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Abstract

Excerpt

As I contemplate the rise worldwide in intrastate (in contrast to *interstate*) conflicts (see, e.g., van Creveld, 1991 and K. Holsti, 1996), leading to Yugoslavian and Rwandan-type situations, I sense the need to do something about them. As Rousseau has said, "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). And quite frankly, there are few, if any, mechanisms worldwide relevant to staving off a future Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and the like (see Lund, 1996): witness the unfolding of the violent Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo into a possible, wider Balkan war (see, e.g., Nordland and Watson, 1998; Finn, 1999; Dinmore, 1999a, 1999b)!

Keywords: *aggressive manifest conflict process (AMCP), conflict mapping, conflict resolution, intervention, manifest conflict process (MCP)*

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A COMPREHENSIVE MAPPING OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A THREE PILLAR APPROACH⁽¹⁾

Dennis J.D. Sandole

INTRODUCTION

As I contemplate the rise worldwide in *intrastate* (in contrast to *interstate*) conflicts (see, e.g., van Creveld, 1991 and K. Holsti, 1996), leading to Yugoslavian and Rwandan-type situations, I sense the need to do something about them. As Rousseau has said, "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). And quite frankly, there are few, if any, mechanisms worldwide relevant to staving off a future Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and the like (see Lund, 1996): witness the unfolding of the violent Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo into a possible, wider Balkan war (see, e.g., Nordland and Watson, 1998; Finn, 1999; Dinmore, 1999a, 1999b)!

Before proceeding further, let me provide some basic definitions. *Conflict*, for me, is a dynamic phenomenon, a "manifest conflict process" (MCP), characterized by phases of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, and management, perhaps leading to some kind of termination reflective of settlement, resolution, or transformation (see Sandole, 1993, p. 6).⁽²⁾ A *manifest conflict process* (MCP) is a situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, try to pursue their *perceptions* of mutually incompatible goals by *undermining*, directly or indirectly, each other's goal-seeking capability (ibid.). A conflict in this sense is not necessarily a bad

thing; indeed, it may be an "early warning" sign that something has gone wrong in an otherwise important relationship that needs to be addressed before it gets worse.

What does concern me is if the MCP does, in fact, get worse, producing what I call an *aggressive manifest conflict process* (AMCP): a situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, attempt to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by *physically damaging or destroying* the property and high-value symbols of one another (e.g., religious shrines, national monuments); and/or *psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another* (ibid., p. 7).

An obvious question that comes to mind here is: How can we prevent MCPs from becoming AMCPs? A preliminary question, however, is: How do MCPs become AMCPs? Before we can know something about how to prevent "future Yugoslavias," we have to know something about the causes and conditions of the genocidal unraveling of Yugoslavia itself.

The comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution proposed here is not only relevant, but facilitates answers, to these interrelated questions. It is based on the assumption that "mapping" any particular conflict in terms of various categories -- e.g., (i) *conflict*; (ii) *conflict causes and conditions*; and (iii) *conflict intervention perspectives and processes* -- constitutes a preliminary step to designing and implementing an effective intervention into it. As Paul Wehr (1979, p. 18) puts it: "Mapping is a *first step* in intervening to manage a particular conflict" (emphasis added).

Although, *prescriptively*, an effective intervention ought to depend upon knowing something about any given conflict and its causes and conditions before intervening into it, *descriptively*, there is a "two-culture problem" between the academic and other researchers who study and theorize about conflicts and the practitioners who actually try to intervene in them. My objective here, therefore, is to propose and outline such a mapping in a manner that connects theory to practice, to maximize the prospects that interventions will be effective: unless we know what makes conflicts "tick," we may, *good intentions to the contrary*, only make matters worse.

Given that we are concerned here with conflict at *all* levels -- e.g., interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, intersocietal -- the mapping presented below is suggestive of *generic theory*. The premise is that a "generic theory" will be useful, not just for explaining, but for responding to conflict at all levels, including the violent ethnic conflict and warfare of the post-Cold War era.

Generic theory in conflict and conflict resolution has been a contentious issue (e.g., see Burton and Sandole, 1986; Avruch and Black, 1987), with no clear resolution in sight. On the one hand, Kenneth Boulding (1962) thought such a theory possible, differences between levels notwithstanding, and went some way toward developing one. On the other hand, Anatol Rapoport (1974, pp. 7-10) -- despite (or precisely because of) his own efforts in this regard -- had his doubts about a general theory of war as well as a general theory of conflict. Somewhere in between is John Vasquez (1993, p. 306) who, while he believes that a *unified theory of conflict and violence* is possible, does not feel the same about a *generic theory of war* (ibid., p. 49):

[Given] the assumption of multicausality, or equifinality, ..., trying to delineate the causes of war by only studying wars in the hopes of finding a common pattern will not be successful. ... In terms of policy relevance, this means that even if some causal sequences of war are identified and eliminated, war may still be caused by other factors. This makes the task of bringing about permanent peace arduous and complicated.

Our approach reflects Boulding's (1962, pp. viii, 1-2) view that:

It seems reasonable to suppose that conflict [of which war is a special case] does exhibit many general patterns, that the patterns of conflict in industrial relations, international relations, interpersonal relations and even animal life are not wholly different from one another, and that it is, therefore, worth looking for the *common element* (emphasis added) (also see Wehr, 1979;

Mitchell, 1981; and Kriesberg, 1982).

The mapping which follows, therefore, reflects one attempt to find that "common element," and it does so at two levels: at the *macro* level it provides a framework for organizing information on the entire field of conflict analysis and resolution and, by "deduction," it provides, at the *micro* level, a potentially useful framework for organizing information on any particular conflict.

As Figure 1 shows, we can locate conflict (*pillar 1*) in the middle of the map, with conflict causes and conditions (*pillar 2*) to the left, and conflict intervention (*pillar 3*) to the right of it. In this way (and in any case), it is clear that conflict is the central focus, our primary "subject matter": the thing that we have to explain or predict in order to respond effectively -- to prevent, manage, settle, resolve, transform, or otherwise deal with it.

CONFLICT (PILLAR 1)

Under *conflict* -- latent conflict (pre-MCPs), MCPs, and AMCPs -- conflict analysts and potential third parties would want to know something about: (a) the *parties*; (b) the *issues* about which the parties are conflicting; (c) the *objectives* they hope to reach by conflicting over those issues; (d) the *means* they are employing to achieve those goals; (e) their *orientations* to conflict and conflict handling; and (f) the nature of the *environments* within which their conflict occurs and their efforts to deal with it are played out.

