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Moving from Fear towards Unity among Intergroup Dialogue Participants in Israel-Palestine: Findings from a Qualitative Meta-Data-Analysis

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Moving from Fear towards Unity among Intergroup Dialogue Participants in Israel-Palestine: Findings from a Qualitative Meta-Data-Analysis

by

Jesse Treakle

A Dissertation Presented to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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This dissertation was submitted by Jesse Treakle under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

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Abstract

This qualitative meta-data-analysis was designed to identify themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. A review of the literature indicated a scarcity of research that describes the ‘meaning-making’ processes that these participants undergo while engaged in structured intergroup dialogue, and this study was designed to address that shortage. The analyst conducted a targeted search of academic journal articles and Ph.D. dissertations published after 1999. The result of this search was a set of 17 primary reports, and the findings of this study are based on the verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants as cited within the set of primary reports. The analyst performed a thematic analysis of said quotations and, guided by contact theory, social identity theory, and intersubjectivity theory, concluded that Israeli Jews, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, and Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories all enter dialogue carrying varying levels of fear and anger; and if they remain dedicated to dialogue processes, they eventually—to varying degrees—seek truth, pursue justice, and realize unity. This study’s primary contribution is its explication of the specific areas intergroup dialogue facilitators and researchers need to focus in Israel-Palestine. The findings indicate that more research needs to be conducted on interreligious, narrative, and activist models. Furthermore, the data evidences the presence of geotheological influences on participant perspectives. Overall, the findings of this dissertation are consistent with previous research that affirms the power of dominant group narratives to sustain intractable conflict and the necessity of intergroup dialogue to foster cross-group friendships that can overcome intractable conflict.
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

The Intractable Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Everybody . . . sees a difficulty in the question of relations between Arabs and Jews. But not everybody sees that there is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can fill that gulf. It is possible to resolve the conflict between Jewish and Arab interests [only] by sophistry. I do not know what Arab will agree that Palestine should belong to the Jews—even if the Jews learn Arabic. And we must recognize this situation . . . [and not] try to come up with ‘remedies’ . . . We, as a nation, want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be theirs [David Ben Gurion, then-Labor Zionist spokesman and future Israeli Prime Minister, 1919]. (Caplan, 2010, p. 8-9)

The day negotiations start will indeed be a great occasion for celebration. Yet let us remember the lessons psychologists teach—that direct contacts between human groups do not always draw them together, but may make them realize how far apart they are and thus lead to further estrangement [Yahoshafat Harkabi, 1974]. (Caplan, 2010, p. 178)

Arabs and Jews are destined to live together [Yitzhak Navon, Israel’s Education Minister, 1985]. (Abu-Nimer, 2004a, p. 409)

These three chronologically presented quotations of prominent Israeli leaders demonstrate both a) the shift that has occurred within the public discourse regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and b) the power of the multiple narratives, perspectives, and ideologies that have motivated the parties within this conflict. The latter quotation
demonstrates the confidence Israel’s leaders have had in the eventual success of the numerous intergroup dialogue programs that facilitate conversations between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Yet 30 years since this confident declaration, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains synonymous with the term ‘intractable conflict.’ The conflict’s causes, effects, and potential resolution have been analyzed, scrutinized, dissected, re-framed, and debated by academics, politicians, theologians, clergy, and commoners alike. Yet despite all this application of critical thought, research, and theorizing, the conflict persists; and the present state of affairs offers little indication a comprehensive resolution will come any time soon.

**The Roots of the Conflict – Where to Begin?**

Summarizing the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is a challenging endeavor for the researcher and academic for numerous reasons, three of which I will outline here. First, the conflict has undergone so many stages and developments that it is difficult to choose and thereby justify a starting point of the conflict: does it begin with the 1967 war in which Israel captured territories from Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, which placed hundreds of thousands of already displaced Palestinian Arabs under Israeli military control; or in 1948 with the official declaration of Israeli statehood; or earlier? Second, the overwhelming volume of research already extant on the history of the conflict can metaphorically drown the researcher in narratives, testimonials, statistics, and conspiratorial ‘secret histories’ to the extent that the researcher can quite literally never ‘know everything there is to know’ about the conflict. Third, the histories of the conflict and the parties to the conflict have been presented within multiple frameworks of competing and contradictory narratives and ideologies (national,
hegemonic, and religious), thereby rendering the researcher’s attempt to present ‘objective history’ virtually impossible (Caplan, 2010). On this third point, numerous academicians have chosen to abandon any pretense of objectivity and have fully embraced the narrative and ideology of one of the conflicting parties—a choice that has resulted in professional ostracism for some (i.e. Norman Finkelstein). However, other academicians who have advocated one narrative over another have weathered the storm of criticism and continue to actively play the role of ‘advocate to the oppressed’ (i.e. Noam Chomsky). (The American Studies Association’s recent academic boycott of Israeli institutions of higher education points directly to the severity of the rift between and among Israeli-Palestinian master narratives and the interpretations of academic responsibility thereto).

The process of generating a comprehensive yet objective historical review of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for this dissertation has required me to find ways to overcome these three challenges. On the first point regarding the starting point of the history of the conflict, I have chosen to begin with an exploration of the earliest histories of the origins of the claims to the land in dispute between today’s Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in order to provide key background narratives that inform (to greater and lesser degrees) the modern day identity of being an ‘Israeli Jew’ or a ‘Palestinian Arab’. On the second point regarding the sheer volume of published historical accounts and interpretations of those accounts, I have limited the historical source material to a) those that have been published within the past 15 to 20 years (so as to include the events of the Second Intifada) and/or b) those written by authors who have either expressed a commitment to a “relational history” between Palestinians and Israelis (Krämer, 2008, p. xi; Adwan et al., 2012) or
attempted to clarify the historical record and let the “facts speak for themselves” (Caplan, 2010, p. 225). This choice of historical source material that emphasizes ‘relationality’ and ‘fact over interpretation’ also relates to the third point regarding the ‘impossibility of pure objectivity’ in presenting the history of the peoples and the ongoing conflict. This multi-millennial history and its over-arching themes that inform and influence the conflict today are presented in greater detail in Chapter 2.

**Intergroup Dialogue Between Israelis and Palestinians**

The perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is by no means the result of a lack of effort to prevent its continuation. Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue encounters have been conducted since as early as the 1950’s (Maoz, 2010), and today there exists in Israel and Palestine a wide variety of policy development groups, peace education organizations, political activists, and community development groups, all working towards the purported goal of strengthening relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. As of 2002, as many as 150 different intergroup dialogue and peace building programs, backed by investments totaling $9 million annually, were being facilitated in Israel and Palestine (Maoz, 2010). Generally speaking, these programs have been based on derivations of the ‘contact hypothesis,’ which states, “intergroup contact can be effective in reducing negative intergroup stereotypes and mutual prejudices, provided that certain conditions are met” (Pettigrew, as cited in Maoz, 2010, p. 304).

Running in parallel with the facilitation of the dozens of peace programs in Israel and Palestine has been the execution of numerous case studies, reports, and analyses of the purported effectiveness of these respective programs. However, academically rigorous research of these programs—as opposed to subjective ‘insider’ reports—are
lacking not only within the body of Israeli-Palestinian peace education research but also in the field of peace education in general (Salomon, 2002). Though these ‘insider’ perspectives yield valuable insight into the challenges, obstacles, failures, and accomplishments of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue efforts, they can only go so far in yielding the kind of data that meet the social scientific standards of reliability and verifiability.

**The Research Problem**

As observed by Pettigrew, “the vast majority of [intergroup] contact research studies outcome, rather than process” (as cited in Hammack et al., 2014, p. 297). To wit, Hammack et al. (2014) mention the “dearth” of research related to the meaning-making processes of participants in intergroup dialogue building programs in regions of intractable conflict (p. 296). These authors suggest that what is lacking in the body of research on peace programs in regions of intractable conflict is a kind of ‘thick description’ regarding the experience of peace program participants—a description that is often best revealed through qualitative research methods.

Despite this perceived ‘dearth’ of qualitative studies on the meaning-making processes within contact research, Dixon et al. (2005) identified a small number of studies that utilized qualitative methodologies for the purpose of ascertaining “participants’ own frameworks of meaning as they are applied within particular social contexts” (p 704). Though they are few in number, qualitative studies that analyze the utility of the ‘contact hypothesis’ within a framework constructed by participants’ experiences do exist and include Buttny (1999), Buttny & Williams (2000), Connolly (2000), Dixon and Reicher (1997), Hubbard (1999), and Morris (1999). Of these
aforementioned studies, only Hubbard’s (1999) study features verbatim accounts from Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants; however, all participants in that study were American citizens who did not at the time of the study live in Israel-Palestine.

Taken together, the processual experience of intergroup dialogue participants, especially within the Israeli-Palestinian context, has thus far not been extensively well documented in the current literature. Nevertheless, a cursory journal article search on ProQuest and EBSCOhost reveals the existence of studies that utilize qualitative methodologies such as narrative analysis, case study, discourse analysis, and participant observation in relation to the experience of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have participated in dialogue building programs. Though the number of these types of qualitative studies is not particularly high, their number is high enough to warrant a closer look at what these qualitative studies, as a whole, might reveal in regards to the themes of experience of Israel Jew-Palestinian Arab peace program participants.

**Purpose of the Research**

As such, the purpose of this dissertation is to identify overarching themes of experience for Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have participated in a structured intergroup dialogue program. The source material for identifying these potential themes of experience are primary journal articles and Ph.D. dissertations that contain verbatim quotations from Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. In order to narrow the range of possible reports to those that are most relevant to the present day conflict and reflect the most current developments in both intergroup dialogue theory
and intergroup dialogue program design, the included reports have been published between 1999 (at the approximate start of the second Palestinian Intifada) and May 2015.

To achieve this aim of identifying any overarching themes of experience among Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants, this dissertation outlines the procedure and outcomes of the first stage of a qualitative meta-study, as described by Paterson et al. (2001). This methodology is similar to quantitative meta-analysis in that it seeks to systematically analyze and synthesize a body of data collected over a particular period of time within a defined topic area. The primary difference between qualitative meta-study and quantitative meta-analysis is that the former focuses on data collected through qualitative methods (phenomenology, qualitative case study, grounded theory, ethnography, etc.), while the latter utilizes data gathered through quantitative methods (surveys, test scores, statistical tests of significance, etc.). As such, this study serves as the first stage (meta-data-analysis) of a four-stage qualitative meta-study to identify themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue programs or workshop participants, as revealed by their verbatim accounts that have been recorded within select qualitative studies.

**Conflict Resolution and Israeli-Palestinian Intergroup Dialogue**

‘Conflict resolution’ as a field and Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue programs both have relatively short histories and are today at a sort of ‘crossroads’. In regards to history, ‘conflict resolution’ as a field of practice and academic endeavor has interdisciplinary roots that primarily stem from the human relations movement of the 1940s and 1950s, specifically within the arena of industrial organization (Abu-Nimer, 1999, p. 11). Because conflict resolution as a field is primarily an interdisciplinary one,
its purpose and definition is multi-faceted and dependent upon the context in which it is practiced (i.e. alternative dispute resolution in the US judicial system; peer mediation in elementary and middle schools; victim-offender restorative justice programs in district and local courts). Generally speaking, conflict resolution as a field has embraced a set of assumptions and principles regarding ‘conflict’ and the means to (and signs of) its ‘resolution.’ Some of these principles and assumptions are:

- conflict is a creative force that can result in either constructive or destructive outcomes;
- conflict is an inevitable component of important human relationships;
- conflict is an opportunity to release stored emotions;
- conflict can be positive when it results in effective communication, increased trust, and problem solving;
- conflict can be negative when it results in violence, distrust, and uncooperativeness;
- conflict can be resolved by teaching conflict resolution skills such as non-judgmental observing, listening, and speaking; and through collaborative problem-solving (Abu-Nimer, 1999, p. 16).

Like the field of conflict resolution, Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue programs have been operating since the 1950s, but the first “serious conceptualization of research on Arab-Jewish encounters . . . was conducted by Peled and Bargal in 1983” (Abu-Nimer, p. 44). Also like the field of conflict resolution in general, intergroup dialogue programs that engage Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in conversation are based on certain principles, namely that ‘peoples in conversation are
peoples who can achieve understanding of each other’ (Abu-Nimer, 1999). This belief in the power of contact has its roots in the contact hypothesis, which was originally explicated by Allport (1954) and has since been re-evaluated multiple times and recently revised by Pettigrew (1998). As summarized by Abu-Nimer (1999), “The main belief in the 1950s was that intergroup contact would inevitably lead to a change in mutual attitudes of interacting members and improve their relations” (p. 1). Furthermore, the forms of intergroup dialogue programs between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have been multifaceted and multifarious, depending on the purpose and context of each respective program (i.e. student encounter programs emphasizing coexistence and equality; Israeli democracy building programs; two-state solution diplomacy programs; interreligious dialogue programs).

The present condition of the field of ‘conflict resolution’ and the role of intergroup dialogue programs between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are both at a sort of ‘crossroads’ today. Fox (2006) laments that despite the movement towards a ‘canon’ of conflict resolution practice, the primary texts around which such a canon could be developed emphasize the ‘legalistic’ application of conflict resolution approaches and fail to adequately address “the deeper and differing belief and value systems that underlie (conflict resolution’s) growing body of scholarship” (p. 235). For example, Fox points out that the most influential voices in the field of conflict resolution have dismissed any real discussion of the difference between a ‘conflict’ and a ‘dispute.’ Lamenting this dismissal of definitional differentiation, Fox states that “language is meaning, and therefore, different terms represent very different ways of knowing what we seek to understand” (p. 236). Wing (2008) suggests that one of the primary tenets of conflict and
dispute resolution—third-party practitioner neutrality—is a culturally-biased tenet that disadvantages members of non-dominant cultural groups within a predominantly White-Anglo context. As such, ‘conflict resolution’ as a field seems to be at a crossroads at which the field must define itself as either a specifically ‘western positivist model’ that is best suited for legalistic settings or one that can adapt and accommodate a variety of socially constructed viewpoints.

In a similar vein, intergroup dialogue practice, especially in regards to those developed specifically for Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab dialogue, are also at a sort of ‘crossroads.’ The purported effectiveness and overall value of these programs has come under scrutiny by those who point out that, despite decades of intergroup practice, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues unabated. As highlighted by Ross (2013), a 2012 opinion column in the Jerusalem Post lambasted the perceived ineffectiveness of ‘coexistence projects’ (a particular type of Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue model) because “it is based on nonsense, false analogies, misinformation, propaganda, and naïveté” (Frantzman, as cited in Ross, p. 3). Another criticism leveled at intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine was articulated in a 2007 issue of The Economist: “[W]hen asked whether their own work influences anyone beyond the participants, [peace activists] often fall silent; such things are impossible to measure” (“Still Campaigning,” para. 10). Clearly, the entire Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue process is at a crossroads too, whereby the pressure to demonstrate actual progress towards resolving the conflict and influencing Israeli and Palestinian society is perceived to be a pressing matter.
This dissertation, completed as a partial requirement for a Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution within Nova Southeastern University’s College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences, is intended to provide a meaningful contribution to the respective ‘crossroads’ of both the field of ‘conflict resolution’ in general and the practice of intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in particular. Though conflict resolution has its roots in industrial relations and tends to emphasize a ‘problem solving’ approach to conflict, it also carries within its interdisciplinary missives the more idealistic goals of social change and personal transformation (i.e. Bush & Folger, 2005). Intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine have focused (to varying degrees) on both of these same idealistic goals of social and individual change. As such, the outcomes and findings of this dissertation will be relevant in addressing the ‘crossroads’ at which the field of conflict resolution is today.

**Theories Underlying Intergroup Dialogue and the Experience of Participants**

Academic explorations of the theoretical bases and practical outcomes of intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have been published for decades and continue to the present day. As mentioned previously, the contact hypothesis has been the primary theoretical foundation from which Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue programs are based. Generally speaking, the contact hypothesis suggests that in order for intergroup dialogue to be effective (i.e. to successfully reduce prejudice and intergroup bias), certain conditions must be met within the intergroup dialogue process itself, namely:

- the participants have equal status in the group;
- the groups are working towards a common goal;
the groups are cooperatively interdependent; and

- macro entities outside the dialogue encounter (i.e. laws, customs, institutions) support the intergroup contact (CuHadar & Dayton, 2011, p. 277).

In the decades since the original explication of the contact hypothesis, numerous studies have confirmed these basic conditions for successful contact; however, subsequent researchers have suggested further conditions be added as well, such as the active participation of all participants (Maoz, 2005). Pettigrew (1998) suggested that ‘overburdening’ the contact hypothesis with additional conditions would eventually render the hypothesis useless; nevertheless, he did add ‘a friendly environment’ as a fifth condition as “a key factor in reducing prejudice and must be included in the generic framework of contact hypothesis rather than as a facilitating factor” (as cited in CuHadar & Dayton, 2011, p. 277).

Despite evidence that the contact hypothesis is successful at reducing prejudice between groups in dialogue, a chief criticism of the contact hypothesis is that it is not an adequate framework for reducing prejudice in an environment characterized by institutionalized inequalities and discrimination. Abu-Nimer (1999) argues that this is a primary reason why intergroup dialogue programs have largely failed to effect significant social change in Israel and Palestine: “[T]he contact hypothesis is based on individual and interpersonal encounter, [and therefore] lacks the ability and potential to address inter-ethnic conflict and asymmetric power relations” (p. 9).

Asymmetry, as such, is at present a recurring theme within the literature regarding the Israeli Jew-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue experience. According to Abu-
Nimer (2013), individuals living within a system of institutionalized inequalities tend to assume a number of norm-regulating dynamics regarding human behavior, such as:

- individuals are selfish and self-interested;
- collectives will unilaterally compete to meet its self-interested goals;
- competition is better than cooperation; and
- ‘soft power’ such as morality and relationships are measured in tangible economic and military terms (Abu-Nimer, 2013, p. 179).

Such ‘might makes right’ assumptions tend to color the content of interactions between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in dialogue and, as a result, fail to bring about meaningful dialogue that can lead to empathy and understanding.

However, the perception of ‘power’ in Israel and Palestine is not necessarily unidirectional. Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) outline the dynamics of a ‘double asymmetry’ between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, whereby members of each group perceive themselves as both ‘powerful’ and ‘vulnerable’ simultaneously. For example, both Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews perceive and acknowledge a social asymmetry that benefits Jewish Israelis. However, from the wider standpoint of the relationship between Israel and the larger Arab world, “the Arab world surpasses Israel in human and material resources and . . . in the capability of enduring a [military] defeat. Thus, for many Israelis, the asymmetry tilts in favor of the Arabs” (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, p. 764). As such, this perceived double asymmetry, along with other social and intergroup dynamics specific to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have run numerous intergroup dialogue processes into a ‘stalemate’ of irreconcilable positions.
The Usage of Names

Krämer (2008) opens her *A History of Palestine* with the statement, “There are no innocent terms, especially in geography” (p. 1). A primary characteristic of the postmodern human identity is the concept of ‘nationality,’ and the relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘identity’ for the inhabitants of Israel and Palestine is hardly an innocent one. A challenge for researchers who delve into the ‘identity-worlds’ of the peoples of Israel and Palestine is the need for consistent usage of terminology when referring to said peoples. Furthermore, the choice of terminology a researcher utilizes is often directly related to the researcher’s own perspective of Israel and Palestine and the nature of the conflict its peoples are enduring. As a case in point, Hammack (2011) makes explicit in the opening paragraphs of his *Narrative and the Politics of Identity: The Cultural Psychology of Israeli and Palestinian Youth* the names he used to identify both the places in which he conducted interviews and the peoples he interviewed. Because Hammack perceives Israel and Palestine as two separate ‘nations,’ he makes explicit the name ‘Israel’ as the nation “internationally recognized by the United Nations” and the name ‘Palestine’ as “those regions internationally recognized as under Israeli military occupation since the Six Day War of 1967” (p. 4). In line with Krämer’s observation of the ‘non-innocence’ of geographical terms, Hammack makes clear that his usage of the word ‘Palestine’ is his way of “[legitimizing] the Palestinian aspiration of national statehood in these territories . . . and ultimately necessary for a sustainable peace in the Middle East” (p. 4).

As such, the terms I have chosen to refer to both the regions of Israel and Palestine and the peoples who call these regions ‘home’ are a reflection of my
paradigmatic views, belief systems, and chosen epistemological approach to the research at hand. These latter elements will be explored later in this dissertation as part of the necessary ‘bracketing’ of my own assumptions and perspectives (i.e. invoking the \textit{epoché}) (DeTurk, 2010, p. 570). Whenever possible, and for the remainder of this study, I refer to the geographical region of ‘Israel-Palestine’ rather than two separate states or nations of ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’ as a reflection of my belief that ultimately a ‘one-state solution’ is what is needed to ensure lasting peace (for different versions of a one-state solution, see Abunimah, 2006; or Kelman, 2011). Though the focus of this dissertation is not necessarily the exact ‘terms and conditions’ under which the peoples of Israel-Palestine must or should live (as opposed to the conditions under which they are presently living), there remains a certain degree of ‘teleology’ underlying the intergroup dialogues between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. To acknowledge the ‘end point’ towards which one wishes a particular venture to proceed is a critical acknowledgement that engenders transparency and truthfulness—two elements critical for any intergroup dialogue encounter. As such, making explicit this belief is one I believe is necessary to ensure my research reflects the values that I believe are important for the subject I am exploring herein. It should be noted, however, that my use of ‘Israel-Palestine’ versus ‘Israel’ and ‘Palestine’ is not a reflection of my belief or adherence to one particular historical narrative over another.

However, the names I have used to refer to the peoples who live in Israel-Palestine and participate in the intergroup dialogue programs and workshops included in this study reflect the \textit{current} condition of the Israeli nation-state and the United Nations recognition thereof. Consistent with the terminologies used by Lazarus (2011), I refer to
the following groups of peoples living in Israel-Palestine as such: Israeli-Jews (IJ), Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (PCI), and Palestinian Arabs living in the Occupied Territories (OPT) (i.e. those regions captured by the Israeli military from Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in 1967). Whenever possible, I differentiate between different groups of IJ, such as Ashkenazi Jews (i.e. Jews of central European descent) and Mizrahi Jews (i.e. Jews of Middle Eastern and North African descent). Similarly, whenever is possible and relevant, I differentiate between PCI and OPT Muslims, Christians, and Druze. Again, my choice of identifying individual intergroup participants within these terminologies of identification is intended to reflect the participants’ current situation; the use of a more unified ‘Israel-Palestine’ in reference to geography is intended to reflect my belief (or hope) in a future reality that sees all peoples within Israel-Palestine’s borders enjoying security and civil rights as citizens of one nation, and not as a preference for either Israeli or Palestinian historical or national narratives.

**Chapter Summary and Dissertation Overview**

To tell even a cursory story of the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants requires an examination of the history of Israel-Palestine, the peoples who have called this region ‘home’ for well over two millennia, and the roots of a conflict that has for decades eluded resolution. Despite the elusiveness of a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, intergroup dialogue still offers Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs the opportunity to face the deep-seeded issues that work to discourage the development of trust, empathy, and other-regarding behavior long espoused by philosophy, religion, and common sense cultural-social norms necessary for productive human relations. As Abu-Nimer and Lazarus (2007) state, “Competently
structured and facilitated encounters can allow Israelis and Palestinians to safely turn the key, inviting psychological transformation by altering a single variable—relationship with the ‘enemy’—in the social environment of participants” (para. 9).

Despite years of research into the processes of encouraging this ‘transformation’ through the relationship variable, questions remain: what do these intergroup dialogue participants experience? What does it mean to experience a ‘transformation’? If a ‘transformation’ happens, what is it that gets transformed? By exploring the verbatim accounts of Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants, as reported in qualitative studies published between 1999 and 2015, within the methodological framework of a qualitative meta-data-analysis (Paterson et al., 2001), this dissertation contributes to the overall body of literature that seeks answers to these same questions. As explained by Paterson et al. (2001), a meta-data-analysis like this one should also serve as the seeds of a full qualitative meta-study that can “[illuminate] the implications of the contexts, methods, and theories that have influenced the body of research in the field [of conflict resolution]; [generate] new or expanded theory; [and articulate] an alternative overarching perspective about the phenomenon” (p. 125) of the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup participants.

Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a more detailed literature review that builds upon the theories and gaps mentioned in Chapter 1. Specifically, Chapter 2 provides an historical overview of Israel-Palestine through the themes of geotheology and asymmetry, the competing narratives that animate that history, and how those competing narratives shape the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. Chapter 2 also explores the theoretical foundations of intergroup dialogue processes in Israel-Palestine and the recent
criticisms and new directions proposed by influential researchers of Israel-Palestine intergroup dialogue models. Chapter 3 provides the methodological overview of this initial qualitative meta-data-analysis. Chapter 3 also contains my attempt to bracket my experiences, expectations, and beliefs that shape my decisions as a qualitative researcher. Chapter 4 describes the process and subsequent results of the meta-data-analysis through a framework of thematic analysis as outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Chapter 5 provides an overview of the relevance the findings from the meta-data-analysis, what the remaining stages of the qualitative meta-study could yield, and what those findings mean for the future of intergroup dialogue and peace education program development. Chapter 5 also provides an overview of shortcomings and limitations of the research and future directions for research in this field.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The execution of this dissertation necessarily relies on the history of multiple entities: the land of Israel-Palestine, the peoples who call this land home, and the intergroup dialogue programs within which Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have participated. The histories of these three entities are intertwined, and within each history there exists competing narratives. Some of these narratives (especially those related to the history of the land) rest on claims of mutual exclusivity while others (especially those related to intergroup dialogue programs) are couched within a reflexive stance that allows for multiple competing narratives. This reflexivity comes in part as a response to the themes of exclusivity espoused by the peoples who live within the either national or historical borders of this land; it also comes as greater numbers of these peoples recognize that these themes of exclusivity can no longer sustain the health, security, and civil rights of those same peoples. As such, the literature review contained within this chapter attempts to provide both an historical overview of these entities and an overview of the theoretical frameworks that have thus far motivated intergroup dialogue programs and models between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

Narrative Histories: Geotheology and Asymmetry

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the history of Israel-Palestine and the peoples who call this region home cannot be contained within a singular, cut and dry, completely non-subjective retelling of events. The historical record can identify when and where particular events happened, but the ensuing ‘interpretation’ and ‘explanation’ of the motivations and purposes behind those events vary significantly. One of the primary reasons there exists a multitude of interpretations behind the history of Israel-Palestine is
because of ancient ‘geotheological’ claims of different peoples to the land. These claims and the subsequent realization of said claims have helped create a modern history characterized by asymmetry—imbalances of power; of representation; of population distribution; and of access to natural resources, security, and land. As such, these ‘geotheological’ claims to the land of Israel-Palestine are (at least in part) a cause for the asymmetrical relationship that currently exists between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs that, I will argue, continues to have salient consequences on the conflict today. Therefore, my intention here is to present an historical review of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the elaboration of the two themes of geotheology and asymmetry.

Because the history of Israel-Palestine is an enterprise that, whether intentional or not, has the effect of boxing the interlocutor within a particular ‘perspectival framework,’ I have attempted to present here historical accounts that either a) emphasize the ‘relational’ history of Israel-Palestine and its peoples or b) are based on a conscientious attempt to present history as ‘facts’ sans ‘interpretation.’ As such, I rely chiefly on the work of Krämer (2008) and Caplan (2010) for historical accounts of relational objectivity. In instances where events in the history of Israel-Palestine cannot be re-told without invoking an asymmetrical narrative that privileges one people’s identity over another, I have attempted to share dual narratives primarily based on the work of Adwan et al. (2012). Finally, the elements included within this historical overview are those that appear to have the most salience in regards to the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. As this study progresses, I intend to show how these historical elements tend to reveal themselves within dialogue.
participants’ speech, expressed justifications of belief and behavior, and expressions of identity.

**Geotheology: Ancient Ideas Shaping Modern Reality**

Caplan (2010) outlines key questions that, from his perspective, summarize both the tangible and intangible elements of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first of these questions—who resided in Israel-Palestine first, and whose land was it to begin with—will be explored here. It should be noted that the purpose of this initial exploration of the ‘geotheological’ influences on the conflict is not intended to arrive at a conclusive answer over land rights, but rather to provide insight that suggests the modern problem of Israel and Palestine—often described as a conflict about land rights and justice and less about religion—indeed has deep roots in the interpretation of ancient religious texts. For example, at the time of this writing, the popular Israeli media outlet Haaretz has posted an article entitled “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Not About Religion” (Diab, 2015), which suggests that a number of its readers are of the opinion that the conflict is indeed about religion. Exploring the ancient historical roots of the conflict is not to deny the existence of ‘secular and modern’ motivations behind the conflict, but rather to revisit the narratives that tend to underlie the structure of those modern problems and which make successful intergroup dialogue such a challenging process.

**Geotheological influence on the Jewish/Israeli narrative.** The term ‘geotheology’ has been most recently explicated by Vann (2008) who defines it as “aspects of place linked to worship and the divine” (p. 7). Krämer (2008) mentions that ancient roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict “(offer) a textbook case of the ‘territorialization of history,’ in which political claims are anchored in historical
geography” (p. 2). Because this ‘historical geography’ is based on place names and
categorizations of tribes and groups of peoples that are traced to the Biblical Old
Testament (and more recently to archeological and epigraphic evidence from ancient
Egyptian and other Middle Eastern sites), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fits within
Vann’s definition of a phenomenon shaped by interpretations of ‘the divine’.

Sketched briefly, modern Jews trace their ancestry and religious lineage to the
ancient Hebrews, whose history is recorded in the Biblical Old Testament and the Torah.
Of note, the earliest record of the name “Israel” has been found on a stone tablet from
ancient Egypt that dates 1210 BC, and which indicates that the word “Israel” denotes a
group of ‘foreign people’ and not a particular terrain. Krämer (2008) states that despite
the archeological evidence of multiple groups of people living in the region (i.e.
Canaanites and Philistines on the coastal plains of modern day Palestine, Israeliites in the
mountains to the east) it was “the Israeliites (Hebrews, Jews) who profoundly shaped the
subsequent history of Palestine” (p. 4). Of interest is that of all the place-names of the
region that have persisted to the present day, the only one the Israeliites did not coin was
the name ‘Palestine’ itself (Krämer, p. 4). The roots of the name ‘Palestine’ can be traced
to “Assyrian and Egyptian sources to designate the coastal plain of the southern Levant”
(Krämer, p. 14). Variations of ‘Palestine’ have been found in numerous ancient Roman
designations of modern day Israel-Palestine regions, such as ‘Syria Palaestina’ for Judaea
(today’s Gaza) and ‘Palaestina Secunda’ (today’s Bet Shean) (Biger, 2008).

Modern day Jews (whose political leanings can be charted on a spectrum ranging
from leftist-secular to right-wing Orthodox and Zionist, and whose ethnic backgrounds
range from European Ashkenazi to Middle Eastern Misrahi to North African Berbers)
base the Jewish claim to the land of modern day Palestine (to varying degrees) on the promise of ownership of said land by God (Yahweh) by way of direct communication with the Biblical figure of Abraham—a promise renewed numerous times through Abraham’s lineage, namely via Abraham’s son Isaac.

Kallai (1997) distinguishes between three different accounts regarding the ancient promise that purportedly validates Jewish peoples’ claim to Palestine: a) the ‘location of ancient Canaan (i.e. the ‘promised land’), b) the area the ancient Israelites actually settled, and c) the ‘patriarchal boundaries’ of Israel as defined by Jewish law (p. 70). Regarding the Biblical account of the boundaries of the ‘promised land’ of Canaan, there exists no consistent, clear geographical mapping. The boundaries of the land and its promise described to Abraham and renewed through Moses appear in different locations in the Old Testament and continue to be the subject of historiographical debate today (Kallai, p. 76). A map outlining the difference between the boundary of Canaan and the boundary of Israel is provided in Figure 1 below.

According to the Biblical record, the ancient Israelites were an enslaved people in Egypt, and Moses—who, while in modern day Jordan, received a message from God commanding him to free the Israelites—successfully entered Egypt and convinced the pharaoh to release the Israelites. It is from this story the narrative of the ‘exodus’ and the Israelites’ title ‘the chosen people’ is based. It should be noted that, though the Biblical record describes the Israelites as ‘taking’ the ‘promised land’ from its Canaanite inhabitants, “it is not a history book to draw reliable maps from” (Krämer, 2008, p. 8). There is as of yet no non-Biblical source material (i.e. archaeological findings) that corroborates an Egyptian exodus.
In regards to Kallai’s (1997) second point—the area of land the ancient Israelites actually settled—ancient texts and archeological evidence indicate that the ancient Israelites successfully settled only a portion of the land promised them in the covenant with Abraham. The land ‘actually’ settled by the Israelites is referred to as ‘Eretz Israel’ and is mentioned numerous times in the Bible. This designation of Eretz Israel is directly
related to the third consideration: what does Judaic law say about the borders of the ‘promised land’? According to various verses in I Kings, King Solomon, who ruled over the Kingdom of Israel circa 967-928 BC, had jurisdiction over a territory “from Dan to Beersheba,” and “from the Euphrates to the land of the Philistines and to the border of Egypt” (as cited in Krämer, 2008, p. 9). Because King Solomon’s rule would prove to be the highest point of territorial success for the ancient Israelites, the designation “from Dan to Beersheba” has come to represent “a kind of core nucleus of Israelite land” (Krämer, p. 9). As will be explored later in this review, this ‘core nucleus’ would prove to be such a powerful component of the Jewish narrative that it would shape the present day Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It was during Solomon’s rule that much of Judaic/Jewish law was consolidated and codified. Because Solomon established successful trade routes with neighboring kingdoms and tribes, he raised significant wealth for the kingdom and with that wealth oversaw the construction of Solomon’s Temple (or the First Temple) on Mount Zion in Jerusalem. After Solomon’s rule, the Israelite kingdom endured alternating periods of degradation and re-growth, but within a few centuries the Babylonians overran it. Solomon’s temple was destroyed and the Israelites (who at this stage tended to be referred to as Jews) were sent into exile.

Sixty years later, Cyrus of Persia conquered much of the region and allowed the Jews to return to the region of ancient Judaea and Jerusalem and subsequently rebuild the Temple. By 332 BC, Judaea was conquered by the Greeks and many parts of the region became Hellenized. The Jewish people had already successfully rebuilt Solomon’s Temple, but Greek rulers converted it into a temple for the purpose of worshipping Zeus.
This led to a Jewish rebellion led by the Hasmoneans who successfully regained political control over a region that reached “from Dan to Beersheba” (Krämer, 2008, p. 12). Though the Hasmonean reign was relatively short-lived, the land claimed during this reign has significant shaped modern conceptions of the extent of historical Israeli land (Finkelstein, 2015).

After the Romans conquered Palestine in 63 BC, further Jewish revolts were attempted but with disastrous consequences. By 70 AD, Jerusalem and the Second Temple had been burned to the ground. (The remains of the Second Temple are today known as the ‘Wailing Wall’ and are a site of sacred pilgrimage for Jews worldwide.) Despite the elimination of this primary physical symbol of the Jewish people, Jewish rebellions continued. The Romans eventually banned Jews from entering the re-built Jerusalem and attempted to “eradicate any trace of Judaism in that area” by renaming the province of Judaea ‘Syria Palaestina’ (Biger, 2008, p. 69). Jews centralized their populations in Galilee, and non-Jews gradually moved in where Jews had previously resided. By 300 AD, “Jews made up a mere quarter of the total population of the province of Syria Palaestina” (Krämer, 2008, p. 15). The rest of the population over time became mainly Greek, Egyptian, Phoenician, or Arab.

Though much more could be included within this sketch of the history of the ancient Israelites, such an elaboration would go beyond the intention of this section. Instead, this overview is presented for the purpose of emphasizing the geotheological influence this history has had on the modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how this geotheological influence shapes the Jewish-Israeli claim to the land. The borders of Eretz Israel stem from a millennia-old story handed down generation to generation before being
recorded and codified into Jewish law around the time of King Solomon (Krämer, 2008). From this ancient history also come themes of Jewish identity that are discernible within the Israeli-Jewish narrative today: punishment, exile, and redemption. These themes of identity have been collectively identified by other researchers and scholars and will be explored later in this review.

**Geotheological influence on the Arab/Palestinian narrative.** Modern Palestinians trace their ancestry generally through at least two (and sometimes three) groups of people: Muslim Arabs who conquered the area of modern day Palestine in the 7th century AD, the ancient Philistines who arrived on the coastal plains of Palestine (modern day Gaza) from the Aegean region around 1200 BC, and the Canaanites who also lived on the coastal plains from as early as 3200 BC (possibly even earlier). However, as indicated in the previous section, by 300 AD Palestine was inhabited by Greeks, Egyptians, and Phoenicians as well, so ancient Palestinian roots are likely quite multi-ethnic.

Despite their significant presence in the region of modern day Israel-Palestine, neither the Canaanites nor the Philistines receive as much credit for having influenced the region as do the ancient Israelites, in part due to the “dominant perspective (that) has clearly been informed by biblical associations” which tends to “(place) Jews at the center (and pushes) all other population groups (even if and when they formed a majority) into the background” (Krämer, p. 2). Krämer’s point here is not to discredit the ancient Israelites influence on the region but rather to ‘symmetrize’ the perception of the presence (and relevance) of other groups of people in ancient times. This point is
particularly relevant considering that Muslims, like Jews, recognize Abraham as their common ancestor. As such, from a Muslim/Islamic perspective,

even if God’s ‘eternal covenant’ was made only with [Abraham’s son] Isaac and his sons, the descendants of Abraham that Genesis 15:18-21 refers to also included the sons of Ishmael, whom the Bible names as the ancestor of the ‘Ishmaelites’ . . . and whom the Muslims recognize as one of their prophets.

(Krämer, 2008, p. 7).

Modern day Palestinians (which include Christians, Druze, and Muslims) tend to identify as ‘culturally’ Arab, while some Palestinians also claim an ethnic identification with the ancient Canaanites. Indeed, with the advent of the human genome era, some have attempted to resolve the ‘who was there first’ question by way of DNA mapping, only to receive inconclusive results (Muir & Appelbaum, 2007). Nevertheless, in regards to religious affiliation, a majority of Palestinians identify as Muslim and, as such, tend to adhere to a narrative that is also influenced by geotheological considerations.

The chief geotheological claim modern day Muslims have to the region of Palestine is through the city of Jerusalem itself, and the claim stems from two events in early Islamic history. The first is related to the qibla—the direction to which Muslims face while praying—the Prophet Mohammed designated for his followers. Initially the qibla for Muslims was Jerusalem—the same direction of prayer as the Jews. However, Mohammed later designated the qibla as Mecca, which essentially had the effect of differentiating who were Mohammed’s true followers and who were not.

The second event that links Jerusalem to the geotheological history of Islam is based on Islamic interpretation of the 17th Sura of the Quran. Within this chapter is a
verse that describes how God/Allah took the Prophet Mohammed from the ‘sacred place of prayer’ to the ‘furthest place of prayer’ (Busse, 1991). The former element of the verse has been interpreted as being Mecca, while the latter has been interpreted as being Jerusalem, specifically Mount Zion, or Solomon’s Temple. Less than 100 years after the death of the Prophet Mohammed (around 690 AD), the Umayyad caliph Abd Al-Malik b. Marwan oversaw the construction of the Dome of the Rock at the same site as the remains of the Second Temple. A few years later, the Al-Aqsa Mosque was built near the Dome of the Rock, and these sites (including the whole of Jerusalem) have subsequently become among the holiest sites in Islam (Krämer, 2008, p. 33).

The consequences of Islamic geotheological claims on Jerusalem continue to have significant reverberations today. Not only do Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians engage in open conflict on who should administer and govern the sites and the city itself, but UNESCO recently condemned the “persistence of the Israeli illegal excavations” in Jerusalem and criticized other Israeli infrastructure projects which UNESCO said severely affects the “visual integrity and the authentic character of the site” (JTA, 2015). Thus far numerous Israeli media outlets have responded to UNESCO’s comments by encouraging ‘Israel’s supporters’ to sign petitions and contact UNESCO to affirm Israel’s ‘Biblical right’ to Jerusalem. Clearly, geotheological claims to Jerusalem and Palestine in general continue to have a palpable influence on the parties within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The sum effect of these geotheological claims has thusly resulted in a stalemate, rendering a comprehensive and satisfactory answer to the question ‘who was there first and whose land is it anyway’ virtually impossible (Caplan, 2010). Caplan summarized the situation as follows:
Those inclined to interpret the Bible as a roadmap for the present would cite references to God’s promises to Moses and Joshua . . . Arabs and Muslims would fear this as a master-plan for modern Israeli conquest of parts of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, while Orthodox Jews would regard it as a deed of entitlement. (p. 7)

**Asymmetry: The Wake of Mutually Exclusive Geotheological Narratives**

The ancient geotheological claims of Jews and Muslims outlined above have remained primarily unresolved matters for the better part of the past 1500 years. The following section of this historical overview is intended to provide a link between the time of Jewish expulsion from Palestine through the birth of the Islamic Empire and up to the present day. These events are presented with the intention of demonstrating the persisting geotheological influence on the modern expressions of the conflict. Accepting the influence of the persisting geotheological claims explains (at least in part) why the successful resolution of the ‘tangible’ elements of the conflict (access to natural resources, land ownership, security, etc.) continues to elude Israeli and Palestinian leadership today. These claims and their subsequent dual historical narratives—Jewish/Israeli and Arab/Palestinian—have their roots in geotheological interpretations and tend to become exacerbated by asymmetrical relationships; and, as this review intends to show, the contradictory nature of these narratives have had the effect of perpetuating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the point of cyclical stalemate (Caplan, 2010).

**From the Muslim conquest into the Ottoman Empire.** From 636 to 1516 AD, the region of Palestine was conquered and colonized multiple times over by numerous regional powers. Control over Jerusalem and Palestine alternated between Muslim rulers
and Christian Crusaders throughout this period. In 1516, the Ottoman Empire claimed control over Palestine and for 400 years the region was “repeatedly subdivided and fused with neighboring administrative units” (Krämer, 2008, p. 16). The region was decidedly Muslim in character and culture, though Christians, Druze, and (to a lesser extent) Arab Jews lived in the region too.

Though the vast majority of Jews during this period had been exiled from ‘Eretz Israel’ to locations throughout Europe and Asia, they maintained a ‘longing’ to return to Jerusalem, which is evidenced in multiple Jewish prayers and liturgical commemorations (Ben-Arieh & Davis, 1997). There is even evidence that, as early as the third century AD, Jews successfully transferred their dead to Palestine for burial in the ‘holy land’ (Krämer, p. 26). However, as Jews attempted to integrate with other populations and peoples outside of Palestine, this emphasis on the importance of a ‘return to Zion’ among the Jewish diaspora fluctuated.

1830 to 1917: From the ‘Tanzimat’ to the Balfour Declaration. During the late 1830’s, Ottoman leaders began issuing and implementing a number of social and economic reforms known as ‘Tanzimat.’ These reforms included the establishment of programs to ensure sustainable social order such as a regular census, tax collection, compulsory military service, and a re-organization of local governing bodies. Some of these reforms were developed through a process of diplomatic exchanges between the Ottoman elite and European powers, namely Britain and France. As Krämer (2008) notes, “the interplay of intended and unintended effects and side effects, of internal and external factors, makes the Tanzimat era fascinating to the modern observer” (p. 71).
The rise of Zionist nationalism. Despite persisting ideas that Jews were effectively banished from all of Palestine from the time of the Roman conquest on into the Ottoman Empire, there is evidence to suggest otherwise, as was mentioned earlier in this review by Krämer (2008). Still, at the beginning of the 19th century, the vast majority of Jews lived outside of Palestine, and for a short period the Ottomans banned Eastern European Jewish immigration. According to Sours (1998), a combination of factors made it possible for Jews to begin migrating in steadily greater numbers from Europe to Palestine. One of them was a ‘Tanzimat’ edict issued in 1836 “which laid down the conditions for legal arrangement for the resumption of immigration to Jerusalem from Eastern Europe” (Hirschberg, as cited in Sours, p. 75). This edict, plus the rise of European nationalism and the increasing influence European nations had in Palestine (and on the Ottoman ruling elite), encouraged a steady flow of Jewish immigration into Palestine throughout the mid-19th century.

The first significant wave of Zionist Jewish immigrants to Ottoman Palestine was in 1872. Zionism—here loosely defined as a social and nationalistic movement seeking to establish Eretz Israel as a Jewish territory specifically within the region of Palestine—was by no means a consensually popular movement throughout the Jewish diaspora at this time. Zionism was initially proposed as a means to resolve the ‘Jewish question’: what should be done about the Jewish diaspora in the face of European nationalism? Where do European Jews belong? As has been mentioned already, Jews had been living in Palestine well before the first wave of Russian and European Jews arrived in the late 1800’s. Krämer (2008) points out that the ‘New Yishuv’ (i.e. new Jewish immigrants) purposely distinguished itself from the ‘Old Yishuv’ (i.e. Jews who had already been
living in Palestine for generations) because it wanted to overcome the Jewish stereotypes “they detested—tradition, immobility, and reliance on others” (p. 104). The second and third ‘waves’ of Jewish immigration (between 1904 and 1918) also sought to distinguish themselves from the previous waves of immigrants and were largely dedicated to a process of establishing “an egalitarian Jewish society that would be largely self-contained and self-sufficient” (Krämer, p. 111).

