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Civilian Experiences and Military Perceptions of the U.S. Military During Domestic Disaster Operations

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by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated first to my grandparents, Pauline Gauthier and William Buckman, and my aunt, Lysette Buckman. To my grandparents, I will always love and miss you both very dearly, and may the Lord keep you always and forever. To my aunt, I never met you in life but I know your life had a profound and everlasting impact on my father, who waits for the day when he can see you again.

Additionally, this dissertation is dedicated to the men and women of the United States military who died in the line of duty at the request of the Nation and never returned home.

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Abstract

Since its founding, the United States has experienced social strife and humanitarian disasters, either of which can provoke a military domestic response. Political leaders have considered with caution and reservation under what circumstances to rely on the military to respond to internal domestic crises. The use of the military – including Guard, Reserve, and federal active-duty forces - to respond to internal problems continues to increase. In turn, this increase has a strong potential to change the dynamics of civil-military relations in the United States and generate new public expectations for the military. This study explored the perspectives of individuals who experienced military domestic activities and then examined military officials' perceptions of their roles during domestic responses. Exploring these experiences and perceptions is necessary for better concordance between political leaders, military leaders, and members of the public. The primary research question for this dissertation was as follows: Given domestic disasters over the past 20 years requiring a military response, what are the perceptions and perspectives on domestic use of the military to respond to crises and domestic states of emergency? This question was answered qualitatively through the application of interpretative phenomenological analysis based on how members of the public experience and make meaning of the phenomena of military domestic operations, and inductive thematic analysis based on interviews with military officials regarding their roles.

Keywords: civil-military, military, domestic, disasters, phenomenology, Katrina, COVID, unrest.

Chapter 1: Introduction

"A standing army is one of the greatest mischiefs that can possibly happen."
– James Madison, Virginia Convention Debates, 1787

Background

There are many examples throughout history where various forms of government and regimes have employed their militaries internally as security and police forces to maintain power, quell internal threats, construct state projects, or applied them to any number of internal tasks. There have also been numerous times when the heads of militaries decide to wield the forces under their control to overthrow their governments and usurp power or install a leader they find more preferable. Around the world, coups or the state's heavy-handed use of military power domestically are certainly nothing new, and the potential internal domestic dangers posed by military forces were not lost on the Founding Fathers as the United States sought its independence from Britain.

Colonists established the United States as a sovereign country based on principles of personal freedom and civil liberty, founded largely on self-determination, where the government was essentially subordinated to the public will through the limitations placed on it in the Constitution. The Founding Fathers codified these individual freedoms in the Constitution, constructing a federalist system of government around these freedoms to ensure their protection. Caution against government tyranny and wariness about abuses of power weighed heavily on the writers of the Constitution. During the second half of the eighteenth century, George Washington, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and many others – both federalists and anti-federalists – opined on the dangers of a permanent standing military, though many understood it was likely inevitable and would be at times a necessity (Preble, 2010, pp. 688-689).

In Brett F. Woods' *Thomas Jefferson, Thoughts on War and Revolution* (Ed.), Jefferson wrote to U.S. diplomat William Carmichael to explain the general structure of the new government. In his letter, Jefferson opined, "I do not see how [civilian leadership] can prohibit altogether the aid of the military in cases of riot," although "it is probable…that not knowing how to use the military as a civil weapon, they will do too little or too much with it" (2009, p. 86). His perspective shows concern over the potential for domestic abuses by a powerful and overbearing military operating domestically at the inception of the country. While the constructionists of the United States realized a standing military force was necessary - and such a force would ostensibly operate domestically at times to maintain order and preserve the very foundation of the state - they also enshrined civil leadership of the military as a fundamental tenet of its very being. The Third Amendment in the Bill of Rights thus guarantees that at no time during domestic operations can the military force private citizens to house or protect armed troops.

Politics, though, is a human endeavor. Despite constitutional safeguards, the United States at all levels of government proves to be susceptible from time to time to the whims of politics. Even though the United States serves as a beacon of freedom and prosperity to many around the world, there have been dark periods of slavery and suffrage. Slavery was so embedded in American society that when the federal government spoke of abolition, the South sought to secede, forming the Confederate States. In 1861, the United States went to war with itself over slavery, and more than 700,000 Americans were killed in the fighting (Gugliotta, 2012). After the North achieved victory, the Union Army was used to police the South and protect newly-emancipated black Americans and their white Republican allies from violence at the hands of southern white terrorist groups, most notably the Ku Klux Klan (Cengage, 2020).

In 1878 (discussed later in this dissertation), the United States passed the *Posse Comitatus Act*, prohibiting generally the use of the federal military in domestic activities, including and especially law enforcement, without the express authorization of Congress (Noone, 2003, p. 195). The National Guard, however, as a descendant organization of individual state militias, was not bound under Posse Comitatus. Rather, governors of their respective states control their National Guard forces, except in certain circumstances of federal mobilization. State governments and the federal government have used National Guard forces in domestic capacities numerous times under the authority of Title 32 to maintain peace and quell widespread social violence. In a free society, however, the sight of uniformed soldiers with heavy weaponry does not present well in the minds of many Americans, as distrust of government is a hallmark of America's founding. This is complexified because American citizens generally do not differentiate between state National Guard soldiers and federal military troops. To the public, any differences between the two may be academic, given that both attend the same recruit training, or "boot camp," share the same uniforms, and are capable of supporting the same-or-similar missions. (Schlichter, 1993). This is exacerbated by ambiguities between police and the National Guard. As Dr. Jim Golby of the United States Studies Centre (2020) explains:

> So far, evidence suggests that the National Guard has been relatively restrained in most locations, but the increasing militarisation of local police forces makes it harder for average Americans to distinguish between the police and the National Guard. And since National Guard soldiers wear regular Army uniforms, it is unlikely many Americans will make meaningful distinctions between these reserve forces and active duty.

A free and open press has shed enough light on military activities, domestic or foreign, to keep the American public proud of its forces in external activities while simultaneously wary of the

military's application on the home front. Cohen (1997) notes, "Democratic society normally produces a certain amount of healthy suspicion of the military" (p. 185). Highlights of military actions that were condemned for brutality or heavy-handedness go back throughout American history. Examples include the Battle of Little Bighorn in 1876 when General Armstrong Custer and his men attempted to slaughter some 7,000 Native Americans, only to be slaughtered themselves (Powers, 2010); Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus' mobilization of the National Guard to prevent nine black students from entering Central High School until President Eisenhower deployed the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne to ensure the safety of the nine students (Anderson, 2004); and the Kent State University shooting on May 4, 1970, where National Guard soldiers opened fire on protesting students, killing four and wounding nine (Kaur, 2020). Concerns remain today regarding domestic military action when used to blunt civil disobedience or carry out political will within the United States.

In much more recent history, a new virus, 'coronavirus disease-19,' or "COVID-19," spread across the world. In the United States, the virus has infected tens of millions of people, killed hundreds of thousands, and the spread continues (CDC, 2020). The federal, state, and local governments have not come up with a unified approach to dealing with the pandemic, and the virus continues to cause substantial fear across the United States. Some fringe elements have decried government/military conspiracy theories while states shuttered businesses and prohibited gatherings of individuals (depending on the state, every state's response has been distinct) with the threat of law enforcement and the use of the National Guard during what is arguably a time of extreme political polarization in the country. The federal government, to support some modicum of response, deployed two U.S. Navy hospital ships, one to Los Angeles and the other to New York. The deployment triggered wariness and suspicion amongst some members of the

public. In Los Angeles, an individual – who was a train engineer – asserted that the presence of the ship was 'suspicious,' and while operating a train he deliberately derailed it in an attempt to attack the ship on April 2, 2020. The train finally stopped less than 300 yards from the ship (Weber, 2020).

In addition to the pandemic, also in 2020, widespread protests took place across the United States – and around the world - after a video broke of a Minneapolis police officer, Derek Chauvin, who is white, kneeling on the neck of a black man, George Floyd, for more than eight minutes, ultimately killing Floyd. Chauvin was fired and convicted of unintentional second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter for the killing, and three other officers attending the scene were fired and also criminally charged for failing to stop Chauvin (who did not stop until medics arrived and told him to do so). In some areas, social protests grew into civil disobedience and unrest in the form of riots, as the movement against police violence was in many cases hijacked by other groups with other purposes and goals. Anarchist groups, who hijacked much of the media spotlight on the protests, burned police stations and cars and attacked police. In some cities, there was widespread looting and arson, and homes were attacked. One radical group even temporarily seized control of a section in the city of Seattle, Washington, and declared an autonomous zone known as the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAP), or the Capitol Hill Organized Protest (CHOP) (Burns, 2020).

Following the racial and political civil unrest in 2020, the level of social violence reached new heights in 2021, when, on January 6, thousands of supporters of President Trump marched down Pennsylvania Avenue to denounce the election of incoming President-Elect Joseph Biden and Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris in what was called the "Save America" rally (Tan, Shin, & Rindler, 2021). Hundreds of protestors broke away from the main protest and marched to the

U.S. Capitol building and turned from protestors to armed assailants. Police initially attempted to blockade the rioters from entering the Capitol, but the pro-Trump rioters quickly outnumbered the officers and fought their way into the Capitol building.

During the rioting, police officer Brian Sicknick suffered a stroke, from which he later died, although the New York Times published an article falsely claiming he'd been 'murdered' by the rioters (McCarthy, 2021). Shortly after Officer Sicknick's death, Officer Howard Liebengood, who had been on duty at the Capitol during the siege, committed suicide (Klein & Tan, 2021). Four rioters died as well, although only one death, that of Ashli Babbitt, occurred as a direct result of the conflict. Babbitt was shot and killed by police as she climbed through a broken window to gain access to the building. Three other protestors died from medical emergencies; Kevin Greeson, 55, died from a heart attack, Benjamin Philips, 50, died from a stroke, and Rosane Boyland, 34, was either trampled to death according to some family members, or collapsed inside the Capitol Rotunda, according to one of her sisters (Healy, 2021).

As details began to emerge from the riots, it became more apparent there was possibly a more nefarious plot at hand; the events on January 6th increasingly appeared to be of a deliberate insurrection effort rather than a riot of spontaneity. In addition to wearing helmets and body armor, some of the rioters came prepared for more than a protest. Police allege objects brought near or into the Capitol building included firearms, a crossbow, zip ties (for possible use as handcuffs), pipe bombs, and ammunition (Heath & Lynch, 2021). Purported motivations behind the anti-government riot, however, remained ambiguous. Some likened the rioters to insurgents in Iraq, attempting to overthrow the government. Some claimed they were looking to kill the vice president and strike at congressional officials and police. Concerning law enforcement engagement, some news outlets called the police "heroes" while others accused them of having

colluded with the rioters (Hannon, 2021). Regardless of the intentions of the rioters, it was apparent that law enforcement and members of Congress were unprepared (Viswanatha & Gurman, 2021).

The riots generated enough concern among lawmakers that more than a dozen states deployed National Guard troops to Washington, D.C. to safeguard the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden (Altman, 2021). There were nearly 25,000 troops dispatched to DC, the largest number in history and five times as many U.S. troops as in Iraq and Afghanistan combined (Garamone, 2021; Schwartz, 2021). Whether due to the presence of thousands of troops and law enforcement, a lockdown on movement and a 6 pm to 6 am curfew throughout DC (Sprunt, 2021), heightened vigilance toward potential violence, or a combination of factors – there was no manifestation of violence at the inauguration. Still, the National Guard announced that 5,000+ troops would remain in DC until sometime in mid-2021 out of concern for further violence (Tomlinson, 2021). In mid-February, around 6,000 remained at a cost of around $450 million, and the Department of Defense hinted the troops might remain until late 2021 (Pagones, 2021).

The number of troops in DC as of January 2021 was the most in the history of the United States, more than at the end of the Civil War, and nearly double the number deployed following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968 (Schwartz, 2021). Six months earlier, in June 2021, President Trump deployed the National Guard to DC to quell civil disturbances in what Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi had, at the time, described as the militarization of the nation's capital (Segers, 2021). With both political parties agreeing to the increased number of troops in January, and with the extension of thousands of troops into nearly the middle of 2021, it may appear that political (and military) leadership is growing accustomed to the use of troops for law enforcement. Whether the public shares this sentiment, or is growing apathetic to the

presence of uniformed, armed troops on public streets, has yet to be determined. The nation's capital was not the only capital to deploy troops, as more than 21 states deployed troops to their capitals (Jacobo, 2021).

Currently, numerous politicians and city councils have dramatically cut funding to police forces, and have also sought law enforcement reformation in other ways; reducing law enforcement authority, requiring more training, requiring police officers to provide a warning before using lethal force, increasing police liability, and reducing occupational protections (such as the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights), or placing social workers with police (Ali, 2020). As police were laid off, voluntarily quit, or retired early, crime, especially violent crime, rose dramatically in many U.S. cities. In 2020, for example, metropolitan areas experienced a 33% rise in homicides (Tucker & Nickeas, 2021). While this research is not on law enforcement, there is the consideration that to fill police roles, individuals must undergo the recruitment and selection process, followed by adequate training to carry out their responsibilities. This means that while it is easy to cut police forces, it is comparatively more time-consuming (and more difficult when state and local governments may appear at odds with their police forces) to grow a professional department. A reduction in security forces brings reduced security capacity, and so should crime continue to rise, or should a disaster occur, police in metropolitan areas that have some of the highest population densities would be overwhelmed, which potentially means more reliance on the National Guard and military forces.

This, in turn, leads to what may be yet another problem. Although the use of the military domestically has taken place several times over the past decade, and although legislation has been crafted making it easier to deploy military forces during times of domestic need, the military may soon struggle with these roles as well. Public confidence in the military fell by 14

percentage points between 2018 and 2021 (Flatley & Tiron, 2021). In turn, a record-low number of young Americans, 12.5%, would consider joining the military, including only 2.4% of those turning 18 (Arkin, 2019). This may provide some background highlighting some disconnect between the public, political leaders, and the military that would influence how the public views the military's purpose and efficacy during crisis response.

This research study first focused on how members of the public have experienced military actions and activities, and how those civilians perceive the roles of the U.S. military, during times of national crisis. The research study included the views of military officials to see how those views align or diverge from civilian experiences, and how military officials view their roles during domestic operations compared to how civilians view military roles. Primary data research, however, came from interviews of civilians and military officials. The perceptions and perspectives serve to frame, inform, and even possibly influence the military's understanding regarding its apolitical civic role in society during what can be politically polemic and divisive crises.

This research contributes to the field in several ways. Foremost, this study adds to the literature and provides a better understanding of the dynamics between the public, the military, and political leaders, at times described as ambiguous, tumultuous, and contentious (Travis, 2018). Next, this research may assist military planners and practitioners in identifying opportunities for peacebuilding and greater collaboration with the public and political decision-makers, in turn helping civilians and domestic security practitioners overcome future challenges of employing the military to work with the public. Furthermore, the research expands the understanding of the different parties involved, primarily the public – through the unique lens of those affected by disasters and military interaction – and the military itself. Finally, this study

can help foster transparency and trust amongst the civilian population, and provide a greater degree of safety for both the public and military service members through awareness.

Statement of the Problem

In 2021, the use of military forces acting in a domestic capacity is a prominent topic. The topic commands significant time from political leaders, the public, and journalists, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest. The issue is not new, however. In 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama, recognizing a potential future increase in reliance on the military domestically, said in part, "We cannot continue to rely only on our military in order to achieve the national security objectives that we've set. We've got to have a civilian national security force that's just as powerful, just as strong, just as well-funded" (Cauthen, 2009). This issue is likely to only grow in importance, based on possible increases in the "use of the armed forces to cope with a plethora of domestic problems," including "domestic terrorism, drug interdiction, immigration control," and real or perceived "societal decline into decadence" (Donnithrone, p. 7, 2013).

Recently, in response to widespread civil strife in 2020, 23 states activated National Guard units to maintain order (Dunlap, 2020), with President Donald Trump encouraging an increase in the use of soldiers, which spurned fierce debate about the legal and ethical implications of such actions. In fact, for his last several months in office, much of President Trump's remaining term was immersed in public debate regarding "the role of the military in civil disturbance and social justice protests" (Shane III, 2021). While President Trump sought to use the military to police left-wing agitators, on January 6, 2021, right-wing agitators stormed the Capitol, which led to the deployment of thousands of National Guard troops.

Whereas left-leaning politicians and news pundits had decried President Trump's efforts to deploy troops, suddenly those aligned to the right decried the use of troops in the nation's capital.

Trust in many government institutions has declined due to increased conflict over contentious social issues, which includes the military. While the military is still highly respected among Americans, that number has recently fallen to an all-time low. 56% of Americans now say they have "a great deal of trust and confidence" in the military, a decline from 70% in 2018 (Gains, 2021). Research shows that public support for the use of the military is dependent on the public's understanding of the military's objectives, however, it is difficult for the public to understand the military's purpose during an operation "because they cannot directly observe a policy's true intention and influential political actors offer competing frames to define it" (Perla, Jr., 2011, p. 139). This is critical, because despite the military's role in society as an apolitical organization, political party identification "is now the best predictor of one's confidence in the military," and "partisans on both sides are more confident [in the military] when their party holds the White House" (Burbach, 2019, p. 211). Public beliefs that the military is aligned with one political side over the other do damage to public confidence in an objective military (Golby, 2020).

The public's overall understanding of the military's role, even in humanitarian operations, is described as poor (Baxter & Beadling, 2013, p. 1232). The Department of Defense needs to understand how the public experiences and perceives its domestic activities to gain insight, provide transparency, and communicate to provide to the public realistic expectations and understanding. Effective communication to the public is foundational to operations, and once confidence is lost, the "credibility of the government is hard to regain" (Tussing, Roth, & Dillon, 2006, p. 4). Understanding the public's experiences of military action in such polemic times will,

in turn, facilitate the Department of Defense's abilities to understand constituencies, express objectives, and elucidate on topics to the public so individuals better understand the role of the military in domestic operations, and thus improve conditions for the military domestic deployments.

Purpose of Study

This study examined how members of the public experienced military intervention during times of significant, large-scale domestic conflicts and national crises, as well as how military officials perceive their roles during the same types of events. The researcher sought to derive from civilians who have experienced domestic military operations (CEDMO) participants how their unique experiences have shaped their perceptions and views of military domestic activities. The researcher also interviewed military leadership to gather participant data about their understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

Guiding Questions

The following questions were used to guide this qualitative study:

1. How have members of the public experienced the use of the military in domestic crises and what meanings do they make of the military's roles and responsibilities during domestic crises?
2. How do military service members perceive their roles and responsibilities to the public during domestic operations in terms of the resources and capabilities they bring to bear during crises?

The research objectives for this study are as follows:

1. To understand the lived experiences of civilians who suffered through disasters, or other significant domestic calamities, during which they encountered military personnel responding to the event.
2. To identify some ways in which both civilians from among the public and members of the military view the military's roles and responsibilities when conducting domestic operations.
3. To highlight the perceived boundaries of domestic military operations and provide opportunities for further research.
4. To make recommendations as to how the military may better, when necessary, understand its capabilities and roles of public service and support through the experiences and shaped beliefs of civilians who have experienced domestic military operations (CEDMO).

Theoretical Framework

Two theoretical frameworks were used to frame the study; the first is *Concordance Theory*, and the second is *Convergence Theory.* Concordance Theory is the framework most applicable to this study because it serves to examine the overarching relationships between the military, political elites (political leaders), and the public (citizenry) in democratic states. The military is likely to be both physically and ideologically separated from the other two (though this is not required), but under conditions of concordance and cooperation, the military will carry out its functions as expected without concern for a coup or other forms of military intervention (Schiff, 2009, p. 32). Although this theory is applied generally to relationships in democratic states, it is applied here exclusively to the United States.

Concerning Convergence Theory, Morris Janowitz introduced this framework in his 1960 seminal work, *The Professional Soldier*. In it, Janowitz argued members of the military view the world quite differently than does the general public, but that the military would need to continue to change contemporaneously with society, or friction between the two would increase over time. Civilian control, then, is necessary to ensure that the military overall can change and reflect the will of society, and in turn remain subordinated to the political leaders elected by the public (Swomley, 1964). Both theories are covered in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Research Design

This was a contemporary qualitative study using *triangulation* of the data between two participant groups within the research study containing an assessment of *interpretative phenomenological analysis* (IPA) and *thematic analysis*, with consideration of the theories and relevant literature. Using IPA, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with members of the public to gain insight into their lived experiences of the phenomenon of domestic military action. Members of the public interviewed for the study included those who either experienced first-hand the presence of military forces or who were involved in a catastrophe or condition requiring the use of military forces by political leaders, primarily between 2001-2021. This allowed the researcher to include slightly more temporally-distant military interventions, such as the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, to more recent interventions, such as the presence of thousands of troops in the capital in the wake of the January 6, 2021 riots.

The researcher applied thematic analysis (described in greater detail in the Chapter 3 section *Thematic Analysis: Data Analysis*) to the professional interviews of military officials (defined in the "Terms" section) relating to their own experiences, knowledge, understanding, and adaptation of military policy and protocols. These included commissioned officers or top

senior enlisted as the representatives of military officialdom; those who execute political policy and create internal military policies. CEDMO interviewed for the study came from different backgrounds and locations within the United States, while military participants represented all branches of the military (the exception to "branches" includes the Coast Guard as a component of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Space Force as a current sub-component of the U.S. Air Force). Current geographic locations of military participants were not important as a consideration of research-subject selection on account the military moves a majority of its personnel roughly every 2-4 years, called "Permanent Change of Station," or PCS, moves (Gresh. 2019, Janowitz, 1960, p. 361). Military officials as research participants had varying levels of training and insights concerning domestic operations, as well as varying familiarity with military operations and command structures. These individuals also held different levels of knowledge regarding overarching federal statutes, such as *Posse Comitatus, Stafford Act,* and *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (DSCA) operations. Details on the data collection and data analysis strategies of both the phenomenological and thematic interview studies are covered more thoroughly in Chapter 3: *Methodology*.

Although content analysis was not a part of the research design in terms of the methodology for the research conducted, pertinent content is presented in Chapter 2: *Literature Review*. The literature provides the reader with a basis for understanding relevant laws, policies, and precedence for military domestic operations. There is a place in the research for consideration of U.S. law and military policies governing conduct and behaviors, which set the boundaries outlining the circumstances under which the U.S. military may operate domestically. This includes literature on what is permissible based on certain conditions. However, this particular research is not an examination of legal authorities. Military officials and decision-

makers should have a general idea about these conditions and what they can or would do under particular circumstances. Once activated to respond to a crisis, these officials would have legitimate control of the components of the armed forces under their charge. They would strategize an operational approach to satisfying tasks, whether combat or humanitarian operations; prioritize resources and efforts; and determine "how leadership is conveyed" up and down the rank structure hierarchy of control (Department of the Army, 2019).

Definitions of Terms

Before moving into the research, it is critical to define the key terms. Doing so reduces ambiguity while bounding the scope of terms, and therefore helps to set specific parameters for the study.

1. *Civil-military relations.* This term refers to the relationship between the military of a state and the broader society which it serves; relationships between the military and political institutions; and relationships between military leaders and the civil-political leadership who direct military forces and oversee military policies (Blankshain, 2020; Hooker, 2012, p. 1; Nielsen & Snider, 2009, p. 3).
2. *Military*. Many individuals may have a general idea of what a military is, and while there are hundreds of militaries and paramilitaries around the world, it should be noted that not all are the same. Nations ostensibly structure their respective militaries differently; many have different mandates, purposes, and uses; and the authorities and prohibitions on military activities vary dramatically from nation to nation. This research focused solely on the U.S. military, which the U.S. Government typically refers to as its "armed forces," rather than its military. According to U.S. Code Title 10, Armed Forces, the military is officially defined as, "the Army, Navy, Air Force,

Marine Corps, Space Force, and Coast Guard" (10 U.S.C. § 101). This may also include National Guard forces. However, for this research, the definition was even more specific. The terms "armed forces" and "military," when referring to the United States military, are synonymous and defined here as *a federally-funded, uniformed, armed force that is staffed, trained, and equipped for engaging in warfare and other operations at the discretion of the Executive Branch, or governors as state executives, as directed to satisfy national or state objectives.*

3. *Military official(s)* – Military personnel as they appear in the press are often referred to as "military officials" (Callahan, Guilliot) without much context to rank or authority. The word "official" is defined as, "one who holds or is invested with an office: officer" (Merriam-Webster, 2020). Before providing a definition, it is important to distinguish commissioned officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers. Military officers hold commissions of office (hence the term "commissioned officers," as utilized by the military in differentiating between enlisted) granted by the United States Congress and under the direction of the president. These commissions grant officers authority of command – including the authority to conduct legal proceedings under military law and craft policies. Warrant officers are restricted officers subordinate to commissioned officers, limited in their authority. Enlisted ranks have "non-commissioned officers," often referred to as "NCOs," which typically begin at the rank of E4 or E5, depending on the service. NCOs are enlisted officers who cannot create policy but have limited supervisory authority vested in them by the military services to carry out policies. Senior NCOs are technically subordinate to the lowest ranking officer, such as a Second Lieutenant,

though in practical application some senior enlisted personnel hold more sway than junior officers due to their overall level of experience. Given these considerations, this research paper defines military officials as "military commissioned officers or warrant officers capable of holding legitimate and lawful command authority over a military unit, or senior individuals able to make policy decisions or craft policy, such as senior enlisted non-commissioned officers who may advise top levels of leadership."

4. *Military strategic messaging* – For this research, the term "strategic messaging" refers to the Department of Defense's abilities, which includes its military branches, to convey through words or silence, action or inaction, or through the posturing of personnel and resources its intent to undertake a series of actions in support of an overall objective.
5. *Public* – The term "public" is unique, as it either refers to an aggregate of the private citizenry, or it can refer to policies that are government-run, directed, or managed. An example is found in government references to "public-private partnerships," where "public" refers to the government and "private" refers to entities in the private sector (Sharma & Bindal, p. 1270, 2014). Typically, when used as an adjective, the term "public" is "relating to the government or state, or things that are done for the people by the state," while, as a noun, the term refers to, "people in general, or to all the people in a particular country or community" (Collins, 2020). For state security, however, whether using as an example law enforcement or other armed forces, "public" is defined as, "a native or naturalized citizen, or otherwise permanent

resident, of a sovereign state who is not in the armed forces (military) and is entitled to the protection, rights, and privileges within that state."

6. *Civilian* – Customary international humanitarian law, as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), defines the term "civilian" as "*persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians* [without reservation]*"* (Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, Alvermann, Dörmann & Rolle, 2005). This term – while broad - is both sufficient and appropriate for this research when referring to civilians generally. In line with this definition and understanding, the research focused specifically on the views of civilians who experienced first-hand domestic military responses. In this study, civilians who have experienced military domestic intervention in certain capacities are referred to as "Civilians who have Experienced Domestic Military Operations" (CEDMO). It is worth noting the DoD Joint does not define the term "civilian." Instead, the DoD defines only "displaced civilian," as "a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person" (DoD, 2021, p. 65).

Propositions

The general propositions moving into the study were as follows:

1. There is confusion and a lack of clarity on the role of the military as well as suspicions about the military's intentions in domestic crises.
2. There is a wider gap in today's society for problems that quickly over-encumber state and local resources, necessitating a military response.

3. Many civilians in the public sector are wary of domestic military intervention and action during times of crisis.
4. Since its founding, the United States has experienced social strife and humanitarian disasters, either of which can provoke a military domestic response.
5. Public sentiments weigh heavily in driving government action, including the use of military forces in domestic response.

Scope and Delimitations

This study focused on the experiences of the public (CEDMO) regarding the use of the military domestically, and how those experiences have shaped their perspectives. With military leaders, the research captured how military leaders understand their domestic roles and responsibilities to determine whether there is support for domestic military intervention in the face of significant problems. To this end, the military was represented in the study by military officials within the Department of Defense (DoD) as individuals with the capacity for command and control of military forces.

The scope of this study in terms of time was from 2001 to 2022, except for the relevant policies, statutes, and regulations that continue to outline military activities. The study focused on the lived experiences, and the perspectives shaped by those experiences, of the U.S. public, and the understanding of U.S. military leaders regarding their roles. Therefore, the need to comparatively analyze foreign militaries and perspectives was of little value. Finally, the study was limited in scope to allow for enough focus and detail for an in-depth study.

The study of the military extended to National Guard forces, which created both some overlap and distinction both with and from the federal active-duty forces. National Guard forces

are typically controlled by individual states and territories but are so often interwoven with the federal military on issues that their status under U.S. statute is relevant. Police and other forms of domestic security (homeland security, the FBI, etc.) were not included in this study from a response role on account that they are not military, nor paramilitary, although military forces can provide support to law enforcement. Without a supporting military supplement, however, law enforcement agencies have legal jurisdiction only in the United States or in their respective states and localities depending on their federal, state, or tribal status, and including them without a military context does not provide anything substantive to this research.

Conclusion

The U.S. government's use of the military domestically has been a contentious issue dating back to the founding of the country itself. This research study examined the policies, perspectives of military officials, and lived experiences of CEDMO to identify themes regarding perspectives of appropriate military domestic employment and the efficacy of the military's own strategic messaging to assuage negative concerns.

The timeframe of focus for the study was from 2001 to 2021, and the country of the study was limited to the United States. While there were some minor research limitations worth mentioning for transparency, these do not affect the conduct of the research, nor skew the results in any particular manner. This research was timely, given the simultaneous, national-level contemporary issues taking place - the COVID-19 pandemic and the use of unprecedented numbers of troops to quell civil unrest - and will add substantially to the small body of literature.

To prepare the reader for an overview of the subsequent chapters, Chapter 2, *Literature Review,* serves to share with the community an understanding of existing research, identify and explain any relevant gaps in the field this research helps satisfy, and also identify variances in the

scholarly research and perspectives. This chapter shares with the reader the literature on the topic in different forms and the primary themes of this research. Following this, Chapter 3, *Methodology*, lays out the research design and methodologies employed throughout the research. The chapter explains the methods of interpretative phenomenological and thematic analyses in responding to the original problem statement. In Chapter 4, *Findings*, the researcher presents the research findings, including framing the research study and research approach. This includes data and cultivated themes generated by and from the data based on the research participants. Finally, Chapter 5, *Discussion*, provides the interpretation of the findings. This includes an explanation of the analytic process used and where the findings fit within the body of research. The researcher also provides the research relevance, pertinence, reflections, and recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The first chapter of this research provides the reader with the context of the study in terms of *what* is being researched, whereas this second chapter supports unpacking *why* the topic is ripe for research. There is a notable volume of literature regarding civil-military issues and considerations, mainly from theoretical and historical perspectives. A review of the literature regarding civil-military relations reveals much of the material focuses predominately on the relationship dynamics between political leaders and the military (Bland, 1999; Blankshain, 2020; Burk, 2002; Diamond & Plattner, 1996). There is a paucity of research, however, on the experiences and perceptions of citizens regarding the military operating domestically. This is true both generally (with the wider public) and more specifically with individuals who have experienced and interacted with the military directly.

There is significant literature on militaries throughout history and from around the world in terms of how they engaged in military campaigns. This often includes interactions with civilians, though predominately militaries interacting with *foreign* populations during these campaigns. Material is abundant regarding the human dimension of the military and military interactions, including armed conflict, humanitarian relief efforts, training exercises, new military initiatives, and peacekeeping operations. Some of the literature on the topic of civil-military interactions focuses on how militaries of the past and present recruit from the population, how they wage war on behalf of a state, or how governing political bodies employ militaries. To reiterate, however, it is the public's *perspective* (and often military perspective) that is especially absent. Much literature, rather than focusing on the experiential perspectives of the public, is instead focused on political systems and transitioning state systems, namely "coup prevention and the transition from military-led regimes to functioning democracies" (Feaver,

2003, p. 292). While Feaver (2003) offers that there is much opportunity to expand on the scope of research dealing with civil-military relations, including U.S. military structure and strategies (pp. 292-293), nothing he puts forth includes perspectives of domestic civilian populations.

There are also studies regarding how the military influences politics and vice-versa, such as how Democrat presidents tend to appoint liberal officers, whereas Republican presidents "almost always appoint conservative officers," and that presidents from both parties are "more likely to use military force when advised by military officers whom they appoint…" (Golby, 2011). Again, though, in such studies, the public is absent, and "military force" is used mainly to refer to power projection overseas against foreign entities, so this research remains distinct.

Regarding the United States specifically, researchers have conducted studies on broad public opinions of the military regarding specific attributes weighted against individual military branches, as well as social influences on military culture (Shamiev, 2020). Nonetheless, there is a gap in the literature regarding public experiences with the military domestically, and how those experiences have shaped perceptions of domestic military deployments. Research on this topic fits in between research on military relationships – the government and the public – and the public's exposure to domestic military operations and activities. This research shares the experiences of civilians who have lived through national crises – deemed so by the event and the need for military intervention – to provide insight into those experiences. The research also provides perspectives of military officials. From these two participant groups, this study supports identifying how the military, through its leaders, can better understand public experiences and perspectives; craft internal policies with civilian understandings in mind; generate systems of rapport with the public; and understand from the positions of both military and political leaders how to create policies, and processes with those same considerations. Understanding these lived

civilian experiences and professional military understandings will serve to ameliorate friction between political leaders, military personnel, and the public during times of crisis.