Figure 1:

A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution:

A Three Pillar Approach

Pillar 2	Pillar 1	Pillar 3
<i>Conflict Causes and Conditions</i>	<i>Conflict Latent (Pre-MCP) MCP/AMCP</i>	<i>Conflict Intervention 3rd-Party Objectives</i>
Individual Level	Parties	Conflict Prevention

Societal Level	Issues	Conflict Management
International Level	Objectives	Conflict Settlement
Global/Ecological Level	Means	Conflict Resolution
	C/CR Orientations	Conflict Transformation
	C/CR Environment	[Conflict Prevention]
		3rd-Party Approaches
		Competitive vs. Cooperative
		Negative vs. Positive Peace
		Track-1 vs. Track-2

Parties

The first, and most obvious, question that comes to mind here with regard to any given conflict is, "Who are the parties?" As indicated above, the parties may be, among others, individuals, groups, organizations, societies, and/or regions. One great constancy across levels, however, is that the *individual* constitutes the *basic unit of explanation*, regardless of what specific level(s) one focuses on, because individuals are decisionmakers at *all* levels (see Burton, 1984, p. 19).

The conflict analyst can begin to ascertain who the parties are by reading through the appropriate literature on the conflict in question, and by interviewing governmental and nongovernmental experts on the conflict and region[s] wherein the conflict is occurring. Conflict analysts can also begin to interview the parties themselves to fill in the blanks -- thereby reinforcing the idea that an appreciation of interview skills and data analysis would be useful (see Frankfort-Nachmias

and Nachmias, 1996, Ch. 10; Moore, 1986, Ch. 5; and Sandole, forthcoming) -- to get at the parties' *act meaning*, complementing the *action meaning* provided by observers (e.g., the governmental and nongovernmental experts).⁽³⁾ The point is to ensure that in any subsequent third party intervention, all voices are represented and heard. If they are not, those not inside the "house" might not have any stake in preserving it -- preventing it from "burning down."⁽⁴⁾ Once efforts are initiated to bring the conflicting parties together, it would be useful to know if they are to be *self-* or *other-represented*.⁽⁵⁾ As conflicts move along the social-organizational gradient from the interpersonal to international levels, they tend to move from self- to other-representation. In a divorce mediation, for example, the primary parties -- the husband and wife -- can represent themselves; in contrast to, say, an international mediation over access to water, where the group parties will be represented by "others": individuals who may be "insiders" (e.g., diplomats acting on behalf of their governments) or "outsiders" (e.g., lawyers working under contract).

Whether parties are self- or other-represented, however --which introduces into our analysis distinctions between *focal (primary)* and *nonfocal (secondary or interested third) parties* (see Kriesberg, 1982; Wehr, 1979) -- does not depend only on their "level-of-analysis" location. If the divorcing husband and wife, for example, decide to opt for litigation, they may be represented by lawyers. But even if they elect to stay with mediation, they may still be represented by lawyers in the evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of their agreement. On the other hand, an international negotiation between two heads of state will involve, in part, the two principals themselves.

The point here for conflict analysts and potential third parties to keep in mind is, the more that the parties are represented by "others," the more that "others" will have to confer with the parties -- their clients (if the intermediaries are "outsiders") or leaders (if intermediaries are "insiders") -- before significant agreements can be made. To add to the complexity here, even the principals themselves in direct face-to-face negotiations may have to deal with their constituents before such agreements are made and/or implemented: husbands and wives may need to confer with their children and/or other relatives; and heads of state may have to consult with their ministers and national legislatures (e.g., Russian President Yeltsin consulting with the *Duma* [the lower house of the Russian parliament] concerning the ratification of the START II strategic arms treaty that was signed in January 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996 [see Baker, 1998]). A special problem for those who have to return to their leaders or constituents and "sell" them on an agreement to which they were not a party is *re-entry* (see Burton, 1987, pp. 69-70; Burton and Dukes, 1990, pp. 136-138, 207-208; Mitchell and Banks, 1996, pp. 130-143; Ch. 6).

As the analyst begins to read further into the appropriate literature and to talk with experts and the parties themselves as a necessary precondition to designing and implementing an effective intervention, he or she would want to explore to what extent, if any, the conflict in question is *interlocked* with other conflicts (see Kriesberg, 1980, 1982). If, for instance, any one party is itself conflicted, it would be difficult for it to deal effectively with a conflict it has with another party unless it first deals with its own internal conflicts.⁽⁶⁾

Intrapsychic conflicts are an interesting subset here, in part, because conflict resolution training often does not deal with them: there is the view among some practitioners that "we are not

therapists!"; ergo, we do not deal with the intrapsychic level. The problem with this attitude, however, is that in protracted, deep-rooted conflicts, individuals will often have been brutalized to the extent that any attempt to bring them together to deal with their "inter-party" conflicts may fail unless their internal wounds are dealt with first; hence, the emphasis that some theorists and practitioners put on healing and reconciliation (see, e.g., Montville, 1993; Lederach, 1997).

Among the categories of conflicts that may characterize the intrapsychic level are *motivational conflicts*; for instance, conflicts involving equally attractive choices (*approach-approach*); equally unattractive choices (*avoidance-avoidance*); or some combination of choices, each characterized by attractive and unattractive elements (*approach-avoidance*; *double approach-avoidance*) (see Brown, 1957; M. Deutsch, 1971).

Avoidance-avoidance conflicts -- where individuals face equally unpleasant choices -- has been captured by William Styron's (1979) *Sophie's Choice* where, upon arrival at a Nazi death camp during World War II:

A Jewish mother is told by a Nazi guard to select which of her two children is to be killed, and if she refuses to make the choice both will be killed (M. Deutsch, 1971, p. 43).

As Morton Deutsch puts it:

There is no constructive solution to such a conflict except to outlaw it. This type of conflict involves not merely being "damned if you do and damned if you don't" but being damned by oneself (ibid.).

More generally, avoidance-avoidance conflicts can characterize members of minority groups who, having no legitimate way out of their cultural, social, political, and economic ghettos -- in effect, being denied access to the resources presided over and typically enjoyed by members of majority groups -- find that they are often faced with equally unattractive choices.

The point here is that an individual may be unable to choose between roughly equally-weighted options -- whether they are both attractive or unattractive -- or is unable to choose any one particular option because its positive elements are canceled out by its negative ones. In such cases, the individual enters into, and perhaps remains mired in, a decision-making quandary, from which, perhaps -- with the possible exception of avoidance-avoidance situations -- a gifted third party can strive to extricate him or her through *reframing* (e.g., by encouraging the individual to alter the values attached to options or parts of options).⁽⁷⁾

Other examples of intrapsychic conflicts include *role-set* and *multiple-position conflicts* (see Thompson and Van Houten, 1970, pp. 143-144). A "role-set conflict" is a conflict between two or more parts of the *same* role; e.g., a married woman might feel torn between her wifely and motherly duties -- two aspects of the role of "married woman." In a "multiple position conflict,"

there is a conflict between *two or more* roles; e.g., a woman may experience tension between her roles as a married woman and as a working woman.⁽⁸⁾

Consider also the case of an *insider-partial* mediator (see Wehr and Lederach, 1991) -- one who is regionally, culturally and/or otherwise connected to a particular conflict -- who may be conflicted between his or her sense of the third party role on the one hand, and on the other, his or her sense of connectedness or antipathy to one of the parties. But even an *outsider-neutral* third party might experience "dissonance" (see Festinger, 1962) as part of a personal conflict between, for instance, the needs for, on the one hand, "justice" (arresting, prosecuting, and punishing perpetrators of genocide) and on the other, "reconciliation" in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere.