The rise of Arab nationalism. While Zionism as a concept and a cause began taking shape and gaining momentum among Jews entering Palestine, the concept of Arab nationalism began taking shape among Arabs under Ottoman rule in the form of both secular and religious movements. A secular concept of Arab nationalism was motivated by a) a desire to break away from an Ottoman leadership that had been attempting to ‘Turkify’ the non-Turkish speaking peoples within its territories and b) a vision of unifying Arabic-speaking peoples under a common identity regardless of religious affiliation (Caplan, 2010). Krämer emphasizes that both the secular and the Islamic Arab nationalist movements shared many similar themes, and that they should be considered political competitors rather than polar opposites (Krämer, 2008, p. 124). Complicating matters further were the increasingly frequent conflicts between Arab landowners and Jewish immigrants in Ottoman Palestine. In 1905, Arab nationalist Négib Azoury (as cited in Caplan) observed the following:

[There exists] two important phenomena, of the same nature but opposed, . . . the awakening of the Arab nation, and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. Both these movements are destined to fight continually until one of them wins. The fate of the entire world [he
predicted] will depend on the final result of this struggle between these two peoples representing two contrary principles. (p. 42)

**The end of the Ottoman Empire and Britain’s influence.** As the Ottoman Empire gradually fragmented, British influence in the eastern Mediterranean and Palestine increased to such an extent that one historian states that the British were “more involved] than any other foreign power in the creation of Palestine as a modern political entity and in establishing its boundaries” (Biger, 2008, p. 70). One significant example of the British government’s influence on boundary creation during this period was the creation of what is today Israel’s boundary with Egypt. In 1906, Britain successfully renegotiated the border between Egypt (which was under British control) and then-Ottoman territory in Palestine “in order to place [the border] as far as possible from the Suez Canal” (Biger, p. 70). At the conclusion of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was effectively dismantled and Britain became “the sole ruler of the area that later became Palestine” (Biger, p. 70). Through further negotiations with France (known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement), Britain established the northern and eastern borders of Palestine.

**The Balfour Declaration.** It is at this stage in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the end of World War I and the British military’s entrance into Palestine—that the differing narratives between the two sides begin to solidify. In brief, at the conclusion of World War I both Zion nationalists and Arab nationalists petitioned Britain for different reasons: Zionists sought a national home for Jews while Arabs sought protection to establish a nation-state of their own. In an apparent attempt to balance the prior commitments British officials had made to Arab leaders with the need to help resolve the ‘Jewish question,’ Britain’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a statement in
November 1917 to the head of the English Zionist Federation Walter Rothschild that obligated Britain to helping establish a ‘Jewish national home’ in Palestine where the ‘civil and religious rights’ of the ‘existing non-Jewish communities’ in Palestine were to be ‘unprejudiced’. This came to be known as the Balfour Declaration.

However, the wording of this obligation to the Zionist cause in Palestine proved to be quite problematic. Arab nationalist leaders rejected the Declaration on multiple grounds. First, the declaration did not refer to the indigenous population of Palestine as ‘Arab’ or ‘Palestinian’ but rather ‘non-Jewish.’ Arab nationalists interpreted this as meaning that the indigenous Arabs of Palestine would be provided no political or civil rights. Second, the Balfour Declaration contradicted letters written by British high commissioner Henry McMahon to Sharif Hussein of Mecca in which the former assured that Britain would grant independence to various Arab regions including Palestine (Krämer, 2008). Third, by placing the aspirations of a Jewish national home above the nationalist aspirations of the indigenous Arabs in Palestine implied that “the Arabs were a minority in Palestine,” which statistically was not the case (Adwan et al., 2012). Further complicating matters was the fact that the region known as Palestine “formed no administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire and thus had no well-defined boundaries” (Krämer, 2008, p. 145).

**Dual narratives crystallized.** Arab and Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Balfour Declaration, compared to Zionist satisfaction with said Declaration, set the stage for the next chapter in this evolving conflict. As Caplan (2010) has observed, the conflict at this state began to shift from being a Zionist-Arab conflict to a Zionist-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, the British government found itself within a ‘dual obligation’ to
satisfy both Zionist-Jewish aspirations, as mentioned in the Balfour Declaration, and appeasing the indigenous Palestinian population which rejected the Balfour Declaration outright.

To this point I have attempted to present the history of this land and these peoples through Krämer’s (2008) lens of ‘relationality’ so that facts can ‘speak for themselves’ (Caplan, 2010). However, from this point onward I will present this history through the lenses of both of the dual narratives (albeit abbreviated versions) of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the events of this period (from the Balfour Declaration to the present day) cannot be related without ‘showing one’s hand.’ In other words, the semantic choices an interlocutor must make in order to provide a narrative that insinuates neither villains nor innocents are beyond my abilities. As such, the primary events of this period will be presented as separate and alternating ‘dual narratives,’ inspired primarily by the work of Adwan et al. (2012).

**The Zionist-Jewish narrative: Balfour Declaration to Israeli independence.**

With the support of both the British military and government representation, Palestine was provided the means to develop infrastructure such as roads, schools, and medical facilities. These improvements were intended to support both the development of the Jewish state promised in the Balfour Declaration and the economic development of the Arab population of Palestine. Despite relative calm between 1922 and 1929, a series of Arab riots broke out in August 1929 including a massacre in the city of Hebron, whereby Arab mobs attacked and killed Jews. After these events, the British began to withdraw from their promise within the Balfour Declaration and a British commission recommended “ending the Jewish immigration and land purchases by Jews” (Adwan et
Nevertheless, by the early 1930’s Jewish immigration resumed and “a self-defense capability was established” (Adwan et al., p. 66).

Through the 1930’s the Jewish population enjoyed significant growth and continued to develop economic opportunities for Jews and Arab Palestinians alike. However, by 1939 Arab revolts and uprisings resumed in an attempt to a) reverse the Balfour Declaration, b) break the ties between Britain and the Zionist movement, c) cease Jewish immigration, d) prohibit the sale of land to Jews, and e) establish a single Arab state in Palestine. The Palestinians engaged in terrorist attacks and economic strikes in their attempts to make Britain meet their demands. However, the British strengthened their ties to Jewish leadership and suppressed the Arab revolts (Adwan et al., 2012).

Nazi Germany’s persecution and mass execution of European Jews brought increased urgency to the need to establish a Jewish state. However, by 1940 a series of white papers made it clear that Britain would work to establish an Arab state in Palestine with a Jewish minority, which would require the limiting of Jewish emigration to Palestine and a freeze of Jewish land purchases. When it was clear Germany would lose the war, certain Jewish dissident groups attacked and killed British personnel in an attempt to force Britain to reverse the restrictions on Jewish immigration. The Yishuv condemned these tactics and helped British officials capture the guilty parties.

As the atrocities of the Holocaust came to light (6 million Jews killed by Nazi Germany), the pressing need to relocate the surviving displaced 200,000 European Jews became the Yishuv’s primary concern. In 1947, the British turned the ‘Palestinian problem’ over to the United Nations, and by November a partition plan was adopted that would establish two independent states in Palestine, one Jewish and one Arab. However,
the entire Arab world rejected the plan and continued attacking and killing Jews, thus initiating the War of Independence, which concluded with the British military withdrawal on May 15, 1948. According to Adwan et al. (2012), “Between December 1947 and March 1948, about 75,000 Arabs had already left the country, mainly people from the upper and middle classes” (p. 118). Soon after Israel had officially became a nation of its own, an estimated 600,000 Arabs left the State of Israel (Adwan et al., p. 120).

**The Arab/Palestinian narrative: The Balfour Declaration to the Al Nakhba.**

Despite the illegality of the Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate ensured an increasing number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine for the purpose of turning Palestinians into a minority within their own land. The British also instituted numerous ‘divide and rule’ policies that were intended to pit Arab families against each other and create suspicion between rural and urban dwellers. These policies and practices had the effect of weakening Palestinian unity and resistance to Zionist initiatives (Adwan et al., 2012).

The British also weakened the economic opportunities for Palestinian farmers by “flooding the market with imported wheat and oil just a few weeks before the wheat harvest season or olive picking to force the local products to be sold at the lowest prices” (Adwan et al., 2012, p. 47). Thus, farmers would eventually incur so much debt that they would be forced to sell their land to Zionist settlers and migrate to urban areas.

Educational opportunities for Palestinians were also restricted due to British interference with Arab school administration and curriculum.

Under these conditions, the Palestinian national movement grew stronger. When Jews openly provoked Muslims in Jerusalem over access to the ‘wailing wall’ at Al-Aqsa
Mosque, rioting broke out and both Jews and Muslims carried out numerous murders. When the British captured and sentenced the perpetrators, three Palestinians were sentenced to death while only one Jew received a commuted sentence for the murders he committed.

Through the 1930’s the Palestinian national movement gained momentum. However, Arab Palestinians continued to lose land to Jewish settlers and the British continued to crack down heavily on Palestinian protests. Despite Palestinian attempts to organize politically, these initiatives were all ignored. When the UN Partition Plan was passed in 1947, Palestinians immediately revolted against Jewish occupation. When the British military departed on May 15, 1948, more than 800,000 Palestinian Arabs were either forced out of their homes or fled to neighboring countries (Adwan et al., 2012, p. 120) creating the Palestinian refugee disaster, the Al Nakba (Arabic for ‘The Catastrophe’).

1949 to present: The cyclical stalemate. The events of this period signify the shift from the Zionist-Palestinian conflict to the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict. The dual narratives presented in the previous section represent many of the themes and grievances still animating the conflict today. The Israeli narrative includes themes similar to those presented in the ‘geotheological’ origins section: victimization, redemption, and existential threat from outsiders. The Palestinian narrative shares nearly identical themes: victimization, injustice, and existential threat from outsiders. This final section of the history of the conflict is presented primarily as a list of events without further elaboration on the continuing dual narratives.
The effects of Israeli independence and the Al Nakba. The Palestinian rejection of the UN partition plan of 1947 and the subsequent war changed the landscape of the conflict dramatically. Both Jews and Arab-Palestinian peoples before Israeli independence were under the protection of the British Mandate, but after the Mandate ended and the subsequent exodus/forced exile of Palestinian Arabs, the inhabitants of this region came under one of the following categories:

- Jewish-Israeli citizens of Israel,
- Palestinian-Arab citizens living inside Israeli borders who accepted citizenship after the state of Israel was created, or
- Palestinian refugees who reside in one of Palestine’s neighboring countries (namely Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) and are thus considered ‘stateless’.

The number of ‘Palestine refugees’ in 1948 numbered as many as 650,000 (Caplan, 2010). Because their situation has still not been resolved, subsequent generations of Palestine refugees eligible for assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) now total 5 million (UNRWA, 2015). In December 1948, the UN passed Resolution 194 which stipulated that the Palestine refugees had the right to return to their homes and be compensated for their losses. However, this resolution has still not been implemented.

The effects of the 1967 war. After Israel gained independence in 1949, the population of the new Israeli state included approximately 350,000 Arab-Palestinians while the Jewish population numbered nearly 1 million (Caplan, 2010). The Palestine refugee crisis stretched the capacities of the infrastructures of neighboring Arab states,
adding further strain to the already hostile relations between Arab states and the Jewish-Israeli state. In June 1967, Israel attacked Egyptian planes near their borders, which obligated both Jordan and Syria to attack Israel on Egypt’s behalf. The six-day war resulted in the Israeli military conquering territories from each of these Arab states that consequently added 430,000 square kilometers to Israeli territory (Caplan, p. 145). This military incursion also placed an additional 600,000 Arab-Palestinians under Israel’s military control. Since that time, multiple UN interpretations of the Fourth Geneva Convention have concluded that these territories must be returned to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, but as of yet Israel has not fully complied. The result of this military occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights created a new Palestinian category of identity: ‘Arab-Palestinian within occupied territory.’ These Palestinians are differentiated from both Arab-Palestinians that possess Israeli citizenship and Palestine refugees living in camps supported by UNRWA in neighboring Arab states.

**The rise of the PLO and the Intifadas.** Following the events of 1967, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been founded in 1964, expanded its realm of influence as the primary representative of both Palestine refugees and Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories. The PLO’s 1968 National Charter, overseen by its leader Yasser Arafat, called for the “elimination of Zionism in Palestine” by way of “armed struggle” because this represented the only means of “regaining Palestine as an Arab state for its original Palestinian inhabitants” (Caplan, 2010, p. 163). The PLO and multiple Palestinian splinter groups carried out acts of violence against Israelis both inside and outside Israel, while Israel responded with covert assassinations of Palestinian leaders and heavy military incursions on Palestinians in the occupied
territories (Caplan, 2010). Furthermore, Israeli settlers (Orthodox Jews committed to the pursuit of the Zionist vision of a fully Jewish state) were allowed to establish homesteads within Gaza and the West Bank, which resulted in further violent confrontations between Arab-Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. These cycles of violence continued throughout the 1970’s and 80’s.

Due to worsening economic conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories, the first ‘Intifada’ (Arabic for ‘uprising’) began in 1987. The violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli police and military had by 1991 resulted in the deaths of at least 800 Palestinians. During this period, the PLO and Israeli leadership had engaged in talks that resulted in the PLO’s renunciation of ‘terrorism’ as a means for achieving Palestinian statehood. Despite the optimism this renunciation created, violence clashes continued in the occupied territories as late as 1993. That same year Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin signed the Oslo Accords which were intended to begin the process of reconciliation between Israel and Palestinians and eventually result in a Palestinian state. However, Rabin was assassinated shortly thereafter by an ultra-Orthodox Jew and the Oslo Accords ended up making very little actual change in the conflict. The cycle of violence continued through the 1990’s.

By 2000, Arafat and a succession of Israeli Prime Ministers had engaged in multiple talks in an attempt to continue what had begun with the signing of the Oslo Accords. However, when Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba, Egypt, they were unable to overcome ‘thorny’ issues related to the ‘geotheological’ matters underlying the conflict, namely the governance of Jerusalem and the administration of Islamic and Jewish holy sites (Caplan, 2010). In September of 2000, Israel’s Likud party
leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which prompted violent responses from Palestinians in Jerusalem. Thus the second Intifada was initiated, which proved to be even more violent and deadly than the first Intifada: by September 2004, 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis had been killed (Caplan, p. 206). In response to the increase in Palestinian suicide bombings, Israel initiated the construction of a barrier separating Jewish and Palestinian populations and established multiple security checkpoints which effectively limited the ability for Palestinians to travel within and between the occupied territories.

The United States’ role in the conflict. Though the United States has never officially established or drawn any boundaries in Israel-Palestine, its influence in the region has been significant. The US supported the UN resolution of 1947 and later “adopted the English version of Resolution 242, calling for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied during that war” (Biger, 2008, p. 84). Furthermore, the US has served as a mediator and peace broker between Israel and the PLO, most notably under Presidents Carter and Clinton.

Nevertheless, outside of these official diplomatic engagements, the relationship between the US and Israel has repeatedly been described as ‘special’—first by President Kennedy in 1962 and again by Carter in 1977. Bar-Siman-Tov (1998) suggests that this relationship has become characterized as ‘special’ in due to the US government’s significant military and economic aid to Israel. From 1948 to 1996, the US government provided more than $65 billion to Israel despite the lack of any formal defense or military pact (Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 231). More specifically, the relationship between the US and Israel could be characterized as ‘patron-client,’ whereby the US has provided Israel
tangible military and economic support while Israel has provided the US intangible assurances of ‘self-restraint’ against attacking neighboring Arab states (Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 261). The future of the US-Israeli ‘special relationship’ is likely to evolve not because of individual differences between each nation’s respective leaders (i.e. Obama and Netanyahu) but because of shifts in the nations’ respective national interests (Waxman, 2012).

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. Since 2002, a number of high level resolutions and ‘peace plans’ have been developed, but thus far very little political progress has been made in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 2002, a Saudi Arabian-backed peace plan was approved by the Arab League which, if implemented, would offer Israel full diplomatic recognition among Arab states (currently there is no such diplomatic recognition) in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 occupied territories. In 2003, multiple international players including the UN, the European Union, Russia, and the United States developed a performance-based ‘Roadmap to Peace’ intended to lead to a two-state solution. Also in 2003, Palestinian and ex-Israeli negotiators working independently and outside of their respective governments developed a set of proposals—collectively called the Geneva Initiative—that builds on the initial agreements achieved during the Taba, Egypt talks.

In 2005, Israel officially withdrew its military operations from Gaza, and in 2006 the Islamic Palestinian party Hamas won major elections in Palestine. Since these events, Israel has maintained its system of checkpoints and border wall separations, while Palestinians have struggled to unify around a specific political cause, with loyalties divided between the PLO, Hamas, and Fatah. Furthermore, millions of Palestine refugees
remain stateless in neighboring Arab states, and the economic health of Gaza has worsened due to Israel’s increased military presence on its borders. In 2009 US President Obama successfully pressured Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept the goal of a two-state solution. However, official Israeli and Palestinian leaders have not been able to agree on the terms of ‘freezing’ Jewish settlements on land captured in the 1967 war. Tension around this issue of Israeli settlements remains significant. As of this writing, ultra-Orthodox Jewish settlers in the West Bank recently firebombed a Palestinian family’s home, killing two, critically injuring two, and sparking demonstrations throughout Israel and the occupied territories (Lappin & Lazaroff, 2015).

**Sociological ‘Master Narratives’ and the Perpetuation of the Conflict**

The preceding overview of the history of the conflict between Jews/Israelis and Arabs/Palestinians demonstrates that despite numerous attempts at resolving the conflict—from British intervention in the 1920’s to UN partition plans in the 1940’s to international peace plan conferences in the 1990’s—the conflict has developed a self-perpetuating characteristic that renders it an ‘intractable ethnonational conflict’ (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). As such, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differs from that of a ‘tractable’ conflict in that the parties involved in the latter type of conflict are more likely to be moved towards (and achieve beneficial results from) peaceful negotiations. The key characteristics of intractable ethnonational conflict are the conflict’s threat to a group’s basic human needs of security and recognition; the conflict’s infiltration into the groups’ social, cultural, and political systems; the conflict’s multi-generational protractedness; the conflict’s violent manifestations; and the conflict’s apparent irreconcilability (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, p. 761-762).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exhibits all of these characteristics and is made unique by further key elements. First, because both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Arab master narratives emphasize exclusive rights to the land, the narratives are, at the most fundamental level, mutually exclusive of each other. To acknowledge and accept the Israeli Jewish narrative means rejecting the Palestinian Arab narrative, and vice versa (Hammack, 2011). As such, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who fully accept their own respective master narrative must reject the other group’s right to security and recognition for the sake of eliminating cognitive dissonance. Second, both groups see themselves as victims of the other group’s aggression: Israeli Jews tend to exhibit a ‘siege mentality’ in the face of external threat (Bar-Tal & Antebi, as cited in Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998), while Palestinian Arabs evoke the Al Nakhta and suffering at the hands of colonizing empires. Third, the relationship is characterized by (either perceived or actual) ‘double power asymmetry,’ whereby Israel possesses superior military and political power while Palestine possesses greater access to human and material resources (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, p. 764). Finally, the role of religion has been politicized considerably, as has already been explored in the previous section on the role of geotheology.

All told, these master narratives and dynamics of intractable conflict create psychological dynamics that enable individuals in each society to a) cope with the stress and anxiety caused by the conflict and b) maintain belief systems that in turn ensure the perpetuation of the conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). In order to cope with the stress of the conflict, both Zionist-Israelis and Palestinian Arabs insist that their claim to the land is justified by historical precedence (Biblical promises) and the need to correct a
wrongdoing (the Al Nakhba), respectively. Also, members of each group view
themselves as superior to members of the other group: modern Israeli Jews have
purposely worked against historical negative Jewish stereotypes to present themselves as
morally superior to non-Jews, while Palestinian Arabs view themselves as superior in
terms of courageousness, especially in the light of the power asymmetry described
previously (Rouhana & Bar-Tal).

The stress and anxiety caused by intractable conflict also causes respective
members of each group to become ‘cognitively frozen,’ which means they “commit
themselves to certain beliefs and refrain from critically challenging them” (Rouhana &
Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 766). As a result of this ‘cognitive freezing,’ members of each group
tend to select, interpret, and elaborate information about the conflict and the other group
that is consistent with already held beliefs and biases. As such, new or contradictory
information about the conflict that challenges the master narrative is dismissed
immediately. Neither Israeli Jews nor Palestinian Arabs are immune to this phenomenon
and explains in part why the conflict has been impervious to resolution for so many
generations.

**How the Conflict Affects Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs**

Understanding the degree to which Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs subscribe to
a master narrative and how they view themselves as members of an in-group in relation
to an out-group are only parts of their respective worlds of experience. Regardless of how
these individuals view themselves in light of their group’s respective narrative, members
of both groups can be considered ‘survivors of the conflict.’ ‘Surviving the conflict’ does
not only mean ‘not dying in a violent altercation’; it also means ‘getting through the daily
grind of life in spite of the conflict.’ As such, what follows here is an overview of how this intractable ethnonational conflict has shaped both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab opinions about peace and conflict resolution and how the conflict has affected individuals in both groups—psychologically, physiologically, and relationally.

The role of ‘ethos of conflict’ on perceptions of the conflict. The term ‘ethos of conflict’ is defined as “a configuration of central shared societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to societal life under conditions of intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, as cited in Lavi et al., 2014, p. 71). As was mentioned earlier, the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab ‘ethos of conflict’ share many of the same themes related to victimization and justness of national goals. However, individual Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs vary in their degree of adherence to their group’s ethos of conflict, and these differences in adherence often affect how these individuals respond to the hardships of the conflict.

Specifically, Lavi et al. (2014) found that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who adhere strongly to their respective group’s ‘ethos of conflict’ were often ‘protected’ from experiencing depression after experiencing certain conflict-related events such as financial loss or a home demolition. However, individuals who have a low adherence to the ethos of conflict experienced greater levels of negative emotions after experiencing such events. These results suggest “strong ideological commitment can help the individual find the social context a stable one, with predictability and meaningfulness, even when this individual is confronted with harsh events that have resulted from the same social context” (Lavi et al., 2014, p. 84). However, a high ethos of conflict
adherence did not protect either Israeli Jews or Palestinian Arabs from ‘post-traumatic experience’ following the death of a loved one.

Furthermore, the Lavi et al. (2014) study indicated that Palestinian Arabs with a low ethos of conflict adherence, in the face of extreme conflict-related stressors, are likely to feel greater levels of ‘national threat’ and, as such, start adhering more closely to the ethos of conflict. Similarly, Israeli Jews with a low ethos of conflict experience greater levels of hatred and fear when exposed to extreme conflict situations. This suggests “threatening contexts result in movement toward conservative views (i.e. strong adherence to the ethos of conflict) but only among those who did not hold such views in the first place” (Lavi et al., 2014, p. 87).

Despite evidence that demonstrates some correlation between the experience of violent conflict events and the likelihood of individuals subsequently advancing conflict-perpetuating beliefs and behaviors, survey data collected over the last few decades suggest that popular beliefs and perceptions among Israelis about Palestinians have been changing. For example, in the 1970’s, 70% of surveyed Israeli Jews believed that the Palestinian Arab people did not constitute ‘a nation,’ but by 2009 the percentage dropped to 32% (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). As such, Israeli Jewish popular opinion suggests that there has been a significant increase in support for ‘Arab Palestinian national recognition.’ However, popular Israeli Jewish perceptions of the ‘trustworthiness of Arab Palestinians’ have dropped since the beginning of the second Intifada. For example, in 1999 64% of surveyed Israeli Jews believed most Arab Palestinians ‘want peace,’ but by 2009 that number had dropped to 44% (Bar-Tal et al., 2014). These trends indicate “if trust could be rebuilt, Israeli Jews would be considerably better poised to make political and
territorial concessions for peace than they were at the start of the ‘Oslo Process’” (Newman, 2012, p. 476).

**Physiological effects of the conflict.** Though survey data measuring Israeli Jewish perceptions of Palestinian Arabs in light of the conflict is far more extant than reliable survey data measuring Palestinian Arab perceptions of Israeli Jews, there are a number of studies that point to the negative effects the conflict has had on both groups. The effects on Palestinian Arab children are quite substantial. For example, Palestinian Arab children are likely to experience ‘loneliness’ and ‘lack of intimate friendship’ after witnessing severe military violence (Peltonen et al., 2010). Another study showed that in the aftermath of war, nearly three-quarters of surveyed Palestinian Arab children ages 8 to 14 actively feared their own impending death and nearly all of them believed adults were unable to protect them (Thabet et al., 2010). Giacaman et al. (2007) report that Palestinian Arab adolescents who endure or witness as few as one ‘humiliating’ life event (i.e. one that violates dignity and basic human rights) were subsequently significantly more likely to report a high number of subjective health complaints. Furthermore, the stress Palestinian Arab children have experienced due to poverty and social marginalization has made it extremely difficult for them to achieve academic success (Diab, 2011).

The negative effects the conflict has had on Palestinian Arab children and youth is not reflected equally through their population. For example, Lavi and Solomon (2005) found that Palestinian Arabs living in the occupied territories witness or experience a significantly higher number of traumatic events than do Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Gaza and West Bank Palestinians also reported higher levels of post-traumatic
symptoms, expressed greater pessimism about the future, and were less likely to express positivity about peace negotiations than did Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. However, both groups experience similar levels of chronic stress due to the conflict.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has affected both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab families significantly, especially those that have lost a family member in a violent event related to the conflict. Though Abbott’s (2009) study cannot be considered representative of all Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab families who have lost a family member, Abbott identified key differences in the themes of experience between how Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are affected by the death of a family member. For example, while both Palestinian Arab and Israeli Jewish families expressed shock and grief at their family’s loss, the former celebrated the deceased as a ‘martyr who has earned a place in paradise’ while the latter saw only the ‘senseless’ loss of the deceased (Abbott, p. 121). Israeli Jewish family members in Abbott’s interviews generally did not express hatred for Palestinian Arabs, but they did express a lack of trust in Palestinian Arab intentions. Some interviewed Palestinian Arab families, however, expressed hope that other family members would become martyrs for the ‘cause of Palestine.’ Beyond these differences, however, Abbott found that both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian Arab families, especially siblings of the deceased, experienced emotional and psychological ‘devastation’ many years after the loved one’s death. Families from both groups coped by memorializing the deceased in annual commemorations and, in cases where the deceased was a child, by giving birth to a ‘replacement child.’ These identified ‘themes of experience’ are also consistent with Punamäki et al.’s (2005) study that shows that Palestinian Arab families who had endured loss due to military violence received
considerably more social support than families who endured domestic violence. For Palestinian Arabs, ‘heroism’ is strongly related to ‘national sacrifice’ while ‘shame’ is strongly related to ‘family violence’ (Punämaki et al., 2005). What all this suggests is that although Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab families cope with tragic loss in similar manners at a basic human level, each group assigns significance to that tragedy in a manner consistent with each group’s respective master narrative as described in previous sections of this review.

**The multiple identities of Israeli Jews today.** Despite the presence of multiple culturally-different Jewish populations within Israel, few (if any) of the studies referenced in the previous section made any mention of these various populations. Census data within Israel tends to ignore these cultural differences among Israeli Jews by classifying Israeli Jews under one of only two categories: Ashkenazim (Occidental Jews) and Sephardim (Oriental Jews) (Leichtman, 2001). These broad categorizations of Israel’s Jewish population ignore the historical identities of a variety of culturally-different Jewish populations which include Egyptian, Moroccan, Ethiopian, Russian, Yemeni, Indian Jews, and Palestinian Jews (i.e. the Old Yishuv mentioned in a previous section).

Mizrachi (2004) suggests that this kind of ‘lumping’ of Israeli Jews into a minimal number of categories is representative of a larger phenomenon of ‘ethnic hierarchy shaping.’ Mizrachi postulates that Mizrahi Jews (those of Middle Eastern/Oriental background) have been victimized by a multi-generational process of ‘ethnopsychology’ whereby the behaviors of the Ashkenazi (i.e. Zionist European Jews) were gradually standardized within Israeli psychological practice as ‘normal’ behavior,
while the behaviors of the Mizrahi Jewish population were deemed as ‘abnormal’ or ‘sick.’ This has had significant social and political effects on the Mizrahi population within Israel: “Politically, [Oriental Jews] have been considered as part of the [Israeli] nation-building project and of the Jewish collective, but culturally they have been the ‘other’” (Mizrachi, 2004, p. 226).

Mizrahi Jews make up nearly half of the Jewish population of Israel (Wurmser, 2005) yet their enrollment in higher education is less than both that of Ashkenazi Jews and Palestinian Citizens of Israel, and their income levels are significantly less than Ashkenazi Jews (Shavit, 1990). This suggests that their marginalization within Israeli society has had significant effects on their overall opportunities for social and economic advancement. Some post-Zionist writers have referred to the status of Mizrahi Jews within Israel as a call to action against Zionism: “The Zionist denial of the Arab-Moslem [sic] and Palestinian East, then, has as its corollary the denial of the Jewish ‘Mizrahim’ who, like the Palestinians, but by more subtle [sic] and less obviously brutal mechanisms, have also been stripped of the right of self-representation” (Shohat, 1988, p. 1). However, though the existence of ‘Arab Jews’ would at first appear to be a natural ‘bridge’ towards reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, “most [Mizrahi] hold an antagonistic view of the Arab world and find the attempt to define them as Arab Jews rather than as Israelis insulting” (Wurmser, para. 32).

**Peace Education & Dialogue, Social Theory, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

Intergroup dialogue is one of numerous expressions of peace education, whereby participants are facilitated through a process of conversation in order to reduce prejudice and build positive relationships with ‘the other.’ Unfortunately, rigorous research and
evaluative scholarship is lacking in the field of peace education (Salomon, 2002). Salomon likens the state of peace education research today to a hypothetical medical field that fails to differentiate between invasive surgeries to remove a malignant tumor versus non-invasive laser surgery to correct myopia. As such, the field of peace education has generally lacked the kind of rigorous scientific procedures for ascertaining not only the type of ‘conflict maladies’ infecting a group of people but also the appropriate ‘treatment’ for said maladies (Salomon, 2002).

One of the reasons there exists such a ‘disconnect’ between scholarship and practice in the field of peace education is due to the ‘amorphous’ goals of peace education (Harris, 2002). At the very least, peace education promotes alternatives to violence, but because there are so many different forms of violence (structural, domestic, gender-related, police, racial, etc.), peace educators end up trying “to address all the different forms of violence that occur on this planet” (Harris, para. 3). By trying to offer a solution for all human conflict, peace education as a whole often fails to address any of the forms of violence adequately.

Furthermore, one primary reason why the field of peace education exhibits such an ‘amorphous quality’ is the disagreement among peace education scholars regarding the definition and conception of ‘peace.’ Peace has been defined on a broad spectrum ranging from Spinoza’s conception of peace as “not an absence of war, (but) a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice” (as cited in Danesh, 2008, p. 815), to Galtung’s (1969) systems-oriented conception of peace as the absence of personal and structural violence. Johnson and Johnson (2006) view peace as “the absence of war or violence in a mutually beneficial, harmonious relationship among
relevant parties” (p. 147). A recent conception of peace offered by Firer (2008) defines peace in terms of personal action, ranging from positive peace (the proactive elimination of structural violence) to negative peace (conflict avoidance). Whether peace primarily lies in personal ethics, social systems, the elimination of militaristic conflict, or some combination of these is still a matter that has not been universally delineated among peace scholars and conflict resolution practitioners.

**Peace Education in Zones of Intractable Conflict**

Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of peace, there is little debate over the definition of ‘intractable conflict,’ and regions that exhibit intractable conflict are a significant challenge for peace builders. According to Bar-Tal (2000), ‘intractable conflict’ is “protracted, irreconcilable, [are preserved through] vested interests in their continuation, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central. They are demanding, stressful, exhausting, and costly both in human and material terms” (Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 22). Furthermore, because intractable conflicts tend to be both the products of and cause of a prolonged period of violence, mere conflict resolution is not enough to bring about any semblance of peace. Instead, peace builders must focus on creating opportunities for genuine reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000).

According to Salomon (2002), peace building initiatives in areas of intractable conflict can only be effective if a) practitioners shift the focus from individuals to collectives; b) the narratives of the past that justify essentialized perspectives of the other can be deconstructed; and c) the expressed animosity over past injustices can be overcome. Echoing Bar-Tal (2000), Salomon (2002) points out that, in order to achieve these three goals, peace education programs in regions of intractable conflict (such as
Israel-Palestine) must lead participants to the following four behavioral and perceptual outcomes: a) acceptance of the other’s narrative, b) a willingness to examine one’s own group’s claims in the light of the other group’s claims, c) a readiness to express and show empathy towards the other, and d) a disposition to engage in nonviolent activities. Each of these outcomes is fraught with challenges, especially considering that these outcomes would ideally be pursued in an arena of symmetrical social power. However, regions of intractable conflict are in conflict largely because there exists a state of asymmetrical social power.

Theoretical Foundations of Contact: Allport to Sherif to Tajfel

To understand the development of intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine requires a brief overview of the development of social conflict theories that have served as the foundational concepts of intergroup dialogue practice in general.

‘Intergroup dialogue’ as a concept and practice can be traced as far back as the days of Socrates and his introduction of the ‘Socratic method,’ whereby individuals are encouraged to ask well-conceived questions for the purpose of arriving at truth (Dessel & Rogge, 2008). ‘Intergroup dialogue’ can be defined as “a facilitated group experience that may occur once or may be sustained over time and is designed to give individuals and groups a safe and structured opportunity to explore attitudes about polarizing societal issues” (Dessel & Rogge, 2008, p. 201). Numerous different models of intergroup dialogue have been developed over the past few decades, and many of these models are based on the theoretical implications of the ‘contact hypothesis,’ which was originally developed by Allport in 1954 (as cited in Dessel & Rogge; Hammack, 2011) as an attempt to address the problem of prejudicial forms of in-group/out-group conflict.
According to Allport’s hypothesis, in order for contact work to be ‘optimal,’ four conditions need to be met: (1) the groups must have equal status with an encounter, (2) the groups must share common goals, (3) the group members must exhibit cooperative interactions, and (4) the interactions must have the support of authorities (Dessel & Rogge, p. 212).

According to Hammack (2011), Allport’s works (which were chiefly intended to address the problem of racial injustice in America) introduced the concept that ‘prejudiced behavior’ exhibited by in-group members towards out-group members is not the product of ‘pathology’ but rather the normal consequence of segregation. As Hammack states:

[F]or Allport, prejudice begins with a problem in the structure of a society: the physical separation of groups and their subsequent inability to engage with one another in basic daily contact, to get to know one another as distinct individuals rather than simply members of an out-group. . . . (Allport) viewed individual reason as ‘superior’ to collective mobilization. (p. 254-255)

This shift from ‘prejudice as pathology’ to ‘prejudice as predictable consequence of segregation’ led to the development of ‘realistic conflict theory’ as inspired by Sherif’s ‘Robbers Cave’ experiment in 1958 (Hammack, 2011). ‘Realistic conflict theory’ posits that prejudicial behavior towards an out-group occurs as a natural outcome when multiple groups compete over scarce resources. Furthermore, prejudicial attitudes and behaviors are reduced when the competing groups recognize the need to cooperate to achieve goals necessary for their survival. As Hammack (2011) explains, Sherif’s work demonstrated
that “the nature of the relationship between groups must itself be altered so that the original conditions that produced prejudice are eliminated” (p. 256).

Both Allport’s and Sherif’s work suggest that the process of eliminating prejudice requires the reduction or neutralization of structural and social power (Hammack, 2011). However, Tajfel (as cited in Hammack) argued that ‘realistic conflict theory’ focuses too heavily on interpersonal relations rather than intergroup relations. As such, Tajfel emphasized “the significance of the social psychological process of identification with the group in the larger context of conflict” (p. 257). Tajfel and Turner (1986) advanced ‘social identity theory’ which places identity as a primary influence on the development and perpetuation of intergroup conflict. They defined ‘social identity’ as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel & Turner, p. 16). Subsequent social experiments of ‘social identity theory’ showed that intergroup conflict could be created simply by artificially and arbitrarily assigning ‘group identities’ to previously unrelated groups of people (i.e. red team and green team). As Hammack (2011) summarizes, “identity itself [seems] to play a central role in the very creation of conflict” (p. 258).

A recent meta-analysis of over 500 studies that measured the effectiveness of intergroup contact programs based on Allport’s contact hypothesis showed that even in the absence of the four ‘optimal’ conditions, many dialogue efforts resulted in a reduction of prejudice among participants (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, p. 767). However, as highlighted by Hammack (2011), “not all (contact) efforts are so successful. There are clearly situations in which contact may, in fact, produce negative consequences or fail to reduce prejudice” (p. 248). Hammack suggests that contact sometimes produces negative
results (i.e. animosity between groups increase after dialogue) because both ‘contact theory’ and ‘realistic conflict theory’ are based on individualist social psychology—a framework that generally places the individual as the primary agent of change who can ‘rise above’ any unjust or primitive component of the social structure in which said individual exists. This ‘elevation of the individual’ over the collective to which the individual belongs effectively ignores the role of ‘power’ in social relations.

For this reason, Hammack suggests that the contact theory (and the theory’s subsequent reformulations) is an inadequate foundation for intergroup dialogue programs between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. As Hammack states, “If we only discuss conflict through the lens of individual personality, we miss the larger context within which those personalities develop: (…) structural factors like unequal access to resources, institutions, or lack of recognition . . . specify the context in which individual lives unfold” (p. 38). In brief, Hammack elevates the role of social-structural asymmetry as a primary factor affecting the quality and patterns of dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. In order for dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs to be an effective method of prejudice reduction, the foundation of the dialogue approach must account for the power of the collective sum of the individual’s social world to shape and determine the power of the individual.

**Models of Intergroup Dialogue Programs in Israel-Palestine**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, intergroup dialogue programs have been utilized for decades to facilitate conversations between Israelis and Palestinians. As described earlier, one of the primary motivations for the creation and utilization of intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine is to reduce prejudice and improve relationships between
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Despite the ‘geotheological’ themes that have colored and influenced the narratives of each group, many intergroup dialogue models in Israel-Palestine emphasize the social and political elements of the conflict rather than any specific ‘religious’ themes. According to Newman (2012), this exclusion of specific religious themes is purposive: “The peace movement in Israel has emerged from secular Israeli society. The relationship between secularism and the Israeli peace movement is more than just a correlation. It represents a causal relationship as well” (p. 485). As such, the peace movement, from a secular Israeli-Jewish perspective, is primarily a product of post-Zionism: the rejection of an Israeli national identity that dismisses Palestinian Arab narratives and instead “help(s) Israelis confront the reality of their own past and present by stripping away the myths and retelling their history warts and all” (Newman, p. 485).

Intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine can be categorized broadly under two umbrellas: secular dialogue models and interreligious dialogue models. Under each of these umbrellas are particular models. Under the secular umbrella are coexistence models, joint project models, confrontational models, and narrative models (Maoz 2010, 2011). Under the interreligious umbrella are three primary models or formats: cognitive interpretations of religious texts models, theological dialogue among clergy models, and reconciliation models (Abu-Nimer et al., 2007). What follows is a brief overview of each of these umbrellas of intergroup dialogue and the respective models under them.

**Secular models.** Maoz (2011) provides an appraisal of secular ‘intergroup encounters’ conducted between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. These types of encounters have been conducted in Israel since as early as the 1950s, and have appeared in various forms and under a wide variety of titles over the past six decades. As
of 2002, at least 150 active intergroup contact programs were in operation in both formal and informal Israeli educational institutions, from primary school through higher education (Maoz, 2010). The theoretical basis of many of these programs is the ‘contact hypothesis’ as originally explicated by Allport and later developed by Amir (as cited in Maoz). As such, a primary goal of these intergroup encounters is to reduce negative intergroup stereotypes and mutual prejudices. Though these Arab-Jewish intergroup programs all share this overarching goal of reducing prejudice and negative stereotypes, the methodologies for achieving this goal generally fall under one of four categories: coexistence models, joint project models, confrontational models, and narrative models (Maoz 2010, 2011). The identification of these categories is the outcome of a review of 20 years of peace education programs conducted between Israelis and Palestinians in Israel (Maoz, 2011).

**Coexistence models.** Coexistence models of peace education and intergroup dialogue represent the dominant form of peace building approaches in Israel-Palestine and are the models that adhere most closely to the contact hypothesis. The overarching theme of these models is the message ‘we are all human beings’ and thus emphasizes togetherness and cooperation (Bekerman, as cited in Maoz, 2011). Research has shown this type of model is effective for very young children (Stephan & Stephan, as cited in Maoz) but could be perceived as ‘irrelevant’ or even immoral by adult participants who may want to discuss specific issues related to the conflict rather than matters such as individual-level prejudice (Bekerman, as cited in Maoz).

**Joint projects models.** Joint projects models of peace-building are intended to invoke a spirit of mutual understanding and prejudice reduction primarily by bringing
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs together for the purpose of completing a project or goal. These goals and activities include art projects, orchestras, sporting events, and environmental service projects, just to name a few. Like coexistence models, joint projects models tend to avoid dealing directly with issues related to national identity or political conflict. The outcomes of these types of projects have been mixed: some projects like soccer matches have been quite successful in forging members of different groups towards the achievement of a shared goal (i.e. winning a match or tournament) while other programs (like co-curricular development in a school setting) have not consistently succeeded in creating a spirit of cooperation and, in at least one case, have even served to reinforce negative stereotypes (Maoz, as cited in Maoz, 2011).

**Confrontational models.** Confrontational peace education models (or group identity models) were developed primarily in response to the shortcomings of the coexistence and joint projects models. The underlying theoretical framework of these models emphasizes the reconstruction of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab relationships by focusing on both the asymmetrical power balance between the groups and the empowerment of the minority. Retrospective studies have indicated that these types of peace education models have in many cases successfully raised awareness among participants regarding injustice towards and victimization of Palestinian Arabs. However, “Confrontation Models can be more susceptible to destructive intergroup communication patterns that include verbal violence towards, and degradation and delegitimization of members of the other group” (Maoz, 2011, p. 120). In short, facilitators of the confrontational model have struggled to maintain an environment conducive to mutual respect among participants.
**Narrative models.** According to Maoz (2011), narrative and story-telling models, which were first facilitated in Israel-Palestine in the early 1990’s, represent the most recent development in peace education in Israel-Palestine. As the name suggests, these models emphasize the importance of personal story-telling within a mixed group setting for the purpose of identifying group identities and reconciling anger and pain associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These models emphasize a ‘transformational’ approach to conflict resolution and peace education and assumes that empathy towards others comes, in part, as an outcome of hearing the personal stories of people from the other group. While these models of intergroup contact appear to wed the best of both the coexistence models and the confrontational models, narrative models of interaction face issues of authenticity and quality: how do narrative facilitators ensure that participants share stories that are simultaneously factual and poignant yet non-inflamatory (Maoz, 2011)? Like facilitators of the confrontational model, facilitators of narrative models have struggled to maintain an environment of mutual understanding and respect.

**Interreligious models.** The secular intergroup dialogue models outlined above tend to emphasize the goals of prejudice reduction and relationship quality while skirting issues related to religion. Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) suggest that ignoring the religious aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the sake of emphasizing “issues of self-determination and resources” renders a superficial understanding of the conflict. Religion in this region of the world has never been distinct from politics; the centrality of religious affiliation to Jews and Arabs . . . is a natural part of [their] lives . . . [they] cannot live without asking what the other religion is. It is part of [their] daily lives. (p. 43)
As was explicated earlier, both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have espoused geotheological claims to the ‘rights to the land’ for generations. As such, multiple Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religious groups have deemed intergroup dialogue that places religion at the forefront of discussion essential for building lasting peace in Israel-Palestine. Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) surveyed interreligious dialogue participants from 2003-2004 and from that data identified three primary models of interreligious dialogue in Israel-Palestine: cognitive interpretations of religious texts models, theological dialogue among clergy models, and reconciliation models.

**Cognitive interpretations of religious texts models.** According to Abu-Nimer et al. (2007) participants within this interreligious dialogue model gather and listen to presentations about a number of key elements of Judaic, Christian, and Islamic narratives and concepts. Typically, an expert presenter will offer an extended talk or lecture about a particular topic (i.e. jihad, Mohammed’s night journey, Judaic marriage rituals, etc.) which is followed by small-group discussion. These sessions are intended to be primarily educational and not an attempt to convert anyone from one faith to another. This model is based on the assumption that “people learn more through the discussion, and the encounter becomes deeper and more positive, when participants discover the humanity in each other” (Abu-Nimer et al., p. 53).

**Theological dialogue among clergy models.** The purpose of this model is to bring religious clergy (i.e. rabbis, priests, imams) and other religious theologians together to explore the differences and similarities between and among their respective religions. The focus is on ‘intellectual’ exploration rather than ‘spiritual.’ Typically, one participant will present a particular agreed-upon theme or topic and afterwards the participants offer their
respective reaction to the presentation. The primary shortcoming of this model is that these discussions rarely penetrate the real lives of the followers of the respective faiths and the dialogue remains within the metaphorical ivory tower (Abu-Nimer et al., 2007).

