National DPA Program for Administration The Center for the Study of Administration Program Mover Sequence 6

Nova University

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/hsb_pgcoursecatalogs

Part of the Business Commons

NSUWorks Citation
Nova University, "National DPA Program for Administration The Center for the Study of Administration Program Mover Sequence 6" (1981). Huizenga Postgraduate Course Catalogs. 189.
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/hsb_pgcoursecatalogs/189

This Bulletin is brought to you for free and open access by the NSU Course Catalogs and Course Descriptions at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Huizenga Postgraduate Course Catalogs by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
Program Characteristics
Governing and Decision-Making Processes
Central Issues
The System of Pluralism

Roy W. Crawley
Edward S. Flash, Jr.
Walter G. Held
James M. Mitchell
Douglas L. Yoder

SEQUENCE 6
Public Administration Series

National DPA Program
for Administrators
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION
Nova University

1981
PROGRAM MOVER

Program Characteristics
Governing and Decision-Making Processes
Central Issues
The System of Pluralism

Roy W. Crawley
Edward S. Flash, Jr.
Walter G. Held
James M. Mitchell
Douglas L. Yoder

National DPA Program
for Administrators
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION
Nova University

1981
Copyright ©1981 by Nova/NYIT University Press.

All rights reserved. Reproduction or use, without express permission, of editorial or pictorial content, in any manner, is prohibited. No liability is assumed with respect to the use of information contained herein.
Participants in this program of 'experiential learning', when reaching Sequence 6, are encouraged to pause intellectually, look around, and take stock. It is obvious from the title of the sequence, 'Program Mover', that the objective is increased understanding of how to 'put it all together', and to 'get things done'. These are imperatives for the public administrator, if he is to fulfill his function. If policies and programs have been wisely conceived, to deal with problems which have been adequately understood, and if adequate resources have been provided, the administrator's prospects are good. But even with these favorable circumstances, the road from policy and program to completed action, so conveniently covered by the euphemism, 'implementation', is seldom clear, free of difficulty, or sure. Those who speak of implementation airily are usually choosing to overlook, wave aside, and minimize, the hard core of public administration which is execution. One is tempted to say that on the road from policy to completed successful achievement, there are always unexpected potholes, detours, and washed out bridges, not to mention lurking highwaymen. At least, the experienced administrator learns to look for the unexpected, the X factor, and to be ready to deal with it.

In spite of the set of unknowns hiding under the mantle of 'implementation', perhaps because of them, it is useful to be systematic in preparing for the trip from policy goals to completed program execution. A trip plan or game plan is useful, although it may have to be changed midway in the venture. There have been numerous attempts to analyze systematically the program mover's role. Luther Gubick's PODSCORB,
which to many now seems to be a grandfather of these analyses, is one of the best known. It has the merit of comprehensiveness and is by no means obsolete.

But it was not the first systematic approach to the program mover’s role. Buried in the rhetoric of Mary Parker Follett and Chester Barnard, one can also find systematic thinking about the executive’s role in program moving, although the pattern of thought is not identified by acronyms. Nor were they the first Americans who understood the program mover’s role.

James Hart made it clear in his perceptive study of the first American President’s first year in office that he understood the essentials of PODSCORB. (*The American Presidency in Action*, New York, Macmillan, 1948). With the help of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, George Washington was “implementing” more than a policy. He was implementing a constitution. Has American public administration ever produced a more knowing and successful program mover?

Going back further in administrative experience, public administration did not begin with the Constitution of the United States, remarkable though that document is. In our modern era, Napoleon Bonaparte’s grasp of the functions and processes of the program mover would appear to have been rather complete. It wasn’t just intuition; he understood how to put it all together and changed Europe permanently. Nor was he the first European executive genius. Julius Caesar and his nephew, Octavian, were not unaware of the phenomenon of pluralism when they organized a cosmopolitan empire, launched and executed economic and social reforms, and put into effect policies that made for two centuries of peace and prosperity that are still regarded as a golden era in Western Civilization.

Unfortunately, the insights and systematic thinking of the administrative geniuses of past periods of administrative achievement have not been fully recorded and made available to us in capsule form. Even if this were possible, perhaps each generation must start over, at least approach the subject freshly, in analyzing the Program Mover’s role in the ever-changing socio-political context.

Professor Edward S. Flash, the original architect of Sequence 6, has devised a pattern of analysis which is presented in the curriculum statement and utilized in the Program Mover sequence. We believe it has merit, and can be useful to the Program Movers of the 1980’s in analyzing their tasks and their situation.

In integrating these ideas with your own experiences, you will doubtless add to, change the emphasis of, or otherwise modify the pattern set forth here. The important thing is to understand the subtleties and interrelationships of the analysis here presented, and to put your mind to
testing it critically against your experience, in the context of your management environment. Consider your validation or reconstruction of the Sequence 6 model as only the first step in what must be a continuing and never-ending process of learning.

Sequence Six provides a specific base from which to approach the succeeding sequences of this program. In them, the Program Mover views the administrative culture of other peoples and other times, seeking to understand how these other administrators moved their programs. This is all in the family, so to speak, the restricted family of the Western World, in which, despite the differences in structure, processes and relationships, there is a common bond of shared goals and human values. This quick but analytical look at our cultural cousins and administrative ancestors can make it possible for today’s program movers to see themselves and the administrative institutions of late Twentieth Century America freshly.

In the fresh look at ourselves, we should perceive that our way is not the only way, that others, being older, may be ahead of us in administrative time, and that there is something to be learned by sharing this broader experience — broader in both place and time. Such analytical tools and insights as have been so far acquired, or perfected, can now be applied to probing deeper into the experience of others, and to creative thinking about improving the administration of public affairs in the United States.

Part of the responsibility of administrators who would contribute by increasing their own professional competence, is also to be able to contribute to the improvement of the institutions of which they are a part, and to the refinement and validation of doctrines which guide administrative practice. This is an intellectual challenge to all.

John M. Clarke
PREFACE

On November 1, 1975, the initial curriculum statement for Sequence 6, Program Mover, was published for use in the Nova University DPA program. Written by Dr. Edward Flash, Associate Professor of Public Administration, Cornell University, it was designed, in part, to integrate and build upon the ideas and concepts of the first five sequences and to help provide an analytical framework by means of which the public administrator can fulfill his duties and responsibilities more effectively. Over the years, it served those purposes well.

By late 1978, it was evident, from experience gained by the preceptors who taught Sequence 6, that the document required revision. Accordingly, a two-day meeting was held during which four of the preceptors who teach the sequence—Roy W. Crawley, then Director of the DPA program; Flash; James M. Mitchell, former Director of the Advanced Study Program at The Brookings Institution; and L. Douglas Yoder, Planning Director, Department of Environmental Resources Management, Dade County, Florida—considered, and agreed upon, the necessary modifications.

This revision reflects the agreement. Flash wrote the new Introduction and Part I—Program Characteristics As Determinants of Program Moving. Yoder drafted Part II—The Program Mover's Separate and Interdependent Responsibilities. Mitchell modified Part III—The Central Issues Faced By The Program Mover. Crawley drafted Part IV—The Program Mover And The System of Pluralism; we also edited the entire curriculum statement.

