The West and the Rest of Us: Islamic Militancy, Refugee crisis and the Migration wave towards Europe

Simeon Onyemachi Hilary Alozieuwa Ph.D.
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, alzworld67@yahoo.com

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Abstract
The recent migration wave to Europe from the Arab world thrusts to the fore for serious discourse, an issue the world has hitherto shied away from: the gradual Islamization of the world beginning with the West. The issue is not the Islamic faith itself. Certain elements of the faithful are imbued with hegemonic-domination tendencies marked by the excessive obsession to obliterate others’ cultures. This paper views the Euro/West-ward movement of the Muslim Arab refugees/migrants as a grand strategy for the Islamization agenda; the smuggled Islamist militias are its foot-soldiers. It also throws up existential threats which were not contemplated by the framers of extant Western human rights regimes. The West needs, therefore, to interrogate its overextended human rights regimes with a view to attuning them to emerging realities of our contemporary world.

Key words: Islamic militancy, Refugee, Migration, West, Multiculturalism, Human Rights
**Introduction**

The grim spectacle of two-year old Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian toddler washed ashore off the Turkish coastline in the month of September, 2015 eventually became the poster for the human tragedy that has been playing out in the Mediterranean, going for about half a decade now. Not a stranger to such unwholesome spectacle, having also hosted thousands of African deaths resulting from the post-Ghaddafi tumult in Libya, the Mediterranean has lately become a cemetery to thousands of desperate refugees and migrants fleeing either from zones of conflict or poverty or both and surging towards Europe in the hope of better life. Although the current humanitarian crisis owes directly to the Syrian civil war, within the mix are economic migrants and persons fleeing from conflict zones in the Middle East, Asia and other parts of the Arab world. As of September 18, 2015 deaths on the sea in the course of the dangerous journey stood at 2,812 (IOM, 2015). Arrivals by sea to Europe through two and a half weeks of September 2015, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded a total number of 473,887. The number continued to swell and had been christened the worst refugee crisis continental Europe has had to grapple with since World War II (CNN, 4 September, 2015).

For all the outrage and pathos the tragedy has invoked, while the world focuses mainly on the humanitarian crisis associated with the refugee problem and the conflict in Syria, little attention seems to have been directed at one critically-important element in the entire episode. The problem is streaming out of the Arab world from where global jihadism was born, weaned and unleashed on other parts of the world. This paper looks at the refugee/migration crises from an entirely different perspective. While acknowledging the human tragedy in the entire trajectory – from the Syrian conflict to the dislocations from other Arab worlds, and the deaths in the thousands in the Mediterranean – it also looks beyond the pathos and concerns,
themselves, with a certain aspect of the problem that links with the character of the societies from which the refugees and migrants are fleeing.

The remit of the paper is to interrogate the anti-Western ideology that drives the global jihadist movement. It challenges the Jihadist’s claim that s/he is solely driven by the desire to return the world to Islam’s medieval past and join the caravan of the prophets; that s/he is insulated from modern political concerns. In the process, the paper shall attempt to address the following important questions: why are members of the societies that incubate and tolerate jihadi anti-western rhetoric calibrating towards Europe rather than some Arab/Gulf States that not only share similar cultural behavior and are wealthy enough; why do the refugees/migrants from the Muslim world shun the rich Muslim Gulf countries, which are geographically closer to them - most of whom do not pose the kind of risks and dangers inherent in the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea- than far-flung Europe? In other words, why is the gravitation from the Muslim world towards Christian Europe? If the refugees, many of whom are Muslims, are fleeing from the strife in their respective countries, why are they not headed toward such destinations as Saudi Arabia or Qatar, or any of the Gulf States that not only bear better economic prospects than most of the countries of Europe but also have brighter prospects for easy socio-cultural assimilation? Saudi Arabia ranks as among the world’s 20 largest economies, for instance.