**Reconciliation models.** A third type of interreligious dialogue models is the reconciliation model, whereby large numbers of Jews, Christians, and Muslims attend one or two-day long public meetings and ceremonies that feature dance, music, chanting, prayers, and speeches. Whereas these types of public ceremonies tend to attract both religious and secular participants alike, a chief criticism is their “lack of individualized process, continuity, and follow-up” (Abu-Nimer, 2007, p. 53). Nevertheless, these types of gatherings tend to reach the largest numbers of people from the three primary faith groups in Israel-Palestine.

**Recent History and Limitations of Intergroup Dialogue Models in Israel-Palestine**

A number of compilations and articles have been published that provide anecdotal, journalistic, or insider reviews of individual structured peace education programs in Israel-Palestine (for recent examples, see Kuriansky, 2007). Though these articles provide valuable insights into the challenges researchers face in the peace-building process within a zone of intractable conflict, few of them fit the definition of ‘extensive scholarly analysis.’ As such, what follows is an overview of the structured (primarily secular) peace education and intergroup dialogue programs conducted with Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. These scholarly summaries and evaluations are based primarily on the work of Abu Nimer (1999, 2001, 2004a) and Salomon (2004, 2013). Taken together, these reports offer a range of critiques, observations, and recommendations for improving the intergroup dialogue process.
Asymmetrical social systems replicated within the dialogue. Abu-Nimer (2001) identified four primary limitations of intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine, all of which are related in some way to the theme of social and structural asymmetry. First, intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs tend to emphasize interpersonal relationships at the expense of discussion about social change that could lead to a broader recognition for civil rights and protections for Palestinian Arabs (a sentiment later echoed by Hammack, 2008). Second, because many intergroup dialogue groups emphasize Hebrew as the primary language, Palestinian Arab participants are forced to utilize the language of the oppressor, while Israeli Jewish participants are almost never expected to utilize Arabic. This phenomenon of language dominance is a replication of the asymmetrical relationship in Israeli society. Third, many dialogue programs tend to focus on processes of ‘similarity seeking’ rather than ‘difference identification’ which effectively mutes any discontent Palestinian Arabs may wish to express in dialogue. Finally, because most intergroup dialogue groups in Israel-Palestine are funded by the Israeli government, Abu-Nimer (1999, 2004a) questions the political motivations of intergroup dialogue backers.

Lessons learned from the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue encounter process.
Salomon (2013) reviewed 20 years of research into intergroup dialogue encounter programs and developed a set of ‘lessons learned’ from said research. The most salient of these lessons are presented here, namely: socio-political forces can override positive effects of a dialogue process, monolithic models of dialogue are less effective than adaptable or tailor-made models in helping dialogue participants bridge differences, and peace education alone is not enough to ensure long-lasting changes in participants’
beliefs and behaviors. Taken together, Salomon concludes, “peace education programs need to affect not only those who actually participate in the programs, but the effects need to spread to other realms of society” (2013, p. 12).

The power of socio-political forces to suppress peace education outcomes.
Salomon (2013) demonstrates that while many peace education and dialogue programs can claim short-term success in helping both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs change their respective attitudes from hostile to conciliatory, the positive effects quickly disappear after a contact program concludes. Salomon suggests this ‘erosion’ of positive effects is due to the strength of each respective group’s larger social narrative that effectively works against the narrative of reconciliation. However, Salomon demonstrates that the positive effects can be ‘restored’ if participants get engaged in a reflective process that requires them to re-tell the narrative of ‘the other’ to members of their respective in-group. This finding suggests that though empathic concern for ‘the other’ can be inhibited, “(it) cannot be totally erased. [It] may be suppressed by the prevailing collective narrative, but [it] can still be restored and revived” (p. 6).

The limitations of monolithic models of dialogue. Because members of different groups involved in intractable conflict usually perceive different causes of, sources of, and solutions to the conflict, Salomon emphasizes the importance of “addressing the different needs, aspirations, and motivations of all involved” in a process of peace-building and reconciliation (p. 8). Salomon suggests future peace education and intergroup contact programs utilize an approach akin to Shnabel et al.’s (2009) model of needs-based intergroup reconciliation, in which the needs of both groups involved in intractable conflict are both fully addressed, even if those needs appear to be in mutual
contradiction with each other. As Shnabel et al. found in their controlled study, “members of the perpetrator group showed greater willingness to reconcile when they received a message of acceptance, rather than empowerment, from a member of the victimized group” (p. 1021). This suggests that the path to reconciliation between groups involved in an intractable conflict characterized by asymmetrical power begins with an unambiguous acceptance of the current situation at hand, rather than a transformative process of empowering the weaker group.

**Peace education has its limitations.** Drawing from the outcomes of numerous studies, Salomon (2013) demonstrates that dialogue and peace education programs are effective at helping Israeli and Palestinian participants change their respective ‘viewpoints’ and general ‘attitude’ towards the other. However, these same programs do not seem to affect change on participants’ ‘convictions’ or emotionally-charged beliefs about the narrative underlying the conflict. This finding suggests that peace education programs, especially those of short duration, are not adequate means for ensuring long-lasting change, and that the process of helping Israelis and Palestinians move away from their respective narratives requires more than just dialogue (Salomon, p. 9).

**New Directions of Intergroup Dialogue in Israel-Palestine**

As the previous sections indicate, the dominant models of secular intergroup dialogue programs that are based on some derivative of the contact hypothesis (namely coexistence, confrontational, and joint project models) still have room for improvement, especially in regards to the observed replication of inequalities in the macro social arena within the dialogue process. However, there is evidence that these same intergroup dialogue programs do yield positive outcomes. For example, Abu Nimer (1999) suggests
that participants generally had ‘good personal experiences’ within the Israeli-Jewish interactions and became more aware of the problems within Israeli society. Other studies have demonstrated that intergroup dialogue has helped Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab participants recognize oppression and the roles individuals play in the perpetuation of that oppression (Halabi, as cited in Abu-Nimer, 2004) and recognize own and other’s perspectives and beliefs (Khuri, 2004).

All told, these findings suggest that intergroup contact models should explicitly recognize the role of structural inequities shaping the everyday lives of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. While this would certainly be a helpful addition to the underlying purpose of intergroup dialogue processes, Hammack (2008), Hammack et al. (2014), and Bekerman & Zembylas (2012) have provided additional criticisms and insights regarding intergroup dialogue and peace education models in Israel-Palestine and offer specific guidance on future initiatives in this field. What follows here is a brief overview of Hammack’s (2008) call for an intergroup model based on cultural psychology, Bekerman and Zembylas’ (2012) call for a ‘critical design’ peace education pedagogy, and Hammack et al.’s (2014) call for further research into individual processual change within the intergroup dialogue experience.

The call for cultural psychology. Hammack (2008) suggests that simply acknowledging power asymmetry between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs still does not fully ensure long-lasting, enduring change in the respective group’s relations. Instead, Hammack advocates the utilization of an intergroup contact model based on a paradigm concerned with the “cultural psychology of identity and conflict” (p. 38). What Hammack suggests is that narrative models of engagement and dialogue—rather than
confrontational or coexistence models—carry the potential to provide both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs the opportunity to realize that both “the individual and [the] social structure are dynamically interacting in a mode of reciprocal production . . . and it is through the individual process of narrative engagement that they come to unwittingly participate [in the production of a larger social transformation]” (p. 39).

**The call for pedagogical ‘critical expert design’**. In contrast to Hammack’s (2008) call for a move towards a cultural psychological foundation of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine, Bekerman and Zembylas (2012) believe peace education and intergroup dialogue, especially in regions of intractable conflict, need to move away from positivist “psychologized perspectives of peace” (p. 224) and instead develop a re-imagined form of “educational rhetoric” that conceptualizes ‘peace’ not as an abstract ideal but as a set of behaviors with real life consequences (p. 226). They call this move the first step towards the creation of a ‘reconciliation pedagogy’ that would allow members of groups in zones of intractable conflict to become ‘critical design experts.’ Such a pedagogy of reconciliation would help participants resolve issues that tend to evade comprehensive resolution. For example,

forgiveness may be offered as an exchange for symmetry when other forms of symmetry cannot be achieved (e.g., when lives cannot be returned—or returning territories can be too complex and compensation is offered). Forgiveness . . . enters the scene when symmetry cannot make its appearance—not because people do not want to offer symmetry, but because nothing more can be done pragmatically. (p. 228)
Documenting the process of identity change. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Hammack et al. (2014) recognized a “dearth” of research related to the meaning-making processes of participants in intergroup dialogue programs, particularly in regions of intractable conflict (p. 296). The authors also identified a lack of research that compares the participant experiences between different dialogue models. To address this ‘dearth,’ Hammack et al. facilitated intergroup contact dialogue sessions among American, Israeli, and Palestinian youth (while in the USA) and gathered both qualitative and quantitative data for the purpose of addressing a variety of gaps in the contact hypothesis literature. Specifically, the authors “examined the interaction of nationality and contact paradigm on the experience of contact . . . whether the experience for certain national groups changes as a function of the contact paradigm employed” (p. 297). Furthermore, the authors compared participants’ pre- and post-test responses and diary entries to determine (in part) if the model of intergroup dialogue (in this case, coexistence versus confrontational) yielded different types of experience for the respective participant.

The authors’ mixed methodology study yielded a variety of findings on the processes Israeli and Palestinian contact dialogue participants undergo. Specifically, they found that the confrontational model is effective in helping participants “initiate a process of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness,” and that Palestinian participants in particular “reported higher levels of empowerment and positive mood throughout contact relative to all participants” (p. 296). Also, they found that “(Participants’) diary entries in the [confrontational model] condition were more likely to contain entries reflective of negative psychological experience (e.g. confusion, frustration, and fear/anxiety) than diary entries in the [coexistence model] condition” (p. 312). However, the authors found
that “participants in a [confrontational] condition of dialogue reported lower levels of self-consistency and higher levels of intergroup differentiation over time, suggesting the effectiveness of this approach to initiate a process of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness” (p. 296). Furthermore, participant responses suggest that the confrontational model of dialogue was more likely to be associated with “higher levels of empowerment and positive mood throughout contact” especially for Palestinian participants, which suggests an “effectiveness of [the confrontational] approach to challenge power asymmetries and its positivity for the low-status group” (p. 296).

**Chapter Summary and Chapter 3 Preview**

In Chapter 2, I have gone to considerable lengths to outline the recurring themes of ‘geothetical influences’ and ‘asymmetry’ within a) the histories of Israel-Palestine, b) the master narratives of the peoples who call Israel-Palestine home, and c) the development and execution of intergroup dialogue programs that have been conducted between these peoples of Israel-Palestine. The history of Israel-Palestine was presented through the lenses of relationality and objectivity; however, when objectivity was untenable, both narratives of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs were presented. Both of the master narratives of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are characterized, to varying and lesser degrees, by double asymmetry, victimization, existential threat; and the violent conflict these themes both sustain and engender have had devastating outcomes on both groups of peoples physically, socially, emotionally, psychologically, and physiologically. The intergroup dialogue programs that have been in place for decades in Israel-Palestine are generally based on the contact hypothesis and have yielded mixed results. The primary criticism leveled against contact theory and the programs upon which the theory
is based is their general inability to generate lasting change in the respective larger Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab societies. Finally, recent initiatives in Israeli Jewish-Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue have called for continued reformulations of the foundational theoretical frameworks of these programs and for further research into the processual changes these intergroup participants undergo while participating in these dialogue programs.

As such, this dissertation seeks to address the same question Hammack et al. posed in their 2014 study: what are the processes intergroup dialogue participants experience throughout the dialogue process? Hammack et al.’s purpose for conducting their study was to address the lack of research on psychological processes among contact participants in general. However, Israeli and Palestinian intergroup dialogue participant commentary is extant in a number of studies conducted over the past 10 to 15 years.

Assuming answers to that question can be found within those older studies, I re-visited those various studies that include Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participant commentary. An appropriate qualitative research methodology for conducting a study whereby the data are previously published studies and reports is ‘qualitative meta-study’. The exact research questions and an explanation of the specific approach to qualitative meta-analysis I pursued are described in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3: Research Method

Bracketing—Identifying My Presuppositions

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the process of ‘bracketing’ is a crucial element of any interpretive qualitative research project. Because qualitative meta-study falls under the umbrella of interpretive inquiry, I have attempted to bracket my personal preconceptions, theoretical assumptions, and paradigmatic worldview influences in order to make transparent how my interpretations of the data are made ‘subjective.’ Taking an interpretivist constructionist stance means accepting that pure objectivity in social scientific research is an impossibility. Nevertheless, an open awareness and unambiguous presentation of those ‘subjectivities’ allows the reader to make a fully informed decision regarding the validity and acceptability of the researcher’s interpretation. As such, in this section I have attempted to bracket my experiences and perceptions in order to not only inform the reader of my subjectivities, but also help me stay “sensitive to how prior understandings inform analysis” (Roulston, 2014, p. 306).

The Need for a Transformative Solution

In 2002, I recall watching Israeli military campaigns unfold in a number of Palestinian towns in retaliation against the waves of suicide bombings perpetrated by members of Hamas. I remember the effect these particular episodes of armed and deadly conflict had upon me. These military campaigns and suicide bombings continued despite the Oslo II agreement, the Wye River Memorandum, and a recent UN resolution calling for an end to the violence. I remember that while watching the news on the continuing violence that night in 2002, I concluded that there can never be a purely political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The only true resolution to the conflict, I concluded,
would come when Israelis and Palestinians experience a complete transformation of their perception of each other—nothing short of a transformation of comprehension of what it means to be human.

Within a year of drawing this conclusion of the necessity for a transformation in Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab consciousness, I had begun pursuing a graduate degree in conflict resolution. This pursuit took me to Switzerland where I was first introduced to the Bahá’í Faith. Though I did not complete my master’s degree due to internal and financial struggles within the university, it was in Switzerland where I also met my wife Manal, a Syrian Arab Bahá’í. We got married in Damascus and moved to the United Arab Emirates, where Manal had grown up, and from that point both my perspectives on peace and conflict and my personal identity underwent a gradual but discernible reconstruction.

**My Multi-Faceted Identity**

I was born and raised in the Midwest US, a fifth generation son of German immigrant farmers. My grandmother shared stories with me that when she was a child on the playground (circa 1919) other kids threw stones at her for speaking German. Though it is normal for third and fourth generation immigrant children to lose their ancestral mother tongue due to the process of acculturation, in my family’s case that loss of mother tongue was hastened by threat of violence and social ostracism. Thus begins one level of my personal identity: I am a descendent of US immigrants who experienced rejection in the face of the local status quo and chose to shed all indication of membership to any other identity than ‘English-speaking white American.’
Though I was raised in the Lutheran church, there is anecdotal yet consistent evidence that those same German immigrant ancestors were not Protestant Christians but Jews. If the evidence is indeed accurate, that would mean that my German immigrant ancestors not only gave up their mother tongues in order to fit the standards of the American Midwest status quo, they also shed their religious identities. As such, a second layer of my identity is thus: I am a descendent of German and (potentially) Jewish converts to Christianity.

After graduating from college, I began questioning Christianity and ultimately threw off my own Christian faith in preference for a universal, holistic approach to spirituality. After moving to Switzerland, becoming a member of the Bahá’í faith, and marrying a Syrian Bahá’í, my identity became further multi-faceted. As such, I am a formerly Christian convert to the Bahá’í faith who is married to a Syrian Arab.

Because the Bahá’í faith’s international headquarters are located in Haifa, Israel, I, like the intergroup dialogue participants featured in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, experience a sense of belongingness to Israel-Palestine. Though I have never visited either Israel or Palestine, it is towards Haifa I face when I say my obligatory prayers, in the same way Jews face Jerusalem and Muslims face Mecca. As such, my spiritual identity is decidedly influenced by the geographical importance attributed to Israel-Palestine.

Finally, the tenets of the Bahá’í faith have had a great influence on my paradigmatic perspectives on matters of epistemology and ontology. Despite the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the world’s major religions, I view them as stages of one ever-evolving faith of God that differ only due to the particularities of the
age and region in which each respective religion was revealed. I have taken to heart a
tenet of the Bahá’í faith that forbids ‘conflict and contention,’ and I am influenced by the
decision-making framework of Bahá’í consultation which, among other things,
emphasizes the need to ‘seek truth’ rather than merely ‘compromise’.

Taken together, my identity as a descendent of German Jews who was raised in
the Christian church and has since joined the Bahá’í faith and helped create a multi-ethnic
Syrian-American family places me in a unique position to analyze the verbatim speech of
Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs engaged in intergroup dialogue processes. I possess an
active interest in the resolution of the conflict that goes beyond a merely academic or
pragmatic preference for peace. My interest is related more to the gradual processes of
identity transformation that I believe is necessary for lasting peace not only in Israel-
Palestine but worldwide. My faith informs me that this peace is only possible through the
realization of justice, equity, and human oneness.

A One State Solution

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, I personally tend to support a ‘one state’ vision
as part of the overall solution to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
subsequent sustainment of peace among the peoples of Israel-Palestine. However, I do
not at this time support any one particular version of a one state solution despite the
existence of multiple versions of said solution (see Abunimah, 2006; or Kelman, 2011).
The primary reason I advocate a one state solution rather than a two state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to my overall epistemological perspectives on the
nature of human reality and social interactions. Because the conflict between Israeli Jews
and Palestinian Arabs is sustained in part by the persistence of mutually exclusive master
narratives, the acceptance of a two state solution is, in my opinion, akin to a surrender to
the irreconcilability of these narratives. A two state solution to me is a resignation to the
impossibility of genuine peace. A one state solution, on the other hand, is more consistent
with the overall concept of human oneness that animates my paradigmatic worldview.
Furthermore, a one state solution requires that the mutually exclusive master narratives
that animate the conflict be re-written, and such a ‘re-writing’ can only be accomplished
through grassroots and political engagement of both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

The Research Questions and an Overview of Qualitative Meta-Study

As the previous chapter illustrates, the subject of ‘participant experience’ within
intergroup dialogue between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is tied to a variety of
interrelated topics and has been addressed through a variety of different research
methodologies and theoretical frameworks. Published research about these two groups of
peoples (Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs) and their respective identities and paradigms
of experience has been presented through sociological, psychological, and ethnological
theoretical frameworks. The intergroup dialogue models within which moderators have
facilitated dialogue between these two groups of peoples have been designed within
either ‘secular’ social psychological or ‘spiritual’ religious frameworks. The researchers
who have studied the processes and outcomes of these intergroup dialogue models have
couched their research and analyses within dialogical, discursive, and narrative
terminologies, just to name a few. Clearly, a suitable research methodology for
addressing the topic of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab relations must be both
interdisciplinary and flexible in order to accommodate for such a variety of perspectives
and frameworks.
As mentioned in the literature review in the previous chapter, one of the gaps in the research of intergroup dialogue encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is related to the general understanding of the meaning-making processes participants experience throughout the stages of a dialogue encounter. As observed by Stuhlmacher and Gillespie (2005), meta-analysis is a burgeoning research method in the field of social theory and conflict resolution. Specifically, they suggest that the field of conflict resolution can and should become “fertile ground for meta-analytic work” (p. 76). As such, I have chosen qualitative meta-study—a form of qualitative meta-analysis as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001)—as a suitable methodology for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not any relevant information related to this research gap can be found within previously published research about intergroup dialogue encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

Before I outline the central research question and secondary research questions, I present some of the characteristics of qualitative meta-analysis and how those characteristics have shaped the process of research question development. Among the various challenges qualitative meta-analysis presents to the meta-analyst is the formulation of research questions. As Timulak (2009) explains, “The evolving and flexible nature of qualitative research may be visible in qualitative meta-analysis by the fact that the research question may change during the procedure” (p. 593). This may occur because the data the analyst sets out to find may in reality contain information that was unexpected and does not relate directly to the research question of the meta-analysis. As such, as I began to conceptualize the direction of this dissertation, I refrained from outlining hard and fast research questions until I had conducted a reasonably thorough
literature review and had located a significant number of potential primary reports from which data was to be collected. After completing the literature review and completing a cursory reading of the potential primary reports containing the relevant data, I then formulated the central research question as thus: what are the experiences of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants?

Because this topic, its subjects, and the processes through which both the topics and subjects operate are influenced by a wide variety of historical, sociological, psychological, and spiritual influences, the methodology for answering this central question needs to be both dynamic enough to allow for an interdisciplinary approach and flexible enough to allow for original interpretation of the data and its significance. Qualitative meta-study, as outlined by Paterson et al. (2001), is a form of qualitative meta-synthesis that fits both of the methodological requirements the specific subject under study in this dissertation requires. As Zimmer (2006) stated, “Given the dialogic interpretive approaches used for qualitative meta-synthesis, [this methodology] is consistent with the aims and processes of interpretive inquiry” (p. 317). Furthermore, Paterson et al. (2001) suggested that one of the strengths of qualitative meta-study is that it encourages “a dynamic and iterative process of thinking, interpreting, creating, theorizing, and reflecting” rather than “definitive procedural steps” (p. 112). As such, this chapter provides an explication of the central and secondary research questions and an overview of the steps I followed to collect, analyze, and interpret that data to answer the respective research questions.
The Central and Secondary Research Questions

To reiterate, the central research question of this study is: what are the experiences of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants? With the central research question established, the secondary research questions are related directly to both the themes identified in the literature review and the interpretive flexibility that qualitative meta-study allows. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this topic and the dynamic, interpretive flexibility of the research methodology, the secondary research questions are grouped according to three general areas: A) the speech of intergroup dialogue participants, B) the intergroup dialogue model within which the dialogue is conducted, and C) the future of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. As such, the secondary questions are:

- **A1.** What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say *within* dialogue processes?
- **A2.** What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say *about* dialogue processes?
- **B1.** How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?
- **B2.** How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
- **C.** What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes in Israel-Palestine?

**Qualitative Meta-Study Compared to Qualitative Meta-Synthesis**

Qualitative meta-analysis shares much in common with quantitative meta-analysis in that both research methodologies aim to summarize the data within the most salient
primary studies within a given domain. The main difference between them is the
framework of the primary studies chosen for synthesis (or analysis). Whereas quantitative
meta-analysis requires the gathering of data from studies that present statistical evidence
to support or disprove a given hypothesis, qualitative meta-analysis requires the gathering
of data from qualitative primary studies such as ethnography, grounded theory,
phenomenology, narrative discourse analysis, and the like.

Though qualitative meta-analysis is a fairly new form of research methodology, a
variety of different approaches have been developed. Two of these approaches are the
‘qualitative meta-synthesis’ approach as explicated by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007)
and the ‘qualitative meta-study’ approach as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001). What
follows here is an overview of each of these approaches and an explanation of why I have
chosen to follow the guidelines of a ‘qualitative meta-study’ approach as described by
Paterson et al.

**Qualitative meta-synthesis.** Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) provided an
authoritative text on the process of qualitative metasynthesis and how this method differs
from other ‘synthesizing’ or ‘meta-analytical’ approaches to analyzing primary
qualitative data. Sandelowski and Barroso (as cited in Thorne et al., 2004) define
qualitative metasynthesis as “an interpretive integration of qualitative findings that are
themselves interpretive syntheses of data, including phenomenologies, ethnographies,
grounded theories, and other integrated and coherent descriptions or explanations of
phenomena, events, or cases” (p. 1358). They differentiate metasynthesis from
metasummary in that the latter “is a quantitatively oriented aggregation of qualitative
findings that are, in turn, topical or thematic summaries or surveys of data” (Thorne et al.,
Metasummary utilizes quantitative tools for establishing a sort of statistical validity for the frequency of findings within qualitative research and provides information that is essentially ‘the sum of all parts’, while metasynthesis utilizes data from qualitative studies that interpret and explain qualitative findings and concludes with an end product that is an “[integration equal to] more than the sum of parts, in that they offer novel interpretations of findings” (Thorne et al, p. 1358).

According to Sandelowski and Barroso (2007), qualitative metasynthesis is the method best suited for integrating primary qualitative studies that offer interpretations, explanations, or conceptual and thematic descriptions of the phenomenon under study. These include phenomenology, grounded theory, qualitative case study, and ethnography. Qualitative metasummary, on the other hand, is the method best suited for integrating qualitative data that comes in the form of topical or thematic surveys.

**Qualitative meta-study.** A method of qualitative meta-analysis that pre-dates Sandelowski and Barroso’s (2007) publication on qualitative meta-synthesis is Paterson et al.’s (2001) guide to conducting a qualitative meta-study. Because Paterson et al.’s work precedes Sandelowski and Barroso’s work, many of the elements found in the latter guide are also found in the former. However, differences exist between the two guides; those general differences include the inclusion criteria for primary reports and the specific stages of data analysis.

While Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) place a strong emphasis on differentiating between the types of primary reports from which data may be drawn (as explicated in the previous section), Paterson et al. (2001) tend to emphasize the researcher’s discretion in choosing which reports should be included in a qualitative meta-analysis. Whereas
Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) explicitly state that certain qualitative methodologies are more appropriate for meta-synthesis (i.e. grounded theory, phenomenology) and other methodologies are less appropriate (i.e. thematic surveys), Paterson et al. suggest that a range of qualitative methodologies and approaches can provide a richer and more nuanced picture of the experience under study. They state, “If primary research reports are regarded as the sample of the meta-study, they can vary in characteristics as would the sample of participants in an individual research study” (Paterson et al., p. 41).

More to the point, they state that their approach to meta-analysis (or qualitative meta-study) can handle a range of reports that feature a variety of qualitative methodological approaches (grounded theory, phenomenology, thematic analysis, etc.) in part because of the rigorous step-by-step process they recommend. Specifically, they believe that “building meta-synthesis on an explicit basis of a) meta-data-analysis, b) meta-method, and c) meta-theory is what makes meta-study so much more intriguing and complex than the more aggregative meta-synthesis approaches” (Paterson et al., p. 41). What follows here is a description of these four stages of Paterson et al.’s qualitative meta-study procedure.

**Stage one: Meta-data-analysis.** For the purposes of their approach to qualitative meta-study, Paterson et al. (2001) define meta-data-analysis as “the comparative analysis of research findings of primary research studies conducted by a variety of researchers” (p. 55). The purpose of meta-data-analysis is “to extend knowledge about a particular phenomenon in a field of study” (Schreiber et al.; Sherwood, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 56). The term ‘data’ in meta-data-analysis refers to that which is “obtained from the text of primary research reports. Text may be one or two words or a sentence or a paragraph”
Paterson et al. (2001) explain that the meta-data-analysis process involves three steps: “(a) the study of the underlying assumptions of various data analysis procedures, (b) the comparison of different forms of data in terms of their quality and utility, and (c) the synthesis of research findings of various studies in a particular area of research” (Cooper, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 59). To complete these steps, the researcher must first select a specific data analytic approach “that fits with [his] research question and design, as well as the prevailing paradigm and [his] personal preference” (p. 59). Of the range of data analytic approaches available, Paterson et al. mention possibilities such as the grounded theory approach to data analysis, meta-ethnography, thematic analysis, and interpretive descriptive analysis.

Furthermore, Paterson et al.’s (2001) process of meta-data-analysis emphasizes a “multifaceted rather than singular grouping system to analyze primary research data” (p. 61). The authors emphasize the importance of categorizing data through multiple categories and groupings (such as gender of participants, time frame of study, or methodology utilized) to develop a richer contextual picture of the data and, ultimately, the experience of the subject being studied. According to the authors, such multi-faceted groupings of data yield “similarities and differences, as well as outliers and negative and extreme cases, [that] are more readily identified” (p. 61). If done correctly and thoroughly, the process of meta-data-analysis “creates the conditions under which the common insights discernible from a body of qualitative research studies can be rendered visible, analyzed, and interpreted” (Paterson et al., p. 68).
Stage two: Meta-method. As explained by Paterson et al. (2001), “meta-method is the study of the epistemological soundness of the existing research, as well as the ways the methodological applications may have influenced the findings that are generated” (p. 71). This stage of the qualitative meta-study process is intended to “determine how the interpretation and implementation of qualitative research methods have influenced the research findings and the emergent theory in a particular field of knowledge” (Paterson et al., p. 71). The meta-method stage requires the meta-study researcher to explore how particular research methodologies have affected how primary researchers perceive and explain phenomena within the particular topic area under study. Furthermore, the process of meta-method yields a sort of historical analysis of the application of a particular methodology, which thus serves as a useful framework for interpreting the results of the meta-data-analysis.

Paterson et al. (2001) highlight two primary steps for conducting a meta-method process: “(a) the initial appraisal of individual primary research studies regarding research design and data collection, and (b) an overall appraisal of the themes and patterns evident within the collection of primary research studies included in the meta-study” (p. 74). A high level of knowledge and experience in qualitative research methods and their respective epistemological bases, controversies, strengths, and weaknesses is necessary for the researcher to adequately complete this meta-method process. Indeed, Paterson et al. caution that meta-method “will be considerably more difficult for the neophyte researcher or for the researcher with limited appreciation for the linguistic and reference cues by which methodological options are described” (p. 74).
Regardless of the meta-study researcher’s particular experience and comfort level with various qualitative research methodologies, at minimum the meta-method process requires an identification of each primary study’s “research question, the role of the researcher(s), the sampling procedures, and the data collection procedures for their fit with the stated research method and their influence on the research findings” (p. 75). Paterson et al. suggest the meta-study researcher arrange these elements of the primary studies into spreadsheets and tables in order to more easily identify patterns of influence, inconsistencies, and historical trends of research findings and influences. Such an exercise is indeed laborious and often “raises [fewer] definitive answers in comparison with the number of questions it raises” (Paterson et al., p. 90). However, the authors suggest that meta-method serves as “a means to introduce new interpretations and techniques to . . . qualitative research approaches and adds to [the] understanding of the methodological complexities [of the subject under study]” (Paterson et al., p. 90).

**Stage three: Meta-theory.** Paterson et al. (2001) describe meta-theory as “a critical exploration of the theoretical frameworks or lenses that have provided direction to research and to researchers, as well as the theory that has arisen from research in a particular field of study” (Neufeld, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 91). Paterson et al. qualify their definition of a ‘theory’ as being “a system of interrelated propositions that should enable phenomena to be described, explained, predicted, and controlled” (Duldt & Griffin, as cited in Paterson et al., p. 91). The process of conducting meta-theory involves the following steps:

(a) identifying major cognitive paradigms and schools of thought that are represented in both the theoretical frameworks and the emerging theory of
selected research reports; (b) relating the theory to the larger sociocultural,
historical, and political context; and (c) deconstructing the implications of
significant assumptions underlying specific theories. (Paterson et al., p. 91)

The purpose, as such, of a process of meta-theory within the unfolding of a meta-study is
to test and potentially re-conceptualize the theories embedded within the primary studies
so that, through a process of meta-synthesis, new theory can be developed (Paterson et
al., 2001, p. 92). The meta-study researcher must therefore be aware of both “the theories
that are used and the way that those theories are used” (Paterson et al., p. 93).

A process of meta-theory begins with thorough readings and re-readings of the
primary texts in order to identify the underlying theoretical assumptions motivating the
research and, after having identified said theoretical assumptions, critically analyzing
them. As with meta-method, Paterson et al. (2001) suggest that the meta-study researcher
be prepared to delve into the historical development of any identified theories and
assumptions motivating the interpretation of the primary report’s data. The authors state,
“Although meta-theory does not produce a complete historical analysis within a specific
field of study, it does entail a critical analysis of why and how certain theories have
evolved or changed over time” (Paterson et al., p. 102). Furthermore, a process of meta-
theory requires the meta-study researcher to question the ‘quality’ of any underlying
theories within primary research and to sometimes play the role of ‘skeptic’ in
ascertaining whether or not a particular theory holds consistent in light of the outcomes of
multiple studies within the topic of study. In the end, “meta-theoretical analysis within a
meta-study project creates the conditions under which knowledge can be transformed into
wisdom” (Paterson et al., p. 108).
**Stage four: Meta-synthesis.** The previous three sections describe the separate stages in the meta-study project, as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001): meta-data-analysis, meta-method, and meta-theory. These authors justify the utilization of these three separate processes because they allow for a complete deconstruction and re-analysis of the whole of the qualitative data available on a particular subject. As the authors state, “Because the larger intent of the meta-study is not simply to raise questions about what is already known but also to build theoretical approaches that may extend what is currently possible, meta-synthesis represents the visionary and constructive outcome of an exhaustive analysis project” (Paterson et al., p. 109). What follows here is a brief overview of how Paterson et al. describe the procedure for the final synthesizing stage of qualitative meta-study.

Paterson et al. (2001) recognize that qualitative meta-study is a research methodology located primarily within the framework of social constructivism, yet endorse a view that “underlying the notion of social construction is a competing ideal of social responsibility, morality, and accountability” (p. 110). As such, the authors of this particular form of qualitative meta-study believe that this research methodology can yield not only insights on the history of a theory motivating a field of study but also new theories and approaches that speak to more idealistic views on the role of scientific endeavor. In the authors’ words, “meta-synthesis is driven, not by a frivolous urge to be creative about ideas or by a presumptuous desire to author a new way of understanding something, but by the abiding sense that the process may yield truths that are better, more socially relevant, or more complete than those from which we currently operate” (Paterson et al., p 111).
To achieve this end, the meta-synthesis process requires the insights of the three previous stages (meta-data-analysis, meta-method, and meta-theory) to be synthesized. However, Paterson et al. (2001) also caution that setting a goal of finding a grand new theory through meta-synthesis may prove to be elusive, and that the outcome of a meta-synthesis may end up raising more questions than providing new answers (p. 119). At the very least, Paterson et al. believe that the process should yield “a richer, deeper, and more multifaceted way of theorizing about a phenomenon” (p. 119). Finally, the authors believe that even if a meta-synthesis project does not yield a grand new theory, “the key to a successful meta-synthesis effort lies in recognizing that small gains can be as important as larger ones, and that better ways of theorizing about narrow aspects of a field may be more useful in the long run than are completely original grand theories” (Paterson et al., p. 120-121).

**The choice of qualitative meta-study over qualitative meta-synthesis.** As mentioned previously, I have chosen to utilize the qualitative meta-study approach as explicated by Paterson et al. (2001) rather than other forms of qualitative meta-analysis, such as that described by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007). The primary reason I have chosen Paterson et al.’s approach is because of the flexibility the meta-study approach allows in deconstructing and re-conceptualizing the data for the specific topic of Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participant experience. Another reason is Paterson et al.’s explication that the final meta-synthesis that can be derived through qualitative meta-study can yield “truly magnificent kinds of theorizing” that may not be possible through the completion of individual studies alone (p. 121). Due to the teleological nature of the subject matter under study (i.e. intergroup dialogue programs
between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are generally purposive in design and execution) a meta-study of these qualitative studies should also have the flexibility to comment upon the teleological dynamic of dialogue models. Furthermore, one of my dissertation committee members, Dr. Robin Cooper, has first-hand experience in conducting a qualitative meta-study. As such, my selecting this methodology ensured the greatest likelihood that I would receive proper guidance in executing its steps, procedures, and protocols.

The qualitative meta-study conducted by Cooper et al. (2012) is only one of numerous studies that have utilized this methodology. For example, Scruggs et al. (2007) conducted a metasynthesis of qualitative research related to the phenomenon of co-teaching in classrooms. Following the guidelines outlined by Paterson et al. (2001), Scruggs et al. found a number of dominant themes among 32 qualitative studies, including the subordination of special education teachers in co-teaching cohorts and the critical role of administrative support to make co-teaching a productive experience. Another example of a recent qualitative meta-study is from Edwards et al. (2010). Utilizing the framework of qualitative meta-study outlined by Paterson et al. (2001), Edwards et al. identified a framework of spiritual caregiving that provide end of life patients a crucial element meeting a metaphysical need. These examples show that the meta-study framework is flexible and dynamic enough to yield useful findings within a variety of disciplines within the social sciences and helping fields.

Data Search, Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria, and Appraisal Processes

The first step in a qualitative meta-study is the location and collection of suitable data which, as just mentioned, is the findings of qualitative studies on a particular topic.
The process of finding, selecting, and appraising studies for inclusion in this qualitative meta-study is described in this section. The reader is reminded that though this study was originally proposed as a full, four-stage qualitative meta-study, limitations in time and resources has restricted this dissertation to the first stage of meta-data-analysis. Nevertheless, the results of this study will serve as the basis of subsequent stages of analysis towards a full qualitative meta-synthesis.

**Data collection.** As stated by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007), “The most important threat to the validity of any research synthesis, whether of qualitative or quantitative findings, is the failure to conduct a sufficiently exhaustive search” (p. 35). In any meta-analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, ‘recall’ and ‘precision’ are common indicators that demonstrate the degree of completeness of a data search. ‘Recall’ refers to the overall percentage of potential studies that were obtained, while ‘precision’ refers to the percentage of retrieved studies that are actually relevant to the metasynthesis. Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) state that for a qualitative meta-analysis, ‘recall’ should take precedence over ‘precision’ because doing so increases the likelihood that the search has truly been ‘exhaustive.’

Nevertheless, Paterson et al. (2001) note that “despite one’s best efforts to locate primary research appropriate to a research question, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to locate all primary research within a specific field of study” (p. 35). They note that in their experience, even a large team of researchers working together at retrieving all relevant and pertinent research in a particular area of study can still miss, or fail to locate, a number of research articles that would have been relevant to the particular
meta-synthesis. Furthermore, the balance between ‘too few’ and ‘too many’ primary research reports is a difficult balance to strike. They state:

If the volume of primary research reports used in a meta-study is too great, data analysis becomes too cumbersome to permit anything but gross generalizations without appropriate depth and breadth. If the volume is too small, the credibility and trustworthiness of the meta-study findings will be jeopardized. (p. 37)

According to Timulak (2009), “qualitative meta-analysis can be conducted with as few as two studies . . . [however, researchers in the nursing field recommend] at least a dozen studies at minimum” (p. 594). Paterson et al. (2001) state, “we would generally recommend that at least a dozen discrete studies be available from which to work to make meta-study meaningful and that working with data sets of more than 100 primary research reports may be overly ambitious for most investigators” (p. 38).

In searching for and locating primary research reports for this dissertation, I began with the intention of completing an ‘exhaustive’ search, as described by Sandelowski and Barroso (2007). However, after many weeks (September to December 2014) of keyword searches of academic journal databases like ProQuest, Wiley, and EBSCO, I had only managed to locate a handful of potentially relevant primary research reports. As I perused these reports and their citation list (a search process called ‘footnote chasing’) I identified Mohammed Abu-Nimer as a primary researcher in the field of intergroup dialogue research in Israel-Palestine. His 1999 publication *Dialogue, Conflict Resolution, and Change: Arab-Jewish Encounters in Israel* is a sort of benchmark in this field of study and has been frequently cited in intergroup dialogue research articles since its publication up to today.
As such, my search for primary research reports began with a forward citation search of Abu-Nimer’s 1999 publication. Google Scholar yielded over 250 citations of Abu-Nimer’s 1999 work, and I searched through all these publications to find potential primary research reports to include in this meta-study. From these 250 citations I identified approximately 60 publications that were potentially relevant sources for providing information about the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. It was at this stage in the process of locating reports that I began formulating the inclusion and exclusion criteria for finalizing the list of primary research reports to include in the meta-study.

**Criteria for data inclusion and exclusion.** As explained by Paterson et al. (2001), in order to find the balance between ‘too many’ versus ‘too few’ reports to achieve a meaningful meta-synthesis, the meta-study researcher must develop appropriate criteria for data inclusion and exclusion. Whereas Paterson et al. advocate including reports that utilize a variety of methodological approaches, at the very least they believe included reports should be “congruent with an interpretivist epistemological stance, regardless of whether or not [the primary research authors] have acknowledged that tradition” (Paterson et al., 2001, p. 42). Paterson et al. suggest the meta-study researcher limit primary studies to those that meet certain criteria related to the professional background of the primary researchers, the location of the primary study, and the verifiability of the ‘data trail’ from which primary research conclusions and findings were drawn. Furthermore, Paterson et al. recommend omitting studies that present findings influenced by political agendas, “[feature] unusual or skewed samples, [omit] significant data or details of the research design, [or arrive] at conclusions or categories that were not
supported by the data provided in the report” (p. 42-43). Additionally, Paterson et al. and Sandelowski and Barroso (2007) strongly recommend excluding studies that represent “duplicate publications or minor variations on previous reports of the same study” (Paterson et al., p. 38). This includes published journal articles that are based on the author’s Ph.D. dissertation or master’s thesis or multi-authored articles that are subsequently re-published as a solo authored article containing a revised analysis of the data.

After a cursory overview of the approximately 60 publications I had located that addressed the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants, I developed the following list of inclusion criteria. I included as primary research reports those that:

- were published between 1999 and May 2015 (which represents the historical time period of the second Intifada to roughly the present day);
- were either published as an academic journal article or as a Ph.D. dissertation;
- contain verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish and/or Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants;
- clearly identify a qualitative research methodology within which data was analyzed for the purpose of answering an explicitly stated research question related to intergroup dialogue experience or processes; and
- clearly identify a particular peace education or intergroup dialogue program or model of dialogue within which intergroup dialogue actually took place.

Further inclusion criteria characteristics of the verbatim quotations of the Israeli Jewish and/or Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants are the following:
the quotations could have been recorded either before, during, or after actual participation of intergroup dialogue sessions, bilingual school classroom sessions, or university dialogue courses;

- the quotations can come in either spoken or written form;

- the quotations can be translations into English.

In order to include only the most methodologically rigorous studies without duplication of data sets, I excluded studies that drew from the same data set of a previously published research article or dissertation, or failed to demonstrate rigorous methodological research practice. In order to ascertain whether or not a study met the basic requirements for ‘rigorous qualitative research,’ I utilized a modified version of Paterson et al.’s (2001) ‘primary research appraisal tool.’ This appraisal tool serves two purposes: “a means to determine [a] report's eligibility for inclusion in the meta-study and a systematic way to record pertinent data about the primary research study” (Paterson et al., p. 46). An example of how I used this tool to ascertain primary research article quality is included in Appendix A.

While conducting the primary report appraisal process, I continued searching for additional articles by ‘footnote chasing’ within the 60 primary reports I had already located. Upon completing this additional footnote chasing process while conducting the primary research appraisals, I found that many of the potential reports did not meet the criteria I had established. A significant number of articles were excluded on the basis of ‘duplicated data,’ while a lesser number of reports were excluded due to lack of methodological rigor. Other published material was excluded because they were master’s theses, book chapters, or conference proceedings. This stage of the data collection and
primary report appraisal process lasted from January to September 2015. The final count of primary research reports included in this qualitative meta-study is 17 (13 academic journal articles and 4 Ph.D. dissertations). Appendix B provides an overview of the focus, content, theoretical framework, and findings of those primary reports.

Data Analysis

As outlined earlier this chapter, the data analysis process within qualitative meta-study proceeds along four subsequent steps: meta-data-analysis, meta-method, meta-theory, and meta-synthesis. Due to the limitations of time and resources for completing all four stages of a qualitative meta-study (often this process is conducted with a team of researchers, while I am presently working alone), I completed the first stage of the process: a meta-data-analysis. What follows in this section is an overview of the steps I executed. This meta-data-analysis as such will serve as the springboard to completing the subsequent stages of meta-method and meta-theory at a future date.

Meta-data-analysis procedures. Consistent with the recommendations provided by Paterson et al. (2001), the meta-data-analysis was conducted within a ‘thematic analysis’ framework, specifically that which is outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). Braun and Clarke provide a step-by-step guide to completing a thematic analysis, and the first step requires the analyst to define the parameters and purposes of the thematic analysis. Specifically, they present four dimensions, each with two end points, along which the analyst should choose how the data will be analyzed.

Four dimensions of thematic analysis. The first dimension is related to the general level of description the analysis will entail: will the analysis include a ‘rich description’ of the entire data set, or will it be a ‘detailed account’ of one or a handful of
specific aspects? The ‘rich description’ is suitable for analyses intended to yield an accurate reflection of all the data, whereas the ‘detailed account’ approach is a semantic analysis focused on a particular set of themes. Because this meta-study is related primarily to the experience of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in intergroup dialogue, this analysis followed a ‘semantic’ approach with an emphasis on factors related to participant identity, researcher frameworks, and theoretical assumptions that influence the findings within the primary reports.

The second dimension is related to the type of analytical process to be utilized. The analysis could be either an ‘inductive’ analysis or a ‘theoretical’ analysis. The former tends to be ‘bottom up’ and the themes are strongly related to the data. The latter tends to be ‘top down’ and is driven by the analyst’s theoretical or analytic interest. Because I had already engaged with the literature related to this meta-study and the topic at hand, I followed a ‘theoretical’ analytical approach. My interest lay primarily in data related to the experience of intergroup dialogue participants and factors that shape and influence their experience.

