven items dealing with views about preferred social distance between Lebanese and Palestinians. Multi-reliability and factor analysis were employed to ascertain the unidimensionality of the scale. The survey items that cluster together are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Survey Items Used to Measure Social Distance towards Palestinians

1. Do you think that Lebanese and Palestinian students should go to same schools or to separate schools?
2. How strong would you object or support if a member of your family had close personal relation with Palestinians?
3. Do you think that there should be laws against marriage between Lebanese and Palestinians?
4. How would you feel if a relative of yours was planning to marry a Palestinian?
5. How would you feel if all your children’s’ schoolmates were Palestinians?
6. Would you accept to live in a neighborhood where the Palestinians are a majority?
7. How willingly would you sympathize with Palestinians?

Table 2. Factor Analysis Scores for the Social Distance Items Using Varimax Rotation (full sample)
Social distance or views on integration of Palestinians is the primary independent variable in this analysis. Nonetheless, whether it is related to attitude toward Palestinian resettlement is to be determined. Although it might be assumed that increased social distance implies opposition to Palestinian resettlement, permitting differentiation between independent and dependent variables, the actual situation is much more complex. Lebanese officials have issued contradictory statements about whether the Lebanese government will permit Palestinians to be fully integrated in the country, and even theoreticians and politicians advance different views about whether such integration is probable.

Bogardus introduced the Social Distance Scale for use as an index of the social distance that respondents perceive between themselves and members of different groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, religion, or politics. The scale, or some form of it, has been used in studies involving a variety of populations, including ethnic minorities (Bogardus 1925, 1967; Fagan & O’Neill 1965; Payne et al. 1974; Kunz & Ohenebra-Saki 1989; Lambert & Taylor 1990), and has been considered as a measure of prejudice. The survey contained a battery of likert scale questions (responded to in terms of strong agreement, agreement, etc.) tapping various aspects of the preferred social distance between oneself or one’s family and Palestinians living in Lebanon. Some items were phrased positively (i.e., indicating tolerance) and others were phrased negatively (i.e., indicating prejudice). From seven of the questions used in the survey, this scale which assesses respondents’ willingness to accept Palestinians in various roles (as a neighbor, friend, etc.) was constructed and checked by various empirical analyses (internal consistency of items in a scale, factor analysis of items, and scale inter-correlations). The sum score of the items divided by their number was taken as an indication of negativeness or prejudice. The survey items that cluster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same or separate schools</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close personal relation</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws against mixed marriage</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian schoolmates</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian neighborhood</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathize with Palestinians</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marry Palestinians</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
together are shown in Table 2. Other independent variables are also included in the analysis to assess the explanatory power of intense religiosity relative to that of other factors. Linear regression is used to examine these relationships, with the following independent variables included in the model: education, income and SES.

2. The Dependent Variable

   Table 3: Survey Items used to measure the Dependent Variable

1. If resettlement were imposed, would you accept it?
2. If Palestinian resettlement were imposed, would you actually try to resist it militarily?
3. Do you think that Palestinian resettlement will lead to inter-group conflict?
4. Do you agree with the claim that Palestinian resettlement will result in the resumption of the civil war?
5. Given your understanding of the Palestinian resettlement issue, would you say resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese society?

Factor Analysis Scores for the Attitudes towards Resettlement Items Using Varimax Rotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accept resettlement</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resist resettlement militarily</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement will lead to conflict over allocation of power</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement will result in the resumption of the civil war</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese society</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Attitude Toward Palestinian Resettlement Scale by Religious Sect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maronites</th>
<th>Catholics</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox</th>
<th>Sunnis</th>
<th>Shi'is</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favors resettlement</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat for resettlement</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposes resettlement</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The items listed in Table 3 have been combined to form a scale.