An inclusion of the intrapsychic level in interventions dealing with otherwise interparty conflicts -- especially of a deep-rooted, violent nature -- is compatible with an observation I have made elsewhere (Sandole, 1987, p. 296):

Once individuals in conflict -- whether at the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, international or any other level -- start to express themselves through [violent means], they may become brutalized, unable to view their "enemies" as anything but despicable subhumans. Under such circumstances, which can lead to an extension of the conflict beyond the lives of its original participants [e.g., as in Northern Ireland or the Balkans], potential third parties who wish to intervene effectively must be able to operate at the *intrapsychic* as well as interparty levels. Unless the first is dealt with adequately, the second may only worsen (emphasis added).⁽⁹⁾

Once the *intrapsychic* level of "parties" has been addressed, the conflict analyst can then move on to the *interparty* level, where one question to answer is, are the parties *symmetrical* ("homogeneous") or *asymmetrical* ("heterogeneous") in terms of type, character, or purpose (see Boulding, 1962, pp. 166-167; Rapoport, 1974, pp. 175-176)? A related, albeit more critical question is, are the parties *balanced* or *unbalanced* in terms of *power* and other resources (see Curle, 1971, pp. 5-8), including *access to authority* (see Dahrendorf, 1959)? While this question itself may be relatively easy to answer (disregarding for the moment the difficulties involved in "measuring" power [see Coulombis and Wolfe, 1986, Ch. 5]), its implications for the third party role are far less easy to deal with. In this regard, there is an ongoing debate in the conflict resolution community between those who argue that third parties should not endeavor to alter unbalanced power relationships and those who argue that third parties should, indeed, endeavor to *empower* originally disenfranchised parties. For the former (see, e.g., Colosi, 1987), a strict adherence to the tenets of *neutrality* is what keeps the process on course, credible in the eyes of the disputants; whereas for the latter (see, e.g., Laue, 1987), agreements are not likely to be long-lasting if the asymmetrical relationships within which problems have arisen remain intact.

My own view is that as long as the parties remain locked in a relationship reflective of what Johan Galtung (1969) has conceptualized as *structural violence* -- situations of unfair access to political, economic, and other resources because of one's *involuntary* membership in certain ethnic, religious, racial, and/or other groups -- then any agreement they may arrive at will not

have dealt with the *underlying* causes and conditions of their conflict and, hence, their conflict will likely resurface at some later time.⁽¹⁰⁾

Consider, for instance, the case of a wife and husband in a divorce mediation. The wife has asked that her husband pay her a monthly sum in addition to childcare to enable her to complete her university education, which she had earlier ceased pursuing once children came into the relationship. The husband rejects her request, on the grounds that he is bound to pay only for maintenance of their children, whom she will continue to raise. Assuming a male/female comediation team, the male mediator may then ask to "caucus" with the husband in a one-on-one session in an adjoining room, while his female colleague remains with the wife.⁽¹¹⁾ During that session, the male mediator "reality-tests" the husband's original objection, sharing with him the view that, if the husband were to respond favorably to his wife's request, once she completed her university education, she would then be "empowered" to obtain better-paying jobs in the future, perhaps thereby releasing the husband from providing child support beyond a certain level and/or time.

By "reframing" the wife's request in a way that is in the interests of the husband as well, the male comediator may have encouraged the husband to accept what he had originally rejected. This would be a case of a *win-win* agreement facilitated by the third party "violating" a strict reading of "neutrality" in the short run in order to remain "impartial" to both parties in the long run, helping them to arrive not only at an agreement, but one that is in *both* their interests and, therefore, more likely to last.

Issues

Once the conflict analyst has identified the parties and dealt with other aspects of the "who?" -- including the extent to which the conflict in question is "interlocked" with other conflicts, including *intraparty* ones -- then she or he is able to explore the "what?": the *issues* about which the parties claim to be conflicting. The obvious question that comes to mind here is, What *are* the parties fighting about?

First of all, conflicts may be *structural* (Moore, 1986, p. 27), dealing with issues which call into question *whole systems* -- e.g., belief/value (theoretical, behavioral), biological, or physical systems -- or *nonstructural*, dealing with the means for achieving goals *within* systems.⁽¹²⁾ Secondly, among specific categories of issues which may or may not call into question whole systems, Moore (1986, p. 27) talks about *data*, *interest*, *relationship*, and *value conflicts*. Wehr (1979, p. 20) refers to *facts-based*, *values-based*, and *interests-based conflicts*. Rapoport (1974, p. 174) mentions *rights or privileges*, *control over resources*, *political power*, and/or the *very existence of the disputants themselves*. And Morton Deutsch (1973, pp. 15-17) talks about *control over resources*, *preferences and nuisances*, *values*, *beliefs*, and/or the *nature of the relationship between the parties*.

There is clearly some overlap here, with the following appearing to be common (*structural* or *nonstructural*) issues in conflict:

Relationships ("It is Simmel's [1955] contention ... that conflict is a component of *all* social relationships" [emphasis added] [Cosser, 1956, p. 73]. And: "First and foremost is the perhaps self-evident but oft-neglected notion that *relationship* is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution" [Lederach, 1997, p. 26]);

Values (conflicts about what "should be," including *ideological conflict* [see Mack and Snyder, in Smith, 1971, p. 10; Burton, 1962, pp. 11-22]);

Beliefs/data (conflicts about what "is"); and

Control over resources/interests (conflicts "over who will get what in the distribution of scarce resources" [Wehr, 1979, p. 20]).

Among the latter, conflicts over "territory" are what Burton (1962, pp. 6-8) has termed "classical conflicts." Indeed, according to Vasquez (1993), a major issue in war is territory (ibid., Ch. 4): "of all the possible issues that could end in war, issues involving territorial contiguity are indeed the most war prone" (ibid., p. 125), to the extent that *territoriality* may be a "soft-wired" part of human nature (ibid., pp. 139-140).

Beyond the above typologies, there are, as in "parties," some less obvious aspects of "issues" that the analyst might want to pay attention to as preconditions to designing and implementing an appropriate intervention. Lewis Coser (1956, pp. 48-55), for instance, makes a distinction between *realistic* and *nonrealistic* conflicts: is a particular conflict *really* about something (e.g., territory) or does it reflect a need to release bottled-up emotions?⁽¹³⁾ This distinction can be a bit more complex than might otherwise appear to be the case, overlapping with the intrapsychic level of "parties" discussed above. For instance, a "realistic" conflict may have, as one of its sources, a "nonrealistic" component: bottled-up rage from an earlier conflict with others that has never found release that, through the psychological mechanism of (*negative*) *transference*, gets shifted to the conflict at hand (see Levine, 1952, pp. 332-339; Coville, et al., 1960, pp. 247-248). As Morton Deutsch (1973, p. 14) has indicated, a conflict may start out as *false* -- with no "objective" basis -- but elicit new motives and attitudes that transform it into a *true conflict*.⁽¹⁴⁾

The implications here for the potential third party add to the complexity of conflict, as she or he may first have to deal with the "nonrealistic" component -- the original conflict -- before dealing with the "realistic" conflict at hand.⁽¹⁵⁾ Hence, as argued above, the third party intervener may first have to deal with the *intrapsychic* level as a necessary condition to dealing effectively with the *interparty* level. How one should do this, of course, may not always be clear. One approach is to ensure that the "third party" comprises a number of people -- e.g., what John Burton and his colleagues call a *panel* (see Burton, 1969, Ch. 5; 1987, Part X; Mitchell and Banks, 1996, Chs. 4-5) -- in general, to capture the "complexity" of conflict, but specifically, to include a therapist who knows how to listen and respond to individuals whose current "realistic" conflicts are based, in part, on the unresolved *affect* ("nonrealistic" component) of earlier "realistic" conflicts. But

even if a therapist is not available, merely providing parties with the opportunity to "vent" and to tell their "stories" without interruption may provide the necessary *catharsis*.

