Transition from Civil War to Peace: The Role of the United Nations and International Community in Mozambique

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Abstract
With the heavy involvement of the United Nations (UN) and the international community, the Rome General Peace Agreement of 1992 ended more than 16 years of civil war in Mozambique. The peace agreement and post-conflict initiatives by the international community was successful in transforming the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) from a rebel group into a viable political party. Key components of the United Nations and the broader international community success in negotiating peace and creating conditions for political stability and democracy in Mozambique were (a) the provision of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) before democratisation, (b) decentralization of humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial and district levels, (c) provision of financial support directly for the development of political parties, and (d) budget support to sectors relevant to peacebuilding. Though imperfect, Mozambique remains an important case study in how the UN and international community can help in post-conflict environments. Thus, the paper argues that success in peacebuilding operations depends on credible and impartial international support through the UN, as opposed to peacebuilding operations through the United States of America or Russia.

Keywords: Civil war, Peacebuilding, United Nations, International Community, Mozambique

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Throughout the 1980s, Mozambique was often labelled as an unlikely candidate for sustainable peace and post-war democratization by international aid agencies and donor communities, with persuasive reasons. For one, Mozambique was officially the poorest country in the world, with the lowest GDP per capita contraction (averaging -7.7 percent per year), and extremely poor infrastructure and productive economic assets—both human and physical (Adedokun, 2016; Jones & Olken, 2005; Manning, 2002). For another, Mozambique lacked all the desirable pre-conditions usually held to be conducive to sustainable peace and democracy, including weak political institutions, non-functional state bureaucracy, low rule of law, no democratic experience, and low degree of civic culture (Adedokun, 2016; Manning, 2002). Finally, Mozambique was plagued by one of the most brutal civil wars in the world that lasted sixteen years (1977-1992), cost more than one million lives, and left nearly six million people displaced—that is, 4.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 1.5 million refugees (Miller & Ferris, 2015).

Yet, since 4 October 1992, when the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed in Rome between the Government of Mozambique (Frelimo), led by President Joaquim Chissano, and the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), led by Aphonso Dhlakama, the country has successfully undertaken three crucial transitions. These are: From war to peace; from one-party state to formal liberal democracy; and from state-centered economy to market economy. After the peace agreement, thousands of refugees returned to their home and thousands of ex-combatants were demilitarized. Post-civil war democratization, while not without challenges, has been relatively successful. Since 1994, Mozambique has conducted five presidential and parliamentary elections. All of them have been held on schedule, most recently on 15 October 2014. Mozambique’s post-conflict economy also grew at high rates, with GDP growth at levels averaging 7.5 percent per annum over 1994-2014, buoyed by high levels of foreign aid and private foreign investment (African Development Bank, 2015).

Mozambique has made great leaps in terms of human development and well-being. For instance, infant mortality rates have declined from 175 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1975, to
about 70 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011. Between 1980 and 2013, Mozambique’s life expectancy at birth increased by 7.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 2.5 years, and expected years of schooling increased by 4.7 years (UNDP, 2014). This is a surprising development in many ways, considering Mozambique’s unfavorable initial conditions before, during, and shortly after the civil war. It is thus worth asking: How did Mozambique make the leap from violent conflict to “sustainable peace”? Put differently, what factors account for the successful transition from civil war to peace in Mozambique?

Based on extensive primary research this paper scrutinizes some of the most prominent ideas that surround Mozambique’s trajectory—namely, that its peacebuilding endeavor has been a success (Manning, 2002; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, & Zartman, 2008) based on the “end of the Cold War” (Berman, 1996), “drought” (Ohlson, Stedman, & Davies, 1994), “military stalemate” (Lloyd, 1995), “luck” (Vines, 1998; Hume, 1994), and heavy “donor support” (Ball & Barnes, 2000; Manning & Malbrough, 2009).

While refraining from wholly dismissing these accounts, I argue that Mozambique’s relative peace and stability since 1992 is largely due to three complementary factors: (1) local participation in, and local ownership of, the peace process; (2) the persistence of an “inclusive elite bargain”; and (3) credible and impartial international support through the United Nations. I shall focus my discussion in this paper on the last point. Namely, that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations contributed to Mozambique’s relative peace and stability. I am not the first to discover that the United Nations and the broader international community played a prominent, and perhaps determinant, role in the implementation of Mozambican peace process. Alden (1995), Stedman (1997), Manning (2002), and Bekoe (2008) have written on the same subject. However, the mechanisms and strategies adopted by the UN and the international community in Mozambique is yet to be fully explored in the literature. In this paper, I show that any assessment of the UN’s role and performance as well as that of the international community in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four causal mechanisms or instruments, namely: (1) Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) before democratization strategy; (2) Humanitarian assistance; (3) political and electoral assistance; and (4) budget support.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: research methodology and design; a brief background on the causes of civil war in Mozambique: external vs. internal causes; legacies of the
Research Methodology and Design

In order to investigate and empirically analyze the drivers of peace and stability in Mozambique, a qualitative case study-oriented research design was employed. Case studies, by definition, are rich, empirical inquiries that investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not evident (Yin, 2014; Gerring, 2016). By emphasizing the study of a phenomenon within its real-world context, the case study method favors the collection of data in natural settings, compared with relying on “derived” data (Bromley, 1986, p. 23).