Although the timeframe of this research project begins in 2001, it is necessary to go further back in the literature to gain understanding and perspective into key perspectives, policies, and actions that have shaped, and continue to shape present-day events. It is not, however, of value to go any earlier in the literature before the mid- 20th century to provide context to present-day perspectives on the actual use of the military to handle contemporary issues. This framing of time is due to three primary reasons. First, the scope of time is bounded in order to place a reasonable limit on the information used in the study. Second, although the Constitution articulates the use of the military on the homefront to "execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8), the federal government has placed strong limits and restrictions upon the military regarding its roles and authorities while conducting domestic operations and activities. Even so, following major key events, such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress has made permissive modifications to military roles within the United States (Theisen, 2013; Tkacz, 2006). Third, there has been an increase in the use of the military domestically over the past two decades (Canyon, Ryan, & Burkle, 2017; Kalkman, 2018). This includes the military's "increased involvement in collaborative constabulary activities and in police training," including "the development and transfer of useful military skills, tactics, and…transfer of military attitudes and orientations" (Campbell & Campbell, 2010, p. 330). This recent increase in domestic operations also means an increase in the public's direct exposure to the military – and likewise military interaction with the public. Increased use within the United States means there

must be an increase in training for these unique circumstances, given that the military is trained to proficiency in combat, security, and other operations abroad.

This chapter does not focus on literature about fluctuations in military power based on numerical strength, technological advancements, or the lives of service members as private citizens when they are off duty. These topics would be a broad undertaking, irrelevant to the core focus of the research here regarding perspectives on modern-day domestic military operations. Such topics may in some ways relate to the research here, such as covering new technologies used by the military in domestic situations, though these are not influential to the domestic use of the military itself.

Theories

Theories are the foundations of the framework on which the study is constructed in terms of the ways to perceive the topic and relevant research. Theories assist researchers and practitioners in formulating program designs; decision-making; framing problems and interventions; recognizing correlations and possible causal variables; and constructing definitions and measurements (Kane & Trochim, 2009, p. 437). The purpose of the theory sections in this chapter is to further unpack the theories introduced in the first chapter to elucidate on how they are used to conceptually frame and define the issues through a review and analysis of literature on each theory.

Concordance theory. Concordance theory focuses on the relationships between a country's *political elite, military,* and *citizenry* (referred to in this research as the "public"). Of the prominent theories on civil-military relations, Concordance Theory is one of the most nascent. In 1995, Dr. Rebecca Schiff presented her new theory to the academic community as a way to explain why some countries experience turbulent discord with their militaries and others

do not. Within the concordance model are three distinct entities: 1) the military, 2) the political decision-makers or political elites, and 3) the citizenry as the public. According to the theory, these three partners cooperate and offset one another in maintaining a system of governance and a military whereby political leaders can make decisions without fear of the military taking matters into its own hands (as in a coup or unauthorized action). The balance, as explained in the literature, can include institutional separation, but this is not a requirement for the model to work (Schiff, 2009, p. 32).

Concordance Theory, in addition to the three 'participants' (military, political elites, citizenry) rests upon four indicators: 1) the social composition of the military officer corps; 2) the process of political decision-making; 3) how the military engages in recruitment efforts and methods; and 4) respective military-style (Schiff, 2009, p. 13). Concepts of style can carry or contain a breadth of meaning, but within Concordance Theory, those include the importance of military symbols, such as uniforms; rituals, such as parades and saluting; and traditions, such as the "officer and the gentleman" concept of professionalism that "help define the role of the military in society (Schiff, 2009, p. 14). If concordance, or sustainable and tolerable balance, is maintained between the three participants and the four elements or indicators, then the theory postulates that the likelihood of military application and intervention domestically, especially where the military increasingly acts on its own without directives or guidance from the government, is reduced (Schiff, 2009, p. 13). It is important to distinguish that military intervention in the manner in which it is presented within the theory refers more to coups and turning inward without political or civil authorization to do so. Schiff states that Concordance Theory is primarily "about those nations where the fear of the military prevails or the military is uniquely present in daily life yet may not be feared" (2009, p. 18).

Literature specifically detailing the theory, or research applications of the theory remains quite limited. In December 1998, a Naval Postgraduate student stated in his thesis regarding Concordance Theory, "To date, her theory of concordance has yet to be fully explored in book-length and the theory has only been published in two places" (Anderson, p. 23). Since then, Schiff's book has been explored in book-length in *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (2009). In terms of the number of times published, the theory has appeared in several journals and databases, and numerous students have cited her work.

Schiff (2009) illustrates Concordance Theory in her book *The Military and Domestic Politics*, by applying the concepts of her theory to several case studies including the post-revolutionary United States; conditions in Argentina from 1946 – 1955; Israel; corporate philanthropy and the military-industrial complex; and comparatively between concordance in India vice discordance in Pakistan. She notes that models focusing on civil-military relations are particularly accommodating to Western constructs in national, social, political, historical, and cultural contexts. It is the flexibility of Concordance Theory concerning these considerations that perhaps makes it the most useful theory for application. Given that Concordance Theory is heavily focused on the relationship and interactive dynamics between the military, political elites, and the public (p. 2), it is straightforward to see why researchers would likely have an increasingly difficult time applying the theory to progressively autocratic regimes. Within strict totalitarian state systems, there need not be any concordance, as the ruler, or rulers, virtually hold complete control over the military, and power over the citizenry, who do not have a voice in state matters.

Concerning the few criticisms of Concordance Theory, Zulfiqar Ali (2014) offers the most substantial critiques. In his initial critique, *Contradiction of Concordance* Theory, Ali explains what he argues are flaws in Schiff's theoretical construct as it is applied to Pakistan in her book *The Military and Domestic Politics*. In the book, Schiff briefly comments on some of Pakistan's history, starting in the late 1950s, highlighting conditions adverse to those necessary for concordance, and which likely led to several coup attempts over time (2009, p. 64). Ali acknowledges unequal power structures but claims military power grabs were the result of concordance between the United States as a major intervener and Pakistan's military as more of a customer than a partner (pp. 548, 558). In this manner, Schiff superimposes a model constructed for the United States onto Pakistan.

In response to Ali's initial critique, Schiff (2015) defended her theory in a counter-article entitled, *Concordance Theory in Pakistan: Response to Zulfiqar Ali*, where she argues the contrary in that her theoretical application regarding Pakistan works quite well. She specifically highlights "the alienation of the Bengali community and subsequent lack of agreement among the three concordance partners being one significant factor" (2015). To this, Ali wrote yet another critical response entitled, *Pakistan, Military Coup and Concordance: Four Objections to Schiff* (2016). However, another individual by the name of Ejaz Hussain sided with Schiff, publishing an evaluation of Ali's two critiques entitled, *Failure to Understand Military Intervention in Pakistan* (2018). In his dissection of Ali's critiques, Hussain points out how Ali struck down Schiff's 'Western' theory, yet cited other Western philosophers in the same review. This, Hussain argued, "compromised methodological concerns which are central to scientific inquiry," before he declared Ali's arguments as "baseless," "barren," "replete with empirical

fallacies," and ignorant of U.S.-Pakistan dynamics and Pakistan's political developments (p. 369).

Ali's critiques of Schiff's theory may have some merit, especially in applying a model for the United States toward Pakistan. Nevertheless, although Schiff primarily intended to showcase Concordance Theory comparatively between India and Pakistan, she acknowledges heavy American influence. She writes that throughout the 1950s, Pakistan's officer corps was primarily trained and equipped by the United States and adopted American military thinking and tactics (2009, p. 87). However, as Hussain alluded to, it was the state of Pakistan that used these tactics on its own population, and later the United States would intervene due to Pakistan's inability to control radical insurgent groups. Additionally, Ali's critiques of applying the theory to Pakistan are largely irrelevant here, given this research is focused on the United States' own military operating within its borders.

Convergence theory. In the field of political science, Convergence Theory is frequently – and mainly - applied in the theory stratum of international relations (IR), where it is often referred to as "Modernization Theory." Clark Kerr, an economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is credited with structuring and articulating previous research efforts to forecast trajectories of global homogenization through industrialization. As technology, ideas, and certain norms become more globally diffuse, convergence increases between industrialized and industrializing societies, thereby encouraging and generating a more globalized society, rather than nationalized societies (Crossman, 2019; Kerr, 1983; Skinner, 1976; Solow, 1956). Kerr (1983), in his book *The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity,* claims convergence is the "tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances" (p. 3).

In 1960, Morris Janowitz proposed a similar concept regarding civil-military relations. The basic premise remained the same, though concerning the homogenization (or at least the influence of it) of the military and civil society, rather than pressure for interstate homogenization. Janowitz's proposal was primarily delivered as a response to Samuel Huntington's *Institutional Theory,* composed three years earlier, and constructed largely as a moderated version of Huntington's thesis.

It is of benefit, then, to briefly outline Huntington's theory first, as this will help highlight the formulation of Janowitz's own. In 1957, Huntington published *The Soldier and the State*, where he asserted liberalism is the dominant ideology of the U.S. public, whereas the Constitution, and from it, the military, were conservative in ideology. These two ideologies "combined to dictate an inverse relation between political power and military professionalism," where, following World War II, concepts of liberalism and constitutional tenets "made objective civilian control depend upon the virtually total exclusion of the military from political power" (p. 143). Huntington argued subscribers of liberalism generally have little need for the military, and often the military is a target of liberalism. He added that liberals tended to exaggerate the civil-military gap, painting political opponents as closely aligned with the military, and therefore outside the consensus of civil control and order (pp. 154-155).

Huntington averred that there was a balance at hand, whereby a liberal civil authority superseded military authority but should not interfere with military matters on account of military professionalism. To have military professionalism is to have officers whom civilian authorities can trust to maintain a coterminous military hierarchy and internal culture. Professionalism also requires officers to be experts at military studies, responsible in their duties, and at times akin to corporate bureaucrats, given the rigid rank structure and the orders that move

through it (pp. 8-17). These professional stewards of the military world unknown to many in civil society would focus on security and war unhindered by political considerations yet still subordinate themselves to political machinations in the form of national policy. A liberal society and a conservative military facing the Soviet Union during the Cold War would present a challenge to maintaining a strong military to fight for democratic ideals in the face of Communism. This brief explanation unfortunately only touches on some of the prime concepts contained in Huntington's book, which is still held in high regard among international relations experts today. This theory, though, is not utilized here due to its stiff propositions regarding a clear delineation and bifurcation of civil-liberal/military-conservative viewpoints creating a precarious balance. Additionally, the theory is more useful when examining the use of the military externally and abroad in pursuit of national security objectives and interests.

Through Convergence Theory, "Janowitz extends Huntington's normative logic of civilian control" by "emphasizing the roles of self-esteem and professionalism" in order rot "repackage Huntington's value-based logic in a different context" (Donnithorne, 2013, p. 13). This context includes, according to Janowitz, the U.S. military's role as more of a "constabulary" international force, seeking cooperation rather than a prototypical military force seeking absolute victories (1960, p. 418). This constabulary construct makes the military more flexible for a wide range of roles, from using high-intensity weapons of mass destruction to conducting low-intensity counter-insurgency operations. Janowitz does not discuss, however, whether or not such a flexible policing model makes the domestic use of the military more politically palatable or publicly acceptable.

In his theoretical conceptualization, Janowitz is less focused on an external enemy - such as Huntington was with the Soviet Union - and more on modifying the power dynamics to reflect

today's society and its heavy influence on the military. In turn, military leaders attempt to parry favor with the public. Following World War I, for example, "American generals and admirals had learned that their place in history depended in no small part on their ability to project themselves into the headlines of the mass media" (1960, p. 395).

Concerning criticism, pundits critical of Convergence Theory express there is a wide span of variance in terms of how quickly if at all, convergence is occurring. Additionally, scholars cannot agree on whether there is an end to any convergence processes, and if so, what either system would look like. Segal (1973) argues that "the major area of disagreement is on whether the civil or the military will dominate the-merged structure" (pp. 2-3). The basis for such an argument across the literature comes from a previously well-known (but still cited) political scientist named Harold Lasswell, who, in 1941, coined the concept of the "garrison state." He argued that technological advances in warfare facilitated increased striking distance, higher numbers of casualties, and thus greater fear amongst a population. In turn, this may lead to a militarized garrison state, where society is essentially focused on military industry, violence, and defense (Fitch, 1985, p. 31; Lasswell, 1941, pp. 455-468).

President Dwight Eisenhower even worried about the potential for the United States to become a garrison state during the Cold War against Soviet Russia, "with an economy dominated by military spending and civil liberties eroded" (Schwartz, 2005). The United States, some authors argue, serves as a world-renowned icon of political freedoms and civil liberties, and so the garrison state concept stands in stark contravention against such freedoms (Schwartz, 2005). Others, however, disagree, arguing instead that convergence "has led not to a militarization of civilian institutions but rather to a civilianization of the military" (Biderman & Sharp, 1968, p. 397).

Mutual Support Between the Theories

Generally, one might assume there is a point at which a high degree of concordance between military culture and civil society would begin to become a point of convergence. This might be when there more than an operational balance between the military, the citizenry, and political elites, where distinct and separate social and military institutions begin to coalesce. In this way, Concordance Theory and Convergence Theory are complementary and work well both as distinct theories and together. Contributors to each respective theory might take a position as to why one works better than the other, and in some cases, this may be true. However, these theoretical frameworks share some key attributes and features.

There are supporting propositions that have increased the validity of both theories, especially in the United States post-World War II. The military's economic impact provides one such example. In terms of cost, as mentioned earlier based on the Congressional Budget Office and the National Defense Authorization Act, military expenses make up a substantial component of total U.S. spending. The defense budget makes up 15 percent of total federal spending, but it is the single largest source of discretionary spending, costing more than transportation, health, education, and so forth (Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2020). To add additional perspective, however, defense spending accounts for just under 3.5 percent of total U.S. gross domestic product, a downward trend from 16 percent in 1956, and 6 percent in 1988 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). The United States, as with virtually any country, has competing spending priorities, and so the citizenry and their political leaders must weigh such hefty competing costs. As Janowitz highlights, the military seeks to "expand its government defense contracts," and operates public affairs and relations programs to appeal to the public and political leaders, essentially "lobbying on its own behalf" (1960, p. 392). Twenty years later, Schiff wrote, "In the

United States during the 1980s…several economic weaknesses resulted from huge defense spending," and, as she quoted, "the whole issue becomes one of balancing the short-term security afforded by large defense forces against the longer-term security of rising production and income" (2009, p. 132; Kennedy, 1987, p. 445).

Such costs show the need for concordance between the military and civil society, as the military requires a permissible political environment – decided upon by the citizenry – to procure such substantial funding. In this manner, while the military requires a budget to maintain its own defined industry often separate in many ways from the rest of society, it cannot do so without a complicit population. In 2019, Gallup reported in a poll that 25 percent of Americans think the United States spends too little on the military, 29 percent believe it is too much, and 43 percent think it is where it should be, "a remarkable degree of incoherence for politicians trying to interpret the public's will" (Hicks, 2020). There must be agreement from the public to fund high-priced military programs, but given the integration of a large civilian workforce into military production, maintenance, and other aspects, one can see where heavy concordance has transitioned to widespread integrated convergence.

Continuing on military-corporate relations, Schiff (2009) points out that, dating back to 1958, "30 of the top 50 companies listed on the *Fortune 500* list were also among the top 100 defense contractors" (p. 132). The military would not be able to maintain the customs, rituals, and practices both Schiff and Janowitz highlight as unique and distinguishing to military culture without a symbiotic relationship with private business. Also, the military as one entity in the ternary relationship highlighted in Concordance Theory does not create its own equipment. Everything from weapons to the uniforms worn by service members is purchased from private industry, with costs covered by the public (or by the service members in the case of uniforms).

Additionally, regarding the military's influence on politics, defense contracts "have been systematically distributed to rural and suburban areas, where they play a relatively dominant role in local economies and lead to a growing number of legislators with an interest in increasing military spending" (Moon, 2015, p. 1062). Highlighting concepts of both concordance and convergence, corporations can have a high level of influence, even indirectly, on both political bodies and the military, while the military can, in turn, drive political and corporate interests through military campaigns. Economist and author Mason Gaffney (2018) concludes the following:

> Throughout the course of the 20th century, U.S. military spending has been largely devoted to protecting the overseas assets of multinational corporations that are based in the United States or allied nations. Companies extracting oil, mineral ores, timber, and other raw materials are the primary beneficiaries. The U.S. military provides its services by supporting compliant political leaders in developing countries and by punishing or deposing regimes that threaten the interests of U.S.-based corporations. (p. 331).

Additionally, regarding the two theories, proponents of each agree elsewhere as well. Starting with convergence, it is important for the citizenry and political elites to consistently ensure there are enough constraints on the military while also maintaining a balance to permit the military to fulfill its intended roles of security, defense, and power projection. Constraints placed on such convergence of "purely military activities," then "the more dependent the armed forces will be on the civilian sector for non-combat activities, and the more permeable will be the boundaries between military and civilian institutions" (Segal, 1973, p. 4). Schiff, in *The Military and Domestic Politics*, appears to agree, stating "the dynamics of the military-industrial complex (MIC) is used to exemplify how easily the theme of concordance and culture can permeate very

different organizational environments" (2009, p. 126). Given the apparent carrefour of the two theories resolving to the same conclusion on boundary permeation between the military and corporate/civilian sectors, such permeations may help, in part, highlight reasons for the increased use (including the public-political desire for use) of the U.S. military domestically (Banks & Dycus, 2016; Tkacz, 2006, p. 309).

Civil Authority & Military Subordination

Literature detailing the United States' rise to the world's currently most potent global power is quite expansive, and there are numerous books and articles regarding theories of U.S. behavior, utility, and sources of power. Regarding the nation's historic rise, a majority of historic scholars agree the United States became the world's leading economic and military superpower following the conclusion of World War II with its simultaneous entry into the Cold War (Lewis, 2012; Munro, n.d.). In national security studies and related fields, states leverage at least four instruments of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic – often referred to as "DIME" (Farlin, 2014, p. 1). There are variations of the DIME model, however, where additional state tools of power include finance, intelligence, and law enforcement, or "DIME-FIL" (Rodriguez, Walton, & Chu, 2020).

Among these instruments of national power, the military apparatus has become so central to the United States today that it takes up a substantial portion of total government spending. The United States spends more on its military than any other nation (Conetta, 2012). It is important to note U.S. military spending does not make up the greatest percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), totaling 3.3% as opposed to, for example, Russia at 5.3% and Saudi Arabia at 10% (McCarthy, 2018). The U.S. defense budget - $718 billion in 2020 – is the largest in the world (Congressional Budget Office, 2019). In December 2019, the National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2020 was signed into law, which authorized $738 billion for military spending (NDAA of 2020, 2019).

However, in the United States, not all powers are immediately available due to constraints of the Constitution; restraints imposed by those in positions of civil supremacy, direction, and oversight; and the unique structure of federalism (Kemp & Hudlin, 1992, p. 8). In situations of grave emergencies, the federal government has federal law enforcement personnel and resources, to restore order and respond to mass casualties and destruction. These include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its 22 departments and agencies (DHS, 2020), National Guard Bureau and, to quote former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, as a "last resort," military forces under the Department of Defense (Pickrell, 2020).

The U.S. military is, by deliberate design, subordinate to civilian political authority and oversight, and is arguably one of the most prominent institutions of government in several ways. Especially since circa the 1940s, the United States continues to rely on its military as one of its core international powers (Höhn & Moon, 2010). A general (though with exception) stipulation of which the U.S. military is beholden, aside from serving under civilian leadership, is that, according to the Constitution, the government is limited in its powers, and with it the ability to use the military domestically for oppressive political ends (Mills, 1956, p. 176). Although it serves as the physical extension and manifestation of American policy and values, its role as an armed force trained in martial activities coupled with a distinct separation of the military from other institutions causes reservation in the population (Schiff, 2009, p. 5).

Military subordination to civil political authorities is reinforced through both internal and external mechanisms as explained across literature regarding the civil-military control, civil-

military relationship dynamics (though predominately government, as opposed to the public-specific focus as the "civil" component in this study), and so forth. Perhaps the most compelling and overt mechanism denoting civilian control of the military is the framework established in the Constitution as the principal legal founding for the structure of the United States federal apparatus. Concerning this bedrock forming such a precedent, there is virtually unanimous consensus across the literature that the Constitution explicitly places the military under civilian political control (Bland, 1999; Dunlap, 1994; Huntington, 1956; Janowitz, 1960; Prakash, 2008). In the Constitution, Article I, Section 8 clearly outlines the role of Congress in its stewardship, as it relates to the military, with the following responsibilities:

- To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
- To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
- To provide and maintain a Navy;
- To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
- To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
- To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8)

Article II, Section 2 outlines the role of the president as the executive branch broadly and succinctly by stating, "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States" (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2).[*] In placing control of the military squarely in the hands of the civilian power structure, the nation's founders intended for the military to be strictly instrumental, and provided a bulwark against a military that could be used domestically for oppressive political ends (Mills, 1956, p. 176).

All service members both officer and enlisted, swear an oath to "protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," and to "obey the orders of the president and the officers appointed" over the service member. Additionally, officer promotion warrants read that the officer will continue to serve at the "pleasure of the President of the United States of America for the time being under the provisions of those Public Laws relating to officers of the Armed Forces of the United States of America..." (Winters, 1982, p. 14). While some of the wording of the oath has changed over time, allegiance to the Constitution, appointment by the president, and adherence to faithful service have remained unchanged since the Revolutionary War (p. Department of Defense, 2006, p. iv). These requirements not only place the obligation of duty on service members but also highlights the subordination of military officers to public office. Still, while such oaths may "offer helpful guidance," they do not "provide perfectly clear authority for military action" (Banks & Dycus, 2016). For this reason, it is prudent and necessary for military officers to have strong knowledge of the Constitution and civics generally. Leaders who understand their roles, limits, and authorities can carry out their responsibilities with less uncertainty, reducing the chances of violations.

[*] This includes the U.S. Air Force, which did not become a standalone service until 1947. The U.S. Marine Corps, established in 1775, is a component of the Department of the Navy.

Risa (2021) argues that, in addition to the framework provided by the Constitution, the status of the military officer as a professional is yet another mechanism supporting civil supremacy. The status of professional officer, to some degree, retains some faint semblance of the aristocracy of the past, when military officers bought their commissions or were granted them due to their social status. Risa adds that even in the present day, officers in foreign militaries are appointed from the upper echelons of society, the same economic strata of individuals who are appointed to govern. The legacy of this in the United States led to mutual interests and sympathetic understandings, where "the balance of forces *within* the ruling strata has been reflected within the standing army" (2021, p. 173). Although U.S. military officers are no longer in large part selected based on their social position, the military of today is rooted in laws and traditions of those times in the past.

Commissioned officers, those who create and direct military policies, must pass more stringent physical requirements than the enlisted over whom they exert control, and they must possess at least a bachelor's degree, with 42 percent having advanced degrees (Parker, 2017). To this end, requirements of officer stewardship and participation in the strata of higher education mean an educated leadership force that, overall, understands civics and the nature of civilian control. However, as Cohen (1997) states, "The gap between military and society is exacerbated by the military's increasing tendency to recruit from narrower segments of the population," with one report claiming that nearly 25% of new military service members come from military families (p. 180).

About literature that is particular to the interrelational dynamics of the U.S. citizen population and its military, many authors and researchers take to exploring the challenges of how the United States maintains, as Feaver (2003) frames it, "a military strong enough to do anything

the civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize" (p. 2). While the military does not necessarily answer directly to the public, politicians in control of the military do. Domestic populations in democratic states will sanction unpopular political actions, and so politicians will often "avoid policies that will provoke a domestic backlash" (Chapman, 2011, p. 33). Therefore, civil-military relations go beyond the military's relationship with the public, extending to the military's relationship with civilian and political leadership. Just as the public's attitude towards the military can change, so too can the military's perspective of the public, or even of its civilian leaders. The level of civilian control of the military and the military's acceptance of it is not consistently sustained. Instead, interactions between military and political leaders are dynamic, replete with disagreements, underhanded military operations hidden from the purview of political oversight, and at times borderline (if not outright) acts of insubordination.

On relationships between political and military leaders, many authors contend high-ranking military officials have become far too politicized, whether due to personal loyalty to a political party or a particular president or engaging in political speeches and behaviors in the interest of landing potentially lucrative post-military careers (Cohen, 1997; Mills, 1956). There are plenty of opportunities for military officers to become beguiled in partisan politics, especially living in Washington, DC. As Janowitz (1960) points out, "service in Washington involves the military leader in the civilian social structure more conspicuously…moreover, Washington socialite circles have a stronger interest in ranking governmental officials and assimilate military personnel more readily into their ranks" (p. 210).

On the issue of military partisanship, there are numerous examples of military personnel failing to carry out their roles impartially, some of which are captured in the literature detailing

such military partisanship during the Clinton Administration (Feaver, 2003; Kohn, 1994; McLaughlin, 2008). Several authors admit Clinton's staff were not necessarily fond of the military (Patterson, 2004), and top military leadership was uncertain as to how to deal with a president whom they believed was, at a minimum, apathetic to the armed forces. Service members would often denigrate President Clinton and his administration openly, a punishable offense under the UCMJ (Feaver, pp. 181-189). In some cases, military leaders seemed to tolerate such denigrating comments. Some leaders seemed to support such comments, even looking the other way when service members placed anti-Clinton bumper stickers on their cars (Cohen, 1997, p. 178).

In another example, a U.S. Marine sergeant, then-26-year-old Gary Stein, was discharged from the military under "other than honorable" conditions after he wrote political statements on Facebook about President Barack Obama. In one comment, Sergeant Stein wrote, "As an active-duty Marine, I have sworn to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. Obama is the economic enemy, the religious enemy, the domestic enemy." He also said, "I say screw Obama. I will not follow orders given by him to me." The sergeant later claimed he meant that he would only disobey illegal orders, but U.S. District Judge Marilyn Huff ruled the military had the authority to discipline its personnel, and that Stein had also used internal meteorological systems to post anti-Obama remarks (Whitcomb, 2012)

More recently, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas disagreed with an Army recruiting commercial that was a cartoon of an actual female soldier. Ted Cruz said the U.S. military was more focused on political correctness, and that the services had been "emasculated." The controversial comment prompted responses from military officers who entered the political fray. National Guard First Lieutenant Kait Abbott said the senator's comments were "disturbing," played into

"Russian propaganda," and that the comments were overall "misogynistic." According to Beynon (2021), Marine Reserve Major Maggie Seymour issued the following statement regarding Senator Cruz:

> [He] knows exactly what he's doing, pandering to his base. He's getting them riled up, stoking their own fears and insecurities surrounding masculinity and heteronormativity. It's playing into two threats really. The obvious Russian propaganda external threat. … But also the internal threat that comes from the idea that the very presence of women and gays is a threat to the 'masculinity' of the military. … And then people wonder why women are sexually harassed, abused, or killed by their fellow service members.

Despite Senator Cruz's political leanings against the political leanings of the military officers, the increasingly bellicose behavior of some military officers voicing their political opinions against elected political leaders would worry many authors and practitioners of military studies, civics, political science, and civil-military relations. While military leaders increasingly fail to curb providing their personal opinions, it may be surprising to see a military major insinuating that a sitting senator critiquing a cartoon commercial is a Russian sympathizer and responsible for causing sexual assaults and murders of women in the military. However, Paul Feaver points out that military leaders increasingly 'shirk' obligations and responsibilities due to a lack of punitive enforcement from higher levels within the military, or from political leaders. Feaver refers to this as the "problematique" of civil-military relations, stating, "The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity" (1999, p. 214).

One extreme example of military insubordination took place in the 1950s between President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur, a five-star general and commander of

U.S. forces. During the Korean War, General MacArthur repeatedly criticized President Truman's policies in the open, demanding a widening of the war and threatening war with China. This caused confusion on the world stage as to who was in charge of military endeavors and just how the power dynamics worked between both men (Brands, 2016). President Truman eventually had little choice but to fire General MacArthur.

Kohn (2002) argues that civilian control of the military and military officer behaviors has continued to wane over time, and as that control lessens, military officials grow more assertive in their influence in the political decision-making as they have for more than the past four decades (pp. 9-10). Professional military personnel, for example, openly chastised Bill Clinton during his presidency, to the point where two Marine officers were formally reprimanded for openly insulting the president as the commander-in-chief. Two possible explanations for this are a divergence of policy preferences between civilians and the military and a lack of punitive measures for military personnel (Feaver, 2003, p. 190). Military officials have become increasingly vocal in the political sphere, in some cases believing they must speak out against policies with which they disagree, and many speak on matters of foreign policy and relations outside the scope of their military responsibilities.

More than 50 percent of military officers polled claim they have a responsibility to influence decision-making processes regarding the employment and use of the military (Kohn, 2002, pp. 29, 33). Military leader views that they have a responsibility to influence decision-making are not wrong, but their influence is intended to be limited to providing operational advice. Instead, military leaders have increasingly influenced the political process, including when and how it is appropriate for the military to operate. As Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2018) state, "By statute and tradition, the U.S. military identifies itself as an apolitical body. Yet, senior

military officers are often involved in public debates, either intentionally or inadvertently, about how and when to use military force" (p. 45). At times, political and appointed civilian leaders defer to military leaders as experts in their tradecraft, allowing the military to heavily influence what may be in the military's own best interests. At other times, military leaders provide statements and commentary to media outlets and the public, thereby circumventing the political process and directly influencing or appealing to the public. Golby, et al, recount examples of the latter including:

> General Martin Dempsey expressing doubt about intervention in Syria (2013), General Stanley McChrystal expressing skepticism about a light footprint military option that the White House reportedly favored in Afghanistan (2011), General David Petraeus vigorously defending President George W. Bush's surge in Iraq (2007), General Eric Shinseki expressing concerns about troop deployment levels in Iraq in a Senate testimony (2003), General Wesley Clark supporting airstrikes in the Balkans (1999), and General Colin Powell opposing air strikes in Bosnia (1992). (p. 45).

It is important to note that oftentimes individuals in the military carry their rank – and with it the insights associated as viewed by the media and the public – with them in their post-military careers. When General McChrystal disagreed with President Obama in 2011, he was a private citizen in 2011. In 2010, however, President Obama fired General McChrystal after the general had made disparaging remarks about the president and the administration in what he thought were private comments. In explaining his decision, President Obama remarked General McChrystal's commentary "undermines the civilian control of the military that's at the core of our democratic system" (BBC, 2010). In 2022, the DoD suspended retired U.S. Army General Gary Volesky from consulting the military based on a social media post critical of First Lady Jill

Biden. When interviewed for his perspective, Peter Feaver of Duke University's political science department opined on the issue, stating, "Retired military have the right to express their opinions and tweet whatever they like, but that does not make it right, and the more senior the retired military, the more detrimental to healthy civil-military relations an errant tweet can be" (Vanden Brook, 2022).

The military is generally supposed to remain free of political bias and influence, but for numerous reasons, this seems to become less and less the case. Military leaders provide advice to political lawmakers while following, to varying degrees, the direction of the executive and legislative branches of government, or the "political elites" in accordance with Schiff's Concordance Theory. While Schiff (2009) describes the political elite as one of the three parties engaged in civil-military relations, C. Wright Mills (1956) expands this concept to *power elites.* Mills explains that, although political elites are a core component within concordance theory, lawmakers should not be, nor are they, the sole inhabitants of this elitist space of power and influence. Celebrities, lobbyists, and other famous, or wealthy individuals are also considered *power elites* due to their direct influence over political decision-making and processes (pp. 3-4). One of the hallmarks of a nation-state, upon which philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, 1651), and later German sociologist and historian Max Weber (*Politics as a Vocation*, 1919), spent substantial time and effort expounding, is that the state rightfully maintains its legitimacy by maintaining a monopoly on violence through its various security apparatuses. This includes the use of police, standing armies, or even pro-government militias (used by countries such as Russia, Iraq, Sudan, Venezuela, Syria, and elsewhere) to evade accountability (Carey, Mitchell, & Lowe, 2012, p. 250).

Generally, although many top military leaders ultimately have political aspirations (or fame and wealth) in the future, service members have not volunteered to perform military service to attain political power. In the U.S. armed forces, in many ways modeled closely off of the British military as the antecedent, the value of service and the prospects of achievement, rather than political ambitions, are the reward service members seek (Mills, 1956, p. 174). However, these pursuits have changed, as more military officials have involved themselves in politics. Military interventions and forays into domestic civil matters may be less desirous or deliberately nefarious machinations of the military than the public may think. For example, Mills explains that while in some cases military generals are becoming more politically involved, even when the military does not desire political power, political power may be forced upon military forces. These forces have been used, whether willingly or otherwise, by the public as a civil service or for political purposes, and due to the military's training, politicians and the public may be tempted to continue using them domestically (p. 200).

There is a point of view on the civil-military conflict dynamics that conflict between the two, when done cordially, can create a necessary balance. Brower (1999) explains this concept, in part, as follows:

> Believing that top civilians and US armed forces leaders should work together on every issue is naive and dangerous. Only the most insistently blind can fail to notice the daily civil-military friction throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). However, a democratic government lacking such friction is first cousin to tyranny. When the civil-military conflict overheats, the media harp on the scandal and disruption that frequently result. Too much tension can lead to military ineffectiveness; too little can produce thinly

> veiled juntas. Still, in such a war we should wish for no armistice. Rather, we must hope for the continued cordial hostilities.

This sentiment upholds that should commanders step out of line, civilian leaders must hold them accountable. However, when civilian leaders try to micromanage military operations, there can be negative strategic consequences.