Apropos other typologies of conflict and corresponding categories of "issues," Morton Deutsch (1973, pp. 13-14) distinguishes between "displaced" (right parties, but wrong issues); "misattributed" (contrived, i.e., wrong parties and wrong issues); and "latent" (pre-MCP) conflicts (conflicts that should be occurring, but are not).

Under *displaced* conflicts, imagine a couple who argue a great deal about what to watch on television, or where to go for their vacation, or about their children. They never argue about their own relationship, which may be the "real" issue, because to do so would be to call into question that very relationship which otherwise means a great deal to them. So the dilemma here for a potential third party -- who realizes that until the "real" issue is addressed, the conflict will not be resolved -- is, should he or she facilitate the couple becoming aware of the *underlying* issue, even though, to do so, may incur the wrath of one or both of the parties?

A similar dilemma exists for the potential third party who observes that a *latent* conflict exists between two or more parties; e.g., that they may be in an *unperceived* "structurally violent" relationship.⁽¹⁶⁾ Should one bring it to the parties' attention, including the "happy slaves," and possibly incur their wrath, or avoid the situation altogether? My own preference here would be to meet with the originally more powerful party and share with them my observations that a certain situation exists and that unless it is dealt with, sooner or later, it is likely to blow up in everybody's faces. Hence, from a *proactive* instead of traditional *reactive* point of view, the time for action is at that point before, and not after, the explosion. This is also an argument in favor of *early warning/preventive diplomacy* (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Lund, 1996): rather than wait for the "house to catch on fire" when an MCP has escalated into an AMCP, deal with the "incendiary materials" beforehand when the conflict is still at the latent or even MCP stage.

Misattributed conflicts -- or what Clark Kerr (1954, p. 234) refers to as *induced conflicts* -- are what political leaders in distress sometimes do in order to remain in power: create conflicts with others as a way to redirect internal dissent away from them and onto those others. This is what I call the *oldest proposition (maxim) in the study (practice) of politics*: "when the 'natives' (a leader's constituents) are restless, threaten to go to war." The thinking of Bodin (1955), Simmel (1955), and Coser (1956) is relevant here, as is that of Volkan (1985, 1988): conflict with the outside at *any level* can be "functional" for the inside, even for the individual personality. Hence, as Rapoport (1974, p. 174) puts it:

In many cases, ..., the stated issues cannot be taken seriously, because they are too often used for the purpose of rallying support rather than to define goals to be achieved.

Countless examples of "misattributed" conflict exist, including those associated with the wars in former Yugoslavia. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, for example, visited Kosovo in 1987, on nearly the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman Turkish conquest and launching of their 500-year occupation of the area, pronouncing that "never again" will anyone do this to the Serbs. His

actions in this regard are linked to the genocidal warfare in Croatia, Bosnia, and now, as of this writing, even in Kosovo itself -- apparently, all as part of his effort to maintain his hold on what remains of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 7). In this sense, misattributed conflicts can be viewed as a means for maintaining what Burton (1979, p. 73 and Ch. 7) calls *role defence*.

Objectives

Corresponding to the distinction discussed above under "issues," between (a) changes of means *within* systems and (b) changes of *systems* themselves, parties' overall *objectives* can include *status-quo maintaining* ("stability," achieved via "balancing" or "hegemony") or *status-quo changing* ("revolutionary") goals (see Lerche and Said, 1970, pp. 147-150; Kissinger, 1964, p. 1 [cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, pp. 78-80]). Conflicts characterized by such *zero-sum* ("win-lose") goals -- where one party's *gains* equal another party's *losses* -- can be nightmarish for the potential third party: what, after all, can one do if one party wants to maintain a certain state of affairs while the other -- perhaps realizing that it is in a "structurally violent relationship" with a hegemon -- wants to change it in a revolutionary way?

This is one of the defining features of the post-Cold War world, characterized in part by a fundamental clash between two aspects of international law; i.e., there are those who want to maintain the *territorial integrity* of their new states (e.g., Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russian Federation, Serbia) and those who wish to exercise their rights to *self-determination* and break away from those states, forming their own in the process (e.g., Armenians in Azerbaijan [Nagorno Karabakh], Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia [Abkhazia and South Ossetia], Chechnyans in the Russian Federation [Chechnya], Albanians in Serbia [Kosovo] [see, e.g., Rosenfeld, 1998]). What can a third party possibly do to facilitate "win-win" agreements in situations characterized by such stark, diametrically opposed goals?

Suggestive of a possible way out, Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981, p. 59) use the "orange metaphor" to illustrate how, typically, parties to conflicts, even when they think they are being sensible, shortchange themselves from what Pruitt (1987) calls *integrative agreements*: In a conflict between two sisters over an orange, the girls opt to "compromise" and cut the orange in half, without realizing that one wanted the fruit, while the other wanted the peel. So, instead of each sister achieving 100 percent of her goals (one sister, the fruit; the other, the peel), each gets 50 percent and therefore, less of what she wants -- clearly a less durable solution!

How can the, arguably, simplistic "orange metaphor" be of any use in complex conflicts concerning *self-determination* and *territorial integrity* in the Southern Caucasus, Russian Federation, and the Balkans? While, on the one hand, such conflicts appear to be an intellectual puzzle without apparent resolution, on the other hand, the Swedes and Finns have found an "integrative agreement" with regard to the Aland Islands, where Finland retains sovereignty over territory inhabited by an autonomous Swedish community with its own legislature, flag, stamps, control over its own state television and radio broadcasts, and "a slightly different version of the Finnish passport" (see *OSCE Review*, 1997). So, with some creative *reframing* of what the

parties "really" want -- even including the "classical" issue of territory -- the "orange metaphor" may, indeed, offer some insights about how to deal with otherwise complex, apparently intractable conflict situations, including one of the most intractable of all: determining the final status of Jerusalem (see Segal, 1998).

Means

One typology of *means* which parties can use for achieving their objectives has been suggested by Anatol Rapoport's classic *Fights, Games, and Debates* (1960; 1974, pp. 180-183): in *fights*, parties define each other as "enemies" to be *destroyed*; in *games*, they define each other as opponents to be *outwitted*; and in *debates*, they define each other as opponents to be *persuaded* or converted to each's point of view (also see K.W. Deutsch, 1978, Ch. 11).

