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Allan T. Moore Ph.D.

University of the West of Scotland, allan.moore@uws.ac.uk

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Abstract

Rwanda under the rule of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the MRND government was a *de facto* totalitarian governed society, and throughout Habyarimana's twenty-one year rule, it has been established that there was clear propaganda and hatred directed toward those citizens identified as Tutsi through their national identification records. This article examines the effects of centralized power harbored by Habyarimana and the MRND during this time utilizing a theoretical framework based on the intersection of complementary theory from Foucault, Dahl and Weber. The methodology includes a novel critical discourse analysis (CDA) of transcribed speeches delivered by Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera, as well as a short ethnography of the author's own experience of visiting memorial sites in Rwanda. Conclusions are reached that bring in analysis of Popper's *Paradox of Tolerance* and argue that contrary to some opinion on the matter, it is not unreasonable to expect a degree of restriction of free speech under a limited set of circumstances when a society such as Rwanda's has suffered previous mass extreme victimization as a result of past abuse of the power-knowledge-discourse relationship.

Keywords: *Rwanda, Genocide, Power, Discourse, CDA, Paradox of Tolerance, Ethnography, MRND, Juvenal Habyarimana, Leon Mugesera, Hate speech, Freedom of Expression, Knowledge*

Author Bio(s)

Dr. Allan Moore is a lecturer in criminology and criminal justice at University of the West of Scotland. He is a member of the International Association of Genocide Scholars and of the Society of Legal Scholars. Dr. Moore has been researching power in the African context since 2007 with a main focus on the African Great Lakes region.

Words and Power in Conflict—Rwanda Under MRND Rule

Allan T. Moore

This article examines the role of power in relation to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The context is initially set through a short ethnographic account of the author's first-hand experiences in Rwanda, then further developed in a literature review focused on the role of propaganda as a tool to divide the Hutu and Tutsi populations in the decades leading to 1994. The research is situated at the nexus of relationships between Hutu and Tutsi citizens, between the Hutu National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND—the sole political party in Rwanda at the time) officials and other powerful Hutu figures, and between Hutu MRND officials and citizens. An original critical discourse analysis of transcribed speeches made by President Juvénal Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera, former MRND vice chairman, form the basis of the research underpinning the article's discussion and conclusions. In a theoretical sense, the article ascribes at least some of the causes of conflict in the Rwandan context to centralized power-knowledge-discourse, combining complementary aspects of theory developed by Weber, Dahl, and Foucault. This article, therefore, through a wholly novel combination of the theoretical intersections in question, and the original adaptation of data analysis and subsequent presentation, is intended to make a valuable contribution to the extant body of knowledge and published work that cuts across the themes of propaganda, identity-based conflict, hate speech, and the power of authority figures to control large numbers of the masses through propaganda and public discourse.

The Consequential Extent of Abuse of Power—An Ethnographic Account

Look over the lifeless body of a woman cradling her deceased baby. There they lie still, on a wooden bedframe. Scanning around the room there are perhaps another fifty bodies—all unnaturally whitened as a result of the powder used to preserve them and prevent decomposition. And this is just one room. Next door there is another room, and another next door to that. There is an identical building behind this one, and another behind that, both containing room upon room of preserved bodies—about a thousand in all. It is a macabre scene kept on display to remind any visitors to Murambi, in Rwanda, of what the ultimate result of unrestrained hatred can be. That is, the genocide against the Tutsi carried out in Rwanda in 1994. It is extremely difficult not to become emotional and feel nauseous when faced with such alarmingly brutal reality. This is not the experience of viewing a mummy from ancient Egypt in a museum. That baby should still be alive today. He or she would be a

mere twenty-six years of age, perhaps freshly graduating from a university or at the early stages of a career path. Instead, he or she is forever a dead baby, killed not just by that direct event of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, but also as a culmination of two decades of presidency and government that wielded totalitarian power, that endorsed impunity for those who engaged in hate-fuelled discussion and actions against their Tutsi neighbors, up to and including, acts of mass murder. A powerful government looked on, knew what was happening, and did not condemn or criticize. In fact, it encouraged it.

A Modern Humanitarian Disaster

An equally difficult moment came when visiting Nyamata church. The church was a place where thousands of Tutsi took refuge, believing that the killers would not dare commit killings in such a sacred place. They were wrong. When the killers advanced, those hiding were trapped, and with a combination of machetes, guns, and grenades—aside from a few who escaped or were hidden beneath piles of bodies—nearly all were murdered. Nyamata now stands as a memorial site, with purpose built mass graves for the thousands of victims that died in the surrounding region. My most extreme emotional experience emerged when looking over the clothes of the victims piled and hung over the church pews. I came across the section where children's clothing was located, and at the top of the pile was a small green jumper, decorated with cartoon characters, about the size that would fit a child of two or three years of age. This would have come from the young child who almost certainly was killed while wearing it. A modern child, who liked the same cartoons and shared the same cultures that children today still enjoy. I am unashamed to say that I wept. I had a son of about the same age at home for whom that jumper would have fit perfectly. This was not a historical issue that we can detach ourselves from. This was a contemporary calamity, that although many would deny it, *can* happen again if extremist policies and unlimited power go unchallenged.

