Virulent Ethnocentrism and Conflict Intractability: Puzzles and Challenges for 3rd Party Intervenors

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Virulent Ethnocentrism and Conflict Intractability: Puzzles and Challenges for 3rd Party Intervenors

Abstract

This article addresses complex identity-based conflicts, such as those associated with the ending of the Cold War (e.g., Bosnia). It suggests that in many identity-based conflicts, historical memories of outrage and victimhood ("chosen traumas") have persevered across centuries, thereby keeping the conflicting parties "in history." The paper examines the role of virulent ethnocentrism in such intractable conflicts. It also examines the role of "nature" and "nurture" in embedding the universal tendency for humans to divide their species into "them" and "us" within a highly charged emotional context. The paper argues that the complexity of these conflicts has at least four dimensions which challenge the skills and good intentions of third parties: 1. Under stress parties' affective level (limbic brain) tends to override their cognitive level (neocortical brain), thereby enhancing the likelihood of experiencing "feeling is believing" instead of "seeing is believing." Parties may then not be susceptible to the efforts of third parties which often occur at the cognitive level. Such efforts do not necessarily "trickle down" to the affective level where "chosen traumas" are buried. 2. Third parties may have to first deal with an original, historical conflict (e.g., Turkey-Armenia, 1915) before they can deal with one of its more recent variations (Azerbaijan-Armenia, 1990s). 3. Analytically, third parties should employ comprehensive approaches to "capturing the complexity" of historically-/identity-based conflicts. Otherwise their intentions to "do no harm" may not only fail, but may make matters worse. 4. Effective third party intervention may then call for coordination among "multitrack" actors performing different roles at the same or at different points in time; in effect, the collaboration and "co-evolution" of approaches corresponding to otherwise competing paradigms (e.g., Political Realism, Idealism, Marxism, Non-Marxist Radical Thought [NMRT]).

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This article addresses complex identity-based conflicts, such as those associated with the ending of the Cold War (e.g., Bosnia). It suggests that in many identity-based conflicts, historical memories of outrage and victimhood ("chosen traumas") have persevered across centuries, thereby keeping the conflicting parties "in history." The paper examines the role of virulent ethnocentrism in such intractable conflicts. It also examines the role of "nature" and "nurture" in embedding the universal tendency for humans to divide their species into "them" and "us" within a highly charged emotional context. The paper argues that the complexity of these conflicts has at least four dimensions which challenge the skills and good intentions of third parties:

1. Under stress parties' affective level (limbic brain) tends to override their cognitive level (neocortical brain), thereby enhancing the likelihood of experiencing "feeling is believing" instead of "seeing is believing." Parties may then not be susceptible to the efforts of third parties which often occur at the cognitive level. Such efforts do not necessarily "trickle down" to the affective level where "chosen traumas" are buried.

2. Third parties may have to first deal with an original, historical conflict (e.g., Turkey-Armenia, 1915) before they can deal with one of its more recent variations (Azerbaijan-Armenia, 1990s).

3. Analytically, third parties should employ comprehensive approaches to "capturing the complexity" of historically-/identity-based conflicts. Otherwise their intentions to "do no harm" may not only fail, but may make matters worse.

4. Effective third party intervention may then call for coordination among "multi-track" actors performing different roles at the same or at different points in time; in effect, the collaboration and "co-evolution" of approaches corresponding to otherwise competing paradigms (e.g., Political Realism, Idealism, Marxism, Non-Marxist Radical Thought [NMRT])
I was motivated to do this article by the return of genocide -- or genocidal conflict -- to Europe (i.e., the Balkan wars of the 1990s following the collapse of Yugoslavia in June 1991) and by the subsequent inability of the conflicting parties and the international community to translate negative peace in Bosnia -- the absence of hostilities (achieved by the Dayton Peace Accords of October-December 1995) -- into positive peace: the elimination of the underlying, deep-rooted causes and conditions of those wars.

In this article, I try to expand on what I call virulent ethnocentrism (Sandole, 2002a), which reflects not only the apparently universal tendency for people across historical time and cultural space to divide their fellow humans into "us" and "them," but to emotionally frame the "Other" -- "them" -- in terms of intense negative affect (Sumner, 1906; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Tajfel, 1978, 1981).

Identity-based Conflicts

This discussion confronts the notorious "nature-nurture debate" (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Pinker, 2002), noting that while the universality of ethnocentrism at least hints at a biological basis, the variability of the referent ("target") of ethnocentrism -- which could be based on ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, class, gender, region, or any other point of departure (see Kuhn, 1970) -- strongly tilts in the direction of the socially constructed.