The third dimension is related to the identification of themes within the data. A ‘semantic’ approach to theme identification means the analyst looks primarily at the explicit or surface meanings of the data, while a ‘latent’ approach means the analyst is seeking “the features that gave [the data its] particular form and meaning” (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 84). Because qualitative meta-study is primarily an interpretive methodology, a latent approach to thematic analysis allowed for this interpretive element to be realized.
The fourth dimension of thematic analysis is related to the epistemological framework of the analysis. Braun and Clarke (2006) define the two ends of this epistemological continuum as ‘essentialist/realist’ thematic analysis on the left and ‘constructionist’ thematic analysis on the right. The ‘essentialist/realist’ epistemological approach assumes that there exists a simple and unidirectional relationship between meaning, experience, and language; while the constructionist epistemological approach assumes that meaning and experience are socially produced and reproduced (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 85). Because the topic of this meta-study involves a variety of academic and theoretical disciplines (including religion and spirituality), I chose the epistemological framework of intersubjectivity as outlined by DeTurk and Foster (2008) and Gunnlaugson (2009) because intersubjectivity promotes both constructionist ideas and ontological assumptions that are consistent with the multidisciplinary influences present within the subject of this dissertation.

**Thematic analysis through an intersubjective epistemological framework.**

Intersubjectivity as a theory, an epistemology, and ontology is a multidisciplinary approach to conceptualizing data and the subject-object relationship and has been applied to a variety of fields and frameworks within the social sciences such as education, philosophy of mind, transpersonal psychology, and feminist critical theory (Gunnlaugson, 2009, p. 27). Intersubjectivity emphasizes the value and importance of ‘contemplative practices’ such as meditation, prayer, music, dance, and storytelling (Gunnlaugson, 2009) within organization practices. Four of the most well known authors within the field of intersubjective theory and practice include Martin Buber, Thich Nhat Hahn, Christian De Quincey, and Ken Wilber.
A fairly recent development within the field of intersubjective studies of education is related to practices that emphasize ‘second-person’ approaches to education. ‘Second-person’ refers to the exploration of “contemplative experience from an intersubjective position that is represented spatially as between us, in contrast to inside us (subjective position) or outside us (objective position)” (Gunnlaugson, p. 27). In other words, consistent with a narrative perspective of an external shared space between persons in conflict within which a conflict occupies, a second-person intersubjective approach to education (or, for our purposes, intergroup dialogue) suggests that participants in dialogue communicate with each other through first-, third-, and second-person positions. Whereas first- and third- person utterances tend to place speaker and listener within clearly demarcated lines of identity and perspective, second-person utterances point to the creation and shaping of a shared space that refutes the problems created by Cartesian duality which objectifies and depersonalizes self and other (Gunnlaugson, 2009). As DeTurk and Foster (2008) stated, “intersubjectivity implies the mutual creation of knowledge, experience, and also of identity, wherein the being of one person depends on the being of another . . . [T]he quest to capture the essence of intersubjectivity is both epistemological [and] ontological” (p. 25).

*Steps in the thematic coding of data within an intersubjective epistemological framework.* After identifying the parameters through which the coding of the data was to proceed (in this case, a theoretical, detailed account of particular aspects of the data expressed as latent themes informed by an epistemology of intersubjectivity), Braun and Clarke (2006) provide a six-step guide to coding and analyzing the data. In order to fit the parameters of the data and the research questions, I modified the process and approached...
the coding and analysis procedure as follows: a) getting familiar with the data; b) generating initial codes; c) organizing the data according to the code categories; d) reviewing the data within the coded categories; e) selecting the most representative and meaningful data from which to generate themes; f) searching for themes; g) reviewing, defining, and naming themes; and h) producing the report. (A more detailed explanation of steps C through H is provided in Chapter 4.)

After getting familiar with the data, which in this case required me to read each primary report at least twice, I began coding features of the primary research reports relevant to the central research question and the secondary research questions. I coded the verbatim quotations from intergroup dialogue participants accordingly:

- the time frame in which the quotation was recorded (either before, during, or after the completion of the dialogue program);
- the national identity of the speaker (either Israeli Jewish [IJ], Palestinian Arab citizen of Israel [PCI], or Palestinian Arab living in the Occupied Territories [OPT]);
- the gender of the speaker;
- the form of the dialogue program or interview format in which the quotation was recorded (either solo, uninational, or binational); and
- a general description of the topic or purpose for which the speaker’s utterance was made.

For quotations that were recorded within either a ‘binational’ or a ‘uninational’ dialogue session, I added two additional categorical codes: a) the quality of second-person space (‘similarity,’ ‘difference,’ ‘separateness,’ or ‘togetherness’) and b) the
perspective of the speaker according to the ‘integral holon’ as designed by Edwards (2005, p. 280). I adapted Edwards’ ‘integral holon’ in order to fit the characteristics of the data with which I am working, so that the verbatim quotations I’ve coded within uninational and binational sessions fall within one or more of the following categories of ‘holons’:

- holon 1: ‘first person singular’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request) autobiographical information about the speaker (or listener) (i.e. “I think. . .”; “I believe. . .”; “I feel. . .”);
- holon 2: ‘first person plural’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request) cultural information about the speaker’s (or listener’s) larger cultural or ethnic group (i.e. “We believe. . .”; “We see. . .”);
- holon 3: ‘second person singular’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request) dialogical information about the other (i.e. “What you say is. . .”; “When you say that. . .”);
- holon 4: ‘second person plural’ utterances that tend to disclose (or request) intergroup information and observations (i.e. opinions about how communication patterns should proceed, or how ‘people’ should behave in general);
- holon 5: ‘third person singular’ utterances that disclose (or request) information about another person or thing (i.e. “He said . . .”; “She thinks . . .”); and
- holon 6: ‘third person plural’ utterances that disclose (or request) information about a group of other people (i.e. “They believe that. . .”; “They want. . .”).
These two additional categories are intended to provide insight into the intersubjective relationship between and among dialogue participants and the role dialogue models play within dialogue processes. Coding along these terms yielded associations between and among categories that provided insights into answering the main research question and secondary research questions A1 and A2.

The primary reports were coded through the qualitative coding software program Atlas.ti. This software allowed me to organize data in a variety of coding schemes (as encouraged by Paterson et al., 2001). Upon completion of the coding, I was able to identify, name, and produce themes and ascertain any associated relationships between the themes.

**Data Collection and Storage**

Both the primary research reports and the primary report appraisals are stored electronically on both my password-protected personal computer and within my personal password-protected OneDrive cloud storage account. I used this appraisal tool in the form of a converted Word document into which I added information regarding each collected primary report. I also have utilized EndNote to save and organize the primary reports and generate their respective bibliographic details.

**Chapter Summary and Chapter 4 Preview**

Qualitative meta-study (as explicated by Paterson et al., 2001) is an interpretive methodological framework for conducting a meta-synthesis of qualitative research reports. The central research question of this dissertation—what are the experiences of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants?—is addressed through the execution of a qualitative meta-data-analysis of qualitative primary research
reports. These reports, published between 1999 and 2015, have been selected according to a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria that were developed for the purpose of identifying the most methodologically rigorous and relevant studies to answer the central research question. The coding of the data proceeded within the parameters of a thematic analysis informed by the epistemological framework of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, codes were generated in a top down approach, rather than a bottom up approach, because the thematic analysis was influenced by the literature review presented in Chapter 2, in which a variety of relevant themes such as geotheology, asymmetry, and the influence of master narratives on identity were presented as salient to this subject.

The following chapter represents the findings and outcomes of the meta-data-analysis. From the data identified within the primary reports, the next chapter will present an overview of the most salient topics contained within Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participant quotations. From this overview is generated answers to the research questions which then serve as the basis for outlining the overarching themes of experience for these intergroup dialogue participants.
Chapter 4: Findings from the Meta-Data-Analysis

Introduction

As mentioned towards the end of Chapter 3, the meta-data-analysis I performed followed a multi-step process inspired by the guidelines described by Braun and Clarke (2006). In Chapter 3 I detailed my efforts to complete the first two steps: a) getting familiar with the data, and b) generating initial codes. Here, Chapter 4 provides details regarding the outcomes of the remaining steps: c) organizing the data according to the code categories; d) reviewing the data within the coded categories; e) selecting the most representative and meaningful data from which to generate themes; f) searching for themes; g) reviewing, defining, and naming themes; and h) producing the report.

Though I relied on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) linear step-by-step guidance in conducting this meta-data-analysis, the presentation of the findings rendered from those steps are presented here in Chapter 4 more as narrative than as a linear rendering. Through the presentation of the narrative I intend to demonstrate to the reader how conclusions were drawn throughout the process, thereby allowing the reader to participate in a reflexive approach to the reading of the data. Furthermore, the narrative approach to presenting the findings allows for a transparent rendering of the data especially for the latter steps in which themes are reviewed, defined, and named.

To reiterate, the primary research question for this meta-data-analysis is: “What are the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants?” The respective secondary questions are:

- A1. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say within dialogue processes?
• A2. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say about dialogue processes?

• B1. How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?

• B2. How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?

• C. What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes in Israel-Palestine?

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the intersubjective coding framework I chose to code the data is based on an epistemological assumption that the experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants is interrelated with social, psychological, cultural, historical, and spiritual factors. The secondary research questions outlined above serve to limit the number of factors to analyze within the parameters of this dissertation. Since the answer to the primary research question is contingent upon the collective answers to the secondary research questions, it is necessary for me to answer the secondary research questions first.

Furthermore, because research with Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants suggest that the intergroup dialogue model may have some effect on the outcome of the dialogue (Hammack et al., 2014), what follows next is an overview of the key features of the intergroup dialogue models that are included within the chosen primary reports. After that is a general overview of the coded data and key features that are relevant to the remaining research questions. After providing answers to the research questions based on the meta-data-analysis, I conclude with the development of themes
based on the coded data categories and the content of the intergroup participant quotations.

**Intergroup Dialogue Models Included within the Primary Reports**

As described in Chapter 2, intergroup dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine have been categorized as either secular (such as coexistence, joint projects, confrontational, or narrative models) or interreligious. The primary reports selected for this meta-data-analysis feature multiple secular models *but do not include any interreligious models* (potential significance of this exclusion is discussed later this chapter). The exact breakdown of models and the respective primary reports within which they are featured is as follows:

- activist models (Hager & Mazali, 2013; Ross, 2013);
- coexistence models (Bekerman, 2009; Pilecki & Hammack, 2014);
- conflict management models (Collier, 2009; Ron & Maoz, 2013);
- confrontational models (specifically the School for Peace model) (Maoz, 2001; Helman, 2002; Maoz et al., 2002; Sonnenschein et al., 2010; Halabi & Zak, 2014; Pilecki & Hammack, 2014);
- mixed method models (specifically Seeds of Peace) (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005; Hammack, 2006; Lazarus, 2011);
- narrative/theater models (Maoz, 2000; Bar-On et al., 2007; Ross, 2013); and
- a track two diplomacy model (Kellen et al., 2012).

What follows here is a brief description of the specific models featured in the primary reports. These descriptions are provided because, as described in Chapter 2, the structure and underlying theoretical presuppositions of any particular dialogue program has been
the subject of current studies (i.e. Hammack et al., 2014) to ascertain any tangible difference in participant experience between and among different intergroup dialogue models. Therefore, highlighting the differences between the intergroup dialogue models featured within the primary reports included within this meta-data-analysis should provide relevant insight into the experience of intergroup dialogue program participants. A tabular presentation of the dialogue models represented among the primary reports is provided in Table 1 below.

**Activist Models**

Two primary reports featured a form of an ‘activist model’. Hager and Mazali’s (2013) journal article features the results of a process called ‘autoethnographic mapping’ as a tool that provides intergroup dialogue participants the opportunity for presenting a their respective ‘autobiography’ through the tool of a blank map upon which each participant completes significant place names and experiences that have shaped or shape their respective identity. These maps are then shared with other intergroup dialogue participants in order to increase solidarity and mutual understanding. This shared knowledge is then intended to serve as a bridge to “enabling social solidarity, individual, and collective empowerment. Potentially, this lays foundations for joint action to change reality” (Hager & Mazali, p. 263). Hager and Mazali’s study focuses on a college level classroom and the experiences of the students who utilized the autoethnographic mapping tool within the activist model.
Table 1

Dialogue Models Represented within the Primary Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue Model / Program Name</th>
<th>Primary Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activist models</td>
<td>• Hager &amp; Mazali (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ross (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence models</td>
<td>• Bekerman (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pilecki &amp; Hammack (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict management models</td>
<td>• Collier (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ron &amp; Maoz (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontational model / School of Peace model</td>
<td>• Maoz (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Helman (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maoz et al. (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sonnenschein et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Halabi &amp; Zak (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pilecki &amp; Hammack (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed method model / Seeds of Peace</td>
<td>• Maddy-Weitzman (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hammack (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lazarus (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative models</td>
<td>• Maoz (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bar-On et al. (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ross (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track two diplomacy</td>
<td>• Kellen et al. (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ross’s (2013) Ph.D. dissertation features two case studies of intergroup dialogue programs and their respective participants. One of those programs is Sadaka Reut which aims to “[develop] a cadre of activists and young leaders from [Israel and Palestine] who are equipped with skills, knowledge and the ability to create social change and a vision of a just society for Jews and Palestinians in Israel” (Ross, p. 134). The program conducts uninational meetings with Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs and offers participants a year-long ‘communal living’ opportunity to perform joint volunteer service work. Sadaka Reut encourages its participants to be active in social and political reform in Israel and purposefully works to increase awareness of injustices facing Palestinian citizens of Israel (Ross, 2013).
Coexistence Models

As described in Chapter 2, coexistence models represent one of the more common secular models of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. These models tend to emphasize the mantra ‘we are all human’ and encourage interpersonal relationship building over political activism and debate. Bekerman’s (2009) study focused on the experiences of college students enrolled in a year-long dialogue course “aimed at developing the participants’ sensitivity toward the complexity of the relations between [Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs]” (p. 206). Pilecki and Hammack’s (2014) study compared intergroup dialogue participant experiences in both coexistence and confrontational dialogue formats. Pilecki and Hammack’s dialogue participants were primarily high school age teenagers.

Conflict Management Models

Conflict management models are those that emphasize conflict resolution skill building within the context of intergroup dialogue. Collier’s (2009) study focuses on the experiences of high school age participants with the Building Bridges for Peace Program, in which participants are taught to “[see one’s self] in an ‘enemy’ and experience the power of relating. . . Individuals from different groups who are in conflict are taught to explore their thoughts and feelings in dialogue in order to understand one another in human terms” (Collier, p. 351). Though the structure and purpose of the BBFP program shares much in common with ‘coexistence’ programs, I’ve categorized it here as a ‘conflict management’ model because of its particular emphasis on teaching participants specific communication patterns and behaviors such as “empathy, reflective listening, and [the] use of ‘I language’” (Collier, p. 345). Ron and Maoz’s (2013) study also
focuses on intergroup dialogue participant experience within a conflict management
dialogue model and features commentary from participants who had previously had
extensive contact and involvement with Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup
dialogue programs. Participants in Ron & Maoz’ study were all college age and older.

**Confrontational Models**

As described in Chapter 2, confrontational models represent another one of the
most common secular intergroup dialogue models in Israel-Palestine. In this meta-data-
analysis, six different studies focus on participant commentary regarding experiences
within the confrontational model. The confrontational model in all six of the studies were
facilitated according to the model guidelines created at the School of Peace of Neve
Shalom/Wahat el Salam. In contrast to the coexistence model, this model emphasizes and
encourages participants to ‘take sides’ and dialogue with members of the other side as
opposed to building interpersonal relationships among individuals. Five of the six studies
that feature dialogue within the confrontational model were facilitated with college
students; Pilecki and Hammack’s (2014) study featured commentary from high school
age teenagers.

**Mixed Method Models**

Three Ph.D. dissertations included within this meta-data-analysis focused on the
experiences of participants with the Seeds of Peace program: Maddy-Weitzman (2005),
Hammack (2006), and Lazarus (2011). Seeds of Peace is a youth development program
that engages youth from Israel-Palestine in intensive dialogue and joint activity programs
at a campsite in the USA. Though the Seeds of Peace program could be designated as a
‘coexistence’ program because of the program’s emphasis on bringing Israeli Jews and
Palestinian Arab youth together for the purpose of developing a new shared identity as a ‘Seed of Peace,’ I have categorized them here as ‘mixed method’ in accordance with Maddy-Weitzman’s (2005) definition of Seeds of Peace as a mixed method program. As Maddy-Weitzman observed:

On a daily basis, opportunities were created for the participants to interact and get to know each other as individuals (decategorization or coexistence model), as members of groups in conflict discussing core, conflict issues (categorization or confrontational model), and as members of one common group - that of being a Seed of Peace (recategorization approach). (p. 480)

Of note is the fact that these three Ph.D. dissertations on the Seeds of Peace program make Seeds of Peace dialogue participants the most well-represented and most thoroughly studied dialogue participants within the selected primary reports for this meta-data-analysis. The more than 1000 pages of research within these three dissertations contain a wealth of observations that extend beyond the research questions posed for this dissertation. As such, these three dissertations represent a data set worthy of a meta-study on their own.

Narrative / Theater Models

As described in Chapter 2, another common secular intergroup dialogue model is the narrative model which emphasizes the role of storytelling in order to develop empathic responses between and among intergroup dialogue participants. Both Maoz (2000) and Bar-On et al. (2007) studied the verbatim accounts of participants within a narrative model of intergroup dialogue. Maoz’s (2000) study featured the accounts of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab high school teenagers who “gradually learnt to know
each other by sharing personal narratives regarding different aspects of their lives in the conflict” (p. 722-723). Bar-On et al.’s (2007) study also employed personal stories for facilitating dialogue between and among Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab college students, specifically by requiring participants to “interview two members of their family, one from their parents’ generation and one from their grandparents’, about their personal experiences with the Israeli or Arab ‘Other’, to transcribe the interviews and present them for discussion in the workshop” (p. 35).

Another study that features dialogue participant accounts facilitated through a narrative approach to dialogue was Ross (2013). Ross’ Ph.D. dissertation is a comparative case study focusing on Sadaka Reut (as described earlier) and Peace Child Israel. Peace Child Israel was a theater and role play-based program that conducted joint project activities for the purpose of building relationships and empathic understanding between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab youth. Theater was the program’s primary means for achieving these goals, and this emphasis on theater “reflects a belief in the power of role-playing and improvisation and of the use of plays depicting events in other societies to raise questions among participants regarding issues they take for granted, to foster empathy, [to deepen] connections, and [to instill] a more nuanced understanding of cultural similarities and differences” (Ross, p. 114).

**Track Two Diplomacy Models**

Another model represented within the primary reports contained within this meta-data-analysis is that of track two diplomacy: a dialogue process conducted among socially influential peoples who are also members of the respective groups involved in an intractable conflict. Only one study among the primary reports (Kellen et al., 2012)
featured this approach to intergroup dialogue. This particular study is also unique among the rest of the studies because the participants who are quoted in the study are (apparently) much older than the participants in the other studies. Though the ages of the participants are not stated directly, the authors state that the participants are all ‘elites’ within their respective Israeli or Palestinian social or political circles. Kelman et al.’s particular study of a track two diplomacy dialogue group in Israel-Palestine is different from the other studies within this meta-data-analysis because participation with this track two diplomacy group requires participants to adhere to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. None of the other dialogue models featured within the primary reports of this meta-data-analysis required dialogue participants to advocate a two-state solution to the conflict.

**Overview of the Coded Data and the Coding Process**

Before proceeding to the narrative analysis of the meta-data, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the entire data set of verbatim quotations of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants found within the aforementioned 17 primary reports. Also, it is necessary to remind the reader that this dissertation was originally conceived as a multi-stage qualitative meta-study, and this meta-data-analysis is intended to be only the first step of said project. As such, the research questions (as outlined in Chapter 3) were developed within a framework that allows for the end goal of a qualitative meta-synthesis. Were this meta-data-analysis intended to be the sole component of the study, the research questions and inclusion criteria for primary reports may very well have been developed differently.
Furthermore, at this stage of the analysis, my goal here is not to re-interpret the meanings of the quotations of individual dialogue participants but rather to identify what are the contents of the quotations that the primary report authors presented within the primary reports. As such, I have purposely avoided presenting these quotations in terms of what intergroup dialogue participants ‘said’ but rather what the selected quotations attributed to intergroup dialogue participants ‘contain.’ This purposeful presentation of the ‘contents of the quotations’ as opposed to the ‘words people said’ serves to discourage me from prematurely assigning interpretations to the ‘reasons’ why participants said what they said and rather focus on the prevalence and occurrences of ‘what’ participants said in relation to the research questions.

**How the Data was Read**

As was described in detail in Chapter 3, the thematic analysis I performed followed a ‘latent approach’ to the data, in that I sought details and characteristics within the data that ‘give it its meaning’ (Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 84). As such, I purposefully read the primary reports in chronological order (according to publication date) so that I could see to what extent each author’s respective publication either ‘built upon,’ refuted, or ignored the work of previous authors. My approach to thematic analysis also assumed a ‘semantic approach’ to the data, which meant that my reading of the data was performed with an intention to identify specific content related to the research questions rather than a production of a ‘rich description’ of the entirety of the data set.

As such, I did not code every quotation uttered by every intergroup dialogue participant quoted in the primary reports. Instead I coded only those quotations that were:

- *unambiguously* related to the experience of participating in intergroup dialogue;
• provided insight into the perspective or experience of intergroup dialogue participants either before, during, or after participating in the dialogue program;

• recorded by the author(s) of the report; and

• verbatim accounts rather than generalized summaries.

Specific types of quotations that were excluded from coding were the following:

• quotations related to the social ‘re-entry’ process after participating in a dialogue process; and

• quotations taken from social media postings and online list serv discussions.

(Potential limitations to excluding certain characteristics of data are discussed in Chapter 5). Furthermore, the purpose of this meta-data-analysis was not to find ‘statistical significance’ regarding the prevalence of any particular quality or characteristic found within the data but rather to find associations among the various codes, themes, and primary report groupings and to subsequently report on what potential significance those associations may have.

**Coded Data Categories**

As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the data within the primary reports was coded along a variety of categorical types. These categories included the identifying factors about the quoted participants, including national affiliation, gender, and age. Quotations were also coded according to the ‘structure’ of the intergroup dialogue encounter, the topical content of the quotation, and the intersubjective quality of the quotations. What follows here is a more detailed explanation of the coding categories and the strategy I followed in assigning quotations to the various coding schemes.
Time and dialogue group structure coding. All coded quotations were categorized according to the time frame the quotation was recorded in relation to the actual dialogue encounter. The categories were labeled as follows: ‘pre’ for quotations that were recorded ‘before’ the intergroup dialogue encounter, ‘during’ for quotations recorded within the actual intergroup dialogue encounter, and ‘post’ for quotations recorded after the dialogue encounter. Quotations were also coded according to the ‘structure’ of the group within which the participant quotation was recorded: either as ‘binational’ (dialogue where both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab participants were present), ‘uninational’ (dialogue where members of only one of the main national groups was present), or ‘solo’ (quotations recorded as part of individual interviews with the author(s) of the respective primary report).

Intersubjective perspective and second-person space coding. As mentioned in Chapter 3, all quotations coded ‘during group dialogue’ were also coded according to two intersubjective frameworks: the ‘integral holon’ (Edwards, 2005, p. 280) and a ‘quality of second-person space’ (expressing similarity, difference, togetherness, or separateness). Quotations were often coded along multiple holons due to the multiple perspectives participants expressed within single utterances. For example, the following quotation from a PCI dialogue participant was coded as holon 1 (first person singular), holon 2 (first person plural), and holon 3 (second person singular): “It outrages me that you say that human life is not cherished by us” (Helman, 2002). It was coded as holon 1 because the speaker expresses a felt emotion (i.e. ‘I feel angry’); it was coded as holon 2 because the speaker refers to her own group (i.e. ‘We Palestinians’); and it was coded holon 3 because the speaker refers to a previous quotation made by the speaker earlier in dialogue.
(implies, ‘What you said . . .’). Furthermore, within the ‘second person space’ framework, it was coded ‘difference’ because the speaker is making clear the existence of a difference of opinion regarding Palestinians’ collective appreciation for human life.

**Procedure to Moving from Coding to Identification of Themes**

After coding all the relevant intergroup participant quotations, I copied and pasted the quotations into the following categories:

- Israeli Jewish (IJ) participant quotations recorded ‘before’ dialogue;
- IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
- IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ uninational dialogue;
- IJ participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue;
- Palestinian citizen of Israel (PCI) participant quotations recorded ‘before’ dialogue;
- PCI quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
- PCI quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue;
- Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories (OPT) participant quotations recorded ‘before’ dialogue;
- OPT quotations recorded ‘during’ binational dialogue;
- OPT quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue.

Whenever feasible and appropriate, I further filtered the quotations within the ‘during’ categories into other categories according to the relative ‘location in time’ of dialogue: either ‘early stages of dialogue,’ ‘middle stages of dialogue,’ or ‘late stages of dialogue.’ Also, whenever feasible and appropriate, I organized the quotations within these
categories according to the dialogue model within which the participant quotation was recorded.

After organizing the quotations within these categories, I selected the most representative and/or meaningful quotations to include in the final search for themes. By ‘representative’ quotations, I am referring to those participant quotations that contained topical matter found in multiple reports. By ‘meaningful’ quotations, I am referring to quotations that provided unique or significant insight into the intergroup dialogue process regardless of how ‘representative’ the quotation’s content was. This means that the analysis presented in the next section does not present every quotation that I coded during the coding process. By focusing on only the most representative and/or meaningful participant quotations, I was able to balance the competing demands of quantitative and qualitative aspects of the data in the process of developing the ‘key’ themes (for a detailed discussion of these demands, see Braun and Clarke, 2006, p. 82).

The Analysis of the Coded Quotations

What follows is a narrative presentation of the most representative and meaningful participant quotations found within the primary reports that address the research questions of this meta-data-analysis. From these quotations, organized according to the categories described previously, the ‘themes of experience’ of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants are then delineated. The narrative that follows is shaped by the assumptions that both a) the ‘national’ identities of intergroup dialogue participants affects the experience the respective individuals have within dialogue and b) the intergroup dialogue model in which dialogue was conducted influences the participants’ experience within the dialogue process.
As such, the narrative I present here is presented in four parts. Part 1 focuses on quotations from Israeli Jewish (IJ) participants, part 2 focuses on quotations from Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel (PCI) participants, and part 3 focuses on quotations from Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories (OPT). Part 4 focuses on the findings rendered from the intersubjective coding categories. These four parts are then drawn upon to answer the secondary questions and develop the overarching themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants.

**Part 1: The Selected Quotations of IJ Intergroup Dialogue Participants**

This section presents the most representative and/or meaningful IJ dialogue participant quotations found within the primary reports that serve to help identify the themes of experience as delineated by the research questions. The quotations are organized according to ‘when’ the quotations were recorded in relation to the execution of intergroup dialogue: either ‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue, stage or structure of dialogue) are presented whenever appropriate or feasible.

**IJ participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue.** Very few of the coded direct quotations from IJ participants were both a) related directly to the expectations or motivations for participating within intergroup dialogue and b) recorded ‘before’ the actual dialogue commenced. Those that were coded were found within the mixed model dialogue program studies on the Seeds of Peace and Hands of Peace programs. Nevertheless, the quotations contain relevant observations that foreshadow the topics contained within quotations recorded ‘during’ and ‘after’ intergroup dialogue.
The following IJ participant quotation contains an explanation of the participant’s motivations for participating in the Seeds of Peace program:

I know that by words, just talking to them [Palestinians] once or twice, won’t change their minds. But maybe when they’ll see my point of view, they’ll get something and I’ll get something. Because they’re calling the suicide bombers ‘freedom fighters.’ I don’t really understand why. I just wanna get it. Maybe it’s because I wanna understand the enemy, cause if you have an enemy, you gotta know him, if you wanna beat him or something. No, not beating, that’s not what I meant. If you wanna live with him peacefully, you have to understand. If he opens a war against you, you gotta know his ways to fight back. I mean, you can’t fight terror with terror. This is not the answer. But you can fight terror with strikes against the terrorist [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 187-188)

This quotation contains a number of elements that proved to be revealing for what IJ participants actually speak about in dialogue with Palestinian Arabs: a desire to build interpersonal relationships with Palestinian Arabs, a desire to convince Palestinian Arabs about the moral depravity of ‘terrorism’, and a desire to understand why Palestinian Arabs ‘do what they do.’

Other IJ participant quotations contained references to the responsibility Palestinian Arabs have in ‘making peace’ with Israel. The following excerpts, all from Hammack’s (2006) dissertation, provide examples of IJ participants’ perception of Palestinian Arab responsibility for resolving the conflict. These quotations here refer primarily to the events of the second Intifada.
[T]hey should stop the terrorist attacks against us. The whole thing started because of the terrorist acts against us . . . They actually started it. They fired first. They were the first to use suicide bombers . . . I think of [Palestinians] as liars. They came in and lied. The more facts you give them, they just keep on lying. I just saw that in my own eyes, so I don’t really think it’s a stereotype. It’s the reality [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 189, 191)

I think that the Palestinians have to get their own state, but not in such as this condition—like today, they are attacking us. We need to have it quiet before we are letting them to build their own country. No attacks from the Palestinians, and then we will talk about the peace process [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 202-203)

A time when I was very, very angry about the conflict was in 2000 when the intifada started. Yeah, because it was after Camp David when we tried to talk with them about the peace process, and we gave them a lot of good conditions before they are building their own country. But they wanted to return their refugees to Israel, and they didn’t let it go, and we didn’t want to give them this right, because then Israel would not be a Jewish state. There would be too many Arabs. They don’t understand how important this is to us [male, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 203)

[The Palestinians] need to stop complaining about the things they don’t have. They need to stop and think about what they do have. And they have each other, and they have families. I think if we go through them, if we help them, because they barely have technology. Half of them doesn’t even know what a computer is.
So if we help them, all around Gaza, build them houses, give them games, give them money a little bit, something like that, I think it will be better. It’s all about helping each other. Sometimes Arabs can be all the way around there. I’ve heard stories, some people say, ‘We give one finger, they want the whole hand.’ They have to be fair if we gonna be fair. Both sides equal [female, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 214)

These IJ participant quotations above contain numerous characterizations of Palestinian Arabs that describe them deceptive, violent, ungrateful, selfish, primitive, and insatiable. The following IJ participant quotation, recorded at the time of the second Intifada, contains the suggestion that a two-state solution is only feasible if Palestinian Arabs renounce violence and give up the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel.

The desirable solution in my view, in very general terms, looks like coexistence with the Arabs of Israel and nearly total equality . . . [as] citizens of Israel, of course . . . But I would really want them to see themselves as part of this state as it is, accept this fact that the state of Israel exists and will exist as a Jewish state of course [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

This IJ dialogue participant quotation refers to ‘the Arabs of Israel,’ which in this metadata-analysis are referred to Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI). This quotation represents a recurring topic about the ‘Jewishness’ of the Israeli state and was found throughout the stages of dialogue (before, during, and after).

However, not all IJ participant quotations recorded ‘before’ the commencement of dialogue contain an assignment of blame to Palestinian Arabs. The following quotations
from IJ participants contain references to *a level of responsibility on the part of Israel* for resolving the conflict.

I think that Israel should give the Arabs those territories that we took from them. I think the Arabs should get their own separate state. This is the situation: there is a small piece of land [for] both cultures and religions. We should live together, and if we can’t do it together then we should do it separate [female, high school aged teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 197)

All the ideology of my school is to be with the Arab neighbors . . . to live in peace . . . My friends from my town, they are a little more militant than me, and my friends from school are the opposite of me. Their ideology is the opposite of my ideology. It’s a bit opposite because they think we should give them the state and not fight them and not make all the action in Gaza and the West Bank. . . [My friends from home], they think that we should fight them now, and all the Arabs are killers and something like that . . . It’s very hard to think from a different way while you’re always living in one place and you can’t hear the other side, or meet people from the other side. It’s very hard [male, high school aged teenager].

(Hammack, 2006, p. 205)

The latter quotation contains the idea that *Israeli Jews are not homogenous* in their perspectives about the resolution of the conflict, and that the reality of holding *a perspective that advocates the surrender of Occupied Territories to Palestinian Arabs* is a difficult one to maintain as an Israeli Jew. The concept of intergroup dialogue participants being ‘caught between identities or ideologies’ appears repeatedly within
participant quotations at different stages within the dialogue process and is explored further in subsequent sections of this analysis.

Also within the IJ participant quotations recorded before the commencement of intergroup dialogue are references to the meaning of the Holocaust and elements of ‘geotheology’—references to religious or historical Biblical or Quranic concepts that define the meaning of the land of Israel-Palestine.

They were here first [the Palestinians]. We came and took this land from them because God—whoever wrote the Bible—said that this is our land. But if you look at it the other way, in their Bible, in the Koran, this is their land . . . We just came from Europe here after the Holocaust before we settled down here and we started to take control of their lives. I pretty understand their way of thinking right now—of the Arabs. Come on, they were here, they were having a nice life, and then we came and we started to take control of everything. Jobs, and basic social life. So I can totally understand how they feel [female, high school teenager].

(Hammack, 2006, p. 212)

The following quotation contains the suggestion that the conflict’s continuation extends beyond history books and into perceptions of the Israeli-Jewish self.

To go to the army, that’s to be an Israeli. We’re serving in the army, we’re speaking Hebrew, we are Jewish. Religion has a major part in Israel. What else?

Being in the conflict, that’s Israeli [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 204)

Though the number of IJ participant quotations recorded before the commencement of dialogue are scant, they contain a number of themes that prove to be
relevant throughout the dialogue processes. Namely, they contain disparaging categorical
descriptions of Palestinian Arabs and acknowledgments of a desire to convince
Palestinian Arabs of their responsibilities to end the conflict. However, other IJ
participant quotations contain references to a potentially empathic reaction to the plight
of Palestinian Arabs in the face of the creation of the Israeli nation. Nevertheless, despite
this recognition of Palestinian Arab suffering, IJ dialogue participants entering dialogue
still potentially define themselves within the perpetuation of the conflict.

**IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue.** Within this section
representative IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ actual intergroup dialogue are
presented. As there are a greater number of these quotations to read in comparison to IJ
quotations recorded before the commencement of dialogue, this next section presents the
contents of IJ dialogue participant quotations according to the stage of intergroup
dialogue in which each quotation was recorded: either within the early, mid, or late stages
of dialogue. In addition, these IJ participant quotations are organized according to the
‘make up’ of the dialogue group: either ‘binational’ (members of both Israeli Jewish and
Palestinian Arab groups were present) or ‘uninational’ (only members of the IJ group
were present). Furthermore, whenever appropriate, the quotations are also organized
according to the dialogue model within which they were spoken and recorded.

**IJ participant quotations recorded during the early stages of binational
dialogue.** Nearly all the coded IJ participant quotations that were recorded during the
early stages of binational dialogue were from the confrontational model. Nevertheless,
the topics and contents of these quotations are consistent with those found with the
quotations from the previous section and foreshadow the quotation topics found in
subsequent stages of dialogue. These quotations from IJ participants again contain references to a preference for interpersonal dialogue rather than intergroup dialogue, the assignment of blame to Palestinian Arabs for the continuation of the conflict, criticism of Palestinian Arab culture, attempts to understand the behaviors of Palestinian ‘terrorists’, and fear for Israeli safety.

Consistent with the quotation mentioned earlier regarding an IJ participant’s preference to engage in dialogue with Palestinian Arabs chiefly at an interpersonal level, the following IJ participant quotation recorded during a confrontational intergroup dialogue session contains an expressed preference for interpersonal communication rather than intergroup.

If they (the facilitators) relate to us as two groups, discussion will take place between groups and not among individuals and this will be rather difficult for me . . . I want to know about everyday life. I'm not really interested in where your loyalty lies, to Arafat or to Peres [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 940)

Multiple coded quotations from IJ participants refer to the perception of potential violent motives of Palestinian Arabs.

That it wouldn’t bother you [PCI participant] to be part of it [violence targeting IJ’s]. Not just that you support it, but that you would plan terror attacks. . . . Who is what, this is not my question. Am I sitting with people who could plan terror attacks? [male, college student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

IJ participant quotations contain criticisms of perceived Palestinian Arab cultural and behavioral deficiencies.
I ask you why you feel uncomfortable [as a PCI at university]. You tell me you have no leisure activities. It shows your own lack of action, that you [PCI’s] aren't organized [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 942)

You just want to be a minority: that's all. If I didn't have a state I would go anywhere I could to live in my own state, never mind the land. Your attitude to land makes things very difficult for you. You're divided among yourselves and you cannot resolve it [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)

IJ participant quotations also contain references to the role of the Palestinians for the events surrounding Israeli Independence and the Al Nakhba.

The, the. . . Arab leadership, and the, the leaders of the Palestinians, said, “We will not recognize . . . a Jewish country, here, in, in this territory of Palestine. If there will be, if such a, a decision will be made in the United Nations, there will be a war, there will be a slaughter . . . And, no. No, wait a second. And, that’s how [the Al Nakhba] started. Because . . . it’s not that only we were allowed to declare a country. The Palestinians could [also] say, ‘Oh, now we’re forming Palestine’ [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 106)

[My friends and family] show me the Palestinian Covenant and the different things [Palestinian] instigators have written and said, and I am sure that you have relatives that do not really like us [the Jews]. And the question I ask is: What would have happened to us [the Jews] if in 1948 an Arab state would have been established here? What would have happened if we were the minority and you the majority? [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 331)
These two quotations contain references to *asymmetrical reflexivity* that places the Palestinian peoples in a position of ‘reaction’ to Israeli nationalism. In other words, these quotations appear to place Palestinian nationalistic motivations as a reaction to Israeli nationalism rather than as a parallel historical process. In this frame of perspective, Palestinian nationalism is a ‘spin-off’ of Israeli nationalism—taken further, Palestinian nationalism wouldn’t exist without Israeli nationalism.

IJ quotations that reference *religion and geotheological influences* also appear within the early stages of binational intergroup dialogue sessions.

I would like to know how the Koran conceives of the relations between different peoples because I don’t know much about it. The reason I am asking is because you said that under Moslem rule, the Jews were not discriminated against, they got fair treatment [male, college student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 333)

I think that in Judaism, at least at the time the Jews entered the Land of Israel, the initial stance was to kill all the inhabitants of the land, and then they changed it and turned them into ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water.’ And the comparison is interesting because at least theoretically, it can be said that Islam is much more tolerant towards non-Moslems [than Judaism towards non-Jews] [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 334)

IJ participant quotations also contain queries into the relationship between Islam and ‘terrorism’ and focus on *the estimated numbers of potential jihadists in relation to non-jihadist Muslims*.

The Islamic Jihad and the Islamic movement scare me, and I know that people who do things in the name of religion are dangerous to me, even if they are people
of my faith, I don’t identify with them. I am simply frightened, and I would like to know if Jihad is a commandment or not? I think that here, in Israel we have a small group, but in Iran... I would like to know, if there is Jihad and where it comes from [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 335)

I don’t understand how it can be a matter of social conditions. We are talking about the Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Jihad is for killing ... so if there is a law, how it is that such a significant group distorts the contents of the precept? Among us there are a few, well, maybe more than a few, but not that many as [the Islamic Jihadists] [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 336)

IJ participant quotations also contain challenging questions posited to PCI participants in such a way as to expose resistance to dialogue and disloyalty to Israel. These quotations were recorded after IJ participants realized that not all PCI participants would choose to relocate to a future hypothetical Palestinian state if one were to be created.

Would you, if I can now allow you to become citizens of Israel, you would not be denied your own education. . . No one would deny you your language. . . You would not be denied your prayers. . . You would not be denied access to your holy sites. . . And you will have total freedom of movement. Would you become citizens of Israel? [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 108)

So, this means that the establishment of a Palestinian state, even with Jerusalem as its capital, will not resolve the Arab-Jewish conflict . . . Now, if I have an argument with some hawkish extremist and he says to me: 'Listen, they want the
Territories, they want Jerusalem and tomorrow they will want Haifa and Jaffa,' I won't be able to tell him it isn't true . . . You are fighting for a state you have no intention of living in. In my opinion, you are wrong, because once the Palestinian state is established and you come along with complaints, the first thing you'll be told is: 'You have a state, go and live there.' You are only making your own situation worse [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)

In multiple examples, IJ participant quotations containing questions directed at PCI participants resulted in an *explicit exposure of PCI silence or reluctance to participate.*

You're saying, in fact, that when the Palestinian State is established, you won't go and live there. . . You, Nasser, have you no intention of moving there? He isn't answering me [looks round in triumph, referring to Nasser] [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 946)

No, I am quite listening to what she is saying, that she has a principle that she is not at all interested in this [Israeli] state. That is, it is a state that conquered her, and in no way is she willing to contribute to it, right? (to Fida) because you don’t acknowledge the state as legitimate, this is what you are saying? . . . Why are you not answering? . . . Just a minute, why are you not answering? [female, university student]. (Maoz, 2001, p. 202)

Well, I think that besides [PCI participants] Ramzi and Ghazzi there are no... We talk and we hear things that we already know. There are many silent people here (dismissing the interventions of Laila and Ibtisam), and maybe there are things that they don’t want to talk about, because it is uneasy, it is unpleasant. Maybe some people are used to concealing their ideas, because they feel threatened.... It
may be that by mere chance in this group (hinting at the Palestinian students) there is consensus. But I think that there is disagreement on a lot of things. I do not hear any disagreement from the other side, of the kind that may not be so nice to reveal, maybe there is somebody that thinks that . . . [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 339)

In general, the IJ participant quotations recorded during the early stages of binational dialogue referenced above contain numerous ‘confrontational’ characteristics. The quotations contain references to fear of Palestinian Arabs, and, consistent with the IJ participant quotations recorded before the commencement of dialogue, these quotations contain challenging questions regarding Palestinian Arab motivations for dialogue and focus on perceived Palestinian Arab resistance to dialogue. Furthermore, consistent with the realities of Israeli society, IJ participant quotations referenced above tend to reflect the position of assumed privilege over Palestinian Arab perspectives on dialogue processes and the history between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

**IJ participant quotations recorded during the middle stages of binational dialogue.** The quotations included in this section regarding the middle stages of binational dialogue were selected from within the confrontational and coexistence dialogue models (one quotation came from the track two diplomacy model). What these quotations contain are expressions of the various degrees to which IJ participants respond to the new information they receive from Palestinian intergroup dialogue participants. In general, these quotations suggest that IJ participants attempt to reconcile their positions and opinions in a variety of manners. Furthermore, as the IJ participants attempt to reconcile the new information they’ve received, IJ intergroup disagreement can occur.
The following quotations contain references to *surprise that not all Palestinians carry the same opinions* regarding religion and terrorism and suggest the difficulty in *relinquishing stereotypes* about Palestinians.

For years there have been terrorist attacks, and I have been hearing about Jihad. All these years I went around with the idea that Jihad is a precept commanding to kill people, all the non-Moslems. I never heard a different version until I came to this room. How can it be that a significant group thinks that this is a misinterpretation, and we never heard about it? [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 338)

I think that now I understand that Jihad is not a precept in the Koran, and this knowledge is like a beam of light for me. Because it is very difficult not to be carried away after each terrorist act and to disregard words that become almost synonymous: Arabs equal Islam equal Murder equal Terror. This is true even among people who are humanistic and care about human rights. These things are there all the time, and I don’t know.... Most of the time I try to look at people as individuals and not as a group, but I find it difficult not to be carried away after a terrorist attack or a murder. These feelings last for days and weeks, and the small things of every day life lose meaning. I don’t know how many of you know the Tanach (Old Testament), but I think that there are many people who don’t know the Koran. Last year I took a class in the Department of Middle Eastern History, but I don’t think I learned anything about the way of thinking. Look even in the Old Testament there are many theoretical things that do not change, they get frozen [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 339)
Though these quotations above appear to contain apologetic elements, other quotations indicate a *refusal to consider alternative perspectives*.

I want to say that I do not intend to sit in the same room with people who justify attacks on civilians, in no situation does that seem to me something that I have to do [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

It isn’t balanced, I don’t think it’s okay that [PCI’s were killed by Israeli police], and it upsets me, too. [But] you can’t persuade me that our police and soldiers just showed up and shot Arabs [for no reason], you can’t persuade me [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)

You know what, maybe. But, it was a war that it was... us or you [female, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)

The last quotation was recorded within a coexistence dialogue session, and contains a reference to the 1948 war and appears to suggest that the positions between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs was irreconcilable—only a ‘winner take all’ outcome was possible.

The following IJ participant quotations indicate that not all IJ participants respond to the new information they receive in dialogue the same way. These differences in responses can lead to *open intergroup disagreement*, especially when comparisons are made between *the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba*.

(A) [male, university student] I have no other answer but shame. You [PCI] are right. I don’t know how much you happened to see, but it [the similarity between the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba] is exactly like this.

(B) [female, university student] You [speaker A] really hurt me. It hurts that you agreed with her [PCI participant] and you feel ashamed. Because it is not
the same as they (the Nazis) did to us. You were a soldier in the Occupied Territories, and I was not. But I have relatives that are Holocaust survivors and I can’t listen to things like this. This comparison hurts me.

(A) It is not that important in what situation we were persecuted and discriminated against. But just look at what happened the moment that power was in our hands. We hurt others. (Helman, 2002, p. 332)

IJ participant quotations indicating intergroup disagreement occurred within the track two diplomacy model study also. The quotations below refer to what actions Palestinian leaders should implement before Israel agrees to peace (i.e. *preconditions for peace*).