Rwanda—The Literature

Uvin (1999) explained that the institutionalization within public policy of positive discrimination in favor of Hutu, combined with anti-Tutsi sentiment, were crucial elements in the ongoing retention of absolute power by Habyarimana and his MRND Government. Further, due to their controlled public discourse they had the power, used in practice, to escalate or de-escalate tensions and violence at will. He explained that:

Rwanda provides an almost perfect example of the dynamics that have been discussed by scholars of genocides: the existence of long-standing, widespread, and institutionalized prejudice; the radicalization of animosity and routinization of

violence; the “moral exclusion” of a category of people, allowing first their “social death” and then their physical death. (p. 253)

Uvin discussed Rwanda’s colonial history, and in particular the ethnic identity labels and precolonial origins of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa as a source of debate. Although preference appears in the literature to point toward the caste system, there is by no means a consensus on this point. In any case, Hintjens (2001) explained that:

As early as 1959, the evidence suggested that on average Tutsi Rwandans were no better off than Rwandan Hutu... Unfortunately, this did nothing to counter racial stereotypes propagated by the Belgian colonizers. Notions of racial inferiority and superiority were adopted by Rwandans themselves (i.e., internalized) and made it very difficult to construct a shared anti-colonial form of nationalist identity. (p. 30)

This indicates that the colonial strategy of divide and rule had been successful with the divisions now internalized by the population and not viewed as the responsibility of the colonizer; whether there was in fact little by way of wealth or standing for the ordinary person becomes at least to some extent irrelevant. What is more significant in terms of real-world implication becomes the constructed self-identity of each distinct group, and consensus within each of those groups. As Gurr (1993) argued, it “...is not the presence of a particular trait or combination of traits, but rather the shared perception that the defining traits, whatever they are, set the group apart” (p. 4).

As Uvin (1999) discussed, the historical power and dominance of the Tutsi at the State level, as orchestrated by the Belgian colonists, became a proxy for how the Hutu population also viewed the rest of the Tutsi population in the country at the time. It must be understood that conflicts dating back to 1959 and the Hutu uprising, which immediately preceded Rwandan independence from Belgian colonial administrators, had already caused millions of the Rwandan population to flee to neighboring countries—mainly Uganda and Zaire (now DRC) (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 58). In 1973 Juvénal Habyarimana took control of Rwanda in a coup, and he would go on to rule as president for twenty-one years. In his early years as president he was praised for not initiating divisive policies as Kayibanda had before him. However, it quickly became clear that the key to power in Rwanda was not what was documented in written form, but what was carried out through the country’s historical and still present oral traditions. In terms of the role of power related to discourse through public speaking, in an authoritarian regime such as Rwanda during Habyarimana’s rule, Moghaddam et al. (2008) discussed that positioning can complement official roles and assist with crystallizing expectations:

Positioning theory concerns conventions of speech and action that are labile, contestable and ephemeral... closely related to Goffman's procedures by which someone establishes a "footing" in a conversation or some other social process... This idea can be expressed in the image of a conversation going on, with someone on the periphery of the group wanting to have a say. How does this person get a footing in the group and gain the right to intervene? (p. 9)

So the stronger the power over the discourse in question, the more difficult it becomes for anybody other than a select few to establish a footing in order to publicly adopt a contradictory position. Instead, a consistent official position on a matter becomes the norm, and through accompanying propaganda is legitimized in the minds of the masses. Indeed Louis (2008) corroborated this stance by outlining that one of the main goals of positioning theory is "to identify who does and does not possess positioning power, the basis on which the power is allocated, and the role of differences in positioning power in the conflict (e.g., in making certain story lines more dominant)" (p. 30).

In the context of Rwanda from post-independence until the genocide in 1994, the nature of MRND dominance as a group—and for two decades President Habyarimana's power as an individual—ensured that positioning power was controlled absolutely by the State. Propaganda was supported by the President himself and through state-sponsored organizations that used and reinforced very specific language and embarked on a planned, long-term strategy of dehumanization of the Tutsi population of Rwanda. As a consequence of these prior decades, as Rwanda moved into the 1990s, it was already a broken and divided society—the members of which had been raised from birth and educated to believe that the two main ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) should not trust each other (Hilker, 2011, pp. 268-272).

Baisley (2014) identified that "Rwandan elites suggested that all Tutsi—even those inside Rwanda—were supporters of the RPF" (p. 40) and noted that between 1990 and 1994 several massacres of Tutsi populations occurred around the country. This is further detailed by Caplan (2007), who identified eight specific massacres between October 1990 and February 1994 that can all be linked back to individuals associated with the state and state institutions. This is where the importance of political speeches can be asserted, as can be explained with the references from Baisley and Caplan above to Rwandan elites and local/national politicians being responsible for the narrative to that point. Indeed Baisley asserted that:

Habyarimana's speeches drew on a past when Tutsi had been masters of Hutu peasants... the ideology drew on a (somewhat real and somewhat imagined) past when Hutu were poor peasants and Tutsi were wealthy masters... This ideology manifested itself in propaganda leading up to and during the genocide... My analysis of Radio Rwanda and RTLM broadcasts reveals that both stations exploited constructions of Hutu and Tutsi as occupational/status groups, even if those divisions were more imagined than material by the time of the genocide. (p. 40)

This explanation then sets the logical premise that the words and direction were first created by the speeches, which created the ideology, and that ideology was repeated and strengthened by the radio broadcasts. The speeches were necessary first steps from which the broadcasts took direction. This contention is corroborated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), who in 2003 clarified in their judgment of the Nahimana case that the overarching purpose of the various RTLM broadcasts was "where at issue is the speech of the so-called 'majority population,' in support of the government" (ICTR, 2003, p. 1008).

Thus, the officially documented legal explanation is that the propaganda and hate speech broadcast was directly linked with publicly promulgated state ideology. As such, the importance of these speeches cannot be downplayed, rather they ought to be characterized as being one of the root causes for the genocide against the Tutsi.

Important also as raised previously, is not just what was contained within these speeches, but also what was *missing*. So while the presentation of Hutu power and righteousness is clear, and blameworthiness of the RPF is present, what was missing is explained by Baisley (2014) who observes that "Habyarimana's regime did not warn people against confusing supporters of the RPF with Tutsi as an 'ethnic' group. Political interest was equated with 'ethnic' identity, with the RPF being considered Tutsi and vice versa" (p. 40). This missing information as part of the narrative suited the state-constructed meaning system; it made sense to leave the omission unaddressed, as this could allow for denial of responsibility for resulting violent actions. Further solidifying this view on the power of the state to control the narrative, Hintjens (2001) asserts that "in Rwanda only some forms of hatred were deliberately nurtured; inter-Hutu rivalries were actively suppressed. Hatred was only legitimate when directed towards a specific target, identified by the state" (p. 26).