Throughout the document, an effort was made to include appropriate examples and illustrations to help relate the concepts and ideas to the world of the practitioner. In addition, the commentary assignments were revised, exercises were included for Parts II and III, and the required readings were up-dated. Finally, supplementary readings were provided for participants who wish to explore the subject-matter in somewhat more depth.

I sincerely hope that this revision stands the test of time as well as did Flash's original document.

Roy W. Crawley
PROGRAM MOVER

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last 18 months, participants in the Nova DPA program have been asked to put themselves successively in the major management leadership roles of political partner, policy formulator, information user/analizer, program coordinator, and resource mobilizer. These are vital roles, all part of being the "compleat" public administrator. Now, for this integrative sequence, the participant assumes the role of "program mover". This is the most significant role of the public administrator. It embraces the end result of an administrator’s endeavors — the successful or unsuccessful fulfillment of a public mandate. The objectives of this sequence are to:

1. enhance the participant’s knowledge and technical command of the separate but related components of program-moving responsibilities;
2. develop an awareness and understanding of the program characteristics that, in large measure, determine the ends and means of fulfilling program-moving responsibilities;
3. contribute to the development of the participant’s interests and convictions concerning the conduct of public affairs; and,
4. help mature his career objectives and sense of professional commitment.

The intent of Sequence 6 is not to stress some particular approach to public administration nor to establish some idealized norms of public administration. Rather, it is to enable the participant to develop greater
awareness of how and why administrators behave as they do, and to provide an analytical framework through which the participant can view his responsibilities.

The concept of “program mover” connotes action. It encompasses such actions as getting and keeping the program underway, accomplishing objectives as set forth by legislative and executive superiors, interpreted personally as well as by support staff, and evaluated by all who have a stake in the outcome of the agency’s efforts. The program mover mobilizes and applies available resources in an attempt to balance the complementary and conflicting aspects of a multiplicity of plural interests. He maintains the integrity of program and organization in a constantly changing environment of frequently bewildering complexity and contrast. He may, in private enterprise terms, never meet a payroll nor maximize a measurable profit. He confronts, however, a more profound and more complex responsibility—to manage his program and to conduct himself in the public interest. In the process, he thrives and accomplishes or shrinks and fades against such uncertain standards as year-to-year changes in the budget legislators provide, shifts in the public’s reaction to agency activities, and increase or decrease in the staff turnover rate. Only occasionally is he able to relax and reflect on program problems and accomplishments and to contemplate and plan for the future.

The administrator fulfills his responsibilities by “moving” the governing process, as defined below, within complex and dynamic limits of discretion and control; discretion and control applied to him as well as applied by him to subordinates in his organization. This means that, to accomplish program goals and objectives and thus to survive, the administrator, as program mover, acts within the limits of established policies and procedures—“the rules of the game”—in accordance with legislative and administrative guidelines, existing institutional structures, available resources, and analytical capabilities. He also moves within the more subjective but equally potent boundaries of institutional and personal values, pressures and opportunities, and personalities and coincidences. He determines to what degree and in what way he will be a political partner as discussed in Sequence 1, within policy areas such as those covered in Sequence 2, not in the partisan sense but as the interpreter of the values and guidelines that structure the content and conduct of his program. The program mover also both applies the organizational arrangements as considered in Sequence 4 and allocates such resources as he can muster as discussed in Sequence 5. Finally, he determines which of the analytical and informational system techniques, as covered in Sequence 3, can be applied for what purposes and by
what means. In other words, the successful program mover plays an active role that is part catalytic and part creative in the functioning of government.

Although program movement may actually be experienced as a seamless web of pressures and opportunities, of crises and routines, of deadlines and postponements, it can be analyzed in underlying cause and effect terms. Accordingly, “cause” represents the basic characteristics of programs “moved” by the administrator, the nature of which is discussed in Part I of this curriculum statement. By the same token, “effect” represents the ends and means of the administrator’s consequent activities. Constituting the principal subject matter of this sequence, these activities are examined in Parts II through IV in the following distinct but related terms:

1. Part I. Program Characteristics as Determinants of Program Moving. Public services are delivered and public regulations are applied in accordance with the special characteristics of particular issues/programs operating within the general environment. The environment and characteristics of an issue or a program form the determinants of governmental response in terms of services delivered or regulations applied.

2. Part II (6.1). The Program Mover’s Separate and Interdependent Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the program mover are viewed as divisible into six distinct but related components of “the governing process”: (1) goal setting; (2) planning; (3) programming; (4) developing and allocating resources; (5) implementing; and (6) evaluating. These components are considered separately in terms of their unique characteristics, their relationships to one another, and as subjects of the application of decision-making processes.

3. Part III (6.2). The Central Issues Faced by the Program Mover. “Moving” the components of an organization’s governing process (i.e., how, to what extent, by whom, and with what impact) is viewed as determined by the resolution of four central issues or trade-offs in which it is necessary to reconcile or choose between considerations that oppose one another but are not entirely mutually exclusive. The four issues are: (1) discretion and control; (2) satisfying the needs of the individual and the organization; (3) purpose and process; and (4) change and stability.

4. Part IV (6.3). The Program Mover and the System of Pluralism. The resolution of problems, as reflected in the operation of the governing process, is in large measure determined by the pressures and opportunities created outside the program mover’s organization. His adaptation to this external environment is examined in terms of the various subsystems—legislative, executive, judicial, media, interest groups, etc.—that impact his program and influence his behavior.
As will become apparent in exploration of the program mover's activities, Sequence 6 pulls together and, at the same time, builds upon the subject matter of the preceding five sequences. The discussion immediately following of program characteristics, in terms of substantive, financial, political, and institutional factors, provides a foundation for analyzing the three basic policy areas covered in Sequence 2; i.e., maintaining social order and justice, maintaining a prosperous economy and liveable environment, and sustaining social progress in education, health, civil rights, and the reduction of poverty. Financial and political factors are particularly relevant to the roles of political partner and policy formulator. Financial and institutional factors are equally relevant to the resource mobilizer. As a feature of institutional factors, adequacy of information is crucial to the information user-analyzer.

The examination in Unit 6.1 of the governing process reveals how the program mover is at one and the same time information user-analyzer, organizational coordinator, and resource mobilizer. Planning, programming, developing and allocating resources, implementing, and evaluating all depend upon the availability of relevant information and on the analysis of such information in terms of usable descriptive and prescriptive models. Operating and maintaining the governing process are essentially organizational problems of developing formal arrangements of structure and process and of evoking cooperation among individuals of different abilities, personalities, and aspirations. The program mover's strategies of maintaining the governing process are very much those of the resource mobilizer who makes the most of normally limited resources of formal grants of authority, human and material resources, time, and external support.

Perhaps nothing demonstrates the interaction, indeed the indivisibility, of the public administrator's different roles better than the treatment of decision-making in Unit 6.1. It is his core activity, as a political partner, in reaching policy decisions acceptable to legislatures, other governments, and interest groups. It is equally basic to the policy formulator responsible for a particular segment of public policy. By the same token, a rational decision is the end objective of the information user-analyzer who is dependent upon relevant information and analysis. As organization coordinator, the administrator seeks to design and maintain processes of decision-making that insure participation and dispatch as much as analysis and judgment. And, in the final analysis, judgment, as both an intellectual and intensely personal phenomenon, focuses on the administrator as resource mobilizer trying to make the most of limited resources.