The requirement, expectations, and appropriate use cases to employ the military domestically are not always clear. The lines of military subordination to civil authority, while generally understood, can also be ambiguous. There have, as with countless endeavors involving government and society, been contentious issues between military and political leaders. None of these issues have yet reached levels in the United States as seen around the world (at least since the Civil War) with regard to coup d'états and attempted military rule. So far, the U.S. system of military subordination to civil society has worked, with the civil-political system coming out on top in cases of military dissent. Such disagreements and clashes between political and military leaders, and how the public influences such relationships, are examined more in-depth in the subsequent section, *Civil-Military Relations*.

Civil-Military Relations

Professional standing armies active within their own nation's sovereign territories date back to sometime around 745 – 727 BC when Tiglath-Pileser III of Assyria created provinces managed by governors and a standing army to maintain and patrol them (Howard, 2002, p. 36). Since that time, states have used military forces to enforce their wills on other states, or for internal regime stability and policing. Interactions between a state's civil society and its military may date back hundreds of years, but the field of research on civil-military relations as it currently exists is recent. Sun Tzu discussed the military's role in society sometime in the 5th

century BC (1971), followed by numerous other scholars and philosophers. However, the topic became an academic focus in the 1950s during the Cold War (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960) in the fields of military studies, sociology, civics, and political science. The topic is not relegated to the United States, as researchers have studied these relationships around the world. For example, researchers have published articles on civil-military relations between societies and their militaries, including Israel (Lebel, 2006; Barak & Sheffer, 2007; Meir, 1995), Russia (Deriglazova, 2005; Isakova, 2002; Renz, 2005), and Canada (Thomason, Holton, Febbraro, & Gill, 2019).

The term "civil-military relations" refers to "the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated" (Hooker, 2012, p. 1). This term refers not only to the military's interaction with the public, but also to the military's relationship with other politicians and appointed civilians who direct military forces and oversee military policies (Blankshain, 2020).

In many cases, civilians have provided countless accounts detailing the conditions of living under harsh conditions of military rule**.** Accounts of civilian mistreatment by armed forces and governments continue today, in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Myanmar. In Mexico, the government declared war on violent drug cartels in 2006. Since then, heavily armed militias of drug cartels continue to battle with the Mexican military and police for territory. Since that time, the fighting has left over 300,000 people dead (Council on Foreign Relations, 2021). Some first-person accounts recall civilian experiences at the effects of military actions but are focused predominately on life under harsh military rule, usually from host dictatorships or

invading forces. One well-known example is Ann Frank's *The Diary of a Young Girl*, which details Frank's experiences hiding out in the Nazi-occupied Netherlands (Frank, 1993).

There are plenty of stories highlighting positive relations as well, such as those of military liberation and the welcoming of invading armies the citizenry believed would free them from oppression. Even now, decades after World War II, the Polish people emphatically welcome U.S. forces during military bilateral events (Spark & Shubert, 2017). The United States and Poland have a decades-old military defense and trade relationship. Conversely, there are also those instances where military forces are welcomed due to civil naïveté. The Iraq War that started in 2003 pushed Sunni Muslims from the government. Although Sunnis are a religious minority to Shi'ite Muslims, for decades they presided over Iraq. Once the Shi'ites gained power, the government engaged in a crackdown on Sunni cities. In 2014, capitalizing on the grievances of Sunni Muslims against their Shi'ite majority government, the vicious and barbaric insurgent militia of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) rolled into Iraq from Syria. Thousands of Sunnis welcomed ISIS with open arms (Williams, 2014). Unfortunately, it was a welcoming the Sunnis would regret almost immediately once ISIS started its campaign of murder, rape, kidnapping, torture, and terror against Sunnis, Shi'ites, and the rest of the country (Warrick, 2016).

Moving focus back onto the United States, a country that has not experienced a foreign military occupation since the War of 1812, the use of the military domestically is a precarious undertaking for the government. Since the nation's founding, many Americans have been wary of domestic military operations over the military's intentions (Banks & Dycus, 2016). However, in 2016, Harvard University researchers published results of a study reporting that 1 in 6

Americans believe military rule would be positive, whereas in 1995 only 1 in 16 believed the same (CBS News, 2016).

On the subject of civil-military relations, there is no universal understanding of how to frame the concept. Although the term "civil-military relations" is defined in this section, highlighting the U.S. military as an organization with a unique culture as it exists and operates from time to time within civil society, there are a minority of scholars who frame it in other contexts. These alternative ways in which U.S. civil-military relations are understood are provided to offer the full breadth of the term as it may be used elsewhere. Several researchers take the topic of U.S. "civil-military relations" as referring to, or including, the U.S. military's relationship(s) with *foreign* civilian populations, rather than with its own domestic civilian populous. Examples include analyses of the U.S. military's precarious relationships with Iraqis and Afghans during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the reconstruction efforts that followed, respectively (Egnell, 2009; Gintautas, 2020). This is reasonable, given the military is often seen as a force of external power projection in countries and regions abroad (Cypher, 2015, p. 800).

Another way in which studies regarding civil-military relations can diverge from the way it is meant here is the manner in which some researchers consider civil-military relations the ways in which civilians deploy overseas in support of the military and U.S. national objectives (Irving, 2020). However, in keeping with the definition provided and in-line with Concordance Theory, civil-military relations are framed here as a consideration of the relationships between the government and the military, between the military and civilian public, and between the public and the government (Blankshain, 2020, p. 2; Foster, 1997).

Center of Gravity & Civil-Political Influence

There is literature regarding the study of "armed forces and society," but this is quite limited, and again tends to focus exclusively on the theoretical aspects. More often, researchers have historically studied the military as a standalone entity, though in the 1970s studies of the military in relation to society began to expand (Moskos, 1976). On the topic of American perspectives on the phenomena of domestic military activities, this research study is unique and new in a field of military studies saturated in many other ways.

Governments that are not accountable to their citizens, such as dictatorships and autocratic regimes, may not need any public support for military operations. Conversely, how a democratic government employs and utilizes its military is based often in large part on the demands and sentiments of the public. U.S. Army Reserve Colonel Kirk Slaughter (2016) wrote that the "president must adhere to the boundaries placed on foreign policy by public opinion" (p. 10). This would ostensibly hold true - likely even more so in fact - regarding domestic policies of military actions and interventions.

To understand the significance – and potential consequences – of civilian perspectives on the use of the military, it is first important to outline some military concepts in order to frame public influences. Namely, *Center of Gravity* (CoG), and how CoG analysis ties in with public will, and in turn how the concept matters to the United States militarily. Additionally, there are political factors that must be taken into consideration regarding both the use – and the timing of using – military forces in domestic capacities.

Various publications describe the CoG concept in various ways, but ultimately the core of the concept is the same. Prussian General and military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831) created the term "center of gravity," defining it as "a source of power

that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act" (Clausewitz, 2009, 144). The DoD started adopting CoG considerations and analysis in 1993, in Doctrine for Joint Operations (Dixon, 2015), but the impetus for the military to identify CoGs in order to characterize the most important strategic way to win a conflict is now ubiquitous in doctrine and in military academic curricula. Military intelligence analysts and strategists spend significant time in any conflict trying to identify CoGs at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels while protecting their own, as theoretically the destruction, disruption, or dismantling of an opposing force's CoG will lead to victory or a favorable outcome. The CoG is the "hub of all power and movement on which everything depends" (Summers, 1982, p. 128).

When identifying CoGs, there are factors contributing to it that can be qualified, quantified, identified, and articulated for action. These are critical capabilities (CCs), critical requirements (CRs), and critical vulnerabilities (CVs). Critical capabilities refer to the power or functions of the CoG that makes it so imperative and are defined as "Primary abilities which merits a Center of Gravity to be identified as such in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission" (Strange, 1996, p. 43). CRs are the resources or conditions that facilitate operational capabilities. Finally, critical vulnerabilities are the components that are vulnerable to attack, manipulation, or influence that render harm to the CoG and may have far-reaching implications for the rest of the organization.

Critics have been consistently skeptical about the U.S. military's ability to successfully carry out campaigns without the support of the American public There is widespread agreement among historians and military tacticians that during the Vietnam War, the United State's CoG was the will of the American public (Mandelbaum, 1982, pp. 157-69*;* Prosch, 1987, p. 1; Summers, 1982, p. 155). In fact, military leaders and academic scholars have identified the will

of the American public as the CoG over time following World War II (Seagren & Henderson, 2018, p. 70; Schmader, 1993, p. 26; Von Wald, 1995, p. 15; Boylan, 2015). This need for public support is applicable to foreign theaters of operations as much, if not especially, as in a domestic, home theater of operations.

A counterargument might be that the American public, while a component of concordance theory, does not have direct control over the U.S. military, and therefore the military may persist in its mission regardless of public sentiments. However, in a democratic republic, lawmakers may only delay the will of the public. Americans are more likely to accept military campaigns when the threat appears substantial, the more significant the threat, the more acceptance of casualties and support for military efforts. One RAND report, for example, found the American public's "aversion to losses of U.S. life in some recent military interventions has had less to do with a recent decline in tolerance for casualties than with the debatable merits of the operations themselves" (Larson, 1996). However, Americans are more accepting of the government's request for public support on foreign interventions than domestic (Seagren & Henderson, 2018, p. 90), which makes public perspectives all the more critical for military success.

Generally, a political leader's stance on particular conflicts, usually interstate conflicts, has significant effects on public support. In turn, levels of public support can likewise have substantial effects on a political leader's decisions, referred to as "audience costs." One Princeton University study reported, "Audience cost theory assumes that democratic leaders are cautious about making threats, because they believe that domestic audiences—in democracies, voters—will punish them for making threats and failing to follow through," and the public "often [ranks] domestic problems higher than foreign ones" (Tomz, Weeks, & Yarhi-Milo, pp. 6, 12).

However, Slantchev (2012) offers a deeper definition that applies to domestic contexts, and therefore to this research, as follows:

> If (1) backing down in a crisis makes an actor suffer costs in addition to those arising from conceding the stakes, (2) these costs increase as the crisis escalates, (3) these costs can become so large that war becomes preferable to a concession, (4) no other mechanism for coercing the opponent exists, and (5) attempting to coerce the opponent does not increase his costs of conceding, then escalation can commit an actor to fighting, and the resulting risk of war discourages bluffing, which makes escalation informative and gives it a coercive role. (p. 377)

In the context of this research, some civilians *could* be considered opponents in cases of rebellion or insurrection, thereby requiring coercion (threats) or fighting (force). To expand this definition, though, crises can include those that arise from disasters as well. For (3) above, the crisis or disaster could become so large that military action (as opposed to first responders) could become preferable, and in (4), no other mechanism may exist. For (5), waiting out the disaster or its aftermath too long does not decrease the crisis, as in the response delay leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina. As casualties mount and the crisis grows due to ineffective measures by the government, the impetus for a military deployment grows, creating potentially coercive conditions for CEDMO.

Political leaders in democratic societies, as opposed to authoritarian regimes, incur higher constituent-audience costs. If audience costs in the domestic sense refer to the political costs exacted upon lawmakers for propping up unpopular military action, it can be said that this is not the same in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes are not subject to public elections, and thus do not perceive the same costs as political leaders in democratic states (Snyder & Borghard,

2011, p. 437). Additionally, one study found that leaders who make threats they later reverse before taking a different, perhaps lighter approach (policy substitution) will suffer fewer political consequences compared to political leaders who make threats and back down (policy abandonment) (Lin-Greenberg, 2019, p. 559).

Policies are often crafted reactively or under pressure, rather than proactively, based on events that have occurred or prevailing public sentiments of the time, and in this way "constructivists conceive of policymaking as driven by persuasion and the social construction of identity and meaning" (Zahariadis, 2014, p. 30). This perspective can also be applied in the development of military policies as they continue to evolve to address modern issues and challenges, whether overseas or within the United States. Public perspectives are important considerations when leveraging military forces. Increasing use of the military domestically also increases civil-military interactions, and so "new military periodic literature, texts, doctrine, and initiatives are increasingly likely to place social influence at the core of military operations" (King, 2011). However, when members of the public are looking to evaluate and judge their policymakers, "events that occurred far away in time are discounted, while events that took place closer to election day are given greater leverage in the voting calculus" (Chiozza, 2015, p. 4).

In the summer of 2020, President Trump threatened to deploy the military to quell ongoing civil unrest. However, media outlets, state governors, and members of the House of Representatives were vociferous in their disagreement with such a move (Zapotosky, 2020). Even President Trump's Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, opposed any use of the military (Cooper, Schmitt, & Haberman, 2020). While the administration likely did not means-test public opinion to see how publicly favorable such a move would be, President Trump was aware of the federal election several months away, and that such glaring opposition would likely damage his

chances at reelection. Therefore, President Trump, despite making the threat, did not follow through, and thus backed down rather than recalculating another, and perhaps more acceptable approach. Comparatively, just as Chiozza (2015) cites time-distance as a significant factor in suffering audience costs over poor decisions, President Bush's approval rating dropped from 44% down to 38% in the months following the response to Hurricane Katrina. However, this was in 2005. By January 2006, President Bush's approval rating rebounded to 43% (Newport, 2006).

Concerning the public's perception of the military broadly, regardless of any first-hand experiences with the military, there have been independent, structured polls aimed at gauging public perspectives on the military as an entity, or across military branches. Some studies then break down the demographics of those polled by race, ethnicity, gender, age, and political orientation to provide statistics along these lines as well. Segments of the public are intermittently polled on which branch they view as "most favorable," though public sentiments change with current events. For example, a majority of respondents claimed the Air Force was "the most important" prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, after which it became the Army. Then, several years later after major combat operations ended, the Air Force topped the list once again (Bunch, 2017; Norman, 2017).

Gallup polling conducts an annual poll entitled *Confidence in Institutions*, where the military has topped the list "every year since 1998, with at least 72% [of Americans] expressing "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence" in the military as an institution (Norman, 2017). Currently, such sentiments are on a decline, however. As noted in the first chapter of this research, public trust in the military since 2018 has dropped from 70% to 56%. This drop follows a partisan presidential election, political violence, and COVID-19 lockdowns and deaths. Members of the public polled over their views on trust and confidence in the military also shared

"significant concerns about threats emanating from within the United States" (Losey, 2021). The use of phenomenology and participant solicitation for their experiences is more valuable to this research than a structured poll because of the way individuals recall information, as well as the analytical lens applied to those experiences and perceptions. Baum (2004) states that individuals may quickly forget *why* they supported or opposed policies as more time passes. However, "having paid attention in the first instance, they are likely to remember how they felt about it if an entrepreneur later primes the issue" (p. 608).

Several events have taken place in the United States over the past 20 years where social influences put pressure on political leaders regarding military operations, such as the social unrest of 2020-2021, but perhaps most notably is the Hurricane Katrina disaster response in 2005.

Civilian & CEDMO Perspectives on Hurricane Katrina

Within recent history, Hurricane Katrina ravaged New Orleans in 2005 and stands out as a major case study when analyzing the successes and failures of both government and domestic response at multiple levels (Banks & Dycus, 2016; Davis, Cecchine, Schaefer, & Zeman, 2007; Cooper & Block, 2007; Horne, 2006). The disaster received around-the-clock news coverage and is still used today as a case study for government and military operational training. The disaster - and subsequent response - were unique for several reasons. First, the disaster was declared by many as one of the worst natural disasters to befall the United States in terms of overall destruction and was also the costliest natural disaster - $161 billion in damages - in the country's history (Gibbens, 2019; Jacob, Mawson, Payton, & Guignard, 2008; NOAA, 2021). Second, Hurricane Katrina was the second deadliest disaster to befall the United States, leaving 1,300 people dead in its wake, since a 1900 tornado in Galveston, Texas (Burnett, 2017). Third,

Hurricane Katrina "resulted in the largest domestic deployment of troops since the Civil War," and left many wondering "why a country with the most advanced military the world has ever seen struggled to deliver water to one of its major cities". (Hoffmeister, p. 863, 2010).

Hurricane Katrina caused exceptional damage because of the force with which it struck, compounded by a slow, inefficient response caused by political bickering and ineptitude. As Banks & Dycus (2016) point out, only when the military was finally sent in (National Guard and regular armed forces) did most of the help come. Had it not been "for the many heroic rescues by these men and women in uniform, along with lots of heavy lifting to provide medical care, food, and water, the casualties from Katrina would have been much worse" (p. 1). Still, when it came to political leaders and the military, there was a grave disconnect. The military, for its part, was staged immediately, ready to deploy. However, it took days for policymakers to authorize any movement. As was reported at the time, government officials believed any response would need to be intricate and complicated, and would not be straightforward (Cooper, 2015). These officials claimed "one major reason for the delay was that they believed they had to plan for a far more complicated military operation, rather than a straight-ahead relief effort" (Cooper, 2005). Policymakers believed this would likely include operations "in which federal soldiers might have to kill American citizens, perhaps in great numbers" (Cooper & Block, 2006, p. 207). The head of U.S. Northern Command at the time, Admiral Tom Keating, said military communication would need improvement.

This initial failure of the government to prepare for and immediately respond to the disaster was followed by successful military operations that provided much-needed relief. In response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the Department of Defense deployed 42,990 National Guard, 17,417 active-duty military, 20 ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed-wing aircraft

(Bowman, Kapp, & Belasco, 2006, p. 6). Unfortunately, this help would take longer than those affected by the disaster would expect. By August 31, just two days after the hurricane stopped over New Orleans and deluged more than 80% of the city, looting and violence had become so bad that overwhelmed local law enforcement had to stop the search, rescue, and recovery operations to combat the crime wave. It was not until four days later, on Friday, September 2, that the National Guard arrived in convoys to deliver supplies and attempt to maintain order (National Geographic, 2012).

Politics, more than logistics or even legal authorities, contributed to the lack of response. President Bush reached out to Governor Blanco of Louisiana shortly before the hurricane made landfall, though at that time she did not believe federal assistance was necessary. Governor Blanco could not recall whether she contacted President Bush one day or two days after the storm landed and had poor-to-virtually no initial communication with Mayor Ray Nagin. On Wednesday, two days after Hurricane Katrina struck, the state requested federal troops, though the follow-on troops did not arrive until Saturday, September 3 (Frontline, 2005). Although President Bush had reached out to the state before the hurricane landed, he did not press the issue when his offers of assistance were turned down because he believed "the prospect of a Republican president seizing control of a situation from a Democratic governor who explicitly resisted federalizing the military was deemed politically unpalatable" (Peters, 2005).

Governor Blanco did, at some point, request 40,000 federal troops to relieve the National Guard of logistics and rescue efforts, but initially only a small contingent of around six people showed up. The military claimed it wanted to survey the area first to determine what was needed. A spokesman for Governor Blanco said they were expecting the 82nd Airborne, though this unit did not arrive until the afternoon of Sunday, September 4th (Cooper & Block, 2006, pp. 192-

217). While scrutiny may initially fall on the military, there was much hamstringing of DoD response efforts due to political wrangling. Political leaders at all levels were accused of "glory seeking," which includes prohibiting private contenders, such as the Red Cross, from entering the disaster area in order to leverage more credit to government leaders (Sobel & Leeson, 2006, p. 66-67). Mayor Ray Nagin failed to send out initial evacuation warnings before Hurricane Katrina made landfall and set up his command suite at the top of a Hyatt Hotel where he remained for almost the entirety of the crisis (Brinkley, 2006).

Government inaction caused deep distrust in public officials, which resulted in many from the black community questioning if race or income strata weren't factors lending to inaction, or if the event was manipulated and managed with intent to further harm the black community (DeMond, 2011, p. 26). Following Katrina, polls regarding trust in government strikingly showed those who lived through Katrina had 15% less trust in the federal government and 12% less trust in the state government than the general population (Nicholls & Picou, 2012, p. 352).

For many, relief did come until the arrival of the military a week later. Senator Joseph Lieberman, in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs entitled, "Hurricane Katrina: The Defense Department's Role in the Response," said in his statement:

> And my concern, as I look back at this, because in a catastrophe of this type time is obviously of the essence, is that the majority of the assets didn't come in until the week after landfall. The National Guard was obviously first and mobilized by Wednesday. The active duty military didn't fully come in until the following Saturday. (2006).

New Orleanians felt abandoned by political leaders (Tuason, Güss, & Carroll, 2012, p. 288), a feeling more pronounced in Black respondents than whites. Comparatively, by the time the military arrived, residents were 'very happy' to find relief and a greater semblance of security the military offered (Oscar, 2006, p. 10). Unfortunately, due to Posse Comitatus restrictions, the military was, and remains, unable to initiate its own actions at the onset of the catastrophe. Under law, "any request for federal troops in response to a similar disaster "must come from local and state authorities through official channels" (p. 11).

On August 31st, as people seeking help and refuge were increasingly packed into the Super Dome, there was a small National Guard contingent attempting to maintain order and assuage public fears. At some point, someone started a fire inside of the Super Dome, causing everyone to seek fresh air in the center of the arena. Soldiers moved to the center of the arena as well. However, given the worsening situation, "the crowd was frustrated and suspicious of the soldiers, while scuffles broke out and people discussed starting a riot" (Cooper & Block, 2007, p. 194). Rumors started to spread claiming soldiers were killing people, and one soldier was shot, lending credence to this narrative. Later in the evening, it was confirmed, however, that the soldier had shot himself in the foot.

The Super Dome was evacuated on the same day as the arrival of the military's main convoy, and soldiers began loading people onto buses for relocation to safer sites. Attitudes began to change, as people started to appreciate the military as a force of stability. One woman even hugged a soldier and thanked him, and overall, the troops "were quick to make friends and raise the public's cheer" (pp. 216-217).

While victims of Hurricane Katrina may have felt elated to finally be rescued by, and receive aid from, the military, as discussed earlier, sometimes a military presence is seen as

aggressive, or viewed with suspicion. For these reasons, there are still strong advocates against normalizing military domestic responses. Mackubin Owens (2005) of the Ashbrook Center summarizes, in part, the concerns of normalizing such reliance, stating in part:

> Do we really want the American public turning to the military for solutions to the country's problems, with all that means for healthy civil- military relations? And do we really want to saddle the military with a variety of new, non- combat missions, vastly escalating its commitment to formerly ancillary duties? If we do, we will find that we have involved the military in the political process to an unprecedented and perhaps dangerous degree.

The military can pre-stage equipment and be prepared to execute operations as soon as a disaster begins or while it is underway, though this is dependent on decisions by policymakers. There are policies in place outlining the limits of military activities based on which policy is invoked. It is necessary, then, to provide an overview of the major policies directing military use authorization.

Major Policies Outlining Military Domestic Response

U.S. domestic military operations are not without precedent, nor does the military operate without strict boundaries. There are a number of laws and policies relative to circumstances that set conditions under which the U.S. military can do so. While the Constitution outlines some of the basic parameters on the use of the military, laws have been crafted and modified over time in addendum in order to permit the use of the military in unusual or extraordinary circumstances while still safeguarding the principles of a free society without fear of autonomous military influence and intervention.

The Constitution lays the framework for presidential and congressional oversight, and also places some broad limitations on the military's authority. For example, the military is

prohibited from commandeering citizens' homes for military use, regardless of whether during times of peace or war. The Third Amendment of the Constitution reads, "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law" (U.S. Const. amend. III). Historian Gordon Wood (n.d.), writing for the *National Constitution Center*, claimed out of all constitutional amendments, the Third Amendment has faced the fewest legal challenges, and the Supreme Court has never taken up a case stemming from it. Additionally, he states, the amendment is important even today because it emphasizes "the importance of civilian control over the armed forces," and that "some legal scholars have even begun to argue that the amendment might be applied to the government's response to terror attacks and natural disasters, and to issues involving eminent domain and the militarization of the police" (Wood, n.d.).

In October 2002, recognizing a need for command and control of military forces within the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States established U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to lead military domestic response efforts. The major command's mission, as mentioned in the first chapter, is "to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland – protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action" (USNORTHCOM, n.d.).

USNORTHCOM is one of eight geographic combatant commands (GCCs), and its role is to serve as the GCC unified command structure to control an aggregation of federal Department of Defense personnel and resource contingents. It can oversee National Guard troops placed under federal authorities, but it would not oversee National Guard units under the control of the states. In the event of a president invoking a disaster declaration – particularly the Stafford Act –

requiring federal forces, or the Insurrection Act, or in the rare event of martial law, NORTHCOM would take control of any military personnel and units assigned to the response effort. As NORTHCOM's site states, "USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president or secretary of defense" (USNORTHCOM, n.d.). For example, had NORTHCOM existed in 1992, when President Bush declared an insurrection in Los Angeles and dispatched 4,000 Marines and soldiers to the city (Lozano, 2020), the GCC would have provided oversight and direction at the time.

It is important to note that while individual military services may prioritize some military occupational specialties over others in responding domestically (for example, using military police during domestic policing actions), any individual may be used. For example, during the Los Angeles riots, of the 1,500 Marines sent to the city, 100 were infantry (Bailey, 1992, and the 60,000 troops utilized in response to Hurricane Katrina were from a variety of military specialties.

Insurrection Act (1807). Since the days of America's founding, unique – and unfortunately all too often exceptionally grave – circumstances have led to military campaigns on U.S. soil, and with them updates to the legal frameworks providing stipulations on such use. The Insurrection Act of 1807 is one prominent example, and one that dominated headlines in the summer of 2020, as then-President Trump grappled with the idea of invoking the Act to quell riots and civil disturbances in several U.S. cities and the District of Columbia (Aliss, 2020; Myers, 2020; Vladeck, 2020a).

The Insurrection Act "is the principal authority relied upon by the President when deploying troops within the United States in response to a domestic emergency," and is "the major exception to the Posse Comitatus Act" (Hoffmeister, p. 864, 2010). The Act provides broad conditions under which the president may call forth the military. In the Act, the military is defined as either National Guard forces acting under federal direction and authority or federal military forces. The legislation permits the president to send military personnel into any state to thwart insurrection or enforce federal authority when the president "considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" (10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255). The stipulation is that the president must first make a public proclamation for insurgents and agitators to disperse within a specific timeframe (§ 254). Although the Act provides the federal government with a mechanism with which to restore order, "presidents have hesitated to invoke the act for fear of appearing tyrannical" (Shinkman, 2020).

In 2006, the federal government passed a modification to the Insurrection Act entitled, "Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order," which would have provided the president with increased unilateral authority to take federal control of a state's National Guard forces without the typical request from the state itself (Beckler, 2008, p. 1). However, due to staunch state opposition, and before any president could ever invoke the new law, "the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order was repealed on January 28, 2008 and the previous Insurrection Act was restored" (Beckler, 2008, p. ii).

The Insurrection Act was last invoked in 1992, when then-President George H.W. Bush dispatched federal military personnel to Los Angeles in response to the Los Angeles riots, also

referred to as the “Los Angeles race riots” or the “Rodney King riots,” (Chandler, 2021) in an effort to quell widespread destruction and mob violence (Darnell, 2021). Fifty-three people were killed, and thousands injured by rioters, while police officers killed nine people. The only military-involved killing was the death of Marvin A. Rivas. Rivas, an alleged cocaine dealer, had been smashing store windows with a sledgehammer and later drove erratically past National Guard troops. One soldier pointed a rifle at Rivas, who then left the area. Five minutes later, Rivas returned in his vehicle and stopped in front of the soldiers. The soldiers told him to “stop,” at which point Rivas accelerated toward them. Three soldiers fired their M-16 rifles, striking Rivas three times” (Feldman, 1992).

President Trump weighed using the Act in 2020 as a legal basis to deploy federal troops and law enforcement to major U.S. cities in response to widespread civil unrest, though his considerations to invoke the Act were widely criticized. However, numerous scholars acknowledged that, due to the broad language in the language of the Act, presidents generally have wide latitude to exercise the authority granted within the law (Anderson & Paradis, 2020; Miller, 2020; Vladeck, 2020b). The protection of federal property is clear, but legal precedent regarding the use of the military to quell violence is not. The Constitution contains the Calling Forth Clause, which reads that Congress, not the president, can deploy troops to respond to domestic crises not involving federal property, and this is generally applicable only after the state requests such support due to its own police and National Guard forces being overwhelmed (Banks, 2009, pp. 40-41).

In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower deployed troops to Little Rock, Arkansas after Governor Orval Faubus used his own National Guard to block black students from attending school. The Supreme Court had ruled, however, that desegregation was constitutional, and so

President Eisenhower's use of federal troops to uphold federal law was determined lawful (Freyer, 2004, pp. 67-69). This scenario repeated itself in 1963 when Alabama Governor George Wallace stood in front of a door to the University of Alabama to block black students from entering. President John F. Kennedy invoked the Insurrection Act and dispatched the Army's 2nd Infantry Division (Clark, 1993, pp. 227-228). Once again, this was deemed legal.

Next, and perhaps what may be the most well-known and often cited law governing the domestic use of the military, is the Army Appropriations Act of 1878, more commonly known as the Posse Comitatus Act.

Posse Comitatus Act (1878). The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), Latin for "power of the county," was passed into federal law in 1878. The Act was far from a new concept, nor was it intended as a law to specifically prohibit the military from domestic operations, as many pundits might opine today. Instead, posse comitatus as it is rooted today stems from English law circa 1411, authorizing sheriffs to call on citizens (a posse) to keep the peace, dispel violence, and arrest rioters (Buttaro, 2015, p. 138). History author and attorney David Kopel (2015) argues posse comitatus came about much earlier, in the late 9th century. England's King Alfred the Great that, to keep the peace, "the government needed the active participation of the people. Routine suppression of violent crime and emergency community defense against riots, insurrections, and invasions all require that the armed people actively defend the authority of the government" (p. 764). The PCA in 1878 reads as follows:

> Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. (18 U.S.C. § 1385).

The Act was passed at the end of the Reconstruction Era when the North sought to rebuild the war-torn South. Following the Civil War, federal troops were placed in the South (primarily Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia) to carry out law enforcement functions. These functions included the protection of polling places (specifically to ensure black Americans could vote without intimidation), arresting members of the Ku Klux Klan, and maintaining public order (Walsh & Sullivan, 2018). Some historians argue that the passing of the Act, while altruistic at face value, was nothing more than an agreement, in a way, for Northern Republicans to placate Southern Democrats. The argument holds that in the 1876 presidential election, Southern Democrats overwhelmingly supported Samuel Tilden, who ran on a platform of ending Reconstruction. Republicans supported Rutherford B. Hayes, who was conversely in favor of continuing the Reconstruction. As Ghiotto (2020) explains, Tilden won the popular vote, but Hayes won the election through the Electoral College (p. 384). The Democrats alleged the presence of Union troops at polling places shifted the vote to Hayes. Hayes struck a deal with the Democrats where he would become president, end Reconstruction, and remove federal troops from the South. Critics then used this context to argue that "the PCA was a response of Southern whites angry that the Northern whites used the federal government to secure the rights of freed blacks – to diminish the legitimacy of the PCA, and that the Act could have been passed earlier when soldiers "were used to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act" (p. 385).

There are authors and scholars on the other end of the debate who argue that the PCA has been both misinterpreted and misapplied, offering reasons as to why the military was intended to carry out domestic law enforcement functions. There are several prominent arguments as to why the PCA is a misunderstood law that is overdue for legal review and analysis by the courts. The first argument stems from the attitudes of the Founders themselves. The PCA was not passed

until 1878, prior to which the military was used on numerous occasions to patrol the internal frontier during Western expansion, collect taxes, or arrest mobs. Given that the military was conducting these law enforcement activities, "the framers clearly were aware of the posse comitatus and the use of the military in some forms of law enforcement, yet they did not prohibit the practice (Felicetti & Luce, 2003, p. 95).

The concept of posse comitatus permits local sheriffs the authority to require individuals to assist law enforcement in keeping the peace (Kopel, 2015, p. 761). The framers did not prohibit the compulsion of military service members by sheriffs in the Constitution. In fact, in 1787, Alexander Hamilton wrote in *Federalist No. 8,* "The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection," adding that same year in *Federalist No 28,* "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." Due to the Union Army seizing Southern legislatures and guarding polling places, the PCA was likely more about the future dangers of "attempts to use the Army to keep one political party in power while preventing the other party from fairly gaining political power" (Burnett, 1990, p. 14).

Despite varying interpretations of the PCA, the real implications of the Act on military domestic actions are not as significant as the media or political leaders claim. The Act still does not prohibit the military from providing support to law enforcement through supplies, training, or observation and notification of crimes (Bolgiano, 2001, p. 17). Additionally, although the issue of how the PCA is interpreted and applied may be moot, given that it is now widely understood as a limitation on military domestic action, this is not the case. Instead, there are numerous exceptions to the law, one of which is *support* to law enforcement, as already covered. Another is that Congress has authorized a branch of the military (the Coast Guard) law enforcement

authority and placed it under the Department of Homeland Security (it was under the Department of Transportation prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks). Congress has also "established general rules for certain types of assistance," such as the Stafford Act, discussed shortly, and addressed "individual cases and circumstances with more narrowly crafted legislation" (Elsea, 2018, p. 29). In events of mobs and insurrections overwhelming state response, the president can invoke the Insurrection Act, as previously discussed.

Regardless of the restrictions contained within the PCA, there has never been a prosecution for a PCA violation (Dunlap, 1999, p. 219). The military has operated domestically numerous times since the Act's passage to maintain order, provide humanitarian assistance, support law enforcement, and quell civil violence. Following Reconstruction, the catalyst of the PCA, the second-largest domestic deployment of troops on U.S. streets took place following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King on April 4, 1968. In Washington, DC, police were quickly overwhelmed, and so President Lyndon Johnson deployed nearly 12,000 federal troops and over 1,700 National Guard (Risen, 2009). Following the riots, it was another 13 years before the next significant piece of legislation regarding the military domestic roles, the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act.

Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act (1981)

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan declared the War on Drugs shortly after his election. Realizing that the movement of drugs into and across the United States was beyond the capacity of law enforcement, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act (MCLEA) to "free up restrictions on the military to interdict drugs prior to entry into the country," as well as provide "intelligence, training, and equipment [to law enforcement] to combat illicit drug trafficking" (Nevitt, 2014, p. 141). In 1983, the Government Accountability

Office (GAO) reported, "…changes to the Posse Comitatus Act have encouraged greater participation by the military in the Federal drug interdiction effort," adding "we expect that the instances of such military assistance will increase in the future…for a coordinated attack on drug smuggling" (Lauve, pp. 5-6).

The military provided substantial support in counter-drug efforts throughout the 1980s. In many cases, the National Guard is still used to support law enforcement on the border, at airports and sea ports, and in other forms. The Coast Guard, as a quasi-military branch under DHS, is responsible for more than half of the interdictions of cocaine entering the United States, advertising that it is, "the nation's first line of defense against drug smugglers" responsible for "a vast six million square-mile region to disrupt and deter the flow of illegal drugs (US Coast Guard, 2021).

The MCLEA is still valid, though in recent years arguments have grown that because of military training and equipment, and because of military and police intermingling, police have become far too militarized. As Radley Balko (2011), senior writer for the *Huffington Post* wrote:

> The military's job is to annihilate a foreign enemy. Cops are charged with keeping the peace, and with protecting the constitutional rights of American citizens and residents. It's dangerous to conflate the two. As former Reagan administration official Lawrence Korb once put it, "Soldiers are trained to vaporize, not Mirandize." That distinction is why the U.S. passed the Posse Comitatus Act more than 130 years ago, a law that explicitly forbids the use of military troops in domestic policing.

In 2015, President Obama vowed to start de-militarizing police departments (Johnson, 2015), although these efforts were reversed under President Trump.

Stafford Act (1988). The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§5121) was signed into law on November 23, 1988, and amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974. The Act is not specifically military-oriented legislation, but rather it provides an outline for federal assistance and support to state and local governments, as determined by the president, "to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States" (Nevitt, 2020).

The Stafford Act is not an exception to the PCA in that federal troops are still prohibited from conducting criminal searches and seizures and arrests. The Act permits the president to dispatch federal armed forces in response to a disaster to conduct "debris removal and road clearance, search and rescue, emergency medical care and shelter," and the dissemination of public information and assistance (Elsea & Mason, 2012, p. 4).

While the military is not always involved in disaster response, the Stafford Act is one of the most invoked declarations; disaster declarations have averaged 56 per year since 1953 (Lindsay, 2017). When the military is involved, it is on the forward edge of community interaction, providing rescue and direct care to the public. A significant number of CEDMO participants in this study are likely to have interacted with the military during a disaster (as compared to interaction under martial law or during the imposition of the Insurrection Act). The Stafford Act was invoked in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, discussed more in-depth shortly, prompting the deployment of over 60,000 federal and National Guard troops (DoD, 2015).

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2010). Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is the title of Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 signed on December 29, 2010 and updated on March 19, 2018. This directive is derived under Title 10, United States Code, which is the compendium of legal statutes governing the Armed Forces of the United States. The

directive guides military forces providing DSCA to civilian authorities, and perhaps more notably, authorizes the use of the military in particular circumstances without any civil request. The language provided essentially grants military commanders discretion during times of extreme circumstance in using military forces when permission to do so from civil authorities or the president is not possible or would not be timely. The directive reads, in part, as follows:

> Federal military commanders are provided EMERGENCY AUTHORITY under this Directive. Federal military forces shall not be used to quell civil disturbances unless specifically authorized by the President in accordance with applicable law (e.g., chapter 13 of Reference (d)) or permitted under emergency authority, as described below. In these circumstances, those Federal military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because:
>
> 1. Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order; or,
> 2. When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect the Federal property or functions. (p. 6).

Communicating Efforts & the Modern Information Environment

In preparation and response to disaster events, “communication is universally accepted as a critical function” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017, p. 159). In the illustration of military

response during Hurricane Katrina, communication within government, between political leaders and the military, and between the government and the public failed. Information was not timely, nor was it accurate, and ultimately it was the people that suffered (May 2006).

The Department of Defense and its military branches - recognizing the impetus for communication - have taken a keen interest in what is generally referred to as the "information environment," (IE) defined as "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 110, 2010a). In 2009, the official DoD definition of strategic communication, as provided in the Joint Chiefs of Staff *Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept,* was as follows:

> Focused U.S. Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

However, there was some friction with regard to this definition. One reason is that communication is a component of the IE and the service components within the DoD do not conceptualize the IE in the same way. In fact, while there was such an expansive definition provided by the greater Department of Defense, amongst the services, "there are almost as many definitions, perceptions, and opinions about what constitutes the term as there are people throwing it about" (U.S. Marine Corps DOTMLPF-P WG, 2010, p. 65).

The DoD has placed significant interest in how to operate within the IE. It is not quite clear how broadly or intricately information, and operations in this ubiquitous IE, play into 21st-century military operations. One of the issues is a lack of definitive concurrence amongst the

services regarding how military elements frame the harnessing, utility, and dissemination of information. For example, on January 22, 2020, Marine Lieutenant General Eric Smith, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, and Marine Lieutenant General Loretta Reynolds, Deputy Commandant for Information, issued a joint memorandum addressing information-related terms and definitions. In the letter, the two military leaders direct that the Marine Corps will "decommission" the term "information operations," since "information" was declared one of the seven Marine Corps warfighting functions the previous year (p. 2). Furthermore, the letter officially directs that the term "operations in the information environment," (OIE) officially replace "information environment operations" to "align with current Joint and Department of Defense conventions" (p. 2). Due to occasional shifts in the ways in which the DoD and its service components approach concepts of strategic messaging, the 2017 *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning* noted that there was no longer a definition of "strategic communication," as it had been removed from the DoD Dictionary (p. GL-14).

Strategic messaging, or at least a coherent, deliberate, and broad messaging strategy, can be leveraged as a component of success within the IE. In terms of how communication ties in which conflict, sociologist George A. Lundberg posited "communication is the essence of the social process" and "abstinence from communication is the essence of conflict situations" (Coser, 1956, p. 23). How the government receives public sentiments is an important component of crafting a military response. Disasters and upheaval create emotional reactions from the public based on their attention to the information with which they are presented. Political leaders, "especially elected politicians, respond to (and exploit) these emotional and intuitive judgments in their rationales and selection of policy elements" (Schneider, Ingram, & deLeon, 2014, p. 121). Despite any contention within the DoD over the use of the term "strategic communication,"

the military can leverage these concepts not only to fight in conflicts abroad, but "to influence the thoughts and actions of…all those who physically occupy the contested area or who are affected by the outcome of actions within it" (U.S. Marine Corps DOTMLPF-P Working Group, 2010, p. 66).

With regard to public outreach, military units may host official social media accounts in order to communicate with both military families and the greater public using modern means of information dissemination. In the U.S. Army, for example, units that opt into hosting a command social media outlet must appoint social media managers who are responsible for posting approved content on accounts such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, among others. Commands are advised to decide on their content strategy in terms of the information being disseminated and who comprises the target audience (U.S. Army, 2021a).

Many times, the responsibility of social media manager falls to a junior officer or enlisted service member, and there have been occurrences where these managers have failed to consider the implications of personal, unsanctioned conduct. For example, in October 2020, the official social media account for Fort Bragg, an Army installation in North Carolina, sent multiple lewd comments to a woman from a pornographic website (Matthews, 2020). Initially, the Army claimed the account was hacked, only to find out it was the individual entrusted with message dissemination, for which the Army subsequently apologized. In another incident, an anonymous social media manager for the Marine Corps' II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group engaged in an argument with civilians, at one point tweeting, "Come back when you've served and been pregnant," and referring to entertainment host Tucker Carlson as a "boomer," a derogatory term for individuals associated with the Baby Boomer generation (II MIG, 2021). While these examples have little to do with military domestic deployments, they serve to

showcase how newer, more direct methods of mass communication can damage the military's rapport with the public. According to Maltby (2012), "the military's interaction with those in and beyond their own institution increasingly takes place through and via the media in a manner that submits to, and is dependent on, the media and their logic" (p. 256).

The military services have more traditional media communication branches called "Public Affairs Offices," or PAOs. The Army's PAO mission states, "Public affairs fulfills the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed, and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war" (U.S. Army, 2021b). Public Affairs officers (and staff) advise commanders, create press releases, engage in community outreach, and release public statements on behalf of the service components. They receive specialized training in media and communication, and officers have the opportunity to attend an 18-month Advanced Civil School hosted by Georgetown University.

PAOs are necessary for communication and outreach, and the use of individual unit social media means also provides a great venue for individuals soliciting information on and from the military. However, during disasters, reaching the public becomes more difficult, as disaster victims may not have access to television, social media, or other electronic means. During such times, it is imperative to consider other means of wide broadcasting in order to reach individuals in ravaged areas to prepare them for shelter or evacuation.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been an increase in the use of military personnel domestically over time. In June 2020, the National Guard Bureau captured this increase on its website, stating nearly 84,000 National Guard troops were performing domestic response missions around the country. This was around 51,000 more than responded to the aftermath of

Hurricane Katrina. Of these 84,000, 37,400 were "taking part in COVID-19 response efforts and more than 41,500 on duty in 33 states and Washington, D.C., in response to civil unrest" (Soucy, 2020). Official websites like these continue to serve as one of the mediums through which the military overall can communicate and advertise service to the public.

Conclusion

There is literature abound detailing political leadership over the military and some of the contentious relationships between military leaders and those of civil authority responsible for military oversight. New challenges and a changing society continue to lead to new legislation detailing how the military is structured, outlining military authorities, and under what circumstances the military may mobilize to meet unique challenges on the home front. The next chapter provides an understanding of the methodologies used to collect and analyze the data that form the basis of the study.

Chapter 3: Methodologies

As mentioned in the literature review, scholars have conducted primarily historical studies on civil-military relations in order to craft theories to understand the use of militaries in domestic capacities. Rather than a singular methodology, this research study incorporated triangulation (covered at the end of this chapter) that includes data derived from two methods: *interpretative phenomenological analysis* (IPA) and *inductive thematic analysis*, hereafter referred to simply as "thematic analysis." The former is incorporated in order to glean insight into the experiences of CEDMO. Both methodologies are rationales through which to understand sentiments and perspectives across a wide spectrum when it comes to domestic military activities. They enabled the researcher to capture a much wider range of distinct perspectives, and therefore potentially more enriched data, in order to identify conflict points. The researcher conducted data collection and analysis until there was enough refined data to identify that which was pertinent and relevant to the conflict and conditions that serve as catalysts and possible precursors. Recognizing the perspectives articulated by research participants allowed the researcher to identify points of relationship amelioration between the populations involved.

Analysis may be inductive (empirical), which is the form used in this research across both groups of participants, and deductive (theoretical), also known as *a priori*. Utilizing inductive thematic analysis, researchers move through the data, in many cases coding it along the way, and identify emerging themes as they might appear (Bingham & Witkowsky, 2022). These researcher-determined codes are defined as words or phrases that ascribe "a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data" (Saldaña, 2015, p. 4).

Through the inductive process, given that the derived data is the source of any themes, researchers may identify some themes based on answers from respondents that bear a minimal relationship to the explicit questions asked by the researcher. Deductive – or theoretical - analysis is typically applied in the other direction, with the researcher applying theory, creating predetermined codes, and then applying those codes to the data. Moving into the application of theoretical thematic analysis, themes are created by the researcher according to the selected theory the researcher applies (Javadi & Zarea, 2016, p. 35).

There is room for future research using comparative case studies whereby the conflict between policy and political will to use the military in response to crises on the home front, as well as conflict between the public and the military, can be compared to similar conflicts in countries across the globe. Such comparative studies may help showcase how other nations utilize their militaries domestically, or how the public accepts the premise of a military with law enforcement authorities. However, given that the political structures of each government have some similarities, while each has its own uniqueness, researchers would likely have to select specific criteria across cases with which to compare. Additionally, researchers would need to ensure they consider other political and social influences contained within each national culture that could influence the study, and figure out either how to include these influences across all samples, or mitigate their influence(s) on the criteria being measured. Given the relative paucity of data and research on public experiences and derived perceptions, there is also room for development through grounded theory.

Concerning the methodologies of *case study*, *grounded theory*, and *narrative analysis,* the researcher found that these methodologies were not ideal for this particular study. Beginning with case study, this methodology is defined as “a detailed investigation, often with empirical

material collected over a period of time from a well-defined case to provide an analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon" (Rashid, Rashid, Akib, Sabir, & Waseem, 2019). The experiences of civilians experiencing first-hand military operations domestically within their own communities are not well-documented, although the specific disasters and crises that serve as the background for the interaction are. Similarly, the views of military officials on operating domestically, whether based on actual experience or perceived responsibilities when dealing with the public, are not well nor thoroughly documented. The methodological design of drawing upon a well-defined case, especially a single case over time regardless of participant group, is the main reason the researcher did not utilize case study.

Next, with respect to grounded theory, this methodology is suitable "when little is known about a phenomenon; the aim being to produce or construct an explanatory theory that uncovers a process inherent to the substantive area of inquiry" (Chun Tie, Birks, & Francis, 2019). However, the researcher did not seek to develop a theory from this study. The researcher used both Concordance Theory and Convergence Theory as backdrops with which to assess data from the two participant groups in the study and sought to understand the lived experiences of those civilians who had experienced domestic military operations. These views did not lead to theory generation, and it was the methodologies of phenomenology that the researcher used to frame data collection and analysis.

Finally, it is important to highlight why the researcher selected IPA over narrative analysis in its variations: narrative dialogic, narrative structural, and narrative thematic methods. Starting with narrative dialogic methods, as the term implies, this form of analysis is an examination of elements of dialogue applied to a narrative. As Riessman (2008) frames the topic, dialogic analysis looks at "how talk among speakers is interactively produced… including the

influence of investigator, setting, and social circumstances…Simply put, if thematic and structural approaches interrogate "what" is spoken and "how," the [dialogic] approach asks, "who"" (p. 105). In the research conducted here, dialogue in terms of the "who" is not a primary focus for research beyond who qualifies as CEDMO or a military official. The researcher was interested in understanding, through IPA, the experiences and perspectives of CEDMO, and the experiences in the form of cultivated organizational perspectives of military officials on their perceived official authorities, roles, duties, obligations, constraints, and limitations.

With narrative structural analysis, this analytic methodology extends beyond focusing on the semantic content of *what* is said, and instead focuses on the *how* in terms of the manner in which a speaker organizes thoughts and presents information. In the book, *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences* (2008), the author explains how features of speech, such as verbal idiosyncrasies –participant use of metaphors, idioms, figurative language, or other forms of social linguistics – or even the ordering of words and ideas, can illuminate latent meaning. Additionally, these idiosyncrasies can provide insight that may otherwise go unnoticed when researchers focus too keenly on content (Riessman, 2008, pp. 100-101). These idiosyncrasies, while valid and not discarded, were not predominately key considerations of extrapolated meaning-making from either participant group involved in the research.

Narrative thematic analysis content, rather than *how* or *who*, provides the material of focus. However, with thematic analysis, researchers seek to keep segments of interviews intact and draw theory from these segments, rather than through theme development across cases (Riessman, 2008, p. 53). With both participant groups, the researcher sought to identify themes across each group, and then identify those that go across both groups or were relegated to one or the other. Additionally, Cohan and Shires (1988) state, "The distinguishing feature of narrative is

its linear organization of events" (p. 52). A linear chronology of events is useful, but it alone did not provide a basis for analysis. With CEDMO, this is true irrespective of when an interaction took place rather than the experience itself as the object of study. With military personnel, the intact narrative chronology is of even less importance, given that the focus is on their own organizational role perspectives from their time in the military.

IPA is more appropriately applied to CEDMO participants compared to other approaches because of the focus on lived experiences during crises in which the military took a direct role. For military participants, thematic is the most appropriate due to the heavy focus on individual military participant views on their positions within the military and as potential leaders during domestic response efforts. Thematic analysis of military interviews closely aligned to the IPA of CEDMO interviews permits a similar analytical model through which to assess military participant responses on their views without them having commensurate experience.

Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)

Phenomenology as a broader methodology was founded by Edmund Husserl when he decided to address through the study "how objects and events appear to consciousness since nothing could be even spoken about or witnessed if it did not come through someone's consciousness" (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). Focusing more specifically on IPA, Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009) inform readers this particular approach to phenomenology is an "examination of how people make sense of their major life experiences," and it is "concerned with exploring experience in its own terms" (p. 1). Using this methodology and having looked at the role of the military, phenomenology helped the researcher to understand how members of the public experienced and made sense of military actions in military response settings.

A key feature of IPA is that it focuses on "personal meaning and sense-making in a particular context, for people who share a particular experience" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 45). IPA is more appropriate than other approaches because it focuses on, in this case, constructed meaning of military presence to the individual who has experienced such an event. General phenomenology, however, focuses more "on the common structure of [emotion] as an experience" (p. 45). However, going into the research, the experiential features of a view or emotion were unknown to the researcher and differed to varying degrees with each participant. Comparing IPA to narrative psychology as an approach presents even more distinctions, made here for clarity on why narrative psychology was not utilized. Narrative psychology, as an approach, focuses "on how narratives relate to sense-making" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 45). This approach incorporates the story structures people use to describe events that elicit a particular emotion.

For this study, the researcher used IPA to capture the experiences from communities of CEDMO regarding experiences during exposure to an event warranting a military response within their community. This research study did not preemptively seek any particular or specific experiential meaning, nor stories focused on specific emotions. The semi-structured questions, as mentioned in the research design section, solicited both descriptive and structural responses (vice comparative, contrast, and circular).

IPA: Data collection. Concerning specific participant selection, the researcher identified individuals with the lived experience required for the phenomenological study. The COVID-19 pandemic led to nationwide travel restrictions, which made it difficult to travel and locate possible participants. Additionally, would-be participants may have likewise been wary of meeting in a face-to-face venue for fear of infection. In order to identify individuals, the

researcher utilized several tactics. First, the researcher used the social media site LinkedIn to advertise the study by posting a description of the study, solicitation for participants, and contact information of the researcher. This led to one individual reaching out to the researcher to take part in the study, and another providing a third-party contact for the research. The researcher tried to use media reports, researching domestic crises where the military was involved, identifying two individuals who had provided interviews, and then reaching out to them. Unfortunately, in reaching out to two individuals identified in the media, one did not respond and the other declined due to a persistently "busy schedule." Three other individuals recommended yet others whom they knew had experienced the military in a domestic response setting; one individual recommended one, and in the other case, an individual recommended someone, who likewise recommended a third. In this way, the researcher did use snowball sampling. In this type of sampling, research participants provided information for follow-on participants. The benefits were ostensibly ease of access to more potential participants, although there may be risks that this type of sampling can lead to a lack of diverse perspectives in some cases (Kirchherr, 2018).

None of the CEDMO participants were interviewed face-to-face. Six interviews were conducted over the Zoom online software platform and one via phone, all with the consent of the participants. For those conducted via Zoom, this was akin to face-to-face interviews and allowed the researcher to see the participant's face without a mask. This allowed the researcher to see an individual's expressions and how certain questions, or participant responses elicited nonverbal responses.

When selecting a sampling population for IPA, it was important to select samples "purposively (rather than through probability methods) because they can offer a research project insight into a particular experience" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 48). The researcher's original intent

was to identify 10 CEDMO participants, though this was a difficult task and the researcher assessed there was enough information with 7. One participant dropped out of the study after initial contact and another was deemed unfit for the research due to legal reasons, which led the researcher to believe the individual would not be forthcoming in honest experiences. Psychological variabilities as characteristics of individual research participants were not considered beyond this one instance. Physical variabilities and other characteristics (gender, ethnicity, race, religion, and orientation for example) were not a consideration for selection.

The researcher put forth the specific criteria for participant involvement to ensure individuals were included who could offer meaningful data on the phenomena. For the purposes of this study, the target sample population for IPA had to meet the following criteria:

1. Participants must be 18 years of age or older in order to ensure the participants were considered adults by law, able to vote, and therefore tied to direct political implications of their own perspectives;

2. Participants must have experienced firsthand military service members acting in an official capacity in an area where a disaster was taking place or declared;

3. Participants could not, at the time of the study, currently serve in the military or National Guard;

4. Participants could not hold elected office at the time of the interview, where they would be in a position to decide on the employment of military services and take part in the phenomenological research.

There was only one individual who sought to participate, who had been in a disaster (Hurricane Irene) but had not seen nor interacted with the military. Therefore, this individual was not included in the study.

Prior to the start of the interviews, the researcher informed the participants of the research topics for discussion. Participants were offered an incentive in the form of a $10 gift card for their participation, as well as the opportunity to participate in the research as a forum to express

their experiences. The participants were provided anonymity, typically the only condition researchers can offer, and the ability to review their responses prior to any publication of their views in the public domain, as may be customary when safety is a concern (Smith et al., 2009, p. 53).

The researcher provided specific, closed-ended questions in order to once again verify the participants met the criteria set forth in order to participate in the study (age, etc. as listed previously). Following this, participants took part in the semi-structured interviews, thereby allowing the researcher to help maintain an emphasis on the event and the experiences while leaving questions open-ended for participant elaboration (Smith et al., p. 59). The questions were open-ended, eliciting descriptive, rich, and sometimes intimate responses - rather than evaluative - in order to understand participant experiences within the scope of specificity as it relates to the topic. The research interviews provide space for follow-on questions as necessary to encourage elaboration by the participant when need be. The 11 initial questions were as follows:

1. Can you tell me generally about yourself?
2. Can you start by telling me about the event and what happened?
3. Can you tell me generally about your experiences during [event]?
4. Do you remember any specific or impressionable details, such as certain smells, sounds, sights?
5. Please share with me the experiences you had where the military was involved in the event you just shared, and how the military might tie-in with this event from your perspective?
6. Were any impressions left on you by the military's role, or of the military following this event?
7. From your perspective, what was the role of the military during the event?
8. How has this event impacted you since that time and your daily activities or the way you now live your life?

9. In what ways did your feelings or impressions of the military change, if any, from before the event and then after the event?

10. From your perspective, are Americans comfortable with the use of military personnel in response to major events, and generally what are your overall beliefs regarding the use of the military in a domestic capacity?

11. Is there anything else you would be willing to share with me today?

The researcher electronically recorded six out of seven interviews and transcribed the seventh on a laptop, which was from a phone conversation. These recordings and the transcription then provided the researcher with a repository of raw data. This raw data was then digitally transcribed via a software application called *Otter.ai* for follow-on analysis. The recordings and transcriptions provided the material for analysis.

IPA: Data analysis. With regard to analyzing the data, there is no one, specifically prescribed method. In *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis*, authors Smith et al. (2009) provide an outline of six steps for conducting IPA. These steps are:

1) Read and review the data;

2) Initial noting and coding;

3) Identify and develop emergent themes;

4) Identify connections across themes;

5) Transition to the next data set;

6) Identify patterns across cases (pp. 82-101).

To note, Smith et al. (2009) describe the first step as a "reading and re-reading" of the data. However, this assumes the data exists only in a readable format. The step was broadened in this study to include a review of the data in both written and recorded formats. Therefore, the researcher's reviews of the data were not relegated to written format. The researcher utilized the

six steps provided by Smith et al, in tandem with guidelines provided by other authors, such as Saldaña (2015) and Braun & Clark (2018, 2021) as a guide through which to pave the research process.

Step 1: Read and review the data. This step requires reading (examining), reviewing, and even re-reviewing the data in order to gain familiarity through immersion. Once the data was recorded and transcribed into Microsoft Word, the researcher then took the next step in the analytic process of going through each transcript, reviewing and re-reviewing the data in order to become intimately familiar with the data set(s). This included listening to the recorded interviews and reading the typed transcripts in order to gain robust familiarity with the content, as well as the participant's behavior, demeanor, and/or inflection. This provided the researcher with additional understanding and insight beyond the content exclusively. For example, two participants became physically (visually and audibly) upset when recounting certain experiences, and several were passionate about their experiences and beliefs.

Step 2: Initial noting and coding. This step involves making notations, generating initial codes, and reviewing those codes (Smith et al, 2009, p. 83; Braun & Clark, 2006, p. 87). During this step, the researcher printed out each of the transcripts and made initial notations by-hand on each, noting initial thoughts and impressions, and identify anything that initially stood out (Figure-1).



Stefan 36:23
At the time, like many people watching, I didn't understand the scope of the disaster. What other emotions or experiences can you recall?

Bali 36:46
My first husband, his mom is 84-years old. She was watching one of the kids because, well, she had some of the kids with her because they were not evacuating. That house was really, two, you know, two stories high, there's no way you know, nothing's gonna ever happen. And the water came up so fast that they had to go through the top floor onto the roof. And she's 80-something years old. And she's got a five-year-old grandchild and three others. And she puts each of the kids on a roof. And the five-year-old got swept away by the water. So with her little backpack on, she died. She died and they did not find her body until like, a month later, with the backpack still on, so…and then they sat on the roof, waiting for help. With no communication, hoping that somebody would fly over and take pictures of people on a roof. You fly over and take pictures when you really can help. Like, I mean, I can that understand that for the life of me. But you know what, nowadays, people have the iPhones and they will record somebody fighting or getting beat up or whatever. Instead of recording that stuff to your phone you could be calling for help but you're recording because you want to go viral or whatever. But I mean, that was to me that was the beginning of it all people actually flying over you. Yeah. So um,

Stefan 38:50
Were there any ways that your feelings or impressions of the military changed? Did this experience change your impression or feelings about the military after Hurricane Katrina?

Bali 39:07
Yeah, I was hurt. I was…I was hurt by my whole country. I was hurt. I felt like you all left me for dead and took pictures and watched me as I died. I was that drowning child in the bath tub that you didn't reach down and help. Even though I put my life on the line. Every day when I go out to work. You left me for dead, period.

Stefan 39:47
And do those feelings still persist? Such as, you know, abandonment?

Bali 40:07
You know, I think I will always have a little of that feeling of abandonment. But with time, I'm able to understand how well my understanding afterward was that our military was dispersed in so many different areas that they couldn't come and help us. I mean, that was the excuse that I chose to believe so that I could still have some faith in it, right, because just knowing that you couldn't take care of us at home, and you left me is hard is a hard pill to swallow. I would rather believe that you're protecting our country elsewhere so far that you can't get to me. I would rather believe that. That allows me to still have a little faith.

Stefan 41:01

Figure 1. Sample of CEDMO notations

The researcher referenced these copies with initial notations while coding based on exploratory comments and moving through the coding process using unmarked versions of each transcript in Microsoft Word (MS Word). The researcher used the 'comment' feature in MS Word to conduct coding, which was broken down into descriptive, linguistic, and conceptual comments (see Figure-2). Boyatzis (1998) defines a code as, "the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the

phenomenon" (p. 63). Descriptive comments, notated in regular black font, are those that describe the text as it appears based on what a participant has expressed. In some cases, certain words used by the participant may also appear in the comment, as the participant's own words are succinct enough to capture a particular idea or concept. Linguistic comments, showcased in italicized blue font, focus upon language use and meaning-making. This can include repetition in words, the use of metaphors, tone, or emotions and pauses while speaking Finally, conceptual comments, which often appear in interrogative form, were used by the researcher to refine idea (Smith et al., 2009, p. 88). Conceptual comments were underlined and in purple-colored font.



Figure 2. Sample of CEDMO coding

After coding individual CEDMO participant transcripts, the researcher prepared for the next stage by creating a table in MS Word with which to house the codes.

Step 3: Identify and develop emergent themes. In this step, the researcher created a table for each participant and exploratory comments with which to map emergent themes (thematic mapping) across the data (see Table 1). These tables supported the researcher's work in finding recurrent emergent themes in the exploratory comments. The output from this step was an amalgamation of "not only the participant's original words and thoughts but also the analyst's interpretation" (Smith et al., 2009, p. 92). Braun and Clarke (2018) note that often times concepts of identifying or searching emergent themes can come off as a passive process, whereby a researcher may expect themes to be readily apparent. For this reason, they recommend using the term "generating themes" to accentuate that it is an active process on the part of the researcher. In this case the researcher sought to identify emerging themes that "cut across the data set" (Braun & Clarke, 2018).

Table 1

Sample of Thematic Mapping

CEDMO Participant: Avery (C-1)				
Descriptive Comments	Linguistic Comments	Conceptual Comments	Emerging Themes	Themes
Military viewed negatively during civil unrest People want a sense of safety.	*People don't see the military positively all the time, depending on their role.* *Military appreciated more when safety is their primary concern* *Emphasizing appreciation for the military during disaster relief compared to civil unrest/protests* *Military intimidating during civil unrest*	Why does the military help you take hurricane precautions more seriously?	Public Support Depends on Military Purpose Military as a Source of Safety	
The military brought a sense of reassurance The military brought a sense of calm Military eager to help Military engaged with local community	*Building rapport with the public* *"They're there to be a part of the solution"*		Building Rapport through Compassion and Engagement	

Step 4: Identify connections across themes. In the fourth step, the researcher identified connections within and amongst themes from the participant data, including through both abstraction and subsumption as necessary. Abstraction, as it relates to theme development, is where the researcher identifies similarities between themes and groups them together, then creates a new category based on the overall grouping. *Subsumption* is quite similar, where themes are grouped based on similarity, but one of the themes overarchingly subsumes the others (Smith et al., 2009, p. 97). This facilitated the development of emergent themes into nascent themes. Themes are supported in Chapter 4 with *in vivo* (verbatim) statements from CEDMO research participants. Inclusion of *in vivo* statements is useful as a "form of qualitative data analysis that places emphasis on the actual spoken words of the participants" (Manning, 2017). This allowed the researcher to researcher to preserve the words, terms, and phrases offered by the participants themselves in support of the findings.

Step 5: Transition to the next data set. Once the researcher identified the emergent and nascent themes from one data set, the researcher then transitioned to the next data set and repeated the same previous four processes for each subsequent data set. The researcher strived to look at each data set on its own, without the influence of the first. Smith et al., (2009) point out, "During this process, [the researcher] will inevitably be influenced by what [they] have already found (and in hermeneutic parlance, therefore [the] 'fore-structures' have changed)" (p. 100). However, following the steps rigorously for each individual case without deliberately drawing in considerations or identifying themes from the previous case(s) minimized this influence.

Step 6: Identify patterns across cases. Once each data set was analyzed and themes developed, the researcher identified two superordinate themes under which the themes were placed. Binning the themes under superordinate themes subsequently helped the researcher

during cross-comparison and analysis with the military participant data during the triangulation phase.

Criticisms & pitfalls of phenomenological analysis. Phenomenology may present enough utility for researchers to become what is arguably one of the mainstream research methodologies, but the methodology also evokes some warranted criticisms. One such criticism is that the very notion of phenomenology itself may be devoid of an individual's spatial considerations. This view depends, however, on whether an individual identifies as a 'nativist' or 'empiricist.' In the case of the former, nativists such as the philosopher Emmanuel Kant and psychologist Carl Stumpf believed "spatial relations are given immediately in experience," where "empiricists insist patterns of space must be learned" (Sarker, 1994, p. 34). According to nativists, a particular experience can generate a spatial relation that does not need to regard other considerations, such as past experiences, culture, etc. Empiricists, such as German physician and physicist Hermann von Helmholtz, hold that relative space (and relation to objects, including phenomena) must be learned. It stands to reason that there are myriad factors that may influence an individual's spatial conceptions and how, in turn, these conceptions influence the ways in which an individual experiences objects (phenomena).

A second criticism of phenomenology is that it relies on individual consciousness as the subject of study. Individual consciousness is faulty, unreliable, contains fallacies, and is based on subjective experience (Sarker, 1994, p. 37). Contrarily, the notion that an individual's conscious interpretations and recollections of occurrences are unreliable as a source of data would extend well beyond phenomenology. Additionally, even the ways in which a researcher conducts an experiment and interprets findings, no matter how objective the data may be, are prone to subjective interpretation.

A third criticism of phenomenology involves possible challenges of credibility due to the subjective nature of the methodology and the researcher's bias. This is more of a general critique that could be argued for many methodologies. For this reason, Cooper (2014) recommends maintaining copies of the recorded interviews, interview transcripts, any associated analytic memos, and other elements of an audit trail (p. 87). Cooper adds as a limitation to the methodology that "phenomenological studies are not designed with an explanatory purpose and typically do not result in the development of new theory" (p. 88). The same recommendations could be applied to other methodologies as well, including quantitative methods, in order to assure veracity, ensure transparency, and provide accountability throughout the research.

Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is a highly flexible, explorative tool researchers can either use as a standalone method or an interpretive process with which to apply to other qualitative methods to identify, analyze, organize, describe, and report themes within data sets (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 2). As data is fragmented during analysis, thematic analysis, is a methodology through which to reconstitute these fragments "into constructs that contribute to the larger theme (Lochmiller, 2021). Lochmiller (2021) offers that thematic analysis can be descriptive, critical, or explanatory, or combinations of the three. Looking at the ways in which thematic analysis can be used, as a descriptive tool, it may be used to define a research participant's worldview using the participant's own words. Then, those participant views of reality are aggregated into patterns.