The dependent variable in this analysis is attitude toward Palestinian resettlement. A scale composed on five inter-correlated items from the survey instrument measures attitude. Table 3 lists the items used to construct these measures, all of which deal with the respondents’ present position, perceived impact, and reaction to Palestinian resettlement, Table 4 presents the response distribution on these measures of the dependent variable.

Evidence in support of the validity and reliability of these measures comes from several sources. Multi-reliability analysis revealed high inter-item correlations and the reported Cornbach Alpha was equal to 0.86. Confidence was further increased by the use of factor analysis; the five items load highly on one factor demonstrating that these items cluster together and thus measure the same underlying concept.

**Analysis of The Findings**

Table 1 presents the respondents mean ratings for all five independent and dependent variables used in the study. In addition to highlighting the socio-economic status for every sub-group (community), two important results are generated. First, with regard to social distance, all three Christian groups, joined by the Shiis, display higher levels of discrimination against Palestinians compared to Sunnis and Druze. For instance, Christian groups scores were 64 percent, 61 percent, and 60 percent respectively in contrast to 43 percent for the Shiis and 25 percent and 26 percent for the Druze on the social distance scale. Second, in terms of the overall level of support for Palestinian resettlement, the results indicated only moderate support among Sunnis and Druze in sharp contrast to Christian and Shii clear opposition to its prospect. These findings indicate that views of Lebanese communities are
less divided between Christians and Muslims than within each of the subgroups. Thus, in order to answer the research question concerning the independent relationship between the level of respondents’ social distance, their demographic characteristics, and their attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement, multiple regression analysis was employed. Table 5 presents beta weights and t statistics between social distance, education, income and SES and attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement. The results indicate that social distance is significantly related to attitudes toward resettlement for all sub-groups. Thus, the higher the respondents’ level of social distance, the less the overall support given to resettlement. In other words respondents from all sects are much less likely to support resettlement in Lebanon if they contest future personal contact with Palestinians, whether civic, educational or residential. Indeed, these relationships are always stronger than those involving any other independent variable, i.e. educational attainment in the case of the Sunnis and income level for the Shiis were found significantly related to the criterion variable (p>0.05).

**Table 5**

Multiple Regression of Factors influencing Attitudes toward Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maronites (n=283)</th>
<th>Catholics (n=83)</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox (n=83)</th>
<th>Sunnis (n=158)</th>
<th>Shi’is (n=226)</th>
<th>Druze (n=68)</th>
<th>Full Sample (N=901)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social distance</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.77)**</td>
<td>(-4.33)**</td>
<td>(-5.05)**</td>
<td>(-7.02)**</td>
<td>(-6.49)**</td>
<td>(-3.75)**</td>
<td>(-16.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(-0.84)</td>
<td>(4.10)**</td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.52)</td>
<td>(-1.38)</td>
<td>(-0.42)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(2.55)*</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.42)</td>
<td>(-1.27)</td>
<td>(-0.60)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(-1.04)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>34.81</td>
<td>(19.52)**</td>
<td>(17.65)**</td>
<td>(10.34)**</td>
<td>(9.30)**</td>
<td>(10.67)**</td>
<td>(54.61)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Table 5 shows standardized coefficients (betas) and gives t statistics in parentheses *p<0.05;**p<0.01

Although part of these findings is to be expected- in the case of Christian groups- those related to Muslim groups- are surprising and interesting. They are also at variance with the arguments advanced by some scholars, to the effect that Tawtin, or resettlement, is probably the only issue on which the views of the Lebanese - across ideological and confessional lines - agree. This argument is presented by El-Khazen (1997) who contends that Palestinian presence, from being the most divisive issue in post-independence Lebanese politics is one of the few issues that arouse national consensus in post-war Lebanon. A more plausible argument is offered by Sayigh (2001) who asserts that Lebanese public can be divided into three main segments: 1) a determined anti-Palestinian minority, 2) a large
component who are indifferent to the Palestinian issue unless aroused by sectarian campaigning, and 3) a minority that positively supports the refugees.