From the perspective of this research, the main strengths of a single case study are at least three-fold. First, I utilize a single qualitative case study design in order to focus on detailed, in-depth data collection from multiple sources in a specific location, and for a particular group (Bryman, 2008; Robson, 2002), local and external actors in the Mozambique peacebuilding process. A single case study approach is particularly valuable for studying the pathways to sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique, as it allows me to pay particular attention to the historical context, which is important for an in-depth analysis. As Gerring (2007) explains, a single case study approach such as the one presented here can be more valuable than studies that pursue “fleeting knowledge” from a large number of contexts. “We gain better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part” (p. 1).

Second, the decision to apply a single qualitative case study approach was also based on the fact that while the rare process of “post-conflict success” as observed in Mozambique is not fit for statistical testing, it still holds great potential for qualitative analysis and theory development (George & Bennett, 2005). Third, and perhaps, the overarching reason for adopting the single case study approach is that it does not run the risk of “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970, 1984), which is a problem often confronted by statistical and large comparative studies that subject quite dissimilar cases to “one-size-fits-all” analytical frameworks. Moreover, the single case study approach allows for high levels of internal validity because it enables the researcher to identify and analyze those indicators that best capture the underlying theoretical concepts (Maxwell, 1992).
However, case studies also suffer from some weaknesses. These include bias in case selection, indeterminacy problems, and low external validity. In the context of this study, I address these single case study shortcomings by a focused logic of case selection and very specific objectives in the actual case study research.

**Sources of Data for this Study**

In order to conduct the research and gather the data required for this paper, I used several research tools. First, I engaged in an extensive desk study, reviewing the existing literature, and collecting secondary data on Mozambique peacebuilding from international development and non-governmental organizations in order to deepen my knowledge of the empirical terrain and to identify existing knowledge and analytical gaps. I complemented this basic research method with five months of fieldwork in Mozambique, during which time I utilized four methodological approaches: semi-structured interviews, archival research/process tracing, focus group discussions (FGDs), and non-participant observation. Though the four methods in themselves present an incomplete picture, the triangulation strategy (see Denzin, 1978, 2006) that I employed enabled me to construct a comprehensive account of the dynamics of peacebuilding in Mozambique since 1992. First, I conducted 91 interviews with two groups of actors, broadly defined: (1) local and (2) international actors. The first group consisted of actors originating from within Mozambique who are knowledgeable about the project or played important roles in the pre-war, wartime, or post-war period. These included politicians and party leaders, civil servants, religious and traditional leaders, peace mediators, media practitioners, academics, and members of civil society organizations (CSOs).

The second group consisted of international officials who have worked in Mozambique since the end of the war. These included staff of international organizations such as the United Nations or donor agencies, including Department for International Development (DfID), United States via its Agency for International Development (USAID), “Swedish International Development Agency” (SIDA); as well as international NGOs and consultants. In order to guard against bias and reflect diverse perspectives, I conducted the semi-structured interviews at multiple sites in the southern, central, and northern regions of Mozambique (Maputo – southern region, Beira – central region, and Nampula – northern region) from May to October 2015, with the aim of obtaining a wide range of perspectives. On average, the interviews typically lasted between 45 minutes and one hour but sometimes up to two hours and covered a broad range of
issues depending on the respondent’s experience or expertise. Out of 91 participants, 63 were local actors. The remaining 28 consisted of international actors.

Apart from conducting interviews, I also collected documentary and/or archival information in Mozambique. Archival resources are especially useful for case study construction as they are stable, broad, and exact (Yin, 2003). The bulk of this took place at the National Archive of Mozambique, in Maputo, and Eduardo Mondlane University, where I spent a few weeks reviewing thousands of valuable pages of unpublished documents. These documents provided a wealth of information about the processes and dynamics through which peacebuilding policies have been discussed, negotiated, and implemented by both local and external actors in Mozambique.

Finally, in addition to interviews, archival research, and process tracing, this paper is also grounded in observation of non-participants and focus group discussions (FGDs). In analyzing the data, transcripts of interviews with local and external actors were coded in order to identify key themes and issues arising from the data. It became clear that the emergent analytic categories corresponded well with the three findings presented in the introduction, but I will limit my discussion in this paper to the role of the United Nations and the broader international community in Mozambican peacebuilding process. However, before diving into the discussion of the key findings, I first (briefly) provide the causes of civil war in Mozambique as a necessary first step in order to set the historical scene for ensuing discussions about the pathways to sustainable peace in Mozambique.