With regard to the ultimate effect of this misused power and failure of any others with alternative viewpoints to gain a foothold in public discourse, Romeo Dallaire (2007) explains that when it came to neutral reporting, or that which might be critical and hold a government to account, "In the case of Rwanda, that's where the process broke down. The events in

Rwanda simply did not break through to such an extent as to create momentum” (p.15). The various analyses of public information in Rwanda at that time all point to one logical conclusion: the totality of power and control Habyarimana and the MRND government held.

Upon Habyarimana’s sudden death in his airplane’s destruction on April 6, 1994, by persons unknown, the result of decades of propaganda quickly became apparent. In 100 days, a large majority of the Tutsi population living in Rwanda, as well as many moderate Hutu who had not supported the ideological hatred perpetuated by the controlling regime, were massacred in a swift and brutal genocide. While the number of deaths remains a contested fact, recent evidence suggests that as mass graves have continued to be uncovered in the intervening two decades since the initial 800,000 figure that was used, the true number may be over one million (SURF, 2020).

Words Matter – Rwanda

As in all cases of mass violence, and in the case of the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’s case specifically, there is always the question of what conditions enabled the humanitarian disaster. While the previous sections discussed the social-historical context for division, it only touched upon the issues of hate speech and propaganda. In this sense, Ellul (1973) outlines that “propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization” (p. 61).

Further detail on the nexus between politics, power, and propaganda is offered by Dojčinović (2012) arguing a clear nexus between politics, power and propaganda where there is always a struggle to preserve power, and that programs of political propaganda are highly strategic in nature based upon specific and intended responses that emerge in the target audience. One of the most powerful explanations of propaganda, however, is from Harold Lasswell (1927) in *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, where he discusses the complicated nature and context, as well as the scale on which it can be effective. He posits that:

Propaganda is one of the most powerful instrumentalities in the modern world. It has arisen to its present eminence in response to a complex of changed circumstances which have altered the nature of society.... A newer and subtler instrument must weld thousands and even millions of human beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope. (pp. 220-221)

In terms of how propaganda techniques can harness such a volume of human beings into this shared and intentionally constructed state of being (hate, will, and hope), Jowett and O'Donnell (2019) explain that in order for propaganda to be at its most effective, the social-historical perspective is crucial, and that the flow of propaganda travels through a network system "originating with an institution and ending with the possibility of response from the public or a target audience within the public" (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2019, p. 321). It is where there is a clear social-historical perspective which may be harnessed and molded to fit the objectives of the propagandist that there can be a framed justification created by those in power within the institution where the propaganda originated and the network system's inception begins.

The success of the propaganda in Rwanda's case relied upon the three areas, identified by Lasswell above, of hate, will, and hope being nurtured within the target Hutu population. Through the process of dehumanization of the out-group (the Tutsi) as discussed by Scull, Mbonyingabo, and Kotb (2016), it became easier to desensitize the Hutu allowing them to act in an objectively cruel and extreme fashion. The concept of cruelty was removed from the psyche of ordinary people in favor of efficiency and speed, allowing for the most brutal methods of killing with machetes, clubs, and other barbaric but effective means. On how propaganda can be constructed in order to bring about such extreme reactions and achieve mass buy-in from a population, O'Shaughnessy (2004) argues that:

The art of propaganda lies in changing perspectives, and to change perspectives we have to alter interpretation, to interpret the emotion-arousing situation in a different way so people reassess its significance... This process is in its fundamentals emotional, not... some sequence of logical inference, but of emotional argument with the aim of persuading the audience to share a perspective or conjure up a certain experience. (p. 44)

In Rwanda, this pattern is shown through the repeated themes of Hutu power and revolution from oppression, while simultaneously characterising the Tutsi as being oppressors, untrustworthy, and foreign invaders. The Rwandan state under Habyarimana knew that there was emotional ill-feeling in this regard going back to the previously discussed colonial periods in Rwanda's history.

With the whole spectrum of media as possible mechanisms for conveying propaganda by the state, both political speeches and radio broadcasts became the weapons of choice, with written propaganda of secondary importance, in Rwanda. This may be in part because of the power of the spoken word to convey emotions, the crucial element described by

O'Shaughnessy above. In terms of Rwandan society, this was an especially obvious choice as highlighted by many who have written on the subject. Baisley (2014) explains that "violence appeared to increase as radio stations broadcast hate propaganda, more so than when periodicals and magazines published similar propaganda" (p. 39). While Baisley is referring specifically to radio stations, the fundamental argument is that the spoken word, with its added linguistic effects, may have a more powerful propagandistic effect than the written word alone. Indeed, contextualizing the issue further in terms of Rwanda, Baisley explains that "the oral tradition remained strong, illiteracy was widespread, few Rwandans had foreign language skills, and there was a dearth of alternative sources of information about government" (p. 39). All of this strengthens the suggestion that in the Rwandan context, indeed it is likely that speech in whichever form would have been the most powerful means by which propaganda could be most effectively conveyed.

On the nature of the information that would then be publicly conveyed to the mass Rwandan population, des Forges (1999) explains, using the example of the RTLM radio station, that even media that appeared to be private, upon deeper investigation would prove to be controlled by the state asserting that "the ostensibly private station used equipment belonging to various government ministries" (p. 59). Effectively, the centralized power of the Rwandan State was such that it had the ability to control all publicly spoken information, whether through official speeches or broadcast media.

Can propaganda be regarded as *causal* related to subsequent violence?

Not all commentators agree that propaganda has a causal effect on any violence that follows. For example, Slocum-Bradley (2008) argues that:

Any statement can be made about a person's or group's "intentions," "desires," "wants" or "goals," but none can be verified. Hence, explanations that (merely) claim to reveal purported "motives" fail to illuminate the mechanisms of meaning construction and thus provide no scientific value. (p. 210)

However, this is a position that ignores a number of other accepted practices that allow clear inference to motivation and intention. For example, in terms of many legal systems around the world, an accepted means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt is a large combination of circumstantial evidence. The judge in the case of *Chan Chweng Kong v. Public Prosecutor* (1962) explains:

In cases like this where the evidence is wholly circumstantial what has to be considered is not only the strength of each individual strand of evidence but also the

combined strength of each individual strand when twisted together to make a rope.