From an early warning/preventive diplomacy point of view, a potential third party would want to intervene at the latent conflict (pre-MCP) stage, where, if the parties were not quite "dialoguing," at least they would not yet be in a "fight" (an AMCP). Once the "house catches on fire," then the third party would want to facilitate de-escalation from a fight to a dialogue: clearly no mean feat, especially given that, in such emotionally charged circumstances, the parties are likely to be *overperceiving* and *overreacting* to each other (see O. Holsti, et al., 1968; and Zinnes, et al., 1961), generating *conflict spirals* (see Pruitt and Rubin, 1986, Ch. 6) and what I call *negative self-fulfilling prophecies* (NSFPs) (see Sandole, 1987; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986, Ch. 7), where *conflicts-as-process* overwhelm and overtake *conflicts-as-startup conditions*, such that AMCPs become *self-stimulating* and *self-perpetuating* (see Sandole, 1999).

Orientations

The "means" that parties use to achieve their objectives may be reflective of their underlying *orientations* to conflict and conflict handling. If the parties are characterized by a *competitive* orientation, they will tend to be adversarial, confrontational, and view conflict as a *zero-sum* ("win-lose") game; and if *cooperative*, they will tend to be nonadversarial, nonconfrontational, and view conflict in *positive-sum* ("win-win") terms (see M. Deutsch, 1973). Another way to think of orientations is in terms of the *Thomas-Kilmann conflict styles* typology, with the various options located along a competitive/cooperative conflict-handling gradient, from, e.g., *competing*, *avoiding*, *compromising*, and *accommodating*, to *collaborating* (Thomas, 1975).

Still another way to think here is in terms of the *cultures* (see Avruch and Black, 1987, 1993; Avruch, et al., 1991; Avruch, 1998), *worldviews* or *paradigms* (see Kuhn, 1970; Sandole, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1993, 1999), within which orientations are embedded. For instance, parties tending more toward the competitive side of the conflict-handling gradient might be characterized by *Realpolitik* worldviews, with a negative view of human nature and a severely circumscribed sense of the possibility of systemic (environmental) and behavioral change; in contrast to those tending more toward the cooperative side, who might be reflective of

Idealpolitik worldviews, with a more optimistic view of human nature and the possibility of change (see Sandole, 1993, 1999).

Realpolitik-influenced actors, associated with competitive approaches to conflict and conflict handling, may, through their more likely engagement in "fights," also be associated with destructive outcomes; in contrast to *Idealpolitik*-influenced actors, predisposed to cooperative approaches, who are more likely to be involved in debates associated with constructive outcomes. However, reflective of the "complexity" of the *identity*-based conflicts of the post-Cold war world, when the *basic human needs* of normally *Idealpolitik*-type actors for *recognition, identity, and security* (see Burton, 1997), have been violated and frustrated, these actors, too, might be associated with competitive approaches, fights, and destructive outcomes. We have here, in other words, an example of *equifinality*: different paradigmatic sources of violent conflict behavior. In any case, as Kriesberg reminds us, "escalation [of MCPs into AMCPs] is not inevitable and endless" (1982, p. 319); conflicts can, indeed, be "waged constructively" (1998).

Environments

Conflict analysts and potential third parties would also want to know whether parties' conflict/conflict handling *environments* contain or do not contain mechanisms for controlling or resolving conflicts. According to Rapoport (1974, p. 175), there are *endogenous* conflicts:

wherein the conflicting systems are parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for maintaining a steady state, which may include mechanisms for controlling or resolving conflict between the sub-systems;

in contrast to *exogenous* conflicts, where "there may be no "super-system to exercise control or resolve conflict".⁽¹⁷⁾

If an environment is primarily *exogenous* within which a latent conflict or MCP is developing or an AMCP is in full bloom, then a third party would have to work much harder than would be the case in a primarily endogenous environment, to move the parties away from fights and toward debates. To the extent that the third party is successful, she or he (or they) might want to encourage the parties, as part of their agreement, to put mechanisms in place such that, "next time," they do not have to "burn the house down." What we are talking about here is helping the parties to craft a response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's dictum that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them."

If, on the other hand, an environment is basically *endogenous*, but the parties are unaware of the availability of existing mechanisms, then the third party can sensitize and work with them to activate such mechanisms; e.g., the various early warning, conflict prevention, and dispute resolution mechanisms associated with the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*

(OSCE); e.g., the *High Commissioner on National Minorities* (HCNM) (see Hopmann, forthcoming; OSCE Annual Report, 1997; *OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures*, 1998; Zaagman and Thorburn, 1997).

Once conflict analysts/potential third parties have ascertained answers to these and other questions subsumed under Pillar 1 concerning parties, issues, objectives, means, orientations, and environments, ⁽¹⁸⁾ they are then poised to deal with Pillar 2: the causes and conditions of a particular latent conflict, MCP, or AMCP. They have to understand what drives the conflict before they can decide what, if anything, they can do about it.

CONFLICT CAUSES AND CONDITIONS (PILLAR 2)

Given the complexity of conflict, under *conflict causes and conditions*, conflict analysts and potential third parties would want to know about the potential sources of conflict operative at, e.g., the (a) *individual* (biological, physiological, psychological); (b) *societal* (political, economic, social); (c) *international*; and (d) *global/ecological* levels (see Waltz, 1959; North, 1990). No matter at what level a conflict occurs -- at the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, or international levels -- factors operative at each of these four explanatory levels may be impacting the conflict (although, depending upon the level at which the conflict occurs, perhaps in terms of varying "weights"). And if the causes and conditions of a conflict are multi-level, then attempts to deal with it must be multi-level as well.

A major problem here is that most of us obtain our degrees or otherwise become professionally competent in terms of only *one* field; e.g., we are *either* biologists, psychologists, anthropologists, historians, sociologists, political scientists, international relationists, philosophers, *or* something else (including "scholar" *or* "practitioner"), but not "all of the above." This disciplinary fragmentation of knowledge into zealously guarded "sovereign units" breeds arrogant ethnocentrism and comedic, if not also dangerous replays of the scenario of the three blind men, each assuming that the bit of the elephant he has grabbed onto represents the totality of the beast.

Again, given the complexity of conflict -- and the compelling thesis of *complexity theory* that "everything is connected to everything else" (see Waldrop, 1992), including "nature" *and* "nurture" (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 8) -- we need all the bits or, in our case, levels represented. Otherwise, the equally compelling tendency toward *single-factor*, "parsimonious" theories may further exacerbate, rather than facilitate solutions to, complex problems.

Accordingly, I have identified a variety of potential causes and conditions of violent conflict operative at the four explanatory levels, from which I have distilled the following embryonic *generic theory* (see Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6):

(1) There appears to be a *physiological mechanism* (inclusive of, e.g., the *hypothalamus* and *amygdala*) that requires some kind of stimulation to be activated to produce violent reactions, which can nevertheless be influenced by *learning* (Scott, 1958; Bandura, 1973).