**The Causes of Civil War in Mozambique: External or Internal Causes?**

In 1977, just two years after independence from Portugal, Mozambique embarked on sixteen years of civil war that left the country economically damaged and politically fragile. The underlying causes of the civil war have been the subject of controversy and have tended to polarize around two opposing ideological positions. The first line of argument is that the war in Mozambique was an externally sponsored project of destabilization against the Frelimo led government in the context of the South African apartheid regime’s “total strategy” for the region, and conservative Western concern about a communist-inspired government providing an alternative development model for other African states (Isaacman & Isaacman, 1983; Hanlon, 1984; Fauvet, 1984). Here, the insurgent force, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo) is
seen as a puppet force, set up and sustained by external support, with no real political program or intent to govern, and no domestic power base (Hanlon, 1984).

The opposing argument is that the causes of the war in Mozambique were mainly internally driven. Particularly prominent among these researchers were Geffray (1988), Geffray and Pedersen (1988), Otto Roesch (1988, 1992), and Cahen, (1984). Their central argument was that uneven development between the northern and southern regions, exclusion of the northern elites from government, and more importantly, Frelimo Marxist-Leninist ideology and social policy initiatives played a major role in the onset and persistence of the conflict (Sitoe 2004; Sambanis, 2003; Cahen, 1998; Flower, 1997; Newitt, 1995; De Brito, 1991).

In this paper, I take a step back from the polarizing debates about external and internal causes and focus centrally on their interactions. My argument is that both external and internal factors are complementary and do not substitute each other. Because at every point in Mozambique’s conflict, external actors played a crucial role—providing the means to mobilize domestic grievances, the resources to wage a protracted war, and the financial incentives to end the war (Weinstein & Francisco, 2005). Similarly, Frelimo’s policy errors during its radical socialist policy phase, and in particular, the secular zeal of the Frelimo government in disrespecting both the religious and traditional leaders, certainly contributed to the onset, duration, and the intensity of the war (Chan & Venancio, 1998).

**Legacies of the War**

By the end of the war in 1992, an estimated one million people (7 percent of the population) had died, five million others had been forcibly displaced, 60 percent of all primary schools and 31 percent of clinics had been destroyed, and the economic damage totaled $20 billion (Adedokun, 2016; Miller & Ferris, 2015). The psychological impact of the war was even more devastating. Every Mozambican has probably lost a friend, relative, neighbor, or at least an acquaintance. Gehrke (1991) described the situation in Mozambique in the 1980s as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, while others have called it a holocaust.

**Peace Initiatives in Mozambique**

In light of the negative consequences of Mozambique’s war, several attempts at resolving the conflict and stabilizing the country were explored in the 1980s and 1990s. These included the 1984 Nkomati Peace Talks, the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process, and the 1992 Rome General Peace Agreement. Though the Nkomati Peace Talks and the 1989 Nairobi Peace Process failed in all
senses to produce a durable peace, a sustainable negotiated treaty was reached in Rome, Italy, in 1992. I will limit my analysis in this section to the Rome General Peace Agreement.

Mozambique’s Transition from War to Peace: Rome General Peace Agreement as a Guide

After the collapse of the Nairobi peace talks in 1989 as discussed above, representatives of Frelimo and Renamo finally met for a first round of direct negotiations and peace talks in Rome during the month of July in 1990. The Rome peace negotiations were hosted and mediated by the Italian government and the Roman Catholic Sant’Egidio community, an Italian Catholic lay order and voluntary charitable organization, and were observed by Mozambique’s major donors, including the U.S, UK, Portugal, and Germany. After twelve rounds of peace talks, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed on 4 October 1992 by Joachim Chissano, the President of Mozambique and leader of Frelimo, and by Afonso Dhlakama, the President of Renamo. The General Peace Agreement consisted of seven protocols designed to address both the formal resolution of Mozambique’s civil war, and the establishment of a new political system meant to provide the basis for lasting peace and political stability (Alden, 1995; Manning, 2002; Dobbins et al., 2005).