Explanatory thematic analysis ties patterns found in participant data to a theory or concept. Lochmiller writes, "As an explanatory tool, thematic analysis can be used to infer meaning about experiences, perspectives, or belief systems through the lens of a particular

conceptual or theoretical framework" (2021). Finally, critical thematic analysis is used to identify gaps in participant experiences. These gaps in data "are often representative of recurring patterns which point to the existence of oppression, discrimination, or an imbalance of power" (p. 2031). Critical thematic analysis is not utilized in this study, as power dynamics are not the focus of the study. Thematic analysis, as it is utilized in this study is used primarily as a descriptive tool, and secondarily as an explanatory tool.

With the application of thematic analysis, there are numerous ways to gather data, and there are likewise a number of ways researchers can then explicate data to identify recurrent themes. Some researchers view the utility of thematic analysis in direct comparison to content analysis, arguing that, of the two, it is thematic analysis that provides a "rich and detailed, yet complex account of the data," and "involves the search for and identification of common threads that extend across an entire interview or set of interviews" (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013). Braun and Clarke (2006) note that thematic analysis is often "poorly demarcated" from other analytic strategies (p.77). Still, the thematic analysis and other analytic processes need not be evaluated as separate and distinct. Thematic analysis can supplement other forms of analysis, perhaps especially content analysis in searching for patterns, and thus the two are not mutually exclusive analytic methods. Riessman (2008), for example, makes less of a distinction between thematic analysis and content analysis, stating, "in thematic analysis, content is the exclusive focus" (p. 53). Consider that material – for example, text – could be handwritten by a participant or transcribed by the researcher from an interview with the participant. Both are sources of participant-generated content, and depending on how the researcher intends to organize, structure, and analyze the data, he or she may decide to incorporate one or both strategies.

Regarding interviews with military officials within this study, the researcher canvassed participants for their respective interpretations and perspectives of their military roles and responsibilities based on the understanding, views, policies, and procedures that guide or regulate the domestic deployment of troops. The interviews of the individual officials were pertinent to the study, but the value came from identifying themes from an aggregate of those interviews with military authorities as representing and directing the element of miliary response with which members of the public will interact.

Interviews with military leaders help further clarify on behalf of the research community the military's own understanding of the practical application of their authorities, which can often be dramatically different than the ways in which those with little-to-no military experience may perceive them. For example, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) published a guide stating, "many Americans' knowledge about the military is limited to what they have acquired from movies, books, and news reports. Few outside the military understand the culture, the values, or the people who make up the most powerful military force on earth" (2010, p. 1). The information military officials provided may ideally bridge theory on how the military should operate based on the direction of political leaders, military leaders, and military policies, with or against public expectations or apprehensions. More broadly, thematic analyses of military officials' responses can help elucidate how military forces would – or will - likely operate domestically in actuality.

Military action (or inaction) and behaviors will mainly stem from an official's own policy interpretation combined with what is actually taking place at the scene of a disaster or other event. This is, of course, not considering any unpredictable events, whereby one or more military personnel may commit a crime or otherwise act outside of the policies and laws put in place (an

example of which was shared by one CEDMO research participant). Just as the content of the policies is important, so too are the perspectives military officials provide. In this study, the manner in which a military official as a research participant structures their responses is not a primary research focus. The official is providing individual policy-based interpretations and insights into operationalizing policy through manifest application. In this manner, military officials' perspectives are important in order to understand under what leadership perceptions domestic response actions are likely to take place. Trying to ascertain deeper meaning in any expressions or inflection would not be of great benefit here on the application of large numbers of troops in U.S. cities. For this reason, thematic analysis remains the analytic methodology for selection, while structural is better reserved for another specified study.

Thematic analysis: Data collection. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the participants for thematic analysis were military officials who, based on their knowledge of military operations and understanding of policies, have been or could be responsible for supervising troops during a domestic crisis response event. The researcher contacted military personnel via firsthand military acquaintances in the National Capital Region (NCR), and was provided secondary points of contact from primary sources in some cases. As mentioned previously, the current locations of service members at the time of the interviews were not important to the study on account that military service members move locations due to 'permanent change of station' (PCS) orders generally every 2-4 years. Roughly 400,000 U.S. service members PCS each year (MilitaryOneSource, 2022). As with CEDMO participants, military participants were likewise offered a $10 gift card to participate in the study.

Given the nature of conformity and uniformity in the military, officials similar in grade may have vastly different experiences. Despite this, based on this uniformity their professional

perspectives on operations dictated by government under strict policies are likely much more similar to one another in comparison to the unique experiences of individual CEDMO. Policy, protocol, and official considerations are key content sought for data collection, alongside more personal inquiries regarding views on politics as a driving factor and ethical considerations. For this study, the researcher gathered data from 11 military officials. Five interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format and six were conducted via the Zoom platform. Face-to-face interviews with military officials were more easily attained than with CEDMO on account that the researcher works with the Department of Defense and maintains access to military installations.

The researcher solicited 15 military participants for the study, all of whom initially agreed to take part in the research, but four canceled due to other obligations and were unavailable or unreachable for a reschedule. Of the 11 participants interviewed, 4 participants were interviewed in a face-to-face setting, while the remaining 7 were conducted via the Zoom application. The interviews conducted using Zoom were recorded and saved as MP4 audio files. Those files were then transferred into a program called “Otter.ai,” which automatically transcribed the conversations into text. This allowed the researcher to export the transcripts in Word and in Microsoft Text, which could then be imported into an Excel document for manual coding.

The interviews were semi-structured, where the researcher was able to ask questions on specific topics but where there were wide opportunities for participants to clarify, expound, or share any thoughts or insights outside any rigidly-framed questions. Interview questions focused on military views of policies, procedures, and practices of domestic deployments based on legal, political, and ethical standards and considerations. The six interviews that took place over the

Zoom platform were recorded with the consent of participants. The five interviews that took place face-to-face were transcribed by the researcher using a laptop computer. The researcher provided each of the 11 participants with a statement of anonymity and non-attribution for scholarly research. There were twelve initial questions for participants to answer, with follow-on questions during the interviews. The initial twelve questions were as follows:

1) Can you tell me about your role in the military?

2) Have you deployed in a domestic capacity, and if so, can you share the details?

3) If you were to participate in domestic operations as part of a disaster response effort, what would expect your purpose to be?

4) As a follow-up (to question 3), what would your limitations likely be during a disaster response effort?

5) If you were deployed to respond to civil unrest, what would your purpose likely be?

6) As a follow-up (to question 5), what would your limitations likely be when dealing with civil unrest?

7) Who has the authority to provide mission tasking and delegation that you would follow?

8) Do you believe you would violate any of the DoD policies under which you might operate in a disaster response effort based on conditions on the ground?

9) Similarly, do you believe you might violate any of the DoD policies under which you might operate in response to civil unrest?

10) If ordered to arrest civilians who are engaging in suspected crimes, would you do so if your operating instructions were not clear?

11) During domestic response activities or actions, under what conditions or circumstances would you find it okay to violate DoD policies?

12) Is there anything else you would be willing to share with me today?

Interviews are the most pertinent component to this study, and both CEDMO and military participant groups were valuable in understanding perspectives of military interventions. This

range of experiences and views can help to support solutions through consensus of the parties involved, which can increase the chances of more durable and lasting agreements (Hoffman, 2007).

Thematic analysis: Data analysis. Across qualitative research literature, the term "thematic analysis" is often conflated with concepts of "thematic coding," just as the terms "themes" and "codes" are often (erroneously) used interchangeably, which may confuse readers. Saldaña (2016) explains that themes are a result of categorizing or coding, rather than the inverse. Additionally, Saldaña (2009) points out that coding is applicable to themes, patterns, and "significant phrases that make meaning" (p. 368). It is often emergent themes as "secondary codes" that will actually serve as the themes under which to group the previous codes identified during the initial analysis (Ando, Cousins, & Young, 2014, p. 4), as framed shortly.

Similar to phenomenological analysis, there are authors who contend thematic analysis consists of six phases: 1) familiarizing one's self with the data; 2) generating initial codes; 3) searching for themes; 4) reviewing themes; 5) defining and naming themes; and 6) producing the report (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 86; Nowell et al, 2017, p. 4; Vaismoradi et al.2013, p. 402). Lochmiller (2021), offers his own structuring of thematic analysis, organizing the sequential steps somewhat differently, although much of the inherent process is the same. He gives due credit to Braun & Clarke (2006), but parses the six-part process into component parts organized within three overarching phases: 1) Setup Phase; 2) Analysis Phase; and 3) Interpretation Phase (p. 2033). This study incorporates the thematic methodology utilizing both Lochmiller's three phases, and Braun & Clarke's six subsumed phases within and across them, as a constructive blueprint.

The Setup Phase follows data collection and consists of preparing the materials and conditions for data analysis. Examples of recommended tasks within this phase include scanning hard copy files; importing necessary files into the researcher's Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) if used (in this case MAXQDA, discussed shortly); creating any spreadsheets with which to note data descriptions; and transcribing audio files.

The Analysis Phase consists of the first step in Braun and Clarke's model of first reviewing and familiarizing one's self with the data, fragmenting or highlighting words or phrases, and making initial notations. The second step is also the same, which is generating and developing initial codes. In this study, many initial codes became subcodes upon the identification of more overarching concepts captured across data segments. The third step, however, differs in that Braun and Clarke recommend searching for themes. Lochmiller, however recommends at this point engaging in second-cycle coding and looking for any relationships between codes. In the fourth step, he recommends producing categories based on patterns (primarily) or other relationships between the codes, compared to Braun and Clarke's guidance of reviewing themes. The fifth and final step in this process is identifying themes, vice defining and naming themes.

In the Interpretive Phase, Lochmiller recommends the researcher identify connections between and amongst categories and produce the themes. The generation of the report, the final sixth step of the Braun and Clarke model, is assumed. Table 2 provides an overview of the steps proposed by Lochmiller side-by-side with those proposed by Braun and Clarke:

Table 2

Comparison of Lochmiller's Steps with Braun & Clark's

Lochmiller	Braun & Clarke
Setup Phase	**(Assumed Setup)**
Scan hard copy documents; import files into CAQDAS; create spreadsheets	
Analysis Phase	
1. Data review/familiarization	1. Data review/familiarization
2. Develop initial set of codes	2. Develop initial codes
3. Second-cycle coding/data relationship identification	3. Search for themes
4. Produce categories based on codes or fragmented data	4. Review themes
5. Identify potential themes	5. Define/name themes
Interpretive Phase	
6. Identify data connections & produce themes	6. Produce the report
(Assumed report production)	

Given that both IPA and thematic analysis generally involve the same six-step process (with some selective differentiation on the part of the model-in-use for this study explained shortly), it may not be readily apparent how the two methodological processes differ aside from slight variations in their respective steps. But the answer to this is in the premise of the researcher's approach to the respective participant groups, rather than in the process itself. Braun & Clarke (2006) explain with the following:

> Thematic analysis differs from other analytic methods that seek to describe patterns across qualitative data, such as 'thematic' DA, thematic decomposition analysis, IPA and grounded theory. Both IPA and grounded theory seek patterns in the data but are theoretically bounded. IPA is attached to a phenomenological epistemology, which gives

> experience primacy, and is about understanding people's everyday experience of reality, in great detail, in order to gain an understanding of the phenomenon in question. (p. 80)

In this way, the differences are not in the process, for these are virtually indistinguishable. Rather, comparatively one data set - as in this study - may be based on the *experiences* of the participants, while the other is not.

Using thematic analysis, data is coded just as it is within IPA. However, often times, as Lochmiller (2021) notes, codes come from fracturing the data and ultimately themes are generated based on these codes. In his article, *Conducting Thematic Analysis with Qualitative Data*, Lochmiller claims that code-to-theme construction can leave ambiguities and create questions regarding the legitimacy and trustworthiness of analysis. He rhetorically asks, "For instance, how do you know that the theme refers to more than an isolated case or single example drawn from the data?" To provide more transparency, Lochmiller recommends the additional step of creating categories, whereby codes are taken from larger chunks of data, thereby leaving participant meaning intact but in a topically-aligned grouping. Themes can be outcomes of codes or categories (Saldaña, 2015, p. 14). Rossman and Rallis (2003) explain the differences between categories and themes by stating, "think of a category as a word or phrase describing some segment of your data that is explicit, whereas a theme is a phrase or sentence describing more subtle and tacit processes" (p. 282).

Comparing the two participant groups, the researcher coded segments of CEDMO interview transcripts and then identified themes across the coded data. The codes and derived themes were subtle in their abstraction, as they were based on the experiences of the CEDMO participants. A majority of military leaders, comparatively, did not have experience(s) responding domestically, and their questions were already more categorical, featuring much less

open-ended questions and responses. For example, given the overall lack of experience(s), military participants instead had to replace real, experiential responses replete with diminutive details with assumptions, suppositions, or responses based on limited training of what they might be expected to do. These responses from military leaders who all share some level of military institutionalization, uniformity, policies, and training have explicit, military-oriented views of how to take action, which is much more categorical than the unique circumstances and experiences of individuals involved in an event.

It is important to note that these categories as topically aligned groupings are akin to emergent themes discussed in the previous *IPA: Data Analysis* section in that they can be aggregations of like-codes that may become more dominant themes in the research. However, the use of categories, as Lochmiller (2021) explains, "allows the analyst to put different pieces of the data into conversation with one another. For instance, two categories which point to a discrepancy might be encapsulated in a thematic statement as conflict or differentiation." While these categories may not be developed into themes, the data within them may appear enough in the data to warrant further analysis and discussion.

In contrast, some researchers using qualitative coding methods recommend compiling lists of codes, then renaming similar codes in the mapping and in the transcripts for analyst ease and to show quantity of occurrence. For example, if one generated code is "struggled to focus" and another generated code is "difficult to stay focused on task," the researcher would change both codes to "difficult to stay focused" and apply this code to any code dealing with focus (Kruikow, 2020). While this may be a good way to reduce and homogenize codes, it can also reduce raw semantic or latent data, when the purpose of a code should be to "summarize, distill, or condense data" (Saldaña, 2015, p. 5). For this reason, data is fractured and coded for analyst

reference, but the codes only *accompany* the verbatim data placed into categories, rather than replace or represent the raw data in a more generic form. The responses of military participants are so similar in nature, given the perspectives solicited, that they do not share the wide diversity and uniqueness of individual experiences provided by CEDMO participants.

If the data analysis methods of IPA and thematic analysis (as presented by Lochmiller) are so similar, the question may arise as to why the researcher did not utilize a similar added step within IPA data analysis of placing codes within categories lending to theme development. The answer to this is as straightforward as the differentiation between researcher participant groups featured in the premise of IPA and thematic analysis. With IPA, themes in this study were developed using experiences that are dissimilar in relation to the individuals holding them based on uniquely disparate events. However, those experiences deemed the most ubiquitous across CEDMO participants (such as the various ways their needs were fulfilled as identified by the researcher) share common themes but not necessarily replicated conditions or outcomes.

Contrastingly, categories facilitate the grouping of patterns, which Saldaña (2015) defines as "repetitive, regular, or consistent occurrences of action/data that appear more than twice" (p. 5). While the researcher could aggregate *like*-experiences categorically, the individuality of each CEDMO participant's experiences would be diluted. Additionally, descriptions of distinctive, unrepeatable CEDMO experiences may be similar in nature but the limited responses based on questions on perspectives of military officials are much more repetitive and consistent in keeping with Saldaña's definition of patterns that fit into categories. Military officials' perspectives and opinions are limited significantly (though not completely) by the boundaries of the researcher's questions or proffered scenarios, leaving them less "randomized" than multifaceted, multidimensional CEDMO experiences and therefore more consistent. Therefore, similarities in

responses are much more easily overlayed on one another to form categories lending to theme development under thematic analysis. Finally, because of these limitations, the researcher's opinions and interpretations necessary in IPA data analysis are dramatically less present in thematic analysis. Put succinctly, CEDMO participants experienced real-world disasters and the military's specific responses to those disaster at particular times and places that, while in some cases similar, cannot be replicated ever again.

To reduce confusion throughout the next section, Lochmiller's phases are referred to as such. The six phases of the process proffered by Braun & Clarke are referred to as "steps."

Phase 1: Setup. The first phase under Lochmiller's model does not contain any of the six steps provided by Braun & Clarke. Rather, it is as described, an opportunity for the researcher to establish what is needed to conduct an examination of the data. During the setup phase, the researcher purchased MAXQDA, a Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). MAXQDA is billed as a workspace in which to organize, analyze, visualize, and present qualitative data (MAXQDA, 2022). It offers a number of features, which are not readily intuitive, however, there are a number of tutorials for specific features. During the setup phase, Lochmiller (2021) offers that one consideration is that the researcher can "establish all of the codes before the analysis begins," though this assumes research coding is *a priori*.

For the audio transcripts produced by Zoom, the researcher – to reiterate - uploaded the audio files to a software platform called "Otter.ai," which converts audio files into either downloadable MS Word or MS text readable formats. After downloading the completed transcriptions, the researcher scanned the transcripts while listening to the accompanying audio files as necessary in order to correct any erroneous spellings or missed words. For example, Otter.ai transcribed "MREs," which are packaged food items called "Meals-Ready-to-Eat," as

"Mr. Easy" and a number of other incorrect phrases. The researcher then imported the transcribed interviews into MAXQDA and printed out hard copies for convenience.

Phase 2: Analysis. In this phase, the researcher began the first step of analysis, familiarizing one's self with the data, by reviewing the data for intimate familiarization. The researcher made initial notations on the hard copy transcripts, just as with the CEDMO transcripts, as shown in Figure-3:



Stefan 00:04
Okay, so for my first question, can you tell me about your role in the military and a little bit of your background?

Finley 00:21
So my my current role in the military is as a Chief Warrant Officer, restricted officer for the signals intelligence, ground electronic warfare and cyberspace MOS. Currently, I am a second ew advisor to First Battalion, second Marines.

MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY

Electronic Warfare

Stefan 00:46
Have you deployed in a domestic capacity? And if so, what are the details of that?

Finley 00:51
I have not deployed domestic capacity. ← HAS NOT DEPLOYED DOMESTICALLY

Stefan 00:56
If you were to participate in domestic operations as part of a disaster response effort, predominantly for natural disaster, what would you expect your purpose or your mission focus would be?

Finley 01:08
Doesn't believe this is typically a role for Marines

Um, no, I mean, given that, you know, I'm a Marine, that's not typically something that we do. I mean, normally the National Guard's, you know, run that. So I guess what I would anticipate is some form of operational control, you know, command relationship between the Marine Corps, and the and the home National Guard unit that would be kind of leading that effort and basically falling in on doing whatever it is that they need us to do. Typical, you know, humanitarian aid, disaster relief operations include, you know, setting up some form of command and control function to, to kind of command and control everything, as well, as you know, setting up medical sites setting up, you know, humanitarian aid sites, the handout supplies that people need the typical stuff, bottle water, probably MREs, or some form of packaged food. And then, you know, the possibility of relocating or just transitioning people, you know, coordinating the the logistical movement of getting people out of a of an of an affected area, to, to somewhere safe.

Coordination

HUMANITARIAN AID — LOGISTICS
FOOD & WATER —
RELOCATING PEOPLE

Stefan 02:30
And then, as a follow up, what do you think your limitations would likely be during that type of event?

Finley 02:38
PAUSE DURING RESPONSE

As far as limitations go? I think the the interesting, the interesting thing that we would see during any disaster relief, you know, whether it's natural disaster or some form of manmade disaster, is, you know, what we saw, and some of the things that happened in like Kentucky, with some of the rioting and protests that that got out of hand, I think some of the limiting factors are how we integrate with local law enforcement. And I, I wish I could tell you, if that's something that we would be tasked to do I know, the National Guard, the like Kentucky National Guard, for example, got tasked with, you know, combining with local law enforcement to help, you know, police certain areas. And I don't know if that's something

LAW ENFORCEMENT

OVERALL UNCERTAINTY on limitations

- 1 -

Transcribed by https://otter.ai

Figure 3. Sample of Military Transcript Initial Notations

After becoming thoroughly familiar with the data and making initial notes, the researcher then moved to the second step of generating initial codes based on the data provided by the interview participants. This was done using the MAXQDA CAQDAS, as shown in Figure-4.



Figure 4. Sample of Military Coding in MAXQDA

MAXQDA allows the researcher to highlight segments of a transcript and mark the segment with a code, though these codes cannot be formatted in italics, bold-face, or underlined. The segment may be formatted in these ways, but this requires the researcher to code the segment, then go back over the segment and edit the portion *in vivo* with those characteristics.

Given these conditions, the researcher color-coded the data to denote different categories of exploratory comments, just as in IPA. Descriptive comments were highlighted in yellow, linguistic comments in light blue, and conceptual comments in purple.

After conducting coding within MAXQDDA, the researcher then searched for relationships between initial codes through iterative cycles of coding (beyond two cycles) and binned the codes in categories based on patterns and topic. MAXQDA did not have a convenient and user-friendly way to do this, so the researcher used an MS Excel document to place them into a table (Table 6 in Chapter 4). Once the initial categories were developed based on the primary questions and responses, the researcher then conducted another review of the data in order to determine if there were any patterns or frequencies in the data requiring additional categories. Following this, the researcher then did an initial scan to identify possible themes (Braun & Clarke's step three), which took him into the third and final phase.

Phase 3: Interpretation. In this phase, the researcher analyzed connections across categories in order to generate and review themes, the fourth step in Braun & Clarke's process. This directly led the fifth step of defining and naming the themes, including supporting the themes with information from the data (Lochmiller, 2021, p. 2036). The final step was the production of the report in the form of this study. Themes derived from military participant data are supported by *in vivo* comments in Chapter 4, as they were with direct data derived from CEDMO participants. Again, this allowed the researcher to researcher to preserve the words, terms, and phrases offered by the participants in support of the findings.

Pitfalls & criticisms of thematic analysis. One of the most significant challenges researchers may face when conducting thematic analysis is a lack of literature, especially compared to other research methods. Additionally, "while thematic analysis is flexible, this

flexibility can lead to inconsistency and a lack of coherence when developing themes derived from the research data" (Nowell, et al., 2017, p. 2). This is a benefit to the research conducted here in that thematic analysis is not the primary research method, nor is it conducted on the primary body of participants.

Thematic analysis can be difficult for novice use. It is generally so flexible that it does not present many of the limitations and specific application practices that are found with other more specific and more utilized, methods (p. 2). This renders the method quite unstructured for those inexperienced in its application and instead requires a committed adherence to the data. The researcher must also maintain objectivity and acceptance of including data that does not fit the researcher's theory or views as the theoretical thematic analysis does.

Triangulation

Triangulation is defined as, "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (Denzin, 1978, p. 291). Triangulation is a method, as opposed to a methodology, intended to incorporate more than one methodology to provide a more "comprehensive understanding of phenomena" than with just one (Carter, Bryant-Luksius, DiCenso, Blythe, & Neville, 2014). A method is a tool that assists with handling data, whereas a methodology is a "general research strategy that outlines the way in which research is to be undertaken" (Brookshier, 2018; Howell, 2013).

As a method, Carter, et al. (2014) claim triangulation is used to test data validity through information convergence, and different methodologies are used complementarily in the verification of findings. However, other authors disagree that the purpose of triangulation is to provide validity, arguing instead that it serves to provide deeper insight and understanding. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's website section, "Qualitative Research Guidelines Project,"

for example, states that to claim triangulation provides validity "assumes that a weakness in one method will be compensated for by another method…to make sense between different accounts," and that it instead ensures data is "rich, robust, comprehensive, and well-developed" (2008).

There is arguably merit to both interpretations of triangulation that in qualitative research it serves to provide greater validity to data, or that it offers greater data enrichment. In some cases, it can feasibly offer both. For example, more data points may help strengthen validity that an event took place at a particular time and location, or that an event occurred in a specific way. Triangulating qualitative data can offer richer context and provides more breadth and depth of understanding. Conversely, there may be studies where triangulation only helps to enrich data, but does not lead to greater data veracity. For example, two parties in conflict will likely disagree over who is "right," who is "wrong," who is the initial conflict agitator and they may have different perspectives on what the conflict is even about. Using triangulation to assess interpersonal or group – or even interstate – conflict does not always guarantee validity. However, several methodologies will provide much greater context, acting as complementary lenses through which to approach the problem, gather data, analyze the data, and even craft potential solutions.

While triangulation is a method with which to bridge other methodologies, several sources concur there are generally four types, or forms, of triangulation: 1) Data triangulation; 2) Methods triangulation; 3) Theory (or Perspective) triangulation; and 4) Analyst (or Investigator) triangulation (Denzin, 1978; Mathison, 1988; Meijer, Verloop, & Beijaard, 2002; Patton, 1999). This research utilizes the first, data triangulation, which uses the same – or in this case similar - methods but different data sources, to include times, locations, or persons (Hales, 2010, p. 14). In this research, the different data sources are ostensibly the individual research participants and the

two overarching groups within which they are categorized (military and CEDMO). To briefly explain the other three, methods triangulation helps with the "consistency of findings generated by different data collection methods" (Patton, 1999, p. 1193). Theory triangulation applies multiple theories against the same data. Finally, with analyst triangulation, the data remains the same, but multiple analysts or investigators examine the data in order to provide diverse research perspectives. The types of triangulation provide researchers who incorporate one of the four with a framework with which to proceed with data collection and analysis.

As part of the *entre* of data triangulation, once the researcher conducted data collection from public participants using phenomenology and collected the first round of responses from military officials, the researcher collated data and developed themes from each participant group (military officials and CEDMO). Then, the researcher cross-analyzed the data from both groups. The objective was to understand CEDMO experiences regarding the role of the military, and how military officials view their own role. The cumulative data was coded, analyzed, summarized, and reported in three parts:

1) Part one consists of the IPA results from the public;

2) Part two is the data analysis results from military leaders. This includes commentary on any policies or laws from training, experience, or perspective that may facilitate or inhibit opportunities identified between both groups before providing any type of recommendation later on;

3) Part three is the comparative-cross analysis of data from both participant groups and the generation of results.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were a primary consideration throughout this study. One of the foundations of ethical practice was the approval of the study by the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB). The researcher examined the potential for risk and

possibilities of harm to the adult research participants. The researcher determined there were no physical risks on account that the participants need only take part in a one-on-one interview. The environments in which the interviews took place were safe, given that interviews were conducted via Internet or phone, allowing participants to conduct the interview at a place of their choosing (often their own homes). There were no legal, economic, social, or group/community risks based on the research process, interview questions, or environment in which the interviews took place. Out of an abundance of care and consideration, the researcher listed minimal psychological and privacy risk concerns.

Psychologically, the researcher only identified anguish and discomfort in that a participant may recall uncomfortable or unnerving traumatic experiences from having been in a disaster. With regard to privacy, the researcher recognized there is always a slim chance for data compromise due to theft of equipment, such as an external hard drive (HDD) used to store participant data. The researcher remained cognizant of these risks. The researcher also guaranteed anonymity through the use of pseudonyms and offered participants access to the research once complete. With regard to psychological risk, the researcher understood that the recalling of particular memories or emotions was an important part of participant experiences and informed each participant that they could end the interview at any time. Concerning risks to privacy, the researcher safeguarded paper files, such as participant consent forms and a list associating participants' real names with assigned pseudonyms. All digital files, such as audio files and interview transcripts, were maintained offline on an external HDD accessible only to the researcher.

Conclusion

CEDMO participants took part in semi-structured interviews as the research venue through which to study their experiences of having lived through a domestic disaster or crisis where the military was involved. Military leaders were likewise interviewed in order to gain insight and understanding into how officials have or would likely act, and how they have (or imagine they would) experience disaster response from an official position.

IPA, as applied to CEDMO participants, and Thematic Analysis, as applied to military personnel, were quite similar in this study. The primary differences were that the researcher sought the experiences of CEDMO participants but sought opinions and perspectives from military participants. The researcher coded data in order to identify themes from and across both participant groups, respectively. There was a much greater opportunity for theme development from the CEDMO participants given the uniqueness of their responses. Each methodology contains strengths and weaknesses, and IPA may have worked for both groups. However, the researcher did not exclusively seek military service members who had been involved in a domestic response, nor was the researcher primarily seeking their lived experiences. For these reasons, thematic analysis was more appropriate due to the researcher seeking the opinions and insights of military leaders as they are likely to act or perceive roles and responsibilities during and following domestic events.

Methods of triangulation were incorporated into the research design for comparative and cross-analysis between the two research groups in order to identify areas of convergence and divergence, as well as nuances unique to each group. Ethical considerations were at the forefront of the research throughout the process in order to protect participants and participant privacy, and in keeping with Nova Southeastern University IRB approval.

The next chapter, Chapter 4: Findings, provides analysis from both the CEDMO participant and military participant groups supported by the derived interview data. The themes derived from the data within this study are first categorized by successes and failures under the section for CEDMO participants, followed by military participants. Data is provided hierarchically at the thematic, and coding levels as needed to support the findings for both groups. After findings are presented for both participant groups, the researcher then identifies areas of convergence and divergence.

Chapter 4: Research Findings

The purpose of this study was to capture, explore, and analyze the lived experiences of civilians (CEDMO), along with the views and perspectives of military leadership (in some cases absent experience) in order to overcome future challenges with the public for successfully utilizing the military in a domestic role. The phenomenological study was conducted with the interviews of 7 CEDMO participants and thematic with 11 military participants. In this chapter, the research findings are presented in three sections: 1) findings based on the CEDMO IPA; 2) thematic findings from interviews with military officials; and 3) analytic findings across the research populations (triangulation).

CEDMO IPA

This section of the chapter addresses the following guiding question: How have members of the public experienced the use of the military in domestic crises and what meanings do they make of the military's roles and responsibilities during domestic crises? CEDMO participants consisted of seven individuals whose experiences stemmed from a range of events involving military responses. Events included the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the COVID-19 pandemic, the January 6th, 2021 riots, and smaller hurricanes. The domestic events served as the scenarios for civilian experiences and as catalysts prompting military response activities. The researcher cataloged the data from each CEDMO participant by assigning 'C'- for CEDMO - and a number ranging from 1 to 7 based on the order in which the interviews were conducted. Once all data was gathered, the individuals were also given a pseudonym for anonymity in alphabetical order according to their assigned CEDMO number. These alphanumeric designations and pseudonyms are provided in Table 3.

Table 3

CEDMO Participants

Alphanumeric Designation	Pseudonym
C-1	Avery
C-2	Bali
C-3	Cairo
C-4	Denver
C-5	Eli
C-6	Florian
C-7	Gabriel

Background of CEDMO participants

Avery (C-1). Avery is a 33-year-old chaplain who works at a large hospital in Eastern North Carolina, predominately with pediatric patients. He has experienced several hurricanes in North Carolina that prompted military responses and has worked with the military during recovery efforts, primarily the distribution of medical supplies. Avery has provided chaplaincy and counseling services to military service members, their families, and works with several hospital staff who are former military. In at least two instances, Avery received food and other supplies from the military while stuck in his home. In another instance, Avery worked with the military to deliver medical supplies and medical care to the community in his work capacity.

Bali (C-2). Bali is a civilian employee for the Howard County, Maryland Sheriff's Office with their domestic violence unit, and she also manages a catering business with her husband. She retired from the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) as a detective and spent time as a police officer in Baltimore City. As an NOPD officer during Hurricane Katrina, Bali was initially assigned to the Superdome stadium to maintain order, distribute supplies, and investigate sexual assault allegations. She was originally told she would be in the stadium for three days, however, as three days turned into a week, food and water supplies ran low as the officers transitioned

from first responders to victims. While in the Superdome awaiting the military, members of Bali's family were stranded on rooftops. A devastatingly tragic component of her experience was the death of her 5-year-old niece who was swept away by the floodwaters and whose body was not found until over a month later. Her two dogs also drowned in her house after water reached the second floor.

Cairo (C-3). Cairo is a 29-year-old Washington, DC Metropolitan Police officer with two years on the force. She was present at the protests and subsequent riots at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. She explained how a segment of the peaceful protests broke off and took to storming the Capitol, which was broadcast worldwide. Once the riot broke out, the department instituted a "Code 1033" designating the event as an "absolute emergency." She relayed to the researcher that the entire department was activated in response to the riots, and claimed it was the scariest day of her life. She recounted her most vivid recollections as follows:

> What I remember smelling was like, pepper spray everywhere. There were officers using their entire cans of pepper spray on people. We had foggers, so people were getting sprayed all over. I remember like, sweating, like smelling like my own sweat because I was in a mask and I was just pouring sweat because I was so hot. And I just remember hearing people screaming and cursing, and people like just saying like, you know, "eff-you" and you know, "We're here to do what we want. We're breaching the Capitol." I know like, ANTIFA was down there too, and ANTIFA like, really made things worse…I guess stirred the pot.

Denver (C-4). Denver is a 50-year-old woman who lives in South Florida where she has worked as a physical therapist assistant for 25 years. Due to her position in healthcare, she was given priority when COVID-19 vaccines were first released and received her vaccination from

the U.S. Army when it was in short supply. She said, “I was one of the first to be vaccinated, being a first responder. So, I’m thinking like, early 2021, when they were starting to vaccinate, like January or something, January or February.” U.S. Army personnel arrived to provide the initial vaccines, manage crowds, and direct traffic to and from a local park that was converted to a vaccination site.