The real question is: Is that rope strong enough to hang the prisoner? (pp. 307)

This metaphorical concept is universally used as part of legal education where future legal practitioners are taught that no piece of evidence should be viewed in isolation when a case is being constructed; rather it is the totality of evidence that can render a particular interpretation or inference irrebuttable in nature.

Slocum-Bradley (2008) further presents an underdeveloped case seeking to negate the possibility of speech causing any resulting action, arguing that:

While an illocution may “incite” or “encourage” (social force) a particular action, it can never “cause” it... One social force may make another appropriate... However, one social force does not “cause” another... Someone “encouraged” to kill another person can refuse. Thus, an understanding of the normative context generated should be taken neither as a stamp of approval, nor as a suggestion that other options were not available to actors. (pp. 211-212)

Again, the argument presented ignores relevant context. While the premise might be arguable in a vacuum where an individual makes a choice free of any social-historical context, to try and maintain such a stance in the context of any mass atrocity driven by propaganda would deny the evidence of the effects of propaganda researched and published throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. In these cases, it is clear that a state power-driven narrative is created that contains only one singular normative set of values or approaches that can be applied by the target group, and that there is no feasible alternative. There is another problem in this same section where Slocum-Bradley presents causation under a single interpretation. In legal terms however, causation is normally broken into *causa causans* (the primary cause, or the last link to the result), and *causa sine qua non* (an act without which the end result would have been unlikely to occur). So although an act of hate speech or propaganda may not be regarded as causal in terms of the *causa causans*, it most certainly can be regarded as a *causa sine qua non*. Indeed, as explained by Cocks (2019):

As you study historical events, you will discover that things do not simply “happen” without reason. Historical events are caused by things that occurred before them. Also, historical events create changes that have consequences long after the event is over... Every historical event occurred because of a series of events that happened beforehand. Things that lead to another event are called “causes.” Some causes occurred immediately before the event began, while others existed for several years before they caused the event. Causes that occurred only a few hours, days or weeks

before the event are called “short-term causes.” Causes that existed for years, decades or centuries before the event are called “long term causes.”

Ultimately, Cocks presents a strong argument that causation may be interpreted as being on a scale ranging from *direct/short-term* to *indirect/long-term*, with any actions or events on that scale being causal to some extent.

As Slocum-Bradley’s (2008) analysis continues, the author then presents a detailed set of positioning analyses related to RTLTM discourse, the transcripts of which are sourced directly from the ICTR. She logically sets out how meaning systems are constructed through storylines and positioning, and how that positioning results in legitimization and consequence stemming from the discourse in question. However, in her conclusions a further fundamental flaw emerges where she argues that:

Thus, to eradicate the Tutsis, according to the meaning system constructed by the RTLTM journalists, was not only legitimate but the “logical” thing to do. How can the logic inherent to a particular meaning system be countered? One can propose an alternative metaphor: Instead of “impurities,” a minority can be an “enrichment” to society. Because an enrichment is something to be treasured and nurtured, the logic of the metaphor suggests a fundamentally different alternative for (normatively) appropriate action. While a meaning system cannot be evaluated for its truth-value (e.g., there is no “real” storyline), it can be evaluated according to the possibilities for action that it makes viable. (p. 224)

The problem with this analysis is that the situation Slocum-Bradley discusses relies upon a non-existent reality that in all contexts are equal opportunities for alternative positioning, and for opposing viewpoints to gain a foothold in order to contribute to a meaning system. The problem in Rwanda’s case was that the totality of centralized power, including power over all methods of public discourse resulted in there being only one meaning system communicated, one overarching storyline, and only one normatively appropriate action: the destruction of the Tutsi population. This goes beyond broadcast and print media, into all public political speech. The relationship between speech and action therefore, is clearly causal in nature.

In further strengthening this point, Dojčinović (2012) argues that when used effectively, propaganda is not simply a precursor to mass violence:

Political parties, military and paramilitary movements are, for instance, all organized groups. The aspect of “psychological manipulation” of their activities relates to the methods (intentionally) employed with the purpose of bringing people individually, or as groups, to agree on a stipulated action. (p. 31)

And then at the ICTR, through the Nahimana judgment set out that “the ethnic hatred that permeates *Kangura* had the effect of poison, as evidenced by the testimony of the witness” (ICTR, 2003, para. 243). Again, the words used by the court render the position of propaganda as being not simply prior incitement, rather a weapon that plays an active role in the conflict itself.

On Speeches Specifically

Louis (2008), when conducting conflict analysis explains the importance of speeches (and other combined oral-physical means of communicating ideas), outlining that body language including punches, holding hands, as well as symbolism including clothing worn, combine with the speech itself in order to convey messages and the specific interpretation those words are intended to carry. Neither written word nor radio transmission can convey these oral-physical symbols, and so public speeches are necessary for communication to the masses. Further on the subject of inflammatory speeches, Dojčinović (2012) outlines the significance of such public speeches, explaining that:

The content of the messages along with the conditions and circumstances of their utterance... play a key role in determining whether the message is actionable... Based on their status and authority, it can be reasonably suggested that public speakers, leaders and the intellectual elite, have the knowledge and awareness of the possible consequences of their utterances. While the leaders institutionally authorized by law have both legal authority and status, the position of public intellectuals, or other individual citizens for that matter, is commonly based on a status attributed to them by a general social consensus... Patriotic, nationalistic or xenophobic speeches... may lead to a series of incidents or eventually armed conflicts potentially directly resulting in the commission of war crimes. As a matter of fact, all propagandists act with the assumption of “foreseeable consequences.” That is the very reason why they act. (pp. 26-27)