The Rome General Peace Agreement was only a guiding instrument to end the sixteen-year war. How peace was eventually attained in Mozambique remains unanswered by most scholars (Bartoli, Bui-Wrzosinska, & Nowak, 2010). Observers and theorists of the Mozambican peace process have long argued that Mozambique’s transition from war to peace lay in one of five reasons. First, a lengthy military stalemate made it clear to both Renamo and Frelimo that neither could win a decisive military victory (Lloyd, 1995, p.153). Second, external aid to both parties (both in terms of financial and technical support) had been significantly reduced. With the end of the Cold War, support for an ideological battle between Mozambique's Marxist-leaning government and the rebels disappeared, as did their sponsors (Walter, 1999, p.145; Berman, 1996, pp. 19-20). Third, a worsening drought threatened the country with mass starvations, making it increasingly difficult for both sides to feed their soldiers and supporters (Alden & Simpson, 1993, p.126; Ohlson, Stedman & Davies, 1994, pp. 113-116). Fourth, Mozambique was a “unique case” or it was simply that good fortunes guided the peace process (Hume, 1994). Similarly, other scholars have suggested that “hidden hands” had paid off the rebels and “bought” peace in Mozambique (Vines, 1998). Finally, a large number of studies based on a “liberal peace thesis” debunk existing studies and suggest that peace came to Mozambique as a singular result of the
heavy external intervention, and that without the intervention the same outcome would not have prevailed (Bekoe, 2008; Manning, 2002; Stedman, 1997).

While the last explanation points in the right direction, I argue that it does not get to the heart of the matter, partly because: (a) it ignores the strategies and tools adopted by the international community to facilitate Mozambican peacebuilding process; (b) it focuses on Mozambique’s transition from war to peace, and does not capture the factors that sustain the transition. Therefore, while existing studies have offered useful analyses on the Mozambican peacebuilding trajectory, they have tended to overlook the most important causal mechanisms and processes employed by the UN and the international community. The next section provides a theoretical argument that credible and impartial international support through the United Nations increases the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs. Subsequent sections subject this argument to empirical testing.

**Theoretical Argument: Why Credible and Impartial International Support Through the UN Increases the Survival of Peace After Civil War**

Drawing from, and building upon, the established findings of peace scholars such as Caplan, Hoeffler, and Brinkman (2015), Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohne (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), and Fortna (2008)—that external actors contribute to conflict resolution and post-war development—I also argue that external actors not only facilitate the transition from war to peace, but also contribute to the sustainability of peace after the transition. This argument raises an important question: why are external actors critical to the sustainability of peace after war? The bargaining model of war tells us that there are three main sources of problems for states emerging from civil war. The first difficulty is information asymmetry (Slantchev, 2003). The second source of problems as to why peace could break down in the absence of external actors relates to issues of indivisibility of stakes in the conflict (Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2003). The third challenge for states emerging from war is a commitment problem (Walter, 1997; 2009; Fearon, 1995).

This begs the question: how can external actors contribute to effective conflict resolution and the sustainability of peace after war? The existing literature presents several arguments to address this question. First, external actors can escalate the costs among the warring parties for reigniting war. Second, since bargaining theory suggests that war is a result of misperceptions and an inability to effectively transmit credible information, a third party can facilitate the transfer of information among the combatants. Third, external actors can “shame” belligerents into ceasing
violence and accept a peace agreement and/or tenable compromise (see Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Walter, 2002; Fortna, 2008; Osborn, 2013). Fourth, and perhaps more importantly, a third party/external actor can also use its peacebuilding operations’ tools to overcome the credible commitment problem. Budget support or foreign aid, DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance schemes, for example, are designed to enforce the terms of peace agreements and thus build trust for former combatant groups that the peace will endure.

However, not all external peacebuilders or third parties will serve these purposes adequately. Essentially, external peacebuilders fall into two groups: unilateral and multilateral peacebuilders. In the context of this study, multilateral peacebuilding means an UN-authorized mission that reflects a consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council: China, France, Russia, the U.S., and United Kingdom (UK). By contrast, if a state engages in peacebuilding mission without the UN authorization, the action is defined as unilateral peacebuilding. Examples of unilateral peacebuilding missions thus include cases when a state engages in peacebuilding operations along with its allies without authorization from the UN.

Here, I argue that a unilateral peacebuilding mission is likely to impede the development of war-torn states and also reduce sustainable peace. Unilateral peacebuilders often intend to expand influence on target states, thereby ensuring their own security interests and gaining political and economic benefits (Autesserre, 2010; Dobbins et al., 2005; Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2005; Waltz, 1979; Levi, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006). However, unlike unilateral peacebuilding missions that often support one side of the belligerents and attempt to alter the balance of power for strategic interests, including the maintenance of regional influence, the expansion of markets as well as access to natural resources (Morgenthau, 1967; Regan, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, 2006), multilateral peacebuilding missions under the auspices of the UN contribute to negotiated settlement by helping ensure that the current power distribution remains static (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Regan, 2000). Hence, multilateral peacebuilding missions do not intend to benefit or disadvantage a particular group (Barnett & Weiss, 2008), and thus do not face national resistance. According to Finnemore (2003), “peacebuilding operation must be multilateral to be legitimate and indeed successful; without multilateralism, claims of humanitarian or peacebuilding motivation and justification are suspect” (p. 73).
There are three main reasons why multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN should contribute to sustainable peace compared to unilateral peacebuilding missions. First, the UN with high moral authority and international legitimacy can incentivize civil war combatants to cooperate for disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) by affecting soldiers’ morale, focusing international attention on non-cooperative groups, and providing direct benefits for cooperation (Fortna, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). DDR strategy enables a post-war country to divert both material and human resources allocated to military uses to important and urgent social programs, such as the improvement of education, access to public health services, and decent infrastructure. In this way, it can be argued that a multilateral peacebuilding under the leadership of the UN contributes to the increase of resources available for post-war reconstruction by helping resource diversion and thereby facilitating sustainable peace after war.