Eli (C-5). Eli is a 44-year-old recreational therapist in South Florida who also teaches wellness classes to senior citizens. She relayed having experienced domestic natural disasters “a few times.” Eli said she remembers Hurricane Wilma in 2005, where the U.S. Air Force and Florida National Guard were involved in the response. She shared that her most recent experience with the military responding domestically involved the Army National Guard providing her an early vaccine as a healthcare provider, while also working alongside the military to facilitate the distribution of the vaccine and COVID tests to others in the community.

Florian (C-6). Florian is a 49-year-old attorney for the Department of the Interior and currently lives in an apartment in Washington, DC. She is a high-ranking official, and her exact position is omitted from this research in order to protect her identity. Florian was an attorney in New Orleans and was rescued by the military during Hurricane Katrina. She was also present during the January 6, 2021 riots and the National Guard response, as well as some of the Black Lives Matter protests that took place in Washington, DC. She has worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast Guard. Florian expressed that she lives in an apartment because of fear of the damage wrought by Hurricane Katrina, expressing during the interview, “when I moved to DC, I had to make clear that I cannot live in a basement apartment. I have to be up. Yeah, I don't even want a house with a basement. I can't do basements.”

Gabriel (C-7). Gabriel of Fayetteville, North Carolina is a 32-year-old mother of two small children, a 6-year-old son, and a 7-month-old daughter. She was at her parent's house in Fayetteville in 2016 when Hurricane Matthew struck, knocking out power and causing flooding throughout the city. Gabriel said her family did not have much in the way of supplies, and remembers going with her father to a nearby convention center to pick up water. Gabriel witnessed the National Guard moving supplies and spoke to a young soldier, who informed her they were helping to distribute basic necessities and remove debris caused by the storm. Gabriel's experiences with the military as a result of a domestic event were quite limited, though she did share those experiences and her espoused perspectives on military operations.

CEDMO participant data findings. In order to understand the participants' individual experiences, the researcher asked a series of 11 interview questions to each participant. Some follow-on questions were unique to each to participants. The 11 initial interview questions were as follows:

1) Can you tell me generally about yourself?
2) Can you start by telling me about the event and what happened?
3) Can you tell me generally about your experiences during [event]?
4) Do you remember any specific or impressionable details, such as certain smells, sounds, sights?
5) Please share with me the experiences you had where the military was involved in the event you just shared, and how the military might tie in with this event from your perspective?
6) Were any impressions left on you by the military's role, or of the military following this event?
7) From your perspective, what was the role of the military during the event?
8) How has this event impacted you since that time and your daily activities or the way you now live your life?

9) In what ways did your feelings or impressions of the military change, if any, from before the event and then after the event?

10) From your perspective, are Americans comfortable with the use of military personnel in response to major events, and generally what are your overall beliefs regarding the use of the military in a domestic capacity?

11) Is there anything else you would be willing to share with me today?

Data findings derived from the interviews with CEDMO participants indicated that, while participant experiences were disparate in terms of not only the individuals but also the types of events and responses, there were a number of successes and few perceptible challenges. The themes within each of these sections are presented in Table 4:

Table 4

Themes and Superordinate Themes Derived from CEDMO Participant Data

Themes	Superordinate Themes
▪ Fulfilling Civilian Needs ▪ Building Rapport, One Person at a Time ▪ An Organized Response	▪ Military Rapprochement with the Public
▪ Politically-Motivated Use	▪ Use of the Military Through a Cynical Eye

CEDMO participants' experiences during events were overall unique to each individual. Experiences were also mixed based on the specific disaster. Those who experienced a military response to COVID-19 or comparatively minor hurricanes (compared to Hurricane Katrina), for example, were not in as imminent danger or despair as victims of Hurricane Katrina or those whose experiences related to the January 6, 2021 riots. Therefore, CEDMO participants involved in Hurricane Katrina, or in one case the January 6th riot, presented higher levels of distress when sharing their experiences. However, those negative feelings were largely – though not exclusively - relegated to the disaster conditions rather than inculpated upon the military.

Regardless of how bleak, distressing, or damaging an event may have been, most of the data provided by participants revealed favorable impressions of the military. Themes were organized based on coding frequency across participants (see Table 5).

Two superordinate themes emerged from the data as successes and one overarching challenge. Military successes fell under the superordinate theme of *Military Rapprochement with the Public*, while a significant challenge fell within the superordinate theme of *Use of the Military Through a Cynical Eye.* Themes under *Military Rapprochement with the Public* include *Fulfilling Civilian Needs; Building Rapport, One Person at a Time;* and *An Organized Response.* The theme considered a military challenge from CEDMO perspectives was *Politically-Motivated Use*.

Table 5

Responses Driving Theme Development from CEDMO Data

Theme	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7
Fulfilling Civilian Needs							
Building Rapport, One Person at a Time							
An Organized Response							
Politically-Motivated Use							

*Green blocks represent the presence of the corresponding theme as identified through an individual's responses based on experiences; red represents an absence of the theme based on responses of experience(s).

Superordinate theme: Military rapprochement with the public. Overall, participants shared more positive experiences of the military during disasters than negative. All seven participants shared in different forms how the military satisfied critical public needs, ranging from transporting medical equipment and removing road debris, to delivering food, water, and conducting life-saving rescue operations.

Theme I: Fulfilling Civilian Needs. The military received acclaim from all seven CEDMO participants in regard to fulfilling CEDMO needs, regardless of the particular event. For individuals caught in domestic vicissitudes, the military provided lifesaving measures, supplies, relief, and comfort. Whether food, water, medical care, shelter, or something else, each respondent sought respite and relief that the military was ultimately able to provide successfully. This may seem obvious, given that, should the military fail to fulfill basic needs, there would be little other purpose for its presence. It was the impetus participants placed on these things and the ways in which the military satisfied them that were prominent in the interviews.

Avery said broadly in the aftermath of several hurricanes in Eastern North Carolina, “we had to rely on our military to bring things like food and ice and water, and those kinds of things to different neighborhoods,” adding that he also worked alongside the military at different times to provide medical equipment and care. The military typically integrates with local hospitals and law enforcement to ensure the safety and security of the public during and after disasters. It is a given in society that hospitals provide care and resources in the wake of a disaster to the point of public expectation, but it is much more atypical for military elements to step in and fill this role. Avery added that when hospitals are unable to provide transportation and resources due to their own lack of capabilities and vehicles, they allow the military to provide these lifesaving

measures and satisfy critical needs by allowing soldiers to step in and "help with the transfer of those things."

Following Hurricane Katrina, Bali noted there was an extreme "lack of basic necessities," especially needs such as power, food, water, and running water for sanitation. She pointed out the military was most critically needed "for food and water and shelter, you know, refuge." Cairo expressed during her interview that military troops were direly needed in Washington, DC to provide basic safety and security following January 6th, as she told the following:

> You know, I don't know if I like, almost like, appreciated the military more after the event, even though I was in, like, I felt like, you know, I was like, okay, I almost felt like, better that they were there as well. Because like, we just…we needed…there was not enough of us. And there were too many people. So, like, we needed them. And you know, I'm thankful that they were there when they came.

Bali's shared experience included strong emotions over the needs of people in the Superdome. She recalled how water supplies ran low. Then, a military helicopter, afraid of being overrun if it were to land, dropped water from such a height that the bottles burst upon impact with the ground. Thirsty people, she said through tears, lapped up water off of the concrete. She expounded, saying that the military providing such needs was about "survival," suggesting that satisfying civilian needs kept people from making dangerous treks, stating, "It's survival there. We're trying to get food or they are trying to get clothing, but if the military is providing the food and clothing, then you won't have to worry about anybody, you know, trying to go in the store and get milk for a child." She indicated one of the military's basic purposes was to satisfy public needs during times of crisis, adding, "The military was needed for food and water and shelter…you know, refuge."

Denver and Eli, as two first responders, both needed COVID tests and vaccinations, which the military provided, even taking them before the public upon recognizing their credentials. Denver also experienced Hurricane Wilma in 2005, where the community needed water and ice, and which the military provided. She said, “we were supposed to transition to like a medical supply also, but it didn't get to that point, you know, ice and water were the primary needs.”

Florian, who was a victim of Hurricane Katrina and who also experienced the temporary military occupation around the U.S. Capitol after the January 6, 2021 riot, explained at the beginning of her experience how the military brought water and MREs, which brought some level of ease. At one point she laughed and said:

> I discovered the unfortunate thing that we New Orleanians were eating like, three of those things [MREs] a day, breakfast, lunch, and dinner, and, we’re like, we’re all getting fat. Then we found out no, they’re supposed to just take care of a soldier for like, 36 hours…or a New Orleanian for two hours.”

In 2016, during Hurricane Matthew, CEDMO participant Gabriel described how the hurricane knocked out power and caused severe flooding in some areas. The National Guard arrived fairly quickly, from what she recalls. Her family was worried about not having any water, so her father took her several blocks away to a resource point where they were able to receive some bottled water. Gabriel said she also received a military “meal ready to eat,” or MRE, which she thought was interesting since she wasn’t initially certain if she could eat the contents of the MRE without first heating it. Gabriel was much more relieved after receiving the water knowing that it would only be several days before water service was to resume.

During the interviews, all seven participants expressed that the military should have a prominent role in transporting and providing basic life essentials, such as food, water, and medical care. In other instances, these needs included both individual or public safety through rescue operations, medical care, and security.

Theme II: Building rapport, one person at a time. The second most common theme to appear across participants was about their personal positive experiences with the military, especially individual service member, in the execution of their duties. The concept of rapport specifically refers to the development of positive relationships created through interactions between military service members and members of the public. Such rapport is generated through the professionalism, goodwill, and reportedly often the friendly nature service members demonstrate when interacting with the public. In some cases, the interactions between service members and CEDMO can be quite friendly, creating an impression of congeniality with members of the public. Many CEDMO participants recounted the professional and friendly nature of the service members with whom they interacted. Professionalism and a genial demeanor can put people at ease during an already tense situation, where anxiety can be compounded by the presence of troops and law enforcement. Once CEDMO encounter the human side of first responders and military – the individual in the uniform - this can help calm the individual, in some cases so much so that such interactions evoke strong memories when recounting events.

Five of the seven CEDMO participants touched on the rapport generated through interactions with the military. During the researcher's interview with Avery, the participant recounted several times that he found military service members to be pleasant, having experienced working alongside them or receiving aid from them on several occasions in Eastern

North Carolina over the years. At one point, Avery summarized this sentiment with the following:

> I think one of the things that stands out for me the most is always their…their eagerness to help and support and be engaged in the community. Um, I've never experienced an unpleasant individual. And working with these groups over the years, either as a personal recipient or as a healthcare professional. I'm there, they're, they're always just happy to be engaging the community and doing what they do.

Toward the end of the interview, when the researcher asked if the participant had anything else to add, Avery added:

> Like I said earlier, to me just…just…they're pleasant, they're eager to, to provide a service. I will say they're very, I think a lot of times, they're very strategic and logistical in how they do things and how they think through things, which they can be a help sometimes in a situation. Um, I guess I'm just a supporter of the military culture, um, and how maybe they do things. But a lot of times, like, we get in the civilian side, we get very frustrated in kind of trying to figure things out in these chaotic situations.

As for Denver, when she was sharing her experience of receiving military assistance during the early stages of the COVID-19 response, she summarized the way the military generated rapport:

> They were very nice, they were very clear, and they were very professional. And they were paying attention. They weren't joking around. They were definitely they weren't mean, they were always very friendly, and very 'Yes, ma'am, yes,' you know, this and that. But it was definitely, you know, they were taking it seriously.

Eli did not overtly mention direct interaction with service members, but she did note that the military's response to the COVID-19 pandemic by offering to test individuals was viewed favorably:

> Doing what they were doing during COVID, you know, doing things like that, I think really made a connection, I really do. I mean, because I think they were seen favorably overall. It wasn't just me, um, you know, in a situation where, you know, they're helping, maybe physically, you know, giving [people] something, or giving them supplies or, or, you know, letting them into testing or whatever it was, um, you know, these types of situations, I think, help…help make for a more positive connection.

Florian shared how members of the military were polite and cordial during both the Hurricane Katrina and DC riot response efforts. She fondly described with laughter how, following Hurricane Katrina, she encountered two soldiers at a laundromat in a bar:

> I just remembered being in Igor's to do my laundry, which is a bar that has a laundromat in it, and it was one of the few that were open to do laundry. So, I'm doing my laundry and eating a burger and a beer, and beside me were National Guardsmen. They were off-duty, obviously. So, they just start chatting…and they're young. So, we just start chatting and they're young, look even younger not in uniform, just like, "Oh, New Orleans is cool!" I said, "You're not catching us on a very good day."

Gabriel provided a brief example from the time her and her father went to retrieve water from the community center as she recalled, "I remember seeing the military and thinking, "Oh, I'm glad they're here. I remember how friendly they were, I remember that because they were young and super nice."

Theme III: An organized response. The third most consistent theme to emerge from participant responses was their positive impressions of the military's apparent training and organization in terms of how competent and organized the military ran operations. Military personnel receive training to act in a coordinated and uniformed manner, working in an orderly fashion toward an orchestrated response. The military's ability to organize promotes efficiency, which includes the efficiency in how they interact with CEDMO and how they move to an affected area to distribute supplies or render services. As it is captured here, training refers to how service members are taught to execute actions or functions based on directions and requirements. A majority of participants reflected on the organizational effectiveness of the military response.

Four of the seven CEDMO participants shared sentiments regarding the overall training and organization exhibited by military personnel. Avery, in discussing his experiences, recalled that throughout his life he had been in several hurricanes - and had at different times received assistance from the military - was aware of the military operating in his community to provide aid, or worked alongside the military in distributing aid. One of the codes derived from his interview was "military span of control," and as he noted whenever the military became involved, it appeared to him that all other response agencies ceded control of the response to the military. As he revealed to the researcher, the military was able to unify and consolidate response efforts amongst different response agencies, stating:

> You know, a lot of times in these natural disasters, there's the military, there's the American Red Cross, there's FEMA, there's all these different groups that are there on the ground, trying to provide different services and really working together to do so. So, the

> military is just one entity involved in there, I think, and the way they are, they really bring organization to the different groups.

Avery added that the military brings with it a "strategic mind," which means courses of action taken are "very smooth, very rhythmic, and things just flow a lot easier."

Denver shared similar experiences and opined that the military is trained in providing aid. Regarding the military's initial actions during the COVID-19 response, she stated:

> [The military] is trained for that sort of stuff. So, I feel like soldiers are…have quite a bit of training for like rescue and stuff. And then, as far as with the pandemic, they were there. And we needed the help, we definitely needed the help with all the testing. And with all the driving and the confusion, I think that they help to aid the calm.

Denver explained the location of the setup site for COVID testing and vaccinations early on in the pandemic was C.B. Smith Park in Pembroke Pines, Florida. She noted the lines to receive treatment (testing or a vaccination) were quite long, but the military made up for such inconvenience with competence under the exploratory comment of "organization brings comfort." At first, the military thought she was a member of the general public until they realized she was a first responder, recalling the following:

> I remember them kinda looking at me funny because they saw my badge. I remember it was very long but it was very organized. And I remember feeling comforted by the fact that it was so organized because nobody knew what was going on.

Denver added that she was not sure where to go at first as a first responder, so she initially went to the wrong place. However, the military noticed her first responder credentials and helped her navigate the vaccination process quickly, as she recalled, "Because they saw my badge, the army

reservists were like, oh, no, you're a first responder, you go here, and they sent me and it didn't take me but you know, 20 minutes instead of the three hours."

Eli had a similar experience as a first responder during the pandemic at a place called Holiday Park, also in Florida. In her experience, Eli found that the military brought order and organization to operations that were already underway under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component under the Department of Homeland Security. Eli volunteered with FEMA during the COVID-19 response and explained that processes were disorganized until the military arrived, stating:

> So, we, as we were waiting for them to come in, you know, we started doing the distribution and setting everything up. Even our guy started running forklifts, you know, and then National Guard came in and started running the forklifts, you know, running the paperwork, behind the scenes, you know, organizing things a little bit more. And it kind of became a little bit more cohesive and more organized when they came in.

She later summarized her perspective of "flawless execution of the mission" during the military operation, stating:

> What I saw, I thought was ran very smoothly. Um, so, you know, they, they knew how to talk to the public, when they arrived. Um, you know, I believe that…that what we were doing, they were trained to do, and it seemed like, it was almost flawless, you know? So I'm not sure about other situations, that my experience that it was a good, good experience.

Florian, who was in Hurricane Katrina and also experienced the military response to the January 6th, 2021, riots in Washington DC, said she believed the military was well trained,

adding, “I think there are portions of it that are probably better trained than some of our police departments.” She also stated there were units that are probably better trained than others.

Superordinate theme: Use of the military through a cynical eye. Through what were perhaps the most jaundiced views of military response taken from the data showed CEDMO participants believed there were political machinations behind the decision to dispatch the military into communities. *Politically-Motivated Use* refers to the perspective shared by a majority of CEDMO participants that decisions by policymakers on whether or not to provide the military as a response force are based on political partisanship. This was ostensibly a theme that reflected negative sentiments from CEDMO participants.

Theme IV: Politically-Motivated Use. One theme that stood out in six of the seven interviews was the negative perception that the use of the military is often based on political calculations or biases. Despite the broad support for the military as a response force, more than half of CEDMO participants felt that biased political considerations weighed into deciding if and when the military should be used domestically.

During the researcher’s interview with Bali, when the researcher asked her if the military’s actions left any lasting impressions, she replied with tears:

> Um, the most lasting impression was the red tape that they have to go through to help. Like, oh, I can't give you this water until Uncle Sam tells me it's okay to give you water. You know, like that's ridiculous. You see a person that's dying from lack of water, give him the frickin’ water…to me, it kept on popping up like, hey, we cannot come and help you until we get the okay from the governor. Or somebody says it's okay for you know, us to step in or, you know, we can't come and help you, even though we are right here.

Bali noted in her conclusion that her experiences during Hurricane Katrina made her not only consider morality more deeply, but she added, “I don’t like politics anymore.” Bali blamed then-Mayor Ray Nagin, who is currently under house arrest until 2023 following seven years in prison for 21 corruption charges. Bali had strong feelings about Ray Nagin’s lack of leadership during the Hurricane Katrina disaster and response, stating, “I wish someone would stab him with a rusty…never mind.” She also blamed Governor Mary Landrieu for failing to ask the federal government to provide immediate assistance.

A lack of military usage was identified by participants against Nazis or white supremacists based on political machinations. During the researcher’s interview with Denver, the researcher asked, “Do you think Americans generally are comfortable with the use of military personnel in response to domestic events?” In part of her response, Denver said, “I think yes, for the most part, I think most people are with the caveat being if they're going to a protest, you're always gonna have a group of people that don't agree with it.” However, she then went on to add that there is bias over when authorization is given to deploy the military, adding:

> If you're sending the military out because of the Black Lives Matter protests, but yet you'll let the Nazis go protest and not send the military out, that sends a message that, you know, that is very disheartening. You know…you're going to send [the military] out to stop or quell protests, and you have to do it for a lot of different ones. Not just the ones that the government that's in control is against. That doesn’t make sense, does it? And I think it colors the military badly, too. And it also makes these kids you know…you send Black soldiers to stop a Black Lives Matter protest? That's not okay, you know, and they're being forced to do that.

Much in the way Bali perceived political machinations interfering with the Hurricane Katrina response, Eli likewise believed politics played into the COVID-19 response. Some of her interview segments were coded as "driven by partisan politics," an example of which is as follows, where she stated:

> I think that, you know, if everybody's political leaning matched up, you know, you end up getting supplies faster, staffing faster. You know, it just seems like, at one point, you know, all over the country there were places that were in higher need of like, COVID testing than others, with higher numbers of COVID. Certain states were getting, you know, more…more help with opening up sites and, and more supplies. It seemed like when I was looking at the numbers, but, um, generally, I think, you know…if the political leanings match, then then you start seeing more attention to that state, unfortunately.

Florian was perhaps the dourest when it came to believing politics played a role in the military's response as she asserted "it's getting worse." Florian went on to explain further:

> I think that seeing how the National Guard wasn't called on January 6 when they should have been, they weren't prepared. And all the evidence has been coming out of it. It's absolute, I think, proof that…obviously, that it was not everyone - all hands-on deck…but they were bringing out the National Guard and hazing the Black Lives Matters protesters. But then when it came to the white supremacist protesters, [politicians] were like, "Oh, they're fine. It'll be fine. We won't. The National Guard, we're not going to bring them up for that."

Later in the interview, Florian revisited her concern for political influence on the use of the military as she described the National Park Service Police and the military clearing out Lafayette Park "so Trump could have his picture in front of the church across Lafayette Square." She said

that while the military regretted involvement later, military leaders had a responsibility to speak up against being used for political purposes, adding:

> I think that it's an aspect of leadership, which the military does do a pretty good job of doing, of leadership. And now we're talking about at higher levels, but to, um, to be able to…well, I mean, they really do, I think, do their job. When you see any of the congressional testimonies, you see it in the military hearings, they, you know, are very eloquent. They know what they're doing. There are…you don't get to become a general or an admiral without being well-trained and knowing how to talk to politicians. I think it's more a matter of maybe politicians listening. And I can't solve it. It's this way because if we could solve that we could solve the entire problem with the political system. What's fair, I could just claim we'll just fix the politicians, and then the army won't have a problem.

During the interview with Gabriel, her position on the political use of the military was that she believed there is more often a political nexus to the military's use, stating, "Either no one wants to use the police or military, or they do, depending on how they think people will react. It should be that they are used when they're needed but that's not the reality of it."

Of the six CEDMO participants who expressed concern for political motivations and biases influencing or determining the use of the military domestically, Avery took the most moderate position. He took a somewhat moderate position on the topic in that he felt that the very nature of politics was a requirement for using the military, stating, "I feel the military is often called in when the local or regional governing bodies feel that they have exhausted their own resources or capacity to provide the necessary support." However, he did not believe

partisan political views always, or even mostly, were a common driving factor for military use, stating:

> I believe there is - or can be - some subjectivity in this decision sometimes, but overall, these decisions are rarely made by one individual or entity. To answer your question, yes, sometimes there may be a political calculus where an individual or group feels they have something to gain, but generally speaking, I do not think it is overwhelmingly the primary influence of involving the military in these affairs.

Aside from viewing the use of the military through a lens of political calculus, some CEDMO participants were slightly critical of the military in other ways (though not strongly enough, nor numerically enough across participants). Bali was perhaps the most critical, highlighting how the military in one instance left people thirsty, sick, and hot because they were, from her perspective, afraid. She had felt abandoned. Two other participants, Denver and Eli, had high praise for the military but both agreed ever so modestly that the overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic could have been executed faster. While this was not a critique of the military response per se, the military was a large part of that response, and so it is worth noting for the reader these considerations outside of the themes.

A majority of participants mentioned community integration and the staging/provision of supplies and equipment as the most significant recommendations moving forward. Had these been ready to go before Hurricane Katrina or other disasters, the negative aspects of the responses – CEDMO wait times, government unpreparedness, overwhelming humanitarian calamity, lack of security, cleanup efforts – could have potentially been much less severe.

Summary. The interviewer maintained the same open-ended baseline questions for all participants. Participant backgrounds and experiences, as expected, were quite different from one

another. Despite the significant differences in experiences, however, many of the participants identified the military as satisfying needs first and agreed through their responses that military personnel overall were friendly, kind, and helpful. Respondents overwhelmingly felt the military was organized and well-trained for response, but also felt that the military was used as a political tool too often.

Military Thematic Analysis

This section provides the data findings from military research participants and addresses the following guiding question: How do military service members perceive their roles and responsibilities to the public during domestic operations in terms of the resources and capabilities they bring to bear during crises? For context, previous domestic disaster response efforts by military forces overall – agnostic of specific U.S. statutes as they may apply to state and federal forces – have included varyingly all or some service components across the DoD. To reiterate data from the Chapter 3 Literature Review, the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force, and Army National Guard state contingents have participated in responding to the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the Hurricane Katrina response effort (and many other weather-related disasters), COVID response, post -9/11 national security operations, border security efforts, and more.

Just as with the CEDMO participants, the researcher applied pseudonyms to the military participants alphabetically, and an alphanumeric designator for cataloging purposes (M-1 through M-11). As all services from across the DoD may participate in domestic events, the researcher also wanted to solicit inputs from across the services as well, thus military participants represented all branches of service except U.S. Space Force. The breakdown of participants by designator, pseudonym, branch of service, and rank grade, is as follows in Table 6:

Table 6

Military Participants

Alphanumeric Designation	Pseudonym	Branch of Service	Rank (by Grade)
M-1	Adam	Army	CWO3
M-2	Bill	Army	O2
M-3	Charlie	Army	O3
M-4	Dakota	Air Force	O5
M-5	Emerson	Marine Corps	O4
M-6	Finley	Marine Corps	CWO3
M-7	Guillermo	Marine Corps	E9
M-8	Hilton	Marine Corps	O3
M-9	Ivan	Air Force	E5/O1 (Candidate)
M-10	Jesse	Navy	E7
M-11	Kelly	Marine Corps	O3

Background of military participants

Adam (M-1). Adam (M-1) is a Chief Warrant Officer-3[†] in the U.S. Army who deployed domestically three times; the first in response to the 2003 Columbia shuttle explosion, the second as airport security following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the third time in

[†] Military ranks are not capitalized as common nouns and are instead only capitalized as titles before a proper noun (ie, "two captains" vice "Captain Smith"). Despite this, many military publications and correspondence capitalize ranks even when used as common nouns. Within this paper, ranks are treated as common nouns except in the introduction paragraph of each military participant, in order to establish and distinguish their rank from the rest of the text for reader clarity.

response to Hurricane Katrina. He has multiple overseas deployments, including to Kosovo and Iraq. Adam showed a sense of humor throughout the interview, such as stating early on, "I was born at a very young age."

Bill (M-2). Bill is a First Lieutenant in the Army currently stationed at Fort Drum, New York first as an artillery officer, then an administration officer in the adjutant general corps. Prior to becoming an Army officer, Bill was an infantry Corporal in the Marine Corps, from 2004 to 2008, during which he deployed twice to Iraq and once to Israel for Israeli-U.S. training. He also worked as a Congressional staffer and as a middle school history teacher. Bill was commissioned as an Army officer in 2019 after missing the military lifestyle and challenges of deployment. He has never deployed within the United States, although he volunteers as a caseworker with the Red Cross. Despite not having deployed domestically, Bill was selected for this study due to his perspectives and opinions on military domestic operations.

Charlie (M-3) . Charlie is an Army Captain who currently works at Fort Meade. He started his career as a military police officer, and about 10 years later he became an electronic warfare officer. He has done several domestic deployments, the most notable being three snow (blizzard) missions – including one he referred to as the "snowpocalypse" - transporting emergency responders and supplies with military vehicles. In one instance he even responded to a domestic violence situation with a police officer, and in another, he brought a paramedic to a home where a young girl experiencing breathing problems needed oxygen administered.

Dakota (M-4). Dakota is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force in the field of cyberspace operations. He has never deployed domestically, although he has done some training on the topic. Specifically, he took training on Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), and was willing to offer his official perspectives, hence his selection for participation.

Emerson (M-5). Emerson is a Major in the Marine Corps with 11 years of service. He started in the Marine Corps as an intelligence officer and was a scout sniper platoon commander for several years. He was assigned a billet doing intelligence work in Maryland and at the end of his tour as a captain he transitioned to become a cyberspace officer. He has never deployed domestically, although he has deployed as a part of Crisis Response Africa, and around the Mediterranean with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, an amphibious ready group of naval ships carrying Marines to various destinations. He relayed that he has also worked and trained with the State Department and Homeland Security in preparation for domestic events, and thus met the criteria for this research study.

Finley (M-6). Finley is a Chief Warrant Officer-3 in the Marine Corps who has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. He has been in the Marine Corps for 18 years as a "2602, Signals Intelligence and Ground Electronic Warfare Officer." He received the Purple Heart for wounds sustained fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Finley has not deployed in a domestic capacity where he has aided the public, although he has led disaster-preparation efforts on military bases for impending natural disasters. While conducting preparation efforts on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, he simultaneously prepared to help civilians living in the surrounding town in the event local emergency response became over-encumbered.

Guillermo (M-7). Guillermo is a Master Gunnery Sergeant in the Marine Corps with a little over 22 years of service. He was originally born in the Dominican Republic before immigrating to the United States at a young age, where he lived in New York, then South Florida. He has deployed around the globe, including on combat tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. He has also deployed in a domestic capacity as part of a hurricane response relief effort in Texas while stationed at San Antonio. Guillermo's experiences were unique in that rather than

providing aid, logistics, or security, he instead served as a Spanish linguist and translator for first responders due to the substantial Spanish-speaking populace in Texas. Unfortunately, Guillermo could not recall by name the specific hurricane disaster relief to which he provided support.

Hilton (M-8). Hilton is a Major in the Marine Corps who graduated with his Master of Science in Cybersecurity from the Naval Postgraduate School in 2021. He is an intelligence officer and has not deployed domestically. Of the 11 interviews, Hilton's responses were the shortest and most cursory. He has some sense of what might be expected of him during a domestic response. Unlike the other participants, however, the only quality of sampling criteria for his inclusion into the research participant group is his position as a military officer and willingness to provide his perspectives.

Ivan (M-9). Ivan has a wide range of experience in the military and the Department of Defense. He has been involved in domestic disaster response efforts, including Hurricane Katrina and "several other hurricanes," he stated. Ivan started his military career in the Army achieving the rank of Sergeant (E5). He then maintained his rank in the Army Reserves while working as a Government Grade-13 (GG13, out of 15 total ranks in government), a civilian government position, for Marine Forces Cyberspace Command in 2017. He then simultaneously took a civilian promotion to GG14 with the Office of Naval Intelligence and switched from Army Reserves to the Air Force Reserves, maintaining his E5 rank. Following this, he took yet another promotion in 2019 to GG15, the highest government civilian paygrade achievable before having to be appointed, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his military career, he is transitioning from enlisted to officer in the Air Force Reserves and should commission as a Second Lieutenant sometime this summer.

Jesse (M-10). Jesse is a Chief in the Navy with 15 years of service. He is billeted as a senior enlisted leader and has deployed to several countries including Guantanamo Bay. He has not deployed in support of a domestic disaster response effort, though he has supported the Office of Naval Intelligence in its overarching roles during domestic disasters. His peripheral support to domestic operations, rank, and willingness to share his perspectives satisfy the sampling criteria for the study.

Kelly (M-11). Kelly is a Major in the Marine Corps with almost 20-years of service. Before commissioning as a Marine officer, Kelly was enlisted for more than a decade. He has never deployed domestically, but noted that in a globalized world, sometimes the lines between domestic and foreign can be easily blurred. He notes this may be especially true in cyberspace when it comes to the U.S. Government defending or responding to an attack against domestic infrastructure. He has some training on domestic preparedness and response.

Military participant data findings. The researcher asked a series of 12 interview questions to each participant, although the follow-on questions were unique to each of the participants. The 12 initial interview questions were as follows:

1) Can you tell me about your role in the military?
2) Have you deployed in a domestic capacity, and if so, can you share the details?
3) If you were to participate in domestic operations as part of a disaster response effort, what would expect your purpose to be?
4) As a follow-up (to question 3), what would your limitations likely be during a disaster response effort?
5) If you were deployed to respond to civil unrest, what would your purpose likely be?
6) As a follow-up (to question 5), what would your limitations likely be when dealing with civil unrest?

7) Who has the authority to provide mission tasking and delegation that you would follow?

8) Do you believe you would violate any of the DoD policies under which you might operate in a disaster response effort based on conditions on the ground?

9) Similarly, do you believe you might violate any of the DoD policies under which you might operate in response to civil unrest?

10) If ordered to arrest civilians who are engaging in suspected crimes, would you do so if your operating instructions were not clear?

11) During domestic response activities or actions, under what conditions or circumstances would you find it okay to violate DoD policies?

12) Is there anything else you would be willing to share with me today?

Responses from military participants showed that only 4 of the 11 personnel interviewed (Adam, Charlie, Guillermo, and Ivan) had ever deployed in a domestic capacity. The themes, and the superordinate themes under which they were categorized, are presented in Table 7:

Table 7

Categories and Themes Derived from Military Participant Data

Categories	Themes
▪ Actual Roles ▪ Perceived Roles	▪ Military Leaders Seek to Provide Control, Logistics, and Aid During Disasters
▪ Lack of Training ▪ Doubt of Personally Deploying	▪ Military Leader Skepticism and Doubt of Own Utility
▪ Action or Inaction Based on Morals, Ethics, or Unclear Guidance	▪ Military Leaders Will Do What is Right
▪ Support for Military Use in Disaster Response ▪ Lack of Support for Military Use During Civil Unrest	▪ Military Leaders Believe the Public Supports Disaster Response

Four themes, and among them seven categories, emerged from the data. The first was *Military Leaders Seek to Provide Control, Logistics, and Aid.* This theme was derived from categories of data based on those *actual roles* military members who had responded domestically fulfilled, the *perceived roles* that both those who had and had not responded believed they would be responsible for undertaking, and military leaders' belief in the military's *responsibility to respond to disasters*. The second theme to emerge was *Military Leader Skepticism and Doubt of Own Utility.* This was based on military leadership believing there was a *lack of training* amongst military members with regard to domestic response preparedness and knowledge of authorities, and most showcased *doubt in personally deploying* through their responses.

The third theme was *Military Leaders Will Do What is Right*, based on their responses regarding doing the right thing despite policy, or in the absence of guidance. The fourth theme was *Military Leaders Believe the Public Supports Disaster Response*, based on their perception that there would be political calculations for it and the public would support it. However, this sentiment of support was lower when it came to being used to respond to civil unrest.