**Background**

Amid the migration crisis, as European leaders debate the distribution quotas among themselves, under the European Union (EU) relocation scheme, Slovakia voiced its unwillingness to accept non-Christians when considering the 200 Syrian refugees- its share of the 400,000 refugees by August, 2015. Pleading community cohesion, and concerns over integration by Muslims, Slovakia said Muslims would not be accepted because ‘we don’t have mosques in Slovakia’ and ‘they (Muslims) would not feel at home’ (BBC, 19 August 2015).
About 10% of Syria's population were Christian before the country's conflict started (ibid). Similarly, although merely a transit country, Hungary makes a distinction between migrants and refugees. While Hungary's insistence on profiling the bunch was apparently borne out of the need to sift genuine refugees from economic migrants, Slovakia’s position raises a religious cum civilizational issue, even as the underlying security concern could hardly be masked. Although proven to be fake after all, (Mirror, 16 September, 2015) at the height of refugee/migration crisis, images of pro-Islamist elements waving ISIS flags and confronting German police, purporting to be proof of infiltration by jihadi elements into the Europe-bound refugees, were widely circulated on the cyber space. But a Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium recent report (TRAC) (Insight, 15 September, 2015), suggests that reports of jihadi infiltration into Europe could as well be real. The internet images campaign certainly bore the unmistakable signature of the far-right elements in Europe, who are playing on the fears in the West of ISIS jihadi elements seizing the opportunity of genuine refugees to infiltrate that society. Yet the fact that an image from a 2012 anti-Islamic protest in Bonn, Germany was appropriated in the current crisis for the purpose of wiping up Islamist-phobia among the people clearly underlines the anxiety in the West with regards to the migration wave. Two recent studies probably feed this fear. One, a study funded by the German government, and which was published in December, 2014, found that the majority of Muslims in that country hold the view that Islamic Sharia law should take precedence over the secular constitutions and laws of their European host countries (Gatestone Institute, 2014). Two, in response to the British Muslim riots of 2001, a study attempting a comparison between immigration and colonisation notes that the difference between the former and the latter is that whereas the immigrant seeks to adapt to the culture of the host country, the coloniser seeks to make the host country adapt to his/her culture. Western statesmen and policy makers maintain the politically-correctness posturing since the outset of the current migration crisis. Cherson and Molschky
recently published a very compelling book that centered on immigration and its effects on the West- *Immigrants of Doom*. And drawing from the work of Cherson and Molschky, a comparative analysis between the modern Muslim immigration and previous patterns of immigration to the West done by an anonymous reviewer, tends to contradict the stand of the Western political leaders on the migration crisis. For the reviewer,

Cherson and Molschky demonstrate that Islamic immigration to modern, tolerant, liberal democracies is following the second pattern- of the coloniser seeking to make the host country adapt to his culture and is aggressive and supremacist about it. It is a threat to free, Western society (http://www.amazon.com/IMMIGRANTS-OF-DOOM-Y-K-CHERSON-isebook/dp/B00V3Y6P2Y).

Indeed, Cherson and Molschky have argued in *Immigrants of Doom* that,

In the mid-sixties, the West accepted the suicidal doctrine of multiculturalism as its official approach to the problem of immigration. This resulted in an endless stream of immigrants from third world countries pouring into Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia, subsequently displacing the native populations and creating both social tensions and an unsustainable financial burden.

Uncontrolled immigration has contributed to a dissipating economy, disturbing crime statistics, a high rate of unemployment among natives, swollen welfare rolls so out of control they are practically bankrupting Western countries, and has even led to an unprecedented wave of terrorism. But the gravest problem of massive immigration, that which dwarfs all the rest, is the supplanting of the native populations of Western countries with people who quite often do not share those values that were and are the cornerstone of Western Civilization. Moreover, they often come to the West with the intent to destroy it. The sharp growth of the number of immigrants often openly hostile to the West, combined with the distortion of traditional Western values by liberals and leftists pose a serious threat to the very existence of Western civilization.

The truth is simple: immigration builds cheap houses but ultimately destroys the country (http://chersonandmolschky.com/tag/islamization-of-the-west/).

In Europe and the United States, Muslim immigration and conversion have resulted in Islam being the second largest religion. *Immigrants of Doom* stretches the discourse beyond fears of cultural dilution to economic anxiety.
Interrogating the extant explanatory framework

From an economic perspective, popular perception of the Arab world conjures up the image of a region swaggering with stupendous oil wealth. The seemingly robust economies of the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman and Kuwait do a lot to nourish the enviable image of the proverbial land overflowing with milk and honey. But the realities belie the bloated picture. In a recent article, Jane Kinninmont, Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme at the Chatham House, has used a legalistic framework to explain why the richest Arab States- the Gulf countries- do not absolve the deluge of human refugees streaming out of their region. Kinninmont has argued persuasively that the six Gulf monarchies have never signed the international conventions on refugee rights and statelessness, which began to be established after the Second World War. Thus, according to her, rather than a specific issue of hostility, their attitude towards the Syrian refugees draws from the Gulf countries’ non-recognition of the legal concept of refugeehood (Chatham House.org, 08 September, 2015).