(2) During periods of threatened or actual violations of an actor's *basic needs* for, among others, *recognition, identity, and security*, which may reflect *territoriality* (Vasquez, 1993), elements of this physiological mechanism (specifically, the *limbic system*) may come to dominate the actor's "neocortical rationality" (an example of MacLean's [1975, 1978] *schizophysiology*), increasing the probability of a violent response to the perceived source (or a surrogate of the source) of the *frustrated* needs (Davies, 1962, 1973, 1986; Burton, 1979, 1990a, 1990b, 1997; Dollard, et al., 1939).

(3) *Frustration* can be fed by perceived *structural* (and *cultural*) *violence* (Galtung, 1969, 1996) at various levels of the actor's external environment, e.g., *rank disequilibrium* (Galtung, 1964) or *relative deprivation* (Gurr, 1970).

(4) The frustration-of-needs/aggression nexus is both stimulated by, and in turn stimulates, *ethnocentrism* (Sumner, 1906) and *Realpolitik*.

(5) When two or more actors so characterized are parties to a conflict, then frustration-of-needs/aggression can generate a quasi-deterministic spiral, reflective of Richardson's (1939, 1960) *action-reaction processes* (where "men" in particular *do* "stop to think," but in terms of *Realpolitik*), with reciprocal, "imitated" increases in the capability to wage war, and in other "steps to war" (Vasquez, 1993). The more involved in this process the actors become, the more they will tend to *overperceive* and *overreact* to threatened and actual assaults to needs (Zinnes, et al., 1961; O. Holsti, et al., 1968), even in cases where their capabilities have been reduced (Leng, 1983). This will fuel further the spiral (and MacLean's schizophysiology/Koestler's [1967, 1978] "*Ghost in the Machine*"), and increase the probability of generating *negative self-fulfilling prophecies* (NSFPs) (Sandole, 1984, 1986, 1987).

(6) These NSFPs may be reflective of *self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes* as well as of *action-reaction processes*, or a combination of both. Action-reaction processes can operate independently of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes (*eigendynamik*), but over time, in protracted conflict situations, will probably give rise to the latter (a "*culture of violence*"). These can then either operate independently of action-reaction processes or encourage their development, such that action-reaction processes can be viewed as a special case of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes. In either case, regardless of which is "chicken" and which is "egg," each of these two variants of NSFPs would seem to be able to give rise to, and *interact* with the other.

(7) NSFPs, or *conflicts-as-process* (as well as *conflicts-as-startup conditions* [e.g., relative deprivation]) can be further exacerbated by environmental "shocks" and uncertainties associated with developments at the international and global level: among others, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (M. Kaplan, 1957); the "Malthusian nightmare revisited" (Choucri and North, 1975; Clark, 1989; Mathews, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Homer-Dixon, et al., 1993); the collapse of previously existing political and other systems, and corresponding increases in the number of political units and in territorial contiguity; and increases in the amount of violence and war worldwide.

(8) "Conflict-as-process" is where third parties enter the scene, and their "trick" is to create the "magic" by which *Realpolitik*-driven competitive processes can be replaced (or at least supplemented) by *Idealpolitik*-based cooperative processes of conflict resolution.

CONFLICT INTERVENTION (PILLAR 3)

This takes us into *conflict intervention* where, prior to acting, various types of potential third parties -- e.g., *activists, advocates, researchers (fact-finders), mediators (trainers), enforcers* (see Laue and Cormick, 1978; Laue, 1987; Kriesberg, 1982, Ch. 7; and Mitchell, 1993) -- would want to be clear about their own objectives, which could include any or some combination of the following:

(a) (*violent*) *conflict prevention*: stop the house from catching on fire (e.g., the mission of the UN Preventive Deployment Force [UNPREDEP] in Macedonia);

(b) *conflict management*: prevent an existing fire from spreading (e.g., the mission of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia);

(c) *conflict settlement*: put the fire out, forcefully if necessary (e.g., the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in August and September 1995 and subsequent missions of the NATO-led Implementation Force [IFOR] and Stabilization Force [SFOR] in Bosnia);

(d) *conflict resolution*: deal with the underlying causes and conditions (the "incendiary materials") of the fire at hand; and

(e) *conflict transformation (provention)*: deal with the long-term relationships among the surviving occupants of the house, and between them and their "neighbors," such that, "next time," they can resort to less lethal means of conflict handling than burning down the house (e.g., the objectives of the European Union [EU] to transcend the narrowly defined sovereignties and nationalisms of the state system, and achieve *common* ["win-win"] security).

To put this another way, in terms of categories developed by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), potential third parties would want to be clear about whether their objectives were: (1) *preventive diplomacy* ([violent] conflict prevention); (2) *peacemaking* (conflict settlement/resolution); (3) *peacekeeping* (conflict management); and/or (4) *peacebuilding* (conflict resolution/transformation [*provention*]).

No matter how the third party conceives of his or her goals, in order to facilitate achieving any one of them, any sequenced combination, or all of them, *timing* will be a factor (see Wehr, 1979; Kriesberg, 1982, 1987; Moore, 1986; Zartman, 1989; Haass, 1990; Stedman, 1991; Kleiboer, 1994; and Mitchell, 1995/1996, forthcoming). Also, she or he can reflect or otherwise choose any of the following orientations to conflict handling:

(a) *competitive* and *cooperative* processes (see above);

(b) *negative peace* (prevention/cessation of hostilities) and *positive peace* (elimination of underlying causes and conditions of hostilities, including *structural* [and *cultural*] *violence*); and

(c) *track-1* (governmental) and *track-2* (nongovernmental) processes of conflict resolution (see McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

Traditionally, track-1 (governmental) actors have used competitive processes (but more and more, cooperative processes as well) to achieve and maintain negative peace (elimination of hostilities). Negative peace is fine as far as it goes, but since it does not deal with underlying causes and conditions, it may not go far enough: the "peace" will remain fragile, always at risk of breaking down (e.g., as in Cyprus or Bosnia). Track-2 (nongovernmental) actors, on the other hand, use cooperative processes -- e.g., training,⁽¹⁹⁾ problemsolving workshops, facilitation, conciliation, mediation (with more of a *transformational* than a *transactional* bent⁽²⁰⁾) -- to achieve and maintain positive peace (see Burton, 1969, 1987, 1990a, 1997; Burton and Dukes, 1990; Fisher and Keashly, 1991; Kelman, 1990; Mitchell and Banks, 1996).

There is a need, therefore, for a "*paradigm shift*," not to replace track 1 with track 2, but, as a testimony to the *complexities* of post-Cold War conflicts, to *complement* one with the other, using whatever it takes -- singly or in combination, once or in sequence (see Fisher and Keashly, 1991) -- to deal with conflicts at various stages in their development.⁽²¹⁾

CONCLUSION

What we have attempted here is to lay out the parameters (and some content) of a comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution, initially at the *macro* level as a basis for organizing information on the field as a whole, but also at the *micro* level which we believe to be useful for (a) determining what is going on in any (potential) conflict situation and (b) why, before (c) we can decide what, if anything, we can do about it. Although a variation on the theme of the *rational actor model*, we think that the mapping can be helpful in emotionally charged situations where *even* third parties are not immune!