In attempting to resolve continuing issues (Unit 6.2), the administrator is simultaneously program mover and organization coordinator. In both
roles he, as “Mr. Inside”, is concerned with maintaining the organization as a cooperative endeavor, meeting what Chester Barnard conceptualized 40 years ago as standards of “efficiency” (employee satisfaction) and “effectiveness” (organization accomplishment). In dealing with the external environment (Unit 6.3), the administrator is simultaneously program mover and political partner. He is “Mr. Outside” attempting to build support and minimize opposition from those directly benefited and not benefited by the particular program, from organized interest groups, media, other agencies, and other branches and levels of government.

The body of this curriculum statement expands on the summary presented above and includes lists of required readings, suggested supplemental readings, commentary assignments, discussion questions, and exercises. To the degree possible, discussions, commentaries, and exercises involve application of the concepts of program movement to particular programs and organizations. As such, they represent a testing of the utility to the practicing administrator of the concepts and the analytical framework of this sequence.
Examination of how and why program movers function as they do—from paper pushing to policy-making—starts with a consideration of the nature of programs; that is, with the particular characteristics of what is being moved. The underlying hypothesis of this sequence is that the ends and means of program moving are determined primarily by program characteristics. As defined and explained below, these characteristics are categorized as "substantive", "financial", "political", and "institutional". Each category includes a number of factors.

As underlying determinants, program characteristics are in the nature of givens or imperatives to which the program mover, as decision-maker, responds. Although every program is affected by each of the four characteristics and the many factors, they are not of equal significance in each program, nor is any given factor of equal significance in different programs or in the same program at different times. The force or impact of a particular factor on program decision-making is partly a reflection of its inherent nature—for instance, the high technology associated with nuclear power. It also is a reflection of the values associated with that factor and how strongly they are held—for instance, the protest-engendering objection to endangering health in order to develop and provide nuclear power. The shorter the time period the less changeable
as given such factors are and the more the program mover must adapt. Conversely, the longer the time period the more the program mover’s response may include modifying the factors themselves. A program mover’s having to live within a particular combination of legislative mandate, program budget, or organization arrangement in one year does not rule out his attempting to change one or more of these constraints for the longer term in succeeding years.

Separately and in combination, program characteristics determine strategies and tactics in the program mover’s operation of the governing and decision-making processes (Unit 6.1), in resolving the continuing issues within the organization (Unit 6.2), and in successfully maintaining external relationships (Unit 6.3). They provide a basis for understanding the differences among programs (welfare as compared to mass transit as compared to cancer research) as well as differences over time in the same program (environmental pollution before and after the emergence of the energy crisis).

A. SUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS. Every public program has basic characteristics or features that establish it as an essentially unique public undertaking of providing a public service or applying public regulation to non-governmental activity. They comprise the corpus of public policy, modified and reinforced by financial, political, and institutional characteristics and driven by the multiple decisions of public servants. These particular characteristics reflect values and value conflicts relatively self-contained and unique to the program itself: every American should have adequate housing; no one should be denied rewarding employment; health should be a right not a privilege; in a system of free enterprise, airlines should be allowed and even forced to compete with one another. Within the value-laden context of service and regulation, the following substantive characteristics can be identified:

1. Program Goals and Objectives. The degree of specificity, consensus, and reciprocity among related goals and objectives.

2. Clientele. The number (one to a score or more) of clientele groups or institutions served by a program and their relative size in terms of individuals who receive assistance. This factor causes very substantial differences in moving such programs as aid to the blind, assistance for elementary and secondary schools, medical care for disabled veterans, and social security recipients.

3. Routine/Developmental Nature. The normal and regularized, as distinct from the evolutionary and crisis, program. Routine connotes established procedures, certainty, understanding, and acceptance of ends and means. Developmental connotes the oppo-
site: new, untested, project orientation, and controversy as to ends and means. The one time prospect of distributing monthly social security checks is not the same as rebuilding a city's slums which is not the same as searching for a cure for cancer. Nor are they the same as solving a municipal default, containing an oil spill, or dispersing missiles found close to our borders.

4. **Degree of Interaction with Other Programs.** The nature of the complementarity, interdependence, and conflict in the interactions of a particular program with other programs. To varying degrees every program interacts at its decision points with those of other programs. Police protection, the administration of justice, and the incarceration or rehabilitation of criminals interact with one another to comprise crime control. A community's program of care for the elderly depends upon other community programs of health care, employment security, recreation, and transportation. Enforcement of pollution standards contributes to environmental protection; it also conflicts with efforts to conserve energy while raising the cost of production and threatening local unemployment.

5. **Program Scale.** The geographic and/or economic area in which the program functions. Every program has some dimensions of operating integrity within its recognition as a local, state, national, or even international commitment. Whereas "large" connotes a geographic and/or economic scale spanning many political jurisdictions — a region, "small" connotes a geographic and/or economic scale existing within a political jurisdiction or possibly its subdivisions — a neighborhood. Air pollution control, a large scale program, necessarily operates at a regional level. Elementary and secondary education, a small scale program, necessarily operates at a neighborhood or district level; it also is a nation-wide function. Geographic scale can be measured by, for instance, miles, population density, radio signal range, or the boundaries of a river drainage system.

Complementing geographic scale, economic scale is determined by three factors: (a) the scope and the nature of the market for services and regulations, which means the demand and supply relationship; (b) the limits of the economies of scale; and (c) the nature of program externalities. The term "externalities" refers to the phenomenon of the operation of a program influencing one or more other programs whose operation and beneficiaries play no part in the determination of the nature and operation of the first program.
6. **Degree of Technological Complexity.** The scientific and/or intellectual content of a program as reflected in three specific factors: (a) the level of sophistication of the relevant technology; (b) the differentiation in application of a given technology; and (c) the factor of time in the realization of program impact. Relevant technology embraces the natural, humanistic, and social sciences as well as the physical sciences and administration. The respective programs of primary education, sewage disposal, air pollution control, weapons systems development, and space exploration reflect an ascending scale of technological sophistication. With regard to differentiation in application, the architectural, construction, financial, and occupational factors governing the provision of adequate public housing in the older and more impoverished cities of the northeastern “frost belt” are similar in basic nature but considerably different in specific application from the same factors governing the provision of adequate public housing in the new growth centers of the southern and southwestern “sun belt”. To illustrate the factor of time, it can take as long as ten years to conceive, design, construct, and commission a nuclear submarine, but the impact of that submarine on national security becomes apparent and measureable with the first appropriation of construction funds. Conversely, a remedial education program, such as Head Start, can be conceived, designed, established and put into action within months, but the effects, largely unmeasureable in any case, may not appear for years and, in fact, may never be attributable to the particular program.