Ironically, some of the Gulf countries enjoy the enviable status of ranking among generous contributors to aids for refugees around the world. While Kuwait, for instance, stands out as the largest donor, delivering nearly one-third of all aid pledged to the Syrian crisis – about $800 million- through the United Nations (UN), since 2012, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provided $364 million in the same period. Kinninmont notes that though these sums might be lower than the $1 billion from the UK or $3 billion from the US, but are considerably higher as a proportion of GDP (ibid). But the profile camouflages certain dire socio-economic conditions in the Gulf States. As Kinninmont has observed, for one, migrants make up the majority of the workforce in all of the Gulf countries, constituting more than 85 per cent of the population in Qatar and UAE. Secondly, public perception of the Gulf States as wealthy, owes largely to the concentration of this wealth in the hands of a tiny population of the citizenry.
Thus, beneath the legalistic rationale lies the more cogent problems of population and resource structure of the Gulf countries (ibid). The Gulf countries also hardly give permanent residency to migrants beyond a handful (ibid).

On the other hand, Wright (2006) notes the gap between rising expectations and declining opportunities in the Arab world- a framework that provides an insight into behavior of the Gulf States. He argues that the Arab world has failed to generate any other significant source of income outside of their abundant oil revenues, so that outside of the oil revenues, total exports of the Arab world amounts to less than 5 million finns. The Arab world has also failed to create wealth when personal incomes were sharply climbing in virtually all other parts of the globe (Wright, 2006, p.123). All these point to the fragility of the economies of the Gulf countries, which more than any other factor, constitutes the major determinant of their attitudes toward the refugees. Concerns outside of the Gulf enclave also prove why the rest of the Arab society may not be an attractive option for both economic migrants and refugees seeking a better life outside of their native lands. This concern is also playing out outside of the Gulf enclave. The scenario in Jordan may represent the fears even in less endowed Arab states. A recent observation on Jordan by Doris Carrion of the Chatham House, London may suffice:

Civil war in Syria has caused a refugee crisis in neighbouring Jordan, raising the latter’s population by at least 8 per cent. For Jordanians, the highly visible presence of many thousands of refugees living in their midst- mostly in urban areas, rather than camps- has raised fears over competition for resources and opportunities. Host communities have partly benefited from the presence of refugees and the international aid that has come with them, but many Jordanians feel they are worse off because of the Syrians. The refugee crisis has hit the most vulnerable in their country hardest. Increased rents, price hikes and strains on public services and public order have left local inhabitants feeling increasingly disenfranchised and neglected by the Jordanian government and international donors (Doris Carrion, September, 2015).
The Global Jihadi Ideology

In spite of other factors, contemporary global jihadi movement owes its roots essentially to one important political event in modern history: the overthrow of the pro-Western Shah of Iran in 1979 and the subsequent establishment of a modern theocratic Islamic Republic in that country. Other factors were the anti-western feelings in the Middle East as a result of the effect of European colonization and American presence in the Middle East with claims that it brought a corrupting influence. But in the words of Mozayyan (2009:241), the Iranian Revolution, “ushered in a widespread rejectionist philosophy, changing the Muslims’ view of themselves and their position in the world, as well as their approaches to daily life and politics.” Across the world, corrupt and ineffective local political leadership espousing Western ideologies but failing to improve people’s well-being remain a major stimulus to political Islam.

Despite its genealogy to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the current jihadi or radical Islamic movement, was indeed founded by the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden and derives from the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, where, the “links among individuals and different national groups were forged” (Crenshaw, 2009:403). New standards were now set and a new discourse gained currency that targeted the “enemies of Islam” through revolutionary, militant, and martyr-oriented strategies. Life became readily expendable, especially if it hindered the advancement of Islamic agendas. Islam thus became a means and an end for the frustrated masses, giving rise to leaders who spoke in terms of Islamic communities, and pushed the need to restore Islam to its former position of power by removing the corrupting Western influences that hinder the promotion of their own millenarian beliefs (Mozayyan, 2009: 242).