Considering this perspective then, it can be reasonably argued that the more powerful the speaker, and the more legitimate that power is as viewed by the audience, the greater the likelihood that members of that audience would deem the issues raised as being actionable. It would be difficult to find a more powerful figure in this sense than the president of the country itself. On the subject of intellectuals, Schabas (2000) then solidifies the importance of Leon Mugesera’s speech, to follow in more detail later, when he explains that:

There is no magic threshold past which ethnically motivated killing becomes genocide. The real test lies in the intent of the perpetrator. Mugesera's speech had

brought us face to face with a genocidal intent. His call for destruction of Rwanda's Tutsi population was the decisive new element...Mugesera himself did not commit genocide, although his speech sparked a series of atrocities directed against Tutsi in the Gisenyi region of the country...The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech. (p. 144)

So it is clear that the nature of speeches in Rwanda leading up to the genocide in 1994 may be an important factor in the violence that occurred, and further analysis of those speeches is warranted in order to establish if such conclusions can indeed be drawn.

Theoretical Framework

When considering the case of Rwanda and President Habyarimana's ability to control the actions of the Interahamwe (the militant youth wing of the MRND) and the wider Hutu population to the point that they would kill and consider this to be little more than *work*, this fits into Weber's (1978) and Dahl's (1957) models of power where Habyarimana is exercising power over *his* citizens, both Interahamwe or the wider Hutu population, in the form of "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203).

Where Foucault views that power and knowledge are inseparable, with the repeated linking of each in his work, it should be clear that those able to create and manipulate knowledge are the same people that ultimately hold power. In discussing Foucault, Sheridan (1980) explains that:

No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. (p. 283)

In Rwanda with divisions in formal education whereby Tutsi and Hutu children were physically separated and given different learning experiences, where top-down knowledge was fed to the population via the state-sponsored RTLM radio station and through publications such as *Kangura*, nearly all public discourse from childhood into adulthood from the early 1970s until 1994 included anti-Tutsi sentiment and propaganda. This totalitarian power over knowledge is a clear example of Foucault's position on the inextricability of each from the other, at least in the Rwandan context.

Foucault (1978) further discusses in *The History of Sexuality* the importance of discourse to power. However he emphasizes that the ability to control public discourse can be used either for the retention of existing power, or for the purposes of resistance, noting:

A discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart. (pp. 100-101)

In the context of Rwanda, although identity-based conflict had previously emerged through violent episodes in the 1950s and 1960s, tensions escalated greatly from 1973 throughout the two decades of Habyarimana's leadership. The centralized power-knowledge-discourse held by the MRND government, and the lack of any foothold into this discourse by the eventual target victim group, can be aligned to the combined theoretical outlooks of Weber, Dahl, and Foucault. In Rwanda, the one-sided power-knowledge-discourse was used by the powerful, autocratic state through public speaking and propaganda, designed in such a way that major conflict was the only possible outcome. This eventually arrived in the form of the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.

Methodology

Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis

On analysis of the above theoretical framework, the choice and justification of discourse analysis (DA) as a methodological tool should be clearly understood. Discourse analysis is a commonly used to analyze political speech. As highlighted by Boodhoo and Purmessur (2009), where the authors discuss DA in particular, spoken discourse is the most common method employed by politicians to harness a wide audience as it is more effective in capturing and retaining the attention of a wide audience than written text alone. The authors use the phrase "political marketing" (p. 4), which is a striking phrase illustrating that the concepts of consumer buy-in for a product and populace buy-in to a political ideology may not be dramatically different.

In further refining the appropriate methodologies that may be applied to the topic at hand, the most readily apparent and natural fit is to embark on a critical discourse analysis (CDA). As explained by van Dijk (1995, pp.17-18) CDA does not intend to focus on a theoretical paradigm, although such paradigms may be included. Rather it aims to focus on a societal problem or issue whereby power and inequality are either tackled or reinforced depending on the discourse adopted. Within CDA it is common to consider linked methods of communication including spoken and written word, body language and gestures, as well as

alternative media such as sound and visual aids. Perhaps the most important facet of CDA is again highlighted by van Dijk (1995) where he explains that:

CDA specifically focuses on the strategies of *manipulation, legitimation, the manufacture of consent* and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in the interests of the powerful. This attempt to uncover the discursive means of mental control and social influence implies a critical and oppositional stance, *against the powerful and the elites* and especially those who abuse their power. (p.18)

The need for such a methodology is simple, in that it is not contentious to say that political discourse is at least partially constructed to influence the way that society views particular issues, and shape or alter the mind-set of the viewer or listener. Possibly more contentious but accepted by the author is that there are often covert, ulterior, or even indoctrinating hidden or subliminal messages conveyed within political discourse that are deliberately constructed in this way to “retreat into mystification and impersonality” (Kress, 1988, p. 57) and effectively preclude any possibility of direct challenge on accountability when the subliminal instruction or passive approval are then enacted.

In practice then, when conducting the CDA, each level of discourse will be analysed, from the social conditions that have led to the discourse being created and how those might validate the given interpretation; then moving on to the process (if this can be ascertained or inferred) by which the discourse was constructed, i.e. if the discourse was pre-planned or spontaneous, and how this might aid interpretation; and finally the discourse itself, which will be critically analysed in light of the first two levels. As relates to the discourse itself, an interpretation of how the speaker’s underlying intention might be discerned by considering the interaction surrounding the discourse, and finally a critical explanation concluded by drawing links between the discourse, interaction, and wider social conditions. This structure of analysis should then close the circle whereby, as highlighted by van Dijk (1995), politicians may start a process by either explicitly or implicitly attributing major societal problems to a particular (often minority voting) group, which then has the effect of influencing the mindset of another (usually majority voting) group. That majority group can then be observed to act in accordance with that influence and blame the targeted minority group, which has the effect of legitimizing policy and action that may lead to further prejudice and marginalization, and effectively ending the process with the same party from which it originated, having had the desired effect.