Findings from the present study lend only partial support to these arguments. Social distance defined in terms of degree of endorsement or rejection of inter-communal -social, civic, residential, educational- ties with Palestinians bears a significant relationship about attitude toward resettlement. Intense anti-Palestinianism is discernible in the case of Christian groups namely in statements like: "Usually, we don't care about them. Sometimes we feel pity for them because they are poor. But we don't think that they belong here" (Kolterman 1997, p.7). A reconstructive ethos promoting "Lebanon for the Lebanese", which has been carried by Lebanese Christians throughout the civil war, is reiterated usually by Christian leaders who tend to exaggerate the size of the Palestinian community and use the question of resettlement to flourish their political vision of partition. Religious affinity plays a part in this extreme position since the Palestinian refugee population is constituted as nearly all Muslim (Peteet 1997). Prior to the 1975 civil war, in order to further a sectarian gloss to the refugee issue, and in a demographic attempt to bolster the Christian population, the Lebanese Government made available Lebanese citizenship to Palestinian Christians. One of the major consequences of the Civil War was Confessional “cleansing” of Palestinian refugee camps in Christian-controlled areas to other parts of the country. Massive population shifts, accompanied by the reintegration of displaced Palestinians into more homogeneous, self-contained and exclusive spaces and the consequent physical separations have confined Palestinian interaction to practically two Lebanese groups, Sunni and Shii Muslims (Khashan 1992). However, a highly significant negative relationship between social distance and attitude toward resettlement emerges from the findings. Beyond political factors, such as the deterioration of Palestinian-Lebanese relationship, heavy-handed Israeli retaliation and PLO excesses, a set of economic asymmetries added to Palestinian-Shii antagonism. Both communities lived side by side but the Shii belonged to a lower low socio-economic spectrum. Underclass resentment aroused because of the material advantage enjoyed by Palestinians who were well established in Arab oil-producing states projecting Palestinians as aliens, intruders and destroyers of our country (Sayigh 1994). Referring to Palestinian misbehavior during their presence in Lebanon, a Shii villager told Norton “We gave Palestinians everything and they gave us back insults, corpses, and lessons in corruption” (Norton 1987, p. 12).

This negative position is extended only to a minority of Sunni respondents. Khashan and Palmer (1981), who examined Sunni perceptions during the Lebanese civil war, found out that the dominant position enjoyed by Palestinians during that period, while not vociferously opposed by the Sunnis, was complicated by the fact that Lebanese Sunnis generally accorded
the Palestinian refugees an inferior social status. Thus, Palestinian-Lebanese Sunnite affinity was partially eroded by military dominance of Palestinians and by the reversal of status roles (Khashan & Palmer 1981). While part of the Sunnis tends to distance themselves from Palestinians, this tendency is stronger among less educated Sunnis than among their college-educated counterparts. Indeed this result is striking since the integration of refugees is supposed to take place, according to experts, within their sub-community. However, this finding is in line with the position adopted by most Sunni politicians. In 1990, even the Sunni Muslim leaders-who theoretically had most to gain from the assimilation of the Sunni Palestinians into Lebanese society- refused to welcome the Palestinians. This ultimately led to the unexpected amendment to the constitution refusing non-Lebanese permanent residence in the country. Later, Sunni prime Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri explicitly uttered, "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency that has supported them since 1948" (Cooley 1999, p.1)

Experiences of Palestinian marginality in interacting with Lebanese are illustrated by Sayigh "Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that immigrants carried tuberculosis, and more recent fears of immigrants as carriers of the AIDS virus. Pathology demands quarantine: segregating Palestinians would facilitate the "normalization" of Lebanon in the post-war era with national health restored through the isolation of an infectious presence" (Sayigh 1996, p. 28).