Muazzam (2011:39) offers a comprehensive view of political Islam of which resurgent Islamism is part:
[It] is a very broad intellectual, cultural and political movement throughout the world. It is a modern ideological construction and not the product of a historical continuity with an essentialist Islam preserved in the hearts and minds of the people. It is the result of a protracted societal crisis of multi-dimensional proportions revealing ongoing dialectics between Muslims and their socio-economic political environment. The rise of the Islamist movements is a result and symptom of society in crisis. It is the outcome of a process of development that has exceeded the capacity of the system. The activism of some of the Muslim groups is as such a function of the social, economic and political contexts found in the various societies.

Admittedly, the current jihadi Islamism epitomized by the ISIS has eclipsed Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Indeed, Jihadism may also have evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the al-Qaeda’s priorities and current leadership (Wood, 2015). But the school of thought that now contests extant jihadi political orientation on the basis of the current state of ISIS’s progenitor, al-Qaeda, may be well-misplaced. Wood, for instance, first queries the attempt to characterize Jihadism as monolithic and goes on to reject the temptation ‘to project the jihadists as modern secular people, with modern political concerns, merely wearing medieval religious disguise’ (ibid). She describes bin Laden’s al-Qaeda rather contemptuously. And while citing Peter Bergen, who produced the first interview with bin Laden in 1997, and who titled his first book *Holy War, Inc.*, “in part to acknowledge bin Laden as a creature of the modern secular world,” Wood derisively described bin Laden in the following manner:

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Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently. On Mohamed Atta’s last full day of life, he shopped at Walmart and ate dinner at Pizza Hut.
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Wood frowns at the attempt to deny the Islamic State of its medieval religious character. In fact, much of what the group does, she forcefully contends, “looks nonsensical except in the light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse” (ibid). But then Wood contradicts herself:
Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. (Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces.) (ibid).

The attempt to remove the pejorative from the jihadists as folks fired essentially by mundane motives than the sublime appears to be gaining currency as a recent article “You have atomic bombs, we have the martyrdomseekers: Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s narrative of martyrdom” exemplifies. Using the 72 Virgin legend (the virgins Islamic martyrs are to receive in the afterlife) as an illustration, the author argues, among others that, one, Western narrative of the heavenly virginal motivation for martyrdom prevents martyrdom from being interpreted as self-sacrifice by construing it as the result of a cost-benefit equation; and, two, that, it veils the potentially more honorable motivation of desiring the esteemed company of prophets (Anonymous: Peace and Conflict Studies: Manuscript#1299 @ http://nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1299&context=pcs&z=1444077845&review_mode=1&login=1952905). While denying to legitimize or support al-Qaeda’s military action, political or religious goals, but seeking the legitimization of the humanity of al-Qaeda’s martyrs, for the author, the virtues of the martyr seem to be a reasonable set of attributes that one could sensibly aspire to. They are determination, power, simplicity, and faith. These, the author further contends, guarantee him/her joining the eternal caravan of prophets (ibid).

At this juncture, Francis Fukuyama’s taxonomy of the different Islamic groups has become important. He identifies four distinct groups- the Islamic fundamentalists, Islamists, radical Islamists, and ordinary Muslims. Islamic fundamentalists act out of religious motives and seek to revive an imagined earlier and purer form of religious practice. Islamists, by contrast, tend to emphasize political goals and want to bring religion into politics in some fashion, though not necessarily in ways that are hostile to democracy. He cites the Islamist
Justice and Development Party in Turkey, which on coming to power democratically, supported Turkish entry into the European Union. Radical Islamists or jihadists, on their part, emphasize the need for violence in pursuit of their political goals (Fukuyama, 2006: 69-70). The Islamic State had not emerged at the time of Fukuyama’s writing. Thus Fukuyama rightly identified bin Laden as the world’s number one example of radical Islamists. But ISIS and bin Laden’s al-Qaeda are radical Islamists despite their mutual antagonism. Charles Krauthammer also tends towards Fukuyama’s classification, both which fault Wood’s categorization of ISIS as mere Islamic fundamentalists. According to Krauthammer,

Radical Islam has the distinct advantage of being grounded in a venerable religion of over one billion adherents that not only provides a ready supply of recruits-trained and readied in mosques and madrassas far more effective, autonomous and ubiquitous than any Hitler Youth or Komosomol’s camp- but is able to draw on a long and deep tradition of zeal, messianic expectation and a cult of martyrdom. Hitler and Stalin had to invent these out of whole cloth. Mussolini’s version was a parody. Islamic radicalism flies under a flag with far more historical depth and enduring appeal than the ersatz religions of the swastika and hammer-and-sickle that proved so historically thin and insubstantial (Krauthammer, 2004 cited in Fukuyama, 2006:71).