For many of the identity-based conflicts of the post-Cold War era, the social construction of "us" and "them" -- "friend" and "foe" -- has occurred in terms of ethnicity. Hence, in former Yugoslavia, Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Catholics), Bosniak and Kosovar Albanians (Muslims) were locked in brutal bloodbaths, the genocidal intensity of which had not been seen in Europe since the end of World War II and the Holocaust.

I have mentioned the religious as well as the ethnic identities of the various groups in the Balkans because, with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, an interesting but earlier contentious concept created by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) -- the "Clash of Civilizations" -- has apparently started to come to fruition. Through the "bite-and-counterbite," action-reaction processes generated by the terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led "War on Terror" responses to them, an actual "clash" dynamic seems to have been "self-fulfillingly" launched. As I write this article, there does appear to be a new bipolar international system developing -- a "clash" between Judaic-Christian and Islamic "civilizations" -- replacing the multipolarity that appeared to be emerging out of the ending of the Cold War.

Historical Memory

Ethnic conflicts clearly include dimensions in addition to ethnicity; e.g., "clashes of civilizations cum deeply-rooted, global religious systems." What makes such conflicts so intractable, so impervious to resolution and reconciliation, and likely to degenerate into virulence, including genocide, is an intense collective memory of victimhood. This is often associated with a very clear event or series of events marked by very clear dates on the calendar; for example:
(1) 28 June 1389 for Serbs: the fall of Serbia's "Jerusalem," Kosovo, to the Turkish Ottoman Empire, ushering in 600 years of Turkish "Muslim" occupation of Europe.

(2) 29 May 1453 for Greeks: the fall of Constantinople to the Turkish Ottoman Empire and its eventual "reinvention" as Istanbul.

(3) 12 July 1690 for Catholics in Ireland: defeat of the Catholic King James at the Battle of the Boyne by Protestant King William of the House of Orange, ushering in the structural/cultural as well as physical violence directed at the Catholics of Northern Ireland for over 300 years (Galtung 1969, 1996; Byrne, 1997).

(4) 24 April 1915 for Armenians: the beginning of genocidal massacres of Armenians by Turkish military forces in Istanbul and spreading throughout Eastern Anatolia, resulting in, by 1921, some 1.5 million deaths of Armenians.

(5) World War 2 for Jews: Nazi Germany's "final solution" of European Jewry, resulting in the Holocaust and the deaths of some 6 million Jews and 6 million others (e.g., the handicapped, communists, socialists, and homosexuals).

This is by no means an exhaustive list of what Vamik Volkan (1997) refers to as "chosen traumas." Among more recent examples, we could certainly add

(6) 11 September 2001 for Americans: when 19 young men with boxcutters -- 15 of them Saudis, but all of them Arab Wahabis -- hijacked four passenger-filled airliners, turning three of them into cruise missiles directed at the World Trade Center in New York City and at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, resulting in some 3,000 fatalities.

The 5 November 2002 midterm Congressional elections in the U.S. resulted in President Bush's Republican Party reclaiming control of the U.S. Senate and holding on to the U.S. House of Representatives, thereby allowing the President to pursue his agenda during the second half of his term with few congressional constraints. This, plus the relatively high level of support among Americans for a war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, has made it clear that 11 September 2001 has eclipsed 7 December 1941 -- when Japan launched a surprise attack on U.S. forces in Hawaii -- as the dominant "chosen trauma" for Americans.

In effect, the Bush White House has successfully invoked the functionalist dynamic of conflict (see Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Sandole, 1999, p. 22), whipping up support for the use of armed force beyond the original targets of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Since these dates occur with grim regularity at nonlinear, 12-month intervals as constant reminders of particular "chosen traumas," the sense of historical (or recent) victimhood and of bitter conflict is kept continuously alive for the identity-groups concerned in what Volkan (1997) calls "collapsed time." This tends to keep many Serbs, Greeks, Irish Catholics, Armenians, Jews and Americans in the grip of what Muzafer Sherif (1967) calls the "heavy hand of the past." (Among other examples of "recent memory," a little more than a year after 11 September 2001, on 12 October 2002, a terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, killed 187 people, many of them Australians.)