The Importance of Context

The importance of “real” context for the comparative elements of this paper is crucial. In order to convey the realities of unchallenged manipulation and legitimation, and of the resulting human suffering, elements of ethnography will be utilised. These will be minor and extend only to one of the potential ethnographic foci as identified by Atkinson and Hammersley (1998) when the authors categorize combined characteristics that may be classed as ethnographic in nature, this being “narrative description as the product of analysis that includes an unequivocal acknowledgement of interpretation of the significance and purpose of human behavior” (p. 110). In practice, this ethnographic element comprises a brief narrative description at the outset, of the author’s first-hand account of being present in spaces where genocidal acts had taken place in Rwanda. Many of those spaces have been preserved as they were found at the conclusion of the genocide and are open to the public having been established as memorial sites to the victims of those killed at the hands of perpetrators.

Underpinning Data

In collecting data to carry out a systematic CDA and indeed if carrying out any study involving linguistics, in order to achieve the highest quality and most reliable results it is important that either the individual is present at the event or has access to a complete transcript of the speech/conversation in question. While this is difficult in the context of a retrospective analysis, the nature of public speeches and events when there is clear dialogue between the speaker and their audience becomes appropriate for the application of CDA when transcripts of such events exist.

After a careful search, a fully transcribed event from November 15, 1992, admitted as an exhibit during the ICTR case against Karemera and Ngirumpatse was sourced, where President Habyarimana was carrying out a speech at a rally for the ruling MRND party with the subject matter including allegations of hate crimes that had been committed against Tutsi civilians by Hutu extremists. At the event, Habyarimana invited comment and gave response on several occasions, creating the conditions appropriate for CDA. As courtroom evidence, the accuracy of transcription will have been professionally verified.

In further justification of the use of such public speeches, Verwimp (2004) has argued strongly in the context explicitly related to speeches held in Rwanda by President Habyarimana that:

These speeches, contrary to those he made abroad, are directed at the Rwandan population and, as such, reveal the way the dictator saw his country, its population and his own task as leader. These speeches should not be considered mere rhetoric. I

will show that Habyarimana actually implemented the policies that he advocated in his speeches... It will be demonstrated that his ideology served as a legitimation for the policies he advocated and especially for his personal hold onto power. (p. 2)

With few such affirmed transcripts of Habyarimana's discourse available, and on further searching, another transcript emerged that had been professionally translated on commission of the Government of Canada by Thomas Kamanzi, Professor of Linguistics for the Institute of Rwandan Studies at the Institute for Scientific and Technological Research (IRST) in Rwanda, as part of a Canadian Supreme Court hearing into the status of Leon Mugesera, a former MRND vice chairman, who had fled to Canada in 1993 claiming refugee status. Ultimately the Supreme Court judged that Mugesera's status as a refugee would be revoked and that he would be extradited to Rwanda to face trial. Similar to the Habyarimana speech, Mugesera had been speaking at an MRND party event, only a matter of days after Habyarimana's own discourse. This is useful, as the comparability of the discourse and content from another speech by a different State actor in close proximity to Habyarimana's prior speech has the potential to strengthen the arguments surrounding the centralization of power-knowledge and its potentially calamitous real-life consequences when there is no foothold for alternative discourse to emerge and be considered.

As a tool to carry out the CDA then, an amended version of Wodak's (2001) categorization model has been compiled, with Wodak's existing strategies of *referential/nomination; predication; argumentation; perspectivation, framing or discourse representation; and intensification, mitigation, mystification*. The amendment comes with a further identified strategy of *deflection*, clearly repeated within speeches. This is a fully original element not included in any previously published discourse analysis examined on the subject.

In terms of the speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana at an MRND meeting held in Ruhengeri, Rwanda on November 15, 1992, the key strategic themes of the speech that emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, false equivalence, negative "other" presentation, legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the "other" group as excerpted in Table 1. Similarly, in the speech of Leon Mugesera a week later at another MRND conference held in Kabaya, Rwanda on November 22, 1992, the key strategic themes that emerged from the analysis included self-presentation, negative "other" presentation, legitimation of extremist factions, and de-legitimation of the "other" group that had been present in the Habyarimana speech a few days beforehand excerpted in Table 2.

TABLE 1. Speech of President Juvénal Habyarimana, MRND Meeting, Ruhengeri, Rwanda, November 15, 1992

<u>Strategies</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Devices</u>	<u>Examples from Speech</u>
Perspectivation, Framing or Discourse Representation	Expressing personal involvement, situating the speaker's point of view	Reporting, description, narration or quotation of events or utterances	<p>“We firmly sustain the security”</p> <p>“We wish firmly that the peace comes back in our country”</p> <p>“It is the reason for which we sustain the negotiations in progress in Arusha.”</p> <p>“I, personally, in the name of the MRND, I declare the every time that the MRND party sustains the negotiations”</p>

TABLE 2. Speech of Leon Mugesera, MRND Conference, Kabaya, Rwanda, November 22, 1992

<u>Strategies</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Devices</u>	<u>Examples from Speech</u>
Argumentation	Justification of attributed positive or negative labels	Topoi used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment	<p>“I tell you that the Gospel has changed in our movement”</p> <p>“Tell me, if you as a man, a mother or father”</p> <p>“our movement is also a movement for peace”</p> <p>“Some have quoted the following saying: ‘Those who seek peace always make ready for war’”</p> <p>“Tell me, dear parents gathered here”</p> <p>“now she is attacking teachers!”</p> <p>“these teachers must continue to educate our children”</p> <p>“we cannot let ourselves be invaded: this is Forbidden”</p> <p>“they come back armed with guns on behalf of the ‘Invenzis’”</p>

			<p>“we will never agree to die because <u>the law</u> refuses to act”</p> <p>“even the others who pass for <u>Christians</u> were placed on one side. When an <u>MRND member</u> showed his card, he was immediately shot”</p> <p>“I know you are men, you are <u>young women</u>, fathers and mothers of <u>families</u>, who will not allow yourselves to be <u>invaded</u>, who will reject contempt.”</p>
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Analysis and Discussion