Testimonies from the 20-year old Yazidi girl, Bozi, who escaped from an Islamic State’s camp, indicate that whereas the Caliphate invokes the image of seventh century Islamic social milieu, by virtue of the edicts being zealously churned out by ISIS Caliph, al- Baghdad and members of his high command, including ISIS American convert, Abu Abdullahi Al-Mriki, who sex-slaved Bozi for five months, the ISIS jihadists are not free of the kind of impulses that prompted bin Laden’s disciple, Mohamed Atta, to shop at Walmart and enjoy dinner at Pizza Hut. Meanwhile, millions of jihadists across the globe frenziedly applaud away. In Nigeria, Buluma Modu, a captured commander of the jihadist group, Boko Haram, which has pledged allegiance to ISIS, confessed to the Nigerian military that, “I don’t know how to read the Quran. And I don’t know how to perform (Muslim) prayers either,” (News Express, 24 September, 2015). The Islamic State’s leadership is imbued with similar mundane impulses that once seized bin
Laden’s lieutenants. In our own perspective, bin Laden’s methodology offers more prospect for the jihadists’ millenarian cause. Islamic State’s obsession with territorialism and its horrendously bloody approach to achieving it has raised global consciousness and resolve against its Caliphate. Indeed there is hardly any clear distinction between bin Laden’s request for specific political concessions and al-Baghdad’s expansionism.

The Analysis

Economic reasons may have informed Gulf States’ reluctance to welcome the deluge of Arab refugees, just as the non-recognition of refugeehood by the Gulf States and poverty in the other Arab countries may have motivated the migration toward Europe and the West, generally. Recent migration waves from sub-Saharan Africa to both Europe and the West may have also been driven by socio-economic considerations. Sub-Saharan Africa and most of the Arab world share striking features of growing poverty and depravation. Similarly, that such less buoyant economies in the West as Greece and Hungary, for instance, feature marginally on the migrants’ real destination also tends to support the economic theory of the tendencies of both the Gulf countries and migrants. Germany, with a strong economy, remains the preferred destination; and availability of a cheap, unauthorized labour industry in Europe is additional incentive for migration.

But economic factors alone may not be able to provide a holistic understanding of both tendencies. Michael Hudson has made quite a useful observation on Arab politics. According to him, the central problem of governments in the Arab world is political legitimacy. The shortage of this vital political resource, he argues, “largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic character of all present government” (cited in Muazzam, 2011). For Wright (2006, 123) too, in addition to their abysmal performance at wealth creation, in a global socio-economic milieu experiencing increase in personal income across the globe, the
Arab world also stifled freedom, equally at a time when democracy was on the ascent in virtually all other parts of the world. Rising expectation and declining opportunities may constitute factors that drive radicalism, especially among idle and bored population. So, also, do an environment where art is impoverished, entertainment – movies, theater, music – policed or absent altogether, and young men are set apart from the consoling and socializing presence of women (ibid). Most of the Arab world remains closed societies with little or no opportunities for self-expression by the young. The Arab Spring started as a reaction to harsh socio-economic conditions. But it also had a political context; it happened within a political milieu that encumbered civil liberties.