Second, given their commitment to humanitarian concerns, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN often accompany humanitarian and development aid, which invariably increase resources available for post-war development. Besides DDR, UN peace operations can include large-scale development efforts to assist in post-war reconstruction, such as refugee resettlement programs, demining initiatives, the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of roads, schools, health facilities, and food aid (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Howard, 2008). Such UN-led programs and activities can contribute to citizens’ well-being and post-conflict peace and stability. Third, and finally, multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN can encourage sharing of costs for post-war reconstruction; for which the fixed burden-sharing mechanism of the UN provides an institutional solution that reduces the risks of bargaining failures, decreases transaction costs, and alleviates the problem of free riders (Kim, 2013).

Multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN are not without criticism, however (see, Dobbins et. al., 2007; MacGinty, 2008; Richmond, 2009, 2010; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009). The UN attempts to change political and economic systems of post-war states can undermine a government’s sovereignty and accountability (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Richmond, 2011). However, in civil war affected societies, international assistance may matter more than sovereignty for physical well-being of citizens at least temporarily, as long as it is not motivated by the unilateral peacebuilders’ self-interest, but by multilateral peacebuilding missions through the UN, which are largely driven by humanitarian and development concerns (Doyle & Sambanis 2006).
Translating these arguments to the post-conflict peacebuilding context, we can infer that an external peacebuilding mission will be most successful when it is led and/or authorized by the UN (employing instruments such as DDR, humanitarian and relief efforts, political assistance, and budget support), rather than a unilateral peacebuilding mission led by the United States or Russia. These conditions were all met in Mozambique, primarily because of the partnership between the United Nations, regional actors and the presence of a large and varied network of experienced and committed donors. The following section empirically shows that Mozambique’s successful transition from war to peace is a product of multilateral peacebuilding through the United Nations, and not unilateral.

**How the UN and the Broader International Community Contributed to Sustainable Peace in Mozambique**

Having outlined theoretically the importance and positive effects of international community to sustainable peace under the auspices of the UN in the previous section, the analysis now turns to empirical material from Mozambique. As Ball and Barnes (2000) pointed out, bilateral donors, as well as NGOs, created several forums, both formal and informal, to coordinate assistance for peace implementation in Mozambique (pp. 16-17). More importantly, the Security Council Resolution 797 established the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in December 1992 to help implement the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 October 1992 by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of Renamo. Although the United Nations Operations mandate’s in Mozambique formally came to an end on 9 December 1994, the UN is still present in Mozambique today and continues to influence the country’s post-war peace in four ways: (1) Security/DDR assistance, (2) Humanitarian assistance, (3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Below, I explore each of these strategies one after the other.

**The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (1): Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)**

The UN, together with a committed group of bilateral donors, played a vital role in advancing and promoting peace and security in Mozambique. The DDR component of the UN strategy in Mozambique was unique in two ways. First, The UN provided specialized counselling and vocation training to ex-combatants based on their needs. Second, unlike in the cases of Angola and South Sudan, where the UN conducted elections before demobilization, the UN prioritized in the case of Mozambique the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
before the first election was conducted in 1994. Significantly, ONUMOZ and donor agencies helped to establish a new Mozambican Defense Force—consisting of both the government and the opposition. According to many interview participants, “military inclusion gives feelings of physical security and confidence to the opposition” (Interviewees No. 11, 17, 21, and 26).

Although the overall progress of the DDR and the security sector reform including the professionalism of the military is still an important policy issue in Mozambique to-date, some success has been made. ONUMOZ, with the help of UN-OCHA and other UN agencies and donors, was able to demobilize and reintegrate about 100,000 combatants from both sides. Seventy percent of demobilized soldiers who received training ended up with secure employment after the departure from the camps (Morgan & Mvududu, 2000, p. 16). Several years after the Peace Agreement, demobilized soldiers had been well integrated into the communities of their choice (Kane, 1998). ONUMOZ collected more than 200,000 weapons and gave them to the newly formed Mozambican Defense Force. The United Nations also helped establish a National Mine Clearance Plan to clear an initial 4,000 kilometers of roads, develop a mine awareness program, and educate the population on the dangers of land mines.