Few conflicts are more reflective of the operation of chosen trauma, time collapse, and the "heavy hand of the past," than the conflict in Northern Ireland. Every summer during the
notorious "marching season," in excess of 2000 marches, many of them which go up to, around, and into Catholic neighborhoods, celebrate the victory by Protestants over Catholics at the Battle of the Boyne on 12 July 1690, resulting in over 300 years of Catholic humiliation and marginalization -- and eventually, with the advent of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other (including Protestant/Loyalist) paramilitary groups, terrorism.

Richard Rose (1971, pp. 354-355) eloquently captures the operation of these phenomena in Northern Ireland with the following observation:

Londonderry on August 12, 1969, aptly illustrates how time past and time present can fuse together in an explosive way. Protestants there that day were commemorating the 280th anniversary of the liberation of the besieged Protestant bastion within the old walled city from Catholic hordes surrounding it. As they looked over Derry's walls, the marchers could see that Catholics, as in Jacobite times, were present in great numbers in the Bogside just below their fortifications. Catholics did not have to turn their minds further back than the previous twelve months to anticipate what might happen next. In that period, the Royal Ulster Constabulary several times entered the Bogside in large numbers, assaulting Catholics on the streets and in their homes in ways that official enquiries could later amnesty but not excuse. The Catholics began to build barricades to prevent a recurrence of this. This recalled Protestants from ancient history to the present. The barricades were interpreted as the beginning of yet another Catholic insurrection. The approach of the police to the barricades was seen by the Catholics behind the lines as yet another instance in which Protestants sought, in the words of an eighteenth-century Irish song, to make "Croppies lie down." In such circumstances, it hardly matters whether an individual interpreted events in seventeenth, eighteenth or twentieth-century terms. In Northern Ireland, the conclusions drawn -- for or against the regime -- are much the same in one century as in the next (emphasis added).

Given what has become almost a mantra for some in the conflict resolution/peacebuilding field, in such protracted, intractable, often violent conflicts, it is essential for conflict analysts, conflict resolution practitioners, and policymakers to delve beneath observable symptoms and to deal with the underlying relational processes, and the underlying deep-rooted causes and conditions; lest the military and police have a never-ending supply of symptoms to deal with.

The question arises, however: how can concerned others, potential third parties, deal with conflicts whose origins include events that occurred hundreds of years ago, with the original parties long gone? In other words, how can third parties help conflicting parties to these conflicts deal with their historical wounds -- their "chosen traumas"-- and thereby, free themselves from the "heavy hand of the past"?
Prior to attempting to do anything about any complex, identity-based conflict, it is essential for potential third-parties to understand the conflict as comprehensively as they can; for example:

1. The role and strength of "nature" and "nurture" in the formation and maintenance of identity and of identity groups and, therefore, in the initiation and escalation of violent conflict processes, including war and terrorism. Put another way, third-parties must know something about the nature of the "mix" between inherited "hard-wired" and "soft-wired" human nature and variable environment/"socially constructed" culture in the etiology of ethnocentric "us"-"them" distinctions and violent conflict. Further, to what extent are human nature and that "mix" changeable by the third party and other environmental contingencies? (Sandole, 1999, pp. 180-185; Sandole, 2002b.)

2. Under both "nature" and "nurture," the role and strength of gender. What is it, for example, about male gender that makes males so overwhelmingly more prone to violence than females across time and cultural space? (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Gilligan, 1996; Garbarino, 2000.)

3. Under both "nature" and "nurture," the role and strength of basic human needs (BHNs), such as those for identity, recognition, and security, the frustration of which can lead to violent conflict (Burton, 1997). What is it, for example, about the BHNs-frustration interaction effect that makes violent reactions to perceived sources of BHN frustration so compelling?

4. The likelihood that "chosen traumas" primarily exist at the affective level, whereas third party efforts to facilitate resolution and transformation of these conflicts occur at the cognitive level (Boulding, 1956). How can a third-party, operating primarily at the "knowing" level, negotiate the divide between "knowing" and "feeling" so that what is in any case interconnected is experienced by conflicting parties as being interconnected? In other words, must third-parties be trained psychotherapists (which presently many are not)?

5. During times of crisis and stress, the affective (the limbic brain) overwhelms and overtakes the cognitive (the neocortical brain), producing what Maclean (1975, 1978) calls a schizophysiology, where "feeling is believing" instead of "seeing is believing." What can the third-party do upon entering the turbulent "conflict space" of highly charged conflicting parties, with each characterized by affective override, to arrest the escalatory cycle and transform the dynamic of a "fight" into a "debate" (Rapoport, 1960)?