(A) I said that there, the vacuum in the Palestinian entity. They could move and open the gate from within by the release of Gilad Shalit (Israeli prisoner). It’s a very small item considering all the (short pause) strategic talking that we are talking about. This will open the gate for a ceasefire. This will open the gate for an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This will open the gate to negotiations.

(B) [in response] History (medium pause) the, the don’t let history always start (short pause) with the last event [males, adults]. (Kellen et al., 2012, p. 556, 557)

IJ participant [B]’s quotation contains a reference to the importance of having a long view of history. It suggests that IJ participant [A]’s insistence upon a prisoner release as a precondition for peace ignores Israeli responsibilities for meeting Palestinian demands.

The above IJ participant quotations recorded within the middle stages of binational dialogue demonstrate a range of potential responses to Palestinian Arab
participant quotations. The responses included in this section range from outright rejection of received information from Palestinian Arabs to the beginning of reconciliation with competing narratives. These responses can lead to IJ intergroup disagreement; and, if the dialogue model allows for it, these disagreements become more pronounced within subsequent uninational dialogue sessions.

**IJ participant quotations recorded during uninational dialogue.** As with the two previous sections, the IJ participant quotations in this next section were recorded primarily within the confrontational model. The contents of these quotations suggest that the uninational sessions served as an opportunity for IJ participants to disagree openly amongst themselves away from the view or observation of Palestinian group members. These quotations point to topics that have led IJ participants to disagree with each other openly within the binational intergroup dialogue. These topics are related to Jewish identity, the future state of Israel, and feelings of frustration regarding Israel’s role in resolving the conflict.

The following IJ participant quotation contains elements that suggest an *outing of Palestinian Arab sympathizers*.

[The PCI participants’] big advantage is that they are really very together, more or less . . . But anyhow, with no connection to them, I have a problem with our group [laughs], um, that’s it, so really I will let both of you [two IJ participants], you can go move to their room, that’s one thing [laughter], the other thing is that people really are not speaking out and are not really committing themselves. . . It’s really hard when half of our group is thinking like them [female, university student].

(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)
Nevertheless, within the same IJ uninational group came another quotation that suggests a *deeper understanding of PCI positions and needs.*

They feel a desire to belong here and receive the rights of a citizen. They feel discriminated against because in an analogous way . . . a minority that feels oppressed is like a child who feels oppressed by his parents and still hopes to receive their love [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)

The following IJ participant quotation from within a uninational setting contains *confessional and apologetic disclosures.*

From the start, really from the first meeting, they said, “We are Palestinians” and to me it felt subversive . . . I said how could [you] be Palestinian. Palestinians are at war with us . . . When they said “Palestinian,” I heard “terrorist” [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

Consistent with a ‘pre’ dialogue quotation referenced earlier, IJ participant quotations within uninational dialogue indicate the perception of (and subsequent questioning of) a *collective Jewish identity in part based on existential threat.*

(IJ A) [male, university student] You are really confusing me here . . . It’s very dangerous to be a Jew. I don’t know, it seems self-evident, kind of axiomatic . . . that it’s dangerous, that we have been and will continue to be victims if we don’t watch out for ourselves . . . We don’t want to conquer anybody . . . We do everything to protect our existence as a Jewish people.

(IJ B) (female, university student) At least that’s what the Zionist indoctrination has made us think. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 51)
The following IJ participant quotations contain questions probing into the characteristics of a future IJ identity and the cultural makeup of the future Israeli nation.

What would happen if there were a different identity; if we take away the aspect of the threat and we open the door to thinking about a changing identity, and we don’t unite around the combative, victimized Judaism? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)

[Israel] won’t belong to the Jews, it will belong to some other people too. . . . How would a binational state look, one where Arabs also rule and there are Arab cultural symbols here? . . . For me, it really makes me despair [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)

Other IJ quotations from unination dialogue referencing Jewish personal identity and Israel’s national identity also contain references to painful self-realization and a subsequent choice between accepting a level of responsibility for the conflict or intensifying blame towards Palestinians.

This makes us awfully frustrated because we were attacked at the beginning, and our feelings were not given legitimacy. And we felt terribly guilty. And that’s what we kept feeling, and in the end we had no way to fix the situation. We were blamed and our hands were tied [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)

I feel like there is some kind of feeling that what is hard is to be within this experience and this process of internalizing. That is, there are two possible responses: either to say it is really us, we are the murderers . . . And the other
response is that it isn’t us at all, and they are awful and terrible and like that
[female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)

What frustrates me the most at this workshop is that I came here knowing exactly
what I want, and what is good for them, and with each meeting that passes I leave
the workshop agreeing less with them. Not because of the ideas they present, but
because of how they present it. And I am angrier with myself than I am with
them. Sometimes I'm angry with myself because I don't have the courage to say:
This and this is important to me. Right, it might sound primitive; maybe I sound
like some hawkish representative. But it's important to me. Why can't I say so?
That's the feeling I have at this workshop. Now I can say that I am afraid of what
will happen, of the idea that the conflict will not end with the establishment of a
Palestinian state: I told my family this at home and they said, 'So what's new?'
[male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949)

The IJ participant quotations above recorded during uninational dialogue sessions
indicate processes of disagreement and disunity among said participants. The quotations
represent a range of responses to the challenging reality of the conflict and the roles each
side play in it. The IJ participant quotations above suggest that the dialogue process leads
said participants to come to terms with the contradictory perceptions they have about the
conflict and their respective role in it, both as individuals and as collective members of
Israeli Jewish society.

IJ participant quotations recorded during the late stages of binational dialogue.
Coded IJ quotations recorded in the late stages of binational dialogue suggest that the
process of reconciling competing narratives and identities of self are quite varied. Only
four quotations are presented in this section as representations of the full range of responses. These IJ quotations contain references to *togetherness in the human condition*, *acceptance of responsibility for the conflict*, and *a complete rejection of the Palestinian perspective*.

You [PCI] [have] become quite human, in fact [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 950)

Perhaps we both suffered from the same god? [male, adult]. (Bar-On et al., 2007, p. 45)

I am telling you that through this dialogue I understand much more deeply the wrongs that have been done . . . today I understand this issue much more deeply and I understand where things come from, and I also think that it is much easier for me to take responsibility for it. I mean, I think that in the past I would have said, well, it was different people who did the bad things. Today I say – no, it is my responsibility [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)

The Palestinian group, I don’t know, I feel it’s just one narrative. Like, all the Palestinian people are always poor, are always under oppression, and they couldn’t possibly ever. . . .could never do anything wrong. . . . And that point just pissed me off so much in the last session [that] I just threw the whole pluralist idea out the window and just said [what I] believe [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 108)

The first quotation appeared in the final stages of a multi-week long confrontational dialogue session and suggests a humanization process occurred through the dialogue sessions. The second quotation was recorded within the narrative dialogue model and was
offered in response to a story of suffering told by a Palestinian Arab participant. The third quotation was recorded in the late stages of a conflict management dialogue session and suggests a readiness to work to end the conflict. The fourth quotation was recorded in the late stages of a confrontational dialogue session and indicates felt frustration that the IJ narrative did not receive sufficient legitimization within the dialogue session.

**IJ participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue.** Of the more than 300 coded IJ quotations identified within the primary reports, approximately two-thirds of them were recorded ‘after’ the completion of the intergroup dialogue process—which indicates a comparative lack of direct quotations recorded within actual intergroup dialogue from IJ participants. The IJ quotations recorded after intergroup dialogue that are presented here represent six of the seven dialogue models found within the primary reports (all but track two diplomacy). Because this category of quotations is more diverse and representative than the previous categories (before and during dialogue categories) the quotations are organized and presented first according to the model of dialogue each quotation’s speaker participated within and second by the quotation’s topical contents.

**IJ participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue.** The quotations featured here are representative of the range of ‘hindsight’ realizations and observations IJ confrontational dialogue participants shared after dialogue concluded. In general, some IJ participant quotations in this section refer to how negative perceptions of Palestinian Arabs changed as a result of dialogue while other quotations indicate little to no change in negative perceptions. Some IJ participant quotations refer to an experience of guilt and shame at regarding the Israel’s role in the conflict, and others quotations refer to perceived similarities between themselves and Palestinians as a dialogue outcome.
Some IJ participant quotations refer to *frustration and fear* experienced within the dialogue sessions.

It’s not pleasant to feel inferior, when they [Palestinians] are analyzing you, overall it really gives a feeling of being less. It sounds funny but I felt that my life was threatened during those segments. I mean, it connects with the feeling from before, the threat of their wanting to kill me . . . as if showing me the outside, that if they are so strong, they will start a war and kill us [female, adult].

(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

This IJ participant quotation recorded post-dialogue contains a characterization of *Palestinian culture as primitive.*

I thought that young people our age would be more open, thinking of the future, in the modern world ... It seems like a state within a state ... Everything is alienated. The clothes are alienating. They’re wearing scarves so they won’t be seen, as if they are hiding something . . . They need to change, not because it’s Arab culture but because it’s a closed culture and not developed. The undeveloped always has to go in the direction of the developed, because in our world, without thinking, without an open mind, you can’t do anything [gender unclear, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 68)

The following IJ quotation contains a reference to an experience of *connectedness with Palestinians despite their being Palestinian.*

[At first] you relate to them as a group, so you start with all the hatred toward them . . . Then I saw that it’s the opposite, like we connected pretty well with them and we relate to them, like it isn’t important that they are Arabs and like
[they are] somebody else. In fact, we sat, we talked with them, we laughed with them, we danced with them. We didn’t notice that they are Arabs. They were actually kind of sweet [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 67)

IJ participant quotations contained references to new information about Palestinian Arabs received during dialogue. The following quotations contain references to two such examples of new information: the reality of Palestinian struggles and the difference between PCI’s and OPT’s.

Now their culture does not seem as different from ours. I mean they are basically students like we are, and we all take exams. Before, I thought it was this culture like the Bedouin. What stands out more for me is the situation they are in as opposed to the situation we are in, and not the cultural markers, but that they are in a situation of the minority, of occupation, of a very hard daily reality [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)

You think they’re Arabs who are still living with keffiyas [checkered head scarves], that they come from a disadvantaged place. I heard that they have YES [satellite TV] and Digital and I was in shock; I was sure that they live in villages that barely have electricity. We have this idea that the Arabs are primitive and backward. I also learned about the distinction between [Palestinians living in] the territories and Israel [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 67)

Consistent with IJ participant quotations recorded during intergroup dialogue, IJ participant quotations recorded after dialogue contain references to frustration experienced when learning about the plight of Palestinian Arabs. The following
Frustration is a powerful feeling. I would say, I don’t know what to call this—pangs of conscience? Thinking about this as you get into bed and it’s on your mind . . . and why are things this way? And how should things have been different? And we’re not such innocent, good . . . Like, it’s uncomfortable, like it was more comfortable to be in that place of, like, everything is sort of clear [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)

It wasn’t easy for me to understand this, to accept this . . . [silence]; but it horrifies me on the level that I understood where they are at, and what we as Jews did.... I feel that until then, until the weekend, I didn’t, like, didn’t really get it, I didn’t really absorb this, I didn’t really let myself take it in [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 60)

The following IJ participant quotation refers to the experience of consciously accepting responsibility for the conflict and its future resolution.

This gives me a responsibility, first of all, first of all certainly not to present myself as weak, as a manipulation. This places a responsibility on me to influence, to be more political, to go to more demonstrations, to go to activities of all kinds of . . . And I feel easier with myself now, it’s comfortable for me to accept responsibility directly, in a mature way . . . I could stop stepping on you and say that I wasn’t stepping on you at all, that’s the worst [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 60)
The following IJ participant quotation suggests that conscious acceptance of the conflict strengthens rather than weakens IJ identity.

Today I am ready to hear because I see that this does not hold up against that. As soon as you take . . . all kinds of guilt, it’s a lot harder for you to keep on justifying your place. But I think that on the individual level, this is some kind of growing up, that you know that you can be guilty, not perfect, and still you can stick to your position, or give some different shades to your position. But that doesn’t mean that your whole position breaks down . . . that the Jewish people had done bad things to the Palestinian people doesn’t necessary mean that there is no justification to my existence here [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)

These two IJ participant quotations contain descriptions of an internalized process of ‘re-visioning’ the conflict and a new teleological venture for IJ society as a whole.

I discovered that, on the one hand, I am very ready to give up the things connected with my identity, symbols, the desire that this connection between the state and the people, that this state is only mine. Before that, it was very clear to me that this state is mine and only mine and something here moved a little [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)

The threat defines for you who you are. This is comfortable to some extent, and when you take it away, you don’t know what to do . . . Something else has to be put together instead, and that’s hard. You have to start over and create new values and beliefs [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 57)

In all, IJ participant quotations recorded after participation with the confrontational model contain a range of responses related to processes of reconciling
competing narratives and differing perspectives on Palestinian Arabs and the resolution of the conflict. Though some IJ participant quotations contain elements that point to a tone of patronizing perception of Palestinian Arabs (i.e. “They were actually kind of sweet”), other quotations indicate a recognition of responsibility to Palestinian Arabs (i.e. “it horrifies me on the level that I understood where they are at, and what we as Jews did”). Furthermore, other IJ quotations indicate that this recognition of responsibility consequently shapes perspectives on the future of Israel and whether or not it can continue as a by-definition Jewish state.

**IJ participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue.** These quotations come from participants with Peace Child Israel (Ross, 2013) and the peace education project at the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) (Maoz, 2000). Though there are only five quotations included in this portion, the quotations in general contain references to a humanizing process that occurred through dialogue and the relationship between program activities and the development of a peaceful future for Israel-Palestine. For example, the following Peace Child Israel IJ participant quotation highlights the power of theater and role play to open participants’ eyes to *the everyday reality of Palestinians and Israeli Jews:*

So one of the situations that we were given [to improvise upon] was...um...so, if you entered an Arab village by mistake, or you entered a Jewish city by mistake. And, in each of the groups there was a situation where, like, I still get goose bumps now thinking about it, like, the things that we ourselves wrote and acted out. On the Jewish side it was 4 girls who mistakenly entered an Arab village and they were trapped somehow and a mob reached them and wanted to hurt
them...and to my surprise many of the Arab participants pretended that they got to Tel Aviv and got in trouble there. I thought to myself, what, Tel Aviv, they don’t feel safe there? What does that mean? I was very surprised to realize that [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 117)

IJ quotations from IPCRI project participants describe how dialogue experiences countered inaccurate media portrayals of Palestinian Arabs.

I thought they were all against peace. This is what you see in television and at home, you grow in a society where they say that Palestinians are bad, that they are all the same. The media relayed to us only the negative things. Here, I saw that they are really similar to us, identical. The same dreams, only that they live like in jail [female, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 728)

In the beginning of the encounter we generalized that all Palestinians are murderers, all are stone throwers, all are haters of Israel, but they showed the opposite side from what we thought [male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 728)

A quotation from an IJ Peace Child Israel participant contains a description of the significance of relationships with Palestinian Arabs and the affects those relationships have had as a dialogue outcome.

It completely, it completely had an influence. In terms of getting to know, that it’s not, where he is from and that there really isn’t a problem with [Palestinian citizens] being there, rather they are here and they are part of [this place], and not to fear the Other, and to understand that...they are like me, the same, exactly the same. [Peace Child Israel] had a large influence on my life. In terms of
understanding that everyone, that they are OK. Like, whether they are close to me it is no different than when they are far from me. It’s something that stayed with me. That was there and stayed with me [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 267)

Consistent with other IJ participant quotations, this quotation from an IJ Peace Child Israel participant outlines a connection between events occurring within dialogue to a vision of a peaceful future.

So I’m saying, again, from that small group you develop, you acquire two things in the long term. And in the immediate term, of course. The relationships and the...to walk around, like, everyone can walk around freely in Yaffo and feel OK. And a Jew can go walk around in an Arab village and feel secure and think, “It’s our people, not your people,” and...and at the immediate level you get the outcome of breaking fear and relieving tension within Israel. And on the other hand it can lead to a change in opinions. And then, of course, will come the optimistic solution the most optimistic that there can be, that one of these days the Middle East, the borders of Syria and Lebanon will be like the borders with Egypt. That’s something that we should, that is fun to aspire to. Listen, like enlistment into the army, instead of it being 3 years and mandatory, it will be voluntary. There will be a reality that is different, you understand? [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 186)

In short, post dialogue quotations from IJ participants of narrative and theater dialogue models contain testimony to the power of theater to generate empathic responses toward Palestinian Arabs. These quotations also contain references to the inconsistencies between the messages disseminated in Israeli media versus the experiences they had
within the dialogue process. Furthermore, within these quotations are explicit recognitions of the common humanity of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

**I.J participant quotations recorded after coexistence model dialogue.** Only one coded I.J participant quotation recorded after a coexistence model dialogue session is included here. The quotation refers to a strengthening of two dynamics as a result of dialogue: *an identity as a Zionist and a belief in a two state solution.*

I think that [the peace education program] really changed me. Like, on both sides. In one hand it made me be much more Zionist and believe in . . . the existence of Israel, and in the other hand, it made me know the other side . . . and to understand that we have . . . to have two countries [female, high school teenager].

(Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)

This quotation contains an explicit recognition and validation of what has largely been perceived as two irreconcilable positions: Zionism and Palestinian Arab nationalism. Whether or not such a dual position can be feasibly maintained is not the intended focus here. Rather, the quotation seems to be a fitting representation of the experience participants can have through coexistence dialogue model processes.

**I.J participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue.** All the quotations included within this portion were spoken by IJ participants in Sadaka Reut. These quotations, consistent with IJ participant quotations listed in previous sections, contain references to a relationship between dialogue activities and social change. Also, these quotations contain references to an internalization of program identity as a dialogue outcome. Furthermore, one IJ participant quotation contains a recollection of a dialogue
story that serves as a potent deconstruction of hegemonic privilege applicable to a variety of modern social conflicts.

These IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations refer to the power of activist and joint action dialogue models within an environment of protracted conflict.

The strength of these organizations is, in some way, the very fact that they exist [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 196)

Like, in my eyes, what happened is still happening there, that it’s a group, it’s simply the belief in joint action, like, simply to see that it works [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 224)

The following two IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations highlight the degree to which program identity assimilation is possible and how that identity assimilation can increase self confidence.

I’m a [Sadaka Reut] participant, and, that’s it, it gives me strength and some sort of tranquility that I know who I am in order to work with myself and with my community [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 196)

I think that it formed for me many things that, at least in the years immediately following, certainly...formed me to be, not to fear leading battles, I wasn’t afraid of doing new things [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 223)

This IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotation contains an acknowledgement of the development of the ability to see differences among PCI’s as a dialogue program outcome.

Look, what it did for me and I hope for others, is to not catalog people. It’s not Arabs, it’s Mohammad, it’s Akil, it’s people that I know personally, and to know
that...that not all Arab Israelis or Palestinian Israelis, as they call themselves, are the same. Each one has his own definition. And to be open to changes and different thoughts, which is also important. And yes, at the end of the day the grand idea is to create some sort of change in this country and in the worldview of its population [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 185)

The IJ quotations below indicate recognition of the existence of social power asymmetry and how that asymmetry directly affects PCI’s.

But still the oppression and racism that they deal with in comparison with an Israeli child is much greater. And like, that comparison, that standard was created for me in [Sadaka Reut]. I mean, the fact that, yes, the Arabs who live in Israel, it’s better for them than Arabs who live in Jordan, who are Palestinians. But the comparison can’t be like that. The comparison has to be to an Israeli child, Jewish. [...] And it’s like lenses that have become my eyes, they’re not, they’re not lenses any more. I can’t take them off at this point. And it became the way I see the world. I can’t see it otherwise [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 289)

My awareness grew exponentially, in a way I couldn’t possibly have imagined, and my knowledge expanded so much during the three years [during which I was a participant in Building a Culture of Peace] because I asked questions all the time, and because I was in an environment that constantly addressed questions and topics that [other forums in] Israeli society don’t address [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 138)

I started to see, like, through the fact that I saw the power imbalance in the Sadaka group, suddenly I started to see all sorts of power dynamics in the street. From the
fact that I saw what the history books say, suddenly I started to see what isn’t told in the history books and what isn’t said in the street and what I don’t see and the entire reality that is hidden from me, and all the stories that aren’t told, um, and all of the cultures that are disappearing and suddenly I began to see what is oppressed and what is empowered and, like, how that happens. And then I started to examine myself within that. All the time, thought processes. Constantly, questions questions questions, why this and not that, why is it like this and why is it not like that. And, it’s like, when you live here everything is very clear [...] And nobody asks questions. That’s what Sadaka Reut changed for me [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 290)

This recollection of events shared by an IJ Sadaka Reut participant reveals an understanding of the power of hegemony, and the story shares parallels with the current ‘Black Lives Matter’ versus ‘All Lives Matter’ debate in the United States.

We had a meeting where the facilitator asked us to write down our identities...words that characterize our identities. And I really couldn’t participate in that activity. But all the rest of the girls did and everyone, all the rest of the girls were Ashkenazi and there was one who was, I think she was Moroccan, I don’t remember, Yemenite. And all the girls wrote as their first characteristic: I am a human being. Everyone except for that girl who was Mizrachi. She wrote, I am Mizrachi [...] And then we all started to harass her, [to say] that it doesn’t matter what you are and what your ethnicity is. And then I think that she left the meeting, like, she left in the middle. And many years, not many years but maybe a year and a half two years later, we met the facilitator again and she said to us,
now that we were in a different place, she told us that what happened in that meeting, that it was, like, she spoke with us about hegemony. That there is hegemony in Israeli society. And if you match that hegemony, you can allow yourself to say, I’m a human being. There are people who don’t match that hegemony, and they have something to say that’s more important. Like, they have something to say about themselves aside from the fact that they’re human beings, because they feel this thing about themselves all the time [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 294)

Though these IJ quotations all came from one study (Ross, 2013), their contents point to an explicit recognition of the link between dialogue participation and political activism. Consistent with quotations cited previously, IJ participant quotations recorded post activist dialogue model explicitly recognize the importance of building relationships with Palestinian Arabs for the purpose of breaking down stereotypes and prejudicial behavior. However, quotations in this section more explicitly reference the power of Israeli Jewish hegemony on interactions with not only Palestinian Arabs but also with Mizrachi Jews in Israel.

**IJ participant quotations recorded after conflict management model dialogue.**

These IJ participant quotations came from Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP) participants (Collier, 2009) and conflict management workshop participants interviewed by Ron & Maoz (2013). Many of the same topical material from previous sections appear in these quotations, such as self-confidence and an increased understanding of the Palestinian condition as dialogue outcomes. However, other unique information is found within these quotations as are presented below.
This IJ BBFP participant quotation attributes an *increase in self-confidence* to dialogue group participation.

I learned not to, when I am talking, not to always feel sorry. Because it is not my fault and I shouldn’t get offended from what other people say all the time. . .

‘Cause at the beginning I got very offended from some stuff the other side said and then I didn’t anymore because I . . . got more confidence, not only in myself, in my goals, and in the side of my people, and in our side, the Israeli side [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 345)

Another BBFP participant quotation attributes a *strengthened Israeli identity* to dialogue group participation.

I think I’m kind of more Israeli now. And, I feel like a new immigrant. I was only a year and a half in Israel but uhm, I was kind of sliding between new immigrant and, and, Israeli. And I think it’s more fixed now. I mean I think . . . I know I’m an Israeli. I mean, (louder) I know I’m an Israeli and I know I am a new immigrant . . . I’m able to, to, to make a distinction between the two of them, and to, to behave and to acknowledge the fact that I’m one or the other, at times, I mean when the situation is right [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 357)

An IJ participant in another conflict management dialogue group linked a *realization of privilege* to participation in a dialogue program.

I had a meaningful and founding experience . . . it [the dialogue encounter] undermined me, and mostly brought me to an understanding that I was living in repression and denial, and in ignorance . . . I feel I live like the lord of the manor
in this country. I live at other people’s expense in a lot of ways [female, adult].

(Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 87)

IJ participant quotations related to perspectives of Palestinians point to a new acknowledgment of their daily struggles, especially the struggles of OPT’s.

This other received a face . . . and suddenly [I started] seeing things through their eyes. And, like, the mere possibility of looking at what was happening differently, it was very dramatic. The description of their lives in the territories, the description of their daily life, the way they lived, what happens to them there . . . What happens at the checkpoints, what the daily routine of life there looks like, the prices, what happens to the soldiers serving in the territories . . . lots of things that before I wasn’t even aware existed, or was aware of them in a very general manner [female, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)

The following IJ participant quotation contains an acknowledgement of the unique position of PCI’s and how they represent the entire Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Look, it [my involvement in dialogue encounters] did many things to me. Let’s start from the political – I think that it made me focus much more on the Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. I think that until then I didn’t pay too much attention to them . . . and I realized that ultimately they embody in their identity the core of the conflict. And their case is the most complicated case, and the solutions proposed up to this point do not provide them with answers. This really influenced me [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)

These IJ participant quotations highlight changes in perspective regarding the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and the placement of preconditions for peace on Palestinians.
I used to say, “Fine. First of all accept the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, and then we’ll start talking.” Nowadays I say: “OK, why place any pre-conditions?” You know, why should I define for him how he should see things? And any time someone raises (a claim by the Palestinian citizens, to define the State of Israel as) the state of all its citizens, I truly listen, and ask myself – “why not, why yes, and where does this come from?” And when people speak of national service and civic service, then I understand why, for the Arabs, it is nearly impossible. Like, I have a much greater sensitivity to it [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)

This thing with national rights, the meaning of which may be that the state should be devoid of a national (Jewish) identity, is a kind of glass ceiling, that even within the dialogue it was impossible to breach. And to this day I ask myself what can be done with it. The dialogue ended at a point that I don’t know how to advance from [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)

It’s very hard for me, and I know that it wrongs others, but I still want this to be a Jewish state, and I know that it’s, like, unfair, but that’s what I want . . . but on the other hand I understand that it’s very problematic, and I don’t know how much longer this can go on . . . for instance the Law of Return, and not the right of return which is something that’s very important to me, as are the anthem and the flag . . . although I realize it is impossible, it’s like saying to people they can be my citizens, but yet ignoring them. What else does it mean? This effort to maintain a Jewish demographic majority, which is unfair, which is discriminatory [female, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 82)
IJ participant quotations also express reservations regarding a two-state solution and, ultimately, condemn Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories, as is indicated by these quotations.

[I]t’s clear to me now, for instance, that the classic paradigm of Oslo, of two classic nation states for the two peoples, is pure nonsense . . . I think it contains many issues, that at the time we didn’t even imagine. The issue of the Palestinian citizens of Israel is only one of these. Once I realized this, I realized that, wait a moment, there is a whole new series of issues that we didn’t think of . . . and then I began re-engineering my entire paradigm [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 79)

We are in a problematic place. The occupation corrupts. This is not a proverb, it corrupts. It turns us into bad people. I can’t sit at home, watch TV, and say, oh no, we are doing such terrible things [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 80)

Furthermore, according to the following IJ participant quotation, the Zionist pursuit of a fully Jewish Israeli state (a geotheological aspiration) is akin to racism.

[There is] a kind of racism towards the Arabs . . . a kind of erasure of the other, an erasure of the voice of the Arab residents, people who are Arabs here in Israel . . . look, as long as the state has to maintain its majority because it is the “Jewish State”, and it has to maintain its Jewish majority, then everything there that is not Jewish, if we do not convert it to Judaism, it is not part of the state. This is a problem, in my opinion. It’s a kind of erasure . . . we set some kind of ceiling – twenty percent. In my view its racism, it’s difficult for me to live in this situation. I find it hard to say I can identify with aspects of Judaism that speak of the
demographic problem, that speak of “Judaizing” the Galilee, that speak of conquering the Negev from the Bedouins [male, adult]. (Ron & Maoz, 2013, p. 81)

Consistent with IJ quotations cited in previous sections, IJ participant quotations after conflict management model dialogue processes contain references to a strengthening of Israeli-Jewish identity and an overall sense of self-confidence. However, other quotations contain explicit references to the ‘Israeli-Jewish’ privilege that is had at the expense of Palestinian Arabs. Whether or not these realizations of privilege were processed within dialogue or not is not clear. Nevertheless, IJ participant quotations linking Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories to ‘racism’ are significant and consistent with earlier IJ quotations that acknowledge the power of Israeli Jewish hegemony on Palestinian Arab daily life.

**IJ participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue.** The IJ participant quotations contained within this section all come from the three Ph.D. dissertations about the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace intergroup dialogue programs. As a result, this category of quotations has the largest number of potentially relevant quotations for identifying themes of experience for IJ intergroup dialogue participants. The topics presented here are consistent with earlier sections, and other unique topics are presented as well.

The IJ Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace (SOP/HOP) participant quotations recorded after participation in the program reveal participant motivations for joining the program that are consistent with earlier quotations—a desire to understand them and a desire to be understood.
While I was on a field trip with my school, a suicide bomber killed himself on the bus in Haifa . . . It really came together with the explosion—the terrorist act—so I wanted to go here [to the dialogue camp]. At the beginning, when I thought of the children that were killed, I thought about this place, all the Palestinian children who would be here. I wanted to go here. I wanted to talk to them. I wanted to see their side. I wanted them to see my side [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 186)

Another IJ participant quotation suggests that participation in the dialogue program required the participant to become a representative for Israel.

So then when I went there suddenly I became the representative of Israel, not only my neighborhood, not only Tel Aviv. ... I felt great about it but it was not easy. . . I never thought as big as Israel as opposed to other countries, it was only me, my family, my neighborhood, Tel Aviv, and the rest. Not more than that, and suddenly you had to think those big issues, Palestinians, Israelis, how do we solve the issue? So there were different transitions I went through . . . putting on the Israeli patriotism or nationality all of a sudden and having to deal with that. ... I never liked having to deal with the situation I was born into and suddenly being treated as equal with all other Israelis and having the honor, the respect of everyone else, of representing Israel felt good [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 96)

The following IJ participant quotations indicate that participation in intergroup dialogue can represent the first opportunity to talk to Palestinians, understand the reality of Palestinian life, and learn about Palestinian perspectives on the conflict.
I was quite terrified actually. I had never spoken to an Arab person. I was afraid, I didn't even know we were going to sleep in the same bunk as Arab people, I thought they were going to separate us and meet once a day. I had no idea it was doing everything together. I was pretty sure we would get together once a day for a couple of hours and argue the whole time about politics ... I couldn't even pronounce the Palestinian girls' in my room - their names. I was really shocked, the first day I didn't talk to anyone other than Israelis [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 100)

When I first saw Dina (a Palestinian) I felt like, “gosh she's normal.” I thought before they all want to kill us [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 100)

I had no idea about what was the situation really - and I used to think that they should be grateful - the Palestinians - because Israel was willing to help them while other Arabs countries are not even willing to take them. That was my idea of the situation. They were not grateful, they were really angry and that was not right [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 88)

Before camp I wasn't really aware of the occupation, that it's that big . . . One of the most shocking experiences were when I heard the guy sitting next to me gets water once a week which is like the most basic thing for every human being in this world. And when that guy is not getting it, yeah something is wrong. I know that I couldn't accept it [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 143)
Other IJ participant quotations contain acknowledgements of both Palestinian Arab nationalistic pride and the suffering Palestinian Arabs endure.

I could sense their nationalism and the feelings of belonging or even owning the land, what we call the land of Israel, or Palestine. I really experienced it. I saw it in their eyes, I saw these feelings, these emotions. I learned, you know the first time I saw an Arab geographic map of the region, I saw Palestine ... I saw the Arab names of cities, where there are Jewish communities nowadays, this was something I learned. I just saw the other side’s emotions in the conflict [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 142)

I learned they suffer same as we do. Before Seeds of Peace I didn't consider that they suffer. Now I see their pain. I see what they need to handle each day [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 433)

But then, after hearing all their stories, I thought, maybe they are the victim, the real victim. Maybe they suffer more than we do. I came there and I thought that they might suffer more than we do, but after Hands of Peace, I knew that for sure [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 355)

Other IJ participant quotations contain references to the importance of developing friendships with Palestinian Arabs at the SOP/HOP program because doing so humanizes Palestinians.

I think making a friend from the other side, I think that's what humanizes the conflict because you can no longer say the Palestinians - the Palestinians will automatically ring a bell and say Mohammed or Mamduh, there will be a name
for you, it will no longer be a name for all the people [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 132)

When you hear a story from a Palestinian guy telling you how much his life is miserable, and you don't know the guy, you say, you're just using propaganda, just coming and saying stuff that he hears and trying to make a fuss for nothing. But when you hear a friend of yours saying that, you know that he won't lie to you [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 135)

I just became so much more aware of what’s really going on—the injustices. And making friends—I mean, real friends—from the other side, it totally changed me. Now when something happens in the West Bank, I worry. I think, what if my friend is hurt? [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 342)

This IJ quotation suggests that the process of building friendships breaks down previously held stereotypes about Palestinian Arabs.

When you see some stereotypes being known as not true, you try to doubt all the rest of the information. . . One thing I learned is don't do generalizations. If I say that all Palestinians are terrorists, then I'm actually saying that Rasha and Yusuf are terrorists. I've spent a lot of time with them. They're not terrorists [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 430)

Other IJ participant quotations contain references to a new interest in understanding the events surrounding the Al Nakhba and the significance of that understanding as a result of dialogue program activity.

The [Al Nakhba] day. I haven't heard about it, I haven't read it, there's a small paragraph about it in my history book and that's it. And the Palestinians are
comparing it to the Jewish Holocaust and if to them it looks like a holocaust it might be more appropriate to put more than one paragraph about it [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 142)

There is one fundamental issue - whether Palestinians fled when Israel was established or they were kicked out. And obviously they said the Israeli army butchered us and we had to leave and what I knew, I didn't know much, but what I knew is that they fled . . . First of all, I was presented or posed with a new question - wait, is it true that they fled or were they butchered or threatened by the Israeli army? So even though I didn't get an answer then, at that point I questioned my facts, my history [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 142)

What I regret is that if there's mistakes that Israel made, that we don't learn about it. If there's massacres that happened, that Israeli kids don't learn about it, which is really bad. Because no wonder people see this conflict as a good guy / bad guy conflict. No wonder Israelis will see us as good against evil. I think that if Israelis were taught to believe that Palestinians fled in 1948 when such wasn't really the case, some left at gunpoint if not killed a lot of them, which changes everything [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 436)

The following IJ participant quotation suggests that a certain degree of ambivalence about the best way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains after participation in intergroup dialogue.

I know now that they live horrible lives, most of them. Part of it is our fault, part of it is their society's fault. And I know that they love their land as much as we
love Israel. Their religion and their freedom of religion is very important to them I know that they're not very happy about us being their neighbors but I think they're ready to accept it. . . There are going to be two countries here [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 143)

The Palestinians should get a country of their own, not all the territories we have now, but the majority of them. And we should remove all the settlements from the area, but some of them should remain. I don’t think they should have a capital city in Jerusalem. That’s not what I think. And the right of return, I don’t think they’ll get it. Actually I am sure they won’t get it, because ever since 1948 when we give up something, they also need to do it [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 374)

Other IJ participant quotations do not contain ambivalent perspectives about the specifics of a two state solution and instead challenge the identity of Israel as a Jewish state.

I’m now in Israel, and I know it’s the state of the Jews. It doesn’t mean it has to be the state just for the Jews. It is the state of the Jews—Israel. Everyone calls it Israel, not Palestine or something. But it’s not about Jews only or something. It’s not realistic at all [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 341)

Consistent with the IJ participant quotations from other intergroup dialogue models mentioned previously, the assimilation of program identity into self identity is a topic that appears in some IJ participant quotations.

It's very difficult to see where Seeds of Peace stopped and I began [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 451)
However, other IJ participant quotations contain clear criticisms of SOP on the basis that its format is ‘too American.’

SOP has a good format – fantastic. The summer camp is fantastic. But I will always have a problem with Americans telling me how to run my life in the Middle East [female, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 40)

Sometimes the model of Seeds took the Americanization of conflict resolution too far. As I said before, you have here two peoples, who are Middle Eastern... the way of thinking, the way of negotiating is very different. So here is another point that can help... “Peace and love” [said in English – NL], at the beginning, it’s nice as kids. It’s not serious, it doesn’t work enough, and it doesn’t respect our opinions as Jews and Arabs to resolve the conflict in a different fashion [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 87)

Another IJ participant quotation suggests that participation in the dialogue program served to reify previously held positions regarding the conflict and its history.

First of all, I felt like the program was somehow not equal, that somehow the Palestinians were more powerful and we heard so much of only their suffering and not our suffering as Israelis. What surprised me most about the program, talking with Palestinians, is the facts. I mean, I know facts, and they know facts, but it’s not the same facts. They’re changing the facts! I know the facts! I believe Israelis don’t change the facts. They want the world to see the Israelis as bad people, but I know that what they say is not true. Like in Lebanon, they say Sharon ordered the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, and it’s not true! ...I didn’t
change my mind about anything listening to the Palestinians, but it was interesting
[male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 372)

Other IJ participant quotations refer to the *disappointment felt after returning home* from
the US camp participation and that the dialogue program did little more than affirm the
differences of opinion between IJ’s and Palestinian Arabs.

What happens at the beginning, is you return from camp, and you have an
amazing year. Everything is good, SOP is the greatest thing in the world. After
that, all the bad things happen, and after that you finally (stabilize) [gender
unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 103)

Other IJ participant quotations express a *deep conviction of the rightness of the Israeli
state* and the *invalidity of the Palestinian nationalistic perspective* as a dialogue outcome.

Of course, I think that I’m right—that my country’s right. Everybody thinks that
his country’s right. Let’s start from the first thing [Palestinians at camp] say,
when they say, “I am from Palestine.” I mean, there is no such country named
Palestine. You can check the U.N. There is no country written in the U.N.

notebook called Palestine! There is such country called Israel. So he can say, “I’m
a Palestinian from Israel.” But when you say, “Hi. I’m from Palestine.”

“Jerusalem, Palestine” or something, it hurts the people that are from Israel and
are from Jerusalem. ...This is the problem: they don’t have a country, and they
feel like they have it. And they’re speaking like there is no Israel! [male, high
school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 190)

The source of the conflict is the land. They think it is their land, and we think it’s
our land . . . But we brought development to the area, we built the country. That’s
the problem. We built the country in our territories and now they want it back . . .

They have more rights, they have more opportunities to be successful and they’re just using Israel as a tool for their life. It was a big shock [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 376)

The IJ participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue represented the largest single pool of coded quotations among the various categories of coded IJ participant quotations. The three dissertations from which these quotations were drawn contain extensive analyses on their meaning and significance specifically in relation to the impact of the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace programs. Nonetheless, the contents of the selected quotations above are consistent with the contents of IJ participant quotations cited in previous sections and gathered from other dialogue models.

**Summary of the IJ intergroup dialogue quotations.** This section presented IJ intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative and meaningful IJ quotations that address the research questions of this meta-data-analysis. A brief overview of the narrative outlined above indicate a wide variety of topics and potential themes for describing the IJ intergroup participant experience. Though not an exhaustive overview, the quotations contained within this section represent the following five categories within which topics developed or progressed through the narrative:

- the movement from ignorance to awareness of Palestinian Arabs;
- the process of recognizing Israeli Jewish disunity;
- either deconstructing or reifying Israeli identity and historical narratives;
- remaining a crusader or becoming an advocate; and
- recognizing the complexity of a solution to the conflict.
The movement from ignorance to awareness of Palestinian Arabs. Multiple quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue contained references to the fact that intergroup dialogue represented the first real face-to-face exposure to Palestinian Arabs for Israeli Jews. Other quotations indicated that prior to dialogue, Israeli Jewish participants didn’t understand the difference between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The dialogue experience served as an opportunity to learn about these differences and what members of each Palestinian identity group endure on a daily basis. IJ quotations indicate that dialogue serves as an opportunity to learn about the Palestinian Arab narrative and the relationship between Islam and violence against Israel. Furthermore, other quotations indicated that the process of befriending Palestinian Arabs through intergroup dialogue effectively broke through stereotypes Israeli Jewish participants had previously held about Palestinian Arabs.

The process of recognizing Israeli Jewish disunity. Numerous IJ participant quotations suggest that IJ participants enter dialogue primarily as individual agents less interested in representing Israel and more interested in building interpersonal relationships. However, as dialogue progressed, the quotations indicate that IJ group members realize their group’s collective disagreement regarding various aspects related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Common subjects around which IJ participant quotations indicate disagreement are parallels drawn between Al Nakhba and the Holocaust and Israel’s role in ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quotations recorded within the uninational sessions indicate IJ participants could work through these disagreements to varying degrees of success.
Either deconstructing or reifying Israeli identity and historical narratives. This category of dialogue topics is closely related to the previous category. Some IJ quotations suggest that feelings of shame and guilt are experienced when the Palestinian narrative is juxtaposed against the Israeli Jewish narrative, while other quotations indicate a dismissal of the Palestinian narrative and a strengthened adherence to the Israeli Jewish historical narrative. Furthermore, IJ participant quotations indicate that the process of dialogue with Palestinian Arabs can lead IJ participants to question both the practicality and the morality of defining Israel as a Jewish rather than a democratic state.

Remaining a crusader or becoming an advocate. IJ quotations recorded in the ‘pre dialogue’ and ‘early binational dialogue’ stages indicate that IJ’s enter dialogue with the intention of ‘reforming’ Palestinian Arabs by proving to them the correctness of the Israeli Jewish cause or by convincing Palestinian Arabs of the immorality of suicide bombings. As dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations suggest at least two outcomes of dialogue: some IJ quotations indicate an acceptance of responsibility for the conflict and its resolution while other quotations indicate a rejection of the Palestinian perspective. As such, IJ participant quotations suggest that dialogue can result in either a continuation of ‘crusader’ activity to change Palestinian Arab opinions or a change to an ‘advocate’ approach to work for awareness about the plight of Palestinian Arabs (both PCI’s and OPT’s).

Recognizing the complexity of a solution to the conflict. IJ participant quotations indicate that IJ participants may enter intergroup dialogue with a preset opinion regarding the appropriate course of action to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some IJ quotations indicate a belief in Palestinian Arab adherence to certain ‘pre-conditions’
before entering in further political dialogue, and other quotations indicate a belief in a two-state solution. As dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations indicate that changes in these opinions can occur. Some IJ quotations suggest that the two state solution is impractical. However, other IJ quotations indicate that a two state solution is still preferable despite the complexities involved in making such a solution possible.

**Part 2: The Selected Quotations of PCI Intergroup Dialogue Participants**

Following the pattern established in Part 1 of the data analysis section of this chapter, the quotations of PCI participants are organized according to the time they were recorded relative to participation in intergroup dialogue. From the approximately 160 quotations coded within the primary reports spoken by PCI intergroup dialogue participants, the most ‘representative’ and ‘meaningful’ quotations are included in this section of the data analysis. The quotations are organized according to ‘when’ the quotations were recorded in relation to the execution of intergroup dialogue: either ‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue, stage or structure of dialogue) are presented whenever appropriate or feasible.

**PCI participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue.** Similar to the previous section about the motivations and expectations expressed within IJ participants’ quotations recorded prior to engaging in intergroup dialogue processes, the vast majority of quotations from PCI participants recorded ‘before’ actual dialogue commenced come from the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace Ph.D. dissertation case studies within the primary reports. More specifically, all of the PCI ‘pre’ dialogue quotations presented here are from Hammack’s (2006) dissertation. Nevertheless, the topics contained within these PCI participant quotations are consistent with the topics found in other intergroup
dialogue participant quotations from other stages of dialogue presented in other primary reports—all appearing in forthcoming sections.

The following two PCI participant quotations contain references to the challenge of defining PCI identity.

My identity is Arab Israeli. I am Israeli first; I have no question about this. I live in Israel. Israel is my country. I’m proud of being Israeli, and I’m proud of my country. When an Arab Israeli says, “I’m Palestinian,” it’s because somebody has told them: “You are a Palestinian living in Israel. You must remember your brothers who have been killed,” or something like this. And this happened with me, in the first day of camp. Somebody came and asked me, “Who are you?” I said, “I’m Jibril, I’m from Israel. I’m Arab.” He said, “How can you say you’re from Israel!? You’re a Palestinian!” I said, “No. I’m Israeli!” He said to me, “You forgot your brothers, you forgot what the Jews did to us.” These kinds of things, this doesn’t help make peace. This makes it harder! [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 297)

I guess Arab Israeli, because I live in Israel, and I am a Palestinian. To that question, when I think about it twice, I think I would prefer to be called Palestinian-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian. Maybe that can be achieved after peace [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 314)

This PCI participant quotation contains a version of Israeli history that generally assigns blame to Palestinian Arabs for the roots of the conflict.