MAXQDA CAQDAS, while facilitating segment coding, required more of a multistep process and the creation of new tabs to input emergent themes. Therefore, the researcher created a spreadsheet aggregating some of the major concepts present across participant data when initially seeking to categorize coded data. The actual spreadsheet was long, but a condensed example is provided in Figure 5. Some of the responses were not categorized for purposes of theme development. One example is whether or not military leaders had ever deployed domestically. The primary reason for this is that it is not important, given that the experiences of military leaders are not the key focus, as stated throughout this study. Whether or not they had

deployed did not provide much utility in this research in terms of convergence or divergence with CEDMO experiences, nor with identifying potential constructive recommendations.

Name	Deployed domestically?	Military Well trained?	Tell the difference?	Actual roles	Perceived roles	Should the military train for domestic operations?	Political Calculus	Refuse certain orders or policies during disaster?	Refuse certain policies during civil unrest?	Would public support during disaster response?	Would public support during unrest?
Adam	Yes	No	No	Protect infrastructure Perimeter security Muscle people away Drive buses Evacuations	Security, management of personnel, crowd control	Only Guard	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Bill	No	X	No		Transport Food and water Maintenance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Charlie	Yes	No	X	Transport police and medical	Moving first responders crowd dispersal	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	X	X
Dakota	No	No	No		leadership Planning and staffing	X	X	X	Yes	X	X
Emerson	No	No	X		Logistics moving resources Crowd control	X	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Finley	No	No	No		Command and control Resource distribution	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Guillermo	Yes	No	No	Language support	Coordination handing out supplies	X	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Hilton	No	X	X		Coordinate command and control	X	X	No	No	X	X
Ivan	Yes	No	No	Handing out MREs, etc. logistics	Same, plus command and control of forces	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Jesse	No	No	No		Accountability, leadership	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Kelly	No	X	X		Plan cyber/technical support	X	X	Yes	Yes	X	X

Figure 5. Example of Categorical Responses from Military Leaders

In Figure 5, ‘yes’ responses are marked as such and colored green. ‘No’ responses are also marked as such but colored yellow. Any topic on which a military participant did not provide a response, or even a clear position on a topic, was colored grey and marked with an ‘X’. The actual and perceived roles columns are marked in a somewhat beige color, given that there is no need to highlight differentiation or concurrence amongst participants. Instead, some examples of the roles military service members actually fulfilled or believed they would likely fulfill, and in some cases both, were listed. The next sections provide data regarding the four themes and the categories within those themes, supported by participant responses.

Theme I: Military leaders are geared toward providing control, logistics, and aid distribution during disaster response efforts.

Two categories, *Actual Roles* and *Perceived Roles* constitute the theme of military leaders fulfilling responsibilities overseeing management (control), logistical lines, and aid in the wake of disasters. The data within these categories was straightforward and was distilled through a secondary coding process. Logistics and aid include transportation of materials as well as the transportation and evacuation of victims. While a minority of military interview participants – four out of eleven – had any real-world experience operating domestically, the roles and responsibilities those individuals took are noted as "actual roles." The remaining seven participants, not having actually engaged in the same experiences, could only surmise what those roles would likely be based on training, limited exposure to policies, or hearsay from other service members.

Actual Roles. The roles and responsibilities military participants shared having done when they took part in real-world domestic operations within the United States included primarily managing and coordinating personnel, providing logistics, and handing out supplies. A depiction of the subcodes (or supporting categorical descriptors) under actual roles is provided in Figure 6. The CAQDAS function – while providing a clear visual display - did not have a tool with which to weigh the roles against one another based on criteria, such as number of responses. Therefore, the value of each role appears as equal to all others.

The researcher identified and coded those roles from participant interview transcripts that appeared most frequently across the data. This facilitated the categorization of roles and theme development. Given the military's uniformity of training, doctrine, and policy, it is reasonable that those who had never operated domestically assumed they would fill the same types of roles

that others had filled. In other words, service members can likely assume with some likelihood what they would be officially expected to do in particular situations. In this case, many of these presumed roles overlayed neatly with what others actually did. For this reason, the researcher then distinguished between whether same-type roles were actualized or presumed based on the participant's experiences or lack thereof.

Perceived Roles. "Perceived roles" refers to the likely roles military participants who had not participated domestically envisioned they would, or could, conduct. A depiction of the subcodes (or supporting categorical descriptors) under actual roles is provided in Figure 6, and the depiction of subcodes under likely roles (as perceived roles) is provided in Figure 7. Although both visual mappings were created using the MAXQDA "Code Co-occurrence" feature, there was no set number of occurrences (in which case the software only shows, for example, the top 5 most frequently occurring) in order to depict all of the codes. In Figures 6 and 7, the codes are in totality across all military participants, although MAXQDA does allow filtering for codes associated with a specific participant/subject.

For those service members who had deployed before – Adam, Charlie, Guillermo, and Ivan - the actual tasks they performed included transporting troops, first responders, and civilians; handing out food, water, and medical supplies; and conducting and coordinating logistics. Participant data between the actual roles undertaken by those four participants were quite similar to the participant responses regarding what individuals perceived as their likely roles during domestic response. The top four tasks of what military leaders believed they would be responsible for were: Controlling and directing military forces (command and control), handing out food, water, and medical care, providing logistical support generally (to the military, local first responders, and the public), and providing security in some fashion.



Figure 6**.** *Actual Roles During Domestic Response*

The first perceived role, that of commanding or controlling troops, was the one difference between the responses from the four who had actually deployed, who did not mention anything about command and control of troops as a responsibility.



Figure 7. *Perceived Likely Roles During Domestic Response*

For several participants, especially those who had never deployed domestically, there was what the researcher perceived as difficulty or hesitation in describing what they believe their likely roles would be. This included long pauses or more than one attempt to articulate what they believe they would do. Leadership in the form of command and control seemed to be the first response, which may be due to the more senior ranks of respondents. Charlie responded that, as a junior officer, he would drive vehicles and do more labor-specific tasks, but opined, "I think at this point in my career I would be more relegated to a [tactical operations center] somewhere where truly that management of resources is in question." Dakota, a U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and the senior ranking participant, admitted that he did not know much about domestic

response and had forgotten much of his training on the subject. When asked what he thought some of his roles may include, Dakota paused and said, "Uh, my purpose would be probably in the planning and staffing of any…any…at a plans and staff level is where I would expect it to be at, you know."

Seven participants cited logistics as likely responsibilities, and two of the four who had deployed mentioned conducting logistical tasks. This makes sense, given that logistics constitute numerous endeavors that are critical to a disaster response. This includes everything from moving troops, first responders, and civilians, moving and distributing necessary supplies, and coordinating the movement of equipment. Adam, who was deployed domestically several times, shared an impactful response regarding the under-appreciated logistical lift that took place in response to Hurricane Katrina:

> For Katrina we got out and were delivering food and water to the stadium where they were all living. And I did a lot more logistics during Katrina because we were moving across state lines. During Katrina, 28 of the 50 states responded, it was the most incredible thing I'd ever seen. Bush doesn't get credit, but we moved over 77,000 soldiers to Katrina from around the world in less than 72 hours. It was really amazing.

As for Charlie, when the East Coast experienced winter blizzard conditions in 2010, he drove police and paramedics to calls. Charlie shared, "I responded to a domestic violence situation with an officer, then another time I went with a paramedic to respond to a little girl who was having a hard time breathing so the paramedic could, ah, administer oxygen." Such examples showcase the breadth of situations military personnel can encounter during unique, challenging, and dynamic events.

Kelly, a Major in the Marine Corps, provided a response that was unique to the others in that he believed he would "plan cyberspace operations" due to his role as a Marine in the cyberspace occupational field. However, while Kelly said he would likely support efforts in cyberspace, how this would take place was unclear, as were examples of what these efforts would entail.

From the coding process, of the four participants with response experience, three shared the code "Provided ancillary support to law enforcement" (to denote *support* rather than primary law enforcement roles). This pattern in the responses of these four participants in that 75% of those who had actually conducted response efforts shows that there is a strong potential for the military to provide such support to law enforcement. However, the remaining seven individuals who had never been involved as a military service member in a response effort did not discuss supporting law enforcement as an envisioned role. For this reason, "Supporting law enforcement efforts" did not become a part of any category, despite three of the four with real-world experience having done it. Given that some of the remaining seven individuals had some training on domestic response and did not mention supporting law enforcement as a potential task, the researcher determined this was not strong enough evidence without including more participants with domestic response experience.

Theme II: Military leader skepticism and doubt of own utility. The categories within this second theme include *Lack of Training,* and *Doubt of Personally Deploying*. While most of the responses from military personnel can be viewed as responses of a third-party perspective, these two categories can be interpreted as those from a first-person viewpoint. Despite many examples of the military being used domestically, and in the face of increasing military use

within the U.S. Homeland, military leaders were dubious that they, personally, would be involved in domestic activities.

Lack of Training. Concerning a lack of training, 9 of the 11 respondents opined on how the military lacks training for domestic preparedness. Some of the respondents' remarks were on a lack of military training overarchingly, while others highlighted how they, personally, were not trained in such operations. Adam served as a reserve member in the Texas National Guard and as an active-duty soldier at different periods. He was one of three individuals (Adam, Charlie, and Ivan) interviewed with both National Guard and active-duty experience, and one of four who had deployed domestically (Adam, Charlie, Ivan, and Guillermo). Of note, Guillermo was the only research participant who had domestic deployment experience and had only ever served as active duty. Charlie, though, did not comment on the military's training – or lack thereof – for domestic crises.

During the interview with Adam, he explained that the military overall was not well-versed in the Constitution, and that active-duty forces were not well-trained (if at all) for domestic response. Still, the National Guard of some states were well-versed in domestic response while others were not, primarily based on geographic location. Adam claimed domestic response training and efficacy is state-dependent.

> Florida uses their Guard so often that they are always well-trained. Same goes for Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Less so, but still well-trained would be Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Although, as you move into the Northeast, prep wanes.

Adam noted that he was well-versed in domestic response, especially having engaged in relief operations. National Guard units, he added, were at least somewhat more "entwined" with the

local community than military forces coming in from outside of the area, which may help in different instances.

Ivan, as one of the participants with both real-world domestic response experience and National Guard experience, had much to say on the military's training toward domestic response. When the researcher asked whether or not the military was appropriately trained, Ivan responded assertively:

> No, no, no, I can say that; I can say that with absolute certainty. They are not well trained on that. Um, they aren't. For less great 20 years, we've been well trained, relatively well trained on counterterrorism. That is the only thing the military has known for the last 20 years, just counterterrorism operations. And that's a slight exaggeration, right? But the vast majority of training in the military has been focused on counterterrorism.

Ivan went on to add that the military absolutely must train its personnel before a future president deploys a "trigger happy infantry unit" and things "go south." Training, he said, should start early, rather than immediately before the military is deployed: "That's not the time where people are gonna retain rather complex complex concepts like, you know, the legal definitions of a US person and combatant versus noncombatant and then prisoner versus detainee…"

Bill, an active-duty U.S. Army First Lieutenant, explained that U.S. military personnel could be used domestically, but that they would be limited in their abilities due to their lack of training for domestic response scenarios. He did not highlight authorities as the main cause, however, but rather the focus on foreign theaters since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002. In this vein, Bill shared the same sentiments as Ivan in that the military has almost exclusively focused on counterterrorism operations. Military domestic training is lacking, Bill said, because since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the focus "has been on, you know, Iraq,

Afghanistan, and more recently Syria. It's all been focused on O-CONUS‡ operations, there hasn't really been an emphasis on any…any sort of domestic operations."

When the researcher broached the topic of training for domestic operations and asked if the military was appropriately trained for such operations, Emerson first stated that it was a "loaded question." He added:

> I would say, probably the answer that, in my opinion, is, is no. But that's primarily based on, again, with the answer coming from active-duty DOD, not from Title 10 forces, not from Title 30 to protect…Title 30 forces from National Guard, I think for Title 10 forces is not well trained for because they're not primarily there's so many roadblocks to deploying forces on the on the homefront that are not well trained to.

The researcher noted that Emerson appeared slightly nervous once the researcher began recording the interview. For this reason, in the response, Emerson mentioned that his answer is coming "from active-duty DoD, not from Title 10 forces," despite Title 10 referring to active-duty federal authorities (active-duty). He also mentioned Title 30 National Guard forces, when the National Guard typically fall under Title 32, unless activated as a contingent of Title 10 forces. Emerson added that, while active-duty forces might not be appropriately trained for domestic response missions that they are certainly *prepared* to handle such occurrences.

Finley, who came across as very passionate about his interview responses, said that domestic response operations are difficult to train for. Additionally, military forces are not police forces, and knowing when to detain people for civil violations, as well as how to treat them given that they are not enemy combatants, is a major challenge. Finley went on to state that the American people may not know the difference between National Guard and active-duty troops,

‡ O-CONUS refers to 'Outside the Continental United States'

but that, in-line with some of the CEDMO participants' sentiments, the military brings people a sense of comfort. When asked if the military overall was trained and educated to respond domestically, Finley stated:

> I do not, I don't…you know…something like this is probably not very clearly defined. The, the authorities and titles in which it would fall under are ill defined, which means we could not tailor training and education for the force, because we don't know what those things are. Furthermore, I just I don't see it as, as why service members, as part of the DOD, that's, that's not why they joined. They joined to operate domestically if there was an invasion from a foreign power, you know, but they did not join to deploy domestically. And I think asking the US military to do that is a is a very large culture shift.

Finley highlighted that putting federal troops, such as U.S. Marines, through domestic disaster response training meant that the sacrifice would be training for missions overseas.

With regard to training, Finley pointed out that, although domestic deployments occur, they can be difficult to navigate due to the need for the military to operate different in the United States than overseas. The military does not have time to train for domestic disaster response or civil unrest even though the military responds in such cases. Coupled with a lack of training is the consideration that the military, which perpetually trains for overseas operations, may "take that training [it] did for Syria and employ it in Louisville, Kentucky."

Jesse, the U.S. Navy Chief with 15-years of service, shared during his interview overlapping concerns that "not having that training would cause a lapse in understanding of when…when to enact certain rules of engagement." While Jesse acknowledged the possibility

that he could be used to support domestic operations, he expressed that due to his own lack of training that he would "violate DoD policy" unintentionally.

Dakota, while he did not discuss training in-depth, mentioned "No, I don't think so, the answer is no…. we never take these classes, we're just told to, yeah, uphold the Constitution. When it comes to the 'legalese' of it, no." Similarly, Kelly's response regarding whether or not the military is adequately trained to respond to domestic crises was succinctly, "No, no, I don't." This lack of training may correlate to a lack of understanding or hesitancy for military leaders to envision the potential for such activities in the future, as discussed in the next subsection.

Doubt of Personally Deploying. One common sentiment that appeared across military participant interviews, both overtly and subtly, was a sense from most of the participants that they were doubtful of deploying in support of domestic operations. Many had not considered ever finding themselves in a position for domestic response utilization, or believed they would never be called upon to act in such a capacity. In some cases, as the respective interviews went on, the interviewer introduced topics such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the 1970 Kent State riot, and Hurricane Katrina, which appeared to the researcher to change the tone in some instances to where the reality of domestic deployments became more possible. The concept of personal doubt regarding likelihood of deployment – or to a lesser extent one's utility - is tied closely to the identified lack of training directly because training for, on, or about the military's roles would ostensibly reduce this uncertainty. In other words, military leaders may be uncertain about domestic deployments as a result of a lack of training on the topic.

The apparent exceptions to doubt about domestic deployments came from those individuals who had already participated in domestic operations (disaster response and humanitarian operations). Still, even then, individuals who found the idea possible at times

placed limitations on the roles and responsibilities they might be asked to perform. Adam, the U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer-3 who had operated domestically several times, was one of the few who did not seem surprised or hesitant in discussing the types of operations the military might undertake, and those endeavors in which he had found himself previously.

When the researcher interviewed Bill, a U.S. Army First Lieutenant, the participant did not seem unsure of the potential for domestic operations with regard to disaster response, but he was hesitant regarding responding to civil unrest. When asked what he thought his responsibilities would, or could, be in such a situation, Bill responded that he doubted he would interact with any "opposing forces on the ground" or conduct any activities "like crowd control or making arrests" unless he was working with the infantry. This was an interesting consideration, given the consideration that the military has been used for crowd control throughout the country's history.

Charlie did not dispute that he could be used, but as mentioned earlier, he opined that he would likely be relegated to a staff position somewhere to manage resources. Dakota went a bit further in stating that a limitation in his own utility would likely be "the demand for officers in my…with my experience. I think that would severely limit my selection to assist in something like this." Emerson, similarly to Charlie and Dakota, did not dispute that he would not be used, but that a majority of the responsibilities would fall under the Department of Homeland Security, which he assumed would take the lead over the military. With regard to how he perceived military domestic responsibilities following a disaster or civil unrest, Emerson replied:

> As I understand it, and all and almost all scenarios, it would fall under Department of Homeland Security in some form or fashion. Would they be…would they be the lead government agency, that the that the DoD is in support of and that that would very likely

> do the same for a discount, or other scenario? I don't, I don't know of any plans or scenarios, or haven't any thought of scenarios that where the duty [assumedly military response] is believed.

Finley, a U.S. Marine Chief Warrant Officer-3, said outright that responding domestically is not something Marines do, deferring instead to the National Guard. Specifically, when asked what the military would do during domestic response, Finely, replied, "Um, I mean, given that, you know, I'm a Marine, that's not typically something that we do. I mean, normally the National Guards, you know, run that."

Guillermo, a Marine Master Gunnery Sergeant who had responded to a domestic disaster in Texas, said he did not believe he would ever "handcuff civilians," move, or transport them between locations (despite transportation being a common military task following disasters). Hilton stated that the limitations he would face would be "limited to the official tasking or orders that are given to support the humanitarian assistance." Ivan said the U.S. Army usually responded to civil unrest and, as a U.S. Airman, he "had no idea what [a response] would look like for the Air Force." Finally, during Jesse's interview, he voiced that he did not believe he would be deployed to handle civil unrest, stating, "I don't, I don't think the DoD would deploy…deploy me as a method for civil unrest. I think that's…I think that question is better suited for National Guardsmen." Jesse did add, however, in contrast to other participants that the military should train for domestic operations, offering the following:

> I think…I think that they should train for domestic response. Um, and I don't feel that they…I don't feel that they train enough. And that, that's based off of my experiences of

being associated to commands that are within [Northern Command's] AO[§] that are not necessarily assigned to NORTHCOM.

Providing a précis, military leaders almost unanimously felt that the military was not appropriately trained for domestic operations. Fewer felt that federal forces should not train for such operations, whether due to such training detracting from the military's primary purposes overseas, or because the military was not poised to differentiate between foreign and domestic theaters of operation. Tied to this lack of training was discernable doubt or uncertainty over what the military could, or would, do, or whether or not certain individuals or branches of the military were suited to operate within the United States.

Theme III: Military leaders will do what is right

Action or Inaction Based on Morals, Ethics, or Unclear Guidance. During the interviews with military participants, the researcher asked the participants if they thought they might violate orders or DoD policies, either due to a lack of direction and clarity from superiors or due to moral and ethical considerations surrounding events taking place. A majority of respondents answered that they would, depending on the situation. 6 out of 11 participants stated they might violate orders due to ambiguities of those orders, or over moral and ethical considerations during disaster response efforts; 8 of the 11 respondents said they would likely do the same if responding to civil unrest. 6 of the 8 respondents answered in the affirmative to both questions, with the exceptions of Dakota, who only answered that he would violate policies based on moral considerations with regard to civil unrest, and Finley, who said he would not violate policies during a disaster response but would during civil unrest.

[§] AO refers to 'Area of Operations'

Adam was one of the participants who answered that he would not violate policies during any type of domestic operations. However, he added that he had faith in that directives would either provide enough leeway to permit choice of action or that it would be an easy and straightforward effort to simply report a situation to higher authorities and receive permission to take necessary actions to protect life. Interestingly, however, in sharing his experiences during the Hurricane Katrina response, Adam spoke on the following:

> Blackhawks were fired at because I knew some of the pilots that got fired at. They weren't allowed to return fire, as I said before, that's a big limitation, not only not attacking people, but even much of the typical self-defense we would otherwise be entitled to. I think a lot of that would be curbed, and it was.

Despite this example of what one may perceive as the military denying its personnel a right to self-defense, this is not a contradiction to Adam's interview responses. He did not indicate that he disagreed with the restriction to return fire, nor that it would have even been appropriate to do so, given the potential for the military's superior firepower and ability to egress from a hostile situation. It was also unclear whether the pilots could identify specific shooters, or whether they did not return fire due to high potential for collateral, unintended damage or casualties in a metropolitan area. While this does not speak directly to military leaders stating that they would "do the right thing,' it may showcase that these pilots did just that, supporting the overall theme.

Most participant responses surrounding the impetus for moral or ethical decision-making explicitly included rape and murder as instances where military service members might leave their assigned posts or divert their activities. Bill mentioned that it is up to the individual service member to determine the consequences of doing so, and that the opportunities to stop violence would be higher during civil unrest than following a disaster. Conversely, most participants who

discussed arrests appeared uncomfortable with the prospect of detaining American citizens without proper authorization, regardless of the circumstances.

Charlie, in his response, took a different angle by touching on every military service member's inherent responsibility to refuse unlawful orders. Instead of taking a moral approach to intervening outside the scope of one's responsibilities, Charlie shared the following:

> [If] something came down that was blatantly unconstitutional or unlawful, I would try to advise my commander that it was a bad call, but ultimately would not comply with it. One of the examples that came out of Katrina was weapons confiscation. People were seen looting and people were talking about whether the National Guard would enforce taking weapons that people are constitutionally allowed to have.

Charlie went on to mention that it is everyone's right to defend themselves, and that if told he could not defend civilians or soldiers, he would not follow such orders. This was unwittingly likely in contravention to the scenario Adam laid out with regard to the helicopter pilots. In closing on the topic, Charlie stated that he would rather explain why he did something deemed right or proper after the fact, rather than follow "something that was written 20 years ago in air-conditioned circumstances."

Dakota, when asked about making the right decisions during domestic operations, state that he would do so if he "believed it to be the right thing to do. The researcher asked if he believed a majority of other service members would do the same, to which he replied, "if they had to, yes." Finley went a bit further in his analysis and offered that the friction, chaos, and confusion following domestic calamity makes it difficult *not* to violate policies on some level. Guillermo, through his response, shared Finley's sentiments that straying from policies and orders was likely anywhere. Ivan said a scenario requiring a decision to veer off from official

direction is “definitely plausible,” adding that he would “absolutely” violate policies or take action without permission in the face of moral or ethical dilemmas.

A majority of the participants shared that they would be determined to do the right thing, not only for their fellow troops, but also for U.S. citizenry. Even those who said they would not stray from policy believed that policies were crafted with such considerations in mind to provide the leeway necessary to make the right decisions. This illuminated to the researcher that military leaders view themselves as responsible to one another and to people across the board, and that the welfare of Americans is something all take quite seriously.

Theme IV: Military leaders believe the public supports disaster response. The categories under the fourth and final theme include *Support for Military Use in Disaster Response* assessed against *Support for Military Use During Civil Unrest*. While a majority of military participants, 7 out of 11, said they believe the public supports the military deploying domestically in response to disasters, only 1 out of 11 stated he thought Americans supported the use of the military in response to civil unrest. Many participants believed using the military to curtail civil unrest was unlikely, unnecessary, not in the military’s purview, and should be avoided. Additionally, several participants expressed that unrest should be left to the National Guard.

Support for Military Use in Disaster Response. As mentioned, a majority of military participants believed the American public supports the military responding to domestic disasters. Of the military leaders interviewed, 7 out of 11 expressed how they believe the public supported the use of military forces in such a capacity. The remaining four, Charlie, Dakota, Hilton, and Kelly, did not comment on the topic at all, and so no military leader expressed that the public would not support the use of the military in response to domestic disasters. This may also mean

the number of those who view the public as supportive may be even higher. Some participants, such as Guillermo and Jesse, said they believed the public supports military response to disasters but likewise noted that this did not include civil unrest.

When an individual considers a military response to a disaster-ravaged area, they may think of images of the injured, those needing medical attention and rescue, and food. However, disaster response and civil unrest response can easily become one-in-the same, especially if law enforcement has fled the area or is overwhelmed. Still, CEDMO participants and stories from across literature show robust support. Touching on the topic of such consideration, Bill offered that he believes the public is widely misinformed about when and where the military can be used. Overall, however, he saw public support as favorable, adding "there hasn't really been a situation where the military has been used for anything other than a show of force or to handout to hand out food or transportation."

Some CEDMO participants mentioned feeling a sense of comfort and reassurance upon seeing the military during a response execution. As the researcher spoke with Finley on how the public perceived the military during disaster response efforts, he estimated closely these sentiments in the following excerpts:

> Humanitarian aid disaster relief for, for natural disaster, I think there is somewhat of a comfort factor for, for the American public to see the military out there…I think there is a comfort factor for the American people when they see the military rolling in, in force, you know, ready to, you know, dig out rubble to get people who are trapped in their homes, you know, recovered, and to hand out supplies and provide medical care. I think it's a great…it's a great forward-face of the military domestically during those situations.

Some participants, such as Guillermo and Jesse, said they believed the public supports military response to disasters but likewise noted that this did not include civil unrest.

Support for Military Use During Civil Unrest. Unlike the belief of public support for a military response to domestic disasters, a majority of military participants did not think the public would support the use of the military in response to civil unrest. Some military leaders, such as Adam and Guillermo, stated that they do not believe the public supports the use of the military during civil unrest, though several did not expound. The researcher assumed this may be an uncomfortable topic for some participants to discuss in depth, perhaps given a stigma of violence, or due to their senior positions within the military.

With regard to Finley, although he perceived strong public support for a military presence following a catastrophe, he offered without any prompt passionate reservations regarding actions to thwart civil unrest, declaring, “any type of insurrection or any type of riots, looting protests, you know, that start to get extreme. That's where it gets very complicated, because those things are always very, very closely and very heavily tied to political leanings.” Finley contemplated how sentiments on both sides can heavily influence actions and reactions, exacerbating an already highly-contentious situation.

The only military participant to support a military response to civil unrest was Bill, who said he could see “some circumstances” where the military would be needed and people would support such a move. Generally, however, he said this would be a very unpopular decision for political leaders to make, and if violence ensued the public would likely find the military’s presence inappropriate for handling civilians. Emerson summarized how he perceives the military-civilian paradigm when it comes to civil unrest response:

> It's almost certainly a, a probably a lose-lose scenario. And the very small handful of times that have occurred that, that, that military force has to get there in the heat of the moment is always going to be negative, and the presence of military in any form, whether it be just their mere presence or actually full riot control type of scenario, is, in many cases…ends up fueling, just as the law enforcement sees on a regular basis when they are dealing with these scenarios.

Summary. Military leaders believe the public is largely enthusiastic about military support in response to calamity based largely on the need and appreciation of assistance from personnel, resources, medical care, food, water, and reassurance. They largely did not feel that there was much support, or at least hesitancy for support, in the face of civil unrest, especially protests. The next section provides some of the convergence and divergence between the CEDMO and military participant groups, from which the researcher identified more areas of convergence.

Triangulation

When the researcher analyzed the data across both participant groups, there were prominent areas of both convergence and divergence. Prominent areas of convergence included the military's roles, the military as champions, and political machinations behind the use of the military. There was also convergence in the form of a rift in the data between CEDMO participants and military participants. These areas of convergence and divergence are provided in this section.

Convergence. The first - and most conspicuous - theme of convergence from the data across both groups was that regarding the roles of the military during response efforts. Civilians viewed the role of the military broadly as a force to provide resources and safety. CEDMO

participants articulated resources primarily in the forms of food, water, transportation, and medical equipment (to include COVID testing). Safety included physical security, medical assistance, and in one instance even escorting one participant, Florian, across the street. During her interview, she recounted about the military following the January 6th riots:

> They're very nice. I'm waiting for the crosswalk, but then they're like, "No, we got you because we're doing the traffic," and people are not used to being accompanied across the street with a guy in full jacket carrying a semi-automatic weapon with them crossing 23rd Street.

Military participants felt that their internal responsibilities within their organizations would (or did) include personnel management and command of personnel. Externally, however, respondents felt that their roles also entailed providing food (many mentioned the "Meals Ready to Eat," or "MREs") and water, search and rescue, and medical support.

A second area of convergence – one that overlapped with the first - was on the theme of military doing the right thing, and in doing so, building rapport with the public. In speaking with military participants, most of them were eager to help, if somewhat reserved in sharing enthusiasm for the general idea of using the military in the United States. Most CEDMO participants found the military individuals whom they encountered as friendly, helpful, and comforting. It was notable to participants when the military was, as they perceived, unprofessional or not fulfilling certain expectations. Bali, for example, explained how she felt abandoned by the military, while Florian recounted how some service members supporting the response following Hurricane Katrina were committing burglary within the community. While CEDMO appreciated professional military behavior, military leaders shared how they would not violate policies, or would do so in the interests of helping citizens above regulations.

A third area of convergence was identified with regard to the CEDMO perspective of the politically-motivated use of the military. Despite not being represented as a data-driven category under the themes identified based on military participant responses, a majority of military leaders acknowledged a political calculus in the use of the military. A majority of CEDMO respondents believed the use of the military domestically was, at least in large part, selectively based on political calculations. Similarly, 8 out of 11 military respondents believed that using the military was based on political calculations. However, the manner in which the two participant groups viewed politics as a driving force were not expressed from the same angle, and were a point of divergence.

Divergence. A significant area of divergence emerged from the data regarding the military's own view of its members as untrained or undertrained in domestic response, whereas CEDMO participants viewed the military as well-trained and well-prepared, tied closely with professionalism. A majority of military leaders felt that the military was not appropriately trained to respond domestically, with several adding the caveat that National Guard personnel are likely to be better trained for disaster response than federal military forces. However, CEDMO respondents felt that the military was appropriately trained and organized to respond to a wide range of domestic incidents.

While some military participants mentioned how the National Guard may be better prepared to act in certain capacities, CEDMO participants did not make such a distinction between branches of service. Avery and Gabriel said during their interviews that they were unsure of what services were responding. In most cases, both respondents thought the service members were National Guard but could not confirm this. Of the military leaders interviewed, 7 of 11 felt that the public would not be able to tell the difference between service members (and

any corresponding authorities or distinctions). There was not enough evidence provided by CEMDO, however, to definitively show convergence or divergence in this area, or more specifically, differentiate training between National Guard and federal military branches the way military leaders did.

A second area of divergence, as mentioned in the previous section, was based on the ways in which CEDMO and military leaders viewed military force operationalization based on political drivers. Most CEDMO respondents viewed politics as a driving force for the use of the military negatively. Most military respondents who said they believed there were political calculations driving the decision to use or not use the military understood that political decisions were the natural basis for military use, and that political leaders were those who had to provide authorization for such use. The prevailing sentiment among military participants was technically no way for military forces to deploy without political considerations. Finley captured this when he said, “at the end of the day, we've got to go through elected leaders, from the federal government all the way down to the local governments, and…and that can still, can still be swayed in any sort of way.”

In comparison, CEDMO were much more cynical in their view of political machinations as behind military decisions. Politicians were ostensibly the ones to send the military into a crisis area, though their reasons for doing so were based on politically beneficial or preferential considerations, from the perspectives of some CEDMO. As highlighted through some of the interviews, CEDMO participants felt that the military was deliberately used in support of a politician’s allies or against their opponents or withheld for the same reasons. Four respondents, Bali, Eli, Denver and Florian, felt that President Trump used, or espoused using, the military against certain protest groups while ignoring right-wing groups.

Summary

Military leaders overwhelmingly believed the American public strongly supports the use of the military in responding to domestic disasters. However, military leaders also either do not believe, or at best are uncertain, whether members of the public support the use of the military to face civil unrest. Both military and CEDMO respondents feel that the military has an obligation to provide basic necessities and services, such as food, water, rescue, medical attention, and transportation/evacuation. Both groups also felt that the use of the military domestically was often predicated upon political calculations, though military service members seemed to view this more as an evident part of the process, while CEDMO viewed it more as politician bias. The greatest divergence from both groups was evident in training; CEDMO participants felt that the military was well-trained and organized overall, while military leaders thought the military was undertrained or poorly trained for domestic operations.

The next chapter will focus on a discussion of the findings, to include connecting the themes to the theoretical frameworks of *Concordance Theory* and *Convergence Theory.* The researcher will also provide the significance (relevance) of the study, study limitations, implications of the research, and provide his own interpretations and reflections.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusion

In this study, the researcher examined how members of the public experienced military intervention during times of significant, large-scale domestic conflicts and national crises. Then, the researcher examined some of the ways in which military officials perceive their own role, and that of the broader military, in responding domestically. This allowed for a more holistic understanding of the dynamics regarding military intervention as experienced by the affected civilians as typically the recipients of action, and through the perspectives of the military leaders potentially responsible for response actions. The researcher's analyses of both participant groups served to identify challenges to response and facilitate a better understanding of these types of events, given the space in the literature on topics of civil-military relations in the United States as applied to domestic operations.

In this final chapter, the researcher presents first the significance of the study in order to highlight where the findings fit within existing literature and practice. Following this, the researcher describes the limitations to the study, which includes a sub-section detailing some of the limitations of the MAXQDA CAQDAS. Then, the researcher explains bias mitigation throughout the study. Next, the researcher provides an analysis of how the data ties in with the two theoretical frameworks of *Concordance Theory* and *Convergence Theory*. Finally, after detailing the theoretical connections, the researcher imparts reflections on the study, including proposed recommendations for both change and future research.