6. Something like a paradigm in the same sense used by Kuhn (1970) determines our perceptions, with members of different paradigmatic communities -- including scientific ones -- often "seeing" different things when looking at the "same" thing at the same time. For
example:

An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists took the atomic theory to be asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist whether a single atom of helium was or was not a molecule. Both answered without hesitation, but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom was not a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. *Presumably both men were talking of the same particle*, but they were viewing it through their own research training and practice. Their experience in problem-solving told them what a molecule must be. Undoubtedly their experiences had much in common, *but they did not, in this case, tell the two specialists the same thing* (emphasis added) (Kuhn 1970, pp. 50-51).

...in a famous debate between the French chemists Proust and Berthollet[, the] first claimed that all chemical reactions occurred in fixed proportion, the latter that they did not. *Each collected impressive experimental evidence for his view*. Nevertheless, the two men necessarily talked through each other, and their debate was entirely inconclusive. *Where Berthollet saw a compound that could vary in proportion, Proust saw only a physical mixture. To that issue neither experiment nor a change of definitional convention could be relevant.* The two men were as fundamentally at cross-purposes as Galileo and Aristotle had been (emphasis added) (Kuhn, 1970, p. 132).

(7) One of the apparent paradoxes of perception is that anomalies -- deviations from paradigm-based (embedded) expectations -- that should "prescriptively" call these paradigms into question, "descriptively" are resistant to detection, a phenomenon conducive to maintenance of the stability of the status quo paradigmatic system. In other words, as part of the "socially constructed" part of the "nature-nurture" mix, the paradigms that we learn and internalize over time are usually relevant to our survival. They are not, therefore, easily surrendered in the face of apparent contradictions; hence, the value of being "conservative"!

An additional paradox here, however, is that the anomaly may signal that the old paradigm -- the old SOP (standard operating procedure) -- is no longer relevant to survival; in which case, being conservative may be a suicidal course of action.

(8) The *affective-cognitive override* -- which may encourage conflicting parties to hold on to otherwise outmoded paradigms -- occurs even for relatively minor challenges to existing paradigms, calling into play a variety of *unconscious* defenses of the status quo paradigmatic system. For example:

In a psychological experiment that deserves to be far better known outside the trade, Bruner and Postman [1949] asked experimental subjects to identify on short and controlled exposure a series of playing cards. Many of the cards were
normal, but some were made anomalous, e.g., a red six of spades and a black four of hearts. Each experimental run was constituted by the display of a single card to a single subject in a series of gradually increased exposures. After each exposure the subject was asked what he had seen, and the run was terminated by two successive correct identifications.

Even on the shortest exposures many subjects identified most of the cards, and after a small increase all the subjects identified them all. For the normal cards these identifications were usually correct, but the anomalous cards were almost always identified, without apparent hesitation or puzzlement, as normal. The black four of hearts might, for example, be identified as the four of either spades or hearts. Without any awareness of trouble, it was immediately fitted to one of the conceptual categories prepared by prior experience. One would not even like to say that the subjects had seen something different from what they had identified. With a further increase of exposure to the anomalous cards, subjects did begin to hesitate and to display awareness of anomaly. Exposed, for example to the red six of spades, some would say: That's the six of spades, but there's something wrong with it -- the black has a red border. Further increase of exposure resulted in still more hesitation and confusion until finally, and sometimes quite suddenly, most subjects would produce the correct identification without hesitation. Moreover, after doing this with two or three of the anomalous cards, they would have little further difficulty with the others. A few subjects, however, were never able to make the requisite adjustment of their categories. Even at forty times the average exposure required to recognize normal cards for what they were, more than 10 per cent of the anomalous cards were not correctly identified. And the subjects who then failed often experienced acute personal distress. One of them exclaimed: "I can't make the suit out, whatever it is. It didn't even look like a card that time. I don't know what color it is now or whether it's a spade or a heart. I'm not even sure now what a spade looks like. My God!" (emphasis added) (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 62-64).

Given a conflict characterized by the "affective-cognitive override," the parties may be inhabitants of a turbulent, highly charged "conflict space," where there is a perceptual-emotional as well as cross-cultural gap between conflicting parties and third parties. How does the third party negotiate across these chasms in order to be an effective agent for the parties "letting go of the past"?