Because the Jews came to Palestine at that time, it was the start of the conflict. It was the twentieth century. The Jews built the country, but the Arabs didn’t accept
what the Jews said. So there was a war between the Arabs and the Jews, and the Jews won. But there were six Arab countries against the Jews, and the Jews won! ... [The conflict,] it’s not between Jews and Arabs. It’s between Israelis and some Arabs—not all Arabs. Because I’m Arab, and they don’t have a problem with me. I’m not involved [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 298-299)

Another PCI participant quotation expresses *dismay over the manner in which Palestinian children are taught history*:

> The [school] books don’t have anything about the conflict. The Hebrew book has stories about peace between Muslims and Jews. But they don’t have things like this in Palestine. They’re taught to be against Israel. They learn really bad things about Israel. Everybody there is against Israel. The European Union gave Palestine money to make new books, but they were really bad books. All their books are about war, and against Israel . . . Teaching hate for Israelis will not help. We don’t learn anything against Arabs in the Israeli schools . . . I don’t know why the Arabs do it against the Jews [male, high school teenager].

(Hammack, 2006, p. 299)

The same PCI participant is attributed to the following quotations which *assign blame to the Palestinians for the start of the second Intifada*:

> It’s what the Palestinians say, because Ariel Sharon entered al-Aqsa Mosque. But a lot of Jews enter the Mosque, so why exactly this man? They say because he is a killer. He killed a lot of Arabs or something like this. But they were just waiting for something to start the intifada—the terror organization, I think. Because if
there is no war, there is no work for the terror organization [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 300)

Another PCI quotations expresses both an objection to and an explanation of the existence of Palestinian suicide bombers:

Suicide bombers, I think they undergo a mind-wash, brainwash. Yeah, they get into a very bad situation. Their family, some members of the family are dead during this conflict, so they feel like they have no choice. They feel like they can’t do anything else, so they decide to sacrifice their life. But it’s not exactly a sacrifice, because when someone sacrifices something, he does it to benefit other people, and I don’t see they are benefiting the Palestinian people as they come here and kill innocent civilians. So Israel needs to strike back, more strongly. This is also a circle of violence [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 317)

In regards to the resolution to the conflict, another PCI participant quotation contains a justification for a two-state solution:

I think in this region there are two peoples. There must be two states, and one future for them. That’s the only way to come to peace . . . The intifada is about the Palestinians wanting their own land and their own state, cause they have the right to have their own country. They don’t have the right to leave their village.... There are all these tanks and guns, and every day there is someone who is killed [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 308)

In comparison to IJ participant quotations recorded before dialogue, PCI participant quotations focus more heavily on matters of identity. Though these quotations come from only one primary report (Hammack, 2006), their contents are consistent with
the contents of other quotations from PCI participants in other studies. The theme of
identity is a recurring one within PCI participant quotations, as subsequent sections
demonstrate.

**PCI participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue.** Within this section
representative PCI participant quotations recorded ‘during’ actual intergroup dialogue are
presented. Similar to the previous section presenting IJ participant quotations recorded
‘during’ intergroup dialogue, this section is organized and presented according to the
stage of intergroup dialogue in which each quotation was recorded: either within the
early, mid, or late stages of dialogue. Unlike the previous section about IJ participant
quotations recorded ‘during’ intergroup dialogue, the PCI section does not contain any
meaningful or representative quotations recorded during ‘uninational’ dialogue sessions.
Furthermore, whenever appropriate, the quotations in this section are organized according
to the dialogue model within which they were spoken and recorded.

**PCI participant quotations recorded during the early stages of binational
dialogue.** Again, similar to the section in part 1 of this analysis which presented IJ
participant quotations recorded within the early stages of binational dialogue, nearly all
the selected quotations attributed to PCI participants during the early stages of binational
dialogue in this section were recorded within the confrontational dialogue model.
Because many of these quotations were presented as responses to IJ participant
utterances, a tone of defensiveness is discernible within these PCI participant quotations.
These quotations also contain references to counter narratives to those narratives found
within IJ participant quotations.
In contrast to IJ participant quotations that indicate a preference for interpersonal communication, the following PCI quotation expresses a preference for intergroup dialogue.

We came here to argue, to talk about things, and it isn't at all personal . . . You aren't in touch with what you're saying. You don't know how things come across. How we understand you [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 944)

The early stages of intergroup dialogue in the confrontation model contains quotations from PCI participants that defend and define the PCI identity.

We have been living here for more than forty years [i.e., we have been Israeli citizens] and now you say that I do not belong? From your words I understand that you are not ready to accept me as an Israeli, all the time you speak about me as an Arab [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 331)

I am a Palestinian. There is a difference between national and political affiliation. I will never feel Israeli [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 940)

PCI participant quotations contain justifications for PCI dissatisfaction as a national minority within Israel.

I think that when someone has something, he doesn't appreciate it. This is why it is very hard for you to understand. I have been living here for twenty years now; on Fridays and Saturdays the shops are closed, there is nowhere to go. I stay here for the holidays and there's nothing for me to do. A mosque - to go and pray - it's been turned into the Beer-Sheva Museum. I miss a lot of things here. You don't feel this because you have it all. There's folk dancing, discos, films, but not one
PCI quotations contain a number of comments that appear to carry a defensive tone. In regards to history, PCI quotations can contain attempts to **draw parallels and highlight similarities between the Holocaust and Al Nakhba.**

And you always get furious when people say that you treated the Arabs the same way the Nazis treated you. You went through a terrible time, you did not have a state, you did not have a home, you had nothing, and you came here and treated us the same. That is my question [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 332)

PCI quotations also contain *counter-narratives to terrorism and Islamic Jihad.*

Islam is a religion that has a tolerant attitude towards non-Moslems, they live together. Let me tell you a story: Mohammed, the Prophet, had a Jewish neighbor that used to damage his property, to burn his door and to abuse him. One day the neighbor did not show up and Mohammed went to the fields to look for him and asked: Where have you been all these days? I thought you were ill, so I came to visit you...” [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 334)

[Jihad] [i]s not only a matter of religion, there are other intervening factors, such as socio-economic conditions. There are people that join the Islamic Jihad because the movement provides them and their family with money and helps them. Take for instance the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt, why do their ranks grow all the time? It is because they work on socio-economic issues, they go to poor neighborhoods in Egypt and help them with money and food. During the
earthquake in Egypt, who was there to help? The Moslem Brotherhood, people see it and join them [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 336)

PCI quotations also frame *Palestinian violence as an exception*. The following quotation refers specifically to violence against women as exceptional events.

> It is strange that you say that we [the Arabs] value human life less. First, there were some cases of women that were killed to restore family honor, and they were widely reported by the media. It is true that they were killed, but these are a few cases. There are many cases of women who betrayed their husbands and cheated on them, but they were not killed; they divorced or an agreement was reached within the family. People who killed [their sisters] are a minority [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 341)

The selected PCI participant quotations above tend to contain explicit defenses of Palestinian Arab identity, culture, and nationalistic aspirations. This characteristic of ‘defensiveness’ results chiefly as a consequence of Israeli Jewish participant challenges and critiques to Palestinian identity, culture, and nationalistic aspirations. While PCI participant quotations indicate consistent resistance to IJ participant challenges and critiques, the subject of PCI personal identity continues to develop through the subsequent stages of dialogue.

**PCI participant quotations recorded during the middle and late stages of binational dialogue.** The number of representative and meaningful quotations spoken by PCI participants ‘during’ the middle and late stages of intergroup dialogue is comparatively smaller than those included in the previous section regarding IJ participant quotations recorded ‘during’ the middle and late stages of intergroup dialogue. As such,
the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ stage PCI dialogue participant quotations are combined into one section here. These quotations were recorded primarily within the confrontational dialogue model, and a smaller number of quotations presented here were recorded within narrative and coexistence dialogue models. The quotations continue to contain references to the challenges of possessing a mixed or dual identity. Other quotations appear to continue to function as tools of defensiveness against IJ participant accusations and suggestions.

PCI participant quotations recorded within both a narrative dialogue session and a coexistence tradition include comments intended to *clarify the differentiations in identity among Palestinian Arabs.*

There are (Palestinian) Christians as well! [female, university student]. (2009, Bekerman, p. 214)

You call it ‘Sephardic tradition.’ You have to understand that there is no ‘Sephardic tradition.’ This is an Arab tradition, and at my home also we have the same traditions that were in your home [male, university student]. (Bar-On et al., 2007, p. 47)

The first PCI quotation refers to the existence of Christian Palestinians for the apparent purpose of emphasizing that *not all Palestinians are Muslims.* The second quotation refers to ‘Sephardic Jews’—Jews who are primarily of Middle Eastern ancestry rather than European (Ashkenazi) ancestry. The quotation is apparently offered for the purpose of ethnically aligning Sephardic Jews with Palestinian Arabs.
PCI participant quotations can also contain elements expressing frustration with comments received from IJ participants that criticize or generalize Palestinian Arabs. The following is an example from a confrontational model dialogue session.

It outrages me that you say that human life is not cherished by us. . . You are wrong when you say that among us (the Arabs) the value of human life is inferior to you (the Jews) [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 341)

Expressions of empowerment can also be found in PCI participant quotations, such as the following recorded within a confrontational model dialogue session.

Maybe the power of the Arab group here, the Palestinian group, [is] to bring things, like, to the same level, and you feel that there’s a group here that has rights . . . Maybe you have that sense of a threat [female, university student].

(Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

PCI participant quotations also contain counter-narratives to the IJ participant condemnations of Palestinian Arab suicide bombings and terrorist actions that appear to both denounce violence yet express solidarity with OPT’s.

No, she meant that there is something reciprocal [in suicide bombings]. Let’s say that a state, let’s say like Israel, that bombards Gaza in the middle of the night, this is not called a terror attack even though everyone there relates to it as a terror attack. I definitely think that it’s not justified to hurt any side if they are innocent civilians, let’s say he blows himself up on a bus or that a state like Israel bombards [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

I condemn, in every way, any form of terrorism involving killing innocent civilians . . . But I can’t ignore what is happening there in the territories and in
Gaza when the Israeli army is attacking them all the time [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

Further examples of empowerment contained within PCI participant quotations is the following which apparently serves to challenge Israeli-Jewish privilege in Israel.

You don't appreciate it because you have the land. You want to get rid of us. Do you want me to convert [to Judaism]? Soon you'll want us to celebrate your Independence Day [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 948)

PCI quotations also attempt to expose a flipside of Jewish-Israeli privilege by lamenting the comparative lack of cultural and social development among Palestinian Arab peoples.

Palestinian Arabs Israelis are here in front of you, we are more conservative about our culture, more than other Palestinian countries:: yes. We are here on: on the subject of the culture um: we are barricaded in um: for more than fifty years: we um . . . in the Palestinian sector we don’t really have theater um: that’s considered developed. Um: we don’t have um: actors that are so um: they [the Jews] have the talent and the standards [gender unclear, university student]. (Bekerman, 2009, p. 215)

PCI quotations also contain references to varied forms of social and media asymmetry.

[The media] highlights all the cases of blood feuds and women’s killings as a symbol of the inferiority of the Arabs. But you can also find cases in (Israeli - Jewish society) [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 343)

So can you simply explain to me the results? Do they seem balanced? Thirteen [PCI’s killed by Israeli police]? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)
At least one PCI participant quotation contains a counter narrative to IJ participant quotations that question the loyalty of PCI’s to the state of Israel. The following quotation contains a suggestion that Israeli Jews, if given the option to create a homeland somewhere else in the world, would refuse to go there.

My land is here. Most Palestinian people, should a state be established, will feel they belong there. But there are those who won't leave their land to live with their own nation. Do you understand? There are two issues here. Why didn't you agree to go to Uganda? You said that you differentiate between the nation and the land. So why didn't you go to Uganda? After all, you wanted a Jewish state. Had you gone to another country, you would have felt comfortable [there] with each other and you would not have felt anti-Semitism. [But] another place has no meaning for you; it's the same for us [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 946)

At least one PCI participant quotation contains a suggestion that the creation of a Palestinian state (i.e. a two state solution) will allow PCI’s to reconcile their divided identities as Israeli citizens and Palestinian Arabs.

I think that once there is a Palestinian state, it will be easier for us to define ourselves as Palestinians living in Israel [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)

In short, the PCI participant quotations recorded during the middle and late stages of binational dialogue tend to contain clarifying statements on Palestinian Arab identity, especially for Palestinian Arabs who are citizens of Israel. These quotations also indicate a persistence, at times to the point of exasperation, in defending Palestinian Arab culture and nationalism to Israeli Jewish participant critiques. PCI participant quotations also
indicate solidarity with OPT participants, which further serves the purpose of defining PCI identity.

**PCI participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue.** This category of PCI intergroup dialogue participant quotations was the most well-represented category included within part 2. Five of the seven intergroup dialogue models represented among the primary reports are represented within this section of PCI participant quotations recorded after dialogue. The topic contents of the quotations are varied yet discernable connections can be made between the contents of these quotations and those quotations presented in the previous sections of PCI participant quotations.

**PCI participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue.** PCI participant quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue refer to the benefits of participating in the dialogue encounter. Two examples below highlight *an increase in self-confidence* and *the opportunity to have difficult discussions* with Israeli-Jews as dialogue benefits.

This encounter increased my self-confidence. Just as I stood before the Jews in that meeting, I can do it again in the future. In the past, I was not involved with these things, but this encounter encouraged me to do things like this in the future [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 64)

I think it is better to confront and even hurt one another than just sit around playing games. . . [without that] I don't think I would have been able to talk to anyone here. I came to this workshop to learn new things, I came to voice my opinions, so that people would be able to see things the way I do [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 951)
At least one PCI participant quotation frames the dialogue experience as an opportunity to memorialize Aseel—a PCI Seeds of Peace participant who was killed by Israeli police.

I wanted to come today dressed in a map of Palestine, so that they would know that this is a message from [Aseel], so that they’d know that I am not giving up my religion or my nationality. It’s true that I am with you and I love you, but I am not giving up my national identity [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 65)

Another PCI participant quotation contains an emphasis on the importance of maintaining cultural uniqueness through a lamentation about the manner in which young Palestinian men socialized with young Israeli Jewish females during dialogue.

I’m not in favor of assimilating . . . I know that the Arab boys were influenced. I saw that with my own eyes, how they behaved with the Jewish girls. I got angry and told some of them off, and they kept quiet and didn’t know what to say to me [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 66)

What these handful of PCI quotations recorded after confrontational model dialogue chiefly demonstrate is an explicit expression of self-confidence and determination to maintain Palestinian Arab culture and nationalistic aspirations.

**PCI participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue.** All PCI participant quotations in this section were attributed to Peace Child Israel dialogue program participants (Ross, 2013). Similar to PCI quotations recorded after participation in confrontational dialogue sessions, PCI Peace Child Israel participant quotations recorded after dialogue point to an increase in self-confidence as a result of dialogue.
When I started in Peace Child it simply, I met new people from a different group, um, different customs, all sorts of different things that were very new to me, that I didn’t, I simply didn’t grow up with them. And [...] the project was, it included theater and that also gave me the confidence to speak, to state my opinions. . . [I]t came from theater, which is...we would work on all sorts of, um, improvisations and so on through acting. And that was...it made it easier for us to express ourselves and state our opinions and so on [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 227-228)

PCI quotations from post-Peace Child Israel participation also include references to an increased confidence in creating social change as a result of dialogue.

The fact that we, as individuals, can create social change. I don’t wait, if I want to create some sort of change I don’t wait for anyone [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 207)

PCI Peace Child Israel participant quotations also include references to a deeper sense of critical self-reflection as a dialogue outcome.

I didn’t just gain knowledge in Peace Child. I also learned how to think in a different way and to understand my own opinion [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 227)

Though language asymmetry has been a concern raised by intergroup dialogue researchers (Abu-Nimer, 1999), this quotation from a PCI participant suggests that bilingualism offered the empowering opportunity to improve communication between the Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab participants.
Every Jew who would speak, I would translate. And it was very important for each one of them to understand what that one was saying, what that one says. I felt that I had an advantage and I used it well and it helped the whole group female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 229)

In brief, whereas IJ participant quotations recorded after narrative/theater model dialogue contained references to the power of theater to generate empathic responses, PCI participant quotations tend to emphasize an increase in self-confidence.

**PCI participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue.** All PCI participant quotations presented in this section were attributed Sadaka Reut dialogue program participants (Ross, 2013). Again, some of these PCI quotations refer to an increased level of self-confidence as a program participation outcome.

In fact I came actually not so politically aware into the details of the conflict, and I left with much more, I'd say, more confidently standing behind a defined perspective that I had. And not being afraid of saying whatever I wanted in front of Jewish people, who might not agree with what I say.[...] I guess that was something that I didn't have before [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 225)

This self-confidence can be linked to an expressed perception of an increased conviction in the possibility of social change, as these two PCI quotations suggest.

And the fact that Sadaka Reut succeeded in internalizing within me, it’s not just Sadaka Reut, but it started with Sadaka Reut. Um...it gave me...it gave me this thing, this feeling that...the belief that it’s possible to create change [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 208)
And that’s really what Reut contributed to me, and I feel it and it’s very good – to live, to live as though life is beautiful, as though life is really good. It’s possible to change, it’s really possible for things to change [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 213)

Closely related to self-confidence is the concept of self-awareness, and at least one PCI participant quotation referenced *enhanced self-awareness as a dialogue program outcome.*

At the start I didn’t speak much. At the start I would listen, I also didn’t know many facts. And then when I started, I tried to be objective. I started to say things that I thought and [...] at the end of a seminar, we did [an activity where] everyone had a piece of paper with his name on it and everyone, in a way that others couldn’t see who wrote it, like in an anonymous way, everyone wrote a short sentence about what they think about that person, and someone wrote about me that I am an extremist, that I have extreme opinions. And...it was, I still remember this, someone came to me directly and said to me yes, I wrote that because that’s how I felt. [...] And...it raised some questions about, within me, and about me. And that was a very important activity for me...because you, all the time, people are good at judging other people. But to judge yourself, that’s something else [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 222)

The following PCI participant quotation contains the suggestion that because the social and political climate in Israel-Palestine make friendships between the groups of people difficult, *dialogue groups* like Sadaka Reut are *all the more important for introducing Israelis and Palestinians to each other.*
This type of friendship is much more, much more stable. Because already, a friendship that is built on commonalities, with a small argument over difference or distinction, it can be lost. But if you build friendship on, on the very fact that everybody, that nobody gives up his opinion and that everyone from the start says what he thinks, that’s a friendship, that’s an ideal friendship in my opinion. And it’s too bad, because it’s very difficult to build friendships like that today in...in the existing conditions. But it’s also one of the things that contributed, that Sadaka gave to me [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 186)

Another PCI Sadaka Reut participant quotation contains the suggestion that participation in these types of dialogue programs serves to break down and eliminate prejudices and stereotypes.

[Sadaka Reut] developed and provided a lot for its participants. Participants didn’t know what Jews were. They feared Jews. Why? They thought that Jews conquered the country, that’s what they thought. Jews, police, they give their fathers tickets...and Jews would come, Jews didn’t know what Arabs were. Aside from what fact that Arabs have hummus and their father has an Arab worker, what did they know about what Arabs were? Or their fathers take them on Shabbat to eat falafel in an [Arab] village and they see Arabs. That’s what they know about Arabs. But if you see [friends] who are alumni of [Sadaka Reut], you come and speak with them, and say an Arab is, just an example, shitty, no good, they will tell you, no way Karen, Arabs are good people, I met them, I was in [Sadaka Reut]. I met wonderful Arabs and we spoke and we laughed and we sat together and ate together, they are so sweet. That’s what they will tell you . . . But
a Jew who never met an Arab, just knows what his parents drove into his head, he’ll tell you, yes, of course, Arabs are shitty. And the opposite is true as well. If they meet and speak, all the...the ice between the two sides is broken. And that’s how it needs to be. That’s how it needs to be [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 180)

Similar to the PCI participant quotation earlier that contained a lamentation regarding the comparatively lesser developed social and cultural world for Palestinians, this PCI participant quotation suggests investment in Palestinian Arab society is a critical component for peace.

It’s necessary to invest more in my own side, which doesn’t have resources invested in it, and which is very depressed. And after I see that my society, and myself within my society, we are satisfied and things are good and we are living with respect, then, then I’ll start to speak about coexistence [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 275)

Consistent with the goals of activist models of dialogue, PCI quotations suggest that greater levels of political awareness and political action are outcomes of dialogue participation.

[I] began to build my political identity as a Palestinian...to define myself as a Palestinian who lives in Israel with Israeli citizenship [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 274)

Before [joining the Sadaka Reut commune], I was not at all politically aware. I barely took any interest in politics. I hated politics [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 158)
Another PCI participant quotation suggests that through dialogue, *politically active PCI’s discover new IJ partners in political activism.*

I was very much surprised to see how much [Jewish participants] were really supporting the Palestinian cause and boldly pointing out inequalities, on the responsibility of Israel in the situation. And generally speaking I mean in the Palestinian Israeli conflict. That was something that I never saw before [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 221)

However, other PCI quotations contain *pessimistic messages* regarding the potential for intergroup dialogue programs to *bring about meaningful social change.*

Let’s say that [Sadaka Reut] had an impact on 2000, 3000 people, at an individual level. But change at a broader level, this society is moving only towards extremism and only...listen, I don’t need to tell you [...] I don’t want to denigrate [Sadaka Reut], the opposite. I grew up there, and I’m very proud of what I do. But I don’t believe that they will bring about change [male, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 200)

[Sadaka] Reut was the shock for me that...that you try and try and talk and talk, and try to get somewhere, and we never got anywhere, we only spoke...and I understood the other side, but the other side, it’s easy to understand for anyone who lives in this country - all the media is like [how the other side thinks], all the newspapers are like that, everyone around you thinks like that, and [the other side] is totally closed off in its thinking. They live in some sort of bubble...they are simply people who live in a bubble. You try to talk to them but it’s difficult, it’s almost impossible, because there is a strong side and a weak side, our
[Palestinian] side that does want to try to get somewhere, because [the situation here in Israel] is not good for us. And the other side, it’s good for them, so they come, have this experience in Reut Sadaka, but many of them went afterwards to the army, which doesn’t really make me happy [female, adult]. (Ross, 2013, p. 274)

Nevertheless, PCI participant quotations also contained references to identity assimilation akin to quotations from former IJ SOP participants: “[Sadaka Reut] is me [male, adult]” (Ross, 2013, p. 323).

Consistent with previous PCI quotations related to other dialogue model experiences, PCI participant quotations recorded after activist model dialogue (specifically Sadaka Reut) explicitly refer to an increased level of self-confidence as a dialogue outcome. This self-confidence appears to be related to other PCI participant quotations that refer to a heightened sense of self-awareness as a dialogue outcome. Furthermore, both PCI and IJ Sadaka Reut participant quotations tend to contain references to the importance of friendship and relationship building within dialogue processes as a key process for ensuring continued social and political activism post dialogue participation.

**PCI participant quotations recorded after conflict management model dialogue.**

This section contains only two quotations, both of which are attributed to female PCI participants in the Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP) program (Collier, 2009). Consistent with PCI quotations referenced earlier, PCI quotations recorded after BBFP participation reference the challenge in living with two identities.
Sometimes we have to be Israeli girls, and sometimes Palestinian girls, but all the time we have to be Israeli/Arab girls . . . the ones who understand the problems with Jerusalem and understand what’s happening in Tel Aviv and everything. To be between two sides [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 361)

However, at least one PCI participant quotation refers to a strengthening of Palestinian identity as an outcome of intergroup dialogue.

And I found myself, that’s when I recognized (small laugh) that I had, I found myself defending my . . . (long breath) . . . I mean I am Palestinian before ’48. My grandparents were here and my grandparents are still here. And, wow! I’m turning Palestinian [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 361)

Consistent with PCI quotations cited previously in relation to other dialogue models, the subject of dual identity processing among PCI’s remains a salient theme.

**PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue.** The PCI participant quotations contained within this section all come from the three Ph.D. dissertations about the Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace intergroup dialogue programs. As a result, this category of quotations has the largest number of potentially relevant quotations for identifying themes of experience for PCI intergroup dialogue participants. The topics presented here are consistent with earlier sections, and other unique topics are presented as well.

Like IJ participant quotations cited earlier, PCI participant quotations contain acknowledgement of a lack of contact with members of the other group prior to the dialogue program.
Actually, to tell you the truth, even if I lived here all of my life I never had the opportunity to talk with Jewish youth, or Jewish kids about politics. I kind of lived in my town and I didn’t have political awareness. . . . I live in this country and I didn’t know about their culture, their religion, only prejudiced thoughts.

Stereotypes - Jews had peyote [side curls], and they’re funny, look how they are dressed in black, like they’re going to funerals, they’re so funny the way they pray. Look how they took our land. That’s basically what I heard [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 91)

Consistent with quotations cited earlier, the above quotation also contains the suggestion that lack of friendship between and among Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs leads to negative characterizations and stereotypes of the other.

PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP program involvement also refer to the dual identities PCI’s maintain and express how those identities fluctuate depending on the context of social interaction.

When I am with an Israeli group, I feel more Palestinian, and when I am with a Palestinian group, I feel more Israeli [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 347)

Before going to camp . . . let's say small things such as identity, my personal identity, or how would I relate to Palestinians or Israelis, were things I didn't really care about - they were secondary. I didn't have obvious answers for them and you didn't need to think about it a lot. But once you're at camp everything shifts and you start to know that every word you say and your identity means a lot [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 97)
I think I probably called myself Arab-Israeli, then [at camp]. But we all did... In the early 1990s, a lot of the Arabs in Israel called themselves Arab-Israelis, and it's changed a lot recently... now they call themselves more Palestinian or Palestinian-Israelis [female, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 349)

PCI quotations from SOP participants refer to particular moments when program activities seemed to require PCI’s to choose a national identity.

We had the flag-raising and then you had to decide to stand with which delegation and sing the national anthem. And you know it's the most tough point at camp when you have to go and stand with which country that represents you and which flag that show who you are. And at that point we had a lot of difficulties to choose which country - Palestine or Israel. Cause I'm a Palestinian living in Israel so it's pretty hard for me to decide. The thing is that in the Israeli national anthem there's nothing there that shows who am I as an Arab living in Israel. All of the Israeli anthem says Land of Zion, so I'm an Arab, hello. And in the flag itself, there's nothing that represents Arabs, it has a magen David (Jewish star), and there's no reason for me as an Arab in this flag. And so I couldn't sing the national anthem, but for respect to my country, because I live in this country, and they give my dad money to feed me so I stand at the flag, but I didn't sing, I just stand for respect. And with the Palestinian national anthem, when the delegation came up, I went and did the same thing with them. I went and stand with them also without singing [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 109)

PCI quotations also refer to the varying degrees of ‘Palestinian-ness’ within themselves and as perceived among other PCI’s.
I still feel confused sometimes, but now I understand that I’m Palestinian, and how important that is. After I came together with everyone involved, Palestinians, Israelis, and other Arab Israelis like me, I realize I’m more Palestinian than Israeli. The Palestinians understand me, and I understand them. I side with them cause I’m Palestinian, and now I have a better sense of that [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 382)

[We] were not a group that [was] very unified... everyone was Palestinian in opinion, [but] some were very pro-Palestinian, some were less, some were in the middle... everyone said that they understood the Israeli side, [but] very few of us actually agreed with the Israeli side [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 350)

Some PCI quotations suggest that the variability of PCI identity leads to feelings of estrangement while participating with SOP activities.

I had nowhere to go and no one to talk to... we were like kids there, looking for their parents, and everyone found their parents and I couldn’t find mine [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 354)

It just seemed to be the normal explanation for any teenager who wants to see it as there’s a Jewish side, there’s a Palestinian side and there are us that are not fully Palestinians, we’re not fully Israelis, we understand both sides so the conclusion is we are the middle solution, I mean it’s the simplest explanation for a teenager but it’s not, we’re not the middle part, we’re not the solution, we’re just a third side. And regardless what the solution is going to be, it’s probably not gonna involve what we think. It’s going to be a middle ground between the Palestinians and the Jewish Israelis and nobody cares what we think . . .When we’re sitting in
a session and there’s the Palestinians and the Israelis, we’re not actually bridging between them, we’re another side, another point of view and it does not agree with either one of them and it’s not, and it does not mean this is the middle ground, this is where they should come [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 361)

PCI participant quotations also contain references to the manner in which the presence of OPT participant in the dialogue program further complicates PCI identity.

When I was at camp in 2002, and there were Palestinians (from the OPT) in the group, I felt less Palestinian. We laughed about – I’m Palestinian, but not kosher Palestinian [kasher, ya‘ni], that is not 100% Palestinian. Especially in Seeds, I saw that, the Palestinian identity, the more you suffer, and the more you have horror stories about the occupation and everything, then you are more Palestinian. The Palestinians who come from Jenin [refugee] camp, they are more Palestinian. [To] the Palestinians that come from Haifa, they say “what do you know?” Even the Palestinians say “you have a very good life, and what are you complaining about?” Even when we are in the dialogue, when they are talking about checkpoints, and the Palestinians from Israel say that there is racism against Palestinians in Israel, you feel that there is no place for your “suffering” [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 347)

PCI participant quotations refer to a realization of the realities of Israeli-Jewish life and their history as an outcome of dialogue participation.

I thought that the Israeli-Jews didn’t have worries, this is their state, they can do whatever they want. But I learned that they also have so many worries in life, they
have to go to the army. Before Seeds of Peace I didn’t know that . . . For them it’s also a struggle [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 432)

So I didn’t know I have this gift of listening to people and of really understanding. Especially when I went to the Holocaust Museum and I felt like wow. I felt so connected to humanity. Not to nationality, not to ethnic, not to gender, no, I’m related to humanity. That’s something I never knew. When you’re 15 you don’t know these things. When you work on these things, and you develop them, you learn to empathize with the other side. That’s something I never knew I had [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 451)

One PCI participant quotation outlines *a process of opinion modification regarding the purpose and morality of suicide bombings as an outcome of dialogue processes.*

After Seeds of Peace, I have been changed a lot. I really agreed with the suicide bombings, like my family and like most of the Arabs in Israel. But after Seeds of Peace, I totally disagreed. Because, you know, I don’t see any human thing in the suicide bombing. And I don’t think this is the kind of jihad that Islam talks about. And suicide bombing gives the world the reason to take Islam in the wrong way, to misunderstand Islam. So I totally disagree with it now. And after I had a lot of friends, Jewish friends, after Seeds of Peace, I would see the news and I kept thinking, how would that be if a Jewish friend of mine would die in a suicide bombing? How would I respond? Everyone can be hurt. Even me, I’m an Arab Israeli, but I can be hurt by a suicide bomber. So I’ve been changed a lot, and I have to say that after Seeds of Peace [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 346)
However, the same PCI participant who articulated the quotation above voiced another quotation two years later which contains a complete reversal of opinion regarding suicide bombings and Islamic jihad.

I feel hatred. Not to my friends, which is weird, not to my Jewish friends, because I know this is not their fault, but to the Jews. . . When I watch TV and I see how they treat people so unhuman, I just feel this kind of “Oh my God, I just want to kill this soldier.” Just like this. I feel this hatred inside. But not all the Jews. You know what I mean? Those Jews.

Jihad is good. I mean, it’s better if it won’t be, but jihad is not bad for our religion. Jihad is to kill the one who came to take your land, the one who came to take your money, if you have money, to take your honor. By defending those things, you have to defend yourself by killing him. . . They’re not my society, the Jews. We are different societies right here, the Arabs and the Jews. And I cannot think of myself as one of their society because they won’t take me, they won’t accept me [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 399, 400)

PCI participant quotations also contain references to a deeper understanding of the roots of the conflict and a newfound motivation to engage others in dialogue developing as a dialogue outcome.

I just now understand a lot of this – I can understand when I hear Jews say this is my land - Jews – I can understand why they curse the Arabs, the hate, I can understand a lot of things - it took me a long time to understand these things. Now when my classmates talk about the Jews they think twice because they know I can convince them and they want to believe what they’ve been told and they know
that I know now stories and facts that I could convince them easily [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 313)

It really helped me a lot, to listen more and more and more because you never get enough. Right now I want to go and I want to listen to settlers, I want to listen to right wing people. ... I want to hear what the settlers have to say, maybe I can, I know it will sound, but maybe I can understand them even. I want challenge [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 440)

Though the Seeds of Peace program is primarily promoted as a coexistence program rather than an activist development program, some PCI participant quotations suggest that SOP was the source of a motivation to become engaged in political action.

It was the first time I was put in a situation where I had a right to frame my opinions, and to reflect on where I’m coming from, and what is... When I first went to Seeds of Peace, it was the beginning of my political formation [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 351)

All the demonstrations, and the rallies, and the protests, and all the different forms of resistance that I’ve been doing... and many of these decisions that I’ve made in my life, I had the strength to do it because of my experiences in Seeds of Peace [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 379)

Another PCI participant quotation suggests that participation in dialogue led to a realization that the solution to conflict cannot come through uninational dialogue alone.

When I sat only with the Arabs, I also felt there was something missing. I also couldn’t find answers to the questions that I was asking. And when I went to the uni-national seminar, we also didn’t find answers. And I realized that the
frustrations that I had two years ago, I’m not going to find the answers by myself [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 127)

Despite the PCI quotations indicating positive change as a result of dialogue participation, other quotations point to disappointment experienced after returning to Israel-Palestine, especially in relation to the perceived odds against lasting social or political change.

I understand what they were trying to do, but the world is not the way they present it to you in Seeds of Peace. As a teenager, you don’t understand; in the real world, you get really surprised, you get really shocked [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 374)

The world is way more complicated than you thought it was going to be, especially more than what you thought at Seeds of Peace. You have to fail, you have to struggle, there is no equality, especially living here in Israel, trying to find a job, trying to find education in Israel, going to work with Jewish people that you never talked to before, the vibe that goes around them, it’s so weird, you’ve never felt it before. When you’re with Seeds of Peace, you’re under this protective hat, but when you go out, especially in Israel as an Arab, it’s not like that, it’s so depressing, it’s literally depressing... And that’s why Seeds of Peace disappointed me, because they took us to a certain point but then they just abandoned me. You took me to prepare me but you didn’t do a good job. I wish I didn’t know so much that I know right now [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 375)

I thought about Seeds of Peace and my experience, and I thought about the situation, and I had this point where I realized the situation and the reality is much
harder and much stronger than Seeds of Peace . . . The influence of the reality is much stronger than the influence of Seeds of Peace.... We are seeing things, seeing facts on TV, in radio, in internet, but Seeds of Peace, it’s just words you learned at camp.... I really regret the idea that I was in Seeds of Peace, but the thing is I just felt that it’s going nowhere. I was really depressed and hopeless . . . I know it affected me personally. I met so many intelligent people, and it affected my language, lots of things. And my social things, but it’s still, the political thing is not going anywhere [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 398)

Still other PCI quotations indicate participant realization of the Seeds of Peace ‘ideology’ and an experience of assimilation of the SOP identity.

It’s an ideology, what’s unique about it is that all of us have our own opinions and views, but we have this common thing called Seeds of Peace [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 154)

It's not just seeing them as human and that's it. It's to get the spirit of Seeds of Peace - to really feel so equal to each one who are nearby you and to treat them as well as you want people to treat you [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 433)

Humanity is the most important thing in Seeds . . . The most important part of my identity is being a Seed, but at the same time being Muslim, because they’re connected somehow. ...The first thing really is being a Seed. I so feel Seed in being everything I am. Being a Muslim, I still feel Seed [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 347, 348)
At least one PCI participant quotation frames the *SOP identity in a manner akin to being a mediator*.

Being a Seed after you've practiced a while is having the ability first of all to say that you were wrong and that you can say in order to have a conflict you need to have two sides, you must have mistakes that both sides have done, if only one side is wrong then the conflict should be solved really easily by a neutral country or the UN if only one side is wrong [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 440)

Consistent with quotations cited earlier, PCI participant quotations contain references to *increased self-confidence to effect social change as a dialogue outcome*.

Being a Seed of Peace is also having the will and the power to resist and stand against or stand for every person you have ever known in the whole of your life. Like be ready to show people how you've changed, sometimes it's a drastic change, and also to be brave, to stand against a big number of people not in Seeds of Peace [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 450)

Consistent with the contents of PCI participant quotations cited in previous sections, PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue refer to the importance of relationship building as the key to moving past stereotyping and prejudicial behavior. PCI participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP participation indicate that the program’s rituals and routines generate experiences of stress, alienation, and uncertainty in regards to the program’s emphasis on ‘choosing’ to represent Israel or Palestine. Furthermore, these PCI quotations contain a range of perceived solidarity with the Palestinian cause from advocating Islamic jihad to disavowing suicide bombings. It
appears the general lack of a unified identity among PCI’s entering dialogue remains generally disparate post dialogue.

**Summary of the PCI intergroup dialogue quotations.** This section presented PCI intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative and meaningful PCI quotations that address the research questions of this meta-data-analysis. As was done at the conclusion of part 1 of the data analysis section of this chapter, what follows here is a general overview of the topical contents that point to potential themes for describing the PCI intergroup dialogue participant experience. These PCI quotations can be placed within the following five categories within which topics developed or progressed through the narrative:

- the process of clarifying and defining PCI identity;
- shifting perspectives on the history of the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli Jews in general;
- demonstrations and acknowledgements of a growing self confidence to challenge IJ dialogue participants;
- evidence of malleability in the moral acceptability of suicide bombings and terrorism; and
- a linking of dialogue program participation to an increase in or an avoidance of political activism and social change.

**The process of clarifying and defining PCI identity.** PCI participant quotations containing references to the difficulties in maintaining a PCI identity were found within all stages of dialogue. PCI quotations outline a variety of circumstances that cause this identity to fluctuate in terms of felt ‘aligned-ness’ to either an Israeli identity or a
Palestinian identity. PCI quotations indicate that dialogue program participation serves to clarify and define individual PCI identities—frequently these quotations point to an increased sense of ‘Palestinian-ness.’ However, PCI quotations suggest the presence of a sort of ‘Palestinian identity measurement scale’ which places Occupied Territory Palestinians higher in terms of ‘Palestinian-ness’ than Palestinian citizens of Israel. Other PCI quotations contain references to an assimilation of dialogue program identity into the PCI identity.

*Shifting perspectives on the history of the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israeli Jews in general.* Similar to IJ participant quotations cited in part 1, PCI participant quotations contain acknowledgements of a social separation between IJ’s and PCI’s prior to dialogue. As such, these quotations indicate that dialogue participation served to provide an environment where friendships could be built. These PCI quotations suggest that through these personal friendships, PCI participants experienced a new motivation to dialogue with others about the history of the conflict and the reality of Israeli-Jewish life.

*Demonstrations and acknowledgements of a growing self-confidence to challenge IJ dialogue participants.* Numerous PCI quotations contain a linking of dialogue participation to an increased sense of self confidence to engage in challenging and difficult conversation with Israeli Jews. The most significant example of this can be found in PCI quotations that contain comparisons between the Holocaust and the Al Nakba. Other topics that appeared in PCI quotations that contain challenges to IJ’s are Israeli-Jewish privilege, the lack of Palestinian social and cultural development, and the prevalence of negative Palestinian Arab media portrayals.
Evidence of malleability in the moral acceptability of suicide bombings and terrorism. PCI participant quotations contain reflexive responses to the subject of suicide bombings and terrorism. While some PCI quotations contain counter narratives to the IJ condemnation of terrorism, other PCI quotations indicate strong support for these actions. Explaining why these quotations indicate such a range of responses is beyond the scope of this study, yet the presence of such a range indicates a potential theme of experience that PCI participants struggle to reconcile—how to maintain both solidarity to a Palestinian national cause and maintain a positive relationship with Israeli Jews.

A linking of dialogue program participation to an increase in or an avoidance of political activism and social change. PCI participant quotations recorded after involvement with activist and mixed method models of dialogue contain a linking between program involvement and political activism. However, the quotations vary in the description of the degrees of political and social activity post dialogue. This range of responses suggests that the experience of accepting or rejecting political and social involvement is a potential theme to explore to describe the PCI participant experience.

Part 3: The Selected Quotations of OPT Intergroup Dialogue Participants

Following the pattern established in Parts 1 and 2 of the data analysis section of this chapter, the quotations of OPT participants and organized according to the time they were recorded relative to participation in intergroup dialogue. Of the approximately 120 quotations coded within the primary reports spoken by OPT intergroup dialogue participants, the most ‘representative’ and ‘meaningful’ quotations are included in this section of the data analysis. The quotations are organized according to ‘when’ the quotations were recorded in relation to the execution of intergroup dialogue: either
‘before,’ ‘during,’ or ‘after’ dialogue. Further categorizations (i.e. model of dialogue) are presented whenever appropriate or feasible.

OPT participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue. All OPT participant quotations recorded ‘before’ entering dialogue cited in this section come from Hammack (2006). These OPT participant quotations contain references to the opportunity to present the plight of OPT’s as motivation for joining the dialogue program.

I came here to show, first of all, I want to show all the people that Palestinians are suffering. The Israelis occupied our land. They don’t have any rights, no human rights. They use all the ways to torture us. Plus, freedom fighters are not terrorists because they are fighting for the country, and we don’t have an army. I came to show all the people, Israelis, Americans, Jews, and nationality, I want to show them all what Palestinians are actually going through, how much we suffer [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 261)

In spite of the hardships OPT’s face, OPT participant quotations also contain expressions of pride in Palestinian identity:

The most disturbing thing is, like, little kids, throwing stones. It’s like, you see the courage in your people. And I’m really proud of being a Palestinian. I’m really proud. It’s like, you see men in 8-year-old children. Men. Real men [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 246)

Other OPT participant quotations contain details about the plight and hardships OPT’s experience and witness on a regular basis.

[As a Palestinian in East Jerusalem,] you’re so humiliated, discriminated against, everywhere. ...Checkpoints everywhere you go, soldiers looking at you. You are
not allowed to look at soldiers. You get beat up if you do anything. If you
do...you’re fucked up. You can’t be yourself. And if you do, you’re in danger.
Like a guy was shot next to my house, just because a soldier felt like killing
somebody [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 243)
Being Palestinian, and living the Palestinian life, going through hundreds of
checkpoints, getting beaten by soldiers [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack,
2006, p. 264)

OPT participant quotations also contain references to traumatic events.

When I was a child, always soldiers were there. They came to our house to take
my brother. I remember I was four years old. The soldiers came to our house. I
was in another room, and they stayed the whole night waiting for my brother to
come home. And my mother, she was crying. It was a terrible experience [female,
high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 249)

OPT participant quotations contain both statements expressing willingness to
perpetrate violence and justifications for suicide bombings and Islamic jihad—if dialogue
programs were not active.

[The suicide bombers,] they’re depressed. I’m depressed. I’m here, I don’t know.
I feel that I’m going to explode.... I don’t know, it makes me angry. If I wasn’t in
this Seeds of Peace camp, I would kill any Israeli, I don’t care [male, high school
teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 264)

And how come do they call the suicide bombers “terrorists” and not the Israeli
government? They started all the violence! They invaded Palestine! It’s like,
we’re just defending ourselves. What else can you do?! If your wife was raped
and killed, your mother and father, your whole family was killed in front of you, and you were humiliated, your wife being raped in front of you, and your home destroyed, and you have no reason to live, and all the hate, and you have all the hate inside you, and all you could think of is revenge, right?! . . . It’s wrong, but it’s the only way. And it’s like every Israeli has to join the army. It’s like, so no one’s innocent [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 242)

[The intifada,] it’s a bad thing, but it’s a good thing because it made, the second intifada made me stand for Palestine. The first intifada I was small, I didn’t understand much. But now, I like understand more about it. People are dying for their country, for Palestine, and I think the second intifada was good too because people are fighting, not like the first intifada because now we have suicide bombers and the first intifada was just throwing rocks and small things. And now, we have small weapons . . . Plus the whole world gets to know what’s happening now in Palestine [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 261-262)

Other OPT quotations express support for martyrdom for the sake of Palestine, and at least one quotation contains geotheological justifications for martyrdom.

I believe, if we’re not gonna get our land back, we don’t have to make peace. Everyone should fight until they die [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 242)

And there’s this thing in Islam, if someone dies for his own country, he’s like, these are the best people. If you die for your country, you go straight to heaven. That’s what we believe. It’s in the Koran also . . . The whole Islamic population is supposed to fight for Palestine because, you know, there is the prophet
Mohammed was there. It’s a holy land [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 246)

However, other OPT participant quotations express support for finding a compromised solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

So maybe I’m not against the negotiations, and I’m also not against the self-defense . . . It’s our destiny, to live side by side with Israel. If you want to live peacefully, you have to give up some things . . . You know my mother once told me, it’s like Japan, when they were beaten in the second World War, after the two bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they gave up. It’s not that they are weak, but they were fighting against the strongest power in the world. So they gave up.

Until now they’re beating many countries in economics, cars . . . I’m not against to go and fight, but not like people do it sometimes. If they have to do this thing, they can go to the settlements [female, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 271)

Other OPT quotations reference support for a two-state solution.

But we are two nations, we must decide to stop killing and live peacefully in the two separated countries in 1967 borders [female, high school teenager].

(Hammack, 2006, p. 252)

Though all the OPT participant quotations recorded before dialogue came from one primary report (Hammack, 2006), the contents of these quotations foreshadow subsequent sections. OPT participant quotations recorded before dialogue contain emphases on Palestinian Arab nationalistic aspirations and the high degree of suffering experienced on a daily basis. Whereas PCI participant quotations tend to contain
references to the difficulties of living as a second class citizen and the inability to fully reconcile dual identities, OPT participant quotations often refer to the effects of trauma and the pursuit of justice.