Similarly, reduction of military expenditure has been realized. Before 1994, defense spending was the largest single item in the annual budget expenditure. With UN and donors support, however, resources have been shifted towards social sectors. For instance, from 1994 to 2014 budgets, the education and health ministries benefited from significant increases in both capital and recurrent allocations while funds for the military and other security agencies were cut down. The trend continued in the 2015 budget (see table 2 below).

**The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (2): Humanitarian Assistance**

The UN system and development donors also championed humanitarian and relief efforts in Mozambique. One unique aspect of a broader UN approach to humanitarian assistance program in Mozambique was UNOCHA’s decentralized administrative structure that was replicated at both national and provincial levels. This initiative led to the introduction of emergency assistance in all eleven provinces and helped manage the long-term elements of the demobilization process (Interviewee no. 65). Representatives from the Government, Renamo, and several Western powers, as well as South Africa, organized the various aspects of the assistance program. UNOCHA's central office in Maputo provided overall coordination of the humanitarian efforts. An information and Referral Service and Reintegration Support Scheme were set up to inform ex-
combatants about available support and employment opportunities and to provide them with financial assistance for 24 months. According to many interview participants:

The decentralization of the UN approach to humanitarian and relief efforts to provincial and district levels made Mozambique humanitarian assistance the most successful ever undertaken by the United Nations. Within two years after the peace agreement, over 1.7 million refugees returned to their homeland. (Interviewees No. 1, 5, 17, & 75)

Similarly, more than 4.5 million internally displaced Mozambicans are believed to have returned home during the same period (UNHCR, 1998). According to a UN respondent:

The underlying rationale for humanitarian assistance is that if humanitarian capacity building is well implemented, it can build resilience at the community level; assist national actors in developing the ability to cope with current and future crisis; and more importantly, it can contribute to a more sustainable peace without compromising the principles of humanitarian assistance which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. (Interviewee no. 75).

The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (3): Political Party Development and Electoral Assistance

Recognizing that political participation is a critical component of peace and stability, the UN provided financial support directly for the transformation of Renamo, the rebel group, into a political party. The UN created two trust funds in order to: (1) support all registered political parties (17 parties received U.S. $150,000 each), and (2) support the transformation of Renamo into a political party. It is worth mentioning that Mozambique was one of the “litmus tests” in which the UN provided financial support directly for the development of political parties (Manning & Malbrough, 2009). This was considered a major landmark of the Mozambican peace process.

Although the UN spearheaded the “money for peace” initiative, thirteen bilateral donors, including the European Commission, largely funded it. For example, Italy made the largest contribution, over $11 million. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of over $1.96 million to Renamo’s trust fund, with the Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States (Manning & Malbrough, 2009).

According to Aldo Ajello (1999 p.123), chief of the UN mission and the Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Mozambique:
The Trust Fund played a crucial role for the success of the mission […] the two parties needed to have enough political and economic capital to dissuade them from returning to war […] that the peace would only prevail if both parties felt that it was beneficial for their interests […] in this operation it was also important to give particular attention to Renamo which, at the beginning, had nothing to lose. (as cited in Nuvunga, 2007, p.11)

As a UN interview participant noted: “The existence of viable opposition parties is an essential instrument to the success of the peace process, and money is key” (Interviewee no.11). The Renamo’s Chief negotiator, Raul Domingos, summed it up in a statement on 16 June 1992: “there is no democracy without money” (Vine, 1996, p. 144).

Following the development of political parties, the UN, in conjunction with development donors, established an independent national electoral commission (CNE) (Interviewees no. 2; 4; 6, & 19). The first national elections in Mozambique were held in October 1994. The incumbent President, Mr. Chissano, won the presidential election with 53.3 percent of the votes. The leader of Renamo, Mr. Dhlakama, received 33.7 percent of the votes. The candidate receiving the third largest number of votes (2.9 percent) was Mr. Wehia Ripua of the Partido Democrático de Moçambique (Pademo). Both local and international observers judged the Mozambique elections of 1994 as free and fair. Since the transitional multi-party elections were held in 1994, the democratic process has been consolidated by four subsequently national elections (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014). Frelimo has won a majority in parliament and the presidency in each of the general elections (see Figure 1 below).
Figure 1. Mozambican Elections, 1994 –2014