Pro-Palestinian voices present a weak minority in favor of resettlement. A housing project submitted by the Canadian government to help provide a certain measure of relief to the homeless refugees through the construction of new barracks outside Beirut was supported in 1994, by Walid Jumblatt, Minister for Refugees and leader of the Druze community. However, the media leaked the talks and the violent protests that ensued led to the abandonment of the entire project. This was a symptom of the fact that any initiative that can be interpreted as indirect assent to the Palestinians remaining is interpreted as a confessionally move. The Druze minority was mainly interested in a buffer zone of loyal Palestinians between them and the expanding Shi'a population. This is a clear indicator of expressed social desirability of Palestinians by a large segment of the Druze community.

The findings of the present study indicated that social distance was a significant predictor variable for all sub-groups-and the only predictor for most of them, i.e. Christians and Druze. According to this concept, not only does an observer interpret a group or member of a group erroneously, he or she concludes that it he is inferior and therefore unwanted. This tendency for outgroups rejection and hostility is clearly reflected in the study’s findings that a high rating of social distance is related to the rejection of Palestinian permanent settlement in Lebanon. Specifically, the study’s findings indicated
that respondents who tend to score highly on the social distance scale believed that resettlement will have damaging repercussions on the country, and are therefore more likely to resist it.

To conclude, some brief observations pertaining to other independent variables may be offered. Findings about these variables are not always consistent and are, in any event of secondary importance to the present study. In his attempt to determine the correlates of multiculturalism in Australia, Robert Ho (1990) found that ethnocentrism was the only significant predictor, but none of the demographic variables, for respondents’ attitudes toward multiculturalism. In fact, respondents’ education, income, and SES level were, in most cases, unimportant predictors of attitudes toward resettlement. Nevertheless, there are several interesting relationships, some of which identify promising areas for future research. To begin, the absence of any significant relationship involving SES deserves mention. It delineates the failure of the analysis to control for other meaningful factors, most notably the respondents’ level of economic security and the perceived effect of immigration on employment opportunities. In multicultural Canada, economic concerns and worries have been assigned a more important role than intolerance in determining the attitude toward immigration. Furthermore, because Lebanon suffers from economic stagnation at the moment, it may be hypothesized that perceived economic insecurity would have pushed towards opposition to resettlement. This proposition, which deserves future study, is consistent with findings about determinants of political attitudes toward immigration in Western countries. In his survey of Canadian attitudes toward immigration, Tienhaara (1974) found that opposition to immigration was greater during recession and attributed most to unemployment concerns. This point receives support from a recent investigation that brought similar results using survey data in many studies on immigration and attitudes towards immigrants (Palmer 1996). The economic dimension is particularly worthy of examination as Lebanon may be expected to accept permanent settlement of refugees induced by a tremendous aid/development package. If economic conditions improve as a result of Palestinian resettlement, would this reduce social distance and hence opposition for resettlement? Coupled with the present study’s findings that social distance account for variance in Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement, this suggests that a multi-factor model, including other variables pertaining to the Lebanese situation have a much larger effect on attitudes toward resettlement than do the respondents’ self-interest measures.

Conclusion

A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social distance on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using cross-sectional survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all Lebanese subgroups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes toward
 resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social distance is inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes toward the prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

These findings indicate that, although social distance influence political attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement—a conclusion that is hardly surprising for Christian and Shii groups—the majority of Sunnis and Druze respondent endorse communal ties with Palestinians and approve their permanent economic, social and political integration. They also suggest a more focused conclusion about the kind of social factors most likely to have explanatory power. Judgments about the perceived consequences and to economic needs in particular appear to be important in determining the attitude toward resettlement. This proposition, which receives support from findings about the importance of nature of perception of immigration on economic status, offers a promising area for future research.