**OPT participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue.** Because of the overall lack of OPT intergroup dialogue participant quotations recorded ‘during’ dialogue within the primary reports, it was not feasible to divide these quotations into ‘early,’ ‘mid,’ and ‘late’ stages of dialogue. As such, the quotations cited below are organized into a narrative that presents the most representative and meaningful quotations and their respective topical content. In general, these quotations contain primarily references to the importance of political and social activism as means for improving the Palestinian Arab condition.

The following OPT quotation, recorded in the early stages of a track two diplomacy dialogue, contains references to *OPT’s who identity as peace activists*—a sharp contrast to OPT quotations attributed to much younger participant quotations that advocate violence quoted in the previous section.

I am speaking about ourselves, the people who are peace-loving people, who want to work for (short pause) peace built on reconciliation [male, adult]. (Kellen et al., 2012, p. 553)

The following OPT participant quotation contains an example of *a dialogical turn* that was presented in response to an IJ participant that inquired about where Palestinian Arabs would choose to live in a future hypothetical Palestinian state.

I want to ask you the same question . . . In Palestine . . . there are many Christians. They are living with us, we’re living as Palestinians with each other, peacefully . .

OPT participant quotations contain *counter challenges to IJ participants*. The following quotation occurred in response to an IJ who stated that Israeli prisoners must first be released before any Israeli military can be withdrawn from the Occupied Territories:

“You have occupied lands, free it also” [male, adult] (Kellen et al., 2012, p. 555).

Another example of OPT participant quotations that contain challenges to IJ participant quotations are these which *posit clarifications on the historical record of the events of 1948*.

And, I want to say, all the people who fled to other countries [in 1948] were not, most of them and ninety-nine percent were not, like, they wanted to. They were forced by force, by terror [female, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 106)

Do you remember—you may ask your father or your mother or your grandfather, whatever. At the beginning of the [19]70s, in the beginning of the [19]80s, there [was] peace...between Palestine and Israel, and Fatah and Hamas [existed] in these times. And from [19]93 to 2000, there [was] peace. . .and there were. . .no rockets. . .because there were less checkpoints and there were no military operations each night.... So when you decrease the number of checkpoints so and release some of the prisoners, the refugees, when you solve these things—I’m talking about the Israeli government—when you solve these things, peace will be inevitable [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 108)
At least one OPT quotation contains an inquiry that seeks moral justification for the events of 1948.

I’m not going to question that the partition plan stated that 55% of the land [was] for Israelis. Why did they take 78% of the land? [male, high school teenager].

(Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 105)

OPT participant quotations also include references to the media as a source of distorted and inaccurate portrayals of Palestinians.

I understand that [the fear of the Jews from the Palestinians], and the source is from television, and the media and the continuing policy of the Israeli government. And it disappears from the eyes that we differ personally from each other. You did not see the part that wants peace, only the part that wants to bomb [male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 728)

OPT participant quotations, consistent with the previous section, contain references to the violence OPT’s experience and witness in relation to Israeli police and military.

Two months ago, a child in the village of Lid, a soldier came and killed him with blows of the M16 gun, in front of people, in a very violent way. And a child like me is afraid to go out [male, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 729)

Many of your soldiers stop our innocent people when they want to go to work and shoot them. Shout stop, stop, and when they don’t – they shoot them [female, high school teenager]. (Maoz, 2000, p. 729)
In spite of the violence and difficulties, and consistent with a quotation from the previous section, OPT participant quotations contain *expressions of hope for reconciliation through unapologetic activism*.

So I think. . . in order to be responsible (short pause) we should SHOUT LOUDLY, enough is enough and peace and control, (short pause) and let us try to be courageous to get to the peace of reconciliation, which, the, which INCLUDES (short pause) accepted the other, eh, clearly, accepting the other (short pause) dealing with the other according their needs, not according to (short pause) arrogant positions (short pause) and ideas of dominance and control [male, adult].

(Kellen et al., 2012, p. 558)

Like PCI participant quotations recorded during binational dialogue, OPT participant quotations recorded during dialogue contain defensive commentary in response to IJ participant critiques and challenges. The role of the media in perpetuating inaccurate portrayals of Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories is a theme that again appears in OPT participant quotations. Furthermore, OPT participant quotations reference personal experience with violence and trauma for the assumed purpose of proving to IJ participants the role the Israeli military plays in their daily lives.

**OPT participant quotations recorded ‘after’ dialogue.** Consistent with the ‘post’ dialogue quotations sections in Parts 1 and 2, the OPT participant quotations recorded after dialogue make up the largest portion of OPT participant quotations. However, these quotations represent only 3 of the 7 dialogue models found within the primary reports. This comparative lack of OPT participant quotations is due chiefly to the difficulty intergroup dialogue programs and researchers have had in physically reaching
dialogue participants living in the Occupied Territories (see Hammack, 2008, for narrative on his experiences in gathering data among OPT participants).

**OPT participant quotations recorded after coexistence model dialogue.** Only one OPT quotation is included in this portion, and it makes reference to a potentially new realization that violence is not the best answer to resolving the OPT situation.

If we want to fight and resist this occupation, we should. . .get better education, and have more knowledge, because I think that it would be more effective than violence [male, high school teenager]. (Pilecki & Hammack, 2014, p. 107)

Such a quotation from an OPT participant points to the power of dialogue to break persistent nationalistic narratives.

**OPT participant quotations recorded after conflict management dialogue.** All of these quotations come from OPT participants of the Building Bridges for Peace (BBFP) dialogue program as researched by Collier (2009). OPT quotations recorded after dialogue, like those from previous stages of dialogue, reference the plight of OPT’s.

There is nothing happening in peace, there is no improvement. It is not advancing.

There is closures, there is no work. There is travel restrictions [female, adult].

(Collier, 2009, p. 355)

OPT quotations suggest that these continuing difficulties necessitate less dialogue and more social and political action.

I think we will not do dialogues; we will stop that because we had enough, we had enough in America. . . So I think we have now to work. To do things. To, for example, to meet together. For example Netanyahu is going to make a settlement and both, we both don’t want this kind of action. So we both have to go and make
a little demonstration to express ourselves [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 344-345)

OPT quotations make reference to a *frustration with Israeli leadership*.

[Netanyahu’s] doing nothing for the peace. He is doing everything against peace. He is taking lands and he is taking . . . yeah and they are taking lands and building more settlements, and they’re just, he just, he keeps talking [female, adult].

(Collier, 2009, p. 355)

OPT participant quotations contain references to a *realization that Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs learn different histories*.

As a Palestinian, I was taught the history that the Palestinians think, which is different than . . . actually nobody knows what is true . . . And I used to think that these people, Israeli people, should know that they are doing . . . But then I learned that they think it is a completely different history [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 354)

Consistent with the IJ participant quotations from previous sections, OPT quotations contain *descriptions of a perceived disunity among IJ participants in dialogue*.

(A) In the dialogue sometimes two Israelis, they get into a disagreement together.

(B) Yes! A disagreement together! We never did this!

(C) We were prepared here, we knew everything about the Israelis, their culture, their—everything about them. We didn’t find it difficult to communicate with them, to talk with them, to understand them.

(D) But the Israelis . . . I felt like they didn’t know us very good, as well as we know them.
They [Israelis] only met one or two times before going to Colorado but we met more than twenty times! [females, adults]. (Collier, 2009, p. 356)

OPT participant quotations also refer to surprise that IJ perspectives on Palestinians and the conflict are diverse.

I had a general idea of what the other side thinks of us as me as Palestinian, but then I just got to talk to her about these deep issues and these very sensitive ones. I realized that their people think differently. They don’t all think the same. I had the idea that all the Israelis thought of us as terrorists, but she didn’t show me that she looked at me as a terrorist or being a part of terrorism and so I respected that and I appreciated that [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 360)

OPT participant quotations also contained references to anger and frustration about the dialogue process and the utilization of language.

We feel uncomfortable discussing [the occupation] . . . outside [the workshops] because we are sometimes too angry and if she just talks about that subject I’ll become . . . (she makes a fist and grabs the air with one hand) [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 358)

When she was talking in Hebrew I feel that she wants to be with the Israeli people not with the Palestinian. That’s in the beginning. But when she started talking with me in English or in Arabic, I feel that she is Palestinian, like she is my sister or something like that [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 360)

At least one OPT quotation expressed the process an OPT participant executed in order to represent both herself as an individual and as a Palestinian via the subject of suicide
bombings. In other words, the quotation outlines a process of ‘suicide bombing apologetics.’

I personally talked as an individual but I actually tried to convey the ideas of my delegation or my community as a whole. I mean I told her that, for example, I didn’t like these terrorist attacks, or I didn’t like this shooting of people, but I also tried to explain for her why these people do this, I mean the terrorist attacks. These people don’t come from out of the middle of nowhere and just bomb these people . . . they have their own reasons. I tried to explain, for in a way I was saying “‘they think’” (putting her fingers up to signify quotation marks) not “‘I think.’” Whenever I was saying “‘I think’” then I would put in only my opinion [female, adult]. (Collier, 2009, p. 362)

OPT participant quotations in this section corroborate IJ participant quotations that demonstrate intergroup disunity among IJ participants. Also, the consistency of OPT participant expectations and goals for dialogue participation point to OPT participant unity that is greater than expressed PCI participant unity. Furthermore, OPT quotations recorded post conflict management dialogue indicate that dialogue processes served as opportunities to learn about the reality of Israeli Jewish life and gain motivation for pursuing further political and social action.

**OPT participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue.** OPT participant quotations recorded after participating with SOP/HOP refer to the motivations for joining SOP, which tended to focus on a desire to inform IJ’s about the realities of OPT life and history.
To show the Arab countries, the Israelis, the Americans, what we have gone through as Palestinians and how much we’ve suffered and not just suffered on our personal level of we’re 14 and 15 year old students and kids but to go back historically and prove that we had the right and we were the victims at every stage whether we were talking about 73 or 67 or 48 or 1936, 21, 18 and all the way to Balfour declaration and the Ottoman Empire. We were going to show them that Palestinians were always the victims of somebody else’s agenda and at the same time we still have the right to, we are the ones that have the right to live in this land, period, and everybody else can take their bags up. And of course you get to the camp and you’re eager to see the Israelis and you’re eager to tell them [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 206)

As numerous OPT quotations indicate, OPT’s enter dialogue with a variety of essentialized perceptions of IJ’s.

The only thing I knew about Israelis is soldiers and settlers . . . because this is what I saw in Hebron . . . the settlers . . . sometimes they would come and mess up the market. I remember two times they would try to break into the mosque and the soldiers would take them away. The soldiers would come and bang on our door at four in the morning and would talk to my grandfather and ask him about questions about who lives here and who lives here. If he didn't know they would keep him out all night and bring other people to question. Other things I remember, soldiers coming in and searching the house. These are all this really, very, very negative and bad images of the Israelis, nothing positive [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 89)
The fact that the camp would be for Arabs and Israelis worried me... Before I went to the camp I was afraid to talk to Israelis. To me they were all the same, Army, soldiers... I felt the Israelis were here only to kill us. I saw the army killing people in front of my own eyes [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 90)

I thought of Israelis as being a different nation, aliens coming from somewhere else and they only have guns in their hands. They don't have people of ten years old or thirteen years old. They're only 20 and adults. They ride in jeeps and settler cars. They live far away, next to us but far away... They have lights, they live in the light and we live in the darkness. These are the things that we knew about Israelis [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 90)

We're in the same bunk, you're sleeping sometimes next to an Israeli. You look sometimes when they're sleeping. You're worried, it's something totally new. It's not normal, really. You know, if they're actually going to sleep, if they're planning something... If they wake up like you, what they do when they wake up? If they shower or not? All these things... and then you think okay, they do the same things, you have it in the back of your mind, but you still think no, it still can't be. And then all the things you do are the same. And then you think we're really the same, we're not different at all. It's just where they live and the barriers that are between you, and all the things that exist on the ground, really this is what makes them different from you. And what gives you the horrible picture in your mind of them [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 100)
OPT quotations indicate that participation in the dialogue program resulted in an increase in self-confidence.

After coming back from camp, I had a different character, a different personality. I was stronger. I was in a way, I don't know, I felt more mature. It's hard to explain, I was a different person. I knew many things. Now when people asked me things, I knew how to answer. I didn't have that ability before. Now I had a stronger character [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 448)

OPT participant quotations also contain attributions of dialogue participation to an improvement in interpersonal skills.

Coexistence taught me how to understand and listen to people. When I listened to their stories and they listened to my stories, I learned they can understand me and how I live and I can understand them [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 139)

My second year - all I wanted to do was sit down and listen and hear what they wanted to say and just to understand them and see why we are where we are [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 445)

The main thing I realized in the coexistence sessions is not to be offensive all the time. If you’re offensive, then they’ll spend their time thinking of a comeback, being defensive. But when you reach their human side, then they listen and respect. A lot of arguments towards the end were just Israelis trying to listen [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 329)
OPT quotations from participants in SOP contain references to the joy of experiencing equality with all program participants.

You're wearing the same shirt . . . you call everyone a Seed, you're a Seed from Palestine, you're a Seed from Israel, from Jordan. All things around you makes you feel that you're all the same, you're all human beings. Definitely. And you all deserve to have the same life. And that's so important. Especially for me as a Palestinian [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 108)

You do everything the same. It's not like the Palestinian delegation has this activity and the Israeli delegation has this activity. You're all mixed together in groups. Sometimes you compete with an Israeli against a Palestinian or an Arab. It all makes you feel that you're all pretty much the same, the same level. You don't feel different [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 130)

Despite this in-program equality, OPT participant quotations contain references to the experience of frustration in hearing other participants share historical narratives that differed from the Palestinian narrative.

It was very difficult because the first time anyone goes to camp I think they have very firm and fixed ideas and beliefs and it's so hard. Changing them is kind of impossible, but even questioning them is still difficult. Getting to actually listen to someone who has opposing views or questions your own beliefs or being open to someone else's opinion, that was extremely difficult... I wasn't tolerant of all different opinions. I could not sit quietly and be calm when someone was saying something that I don't believe in or that sounded so different from what I was
taught, what I had heard, and from my beliefs. It was very difficult [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 120)

At the same time, other OPT quotations refer to the opportunities OPT’s made to teach IJ participants about the reality of Palestinian life and historical events.

It was something that I'd always wanted to do, to get a chance to talk to an Israeli and tell him how things really are where I come from and explain to him the things that he doesn't understand about the Palestinian people and give him the true image of the Palestinian people [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 92)

Jerusalem, the refugees, settlements, the situation with the Palestinians currently at the time, 1998, checkpoints, the past, massacres that happened, occupation, all of those things, curfews, things that happened to you personally so you can show them all the horrible things they've been doing to us all this time. Those kind of things [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 96)

Consistent with OPT quotations from earlier sections, OPT quotations contain references to a sort of ‘suicide bombing apologetics.’

I just wanted to explain why we are doing things, that we are not terrorists by nature, we are not terrorists at all. We're just defending our case, that was very important for me to express ... in that coexistence group I talked, I yelled, I did whatever I wanted, and then I listened. I listened to what the other people had to say [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 122)

OPT quotations also contain references to a power of joint activity to build trust between IJ’s and OPT’s.
When you're up on the ropes and you have an Israeli holding you down with the harness, so you'll be like, I have my life in the hands of an Israeli, if you fall off the line it's the Israeli that's holding me by the rope so I won't fall to the ground. It just builds the trust and it makes you think just because he's an Israeli doesn't mean I don't have to trust him, just because he's an Israeli doesn't mean he should be any different than me. He's just another teenager, he's just another person, and he hates the situation just as much as I do. He wants to make it better just as much as I do [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 114)

This OPT quotation draws a link between joint activity and OPT ability to listen to IJ participants.

It's so much easier, so much more useful, so much more productive to actually be sitting and listening when you trust the person. And you know that they want to live in peace, and you understand it. It's so important [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 133)

OPT quotations refer to a process of learning about the Holocaust as a dialogue program outcome.

Yeah, of course, so much about the Holocaust. I didn't know anything about it. These were the things that the Israelis would talk about. Like I never knew that the Israelis . . . were so connected to Palestine and Israel. Just sometimes as much as some Palestinians, you know they're really connected. It's not that they go there just because they're powerful and they want to occupy it. Not all of them are like that. So that didn't come to my mind right away. I had to listen to that until I understood it. Why they wanted to create Israel in the first place. It's not because
they wanted to make the Palestinians suffer, it was because they were actually going through suffering in Europe and they had nowhere to go. All these things I didn't know [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 144)

It's easy for me to see [now] that Jewish people went through the Holocaust and... how Israelis see soldiers as honored people... I understand the Jewish narrative...

Of course extremism in all these things definitely bothers me, but today I can listen to the Jewish narrative without being sad [gender unclear, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 128-129)

Other OPT quotations suggest that dialogue helped OPT’s move beyond stereotypes of IJ’s related to geotheological concepts.

Well, I learned how to erase stereotypes. You know, stereotypes that you learn from television, from your community that all Israelis hate Arabs, all they want from the Arabs is to take the land and to fulfill the Zionist dream of making the Jewish country from the Nile to the Euphrates River in Iraq. It changes my view of the whole conflict, of the whole ‘them and us’ thing [male, adult]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 429)

I got to find out that some Israelis actually don't agree with what their government does at all . . . and they sympathize with us a lot. And I mean just to know that there are Israelis like that, it makes me see the whole conflict from a whole different perspective. And it really makes me want to reach out even more to people I haven't met yet, Israelis that I don't know and to find these people who are like that and bring them out in their society so that we can work together to
make our world a better place [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 430)

This OPT quotation suggests that dialogue with IJ’s represented an opportunity to engage in conversation deemed impossible in Israeli and Palestinian daily life.

In Hebron I would never dare, I didn't have the courage to tell a soldier or someone carrying a gun next to me, you're making my life miserable, just get out of here. Also the soldier would never be able to come to me, with his gun, and tell me oh, you're making our lives miserable, you're bombing us, you're killing so many civilians, and that's why sometimes we go and search houses. This doesn't happen [male, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 139)

This OPT quotation corroborates IJ participant quotations that describe the experience of shame and guilt over Israel’s role in the conflict.

The tears affected me the most. When you see them leave the coexistence sessions crying, not because Israel is suffering, but because their government is making me suffer, because I am suffering. I am suffering because of what they came to convince me – we are not equal. We are equal as human beings but we are not equal on the scale of suffering, on the scale of government, on the scale of power. We [Palestinians] are the oppressed [male, adult]. (Lazarus, 2011, p. 329)

Though most of these previously cited quotations have featured Israel and Israeli Jews as the subject of the quotation, other OPT quotations question Palestinian leadership.

Yeah, before I had total faith in all the Palestinian leaders, and other people. I just thought whatever they're going to do, whatever they say is right. But then I started
disagreeing and I just thought maybe this is not the best thing we could do. Maybe we're not doing our best to make things change [female, high school teenager].

(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 438)

Other OPT quotations indicate a *renunciation of suicide bombing apologetics*.

What if at some point one of them was . . . somewhere when a bombing happens? What if they were on the bus that was bombed? [female, high school teenager].

(Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 434)

Consistent with other dialogue participant quotations from previous sections, OPT quotations refer to *an assimilation of the dialogue program identity*, in this case that of Seeds of Peace.

[Seeds of Peace] defines who I am. I actually forgot how I was before being a Seeds of Peace. It's like, a part of your nationality. When you say I'm a Seed of Peace, you expect everyone to know what is Seeds of Peace and why you're in it. It's a source of pride for me [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 450)

Again, consistent with other participant quotations cited earlier, OPT quotations suggest *the Seeds of Peace identity is compatible with other previously held identities*.

I think it means, it doesn’t have a fixed set of beliefs attached to it or associated to it, I think it involves being yourself, believing in, having your own beliefs and yet being open to questioning those beliefs or being open to other people’s beliefs. And respecting other people, regardless of what they believe in. And also the basic element of Seeds of Peace is understanding and recognizing that peace is the way of solving things and not war. That’s the basic element that I think any Seed
of Peace would believe in [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 154)

This OPT quotation suggests that both IJ’s and OPT’s need to abandon any further identification with victimhood for the sake of resolving the conflict.

I think we should stop worrying too much about presenting ourselves as the victims or the victimizers. I think at this point it doesn't matter. Both sides have been victimized and being the victim does not justify actions against other people. At some point Israelis were victims, they were victims of the Holocaust, of discrimination. This is something that should be acknowledged and recognized by both sides but it should not be used or to justify unjust actions against either side. The same thing with the Palestinians. Okay, they have seen themselves as victims since the occupation, since their land was taken away, since the problem of refugees started, and Jerusalem and all those issues. But then we shouldn't be stuck in playing that role of being the victim all the time. Because at this point it's obvious that both sides are suffering. So it doesn't matter who is the victim and who is the victimizer. Each side has to acknowledge the fact that they have done mistakes, and yes, they have been victims at one point or another, but they should not be stuck at that stage because there is no way they can move on if they keep viewing themselves as victims. It has to be changed [female, high school teenager]. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2005, p. 145)

This OPT quotations suggests that despite engaging in dialogue, the program has little effect on the chances of stimulating social change.
When I hear [IJ’s] say things, and I was like, nothing’s gonna change. There’s no hope.... Also if you convince some of them, they’ll be back here and remix with their society and it won’t stay. So I was like, nothing’s gonna change. Nothing like Seeds of Peace will help. So I just stay focused, and never like give up something because you are the legitimate owner of this land [male, high school teenager]. (Hammack, 2006, p. 365)

The quotations from OPT participants cited in this section suggest that both IJ and OPT participants enter dialogue with similar motivations: to convince the other side of the rightness of their own perspective. Also, OPT participant and IJ participant quotations both refer to the lack of contact each had had with the other before entering dialogue; and this lack of contact result in essentialized perceptions of the other. Whereas IJ participant quotations contain expressions of shame and guilt over realizing the role Israel plays in the perpetuation of the conflict, OPT participant quotations recorded after SOP/HOP dialogue contain expressions of joy after experiencing the sense of equality with Israeli Jews. Furthermore, OPT participant quotations, like PCI participant quotations, contain references to a sense of increased self confidence as a dialogue outcome.

**Summary of the OPT intergroup dialogue quotations.** This section presented OPT intergroup dialogue participant quotations that were deemed the most representative and meaningful OPT quotations that address the research questions of this meta-data-analysis. As was done at the conclusion of Parts 1 and 2 of the data analysis section of this chapter, what follows here is a general overview of the topical contents that point to potential themes for describing the OPT intergroup dialogue participant experience.
These PCI quotations can be placed within the following categories within which topics developed or progressed through the narrative:

- OPT’s successfully conveying the reality of their struggles and challenging IJ’s in dialogue;
- OPT perceptions of IJ’s before and during dialogue; and
- positive outcomes of program participation.

**OPT’s successfully conveying the reality of their struggles and challenging IJ’s in dialogue.** OPT quotations indicate that a motivation for joining dialogue was the opportunity to demonstrate to IJ participants the extent of their daily hardships under military occupation. Consistent with IJ participant quotations in previous sections, OPT quotations indicate that this message is successfully conveyed to IJ participants which results in perceived IJ intergroup disunity and, in at least one case, tearful expressions. OPT participant quotations also contain challenges to IJ participants regarding not only the clarifications of historical records with the Israeli-Palestinian narratives but also ‘moral’ justifications for perceived injustices perpetuated by Israeli nationalistic expansion.

**OPT perceptions of IJ’s before and during dialogue.** Consistent with quotations from IJ and PCI participants, OPT participant quotations indicate a significant social gap between IJ’s and Palestinian Arabs prior to entering dialogue. OPT participant quotations recorded before dialogue portray IJ’s as ‘aliens,’ ‘police,’ or ‘settlers.’ In contrast, OPT participant quotations recorded during and after dialogue reference an experience of surprise that Israeli Jews are not homogeneous in perspective and political opinion.
Positive outcomes of program participation. OPT quotations highlight a number of positive outcomes from participating in intergroup dialogue. Consistent with previous PCI quotations that reference dialogue program outcomes, OPT quotations mentioned an increase of self-confidence and an improvement in interpersonal skills as dialogue outcomes. OPT quotations include an endorsement for the effectiveness of joint activity to help build trusting relationships between IJ’s and OPT’s. One OPT quotation attributes resistance to supporting or executing terrorist activities to the activities of the SOP program.

Part 4. Findings from the Intersubjective Coding Categories

As described earlier in this chapter, all of the intergroup participant quotations recorded ‘during’ intergroup dialogue within the primary reports that fit the inclusion criteria were coded within an intersubjective coding scheme. This coding scheme allowed me to assign a minimum of two different codes to each relevant ‘during dialogue’ quotation: a) one or more ‘holons’ indicating plurality or singularity of the first, second, or third person perspective of the speaker as indicated by the contents of the quotation; and b) the quality of the ‘second-person space’ created by the quotation indicated either as similarity, difference, togetherness, or separateness. Each quotation was also coded according to its topical content and the national identity, age, and gender of the speaker. The quotations were then placed within various ‘code concurrence’ tables within Atlas.ti in order to determine any significant, unique, or surprising associations between or among the various code categories.

As of this writing, no significant, unique, or surprising associations have been found among the categories of coded data. Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories all rely on a variety of ‘intersubjective’ communication patterns, and multiplicity of codes assigned to each individual quotation has rendered meaningful or interesting associations difficult to ascertain. However, my inability to find meaningful associations among the code categories does not necessarily mean that no associations exist—indeed, another researcher in possession of the same data may find associations through the same or another coding scheme. (This lack of significant associations is discussed further in the ‘Limitations’ section in Chapter 5.)

Nevertheless, one significant lack of representation within the intersubjective ‘holon’ coding scheme exists. Only 14 intergroup participant quotations were coded as ‘holon 5’ (third person singular quotations that request or disclose either objective or subjective information about a person or a thing) and nearly all of these quotations were attributed to IJ participants. These types of quotations are unusual because they primarily focus on or refer to a separate person, entity, or idea while the speaker is engaged in dialogue. For example, the following IJ participant quotation was coded as ‘holon 5’ because it refers to the act of comparing the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba: “This comparison hurts me” (Helman, 2002, p. 332). Its coding as a holon 5 quotation makes it an example of one of the few times the holon 5 code was utilized.

The following set of quotations (coded as ‘holon 5’) represent exchanges between an IJ participant, an OPT participant, and an interviewer.

(IJ) Well, we were talking about . . . the checkpoints.

(OPT) Yea.
And I was saying that I think they are necessary for the safety of Israeli citizens and...uhm...that, that was my point of view. And... (gestures to [OPT])

(OPT) And my point of view is that they don’t just stop the men and they stop sometimes pregnant women. They stop old women and old men. So this is what I think. I disagree. (tone gets progressively softer)

(Interviewer) So how did you feel when you had that disagreement?

(OPT) I didn’t feel that I am talking to my...my ally.

(Interviewer) What did you feel like?

(OPT) I just called her another name in my mind and I felt like I was talking to an Israeli and when we finished this, this, uhm, discussion, I just forget about it and forget that it came from her.

(Interviewer) (to [IJ]) How about for you?

(IJ) Well, it wasn’t nice to find something we disagree on, but... it was obvious to me that we come to a certain point (tone gets very soft) and disagree...

[...females, adults]. (Collier, 2009, p. 362-363)

These quotations were excluded from the data analysis presented in parts 1, 2, and 3 because the dialogue structure within which the quotations were recorded was different from the dialogue structures found in all the other primary reports. The dialogue structure is unique in that the quotations were recorded ‘after’ dialogue within a binational setting in the presence of an interviewer. The structure is more akin to a mediation than a dialogue setting—indeed, Collier’s study focuses on the conflict management dialogue program Building Bridges for Peace. Accordingly, the IJ and OPT participants speak
about each other in each other’s presence in the third person. Potential significance of this
dialogue/interview structure and the third person singular quotations it can generate are
discussed later in Chapter 5.

**Chapter Summary and Chapter 5 Preview**

This chapter presented the findings within the meta-data-analysis performed as the first stage of a larger, yet-to-be completed qualitative meta-study. This chapter outlined the procedures that were followed to identify and code the relevant data (in this case, verbatim intergroup participant quotations found within the primary studies). The quotations were coded and organized according to a variety of categories including participant national identity, gender, and age. Quotations were also coded according to topical content and along two intersubjective coding schemes. The quotations presented in this chapter represented the most meaningful and/or relevant quotations from the three groups of identified dialogue participants in Israel-Palestine.

What follows in Chapter 5 are the answers to the research questions and subsequent discussion related to the limitations and recommendations as pertaining to this meta-data-analysis. After answering the secondary research questions, I reintegrate my bracketed experiences and present the overarching themes of experience for Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants. Furthermore, Chapter 5 describes the remaining stages of an as-of-yet unscheduled qualitative meta-study for which this meta-data-analysis represents as its first stage.
Chapter 5: Answering the Research Questions, Limitations, Recommendations, Future Research, and Conclusions

The previous chapter’s explication of the most representative and meaningful quotations served as the basis for answering the research questions. As mentioned previously, the research questions for this meta-data-analysis were originally developed as research questions for a four-stage qualitative meta-study as outlined by Paterson et al. (2001). As such, this chapter begins with a narrative presentation of the answers to the research questions, based on the data presented in Chapter 4. After that, I present the limitations of this study, which is followed by recommendations as to how this study could be improved if the data were to be analyzed further. Next is an overview of the implications of this study on the potential execution of the second and third stages of a qualitative meta-study. After that is an overview of the potential contributions this dissertation can make to the fields of conflict resolution and peace education. This chapter concludes with final remarks on the overall process in relation to the present reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Answering the Research Questions and Identifying the Themes of Experience

As presented earlier, the central research question is what are the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants? The synthesized answers to the following secondary research questions ultimately provide a comprehensive overview that answers the central research question. The secondary research questions address three general categories: A) the speech of intergroup dialogue participants, B) the intergroup dialogue model within which the dialogue is conducted,
and C) the future of intergroup dialogue in Israel-Palestine. To reiterate, the secondary questions are:

- A1. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say *within* dialogue processes?
- A2. What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants say *about* dialogue processes?
- B1. How do dialogue models affect dialogue processes between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants?
- B2. How do these findings compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?
- C. What new possibilities can this data offer for intergroup dialogue processes in Israel-Palestine?

Throughout the data analysis sections of Chapter 4, I attempted to remain consistent regarding the grammatical structure of the presentation of the data. Instead of referring to ‘what participants said,’ I have striven to present participant quotations within the frame of ‘what the quotations contain.’ My doing so was an attempt at remaining transparent in my presentation so as to not ‘interpret’ or ‘read meaning’ into the words intergroup dialogue participants have shared regarding their experience and their exchanges within dialogue encounters. From this point onward, my voice will shift from ‘objective presenter’ to ‘interpreter of findings’ for the purpose of rendering relevant responses to the research questions that have guided every step of this meta-data-analytical process.

Answering this question necessitates a focus on quotations recorded ‘during’ intergroup dialogue. Broadly speaking, Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants talk about the following topics:

- trauma and suffering,
- issues of identity,
- fear of the other,
- religion and geotheological concepts, and
- the events of 1948.

**Trauma and suffering.** OPT participants talk about the variety of ways they suffer and have been traumatized under Israeli military occupation (i.e. checkpoints, random seize and searches, lack of basic necessities, harassment and humiliation). This is consistent with numerous reports that point to the negative physiological and psychological effects OPT’s display as a result of witnessing and experience violence and humiliation (Giacaman et al., 2007; Peltonen et al., 2010). Despite their suffering, OPT’s also talk about hope for reconciliation and express conviction in the power of social and political activism.

PCI participants talk about another kind of suffering—that of carrying the label of second class citizen. PCI’s in dialogue speak of the ways they are mis-represented in the media, accused of traitorous activity, and stereotyped as murderous and violent people. Despite their suffering, PCI’s talk about the privileges Israeli Jews have within Israel and challenge Israeli Jews to abandon the definition of Israel as a Jewish state.
IJ participants talk about trauma and suffering also, but the trauma they speak of is related to primarily two events: the Holocaust and the Palestinian Intifadas. Palestinian Arab participant attempts to draw parallels between the Holocaust and the Al Nakhba result in IJ expressions of suffering, although those expressions are not unanimously espoused among all Israeli Jewish participants. Discussions related to the Al Nakhba and the events of 1948 are discussed further in a subsequent section.

**Issues of identity.** All three groups of intergroup dialogue participants talk about issues of identity. However, the exact dynamics of those issues differ among the three groups. The asymmetrical power relationship between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs seem to shape the way dialogue participants talk about identity. As such, Palestinian Arab participants occupying the space of lower social and political power talk about identity in relation to Israel. PCI participants tend to defend their ‘dual identity’ as Israeli citizens and Palestinian Arabs. OPT participants express pride in their Palestinian identity but tend to do so in juxtaposition to Israeli Jewish identity.

IJ participants talk about issues of identity but more so within uninational dialogues than binational dialogues. Within these sessions IJ participants question the ‘modern’ Israeli Jewish identity and, by extension, the Jewish identity of the state of Israel. The conclusions individual IJ participants draw in relation to their personal identities extend outward to other salient subjects, such as the level of responsibility assigned to Israel for the continuation and resolution of the conflict.

**Fear of the ‘other.’** Both Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab participants refer to their overall lack of regular social contact with members of the other group before entering into dialogue. Within dialogue, IJ participants speak about a) their fear of
Palestinian Arabs for perceived capacity to engage in terrorism and b) their fear of significant identity changes within a future Israeli state that recognizes Palestinian Arabs as equal status citizens. OPT participants tend to talk about fear of the other more so than PCI participants, especially in relation to fear of Israeli police and soldiers.

**Religion and geotheological concepts.** Consistent with the overview of salient geotheological concepts presented in Chapter 2 related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as described by Krämer (2008), dialogue participants talk about religion and geotheological topics within dialogue. The verbatim examples in the primary reports feature primarily IJ and PCI participant quotations that engage in these topics. OPT quotations referring to religion and geotheological concepts appeared in the primary reports as part of the ‘post’ dialogue quotations.

**The events of 1948.** Consistent with the descriptions of the existence of ‘parallel histories’ and dominant narratives presented in Chapter 2 that animate individual perceptions of how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has unfolded, all three groups of participants talk about the events of 1948 within dialogue. Discussion of these events tend to elicit surprise from all participants upon hearing alternative versions of the events surrounding Israeli state independence and the Al Nakhba. OPT participants enter dialogue with the explicit purpose of ‘educating’ IJ participants about these alternative narratives, and members of all three groups express either an appreciation for being exposed to these parallel histories or a rejection of the new information they received.
A2: What do Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Intergroup Dialogue Participants Say About Dialogue Processes?

Answering this question necessitates a focus on quotations recorded ‘after’ intergroup dialogue. Broadly speaking, Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants talk about the following aspects and outcomes of intergroup dialogue experiences:

- changes in self-perspective;
- increased level of understanding of the other; and
- changes in political or social opinion.

**Changes in self-perspective.** Consistent with the topics discussed ‘within’ dialogue, IJ participants often refer to dialogue processes as a significant point in their lives whereby they realized that the ‘meaning’ of their identity as Israeli Jews was potentially in flux. PCI and OPT participants tend to emphasize how dialogue participation increased their self-confidence and served as the impetus to continue engaging in social and political action. PCI participants frequently express how dialogue processes helped them ‘work out’ (to varying degrees) the complications of possessing ‘dual identities.’

**Increased level of understanding of the other.** As mentioned previously, IJ and Palestinian Arab participants refer to a general lack of ‘real life’ social contact with members of the other groups. Both groups identify dialogue processes as a means for overcoming stereotypical and prejudiced beliefs about the other. Through dialogue, IJ participants describe processes through which they came to see and understand the suffering Palestinian Arabs endure on a regular basis. PCI participants describe how
dialogue provides a space for them to see the diversity of perspectives among Israeli Jews. OPT participants describe how dialogue allowed them to learn more about the significance of the Holocaust for Israeli Jews. OPT participants also describe how dialogue processes served to change their opinions, to varying degrees, regarding the utilization of suicide bombings for achieving political and social change.

Changes in political or social opinion. In general, dialogue participants describe how dialogue participation changed or complicated their perspectives and opinions on political and social issues. Israeli Jewish participants point to dialogue participation as an impetus for becoming ‘anti-occupation’ and ‘anti-Zionist’ regarding Israel’s military actions and ideological stances. PCI participants point to dialogue processes as the motivating factor that convinced them to become more politically active, especially regarding activities within Israel intended to promote the social standing of PCI’s. OPT participants express not only readiness but an urgency to engage in political and social action to improve the living conditions in which OPT’s currently endure.

B1: How do Dialogue Models Affect Dialogue Processes between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Dialogue Participants?

Answering this question requires a comparative analysis of the contents of quotations from dialogue participants within the models represented within the primary reports. However, the results of such a comparative analysis in this specific study may not be particularly reliable due to the ‘over-representation’ of ‘mixed model’ dialogue model participant quotations (specifically Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace) compared to the other six dialogue models represented within the primary reports. Furthermore, because this question inquires about the processes between IJ and Palestinian Arab
dialogue participants, the most useful data for answering this question would be those quotations recorded ‘before’ and ‘during’ dialogue processes. As demonstrated by Table 2 below, ‘before’ dialogue process quotations are largely absent from the primary reports and chiefly represented by the ‘mixed’ model studies in the primary reports. The ‘during’ quotations appear more often within the ‘confrontational’ dialogue model primary reports than the other primary reports.

Table 2

*Distribution of Coded Quotations: Before and During Dialogue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Activist</th>
<th>Coexistence</th>
<th>Conflict Management</th>
<th>Confrontational</th>
<th>Mixed method</th>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Track 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coded Quotations Recorded Before Dialogue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coded Quotations Recorded During Dialogue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As such, a fully comprehensive analysis demonstrating how the dialogue models represented within the primary reports affect dialogue processes is not feasible.

Nevertheless, due to the higher number of coded quotations represented within the primary reports that feature coexistence, confrontational, and mixed model dialogue approaches, what this data can yield are general observations regarding the nature of the contents of participant quotations within the coexistence, confrontational, and mixed method models. These observations are what is sought by the next research question. As such, those observations are presented in the next section in order to answer the next section’s research question.
B2: How do these Findings Compare to those of Hammack et al. (2014)?

As was explicated within the literature review in Chapter 2, one of the purposes of this dissertation was to gather any relevant Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue participant quotations since 1999 in order to compare them to the findings presented by Hammack et al. (2014). To reiterate, Hammack et al. set out to address the ‘dearth’ of research related to the meaning-making processes of participants in intergroup dialogue building programs especially in regions of intractable conflict (p. 296). The study Hammack et al. devised and executed resulted in qualitative and quantitative data that shed light on the “interaction of nationality and contact paradigm on the experience of contact . . . [and to see] whether the experience for certain national groups changes as a function of the contact paradigm employed” (p. 297). Among the more salient findings in relation to this current dissertation presented by Hammack et al. (2014) were the following:

- “(participants’) diary entries in the [confrontational model] condition were more likely to contain entries reflective of negative psychological experience (e.g. confusion, frustration, and fear/anxiety) than diary entries in the [coexistence model] condition” (p. 312);
- “participants in a [confrontational] condition of dialogue reported lower levels of self-consistency and higher levels of intergroup differentiation over time, suggesting the effectiveness of this approach to initiate a process of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness” (p. 296); and
- the confrontational model of dialogue was more likely to be associated with “higher levels of empowerment and positive mood throughout contact”
especially for Palestinian participants, which suggests an “effectiveness of
[the confrontational] approach to challenge power asymmetries and its
positivity for the low-status group” (p. 296).

As such, what follows here is a brief presentation of the most meaningful and
representative data from the primary reports that feature quotations from participants
within the confrontational and coexistence dialogue models. In order to avoid duplicity of
data in this section, I have excluded Pilecki and Hammack (2014) because this primary
report is based on the same data as Hammack et al. (2014). Because the mixed model
Seeds of Peace/Hands of Peace studies do not sufficiently differentiate between ‘during’
quotations recorded within ‘confrontational’ sessions versus ‘coexistence’ sessions, they
too are excluded from this section.

**The confrontational model’s likeliness to provoke negative psychological
experiences.** Numerous quotations recorded during confrontational model dialogue were
located within the primary reports that point to negative psychological experiences. Most
of these speakers refer to the unpleasant feelings they experienced when engaged in
dialogue due to a variety of reasons. Examples are presented here first from IJ
participants followed by one PCI participant quotation.

IJ participants during binational talks refer to frustration felt because of intergroup
disagreement over the meaning of the Holocaust in comparison to the Al Nakhba.

[IJ, during binational] You [speaker A] really hurt me. It hurts that you agreed
with her [PCI participant] and you feel ashamed. Because it is not the same as
they (the Nazis) did to us. You were a soldier in the Occupied Territories, and I
was not. But I have relatives that are Holocaust survivors and I can’t listen to
things like this. This comparison hurts me [female, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 332)

IJ participants also express fear over a perceived threat of violence from Palestinian Arab participants.

[IJ, during binational] I want to say that I do not intend to sit in the same room with people who justify attacks on civilians, in no situation does that seem to me something that I have to do [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

Within uninational dialogue settings, IJ participants openly express their negative feelings related to guilt, shame, anger, fear, and confusion.

[IJ, during uninational] What frustrates me the most at this workshop is that I came here knowing exactly what I want, and what is good for them, and with each meeting that passes I leave the workshop agreeing less with them. Not because of the ideas they present, but because of how they present it. And I am angrier with myself than I am with them. Sometimes I'm angry with myself because I don't have the courage to say: This and this is important to me. Right, it might sound primitive; maybe I sound like some hawkish representative. But it's important to me. Why can't I say so? That's the feeling I have at this workshop. Now I can say that I am afraid of what will happen, of the idea that the conflict will not end with the establishment of a Palestinian state: I told my family this at home and they said, 'So what's new?' [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949)

[IJ, during uninational] You are really confusing me here . . . It’s very dangerous to be a Jew. I don’t know, it seems self-evident, kind of axiomatic . . . that it’s
dangerous, that we have been and will continue to be victims if we don’t watch out for ourselves . . . We don’t want to conquer anybody . . . We do everything to protect our existence as a Jewish people [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 51)

[IJ, during uninational] From the start, really from the first meeting, they said, “We are Palestinians” and to me it felt subversive . . . I said how could [you] be Palestinian. Palestinians are at war with us . . . When they said “Palestinian,” I heard “terrorist” [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

[IJ, during uninational] [Israel] won’t belong to the Jews, it will belong to some other people too. . . . How would a binational state look, one where Arabs also rule and there are Arab cultural symbols here? . . . For me, it really makes me despair [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 53)

[IJ, during uninational] This makes us awfully frustrated because we were attacked at the beginning, and our feelings were not given legitimacy. And we felt terribly guilty. And that’s what we kept feeling, and in the end we had no way to fix the situation. We were blamed and our hands were tied [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)

[IJ, during uninational] I feel like there is some kind of feeling that what is hard is to be within this experience and this process of internalizing. That is, there are two possible responses: either to say it is really us, we are the murderers . . . And the other response is that it isn’t us at all, and they are awful and terrible and like that [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
The threat defines for you who you are. This is comfortable to some extent, and when you take it away, you don’t know what to do . . . Something else has to be put together instead, and that’s hard. You have to start over and create new values and beliefs [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 57)

In quotations recorded after intergroup dialogue, IJ participants continue to discuss the negative feelings experienced while in dialogue and how they tried to reconcile those feelings.

Frustration is a powerful feeling. I would say, I don’t know what to call this—pangs of conscience? Thinking about this as you get into bed and it’s on your mind . . . and why are things this way? And how should things have been different? And we’re not such innocent, good . . . Like, it’s uncomfortable, like it was more comfortable to be in that place of, like, everything is sort of clear [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 55)

It’s not pleasant to feel inferior, when they [Palestinians] are analyzing you, overall it really gives a feeling of being less. It sounds funny but I felt that my life was threatened during those segments. I mean, it connects with the feeling from before, the threat of their wanting to kill me . . . as if showing me the outside, that if they are so strong, they will start a war and kill us [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

Negative feelings in confrontational settings were not unique to only IJ participants. This one quotation from a PCI participant indicates felt anger during a binational dialogue session.
[PCI, during binational] It outrages me that you say that human life is not
cherished by us. . . You are wrong when you say that among us (the Arabs) the
value of human life is inferior to you (the Jews) [female, university student].
(Helman, 2002, p. 341)

Though these quotations come primarily from IJ participants and only one from a
Palestinian Arab participant, there appears to be adequate examples within the primary
reports demonstrating that dialogue participants within the confrontational model
experience negative psychological experiences. However, there can be no conclusive
statement on the comparative relationship to the coexistence model because there exists
little to nothing in the coexistence model primary reports that indicate negative
psychological experiences among participants. A lack of evidence in these reports does
not necessarily mean coexistence model participants do not have such experiences.
Nevertheless, the data clearly contains numerous examples of participants in the
confrontational model having negative psychological experiences.