At the moment, the Arab world is in the grip of virulent Islamic militancy. Within the region are citizens, some of whom the underpinning Islamist ideology fervently appeals to because of its promise of new socio-economic and political order that appears to hold more prospects than the extant order. The rest are a citizenry to whom the dangerous ideology may hold little appeal, but who all the same, are disappointed with the political leadership over prevailing dire socio-economic conditions in their various countries. In the aftermath of the Afghanistan war, most of the young Arab combatants, otherwise known as “the Arab Afghans,” discovered to their chagrin that the doors to their countries were shut on them, in most cases by the same governments that encouraged their respond to the battle cry against the infidels in Afghanistan. As Wright (2006) puts it, “they became unwanted renegades in their own countries. As stateless persons, they naturally revolted against the very idea of state….The cinders of Afghan conflagration were drifting across the globe and soon much of the Muslim world would be aflame,” (pp.187-8). For the Gulf countries, throwing their doors open to the refugees may tantamount to unwittingly exposing their societies to hordes of disenchanted population. Anger, resentment, and humiliation spur young Arabs to search for dramatic remedies (Wright, 2006: 123).
The fears of the Gulf countries is ironically rather playing out in the West already—from the United States to Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, among others. Incidents of attacks by disenchanted migrant populations are on the increase. They underline anger, resentment and humiliation—all of which the Gulf States are cleverly hedging. Although no data has yet emerged on the phenomenon, rising migrants’ violence is enough to enflame fear and anxiety among host populations as a recent editorial piece from the United States duly illustrates:

I’m not sure what it’s going to take to wake liberals up about the dangers of just throwing open the borders to everyone and anyone. Here in the U.S. we have the tragic stories of Kate Steinle and Marilyn Pharis, among others, who were brutally murdered by illegal immigrants. In Europe we reported about the mother beheaded and son stabbed by a migrant awaiting deportation. Of course just reading about what happens to other folks doesn’t really change your mind about your “humanitarian” reasons for wanting to dissolve our borders. Surely if it happens to YOU, you’d change your mind, right? (Hickford, 2015).

In October 2015, twenty-nine year old ‘Julius G.’ a pro-refugee activist who had been involved in political activism since his undergraduate days at the Technical University of Dresden, Germany was stabbed by a group of six to eight men who “jumped (on) the student in the early hours and stabbed him twice in the back, leaving him in a serious condition” (Hickford, 2015).

A female open borders activist volunteering on the French-Italian border migrant camp was also gang-raped late 2015. The victim kept the incident a secret for fears that revealing her experience could, “slow the progress of their ideal of a world without borders” (Breitbart London, cited in Hickford 2015). “In Hamburg at the Lohmühle Pond (Eißendorf), two foreigners attacked a 24-year-old man and chased him with his infant nearly into their death” (Sennels, 2016). In Sweden, Sennels, further reports that

Swedish police have dealt with 5,000 incidents involving migrants since October (2015) as they revealed; they are concerned the problems are getting worse. Officers in the country have been called out to nearly 600 assaults in the last three months as well as four rapes, two bomb threats and 450 fights. Migrants and asylum seekers have also been involved in 194 violent threats, 58 fires and nine robberies, according to data obtained by Swedish Democrats (ibid).
Emphasis on those incidents may tend this analysis towards the security dimension of the migration crisis, therefore, playing down both its legal and humanitarian context. The later, obviously, the focus of a recent study by Professor Elspeth Guild et al. In the study titled, “New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access to Asylum Procedures for Persons Seeking International Protection,” the quintet note that, the international obligations of the European Union (EU) law, “demonstrate a continuous commitment to afford international protection to those requiring it. [And] This commitment is not subject to any numerical limit on the persons for whom the Member States may be responsible” (Guild et al, 2014).

Importantly, Guild et al are forceful that

[F]irst-line reception arrangements must comply with the principle of nonrefoulement, the right to family unity, and the needs and entitlements of particularly vulnerable applicants. To ensure fairness and effectiveness of rights, decisions must be taken within an adequate time-scale and ensuring access, both in law and in practice, to appropriate procedures and related means and safeguards guaranteeing a real opportunity for asylum seekers to present and advance their claims. The right to legal assistance, representation, and translation must thus be provided according to EU and international legal standards with a view to ensuring that applications for international protection are subjected to full and thorough examination, including detailed consideration of all the relevant factors surrounding the particular case and the prevailing situation in the country of origin (ibid).