The UN Peacebuilding Toolkit (4): Budget Support

Alongside the use of DDR, humanitarian, and electoral assistance, the UN and donor agencies also employed budget support as a strategy to sustain peace and development in Mozambique. Since the peace settlement in 1992, Mozambique has been recognized as one of the largest recipients of direct budget support in the world. Budget support accounts for 30 percent of the Mozambican state budget, provided by nineteen development partners (International Monetary Fund, 2015). In the table below, for example, budget support increased almost three-fold between 2004 to 2012: from just under $160 million to about $450 million.
Table 1: Budget Support Disbursements by Development Partners, 2004-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Grants</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>11.93</td>
<td>13.49</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>4.52</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>4.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>58.94</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>46.45</td>
<td>58.38</td>
<td>86.57</td>
<td>86.99</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>9.99</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>14.84</td>
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<td>15.20</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>12.96</td>
<td>10.79</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>7.97</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>4.51</td>
<td>5.85</td>
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<td>8.76</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>10.31</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.65</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.52</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>15.04</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td>22.61</td>
<td>29.70</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>27.74</td>
<td>29.58</td>
<td>23.44</td>
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<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27.53</td>
<td>46.37</td>
<td>55.69</td>
<td>86.41</td>
<td>31.71</td>
<td>50.30</td>
<td>54.16</td>
<td>138.44</td>
<td>77.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>23.92</td>
<td>44.45</td>
<td>56.59</td>
<td>40.12</td>
<td>44.42</td>
<td>51.35</td>
<td>43.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>158.84</td>
<td>195.73</td>
<td>214.95</td>
<td>306.19</td>
<td>353.98</td>
<td>325.43</td>
<td>325.59</td>
<td>415.06</td>
<td>310.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>58.68</td>
<td>30.29</td>
<td>32.31</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>28.20</td>
<td>30.32</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>65.91</td>
<td>56.45</td>
<td>69.37</td>
<td>72.09</td>
<td>78.72</td>
<td>88.77</td>
<td>92.90</td>
<td>103.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUB TOTAL</td>
<td>65.91</td>
<td>114.55</td>
<td>99.66</td>
<td>104.00</td>
<td>109.00</td>
<td>118.82</td>
<td>121.10</td>
<td>138.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>158.84</td>
<td>261.64</td>
<td>329.90</td>
<td>399.84</td>
<td>458.38</td>
<td>434.44</td>
<td>444.40</td>
<td>536.16</td>
<td>448.86</td>
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</table>


By definition budget support is the provision of aid directly to the state budget. Budget support for sustainable peacebuilding is grounded in National Poverty Reduction Strategy Document (known by its Portuguese acronym PARPA). The PARPA is a five-year program and is jointly prepared by the Government of Mozambique, development partners, and CSOs. The PARPA has four main objectives that are considered critical to achieve sustainable peacebuilding: (a) rural and agricultural development; (b) poverty and macroeconomic management; (c) governance; and (d) human and social development, especially health and education.

Through budget support, total spending on the priority sectors designated in PARPA has more than quadrupled in nominal terms between 2004 and 2012, increasing by more than 7 percentage points of GDP (see table below). Similarly, as a percentage of total expenditure, education, health, agriculture, good governance, and infrastructure, together with the other smaller priority sectors, have increased their share from 61 percent to just over 67 percent of total spending. The bottom line here is that: budgetary allocations—boosted by Budget Support disbursements—have been consistent with the planned expansion of priority sectors outlined in PARP (see table 2).
Table 2: Influence of Budget Support on Sectors Relevant to Peacebuilding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority sectors as % of nominal GDP</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.85%</td>
<td>4.88%</td>
<td>5.74%</td>
<td>6.23%</td>
<td>6.26%</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
<td>6.58%</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>3.66%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Rural Dvt.</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
<td>2.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>4.05%</td>
<td>3.56%</td>
<td>3.94%</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>4.88%</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
<td>2.67%</td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other priority Sectors</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.39%</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Priority Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.44%</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.58%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.13%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.39%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.86%</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.02%</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.34%</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.62%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority sectors as % of total expenditure</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>20.56%</td>
<td>18.77%</td>
<td>20.86%</td>
<td>22.47%</td>
<td>19.26%</td>
<td>19.91%</td>
<td>18.27%</td>
<td>20.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>14.08%</td>
<td>12.90%</td>
<td>13.29%</td>
<td>11.53%</td>
<td>9.67%</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
<td>11.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Rural Dvt.</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
<td>3.71%</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>3.73%</td>
<td>7.08%</td>
<td>7.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>12.29%</td>
<td>15.57%</td>
<td>12.95%</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
<td>11.71%</td>
<td>15.40%</td>
<td>15.68%</td>
<td>16.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>8.49%</td>
<td>7.54%</td>
<td>7.32%</td>
<td>9.37%</td>
<td>8.83%</td>
<td>8.44%</td>
<td>6.68%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other priority Sectors</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
<td>1.25%</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Priority Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.20%</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.90%</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.60%</strong></td>
<td><strong>62.69%</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.93%</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.89%</strong></td>
<td><strong>56.47%</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.21%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Finance & Fiscal tables from the Bank of Mozambique (for years 2005-2011) and *IMF Article IV estimates (2012)