On considering the key principles that underpin CDA, that discourse is often controlled by the powerful and the elite, and often adopts strategies of manipulation, legitimation, and mystification. The analysis conducted discovered repeated trends in both 1992 speeches conducted by President Habyarimana and Leon Mugesera. There were clear examples of comparable discourse included constructed in such a way that it sought to deflect the specific controversial topic under discussion to an unrelated area that positioned either the speaker themselves or the group responsible for the violence in question in a more positive light. In a number of these cases this deflection attempts to present a false equivalence, while refusing to acknowledge blame for groups responsible for violent incidents. The discourse seeks also to raise the social standing of the perpetrator group, while simultaneously damaging the social standing and reputation of the victim group by referring to different positive and negative aspects of each group’s behavior. In some ways this can be linked to the predication strategies but is distinct enough as a strategy to be classified in its own right. Hence, the *deflection* category was added to the pre-existing list of strategies that had been identified by Wodak (2001) in her original model.

In terms of the referential/nomination and predication strategies that aim to construct in-groups and out-groups as well as create false equivalence through this process, in addition to the construction of positive or negative traits as highlighted above, there are several further examples outlined. These strategies, in addition to the creation of false equivalence, then further seek to absolve a large proportion of the aggressor group of blame and paint them as scapegoats. This is clear when analyzing President Habyarimana’s explicit construction of the Interahamwe as scapegoats for the mass killings that they had in fact been responsible for during the 1990-1992 period (later shown to have been a series of tests of impunity in the

lead up to the eventual 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi). On examination of Mugesera's speech, he moves beyond the more subtle tactics adopted by Habyarimana and leaves no such room for doubt by making numerous references to the RPF and wider Tutsi population as being *inzenzi* (cockroaches), while encouraging those listening to replace the former reference to *inkotanyi* (tough fighters) with the clearly dehumanising former terminology. On the other hand, Mugesera in referring to MRND members and the Hutu population consistently refers to them using familial terms such as brothers, family, and the simple collective *we*, which has the effect of creating a clear division between *us* and *them* for the listener; a simple form of othering.

Moving on to the argumentation strategies adopted, Habyarimana's discourse appears to use topoi to justify political inclusion and exclusion as well as either preferential or discriminatory behaviour applied respectively to the in and out groups. Similar topoi of *patriotism and nationalism, law and order, peace and security, and family and childhood* are evidenced in order to legitimize the aggressor group and justify demonization of the victim group. Similarly, in Mugesera's speech there are further references to *peace, family and childhood*, as well as repeated use of both *religion* and the *fear of invasion by a violent enemy group*. This would seem to be a clear and planned strategy with many correlating topoi and parallels from each of the two speeches, and a possible indication of deliberate abuse of power-knowledge through public discourse intended to lead to conflict.

Looking to perspectivation, framing and representation by the speaker related to the discourse, the circumstances and narrative are framed in such a way as to clearly situate Habyarimana's personal stance on the violent actions in question and both the victim and aggressor groups. President Habyarimana represents the aggressor group as being either wholly innocent or with explicit justification for their actions, while simultaneously seeking to invalidate or minimize the victimhood of those against whom the violence in question was committed. President Habyarimana sets out his perspective that the MRND and Interahamwe (the aggressor group) are the ones maintaining peace and security, carrying the clear implication that the victim group are the ones responsible for the violent actions to which they are subjected. Once again, Mugesera takes these same concepts and amplifies them beyond doubt, moving from implicit to explicit. On multiple occasions he aligns his opinion with fact, blurring the boundaries. He continually refers directly to the truthfulness of his statements, and his speech culminates in the personal, direct stance and threat that the Tutsi population in general are not naturally Rwandan; that they are Ethiopian; and that they will be sent back to Ethiopia through being thrown in the Nyabarongo River. With this statement

he moves beyond doubt that in his opinion the enemy were not simply the previously noted “invading army,” but all of the ordinary Tutsi civilians living in Rwanda.

On analyzing the strategies of mystification in the discourse, there are clear comparisons and similarities. President Habyarimana seeks to mystify the culpability of the aggressor group by refusing to label mass killings, describing them as *disturbances*, then calling the investigation into question and highlighting an apparent lack of evidence when the investigators are not present to answer the allegation. Habyarimana then refers to the investigations themselves as *pseudo* in nature, further calling their legitimacy and professionalism into question. Through his discourse, there is a clear and intentional mystification of the murders themselves, as well as the circumstances under which the murders in question had been carried out. For Mugesera, he seeks to diminish any notion of RPF strength by describing those members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) who had lost key strategic positions in the north of the country during the (at that point) two-year civil war, weakened by low morale, this being the reason that territories had been lost. Further, with an example of government forces robbing local shops in the north, Mugesera blurs the concept of responsibility by tying the issue together with the RPF “descending” on the region, thus seeking to absolve the state from responsibility to some extent.

Finally, there is the newly created deflection category. Here the objective of the discourse is to avoid acknowledgement of a crisis and any blame or accountability related to the questionable actions, as well as to deflect the direction of the discourse to another matter altogether. President Habyarimana appears to raise and discuss controversial issues that have the potential to reflect badly on him and the state should the discourse become too detailed, and then deflect the conversation to avoid in-depth or critical discussion. Where negativity might have been externally assigned to the aggressor group by investigators, Habyarimana deflects by discussing the material issues of their looking attractive in their uniform/clothing to bring a positive light. Then for no clear or apparent reason, Habyarimana deflects central issues altogether by discussing the irrelevant (in the context of this particular speech) matter of his own willingness to help refugee school children by personally paying for their school materials. Discussion of both of these areas was used to deflect external negative perspectives on the Interahamwe and state culpability for violence, redirecting the conversation with a discourse that presented both the aggressor group, as well as himself personally, in a more positive light. While there is less than this in Mugesera’s speech, he uses deflection in order to paint both himself and President Habyarimana in a positive light, when discussing the MRND flags he personally distributed and enjoyed seeing, and on describing Habyarimana as

“invincible” while boasting about party members from rival political groups defecting to the MRND, thus emphasising the ruling party’s popularity and the ruler’s power and strength.