And just as police officers and peacekeepers carry laminated plastic cards indicating their "rules of engagement,"⁽²²⁾ so we believe that third parties can carry cards containing something like the basic structure of the three-pillar mapping proposed here (again, see Figure 1) as a checklist of what to pay attention to, and in what order, when "the going gets tough!"⁽²³⁾ Some caveats are in order here: the conflict analyst/potential third party should realize that the 3-pillar mapping represents a *static* listing of items, e.g., potential "startup conditions." Once a latent conflict has developed into an MCP, or an MCP has escalated into an AMCP, a "conflict-as-startup conditions" may be overtaken by a "conflict-as-process." What this means is that the third party must deal first with the *dynamic* "process" -- must first put out the "fire" -- before dealing with the "startup conditions," keeping in mind that, "[b]ecause a conflict is a social process and is continually changing, any map of it will be valid for only a certain period of time and must be periodically updated" (Wehr, 1979, p. 19); also, that his or her "mere presence" in the "conflict space" of the parties will likely affect it in some way, thereby rendering problematic concepts

such as *objectivity* and even *neutrality* itself. As Laue (1987, p. 20) puts it:

All intervention alters the power configuration among the parties, thus all conflict intervention is advocacy. *There are no neutrals* (emphasis added). (Also see Kriesberg, 1982, Ch. 7; Benjamin, 1990; Cobb and Rifkin, 1991; Sandole, 1984, 1987.)

And here we return to the "two-culture problem" mentioned earlier: there are those in conflict analysis and resolution who deal with "startup conditions" and those who deal with "process." Practitioners intervening into "conflicts-as-process" may deal not only initially but *only* with process. The problem is, once the fire has been put out, unless the underlying "startup conditions" -- the "incendiary materials" -- are dealt with, the fire may reoccur.

The violent ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia are classic examples in this regard. Through conflict-settlement/conflict-management (peacemaking/peacekeeping) measures, the Dayton Peace accords have stopped the "conflict-as-process" in Bosnia; they have imposed negative peace on the warring Croats, Serbs, and Bosniacs. However, Dayton has yet to achieve positive peace: to deal with the long-term, deep-rooted "conflicts-as-startup conditions" through conflict resolution and transformation (peacebuilding) measures. The implication is that "conflicts-as-process" could easily be resurrected in Bosnia (especially given the situation in Kosovo!⁽²⁴⁾

). The mapping should remind us, therefore, that once we pay attention to the immediacy of escalating processes -- "fires" -- there are long-term conditions that we have to deal with later on.

To conclude, what we have attempted here is to give some "order" to the bewildering array of knowledge on conflict and conflict resolution and in the process, stimulate (further) debate on the utility of (the) mapping and allow readers to fill in the blanks themselves, going beyond what has been attempted here. The field (and our "global commons") could be better for it!

Notes

1. An earlier version, basically an abstract, of this chapter appears in Sandole (1998a).
2. For a comprehensive treatment of conflict dealing with these (or similar) and other phases, see Kriesberg (1982), who has:

traced the full cycle of any specific social conflict -- from its underlying conditions and emergence, to choosing how to conduct the conflict, to its escalation, deescalation, termination, and outcome, and, finally, to the longer run and indirect consequences of all that went on before (ibid., p. 317).
3. "Act meaning" refers to the meaning of events and actors' behaviors as defined by the *actors* themselves, while "action meaning" refers to events and the meaning of actors' behaviors as defined by *observers* (see A. Kaplan, 1964, pp. 32-33, 139-143).

4. This is, perhaps, a major reason why former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987, pp. 194-195) talked about a "common European home" as a metaphor for emphasizing that *common security* should -- and to some extent, has -- come to characterize post-Cold War relations between East and West; more specifically, that any future peace and security arrangement for Europe should include *all* relevant actors (including Russia).

5. In this regard, Mack and Snyder (1957; in Smith, 1971, p. 10) mention (a) *primary, face-to-face* vs. *secondary, mediated conflicts*; and (b) *personal subjective* vs. *impersonal objective conflicts*.

6. Contrariwise, as will be discussed later, conflicts with the "outside" can be useful for the "inside," having a beneficial, stabilizing, integrating effect on it (see Bodin, 1955; Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Volkan, 1985, 1988).

7. In avoidance-avoidance cases, the individual may either surrender apathetically to the "inevitable" or, metaphorically or otherwise, "blast" his or her way into the consciousness of the majority, perhaps at the expense of his/her own and/or others' lives. In effect, it is not hard to imagine such an individual engaging in acts of "sabotage" or other acts of "terrorism," at least as defined by those against whom such acts are, or are perceived to be, directed.

8. In this particular example, the multiple-position conflict encompasses the aforementioned role-set conflict; i.e., the married woman part of the conflict with the working woman further breaks down into the conflicting mother and wife components of the married woman role.

9. Fred Parkinson (1977, pp. 202-203) has even advanced the provocative argument that, in order to operate effectively at the intrapsychic level, potential third parties *themselves* must first undergo *self-analysis*:

It would seem ... that before he attempts to act as "mediary" within the difficult and highly complex framework of intergroup therapy, the *completion of intensive psychoanalysis on the part of the therapist* would represent an essential requirement. ... It seems ... downright astonishing that Burton, Doob, and Kelman -- concerned with the resolution of intergroup conflict -- should remain altogether silent on this supremely important aspect of their endeavours.

How can a "mediary" ... be expected to accomplish the task of uncovering hidden motives on the part of the disputants without having first gone through the hard discipline of psychoanalysis in order to recognize his own subconscious motivations? The latter are bound to come into play at some stage in the proceedings. If he is not thus qualified, he will run the grave risk of carrying his unrecognized subconscious motivations into the process of intergroup analysis, thus complicating rather than facilitating his own task.

What Parkinson is referring to here, of course, is the interesting (if not fascinating) phenomenon of *countertransference*, whereby intermediaries -- like their counterparts in psychotherapy -- may unconsciously, but illogically, inappropriately, and perhaps counterproductively, project "lessons learned" from earlier experiences onto the conflict at hand (see Levine, 1952, pp. 339-344).

10. In recent years, Galtung (1996, p. 196) has added *cultural violence* to his typology of violence; i.e.,

those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence -- exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) -- that can be used to *justify* or *legitimize* direct or structural violence. ... The study of *cultural violence* [thus] highlights the way in which the *act* of direct violence and the *fact* of structural violence are *legitimized* and thus *rendered acceptable in society* (emphasis added).

11. The principle applied here is a variation on the theme of the *peer interview*, pioneered by Hans Toch (1966), "in which policemen are interviewed by other police officers and violent convicts by other inmates" (Megargee and Hokanson, 1970, p. 161). The gender parallelism in our case -- with male comediators working with male parties and female comediators, with female parties -- also highlights the possibility of *gender differences* in conflict and conflict-handling behavior (in this regard, see Pruitt, et al., 1986; Brock-Utne, 1989; Maxwell, 1992; Taylor and Miller, 1994; and Fukuyama, 1998).