7. **Balance Between Service and Regulation.** The degree to which a given program provides a particular public service and the degree to which the same program simultaneously regulates particular public activity. The concept of balance assumes that no program is entirely one or the other but reflects a combination of both. Just as service delivery inevitably carries with it some burden of regulation (e.g., qualifications standards for receiving health care), so does the application of regulation inevitably carry some “sweetener” of service (e.g., protection of markets inhering to the granting of commercial radio and television licenses). The delivery of services and the application of regulations constitute the basic strategies for the fulfillment of public policy. Delivery and application are thus means and not ends. *In the final analysis, the balance between service and regulation constitutes the critical substantive factor; it is a culmination of the other substantive factors.*
The substantive characteristics concentrate on the what of a program or an issue; their emphasis is on program content; their value focus is on the goals and objectives of the society.

B. FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS. How a program is financed, by whom, by what means, and to what extent are all important determinants of program moving and program results. The potency of financial characteristics lies in the values of solvency and budget balancing ("We must not spend beyond our means."), of fiduciary responsibility and accountability ("We have a right to know just how our taxes are being spent."), of efficient use of resources ("Return on investment should be maximized."), and of those involving the distribution and redistribution of income ("Those who pay are those who should benefit."). Financial characteristics include:

1. Source or Sources of Funds. Whether a program is self-financed, as with user-charges, or financed from general tax revenues, special tax revenues or assessments; whether it is financed entirely by one governmental entity such as a municipality or from multiple sources operating from one or more levels of government. The last type includes categorical, bloc, and revenue sharing grants made by federal agencies to state and local government.

2. Degree of Financial Interdependence with Other Programs. Whether, as a function of program interaction (as described in A-4 above), the program is financed from its own budget or is dependent upon the budgets of other programs. For instance, the budget of an agency responsible for a community’s aid for the elderly program may be intended to cover its entire costs or only administrative overhead. In the latter case, it would be heavily dependent upon funding from employment, health care, recreation, transportation, and other programs having a care-for-the elderly component.

3. Degree of Perceived Adequacy of Funds. Whether a program is judged sufficiently financed to permit doing the job as mandated by law and as perceived by public officials, particularly the program mover, and taxpayers, or is constrained by insufficient funds so that the quantity and quality of performance must be limited. This factor embraces the contrasting situations of increased and decreased funding, i.e., of program expansion and sharing a larger pie versus program contraction and competing for pieces of a smaller pie. It embraces, too, the relationship between the ability to pay as viewed by the accountant and the willingness to pay as viewed by the taxpayer. It reflects the difference between the amount of funds authorized as the
maximum expenditures for a program and the amount of funds actually appropriated.

4. **Distributive or Redistributive Nature.** The degree to which a program is perceived as involving the distribution or the redistribution of income. A program is distributive when there is perceived to be an approximately equitable sharing of costs and benefits between those who pay and those who benefit. National defense, police and fire protection, and toll roads exhibit essentially distributive payer-beneficiary relationships. A program is redistributive when there is perceived to be an inequitable sharing of costs and benefits between those who pay and those who benefit; that is, either the few who benefit are not primarily the many who pay or, conversely, the many who benefit are not primarily the few who pay. Welfare programs exemplify the first kind of redistributive payer-beneficiary relationship. The second kind can be seen in the general community benefit derived from industrial air pollution controls which are financed by the particular producers of pollution and/or their customers. Actually, the payer-beneficiary relationship is somewhat redistributive in every program. No individual pays precisely in accordance with what he or she receives. Redistribution remains an unsolved problem for accountants and economists even before it reaches the politicians and taxpayers. It is virtually impossible to assign costs precisely in terms of benefits derived in the case of a multipurpose reservoir, a subway extension, or a drug rehabilitation program. Only an approximately or presumvably equitable assignment of costs and benefits can be achieved. **The distributive-redistributive aspect of public programs is frequently the most crucial financial factor.** It often constitutes the synthesis of a program's characteristics, the point around which other factors assemble and achieve their significance.

C. **POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS.** The political systems of representative government exert their own brand of pressures and opportunities on programs and program movers. "Politics", the program mover acknowledges, "enables and sometimes obliges me to do thus and so.—If it weren't for politics I could do such and such." Political characteristics encompass the formal structure and process as well as the dynamics of representation. Representativeness becomes the over-arching value that gives the political characteristics described below their particular potency. Representativeness includes such constitutional principles as separation of power, majority rule, the role of the states, public access to and participation in governmental decision making, public accountability, equity, and due process.
1. **Formal Political Jurisdictions.** This factor encompasses formal boundaries and responsibilities of states, counties, municipalities, and special purpose districts. Their significance lies in the coincidence of formal political jurisdictions to the functioning geographic and economic limits of the particular program. The operation of mass transit in Los Angeles falls within the jurisdictions of three counties in the state of California; the operation of mass transit in metropolitan New York City falls within the jurisdiction of many counties of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The functioning of “fourteen hundred governments” in metropolitan New York City, each with its formal jurisdictions, is of major significance to efforts to integrate the multi-level attempts to rehabilitate the area’s mass transit. It is of incidental significance in the remedial education of disadvantaged students carried out within the separate jurisdictions of Newark, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Stamford.

2. **Legislative Interaction.** The assignment of legislative, appropriations, and oversight functions to subject-matter committees (e.g., legislative and appropriations committees of the House and Senate at the national level). Party alignment, committee chairmanships, committee memberships, sub-committee organizations, and seniority combine with the legislative process itself to exert crucial influence on the development, execution, and evaluation of public programs.

3. **Nature, Intensity, and Source of Political Reaction.** What interest groups attempt to influence particular programs? This factor includes the particular nature of their support and opposition (which are “pro” and which “anti”?) and the intensity with which views are expressed. Such intensity may be “all out” or “token”, as suggested by the diagram on page 17. It may focus on one particular issue or on the gamut of public policy.

4. **Interest Group Strategies and Impact.** The means by which interest groups attempt to influence program decision-making and the difference that such attempts makes to program outcomes. It includes lobbying, program analysis, testifying, developing alliances, etc. Strategies of influence may focus on different decisions such as those concerning policy, annual appropriations, program innovations, and day-to-day program operations.

5. **The Elitist/Pluralist Nature of Decision-Making.** The narrowness or breadth of participation of the decision-making associated with a particular program. In an “elitist” situation, decision-making in the many different areas of a program is dominated by one person, a small group of people, or a single organization;
decision-making is cumulative in that dominating decisions in one area lead to dominating decisions in others. Conversely, in a "pluralist" situation, decision-making in the many different areas of a program tends to involve many different persons or groups or organizations; decision-making is noncumulative in that dominating decisions in one area preclude dominating decisions in another. Decision-making regarding transportation services provided by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey may be characterized as elitist in nature. The Port Authority operates major tunnels and bridges as well as aviation, bus, and marine terminals. It maintains an international trade center and runs a mass transit railroad linking Manhattan with New Jersey. Each of these groups of activities is a separate and highly routinized enterprise. Collectively, they represent a relatively closed transportation system that is organized within an independent authority chartered by two states, financed by its own revenues, and operated over many political jurisdictions of metropolitan New York City. Under these circumstances, the making of all but the most routine decisions in the different areas is highly centralized within an elite group of Port Authority executives. The emergency, however, in recent years of such problems as airplane noise abatement, air pollution, crime control, airline deregulation, and metropolitan financial survival has increased the interdependence of the Port Authority’s operations with those of local, state, and federal agencies. This new interdependence has served to open up the Port Authority system and, consequently, to leaven elitism with a measure of pluralism.