Discernable from the study is that within the EU laws is an existing legal framework that not only serves its legal purposes, but also fulfils both humanitarian and integration agenda for potential migrants. But perhaps more important is that any practice or procedure that may attempt to negate these regimes clearly violates not just the EU laws but also international legal standards- a potential assault on the human rights of refugees. Humanitarian consideration obviously is at display when Greek Islanders ignoring possible charges of infraction of the law-human smuggling- embark on long distance drives to ferry refugees into their country and city (CNN, Sunday 31 January, 2016). But beyond the open display of common humanity, the security concerns mount. Only recently an EU investigation, “found that Greek authorities were
failing to properly register and fingerprint people or correctly check their travel papers” (The New York Times, 27 January, 2016). The investigation found “major flaws in Greece’s border management that could pave the way for other EU nations to isolate Athens and introduce long-term ID checks to restrict the entry of migrants further into the continent” (ibid). The government in Athens consequently has been given three months to fix the problems. In Germany, the government, “has temporarily reintroduced border controls in its part of the passport-free Schengen area until May 13 after around 1 million people applied for asylum in Germany last year (2015)” (ibid). The greater dilemma, however, remains what to do with those who have already found their way into Europe or who may likely do so but who as Cherson and Molschky note, “do not often share those values that were and are the cornerstone of Western Civilization” and who “often come to the West with the intent to destroy it” (2015).

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

In 1995, *The Economist* in its March 18 editorial titled ‘Living with Islam’, had stated as follows: “Islam at its most ferocious, is cutting a blood-stained path to the front of the world’s attention” (cite in Hoogvelt, 2001:198). Today, radical Islamism has successfully charted this blood-soaked path. But while the world cringes in horror at the spectacle of the jihadi sword dripping with much of the blood of the innocent, Islam is making yet another ferocious cut into the very heart of the West; albeit bloodlessly this time. Recent immigration waves provide this insidious incursion. The West is thus endangering the rest of the global humanity by its overextended human rights provisions as well as its exaggerated sense of multiculturalism- some of which have descended to absurdity. Those whose intention is to destroy the West and indeed the rest of human civilization are exploiting those provisions.

The refugee crisis might appear an unpremeditated turn of events, but the West-ward immigration movement appears to be feeding into a well-orchestrated long term strategy to Islamize the world. The following statistics may be quite revealing. Whilst support for the
Sharia law amongst British Muslims revolves around 30% to 40%, in Austria the figure has risen to 73% and stands collectively at 65% across Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, and Sweden (Cherson and Molschky, 2015). Turkey, which today is almost a Muslim society, was once a largely Christian society - the Christian Ephesus. This conclusion does not derive from any sense of Islamophobia. On the contrary, it issues from the fact as Cherson and Molschky have rightly noted that, ‘People are different’ (ibid). The West remains the most attractive destination today, partly because of its liberal ethos, which are easily exploited; partly because of its prosperity, which enables the migrants to settle easily in their new abodes. The rest of the developing world, including Africa, lacking the lure of prosperous economy, is being attended to with a different kind of strategy: a virulent form of militant Islamist violence. Multiculturalism is good all the way, but it should also be juxtaposed with respect for the values and norms that the arriving cultures meet on the ground. Attempting to force one’s values through the sword may end up soaking all of humanity in blood. The West, which at the present seems encumbered by its overextended human rights regimes, should thus embark on a soul-searching and re-assessment. It should, as a matter of urgency, interrogate some of its values that embarrassingly leave it with a progressively dwindling active population - one of the motivations for most Western societies attempting to augment dwindling labour force by looking for populations from the outside.

Extant human rights regimes in the West, especially as they pertain to refugees, were formulated in different social and historical contexts. Times have indeed changed. At the time of their conceptualization, the noble intentions that inspired those laws perhaps did not contemplate a world in which one culture violently and bloodily threatens the others. The current Islamic militancy is anti-multiculturalism. France has taken a proactive stance, for instance, to curb the fall-out of multiculturalism when on 14 September 2010, the country’s Senate passed the law which banned face covering, otherwise known as Loi interdisant la
dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public, "Act prohibiting concealment of the face in public space." Interestingly, the ban, which was challenged at the European Court of Human Rights, was upheld on 1 July, 2014 by the EU Court of Human Rights on the ground that the French law encourages multi-culturalism- "a certain idea of living together." In Africa, the Muslim country of Niger Republic in 2015 toed the line of France in banning women wearing full veil- obviously out of security concerns. In Cameroon, too, another African country, following a string of bombings by women and girls, including attackers wearing such garment, the government banned the wearing of full veil in several regions of the country.

The point is that every society must devise formulae with which to secure itself. The primary duty of every government is the security and welfare of the citizenry. But security precedes welfare. Every society must identify its existential threats and devise strategies to address them. The current political correctness posturing by the political leadership in the West in the face of obvious existential threat posed by Islamic militancy is obviously wrong-headed. It endangers the rest of the human society; not just the West.
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