12. Correspondingly, Coser (1956, pp. 72-80) talks about *basic cleavages* vs. conflicts over means and subordinate ends *within* a consensual framework; Kriesberg (1982, Ch. 2) talks about *dissensual* vs. *consensual* conflicts; Simpson (1937, p. 17) talks about *noncommunal conflicts* vs. *communal conflicts* (also see Mack and Snyder, in Smith, 1971, p. 10); and Rapoport (1974, p. 176) talks about *structure-oriented conflicts* vs. *issue-oriented conflicts*.

13. Jessie Bernard makes a similar distinction, between *issue conflicts* (those that are really about something) and *illusory conflicts* (cited in Boulding, 1965, p. 172). This distinction is not merely an "academic" matter, as it has found its way into law enforcement, where hostage-taking and barricade situations are seen to fall into *instrumental* and *expressive* categories (see Noesner and Webster, 1997): "Instrumental behavior" refers to actions that involve substantial demands and clear goals that, if achieved, could be beneficial to the hostage-taker (*realistic conflict*). "Expressive behavior", on the other hand, communicates the hostage-taker's frustrations, outrage, and despair as well as power; hence, like *transference* or *countertransference* (see Levine, 1952, pp. 332-344), often appears to be illogical and emotional (*nonrealistic conflict*). ("Expressive" hostage-taking and barricade incidents appear to be more common than "instrumental" ones.)

On the "realistic" conflict side, Morton Deutsch (1973, pp. 12-13) distinguishes between *veridical* and *contingent conflicts*: "Veridical" refers to conflicts that exist "objectively," i.e., their *perceived* existence is "not contingent upon some easily altered feature of the environment"; whereas the *perceived* existence of "contingent conflicts" *is* "dependent upon readily rearranged circumstances" which are not recognized immediately by the conflicting parties. "The contingent conflict would disappear if the available alternative resources for satisfying the 'conflicting' needs were recognized": something a third party could assist in!

14. In discussing Deutsch's (1969) distinction between *manifest* and *underlying conflicts*, Raven and Kruglanski (1970, p. 72) point out that "*Manifest* bases for conflict may be [present, e.g.,] in actual inequities ..., but the possibilities for conflict are further increased as the result of *underlying* factors *transferred* from other situations" (emphasis added).

15. As Morton Deutsch (1969, p. 10) has argued, the "*manifest conflict* often cannot be resolved more than temporarily unless the *underlying conflict* is dealt with or unless it can be disconnected and separated from the underlying conflict so that it can be treated in isolation" (emphasis added) (cited in Raven and Kruglanski, 1970, pp. 71-72) (also see M. Deutsch, 1973, p. 13).

16. Concerning the *awareness of conflict*, Curle (1971, pp. 8-9) tells us that:

In many unpeaceful relationships, the parties are perfectly aware of the discordance of their aims. In others, however, the conflict is not clearly recognized. Thus, among colonial peoples before the independence movements, among many oppressed ... people today..., to some extent among students, among some segments of the black American population, and among many black South Africans, there [was] little awareness of conflict. It [was] not... obvious to these people that their poverty, powerlessness, or subjection, or the injustices they suffered, related directly to the riches, power, and authority of the ruling group; that there was, in fact, a conflict of interests. Now that these interests have been made manifest, the conflict has become apparent to most of those concerned.

Hence, Louis Kriesberg's (1982, p. xii) comment that, "I recognize the necessity of struggle -- it is needed to liberate people, preserve freedom, increase equity, and loosen rigidities."

17. Correspondingly, see Mack and Snyder's (1957) distinction between *institutionalized* and *non-institutionalized* conflict (in Smith, 1971, p. 10); Boulding's (1962, pp. 322-323) distinction between *procedural* and *violent* conflict; and Dahrendorf's (1959, Ch. VI) distinction between *regulated* (legitimate, routinized) and *unregulated* (illegitimate, uncontrolled) conflict (see Wehr, 1979, p. 4). Also, see part VIII of Wehr's (ibid., p. 22) *Conflict Mapping Guide*, concerning the "conflict *regulation* potential" that inheres in any particular conflict/conflict- handling space.

18. Paralleling or otherwise overlapping with these constituent parts of Pillar 1 are elements of Paul Wehr's (1979, pp. 18-22) *Conflict Mapping Guide*:

I. Summary Description (one-page maximum);

II. Conflict History;

III. Conflict Context;

IV. Conflict Parties;

V. Issues;

VI. Dynamics;

VII. Alternative Routes to a Solution(s) of the Problem(s);

as well as

VIII. Conflict Regulation Potential.

Similarly, Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, Ch. 4) recommend that potential third parties complete a *conflict analysis chart*, inclusive of the basic elements of a particular conflict: (a) parties; (b) issues; (c) interests; (d) importance of issues (high, medium, low); (e) sources of power and influence (means); (f) positions and options; and (g) interest in working with other parties.

19. Apropos training and education in general -- whether used as a form of third-party intervention or to produce third parties in the first place -- see Wehr's (1979, pp. 49-54) comments, which (overlapping with Pillar 3) include his *Conflict Intervention Guide*. Also, for a listing of organizations involved in conflict *regulation* training, education, and research, see Wehr's Appendices A and B.

For a discussion of training, university, and other programs and developments associated with cooperative trends in conflict resolution as challenges to the paradigmatic dominance of *realpolitik*-based competitive trends, see Sandole (1988). Specifically, for a discussion of the graduate programs of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason University and their use as a basis for institutionalizing the teaching and practice of conflict resolution in Turkey, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern and Central Europe, see Sandole (1997).

20. According to David Maxwell (1992, p. 355):

The mediator, as a *transactional* leader, will tend to focus attention on substantive issues rather than on qualitative aspects of the parties' relationships with each other. Thus we would expect transactional mediators to take a more active role in guiding the parties to a preconceived solution. At the same time, the mediator as a *transformational* leader would be inclined to include among the goals to be achieved the quality of the relationship between the parties and a *more equitable distribution of power* (emphasis added).

21. Some examples of "shifts" in this regard are Michael Lund's (1996) work on developing and implementing preventive diplomacy systems and my *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS) (see Sandole, 1997, pp. 135-137; 1998b; 1999, Ch. 7).

22. See, for example, the "four-page" card issued by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Training Unit), entitled, "*We Are United Nations Peacekeepers*," containing two columns of information, one headed by, "*We will always:*" and the other by, "*We will never:*".

23. As a partial example of what we have in mind here, see the card issued by Conflict Management, Inc. (CMI) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, with two columns of information, one headed, "*Negotiation: A Good Outcome*," and the other, "*Negotiation: Diagnostic Checklist*."

24. In this regard, Senator John W. Warner (R-Va.), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, has expressed his support for "sending a multinational force [to Kosovo] to implement a political settlement" because "instability in Kosovo could spill over to Bosnia and negate the slow progress that U.S. and NATO troops have brought about there" (Priest, 1999, p.

A18).

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