How successful has budget support been in contributing to sustainable peacebuilding in Mozambique? Although the answer to this question is not straightforward, there is evidence of remarkable and track-able progress in education, health, and good governance—all of which imply predictors of stable societies. Consider education for example: between 1980 and 2014, Mozambique’s human development score increased 75 percent, or an average annual increase of about 1.66 percent—a better performance than Zimbabwe or Angola, two countries in the region that had a similar score to Mozambique in 1980. This performance has been driven by a jump in life expectancy at birth, rising from 46 years in 1995 to 55 in 2014, and a leap in income per capita, from $233 in 1995 to $585 in 2014 (constant 2011 U.S. dollars, purchasing power parity) (World Bank, 2016). The UNDP Education Index, which reflects both literacy and enrollment, also shows an improvement between 1995 and 2011 (UNDP Report, 2014): in 2011, 90 percent of school-aged children were enrolled in basic education, which is a significant improvement from the rate of 56 percent in 1995. Similarly, the secondary school net enrollment rate (NER) more than doubled from 8.2 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 2009. In terms of provincial trends, progress was made across all provinces both in primary and secondary enrolment, thereby reducing regional educational inequality (see figure 2 below).
There are several reasons why education improvements, for example, should contribute to sustainable peacebuilding. First, according to a World Bank report (Aoki et al., 2002), government investment in education is a means by which governments can make a direct and lasting positive impact on people’s lives, which may directly reduce the level of grievances in society. Second, the expansion of public spending in education can reduce grievances and conflict by spurring economic development and social equality (Thyne, 2006). According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004), rebel recruitment costs more and rebellion is less likely the higher the level of education in a society. Third, education promotes a culture of peace (Sargent, 1996). As Lipset (1959) pointed out: “Education presumably broadens men’s outlook, enables them to understand the needs for norms of tolerance, restraining them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines” (p. 79). In line with this, several scholars hold that higher educational attainment reduces the risk of political violence by encouraging political participation and channeling conflicts of interest through institutional pathways rather than through the use of violence (e.g., Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Hegre, 2003; Huntington, 1968). More recently, education has also been argued (especially primary and secondary education) to promote social cohesion, such as learning how to work together peacefully, which in turn enables peace and
political stability (Smith, 2010). Thus, the case of Mozambique shows that generous budget support, especially when it is rightly targeted, can help to consolidate the peace process.

**Conclusion**

Although a combination of factors was responsible for the emergence and survival of peace and stability in Mozambique, this paper has argued that one of the most important factors behind Mozambique’s success was the flexible, intensive, and coordinated efforts of the United Nations, Western powers, and major donors, who were committed to making peace work and had long-standing relationships with the both Frelimo and Renamo. The paper further shows that any assessment of the UN and the broader international community’s role and performance in support of sustainable peace in Mozambique requires an appreciation and understanding of four intervention strategies or instruments, namely: (1) DDR assistance, (2) humanitarian assistance, (3) political and electoral assistance, and (4) budget support. Overall, the Mozambican case reinforces many of the findings from the literature on the role of third-party guarantors in securing negotiated peace settlements. Specifically, it provides insight into the argument that external peacebuilding led by the UN is more likely to be successful than a unilateral peacebuilding by a powerful state without UN approval.

But, while it is perhaps difficult to overstate the importance and the positive contributions of the UN and the broader international community in the promotion of peace and democracy in Mozambique, it is also noteworthy to point out that development donors often have their own agendas that are not suitable or in the interests of the local people. In the case of Mozambique, however, the efforts and agendas of the development donors were moderated by the involvement of “local actors.” Here, the first key actors include the Christian Council of Mozambique, which consists of the Catholic, Anglican and Protestant churches, with the constant support of the community of Sant’ Egidio, an Italian Catholic NGO, which enjoyed the confidence of both the government and Renamo. Finally, there is also evidence that the avoidance of post-conflict relapse in Mozambique since 1992 can also be traced to the continued existence of “inclusive political settlement.”

While much progress has been achieved in building a more peaceful polity in Mozambique through the United Nations and the broader international community, there are also challenges. Most of the people I interviewed agreed that signs of peace and progress notwithstanding, Mozambique still faces a large number of social and economic problems:
poverty, unemployment, natural resource boom, increasing political exclusion, dependence on foreign aid, and low access to social and economic services and facilities. Of course, this is not to dismiss Mozambique’s achievements, but rather to demonstrate that post-conflict peacebuilding is contentious, haphazard, and non-linear process. For this reason, Mozambican stakeholders and their international counterparts should consider prioritizing inclusive institutions and promoting economic development in order for Mozambique to continue to be a model of sustainable peace after civil war.
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Sambanis, N. (2003). *The causes of genocide and civil war: Are they more similar than we thought?* Mimeo, Yale University.