Decisions regarding care for the elderly, on the other hand, may be characterized as pluralistic in nature. The program’s dependency on other programs, each with its own set of characteristics, means that different decisions concerning the various aspects of care for the elderly are made by many participants, none of whom participates significantly in the decisions of the others. Separate decisions concerning, respectively, health, employment, recreation, and transportation determine in separate fashion the ways in which the elderly will be cared for. Yet, at the same time and somewhat paradoxically, the significance of care for the elderly, as a subordinate component of these other programs, produces a disinterest in or vacuum concerning care for the elderly that can be met by the isolated and thus elite few who do care.

The elitist/pluralist nature of decision-making generally is the most significant factor among the political characteristics.
CLASSIFICATION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL GROUPS BY SCOPE OF POLITICAL INTEREST AND FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN GOVERNMENTAL DECISION MAKING.

D. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. The foregoing discussion has implied that program moving is a complex process involving many different individuals and organizations. In making many different types of decisions and thus participating in different decision-making processes, individuals, through their organizations, fulfill different responsibilities and play different roles. Therefore, as institutional characteristics, the structures and processes of governmental organizations as well as the composition and behavior of public servants become partial determiners of program moving. As public means to public ends, institutional characteristics are none the less not neutral but have their own impact on the ends of public policy. They are shaped by, but also partially shape, substantive, financial, and political characteristics; ostensibly furthering and facilitating but also modifying and compromising and even undercutting the imperatives of those characteristics. Accordingly, institutional characteristics, as described below, refer to the suitability or adequacy of organizational, procedural, managerial, and human aspects of a program in terms of consistency with demands of the other program characteristics.

The values underlying institutional characteristics are fundamentally the antithesis of those associated with political characteristics, hence the persistent dichotomy between politics and administration that has pervaded public administration in the United States. Instead of representativeness, they are based on a norm of maximum administrative control and organizational efficiency, on a norm of minimum rather than maximum outside participation in program decision-making. They embrace the concept of rationality as both the maximization of benefits over costs and the logic of organizational structure and process. They also embrace the intertwined institutional and individual values of public service, of power and growth, of status quo and survival.

1. Suitability of Formal Structure and Process. The degree to which formal organization and organizational procedures of a program reinforce or distort other characteristics. This factor encompasses formal assignment of program authority and responsibility to particular administrative bodies. It also encompasses the determination of specialties, the hierarchical chains of command, and channels of communication.

2. Adequacy of Informational and Analytical Resources. The appropriateness of available information and analysis in terms of the decisions that have to be made; that is, their relevance, completeness, timeliness, accuracy, and validity. Appropriateness includes suitability of available computer-based, and other, analytical techniques (i.e., the degree to which a program, by its substantive and political characteristics, does or does not lend
itself to quantitative analysis (e.g. headquarters planning and evaluation staff, budget office, or operating division), as well as consideration of the benefits relative to the costs of developing adequate information and analysis.

3. Adequacy of Human Resources. The quantitative and qualitative sufficiency of managerial, professional, and technical/clerical staff in terms of program demands and opportunities. Adequacy of human resources is also a reflection of three interrelated factors: (a) the relevance or “fit” of the existing professional expertise to the subject matter of the decisions being made; (b) the degree of professionalization of the expertise; and (c) the consequent balance between professional, programmatic, and institutional orientation.

4. Degree of Complementarity or Conflict Among Areas of Program Expertise. How and how well the different areas of expertise involved in a program work together. This factor assumes that program operation and program management involve many specialties, the appliers of which have their own perspectives regarding program ends and means. What, for instance, the engineer sees as technically necessary, the economist may not judge economically sound and the lawyer may not judge legally feasible. Each of the three interpret differently the values of air pollution control by appraising them against the values of their respective professions. From the perspective of their respective expertise, administrative officer and area specialist collaborate and compete with one another in the operation of foreign aid programs. From the perspective of their respective professions, the lawyer and the economist in the Department of Justice compete and collaborate in the prosecution of anti-trust cases.

5. Morale and Motivation. Attitudes that public servants as individuals and as members of groups have toward fulfillment of their assigned responsibilities. The concept of positiveness, or negativeness, of human behavior assumes that, far from being neutral, public servants respond psychologically as well as intellectually to the program of which they are part. It accepts the Barnardian argument that bureaucrats need the organization for the fulfillment of their objectives as much as the organization needs them for the fulfillment of its objectives. It accepts the equally behavioral argument that responsibility, being in the minds and hearts of public servants, is internalized rather than imposed; that it is activated but neither created nor guaranteed by formal rules and procedures.
The behavior of public servants— as a function of morale, motivation, and ethics—is the determining factor among institutional characteristics (perhaps among the full-range of program characteristics). It is the public servant—the legislator, the political executive, the bureaucrat, the judge—not the process nor the technique nor the machine, who makes the decision, responds positively or negatively to the complex opportunities and pressures of providing services and applying regulations, does as much as possible or as little as necessary, moves the program, takes or avoids risks, grows or stagnates. It is the public servant who deadens or vitalizes organizational effort; who, in the end, bears success or failure for self and organization.

In analyzing a program/issue in terms of its characteristics, one should put the various factors in question form and then proceed to answer each question in relation to the program/issue. With regard to the first factor—Program Goals and Objectives—under Substantive Characteristics, the following kinds of questions should be posed (and answered). What are the goals of the program?”, “How specific are they?”, “What is the extent of support for them?”, “Within each goal, what are the objectives?”, etc. The same process should be followed for each factor under the four categories of program characteristics. Under “Application of Program Characteristics,” beginning on page 45, the program characteristics of an air defense missile system are examined in this manner.
UNIT 1 (6.1):
THE PROGRAM MOVER'S
SEPARATE AND
INTERDEPENDENT
RESPONSIBILITIES

OBJECTIVES. This Unit is designed to establish an analytical framework which describes the context and process within which the program mover undertakes his responsibilities and by which his responsibilities are, in part, determined. Three objectives stemming from this purpose are to:

1. develop an understanding of the nature and significance of the "governing process";
2. create an awareness of the relationships which exist among the components of the "governing process" and organizational decision-making; and,
3. consider these ideas and concepts within the context of "issues/programs" having specific substantive, financial, political, and institutional characteristics.

This last objective is presented as a reminder of the common thread which ties together the many ideas presented throughout the "Program Mover" Sequence.

THE GOVERNING PROCESS. The governing process is defined as actions taken by public officials in fulfillment of their authorized responsibilities. The process is populated by many program movers in many agencies at all levels of government. In its broadest application, the governing process describes the workings of American government as a system. For individual program movers, however, the most useful application may be to that issue/program (or portion of a program) which
constitutes their field of action. At the same time, it is essential to realize one's relationship to the entire issue/program and the interrelationships of all issues/programs which constitute the overall governing process.

The governing process consists of six separate but interrelated components. They are:

1. **Determining Goals.** The process of determining goals is concerned with establishing or recognizing the ultimate purposes of government programs or activities. Goals are broad, ideal, and slow-to-change expressions of the society's desires and aspirations, e.g., to provide every citizen the opportunity to attain his potential; to regulate the trade practices of private industry to prohibit "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" while also insuring that the costs of regulation—the increased costs that they impose on consumer goods and the depressing effect that they have on the economy—do not outweigh the benefits; to insure the long-range security and well-being of the United States; to abolish all forms of discrimination in employment; to provide equal education to all elementary and secondary school students; to ensure that all Department of Energy policies and programs promote competition in the energy industry and that consumer impact is considered in decision-making.