(9) In order to help resolve a current version of a conflict characterized by these gaps, a potential third party may have to deal first with a related historical conflict. For example, in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (an Armenian area in Azerbaijan), Armenians tend to "see" Azerbaijanis as "Turks." Consequently, Armenians see that Armenia with a population of 2-3 million (and 3-4 million Armenians in the diaspora), is surrounded by 7 million "Turks" in Azerbaijan, plus 63 million Turks in Turkey, for a total of 70 million
Turks surrounding 2-3 million Armenians. Against this David and Goliath background, they also see the Azeri "Turks" as trying to "finish off the job they started in 1915!"

In this particular scenario, dealing effectively with the Armenian-Turkish conflict relationship (perhaps the first genocide of the 20th Century) may be a necessary condition for dealing effectively with the subsequent (and current) conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Interestingly, Canadian Armenian film director, Atom Egoyan, in his new film, Ararat, which is about 24 April 1915, seems to convey the need for Turkey to acknowledge what happened to the Armenians 87 years ago. In a sense, "It haunts Egoyan, as well as most other Armenians, that to this day there's been no real coming to account with the Turks [about 1915]" (Hunter, 2002, p. G4; Kennicott, 2002).

Complexity Theory

To deal with complex, identity-based conflicts, complexity theory may be useful. A major tenet of complexity theory is that "everything is connected to everything else." Its primary focus is the "edge of chaos" which represents a complex balance between chaos (disorder and unpredictability) and order (predictability) (see Waldrop, 1992).

Whenever a third party enters into the turbulent, constantly shifting, high energy "conflict space" of the parties, he, she or they are confronted by this complex interplay between chaos and order. Depending upon the paradigmatic base of the third party, they may elect to use force to suppress the violent manifestations -- the symptoms -- of the conflict in order to achieve and maintain negative peace (Realpolitik: "political realism").

Alternatively, third parties may attempt to mediate an end to hostilities and then establish opportunities for the parties to deal with the underlying deep-rooted causes and conditions, by facilitating promises by the originally more powerful and privileged party to permit access to political, social, economic and other resources to which the less powerful and privileged party has previously been denied access in order to achieve and maintain positive peace (e.g., Idealpolitik: "political idealism"; Marxism; non-Marxist radical thought) (Sandole, 1993, 1999 [Ch. 6]).

Another alternative would be for a creative third party to realize that to "capture the complexity of conflict," it is not a simple matter of reflecting, for instance, "either realism or idealism," but a combination of appropriate elements of both -- of otherwise competing paradigms -- to maintain the careful balance at the "edge of chaos" between disorder and order.

For example, in mid-April 1994, after a genocidal bloodbath began in Rwanda, it would have been essential for the international community to respond favorably to Major General Romeo Dallaire's "early warnings" and pleas to reinforce his lightly armed UN contingent to suppress and prevent genocide (Power, 2001, 2002), before introducing less coercive, more conciliatory types of intervention.

When the third party does intervene via the more conciliatory processes, they may, again, have to deal with fairly recent as well as earlier memories and experiences of
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In order to help the parties "let go of [even the recent] past," in order for them to deal with the present. What "best practices" exist for third parties to employ here (again, keeping in mind that "best practices" may reflect, even for third parties, dangerously outmoded, unconsciously defended paradigmatic belief and value systems)? A truth and reconciliation process like that in South Africa? (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002, 2003.) Story telling? (Senihi, 2000, 2002.) In any case, how do we, as third parties who wish to "do no harm" and "make a difference," negotiate our way from the cognitive (neocortical) to the affective (limbic) level of the traumatized, highly charged conflicting parties?

The answer here may be an appropriately complex one, with profound implications for coordinated, "multi-track" third party interventions (Byrne & Carter, 1996; Diamond & McDonald, 1996; Byrne & Keashly, 2000; Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Fisher, 1997 [Ch. 8]; Sandole, 1998). In addition to launching "mini-Marshall Plans" to assist in the political and economic aspects of peacebuilding -- no easy feat; just consider the present situation in Afghanistan (WP, 2002b; Burnett, 2003) -- third parties may have to have "psychoanalytical access" to the parties to help them overcome resistances to detecting anomalies. Thus, I have written previously that (Sandole, 1987, p. 296):

Once individuals in conflict -- whether at the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, international or any other level -- start to express themselves through [violence], they may become brutalized, unable to view their "enemies" as anything but despicable subhumans. Under such circumstances, which can lead to an extension of the conflict beyond the lives of its original participants, potential third parties who wish to intervene effectively must be able to operate at the intrapsychic as well as interparty levels. Unless the first is dealt with adequately, the second may only worsen.