Keeping in mind that the nature of the sample employed in the present study may limit the generalizability of the obtained results, the overall findings carry a number of implications for the issues raised on the current debate over Palestinian permanent settlement in Lebanon and also for the Lebanese system as a whole. How genuine are Lebanese fears about resettlement? Palestinian otherness is juxtaposed not to a homogeneous singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and alliances, each with particular interests and fears. A majority of Christian and Shii respondents display intense prejudice towards Palestinians suggesting the presence of social barriers that hinders socio-economic integration of camp inhabitants and their children. On the other hand, the results suggest the presence of a structural weakness in the Lebanese system. Lebanese scholar Joseph Maila (2000) concedes that the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the vast majorities of whom are Sunni Muslim, could be fatal to Lebanon’s delicate social mosaic. The Palestinians could turn into an autonomous community, a development unprecedented in Lebanon. The kind of linkage between these Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority is likely to create tremendous problems for the Lebanese in the coming years. Hence, for most Lebanese the question is about their own political survival not Palestinian resettlement. These negative attitudes, coupled with further government restrictions and pressures on Palestinians, imply that permanent settlement is a dangerous alternative that threatens the regime with collapse. If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will create a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of the society. In connection with this, the Lebanese government finds itself compelled to consent to continued Palestinian military presence in refugee camps, which threatens to return to the situation of 20 years ago by reenacting the civil war. Refugees in Palestinian camps have grown increasingly restive over the course of the uprising. Lebanese authorities are discounting fears that the fighting in the Palestinian territories could spark a series of organized cross-border attacks into Israel from south Lebanon.
Whereas, Muslim clerics have been calling for active support to liberate Palestine, Christians responded by condemning “the voices announcing their intentions to violate Lebanese laws and attempt to go back to a past the Lebanese want to forget (Daily Star 7/10/2000).

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**Endnotes**

1In addition to increased attention to the Palestinian refugee question in Lebanon, a conference on Palestinian Resettlement were upheld in 1999, “Lebanese Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation,” at the University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, on November 11 and academic workshop entitled” Opposing Resettlement” at The Saint Joseph University organized by Research Center for Arab Law, Beirut on November 26 grouping prominent Lebanese figures and even the prime minister. This trend received
additional support with the announcement that Lebanese clerics of all sects intended to hold conference to take a harsh stance on the matter on July 29.

ii See Palestinians in Lebanon, Report on the Conference Held at Oxford, September 27th to 30th, 1996 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1996), p. 10. More recently Maronite deputy Naamatullah Abi-Nasr, former president of the Maronite League, offered a figure of 12 percent compared to other Arab host countries where Palestinian represent 1 percent of the population in the United Arab Emirates and only 0.1 percent in Egypt and in Saudi-Arabia during a conference entitled" Lebanese Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation," attended by the author on Palestinian Resettlement at the University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, Lebanon, on November 26, 1999.

iii Recently Lebanese Parliament approved revisions to Law 11614 (1969) concerning ownership of real estate by foreigners, forbidding "anyone who does not have citizenship in a recognized state (Palestinians)" from owning property, text published by al-Safir, 23 March, 2001).

iv This could mean that 40 to 45 percent of total Lebanese territory cannot be exploited and may result in increasing the population density to reach 632/km². This is a huge figure compared to other countries like Irak 47/km² and Australia 2/km².

v Though Lebanon’s constitution allocates public offices on the basis of a 50:50 ratio of Christians vs. Muslims, it is commonly accepted that the Muslims constitute a majority in the country.

vi The author sought to broaden the representativeness of the sample by including 20 professions which were regrouped into five sub-groups for reasons of data manageability: 19 percent professionals, 40 percent semi-professionals, 11 percent unskilled, 25 percent college students (selected from three private academic institutions: Notre-Dame University and Lebanese University, and the American University of Beirut) and 5 percent unemployed.

vii Maronite politicians such as Michel Edde and Naamatulah Abi-Nasr have brought the number of Palestinians in Lebanon to 500,000 and 600,000 respectively stressing that resettling them means partitioning the country.

viii This dimension receives additional support knowing that that unemployment in Lebanon is said to have exceeded 27 percent and that the demographic composition of the Lebanese society includes a formidable
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