Goals are sufficiently general so as to reflect a consensus among the citizenry, and they are expressed as directions or aims of the total society. Goals provide guidance in the planning process for the development of objectives and standards. Most significantly, they provide the impetus for action.

Goals are set forth in the U.S. and in state constitutions, county and city charters, legislation authorizing programs, and, since the legislative process involves bargaining, compromise, and trade-off of one interest against another, in the legislative history developed during the course of legislative hearings.

2. **Planning.** Planning is the translation of goals into objectives and the establishment of specifications, standards, time dimensions, resources, etc. Objectives state, in more specific terms, what is to be accomplished in furtherance of a goal. They are points or levels of attainment in pursuance of a goal. Ideally expressed, objectives have two characteristics: (a) they are measurable, and (b) they are attainable. To be measurable, objectives should state numerical amounts, distances, and dimensions. Since this is not always possible, for example in many social programs, it is often
necessary to state general relationships instead. Objectives are formulated by refining goals through the development of standards as a basis for subsequent evaluation of the relative success of a program.

Planning is more concrete than goal setting and adds a dimension of commitment to goal attainment. It infrequently is carried out prior to passage of legislation; more often it is performed at the administrative level subsequent to a bill becoming law.

3. Programming. Programming adds greater specificity and commitment to the planning component. It is the essential bridge between planning and budgeting. Objectives are broken down into sub-objectives, programs and activities into their essential elements, and resources into more exact requirements.

Programming in the U.S. Navy would stipulate, among other things, the: (a) size and composition of the fleet; (b) staffing levels to be maintained (number and rates of enlisted personnel and number and ranks of officers); (c) steaming and flying hours; (d) overhaul and repair schedules; (e) construction of ships, planes, and other weapons systems; (f) research and development activities; (g) reserve forces; and (h) requisite support—logistics, medical, the Shore Establishment, etc.

Programming is essential to establishing precise estimates of resource needs and to maximizing the effectiveness of a given level of resources.

4. Developing and Allocating Resources. This component, generally called budgeting, consists of raising, or creating, and allocating the resources necessary for the accomplishment of objectives and programs.1 While "Resources" generally is perceived as referring to money, it also includes expertise, political support, personnel, and time.

Budgeting generally is viewed as the dominant factor in the governing process for it is through the budget process that the "bottom line" of who gets what is established. It is the most precise and concrete expression of national, state, or local priorities. It is seen by some as a rational process for identifying and resolving conflicts and determining the public interest—the national good. Others perceive the process as a means of creating organizational loyalty through reward and punishment. Still others emphasize the importance of budgeting as the key to ensuring control over government programs and activities.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 (Public Law, 93-344, 93rd Congress, H.R. 7130, July 12, 1974) is a manifestation of the significance members of the U.S. Congress attach to the budget process. It stemmed from a realization that: (1) Congress, over the years, had allowed the President to become the dominant force in the budget process; (2) budgetary decisions were made by a host of appropriations subcommittees and not by Congress as an institution; (3) there was little attention paid to matching revenues and expenditures; (4) the budget process was in trouble (up to 75 percent of the budget was relatively uncontrollable..."inability of Congress or the President to control outlays during a fiscal year without changing existing law"), only about 44 percent of the budget was subject to the appropriations process, the federal budget was in deficit in 16 of the last 20 years prior to 1974, total federal debt had increased approximately $200 billion in 20 years, not one regular 1974 appropriation bill was enacted before fiscal year 1974 began, and unused budget authority from past spending decisions resulted in about $300 billion in future outlays); and (5) frustration by Congressmen over Presidential impoundment of funds appropriated by Congress for various programs.

The Act established a new Congressional budget process. Committees on the Budget in each House, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and a procedure providing Congressional control over the impoundment of funds by the Executive Branch. The CBO was given responsibility for providing Congress with basic budget data and analyses of alternative fiscal, budgetary, and programmatic policy issues. Specifically, CBO provides periodic forecasts and analyses of economic trends and alternative fiscal policies; monitors the results of Congressional action on individual authorization, appropriation, and revenue bills against the targets or ceilings specified in the concurrent resolutions; develops five-year cost estimates for carrying out any public bill or resolution reported by Congressional committees; provides five-year projections on the costs of continuing current federal spending and taxation policies; prepares an annual report to Congress which includes a discussion of alternative spending and revenue levels and alternative allocations among major programs and functional categories; and undertakes studies on budget-related areas.

At the 1979 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Public Administration, a panel of five persons, well-informed about the
Act, reviewed the results of its first five years of operation. Some of their conclusions follow:

- A more rational budget process, a stronger voice in fiscal policy, improved analytical capability, and a budget system which better responds to the needs of the economy are some of the major accomplishments of the Act in terms of its effects upon the Congress.
- The Act has had a fundamental impact in redistributing control over crucial information on spending and revenue legislation.
- Its major accomplishment has been in producing five years of coherent budget making, earlier appropriations, and orderly reporting of authorizations.
- Congress now is playing a stronger role in fiscal policy-making as a direct result of the budget process, which has encouraged Congress to view programs in multi-year terms.
- The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has been accused of being destructive to new policies; this criticism may be a reflection of the fact that good analysis recognizes complexities and ambiguities in issues and thus tends to throw sand into the gears of coalition forming.
- The budget process appears to have raised the general level of understanding among members of Congress. Although CBO's economic forecasts have not always been used by the budget committees, they have helped to hold down deficits by preventing members from making unrealistically optimistic assumptions about the economy.
- Those panelists believe that the process has failed to gain control over revenue generation and revenue loss and that the 1979 missed deadlines are dangerous to the life of the Act.
- The Act has been successful in moving the impoundment issue from the courts back to the political area “where it belongs.”

5. Implementing. Implementing is the actual operation of a program. It encompasses interpreting the public policy mandate as processed from goal setting on through resource allocation, doing the work, providing the service, accomplishing the task. It occurs almost exclusively at the operating agency level and is the most concrete of the components. It is the primary task of the program mover. Staffing, motivating, and maintaining morale are of critical importance.

Implementing includes sending social security checks each month to 35 million persons aged 62 or more, building and maintaining highways in every state, city and town, 800,000 persons delivering mail, ten million local employees teaching students,
nearly a million firemen preventing or putting out fires, over a million policemen patrolling beats and highways, thousands of people collecting foreign intelligence, hundreds of thousands collecting garbage, etc.

6. Evaluating. Evaluating entails determining what is accomplished during implementation, or what was accomplished after implementation, and the degree of success in goal/objective attainment. It is concerned with measures of productivity and with value-laden measures of effectiveness.