In this manner, the parties can go through the emotional-psychological aspects of peacebuilding -- mourning, healing, reconciliation -- and develop what Benjamin Broome (1993) calls relational empathy: a "third culture" or "meta-paradigm" interconnecting, in "complex" fashion, their otherwise competing cultures or paradigms.

Conclusion

Although this paper has attempted to lay out a creative paradigm for third party intervenors to assist conflicting parties in mending historical wounds and engage them in peacebuilding, it is easier said than done. But, to gain some sense of closure here, let's revisit the Balkan wars, especially in Bosnia, where we began this article:

What does it take for outside powers to rebuild a war-ruined and badly divided country? Bosnia offers a state-of-the-art -- and sobering -- example. Seven years after a U.S. intervention helped end its civil war and Western troops poured in to keep the peace, the Balkan nation of 3.5 million remains far from able to live on its own. The good news is that the horrific fighting that
killed a quarter of a million people in less than four years has not been renewed, that several hundred thousand refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing have returned to their homes, and that peaceful and free elections were held [last] month [October 2002] for all levels of government -- the sixth elections to be staged in as many years. But the [negative] peace continues to depend on 12,000 foreign troops, including 2,000 Americans; the functioning of government relies in no small part on the interventions of a Western "high representative" with near-dictatorial powers; and, most discouraging of all, the victors in the recent elections were the same nationalist [ethnocentric] parties that tore the country apart a decade ago. Bosnia is not now a failed state, but it is a center for the trafficking of women and narcotics, a hide-out for war criminals and a steady drain on Western aid and defense budgets. It's not likely to collapse soon, but neither will foreign troops and administrators likely be able to safely pull out for many years to come (WP, 2002a).

Just imagine multiple "Bosnias" -- in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Palestine -- with Muslims the major victims, and the costs will likely include other factors besides a drain on defense budgets: a further erosion of the Westphalian state system into the "Coming Anarchy" that Robert D. Kaplan (1994, 2000) so accurately, but depressingly presaged, with wars becoming more "local," more subnational and more like the wars of medieval Europe, where:

any fine distinctions ... between armies on the one hand and peoples on the other [are] bound to break down. Engulfed by war, civilians [will suffer] terrible atrocities (van Creveld, 1991, p. 51).

We have already seen this future: two months after Kaplan's (1994) "The Coming Anarchy" appeared in *Atlantic Monthly*, in Rwanda in April 1994, approximately half a million people, Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were savagely murdered at a low tech level of "medieval" warfare (Abdulai, 1994, p. 38; Power, 2001, 2002).

A little more than a year later, in July 1995, the event that precipitated NATO taking action to end the war in Bosnia occurred: Bosnian Serb forces entered the UN protected "safe area" of Srebrenica, disarmed the lightly armed Dutch UNPROFOR (United Nations "Protection" Force) contingent, separated the men from the women and massacred between 6,000 to 8,000 Bosniak Muslim males (see Honig and Both, 1996; Rohde, 1997).

Such is the daunting challenge facing third parties committed to positive peace throughout the world: seven years after the horrors of Srebrenica, nationalist parties have been returned to power in Bosnia. What would it take to help them let go of the "heavy hand of the past"?

Sometimes people say that there are some conflicts that just cannot be dealt with, except in *Realpolitik*, coercive fashion, which, of course, often makes matters worse. That seems to be the case with, among others, the U.S.-Iraq conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Russian-Chechen conflict. So, the question that arises here is: is it the case that some
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people are, in the words of Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992), forever consigned to "being in history"?

As the world moves progressively and perhaps unrelentingly toward further realization of Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," this is no longer just an academic question: as weapons of mass destruction are amassed against the background of that dangerous simplification, they are more likely to be used in the name of God -- the ultimate terrorism!

Notes

1. This article builds upon Sandole (2002a). Earlier comments by Dr. Sean Byrne and two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged and appreciated!


3. See Bracken & Petty (1998) on the problems associated with the use of Western approaches to trauma in other parts of the world where violent conflict has occurred.

4. See Hunter (1998) for an examination of "the future state of relations between Islam and the West." Also, see Gopin (2000, 2002) on the relationships between religion, violence, and peacemaking, especially in the Middle East. Finally, see Appleby (2000) for a comprehensive exploration of the factors predisposing "religious militants" toward violent responses to conflict situations versus factors that encourage them to respond nonviolently in a peacebuilding mode.

References


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