Significance of the Study

Three primary implications stemmed from the conclusion of this research. First, findings from this research provide a further understanding of the experiences of the public in interacting with the military, including an understanding of how those experiences have shaped perceptions

regarding domestic military operations during times of crisis. In this way, these findings and recommendations can provide utility to the Department of Defense as the overarching authority over federal military forces in understanding how to tailor activities and communicate those activities to the public to build rapport, strengthen public-military relationships, and build both trust and operational capacity (the ability to use military resources while leveraging civilian-owned key infrastructure and/or resources).

Second, the research supports the position that there is an opportunity for the federal government to modernize policy permitting the military to assist quickly with appropriate resources and skilled personnel. Although government has made headway in this direction with legislation on *Defense Support to Civil Authorities* (DSCA), there is likely need for further refinement on the military's specific roles, responsibilities, and authorities when it comes to force operationalization on domestic soil.

Third, knowledge gained from this research will provide a basis from which to conduct further studies. Given the paucity of research studies on the experiences of the public during domestic military operations, this study can ideally provide a basis for further examination and analysis, through branches and sequels, on future research projects, examples of which are provided toward the end of this chapter in the section entitled, *Recommendations for Future Research.*

Study Limitations

There were ostensibly limitations to this study. The first is a lack of literature on civil-military interactions that took place during military actions within the United States. While this may not appear as a limitation, it is only in the sense that there are few, if any, recorded exemplars from previous studies which could be included in the literature review or data analysis

in this research. Similarly, there is likewise little research using the application of Concordance Theory that might support the research. However, while in some ways limiting factors, the lack of research on both the overarching topic and on Concordance theory was a motivating factor for the study.

A second limitation is that, while access to military officials was not difficult given the background and access of the researcher, equal representation of all four branches of the federal military, plus the Coast Guard and National Guard, was not attainable. However, this was not critical to the study, as the study was focused on CEDMO lived experiences.

Finally, a third limitation, and perhaps the most notable for this research and for future researchers, is the lack of robust diversity among research participants from both groups. Concerning CEDMO participants, 6 were females and 1 was male. The researcher did not examine the effects of gender on perceiving a military response, nor interactions with military personnel. Conversely, pertaining to the military respondents, there were different races and ethnicities, however, all participants were male. This was not by design, as there was a female participant initially interested who later moved to Colorado and did not contact the researcher thereafter. Male service members may behave differently than female service members during response efforts, may interact in different ways, and may be perceived differently by CEDMO. It is also possible that a service member's views may differ based on their experience level as well, in terms of how long they have been in the service.

MAXQDA CAQDAS Utility. The researcher spent some time reading reviews and experimenting with free trial versions of various CAQDAS software suites before settling on MAXQDA. MAXQDA appeared to offer a better tool suite than three other CAQDAS services, but the full version came with a price, a price that did not necessarily mean more tools or more

tailorability. The researcher thought paying for the service would unlock a greater apparatus of tools, but this was not the case. During the initial stages of data analysis, the researcher sought to capture initial notations (memos) within the interviews for further consideration. Unfortunately, the 'memo' feature was not user-friendly nor particularly useful. The researcher captured this process in Figure-8 (below) with the three steps ostensibly numbered 1, 2, and 3 within the red bubbles. In step-1, the software allowed the researcher to highlight the information on which to make a notation. This opened up the memo pad, allowing the researcher to make the notation as shown in step-2.

The issue came in step-3, whereby the software shows memos on the left side, which appear as yellow squares. However, MAXQDA does not facilitate viewing the notations on the document, instead requiring the user to click on the yellow squares to re-open the memo and see what is written. This is not a significant hindrance, however, but more of an inconvenience. Not having those notations beside one another on the main document means a user could easily forget where in the data a user has made notations and what those notations state. To re-read notations essentially requires blindly clicking on memo icons in order to recall the information. This is as opposed to using a MS Word or Excel document, where the researcher can make notations in the margins that are ever-present alongside the data for easy recall and orientation.



Figure 8. MAXQDA CAQDAS Notation Example

When it came to coding, the MAXQDA platform offered an easy-to-use coding feature, whereby the user is able to right-click on a word or segment, select 'With new code' (or in vivo), and then label a new code. However, the software did not allow for easy theme-development or categorization. While the software offers different ways in which to present the data, saving these without exporting them in order to continue working on a specific layer is unintuitive. Finally, MAXQDA did not offer any intuitive way to comparatively analyze data from both participant groups side-by-side.

Bias

Throughout data collection and analysis, the researcher consistently considered elements of potential bias. Biases in studies can stem from any number of factors; the researcher's gender,

world views, or life experiences. Throughout this study, the greatest potential for bias came from the researcher's own military career, requiring the researcher to guard against any biases or preconceptions. To mitigate bias, the researcher engaged in *bracketing*, which refers to the researcher refraining from judgment, abstaining in holding any opinions, and desisting from taking an active, first-person view on the issue (Moustakas, 1994).

The researcher guarded against biases and preconceptions, first and foremost, by maintaining an open mind to the data. There were, for example, some participant responses to which the researcher did not agree. For example, two CEDMO participants felt that President Trump had used the military against certain groups, as showcased in Chapter 4, but that he had also refused to use the military against *Nazis.* Based on the statements provided by these participants, the researcher explored empirical research to support the claims. As it was determined that the information was not found in previous academic works, it is the researcher's conclusion that the information was opinion. However, it can also be concluded that these opinions are based on the personal experiences of individuals.

Similarly, the researcher was unaware of explicit Nazi protests, though some participants may have conflated or generalized ultra-right wing or white supremacist groups as *Nazis.* However, the researcher did not, at any time, challenge the experiences or beliefs narrated by participants. Instead, the researcher left the verbatim words of the participants intact, and in fact cited them, in some cases *in vivo*, for transparency and for the interpretation of the readers. Similarly, the researcher did not opine, correct, or steer any military participant responses, unless the researcher restated a question for clarity to the respondent.

Additionally, the researcher recognized that law enforcement officers at all levels, including federal law enforcement, may dress in military-style fatigues when responding to face

protestors or guard federal buildings. Therefore, it is possible that protestors mistook law enforcement personnel as military personnel. The researcher did sympathize with some of the CEDMO participants in hearing their stories of grief and loss but did not attempt to characterize these feelings for the respondent in any way relating to any particular topic (i.e., the researcher provided feedback from active listening at one point, stating, "it sounds like the military made some really big mistakes," etc.).

The researcher's service in the military presented another potential bias. The researcher was a civilian at the time of the interviews, however, and did not share any personal miliary stories or examples with participants. The researcher had retired from the military approximately a year and a half before the interviews took place, adding some time-distance as well. Knowing the goal of supporting future research and adding to the body of knowledge, the researcher also did not take any particular position with regard to responses. The researcher, again, maintained an open mind and asked the same basic questions of all participants.

Finally, the researcher recognized bias could affect the very foundations of the study in the way it was contrived and conducted. Martin Heidegger, who contributed substantially to the phenomenological approach in the 20th century, recognized that bias can appear as a fore-structure of a study. Therefore, priority should be given to the object of study, rather than to one's own preconceptions (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 25). With regard to reducing any bias immediately going into the research, the researcher vetted the base questions with a research committee, as well as with the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board for Research with Human Subjects.

Connection with the Theoretical Frameworks

Concordance theory. Rebecca Schiff, as both the engineer and curator of Concordance Theory, stated "concordance moves beyond institutional analysis by addressing issues relevant to a nation's culture," asserting that most Americans support the military but are generally "unaware of military life and government policy in military affairs" (Schiff, 2009, pp. 33, 35). In assessing the CEDMO themes in relation to Concordance Theory, the researcher found that there was strong concordance between the public and the military. Individually, the first three themes of *Fulfilling Civilian Needs*; *Building Rapport, One Person at a Time;* and *An Organized Response* did not directly showcase any of the higher-level, broad relationships (military, public, political elites) underpinning the theory. These three themes, however, formed the pillars of the superordinate theme of *Military Rapprochement with the Public*, and the conceptual and theoretical connection between the military and the public began to take shape.

As these themes are aggregated at the superordinate level, the relationship between the public and the military becomes more apparent. From the CEDMO view, the data driving the themes demonstrates the *public's perspective* of the military's commitment to them, the citizenry, in providing safety, security, and necessary resources; building interpersonal and organizational (community and military) relationships and reliance; and an appreciation for the ways in which the public assumed the military was appropriately trained and organized to respond to civilian crises.

When looking at the themes derived from military participant data, the roles the military have undertaken imbricate those roles many assume they would *likely* fulfill. The roles CEDMO expect from the military are largely those military leaders expect to fulfill. Safety, security, resources, and similar provisions are what the CEDMO expect or received, and for which

military personnel feel responsible for delivering. Military leaders believe the public wants a military presence in the wake of disasters, which also shows concordance. Both groups seem to share in that there may be a need for military response to civil unrest but that it certainly is not preferred. Finally, military leaders will do what they believe is right in defense of CEDMO to save lives and reduce suffering, even if this means breaking from current directives or in the face of ambiguous responsibilities.

Overall, there appears to be strong concordance between the military and the public. There is wide support from CEDMO for the military in responding domestically, a strong desire for the feelings of security the military provides, and these sentiments are shared by military leaders. Regarding divergence, CEDMO and military participants did not share the same views on the military's training and organization; CEDMO were impressed with the ways in which the military brought a sense of organization and shared impressions that military personnel were well-trained. Military participants, conversely, felt the military's training for domestic response was quite inadequate, which lent to the recommendation that the military train for domestic response, provided under the subsequent section *Recommendations for Change*.

While there was not a major discernable fault line between the public and the military based on the data, there was a rift between the public and the third entity of Concordance Theory, the political elites. To reiterate, across the data from CEDMO interviews, there was cynicism over political elites using the military based on calculations beyond the more straightforward need for personnel and resources. This was true with disaster response, but even more pronounced when it came to using the military to quell civil unrest. Given that Schiff argues all three parties must meet the criteria of military composition and utility, or else the

military will be used without the concurrence of the three, this does support the theoretical assertions on the unwitting exposure to military forces.

Military leaders also shared the perspective that political elites – as civil leaders within the military hierarchy – were responsible for decisions to use the military domestically. However, there was little evidence, other than perhaps statements from Adam, that indicated a belief that such decisions were weighted with political calculations in mind. Rather, politicians were a natural part of the process. While both participant groups believed politicians were behind the military's use, military leaders understood it to be a natural and conspicuous necessity; there would be no deployment if not directed from civilian leaders. For these reasons, the researcher did not identify any rift between military and political leaders in the data.

Convergence theory. Initially, the researcher did not assume there would be much indication of convergence within the scoped research. However, after interviewing military participants, the researcher found that there were possibly strong aspects of convergence among military leaders. Many military leaders, though not all, were not enthusiastic about responding domestically in cases of civil unrest, which was aligned with those views of the CEDMO participants. There was more enthusiasm among military leaders for the National Guard, rather than federal forces, to respond to domestic disasters. The military has had violent conflict with U.S. citizens in the past, including as far back as the Reconstruction Era, and much later during the Kent State riots (and subsequent lethal military response) in 1970. Military leaders' aversions to engaging with U.S. citizenry -including concerns over overseas combat zone-oriented training not translating appropriately to domestic operations - may come from the idea that civic liberal idealism has continued to encroach into the military and influence military culture, as suggested by Morris Janowitz.

Aside from civil unrest, military participants were sympathetic to the public but some were cautious in advocating for the military's role. Instead, they either said the military was not designed for such a response, as in the case of Finley, or that it was undertrained or not appropriately trained to conduct such operations. Still, when responding to their perceived roles, military leaders offered safety, security, rescue, food, water, and upholding law. No military leader was eager to engage any members of the public in a negative manner, even with criminality present. Should military leaders find themselves facing down civil unrest, it should be in support of law enforcement. Even Adam shared that there was a rumor General Russel Honoré, during the Hurricane Katrina response, had troops going door-to-door in some areas and seizing weapons from homes. Adam said this was wrong and he would have refused such orders. This level of support and sympathy, coupled with an aversion for direct conflict and apparent discomfort with a *power-over* relationship toward the public may showcase shifts in military attitudes in the ways in which leaders perceive their own roles, influenced possibly by society.

Researcher Reflections

The researcher chose this topic as he was always interested in the dynamics between the military and civil society. The researcher spent over 20 years in the U.S. Marine Corps. There were several occasions when the researcher volunteered at public schools and with local law enforcement agencies while associated with the military. Additionally, throughout his career, the researcher knew several fellow service members who had deployed to New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, and other who had been on standby to respond after Hurricane Sandy. The researcher also attended several military courses, such as the Homeland Security Planner's Course and Joint, Interagency Course at the Joint Forces Staff College.

The researcher has learned from this research that military leaders and CEDMO view the roles of the military quite similarly. Despite any assumptions that the researcher may have had some understanding of the ways in which military leaders perceive their responsibilities due to his own service, the researcher did assume to some small degree that military leaders would want to take part in responding to civil unrest. This was not the case. The researcher also assumed military leaders would want to respond to domestic disasters, which was the case. Furthermore, the researcher discovered an operationalized level of correctness with regard to Dr. Schiff's Concordance Theory based on CEDMO responses, especially the cynical inclusion of political leaders as they determine the use of the military.

Looking at the interviewees, several of the CEDMO participants had strong emotions tied to the disaster of which they were a part. Some of them expressed a profound appreciation for the military, and some shared how odd it was to see U.S. troops operating on U.S. soil. CEDMO participants were very forthcoming in sharing their stories, and several of them even tried to decline gift cards for their participant in the study. Surprisingly to the researcher, CEDMO participants were eager to have their stories heard, and two in particular, Bali and Florian, seemed as if they had just been awaiting an opportunity to tell their stories and share their experiences. Both also cried during their respective interviews, showing how impactful their experiences were.

Concerning military participants, almost every single military service member – except two – refused the gift card. However, many of the military service members came off to the researcher as guarded; the conversations felt shorter once the interviews and recordings started. For this reason, the researcher harbored a personal reflection regarding this position of guardedness as a potential limitation - though indeterminable - to the study. The researcher

wondered about the veracity and truthfulness of military leader responses based on their concern over anyone finding out and disagreeing with their responses. Despite anonymity and assigned pseudonyms, it was difficult for the researcher to determine how open and honest military participants were during the interview process, perhaps due to concerns about being associated with responses and reprisal from the military over their views.

With regard to at least three military participants, the researcher perceived what seemed like a sense of relief or relaxation once the interviews ended. At that point, some military leaders would engage in casual conversation, such as asking the researcher questions about his own service or about the Nova Southeastern University and the doctoral program.

While the service members expressed appreciation for their inclusion in the study, one service member, Jesse, laughed after the interview had ended and said, “Stefan, what was that?” The researcher responded, “What, the interview? I laid it out for you before-hand and went through the purpose and everything.” Jesse then laughed again and said, “I know, but the seriousness of your questions made me feel like I was being questioned by counterintelligence.” The researcher asked, “Are you sure you weren’t just nervous? Nothing should have been contentious, and you’ll be given a pseudonym for anonymity.” He said, “That’s true but those were some intense questions.” The researcher personally did not find the questions to be intense, but understood the apprehension – and concern - of being asked as a uniform service member about violating policies and orders, for example, and worrying about repercussions. Jesse did say he enjoyed it, however, and that he looked forward to reading the report once it was published.

Recommendations

Recommendations for change

Train for domestic response. The first recommendation for change is for the military to conduct training for federal troops in preparation for domestic response activities, primarily disaster response. Although some service members noted that homeland response-oriented training would detract from overseas mission rehearsals, this is not necessarily true. This is also dependent on the number of overseas missions the military is conducting at a given time. From personal experience, the researcher was a U.S. Marine for 21 years, and during his first four years he was stationed in Camp Pendleton, where he took part in a mock school shooting training exercise with the San Diego Sheriff's Department. Shortly afterward, the researcher was sent overseas to Pakistan and elsewhere in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The training time focused on domestic response did not detract from the researcher's overseas training as a U.S. Marine.

Aside from personal experience, training for disaster response need not even be continuous or on a short cycle; domestic training need not be every month, or every six months. Even training once a year toward domestic response can provide an opportunity for service members to meet members of the local community and become familiar with state and local first responders and business owners. These types of training events can build partner confidence between the military and the public and provide opportunity to reduce response times and mitigate loss.

The Department of Defense outlines training exercises with the public outside of military installations through policies outlined in Department of Defense Instruction 1322.28, *Realistic Military Training (RMT) Off Federal Real Property*. The instruction states that such training may

must be coordinated with local "civil, tribal, and private" authorities," must "minimize disruption to the civilian community," and should include opportunities to coordinate with "civilian law enforcement support requirements" (2013, pp. 2-3).

As an example (although geared towards preparation for overseas operations), in Virginia there is a training exercise called *Realistic Urban Training* or *RUT,* that takes place at Fort Eustis and Fort Pickett, but also takes place in locations off of military installations in Charlottesville and elsewhere. The exercise prepares service members to interact with the local population, which consists of role players from the community who volunteer. Local law enforcement assists in notifying local citizens, so they are not frightened when U.S. Marines wearing equipment come through the town. In recent years, role players who speak foreign languages found in Iraq and Afghanistan have participated, as the exercise was, for those iterations, an opportunity to practice meeting with locals and village elders, or politicians.

Service members also practice throughout the country on deploying overseas to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and civil crowd control. Every year some service members must train with their gas masks in a gas chamber, where a type of tear gas is used to show the service members when they don't have a tight seal around their face. This is not far off from the types of activities local law enforcement would conduct in response to civil unrest. From personal experience once again, the researcher trained to hand out pallets of food and water to locals, which the researcher did in the Philippines and elsewhere.

Given the humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, as well as embassy protection and crowd control, service members train for often, there is a substantial overlap that would translate well to U.S. audiences. Training objectives that differ slightly from foreign objectives could be applied, and the rules of the use of force (often referred to as *rules of engagement*) and legal

considerations could be modified for a United States theater of operations. Again, there is so much overlap in the domestic missions compared to some overseas missions that this training would familiarize service members with unique considerations within the United States while also preparing for similar operations overseas.

Open communication among the public, civil, and military leaders.

Leaders within the Department of Defense close to political decision-makers should continue to serve as a bulwark against impetuous political decisions. One example occurred in 2020, when President Trump expressed possible interest in using federal military forces to respond to civil unrest taking place in several major U.S. cities. Then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper distanced himself from the president and pushed back on the use of the military. For these reasons, military leaders must communicate openly with political leaders (Lamonthe, Ryan, Sonne, & Dawsey, 2020). In this way, the military can serve as perhaps an atypical or unusual source of advocacy.

Civilians routinely communicating or working with the military on domestic training initiatives would also present opportunities for those communities to collaborate with the military in preparation for a disaster. Further research, and advocacy of civil-military relations research and initiatives, would help socialize these concepts. Without methods of socialization, concerns of the public and the military responses that follow may be less proactive and more reactive in the face of disaster events or civil unrest. Just as municipal leaders work with the military during RUT, as discussed earlier, military leaders garrisoned in U.S. towns and cities (and U.S. territories) should seek to build these relationships with citizens in outside military installations.

Both training and open communication - in addition to fostering more familiar relationships - would also allow public leaders and personnel on military installations to have a better understanding of potential environments in which the military may operate, resource constraints, hazard identification, and law enforcement capacity.

Promote domestic focus in civil-military studies in academia

The researcher's final recommendation, which shares a strong connection with the next section, *Recommendations for Future Research*, is for the modernization of existing academic programs to focus on consideration for U.S. domestic operations and civil-military operations. There are entire university programs dedicated to military studies and national policy. Federal institutions, such as the National Defense University, National Intelligence University, and Naval Postgraduate School, as well as many others, provide such curricula. Acknowledgement of civil-military interaction with U.S. populations is not a major consideration, if at all, in many of these programs, although overseas humanitarian operations and diplomatic relations are.

The researcher has attended the National Intelligence University and completed a number of courses focusing on a wide spectrum of military activities. This includes the Homeland Security Planner's Course and Joint, Interagency, Multinational Planner's Course taught at the Joint Forces Staff College. However, these did not focus on the impacts of increasing occurrences of domestic military operations, nor on the relationships and interactions between civilians and military personnel.

Given that the military does have a domestic role within the United States – one that is increasing - there is a need for greater focus on these types of operations. The researcher recommends including considerations of interacting with the American public as it is unique from foreign populations and more conventional military activities. This type of academic

engagement will help to develop military and government leaders in conceptualizing unique, strategic and operational approaches toward domestic activities in the 21st century.

Recommendations for future research. Around the world, national governments utilize their militaries domestically, and in some cases the military plays a consistent internal role. In some countries – especially those with authoritarian regimes – political officials can hold military positions and titles (and vice versa). In Western democracies, however, there are often restrictions prohibiting military from simultaneously holding office, or from the military operating domestically much like the United States. Therefore, as the researcher mentioned in Chapter 3, there is room for future research regarding comparative case studies between the United States and other countries.

As introduced in the previous section, *Significance of the Study,* this study provides a basis from which to conduct future studies, especially given the dearth of specific literature focusing on U.S. civil-military interactions. Research of value in the interest of best practices could come in the form of comparative studies between the United States and other nations. This includes possible case studies between the United States and other nation-states to understand best practices for domestic operations and public engagement. Additionally, comparative research on the experiences of the military in dealing with combat situations overseas compared to humanitarian and peace-keeping operations on the home front would be of value to the field.

In an effort to better understand and make recommendations regarding civil-military relations, the researcher recommends studying how the relationships outlined in Concordance Theory may change or have changed over time, including research with a greater focus on political elites. This can support forecasting how the military may better integrate with society

and how the military can better find its place in supporting the U.S. population when the need arises.

With regard to Convergence Theory, further research could be done specifically on military personnel in order to understand how they would engage with civilians compared to the past. Although this research study did not seek to compare military actions and attitudes from past events, such as those at Kent State, with modern day actions, it is possible military personnel would refuse orders to engage civilians if it meant causing physical harm, and if the threat were not commensurate with military necessity.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine and understand how members of the public experienced military interventions during times of significant, large-scale domestic military operations. To gain a more holistic perspective through the research, this included perspectives of military leaders, including their own perceived roles, during these events. The researcher engaged in semi-structured interviews in order to gather the necessary data. The researcher provided some background to civil-military relations through the theoretical constructs of Concordance Theory and Convergence Theory, provided the findings, and offered reflections on the experience. Finally, the researcher provided some recommended ways forward to continue research on a topic that, surprisingly, has not received significant public attention, despite the increase in domestic military operations.

The research concluded that the majority of civilians found the military helpful during times of crisis, while military personnel were still uncertain of specific protocols and regulations. The study determined that military planners and practitioners should identify opportunities for greater collaboration between the public and private sectors, foster rapport with local populations

through engagement, and that academic programs focused on governmental or military affairs should include domestic considerations.

The researcher looks forward to continuing researcher on these relationship dynamics, and is encouraged by those who would likewise pursue civil-military relations in the United States as a research topic. Because of this research, the recommendations in Chapter 5 present some foundational steps to drive positive outcomes for the military and the people they serve.

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Appendix A: General Informed Consent Form

NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled

Civilian Experiences and Military Perceptions of the U.S. Military

During Domestic Disaster Operations

Who is doing this research study?

College: Nova Southeastern University Halmos College of Arts and Sciences, Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

Principal Investigator: Stefan D. Buckman: M.S. Strategic Intelligence; M.A., International Relations; M.A. Organizational Management

Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Dr. Ismael Muvingi, Ph.D., Conflict Analysis and Resolution; M.A., International Peace Studies; M.A., Government and International Studies

Site Information: N/A

Funding: Unfunded

What is this study about?

This is a research study, designed to test and create new ideas that other people can use. The purpose of this research study is to gain an understanding of the experiences of individuals with first-hand exposure to military domestic activities, along with the perceived roles as seen by members of the military, in order to understand how these experiences influence perspectives, and how well the two conceptions are aligned.

Potential benefits of this research include first adding to the literature and provide a better understanding of the dynamics between the public, the military, and political leaders; there is sparse research in this area. Second, this research may assist military planners and practitioners in identifying opportunities for peacebuilding and greater collaboration with the public and political decision-makers, in turn helping civilians and domestic security practitioners overcome future challenges of employing the military to work with the public. Third, this research can help

foster transparency and trust amongst the civilian population, and provide a greater degree of safety for both the public and military service members through awareness.

In terms of any technical terms, individuals who have experienced military domestic activities and interventions during crisis response, and who volunteer to participate in this study, are specifically referred to as "CEDMO," for "Civilians who have Experienced Domestic Military Operations." This is to denote members of the public with this unique, first-hand experience in comparison to members of the public who, while they may have their own opinions on such issues, have not necessarily experienced them.

Why are you asking me to be in this research study?

You are being asked to be in this research study because you have been involved in a disaster response effort as a civilian, or as a military service member, during which the U.S. military responded to and to which you have unique insight into that event.

This study will include about 15 civilians and around 10 military personnel. These individuals are from around the country and have had exposure to the military during different domestic response events.

What will I be doing if I agree to be in this research study?

While you are taking part in this research study, it will include one interview session, during which you will be asked around 10 questions. The interview is expected to take no more than an hour and-a-half to two hours. There may, in certain circumstances, be an occasion where the researcher may contact you in a follow-up simply to clarify a meaning or context.

The interview will ideally take place in a face-to-face setting, or over Internet means, such as Skype or Zoom.

Research Study Procedures - as a participant, this is what you will be doing:

For civilian research participants, these individuals will first be provided with a copy of the general consent form, then screened for research participation eligibility based on the following screening criteria:

-Have you been involved in a domestic event warranting the use of the military?

-At any time during this event, did you have direct experience or exposure to military personnel during the response?

-Are you at least 18 years of age, and if so, what is your age?

-Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the military?

-Do you have any immediate family members in the military?

-Do you hold elected office in a capacity where you are able to make decisions to employ military personnel?

-Did you witness firsthand military service members acting in an official capacity in an area where a disaster was taking place or had been declared?

This screening will take no longer than approximately 15 minutes. After the initial screening, the participant will be asked if they wish to voluntarily take part in the research study, and asked to fill out the consent form. Following this, the researcher will setup a date and time with the participant for the actual interview.

The interview will take approximately an hour and-a-half to two hours to conduct. The research will require one session between the researcher and the research participant.

The participant will be asked to consider the details of any experiences they may have had in order to be able to recall them during the interview.

After the research is successfully completed, the researcher will provide the participant with a $10 gift card.

For participants who are in the military, the process will be the same as above. The military participant will first be provided with a copy of the general consent form, then screened for research participation eligibility based on the following screening criteria:

-Are you at least 18 years of age, and if so, what is your age?

-Are you a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, or have you served in the U.S. Armed Forces, in a capacity whereby you would be expected to exert leadership and make decisions regarding the response effort?

-Are you familiar with your roles as a military decision-maker in terms of how you understand the Department of Defense's expectations of you during a disaster event?

This screening will take no longer than approximately 15 minutes. After the initial screening, the participant will be asked if they wish to voluntarily take part in the research study, and asked to fill out the consent form. Following this, the researcher will setup a date and time with the participant for the actual interview.

The interview will take approximately an hour and-a-half to two hours to conduct. The research will require one session between the researcher and the research participant.

The participant will be asked to consider the details of any experiences they may have had in order to be able to recall them during the interview.

After the research is successfully completed, the researcher will provide the participant with a $10 gift card.

Could I be removed from the study early by the research team? There are several reasons why the researchers may need to remove you from the study early. Some reasons are: it may become apparent that at some time during the interview the research participant is not able to complete the research due to duress or extenuating circumstances. The researcher may attempt to reschedule the interview, but may have to cancel interviews based on time constraints.

Are there possible risks and discomforts to me?

This research study involves minimal risk to you. To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would have in everyday life.

The probability and magnitude of risks are as follows:

- Physical risks - There are no physical risks
- Psychological risks – There are minimal psychological risks if you had a particularly traumatic experience during a domestic disaster.
- Privacy risks – There are minimal privacy risks in terms of the data gleaned from the study being lost or otherwise compromised through theft or a data breach, though the chances of this are low.
- Legal risks – There are no legal risks.
- Social risks – There are no social risks.
- Economic risks – There are no economic risks.
- Group or community risks – There are no group or community risks.

You may find some questions we ask you (or some things we ask you to do) to be upsetting or stressful.

If so, the researcher can refer you to someone who may be able to help you with these feelings.

What happens if I do not want to be in this research study?

You have the right to leave this research study at any time or refuse to be in it. If you decide to leave or you do not want to be in the study anymore, or if you choose to stop participation in the study before it is over, any information about you that was collected **before** the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the end of the study, but you may request that it not be used. Participants who choose to stop participation before the research is over forfeit any remittance, in this case the $10 gift card.

What if there is new information learned during the study that may affect my decision to remain in the study?

If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to whether you want to remain in this study, this information will be given to you by the investigator. You may be asked to sign a new Informed Consent Form, if the information is given to you after you have joined the study.

Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?

There are no direct benefits for the participant, aside from the gift card, from being in this research study. However, we hope the information learned from this study will lead to furthering research in the area of domestic response and concordance theory, and that it can provide insight into ways in which the military can conduct its operations more effectively in tandem with the needs of the public in future domestic disaster situations.

Will I be paid or be given compensation for being in the study?

There is no reimbursement for travel or other expenditures. However, the participant will receive a $10 gift card at the successful conclusion of their participation. This gift card will be furnished

to the participant once the interview (and any subsequent follow-up) is completed. The gift card will be an Amazon gift card, VISA gift card, etc., but specific gift cards may be requested by the participant.

Will it cost me anything?

There are no costs, aside from your time, to you for being in this research study.

How will you keep my information private?

Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a confidential manner, within the limits of the law and will be limited to people who have a need to review this information. This data will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other representatives of this institution, and any regulatory and granting agencies (if applicable). If we publish the results of the study in a scientific journal or book, we will not identify you. All confidential data will be kept securely. Your data will be air-gapped a majority of the time, meaning that it will be stored on an external device (hard drive) that is not connected to a computer, nor the Internet, unless the researcher is actively analyzing and reporting the data. All data will be kept for 36 months from the end of the study and destroyed after that time by deletion.

Will there be any Audio or Video Recording?

This research study involves audio and/or video recording. This recording will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other representatives of this institution, and any of the people who gave the researcher money to do the study (if applicable). The recording will be kept, stored, and destroyed as stated in the section above. Because what is in the recording could be used to find out that it is you, it is not possible to be sure that the recording will always be

kept confidential. The researcher will try to keep anyone not working on the research from listening to or viewing the recording.

Whom can I contact if I have questions, concerns, comments, or complaints?

If you have questions now, feel free to ask the researcher. If you have more questions about the research, your research rights, or have a research-related injury, please contact:

Primary contact:
Stefan D. Buckman, M.S., M.A., M.A. can be reached at (443) 605-3028, stefan.buckman@gmail.com

If primary is not available, contact: Dr. Ismael Muvingi, Ph.D., M.A., M.A, who can be reached at (954) 262-3023.

Research Participants Rights

For questions/concerns regarding your research rights, please contact:

Institutional Review Board

Nova Southeastern University

(954) 262-5369 / Toll Free: 1-866-499-0790

IRB@nova.edu

You may also visit the NSU IRB website at www.nova.edu/irb/information-for-research-participants for further information regarding your rights as a research participant.

Research Consent & Authorization Signature Section

Voluntary Participation - You are not required to participate in this study. In the event you do participate, you may leave this research study at any time. If you leave this research study before it is completed, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are entitled.

If you agree to participate in this research study, sign this section. You will be given a signed copy of this form to keep. You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this form.

SIGN THIS FORM ONLY IF THE STATEMENTS LISTED BELOW ARE TRUE:

- You have read the above information.
- Your questions have been answered to your satisfaction about the research

Adult Signature Section

I have voluntarily decided to take part in this research study.

Printed Name of Participant	Signature of Participant	Date
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent and Authorization	Signature of Person Obtaining Consent & Authorization	Date

Appendix B: Military Rank Hierarchy

Featured here are all 9 enlisted ranks - from E1 to E9 noted across the top - for all 4 military branches and the U.S. Coast Guard (Storlie, 2016), even though it typically falls under DHS. What appears to be a "10th rank" in the right column is an E9 rank, but represents the senior enlisted advisor for that entire service (i.e., Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Sergeant Major of the Army, etc.). The respective service senior enlisted service members have distinct ranks compared to their peers due to their senior positions as advisors to each service's senior officer. Also note that there may be more than one rank per grade. For example, there are two separate E8 ranks in the Marine Corps, Master Sergeant and First Sergeant. Master Sergeants are Marines who remain in their occupational specialty to serve as senior experts in that field. Marines who are selected to First Sergeant are responsible for maintaining order and discipline, and with advising officers on policy, legal and administrative issues, and other leadership functions.

Provided here are the 5 Warrant/Chief Warrant Officer ranks and 10 commissioned officer ranks for all branches, including the U.S. Coast Guard (Storlie, 2016). Of note, there is an 11th rank for the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy, those of General of the Army and Fleet Admiral, but these are not currently in use. These 5-star ranks were used during World War II to ensure U.S.

military commanders were equal in rank to their European ally-counterparts holding the rank of Field Marshal (Military Memorial Museum, 2013).