Evaluating was generally a long-neglected component of the governing process. The emphasis in program audits was upon whether the funds appropriated were expended for the purposes intended, and in an efficient, honest manner. A substantial change occurred in the decade of the 1970's. Senator William Proxmire, Democrat from Wisconsin, concerned over the lack of success of much of the Great Society's programs and apparent waste and mismanagement in the Department of Defense, pressed the General Accounting Office (GAO) into placing stress on the results of programs, intended and unintended, and the degree to which they were fulfilling the objectives for which they were established. In a short period, program evaluation became a major concern of GAO and, of course, executive departments and agencies.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, among other things, gave great impetus to the program evaluation movement. The Act assigned eight additional responsibilities to GAO related to program evaluation, e.g., assist Congressional committees in developing statements of legislative goals and objectives and methods for assessing and reporting actual program performance, assist such committees in analyzing and assessing federal agency program reviews and evaluation studies, develop and recommend methods for review and evaluation of government programs.

Further enforcement was provided the movement by the creation in the mid 1970's of Offices of Inspector General in every department and major agency with responsibility for conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations. Such offices also provide leadership and coordination for, and recommend policies and corrective actions concerning, activities designed to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of, and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in, the agency's programs and operations. (It is noteworthy that the first such office created was in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the first Inspector General was recruited from the General Accounting Office where he was an Assistant Comptroller General, and that the first report of the Inspector General stated that approximately six billion dollars a year of HEW appropriations was lost through corruption and waste.

Finally, planning and evaluation offices or staffs were established in most departments and agencies to coordinate activities in program analysis and planning and evaluation activities, and to ensure that agency policy and program planning appropriately reflect the results of these activities.

Not surprising, the movement spread into state and local governments. By 1979, about 25 percent of state and local government finances came from the federal government through categorical, bloc, and general revenue sharing grant programs which totaled $85 billion. Federal departments and agencies, as well as the General Accounting Office, began to place greater and greater emphasis on appraising the results of these grant programs. And so, to cope with this development, state and local governments began to establish program evaluation units. By 1980, the evaluation industry was well established in terms of authority, personnel, and funds. Learned articles, such as Robert F. Clark’s in *PAR*, now appear frequently in the literature.

**INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF GOVERNING PROCESS COMPONENTS.** The foregoing description may suggest that the governing process normally works in a sequential, systematic, and completely rational way. Such, of course, is not the case. Components may occur “out of order”, may be significantly altered by steps taken in the process, or may not occur explicitly at all. Goals set at one level of government may be programmed at another and implemented at yet another. The components themselves are usually continuous rather than distinct and separate. Precisely where planning stops and programming begins may be impossible to say in a given situation. The same component may be pursued by more than one level of government or separate parts of the same agency.

Charles J. Hitch, in describing decision-making in large organizations and the interrelatedness of the components of the governing process (in one of the more lucid descriptions of the planning, programming, budgeting system — PPBS) stated:

> These two management techniques, programming (an activity that produces a program or program budget classified by “outputs” which are objective-oriented rather than “inputs”, resource requirements

---

and financial or budget implications are linked to the programmed outputs, and the program extends far enough into the future to show to the extent practical and necessary the full resource requirement and financial implications of the programmed outputs) and systems analysis (analysis, explicit quantitative analysis to the extent possible, designed to maximize, or at least increase, the value of the objectives achieved by an organization minus the value of the resources it utilizes) which comprise PPBS were introduced into the Department of Defense for one purpose — to improve high level planning in the Department, i.e., planning at the level of Department of Defense headquarters, service headquarters, and the headquarters of the unified commands.3

I consider planning in its various aspects to be the important function of top management in any large organizations whether government, business, or education. The planning function can be analyzed in a number of different ways. First, by how distant the future time period with which it is concerned. We have short-range planning — planning for the use of existing facilities and resources. We have intermediate-range planning — the planning of procurement and construction of new facilities. And we have long-range planning — the planning of new developments with very long lead times, like new major weapons systems in Defense or new campuses for the University of California. In Defense we generally found a ten-year planning cycle long enough for most of our developments. In the University of California the lead times are longer. New campuses require that we look 35 years ahead, to the year 2000, and we attempt to do so.

Another distinction which is critical is that between substantive planning and fiscal planning. Fiscal planning is the planning of future budgets — how much money and how to spend it. Substantive planning is the planning of objectives — ultimate objectives and intermediate objectives. In the Department of Defense substantive planning is called military planning; in the University it is called academic planning. Both fiscal and substantive planning can be short, intermediate, or long-range.

I repeat, the reason we introduced the two techniques of planning and systems analysis in the Department of Defense in 1961 was to improve the exercise of the planning function, which we found in disarray. We introduced programming to make the military planning of the Department realistic, to make it face up to the hard choices by linking it to fiscal planning, from which it had been divorced. And we introduced systems analysis to provide a criterion or standard for making the hard choices, to achieve some rationality and optimality in the planning.

... There was plenty of planning activity of all sorts: short-range, intermediate-range, long-range, substantive and fiscal. The key to the disarray was the almost complete separation between substantive or military planning and fiscal planning...  

In consequence, the intermediate-range and long-range military planning was largely ineffective. The Department of Defense, one of

---

the world's largest organizations, had no approved plans extending more than one year into the future...

We introduced the program, ____________, to correct the basic flaw in the system, namely the separation of planning and budgeting...

The function of the planning in the planning-programming-budget-
ing system is to develop alternatives—better alternatives—to those in the current approved program...

So, in summary, the program provides the link between planning and budgeting, relating forces and costs to national security objectives, while systems analysis (economic analysis applied to the public sector) provides the quantitative analytical foundation in many areas, by no means all, for making sound choices among the alternative means of achieving the objectives.

From an administrator's perspective the governing process can be viewed as an analytical framework for the administrative process, though clearly the process occurs within the overall political context. The components comprise the "conversion" or "throughput" portion of Ira Sharkansky's cybernetic model of administrative policy-making (Public Administration, p. 6, 3rd ed.). As such, the components indicate not only the different responsibilities of the program mover but also the organizational manifestations of those responsibilities. Thus, an agency typically may have a planning section, a program and budget unit, operating divisions, and an evaluation staff. The program mover may take primary responsibility for determining and achieving objectives, involving himself to varying degrees with each of the organizational units primarily responsible for its respective component of the governing process.

The complex and interrelated nature of programs creates a "nesting" effect in terms of governing process components. For example, a program mover may have primary responsibility for carrying out one aspect or component of an issue/program. Picture the local housing official whose agency is under contract to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide subsidized housing to low income persons in his community. From HUD's perspective the local official is the implementor. However, the local official may determine objectives, plan, program, budget, implement, and evaluate even though he is presented with a number of "givens" in his contract. In this case the objectives, plans, and programs developed primarily at the federal level become the context within which the local program mover activates his entire governing process. In recent years, federal policy in many program areas has been designed to maximize local discretion with respect to each component of the governing process. Revenue sharing is typical of this approach.