The confrontational model’s effectiveness in initiating self-reflection and
intergroup distinctiveness. Numerous quotations recorded before and after
confrontational model dialogue refer to the two dimensions of ‘self-reflection’ and
‘intergroup distinctiveness.’ The following four quotations are attributed to PCI
participants and are presented in order relative to dialogue process stage. The first PCI
quotation acknowledges intergroup differences but suggests that comparing cultural
differences is a fruitless endeavor.

[PCI, during binational] Each of us wants to defend his own culture, so we should
not compare, and in addition we cannot generalize from a few cases [of women’s
killings] to the value we grant to human life [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 342)

This PCI participant quotation suggests that further intergroup distinctiveness will be possible once a two-state solution is realized.

[PCI, during binational] I think that once there is a Palestinian state, it will be easier for us to define ourselves as Palestinians living in Israel [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 947)

This brief statement from a PCI participant indicates meaningful self-reflection has occurred as a result of dialogue participation.

[PCI, during late stage binational] Maybe I have learned to listen at the workshop [male, university student]. (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 952)

This ‘post’ dialogue statement points to a strong opinion regarding the maintenance of Palestinian Arab cultural distinctiveness no matter how it differs from secular Israeli culture.

[PCI, after dialogue] I’m not in favor of assimilating . . . I know that the Arab boys were influenced. I saw that with my own eyes, how they behaved with the Jewish girls. I got angry and told some of them off, and they kept quiet and didn’t know what to say to me [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 66)

IJ participant quotations contain examples of penetrating questions to get to the core of understanding intergroup distinctions between themselves and Palestinian Arabs. The following quotations demonstrate this process in relation to PCI identity, hypothetical historical reciprocity, and religion.
[IJ, during binational] No, I am quite listening to what she is saying, that she has a principle that she is not at all interested in this [Israeli] state. That is, it is a state that conquered her, and in no way is she willing to contribute to it, right? (to PCI participant) because you don’t acknowledge the state as legitimate, this is what you are saying? [female, university student]. (Maoz, 2001, p. 202)

[IJ, during binational] What would have happened to us [the Jews] if in 1948 an Arab state would have been established here? What would have happened if we were the minority and you the majority? [male, university student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 331)

[IJ, during binational] I would like to know how the Koran conceives of the relations between different peoples because I don’t know much about it. The reason I am asking is because you said that under Moslem rule, the Jews were not discriminated against, they got fair treatment [male, college student]. (Helman, 2002, p. 333)

The following written reflections from IJ participants demonstrate how the confrontational model can instill opportunities for self-reflection.

(IJ, written, during binational) Members of the Arab group presented a difficult picture and agreeing to see myself in that mirror was painful . . . as part of the Jewish people would prefer not to see, and to a great extent before these meetings I actually did not see [ . . . ] So the option of taking even more extreme positions was abandoned by me and I was left with the not simple choice of attempting to show empathy and identify insofar as possible [diary entry] [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)
[IJ, written, during binational] Will my Jewish identity and my physical existence be preserved if I stop fighting? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 57)

The IJ uninational sessions also provided opportunities for IJ participants to share their inner dialogue with other group members.

[IJ, during uninational] And here let’s say I feel that way. I have never felt more Jewish and Israeli than I do in this group. And really, most of the things I think here are tied to that [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 56)

Further ‘post’ dialogue quotations from IJ participants provide examples of how self-reflection can lead IJ participants to draw new conclusions regarding the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

[IJ, after dialogue] Today I am ready to hear because I see that this does not hold up against that. As soon as you take . . . all kinds of guilt, it’s a lot harder for you to keep on justifying your place. But I think that on the individual level, this is some kind of growing up, that you know that you can be guilty, not perfect, and still you can stick to your position, or give some different shades to your position. But that doesn’t mean that your whole position breaks down . . . that the Jewish people had done bad things to the Palestinian people doesn’t necessary mean that there is no justification to my existence here [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 59)

[IJ, after dialogue] I discovered that, on the one hand, I am very ready to give up the things connected with my identity, symbols, the desire that this connection between the state and the people, that this state is only mine. Before that, it was
very clear to me that this state is mine and only mine and something here moved a little [male, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)

[IJ, after dialogue] Now their culture does not seem as different from ours. I mean they are basically students like we are, and we all take exams. Before, I thought it was this culture like the Bedouin. What stands out more for me is the situation they are in as opposed to the situation we are in, and not the cultural markers, but that they are in a situation of the minority, of occupation, of a very hard daily reality [female, adult]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 58)

Quotations that indicate processes of intergroup distinctiveness also occur within coexistence dialogue models. However, the examples presented here are few because the primary reports for this study include only one article that focuses on the coexistence model (besides that of Pilecki & Hammack, 2014). The following quotation from an IJ participant refers to certain ‘concerns’ the speaker is experiencing regarding the position of PCI’s in a hypothetical future Palestinian state. The speaker’s quotation may indicate uncertainty about how to make a clear intergroup distinction between herself and Palestinian citizens of Israel.

[IJ, during binational] [T]here’s there’s a double voice meaning also the citizens of the country of Israel and also the citizens of the country of Palestine that . . . not citizens, not you but also in the name of the citizens of the country of Palestine that will arise, and also as part of the Palestinian nation and this, meaning . . . we (always) talked about different kinds of meaning in your different kinds of voices. Am I, like, making myself clear? [female, adult]. (Bekerman, 2009, p. 212-213)
The following IJ quotation suggests a resistance to the idea of a two state solution by emphasizing how PCI’s should be a bit ‘less’ distinct in their identity as Israeli citizens.

[IJ, during binational] If this country is worthwhile, for you and for us, so surely you’ll have to relinquish, or I don’t know, it changes . . . culture changes, like the . . . even the ultra-orthodox [Jews] that they are part, that they would like to be only ultra-orthodox and to insolate [sic] themselves, and that their Judaism will be observed, the living besides um: beside something else, the shared life changes them, and they do relinquish some of their traits [gender unclear, adult].

(Bekerman, 2009, p. 215)

The next two quotations suggest borders to the process of intergroup distinctiveness within the coexistence model. The first quotation from an Ashkenazi IJ participant refers to the friction she feels when in the presence of Sephardic-Arabs (Jews of Middle Eastern ethnic descent).

[IJ, during binational] I want to tell you something, just a second, just a second. I go to a [Sephardic-Arab] home I feel different from when I go into an Ashkenazi home I feel estranged [in the Sephardic-Arab home]... [female, adult]. (Bekerman, 2009, p. 215)

Yet moments later, a PCI participant abandoned this potential opening to find commonalities between Palestinian Arabs and Sephardic-Arab Jews through this statement: “But in the end you are all Jews [PCI, during binational, gender unclear, adult]” (Bekerman, 2009, p. 216).

What these quotations seem to indicate is that the processes of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness can occur in both coexistence and confrontational models, but
the processes differ between IJ and PCI participants. PCI participant quotations indicate that these participants are compelled to both defend the practice of certain cultural traditions and subsequently downplay the significance of those same traditions in order to maintain positive interactions (or even ‘save face’) with IJ participants. PCI participant quotations also indicate that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will substantially aid PCI processes of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness. IJ participant quotations indicate that these participants enter dialogue with the intent of compelling PCI participants to reflect and distinguish themselves as citizens of Israel; however, as dialogue progresses, IJ participant quotations suggest that these same IJ participants are then themselves compelled to reflect on their own identities and the definition of the Israeli nation itself.

The confrontational model’s effectiveness in empowering Palestinian Arab participants and promoting positive feelings. Numerous quotations from PCI participants indicate that confrontational dialogue settings allowed for PCI participants to make bold statements and posit challenging questions to IJ participants. The following five quotations serve as examples of this empowerment.

[PCI, during binational dialogue] No, she meant that there is something reciprocal. Let’s say that a state, let’s say like Israel, that bombards Gaza in the middle of the night, this is not called a terror attack even though everyone there relates to it as a terror attack. I definitely think that it’s not justified to hurt any side if they are innocent civilians, let’s say he blows himself up on a bus or that a state like Israel bombards [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52).
[PCI, during binational dialogue] I condemn, in every way, any form of terrorism involving killing innocent civilians . . . But I can’t ignore what is happening there in the territories and in Gaza when the Israeli army is attacking them all the time [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 52)

[PCI, during binational dialogue] Maybe the power of the Arab group here, the Palestinian group, [is] to bring things, like, to the same level, and you feel that there’s a group here that has rights . . . Maybe you have that sense of a threat [female, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

[PCI, during binational dialogue] Why do you think you’re more human? Do you feel you are more human? [male, university student]. (Sonnenschein et al., 2010, p. 54)

This fifth quotation from a male PCI participant recorded during middle stages of binational dialogue is a succinct example of Palestinian Arab empowerment: “We'll change you” (Maoz et al., 2002, p. 949).

The following quotations recorded after confrontational dialogue clearly link an increase in self-confidence to confrontational dialogue processes. The first quotation even calls for a bold statement of political activism and refers to Asil—a PCI Seeds of Peace participant who was killed by Israeli police action.

[PCI, after dialogue] I wanted to come today dressed in a map of Palestine, so that they would know that this is a message from Asil, so that they’d know that I am not giving up my religion or my nationality. It’s true that I am with you and I love you, but I am not giving up my national identity [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 65)
This encounter increased my self-confidence. Just as I stood before the Jews in that meeting, I can do it again in the future. In the past, I was not involved with these things, but this encounter encouraged me to do things like this in the future [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 64)

The encounter improved our self-confidence because, at the beginning, on the first day, we did talk, but quietly, we had no self-confidence; then on the second day we started talking louder and more nonstop. Within a day, we started to talk and to raise our voices and to argue . . . at first I would tell myself, I don’t want to raise this point, because it could cause problems; then later I saw that that was a mistake. They were saying whatever they wanted to say, why shouldn’t I? If I don’t talk, I won’t get my rights. So long as I’m afraid and I keep quiet in life, I won’t get anything [female, high school teenager]. (Halabi & Zak, 2014, p. 64)

These quotations clearly contain multiple examples of how PCI participants experience both empowerment and positive feelings as an outcome of confrontational dialogue. Nevertheless, as previous sections of this study have demonstrated, both PCI and OPT participants experience empowerment and positive feelings as an outcome of multiple other dialogue models, such as the activist, narrative, conflict management, and the Seeds of Peace mixed model. As such, though this data corroborates Hammack et al.’s (2014) finding, no conclusive statement regarding the confrontational model’s exclusive effectiveness for empowering and engendering positive feelings among Palestinian Arab participants can be made here.
Summary of findings in relation to Hammack et al.’s (2014) findings. The above quotations, all recorded and cited within research articles published before Hammack et al. (2014) and Pilecki and Hammack (2014) generally corroborate Hammack et al.’s (2014) findings. Numerous quotations from other confrontational dialogue model studies indicate that participants experience negative psychological experiences, that participants engage in processes of self-reflection and intergroup distinctiveness, and that Palestinian Arab participants feel empowered and positive during and after dialogue participation. However, these corroborations should not be considered conclusive for two reasons: a) none of the confrontational model primary studies referenced here contained quotations from Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and b) only one article referenced here focused on the processes experienced within the coexistence model. This entire analysis has focused on the distinct differences between PCI and OPT participants, so without any OPT representation, this overview cannot be considered conclusive. Furthermore, without at least a comparatively similar number of quotations to reference from coexistence model participants, any final conclusion regarding the comparative ‘effectiveness’ of dialogue processes between confrontational and coexistence models cannot be considered conclusive here.

C: What New Possibilities can this Data Offer for Intergroup Dialogue Processes in Israel-Palestine?

Many of the salient points and theories presented within the literature review in Chapter 2 can be applied to the findings thus far presented within this meta-data-analysis. Consistent with contact theory and its various amendments, numerous intergroup dialogue participants attribute significance to the power of friendship to make intergroup
dialogue processes truly productive in terms of increasing empathy, breaking down stereotypes, and willingness to engage in difficult or challenging conversations about sensitive information. Geotheological arguments were used by some participants to justify opinions or to lend credence to certain components of national narratives. Suffering and trauma were discernable within participant quotations, especially those of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, as just described above, the findings of Hammack et al. (2014) are mostly corroborated in spite of a lack of a significant number of research articles from which to draw data.

As such, the data in this meta-data-analysis offers little in the way of ‘new’ information. However, what this meta-data-analysis does offer is a clear exposure of what does not exist in current literature on Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue programs and participant experience and their research thereof. What follows is a brief overview of four possibilities for intergroup dialogue processes and research among Israeli-Palestinian intergroup dialogue programs and participants.

An integration with interreligious dialogue models. The break between interreligious dialogue models and secular models in Israel-Palestine is no accident. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Newman (2012) states, “The peace movement in Israel has emerged from secular Israeli society. The relationship between secularism and the Israeli peace movement is more than just a correlation. It represents a causal relationship as well” (p. 485). Though the inclusion criteria for the primary reports for this study would not exclude interreligious dialogue models, none of the primary reports that met the inclusion criteria for this study featured an interreligious dialogue model. It is safe to say
that secular intergroup dialogue models dominate the intergroup dialogue research field in Israel-Palestine.

However, as shown in the selected quotations of this meta-data-analysis, topics of religion and geology occur within these secular intergroup dialogue models. Whenever Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab dialogue participants face an issue related to religion or geology, they have no expert within the dialogue group to which to turn for guidance. Participants are largely left to hash out interpretations through hearsay and conjecture. As such, a new possibility for secular intergroup dialogue processes is to incorporate elements of interreligious peacebuilding for the purpose of providing expertise on matters of theology and the interpretation of religious texts. Though such an incorporation does not guarantee all dialogue participants will be satisfied, at the very least a new kind of dialogue can be generated that will enrich the overall dialogue experience.

**Fill the void of research featuring OPT participants.** OPT participants were the least represented group of participants within the primary reports for this study. The primary reason for their comparatively smaller numbers is due to the difficulty in reaching them and for them to reach dialogue sessions. Perhaps a solution to this problem is to conduct online dialogue sessions via Skype or other such video and audio platform.

**Generate more research that tracks pre, during, and post dialogue experience.** Of the 17 primary reports included in this study, only one (Hammack, 2006) included quotations that tracked the *same participant* through all three stages of pre, during, and post dialogue. Though hindsight evaluations from former intergroup dialogue participants yield valuable information regarding how participants attribute changes in
self to dialogue participation, data that tracks individuals through all three stages will yield more data regarding actual dialogue processes and changes in participant identity.

**Conduct more post-dialogue interviews as triads.** The majority of ‘post’ dialogue interviews featured in the primary reports here were largely conducted as ‘dyad’ interviews—the research study author spoke with each individual participant and recorded the participant’s answers accordingly. However, Collier (2009) interviewed post-dialogue participants as a triad: one Israeli Jew, one Palestinian Arab, and herself as the interviewer. As the example given earlier in this chapter shows, the quotations generated from these interviews yielded interesting results that provide a richer intersubjective perspective on dialogue processes. The interviewees spoke about the other in the third person while that person was present in the room. This triad structure serves to ‘triangulate’ the interview data—were one interviewee to say something that the other believed to be inaccurate, the other could respond immediately and correct the former statement. Were more post-dialogue interviews conducted as a triad, new opportunities for reflective dialogue could be generated for shedding light on dialogue processes.

**The Themes of Experience for Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab Intergroup Dialogue Participants**

Before presenting the general themes of experience and thereby answering the central research question, it is necessary for me to return to the bracketing of my personal experience, ontological paradigms, and interest in the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this point I have attempted to ‘bracket out’ these elements of myself as a researcher in order to remain open and transparent with the data. However, in order to complete the identification of the themes of experience for these intergroup dialogue
participants, I will now “reintegrate” my bracketed experiences in order to generate a more nuanced, interpretive set of themes (Gearing, 2004, p. 1434).

To reiterate: my personal identity, based on both my ancestral history and my life experiences, is multi-layered. In short, I am the descendent of German and (potentially) Jewish immigrants to the Midwest USA who within a generation converted to Protestant Christianity. I myself am a convert to the Bahá'í faith—an independent religion that has its global center in Haifa, Israel. In addition, I am married to a Syrian Arab, and have lived more than 10 years in the Middle East. Therefore, my interest in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to more than merely academics or pragmatism. I see Israel-Palestine as my spiritual home, though I have never actually visited Israel-Palestine. Furthermore, I am deeply influenced by the tenets of the Bahá'í faith that emphasize the importance of personal ‘independent search for truth’ and a prohibition on conflict and contention. With these elements of my personal identity reintegrated into the study, what follows is an overview of the themes of experience of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue participants.

IJ, PCI, and OPT participants enter dialogue carrying various forms of fear and anger. Broadly speaking, they carry:

- fear of living unfulfilled lives and
- anger for not being universally appreciated.

After unsuccessfully resolving their anger and fear, these individuals begin to:

- question their inherited social paradigms, and, by extension,
- reach the limits of their own inherited identity/ies.
As such, by entering into intergroup dialogue, these participants (to greater and lesser degrees) engage in more than just an exchange of words and ideas. They are:

- seeking truth,
- pursuing justice, and
- realizing unity.

**Fear of living unfulfilled lives.** All three groups of dialogue participants live with the fear that a tragic event could cut down their life or the lives of those dear to them at any time. Israeli Jews live with the threat of suicide bombings and are taught that Jews have been victims of history for generations. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel fear they will always be second class citizens and have been the targets of police brutality for many years. Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories have lived under military rule for decades and suffer humiliation and violence on a regular basis. Collectively, all three groups of people experience fear of not living a life of complete freedom and fulfillment.

**Anger for not being universally appreciated.** Closely related to fear is anger, and all three groups experience anger over a lack of universal appreciation. Israeli Jews carry anger towards Palestinian Arabs for not appreciating their safety and security. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel carry anger towards the Israeli government for not granting them equal status as Israeli Jews. Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories carry anger towards the Israeli government for perpetuating military rule.

**Questioning their inherited social paradigms.** Unabated anger and fear are destructive emotions, so people naturally seek means to overcome them. They seek answers to their questions about who or what is responsible for the dangerous environment in which they live. They ask questions about how the situation could
become what it has become. When inherited social structures such as governments, religions, and historical narratives fail to provide adequate answers, some are motivated to look elsewhere for answers.

**Reaching the limits of their own inherited identity/ies.** The ‘elsewhere’ they begin to look may require them to look beyond the sets of ‘truths’ they have learned from family, the media, and all the other various social systems that give their lives a semblance of order. By looking beyond the learned ‘truths,’ individuals come to realize their entire sense of self is in the balance. They realize that resolving the fear and anger requires connection with ‘the other.’

**Seeking truth.** Upon entering dialogue, all three groups instinctively believe they hold the truth while the other espouses falsehood. Upon realizing that the complete truth lies with neither side, participants must find ways to engage with the other in a manner that will lead them to the truth. Truth exists for all participants; it is a matter of them deciding to courageously search for it.

**Pursuing justice.** Closely related to the search for truth is the pursuit of justice. As difficult as this pursuit is, participants acknowledge that this active pursuit is better than resignation to anger and fear. The pain of the past is real and cannot be forgotten, but perpetual blame only allows fear and anger to return.

**Realizing unity.** Despite all the historical pain and present mistrust, dialogue participants instinctively experience the urge to engage with the other. While very few participants consciously realize the unity between and among them, there is an underlying need for all of them to be in the presence of the other. After having experienced these levels of interaction, the participants return to the original ‘inherited
world’ with, to greater and lesser degrees, a new perspective through which to operate and to engage with others struggling to overcome their anger and fear.

Limitations

The data from which this study’s findings are drawn are the outcome of dialogic processes. Such processes of facilitated dialogue have been generally assumed to be a critical means for guiding participants directly affected by or involved in intractable conflict towards peaceful and empathic relationships. The authors of the primary reports identified for this qualitative meta-data-analysis largely subscribe to this perspective of the teleological purpose of dialogue processes, despite the relative lack of understanding of what actually happens for dialogue participants. What follows in this section are two topics: a) an overview of some of the salient critiques of dialogue processes in general, and b) a description of the limitations of this study specifically. These limitations are presented for the purpose of providing readers the opportunity to evaluate this study both within the context of dialogue research in general and the parameters of this meta-data-analysis specifically.

The Limitations of Dialogue Research

Despite the data that points to the effectiveness of dialogue processes for affecting change among participants, a number of critiques regarding the theoretical bases of dialogue persist. One critique is related to the apparent incompatibility of the foundation of dialogue processes to today’s versions of dialogue models. Though the core historical root of dialogue is often attributed to Plato and the application of the Socratic Method (Dessel & Rogge, 2008), there exists a monolithic epistemological basis of Platonism: “a view of knowledge as absolute, unchanging, and humanly attainable through
A second critique of dialogue is related to the intersubjective perspectives that also underlie dialogue processes. Dialogue processes based on intersubjective theories such as those of Martin Buber tend to emphasize the importance of ‘dialogic moments’ whereby new understandings and empathic concern for the other is achieved within a space created by the meeting of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ (Buber, as cited in Steinberg, 2004). This intersubjective stance is problematic for two reasons: it stands in sharp contrast to the absolutist stance upon which Platonism is based (Burbules, 2000), and recent studies indicate that empathic concern for the other can result in unexpected negative outcomes such as defensiveness, denial, and conflict avoidance (Stephan & Finlay, as cited in Steinberg, 2004). These epistemological inconsistencies and undesirable outcomes of empathic concern represent potential challenges to the long-term reliability of discourse and dialogue.

A third critique of dialogue processes is related to the perceived ‘separateness’ of dialogue experience from the reality of the participant’s macro social worlds. As explicated by Burbules (2000), dialogue is frequently perceived as a “momentary engagement... situated against the background of previous relations involving them and the relation of what they are speaking today to the history of those words spoken before them” (p. 263). In reality dialogic encounters are a continuation of a dialogue that will also continue beyond the interactions of the facilitated encounter. Burbules suggests that
dialogue encounters do not have a “unitary, goal-oriented . . . beginning, middle, and end” (p. 263), but rather are part of a conversational continuum and need to be described and conceived by practitioners and scholars as such.

**Uncertainty of an Exhaustive Search**

Paterson et al. (2001) state that the likelihood of finding every single potential primary report that could be included within a meta-study is slim. These authors relate their own experience in conducting meta-studies whereby at the conclusion of a study they are ‘surprised’ to find how many articles were missed that could have been included (p. 35). As such, there is an excellent chance that I did not find all the studies that could have been included in this meta-study according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria I developed.

**Loss of Context**

Paterson et al. (as cited in Timulak, 2009) suggest that because qualitative meta-analysts usually do not have direct access to the data of studies being synthesized, qualitative meta-analyses could fail to present the contextual background from which the data was originally collected. This loss of context could result in an analysis too heavily based on ‘description’ rather than ‘interpretation.’ In the case of this particular study I have tried to maintain a balance between description and interpretation by coding as much of the contextual data as possible (participant identities, structure of the dialogue, intersubjective communication). If this meta-data-analysis becomes part of a larger meta-study, this issue of balance between description and interpretation would likely be resolved more satisfactorily.
Furthermore, because I as a meta-data-analyst do not have access to the primary reports’ authors’ full data set of quotations and observations, the report produced here is potentially of limited value. Meta-studies are only as good as the data provided by the original authors and the quality of the original studies. My utilization of the ‘primary report appraisal tool’ was intended to flesh out the highest quality studies to ensure that the data within would best represent the actual state of intergroup dialogue in Israeli-Palestine today.

**Exclusion of Meaningful Data**

One of the significant challenges I experienced while selecting meaningful and representative data for the final analysis was deciding how to handle quotations that were significantly different in their structure, content, or some other characteristic. Two such sets of quotations were excluded from the final analysis: specific intergroup dialogue quotations recorded by Maddy-Weitzman (2005) and Lazarus (2011) and quotations containing references to social ‘re-entry.’ The details and justifications for these specific quotations are provided below.

Maddy-Weitzman (2005) recorded IJ and PCI Seeds of Peace participant quotations before they engaged in binational dialogue during the early stages of the second intifada. These quotations have meaningful content and the timeframe as ‘pre’ made them rare and potentially valuable for providing insight on dialogue processes. However, the timeframe of the dialogue itself was unique among all the other intergroup dialogue structures among the primary reports because it featured participants who had already engaged in dialogue a few months earlier. These quotations were the only ones of their kind that contained ‘expectations’ and ‘motivations’ for engaging in dialogue after
having already engaged with the same intergroup participants. As such, I was unable to properly code the time frame of the quotations. They were not ‘pre’ dialogue because, unlike the other quotations coded ‘pre,’ these participants had already engaged in lengthy dialogue sessions and were already very familiar with each other. Similarly, they were not ‘post’ because the quotations referred to dialogue that was yet to come.

Another set of quotations that I excluded from the final analysis were recorded by Lazarus (2011). These quotations were also attributed to IJ, PCI, and OPT Seeds of Peace participants who had been engaged in numerous dialogue sessions over a span of many months and, in some cases, years. Lazarus devotes a considerable portion of his dissertation to an analysis of the experience of IJ Seeds of Peace participants who later joined the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Numerous quotations are included from IJ, PCI, and OPT participants regarding their perspectives on Seeds of Peace members who simultaneously perform duties for the IDF. Though these quotations were quite meaningful, they were the only quotations of this kind that contained these kinds of references among the primary studies.

Finally, because the research questions of this meta-data-analysis focused on dialogue processes and the effects of dialogue models on said processes, I excluded participant quotations that contained references to the process of ‘social re-entry’ after engaging in dialogue. I also excluded quotations that contained descriptions of how family members and friends responded to the dialogue participant after returning from the dialogue program. Though this topic of social re-entry is quite meaningful and revealing, they fell outside the parameters of the research questions and were thus excluded from the final analysis.
**Recommendations**

As described in previous chapters, I utilized an intersubjective coding scheme for all the quotations that were recorded within or during dialogue sessions. The intention of using these intersubjective schemes was to identify any interesting or revealing association between or among the other coded categories in relation to the intersubjective codes. For example, I had assumed I would be able to find a relationship between ‘first person singular’ quotations and participant identity. However, after searching for meaningful, interesting, or unexpected associations between and among the codes, I was unable to find anything conclusively worthy of reporting.

Having completed the data-analysis process, if the data were to be re-analyzed, I would recommend a different coding scheme than the intersubjective scheme I utilized. Because the intergroup dialogue participant quotations contain considerable references to the role of identity and how identities change before, during, and after dialogue processes, I would recommend a coding scheme based on Glaser and Strauss’ six dimensions of status passage (1967):

1. is the passage scheduled or non-scheduled?
2. is the passage institutionally-prescribed or not?
3. is the passage regulated or unregulated?
4. is the passage desirable or undesirable?
5. is the passage inevitable or not?
6. does the passage exhibit clear or ambiguous transitional phases? (p. 85-87)

The six dimensions of status passage could be utilized to develop a coding scheme that would place intergroup participant quotations within a variety of descriptors.
to indicate the type of identity change the participant is experiencing. For example, an IJ participant who is a Seeds of Peace participant who wants to join the IDF is going through an identity change. Quotations related to his experience of that change could be coded accordingly: the passage is scheduled, institutionally-prescribed, and regulated; but the degree to which the passage is desirable and inevitable and whether or not it exhibits clear transitional phases could only be determined by the quotation and the quotation’s context. A coding scheme of this kind would shift the focus of the data analysis away from ‘communicative grammar’ and more towards ‘identity within multiple systems;’ plus, a coding scheme of this kind would allow a full integration of the quotations I purposefully excluded from the final analysis.

**Future Research**

As mentioned previously, this meta-data-analysis was developed and executed with the intention of it being the first step of a qualitative meta-study. If such a meta-study were to be conducted in the near future, further research questions would need to be added to the ones already addressed in this study. What follows here is a brief overview of the additional steps of the meta-study and the research questions that would guide those steps.

**Meta-Method**

As described in detail in Chapter 3, the second stage of qualitative meta-study is meta-method, whereby the ‘epistemological soundness’ of the primary reports is analyzed in order to ascertain how “the methodological applications may have influenced the findings that are generated” (Paterson et al., 2001, p. 71). The focus in this step is on the actual data collection and research design of each of the primary studies. As such, a
general research question that would guide this process is: What influence do researchers’ methodological frameworks have on findings of these primary reports? The 17 primary reports identified for this meta-data-analysis feature a variety of different research methodologies such as participant observation, qualitative interviews, transcript analysis, and more. Clearly this stage of the process would require extensive analysis to ascertain the degrees to which each author’s epistemological stance influenced the generation of the original data.

**Meta-Theory**

The third stage of qualitative meta-study is meta-theory, defined by Neufeld (as cited in Paterson et al., 2001) as “a critical exploration of the theoretical frameworks or lenses that have provided direction to research and to researchers, as well as the theory that has arisen from research in a particular field of study” (p. 91). Where meta-method focuses on the methodology in which the data was collected, meta-theory focuses on the frameworks within which that data was analyzed. A general research question that would guide this step is: What influence do researchers’ theoretical assumptions have on the findings of these primary reports? The primary reports utilized in this meta-data-analysis feature a range of theoretical orientations including social identity theory, social unconscious theory, postcolonial theory, and contact theory. This stage of the process would likely be comparatively less intensive than the meta-method stage because of the relatively smaller range of different theoretical frameworks represented within the primary reports.
Potential Contributions to the Fields of Conflict Resolution and Peace Education

In Chapter 4, four areas for future Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue process research and practice were presented based on a perceived shortage of research in these areas. These areas are: a purposeful integration of secular and interreligious dialogue processes; an intensified effort on recruiting and engaging Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories as dialogue participants; the generation of research that tracks participants through pre, during, and post dialogue experiences; and the utilization of triads for post-dialogue interviews with participants. What follows here are explications of two further areas of potential research that this dissertation could serve as a catalyst towards achieving within the fields of conflict resolution and peace education.

Expanding the Research into a Diversity of Dialogue Models

Among the 17 primary reports from which the data was drawn for this meta-data-analysis, more than half of the reports focused on either the Confrontational Model or the Seeds of Peace mixed model. In terms of the type of research conducted on these models, the Seeds of Peace model has been the subject of at least three Ph.D. dissertations since 1999—totaling nearly 1000 pages of research. Though this research is invaluable for understanding the role these dialogue models play in the pursuit of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, numerous other dialogue models have been developed and executed in Israel-Palestine and have been comparatively far less researched and documented than the Confrontational Model and the Seeds of Peace mixed model. This dissertation highlights this incongruity, and serves as justification for expanding research
into the execution and development of other models, especially narrative, activist, and conflict management models.

**Developing Systems for Matching Participants with Dialogue Models**

If the recommendation above regarding the expansion of research into a greater variety of dialogue models is taken seriously, then the knowledge gleaned from such research would allow for a better matching of individual participant characteristics with the most suitable dialogue model. The data presented within this dissertation shows that Israeli Jews, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, and Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories exhibit a diversity of individual differences in terms of political opinions, epistemological ideologies, religious observance, and personality types. At present, dialogue models tend to focus primarily on participants’ identification as Israeli Jewish or Palestinian Arab. If greater attention is devoted to the individual differences within these two broad categories of participants, criteria for establishing the suitability of certain dialogue models and processes for particular individuals could then be generated. Such criteria could serve the purpose of ensuring individual participants are placed within a model of dialogue that best serves their particular interests, personality, and perspectives and, subsequently, increases the chances that genuine friendships would result as a dialogue outcome. Such cross-group friendships, as the data in this dissertation corroborates, are one of the greatest factors that make possible the hope of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Dissemination of Research Findings**

The strength of this meta-data-analysis is not the ‘new’ insight it provides—actually very little of the findings represent anything ‘new’ in that the findings largely
corroborate previous research in the field and are consistent with theories and concepts presented within the literature review. Instead, the strength of this meta-data-analysis lies in what it reveals for potential ‘growth areas’ within the field of intergroup dialogue research and practice, especially within Israel-Palestine. Under-represented dialogue participants (especially Palestinian Arabs in the Occupied Territories), interreligious dialogue models, and triad interview structures are three potential growth areas for both practice and research. Furthermore, the overarching themes of experience could represent a framework that offers a teleological perspective on intergroup dialogue outcomes.

In light of these strengths, future dissemination of these findings can come in a variety of relevant forms. The most salient points can be summarized and published as an editorial response to criticisms of dialogue programs in Israel-Palestine and thereby serving to advocate for continued support for peace educators and dialogue facilitators. The themes of experience revealed by the data serve as reminders of the universal struggle for recognition and respect within one’s identities—both those chosen and those socially appropriated. As such, these findings are salient contributions to the ongoing conversations surrounding the power of master narratives not only in Israel-Palestine but within any region of intractable conflict. Finally, because the data corroborates previous studies that point to a variety of positive outcomes from intergroup dialogue interactions, the results of this meta-data-analysis can serve as a reminder that dialogue can spur positive systemic and structural changes even within environments characterized by less complex episodes of conflict and disagreement.
Conclusions

Hammack (2006) mentions in the conclusion of his Ph.D. dissertation that the process of helping Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs move beyond their present competing identities, which renders them stuck between irreconcilable narratives, requires “a revolution in the narrative stalemate” (p. 441). Hammack’s criticism throughout his dissertation was that programs that attempt to instill a new ‘third’ identity in the hearts and minds of young Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs cannot fully succeed because these youths need to be “guided by some existing ideology in order to forge a revolution” (p. 441). In other words, Hammack suggests that programs like Seeds of Peace, Sadaka Reut, and Peace Child Israel that strive to provide young participants a purpose, drive, or identity that extends beyond their inherited cultural and social frameworks can only go so far. These dialogue programs do not necessarily represent an ideology that can bring about peace; they are extensions of extant ideologies that have allowed (or created) an environment to develop that encourages the conflict to continue. As such, sustainable peace in Israel-Palestine can only happen through “the demise of that social structure [that relies] on the structural conditions of conflict” (p. 442).

As the themes of experience of Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab intergroup dialogue suggest, and in harmony with Hammack’s (2006) observations above, the conflict between these two peoples is (at least in part if not primarily) the outcome of social structures that hinder the seeking of truth, the pursuit of justice, and the realization of unity. Though the specific details of the history of the conflict are unique, the general lessons from it are universal: when people cannot be free of fear and anger, the system within which that fear and anger is generated will gradually lose relevance until it is
replaced entirely. The nature and structure of that new system is not something anyone can define but Israelis and Palestinians themselves; nevertheless, the process is one that must be supported locally, regionally, and internationally. Until that time comes, the data presented here clearly shows that despite current limitations on the overall understanding of the processes of intergroup dialogue programs and models, their very existence allows individual Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs who have begun to question and doubt the capacities of their current social systems to bring peace the opportunity to seek solutions in partnership with ‘the other.’
References

References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the meta-analysis.


doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15325020802540462


Harris, I. (2002). Conceptual underpinning of peace education. In G. Salomon & B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education: The concept, principles, and practices around the world* [Kindle version] (Ch. 2). Retrieved from Amazon.com


doi:10.1080/10702890213971


doi:10.1080/1350463042000227362


doi:10.1080/13537113.2012.734179


Salomon, G. (2002). The nature of peace education: Not all programs are created equal. In G. Salomon & B. Nevo (Eds.), *Peace education: The concept, principles, and practices around the world* [Kindle version] (Ch. 1). Retrieved from Amazon.com


Appendix A: Example of the Utilization of the Modified Primary Report Appraisal Tool

**Document: 26**


**Name, Location, Emphasis of Peace Ed. / Dialogue Program:** Seeds of Peace

**Major Construct/Theory Investigated (if applicable):** long-term impact of peace program participation on life experience and choices; role of macro environment on micro decisions; under what conditions do participants engage in peacebuilding post dialogue program participation.

**Genre of Study (e.g., grounded theory, phenomenology, narrative analysis):** mixed method case study

(*Note: If stated genre does not appear to match the research design, elaborate on the lack of fit.):*

**Nature of Sample:** FOCUS IN THIS APPRAISAL IS ON QUALITATIVE COMPONENT ONLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number: 200+ Seeds of Peace graduates</th>
<th>Economic status: not stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ages: 21-30</td>
<td>Mean ages: not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of men: not stated</td>
<td>Number of women: not stated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National / Ethnic / Religious identification of sample: Israeli Jew; OPT; PCI</td>
<td>Years data collected: 2006-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of sample: high school and college</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other characteristics: Interview data focuses on the ‘meanings of program impact’, and what is the relationship between those meanings and membership in Seeds of Peace. EXTENSIVE data sources, coming in multiple forms, over a span of ten years.

**General Description of Research Approach:** qualitative component follows a grounded theory approach; ‘backward mapping’

**Major Findings:** most alumni involved in peacebuilding activities during high school; military involvement discouraged peacebuilding involvement; about 20% of alumni continued involvement in peacebuilding as adults; and long-term commitments to peacebuilding strongly related to post program follow up.

Meaningful "follow-up" events are a necessity for successful intergroup dialogue outcomes.

**Research Design:**
1. Problem statement
   a. Statement of the phenomenon leads directly to the purpose of the study and the research question (Y or N)

2. Purpose of the research
   a. Clearly expressed? (Y or N):  
   b. Significance of research problem clearly indicated? (Y or N)

3. Research questions
   a. Explicitly expressed? (Y or N):  

4. Evidence of flow from the phenomenon? (Y or N)

5. Identification of assumptions, preconceptions, presuppositions of researcher? (Y N n/a)

6. Identification of theoretical framework? (Y or N)
   a. If yes, name framework (if it is not well-known, include a description):
      Based on theoretical principles from Pearson d’Estree, Ross and Spurk.
      i. concrete, measurable criteria of assessment is complex but possible and essential.
      ii. pluralism in assessment approaches to measure peacebuilding activity
      iii. measured outcomes must be realistically achievable as a result of peacebuilding activity
iv. Assessment must be long-term

7. Clarification of influence of theoretical framework? (☐ Y ☐ N ☐ n/a)

8. Researcher credentials
   a. Documentation of researcher’s discipline? (☐ Y ☐ N)
      i. If yes, name it: International Relations
   b. Any other pertinent information about the researcher (e.g. methodological preference, conceptual preference)?
   c. Name(s) of persons acknowledged by the author(s): Chair: Mohammed Abu-Nimer; Susan Shepler, Anthony Wanis St.- John, Herbert Kelman, Susan Allen Nan, Peter Weinberger, and the late Dan Bar-On; Emile Bruneau, Michelle Gawerc, Maia Hallward, Phillip Hammack, Sonja Arsham Kuftinec, Edie Maddy-Weitzman, and Ahsiya Posner; Bob Bordone, Ron Fisher, Louis Goodman, Susan Hackley, Scott Lasensky, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, David Matz, Bob Mnookin, Fathali Moghadam, Stephen Silvia and Craig Zelizer; Shai Fuxman, Michelle Gawerc, and Karen Ross

9. Role of researcher
   a. Nonresearch relationship of researcher to participants (e.g. staff member, no previous relationship, unknown): former staff member
   b. Evidence that researcher has considered the effect of his/her presence on the research findings? (☐ Y ☐ N)
   c. Evidence that researcher has considered possibility of researcher bias or misinterpretation? (☐ Y ☐ N)

10. Sampling and participants
    a. Description of type of sampling procedure? (☐ Y ☐ N)
    b. Identification of inclusion criteria? (☐ Y ☐ N)
    c. Discussion of attrition in longitudinal studies? (☐ Y ☐ N ☐ n/a)

11. Data gathering strategy(ies)
    a. Clear description of data gathering procedures? (☐ Y ☐ N)
       i. If no, how could the description be improved?:
    b. Description of gaining access? (☐ Y ☐ N)
    c. Discussion of time frame of data gathering? (☐ Y ☐ N)
    d. Data analysis strategies
       i. Description of the method(s) used? (☐ Y ☐ N)
       ii. Identification of categories or common elements found? (☐ Y ☐ N)
       iii. Report of the participants’ response to the analysis? (☐ Y ☐ N)
       iv. Data analysis presented in a clear framework (identification of central themes and categories)? (☐ Y ☐ N)
v. Data presented in such a way that relationships between categories/themes are clear? (Y or N)
vi. Analysis well supported by representative quotes/findings? (Y or N)

vii. Provision of evidence as to how representative in the sample the various findings were? (Y or N)

12. Conclusions, discussion, implications, suggestions for further study
   a. Identification of limitations of study? (Y or N)
   b. Specific limitations identified: attitudinal change as our primary “indicator” of impact;
   c. Discussion pertains to all significant findings? (Y or N)
   d. Interpretive statements correspond with findings? (Y or N)
   e. Examination of findings with existing body of knowledge? (Y or N)
   f. Clear indication of directives for future research? (Y or N)
   g. If yes, indicate directives identified: A comparison of program content between this case and the peace education programs cited in Salomon’s study

Other considerations/thoughts:

Decision to include in meta-study: (Y N Undecided) (explain below):

+ This Primary Research Appraisal Tool was modified from the original tool as presented on pages 135-139 in

## Appendix B: Overview of Selected Primary Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Author(s) (Publication Year); Publication Type</th>
<th>Date of Data Collection</th>
<th>Dialogue model/Name of Program</th>
<th>Major Findings (Take-Home Message)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maoz, I. (2000); journal article</td>
<td>spring 1998</td>
<td>Transformative Dialogue through narrative, administered by a jointly managed Israeli-Palestinian NGO: the peace education project at the IPCRI (Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information)</td>
<td>Transformative dialogue practice can help change participants' perceptions of members of the other group, but long term sustainability is uncertain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maoz, I. (2001); journal article</td>
<td>Dec. 1998 to May 1999</td>
<td>Confrontational model; college classroom, 'intercultural communication in conflict'</td>
<td>As dialogue progresses, turn taking moves towards a symmetrical balance despite starting as heavily Jewish-Israeli. Jews pose more challenging questions to Palestinians than vice versa; Palestinians did not once pose challenging questions within-group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Helman, S. (2002); journal article</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Confrontational model; intergroup workshop, not interpersonal;</td>
<td>Structural inequality can be replicated in dialogic encounters between groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Maoz, I., Steinberg, S., Bar-On, D., &amp; Fakherelddeen, M. (2002); journal article</td>
<td>Oct 1996 - June 1997</td>
<td>Confrontational model; joint activity included</td>
<td>Both intergroup empathy and friendships can be fostered within confrontational dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Maddy-Weitzman (2005); PhD dissertation</td>
<td>early to mid 1990's; 2000-2004</td>
<td>Seeds of Peace, USA - coexistence model &amp; mixed method model</td>
<td>Israeli and Palestinian adolescents are best served by a mixed method approach: confrontational and coexistence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hammack, P.L. (2006); PhD dissertation</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>Seeds of Peace, USA; Hands of Peace, Israel &amp; Palestine - coexistence model; mixed methods model</td>
<td>Youth identities are determined by the cultural context of human development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bar-On, D., Litvak-Hirsh, T., &amp; Othman, R. (2007); journal article</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>Workshop: 'Life Stories as a Means Toward Co-Existence,' utilized 'life story-telling model'</td>
<td>Jewish-Israeli students are shifting away from 'Zionist' narratives and towards 'refugeeism' narratives. When group members allow power to shift towards a symmetrical balance, space is created for participants to explore variances within national groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Publication Year(s)</td>
<td>Type of Program</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bekerman, Z. (2009); journal article</td>
<td>1998-1999</td>
<td>Dialogue/Encounter course - Sensitivity training (Narrative)</td>
<td>Intergroup encounters provide brief moments to break hegemonic national ideologies and engage in critical discourse, but those moments are difficult to maintain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Collier, M.J. (2009); journal article</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Building Bridges for Peace - human relations emphasis (relational skills) (Conflict Management)</td>
<td>Intergroup dialogue models need to incorporate contextual factors like history, politics, social hierarchies, and agency; post-dialogue relationships are rarely maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sonnenschein, N., Bekerman, Z., &amp; Horenczyk, G. (2010); journal article</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
<td>Confrontational model</td>
<td>Israeli-Jewish participants experience/perceive four categories of threat: “permanent existential threat; realistic threat from Palestinians, threat to Jewish hegemony in Israel, and threat to moral worth of (Jewish) national identity” (p.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kellen, D., Bekerman, Z., &amp; Maoz, I. (2012); journal article</td>
<td>Summer 2006</td>
<td>Track two workshop focused on two-state solution</td>
<td>A superordinate ‘peacenik’ identity leaves participants less able to represent the claims of their respective national groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hager, T., &amp; Mazali, R. (2013); journal article</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>Activist Model and Autoethnographic mapping - tool utilized within university dialogue facilitation course</td>
<td>Autoethnographic mapping creates a space that allows meaningful exchange and solidarity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ross, K. (2013); PhD dissertation</td>
<td>Aug 2010 - April 2011</td>
<td>Sadaka Reut (extended communal living, social and political activism focus) (Activist model); Peace Child Israel (apolitical, theater and role play based) (Narrative)</td>
<td>The conceptual and intentional focus of a dialogue program can influence participants’ beliefs in different ways especially in regards to group narratives related to Israel’s definition as a state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Halabi, R., &amp; Zak, M. (2014); journal article</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>School for Peace - Confrontational Model</td>
<td>Short-term dialogue encounters do little to change underlying perceptions of national and social identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pilecki, A., &amp; Hammack, P.L. (2014); journal article</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>Two groups: Confrontational model; Coexistence model</td>
<td>Neither confrontational nor coexistence models led participants away from polarized historical narratives about the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>