As outlined in the justification for the use of CDA, it is crucial to consider the social conditions in which the society subject to the discourse is set, and whether these conditions serve to validate the analysis and conclusions drawn out of the discourse itself, then discussing the nature of the discourse itself and any suggestion as to whether it may have been either planned or spontaneous.

In Rwanda, and in hindsight, it is suitable to assert that the given analysis and interpretation of discourse should be viewed as accurate and indicative of a wider power-knowledge-discourse strategy. When there have been multiple and objectively irrebuttable accounts of a genocide taking place against the Tutsi less than eighteen months after the analysed speeches; where journalists, academics and members of Habyarimana’s MRND government have been convicted by an impartial tribunal for crimes fundamentally linked to the demonization and dehumanization of the Tutsi population, it is clear that the social conditions of the country at the time the speeches were made correlates with the analysis presented throughout this article.

The planned or spontaneous nature of the discourse is somewhat more difficult to conclude with certainty. Verwimp (2004) has tackled this issue previously, concluding:

Did Habyarimana write his speeches all by himself? This question remains open, but he probably did not. According to my informants, at least three people helped him: Ferdinand Nahimana, professor of history and leading intellectual of the regime; Jeanne Charles, a Swiss professor and consultant to the president; and C. Mfusi, a Rwandan journalist who later became a critic of the regime. (p. 2)

Importantly, Verwimp only refers to others having “helped,” the implication being that Habyarimana was still the main creator of the discourse in question. As highlighted earlier in this article, Verwimp makes it explicitly clear that the words spoken by Habyarimana in his speeches tended to be reflected in his policies, strengthening the perspective that the discourse is a reflection of the power he personally held.

For Mugesera on the other hand, through the many court documents surrounding his own trial and prior hearings, there are no indications that anyone other than himself had been involved in the construction of his speech, which was likely to have been in part planned and spontaneous in form. Evidence of a degree of prior preparation can be argued given the similarities noted throughout the critical discourse analysis between speeches.

Ultimately, the centralized power-knowledge-discourse relationship combining the theories of Weber, Dahl and Foucault as outlined through the theoretical framework, is confirmed in the Rwandan context at least through the analysis presented, when considering that the propagandic content of the speeches contributed to the near destruction of the targeted victim group, and the fact that the main perpetrators were not in fact trained combatants, but ordinary citizens conditioned on a mass scale to hate and eventually kill.

Conclusion

In nearly every developed country around the world, freedom of expression is a conditional right that can be interfered with or even removed for a large variety of reasons. One of those typical reasons is to ensure that hate speech is never deemed legal and can be treated as a criminal act by the state. People are free to think what they want, and hold whatever ideology they like; however, they are not free to act on those ideologies with evil intent or to incite others to join them. Under these circumstances it would be worth considering the ideas raised by Karl Popper's (1945) *Paradox of Tolerance*, often shortened and taken out of context to say that unpopular opinions must be suppressed. In fact, Popper's full explanation is more detailed and nuanced than this overly simplified tagline:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them....In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all arguments; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.

(chap.7, note 4, p. 581)

Popper's words make sense when considering the full Rwandan context in both historical and contemporary senses. When unjustifiable hatred and intolerance, and other rhetoric based on fear of the other is espoused by the most powerful individuals in a country, it should be no surprise when the ordinary person follows believing that their own previously suppressed opinions and actions, can be repeated or acted upon in public without fear of

repercussion. Popper explains that it should not always be necessary to suppress intolerant philosophies where alternative discourse is permissible, and this aligns precisely with the set theoretical framework Foucault argues: that discourse has the potential to assist with both retention of and resistance to power when discourse is held in a society that is not under a totalitarian rule and opposing discourse is not permitted. In these circumstances, it would seem that all public discourse then seeks to strengthen power through the control of societal knowledge, and to target and eradicate all threats to those discourse narratives.

It is in these totalitarian contexts that Popper's paradox of tolerance becomes particularly relevant, as when credible signs of intolerance emerge in societies, a key strategy to combat this might involve laws and initiatives that highlight the need not to tolerate the intolerant. In other words, to resist the attempt from the emerging totalitarian element of the state to wield power in its efforts to dominate a discourse to the exclusion of competing discourse, by lobbying for a clear policy to ban certain types of intolerant discourse being held in public. This can be a controversial tactic as many citizens around the globe hold an ideology of total freedom of expression as an express right, however those that have been direct or indirect victims of hatred might hold a different view, whereby they accept that there may be legitimacy in having at least some degree of legal protection from, in particular, hate speech.

Indeed, several countries have laws prohibiting issues such as Holocaust denial. For example: Austria, section 3h of the *Verbotsgesetz 1947 National Socialism Prohibition law*; Belgium, *Holocaust Denial Act*; Czech Republic, *2001 Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human Rights and Freedoms* s261a, Germany, the *Volkshetzeung*, otherwise referred to as the law of "incitement of the people", s130 Incitement to Hatred, revised as recently as 2015; many others have laws banning hate speech in general. In the Rwandan context it should not therefore be particularly surprising that there are laws surrounding public discourse covering issues of genocide denial and ethnic identity, given the grave consequences directly linked to the gross misuse of power in this regard through the discourse of the previous totalitarian regime. Indeed, to express that this is inappropriate could be argued to be somewhat hypocritical and ethnocentric in nature given the comparable legislation that is widely accepted as necessary and proportionate in the context of Holocaust denial.

This normalization of hatred evidenced through abuse of power and a totalitarian hold on the power-knowledge-discourse relationship in many jurisdictions must be halted globally, to prevent further mass outbreaks of violence similar to what happened in Rwanda in 1994. If

not, then it is inevitable that the centralization of power in the wrong hands will continue to lead to either escalation of conflict or further violence in a number of potentially vulnerable jurisdictions.

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