Even staff functions can be viewed in the context of the governing process. The budget director or personnel officer can set objectives, plan, program, and so on. In such cases, the inputs and outputs are from
and to various other components of the larger governing process. The boundary between one’s “own” governing process tends to be penetrated extensively by the governing processes inherent in staff functions. It is an important part of any program mover’s understanding of the context and environment in which he works to perceive the boundary between “his” governing process and other, related processes. The way in which these boundaries are established and the linkages among the components of the governing process can in part be traced back to the program characteristics described in the Introduction to this sequence.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE COMPONENTS.
A specific example may help to demonstrate the concept of the governing process as a set of discrete yet interdependent decision areas. Consider the “issue/program” of water quality. It is national in scope, has traditionally fallen within the province of state and local governments, is technical in nature, is fraught with economic and environmental trade-offs, and very directly touches (literally) the lives of citizens each day (unlike, for instance, national defense). A complex (but quite typical) federal program has been created to deal with the nation’s water quality problems. The broadest level of goal setting is found in the preamble to the Water Pollution Control Act, to make the nation’s waters “fishable and swimmable” by 1983. The Act (and its implementing regulations as prepared by the Environmental Protection Agency) prescribes planning, programming, and evaluation procedures to be carried out by EPA, the states, and, through the states, local governments. The local water quality manager (or program mover) is part of the implementation component as seen from the federal perspective. However, from his own view, and in spite of goal statements, regulations, and funding associated with the program, he has a full agenda from goals through evaluation. Using federal, state, and local resources, he must identify specific problem areas reflecting technical and political (public values) criteria. Through citizen involvement and intergovernmental coordination, a set of local goals must be established which satisfy strictly local concerns while also receiving state and federal approval. This may be quite easy if the goals are set at a very general level so as to permit varying interpretations suited to the needs of the active interest groups. Specific community conditions may force inordinate attention to a particular fact of the overall problem (such as a particularly dirty lake or the proliferation of septic tanks) to the detriment of other technical problems. In this regard, the program mover is likely to find that his technical staff, likely engineers and planners, have preconceived ideas concerning the “proper” goals, objectives, and solutions to problems. He also is likely to find that financial and time resources are insufficient to fully develop and evaluate alternative solutions (or programs). Water resources (and the activities
which impinge upon them) are rarely found within a single political jurisdiction. Therefore, programs may have to be "sold" not only to rival interest groups with conflicting values, but also to various agencies at different levels of government. The allocation of resources and the direct implementation of management programs are likely to be once or twice removed from the direct control of the program mover. This factor must be reflected in the early stages of planning and programming. Potentially, the evaluation phase can be straightforward because it will focus upon relatively precise and scientific measurements of water quality. But the program mover must yet be sensitive to the difference between outputs and consequences by looking beyond assumed cause and effect relationships to the broader socio-economic and political implications. Measurement and analytical techniques become very important in the evaluation as the actual trade-offs are experienced by the "winners" and "losers." It may be particularly important to house the evaluation component in a highly neutral (or politically insulated) institution to accentuate the significance of lowering pollutant levels by parts per million as compared to increasing development or construction costs by hundreds of dollars per unit.

A major, national policy initiative such as the Water Pollution Control Act might appear to give the program mover a clear, unencumbered field of action. Such is not the case. Existing institutional arrangements, economic conditions, local issues, staff characteristics, and other factors in the environment make each specific application of the national goals and guidelines a unique administrative experience in terms of the components of the governing process.

DECISION-MAKING AS THE ESSENTIAL ACTIVATOR OF THE GOVERNING PROCESS. If nothing else, the nature of the interdependence among its components suggests that there is nothing automatic about the governing process. Its operation requires the investment of available resources of money, time, manpower (including expertise), and political support. These resources are applied in varying degrees and combinations to some or all of the steps of decision-making bearing on each of the components of the governing process. Decision-making is the glue which holds the components together. Because of their different characteristics, the components of goal setting, planning, programming, developing and allocating resources, implementing, and evaluating are likely to involve different applications of resources to decision-making. Decisions made with respect to one component may bear directly on another. How decisions are made and by whom may vary from program to program.

For example, decisions concerning goals, which may be generalizations to which all can agree while sacrificing little and possibly gaining much, are often the result of informal processes worked by the
ad hoc association of a few. They may be more a matter of subscription to a carefully worded statement than deliberation or negotiation. Decisions regarding plans and programs — part concept and part commitment — may evolve from the work of a task force association or a collegial professional staff ratified by a wide circle of formal “name” participants. By contrast, decisions that spell commitments to the raising and appropriating of specific sums of money for specific purposes to be spent over specific periods of time typically grow out of the most formal and highly structured process. Broad-based participation marks every step of the process from the setting of budgetary limits to the signing of appropriations bills. The process itself becomes one of the determinants of the decision outcome. This probably accounts for the strong focus of public administration scholars on the budgetary process as compared to other governing process components.

Virtually no two decisions are made in precisely the same way. Moreover, the making of major policy decisions is so complex, so intricate, so full of participants and passion, analysis and advocacy, to say nothing of nuances and hidden agendas, that full analysis is well nigh impossible. Nevertheless, as examination of Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis makes clear, it is possible — by using one or more analytical frameworks — to obtain a generally reliable idea of how particular decisions were, and perhaps are, made. The single rational actor model (I) indicates the ideal approach that each program mover thinks he, as a single entity, takes or wants to take in making “his” decision. The “process model” (II) refers to decisions that are significantly shaped by standard operating procedures concerning such aspects as communications, scheduling, referral, clearance, and approval. The political or participation model (III) focuses on decision-making that reflects the impact of many participants, each with his own concept of rationality. Virtually all decisions, not just the Cuban Missile Crisis, involve combinations of all three models. As a variation of Allison’s process model (II), the components, as listed immediately below, represent a process not only for analyzing decisions but also for determining participation in decision processes (“working the system”), and designing decision-making systems.

Initiation — responding to an opportunity or pressure.

Investigation — gathering and analysis of relevant data, conducting hearings, determining legal requirements, etc.

Consideration of alternatives — comparative analysis, deliberation, etc., of available alternatives.

Choice — negotiation on the choice of available alternatives acceptable to participants in the process.
Ratification — approval or absence of disapproval of chosen alternatives.

Would that decision-making were that straightforward, that rational! As Allison, to say nothing of the experience of virtually every practicing administrator, makes clear, public decision-making is subjected to multiple forces of limited rationality. Imprecision and/or conflict often mark the initial definition of the problem. There are often as many policy values and problem perceptions as there are participants. No public decision-making starts with a clean slate. Encumbered with precedents, existing commitments, interests and institutions, all decision-making is more or less incremental. And the shorter the time horizon the more this is so. Many public programs are so intricate and widespread in their operation and so devoid of reliable measures of impact that it is almost impossible either to determine precisely the limits or boundaries of the decision framework or to anticipate accurately all that will happen if alternative "Z" is followed rather than "A". It is also difficult to control the nature and extent of participation. The very phenomenon of participation by many leads to "plural rationality", each participant having a particular combination of values, objectives, and strategies. Then there is also the phenomenon of luck or coincidence; e.g., timing, the political environment, events, personalities, personal health and disposition, and whatever other issues happen to be absorbing decision-making resources.

These forces of limited rationality are usually complemented by limited resources — not enough money to buy the desired analysis, not enough data, not enough time and/or manpower to accomplish the necessary research and evaluation, not enough power to do the necessary negotiation, acquire the necessary support, or buck the existing system. Often designers or implementers of rational decision-making systems fail to consider the benefit/cost aspects of their attempted rationality. There is a "cost of search". It is not at all certain that 50 percent more information, even if purchased at a reasonable price and taking two more weeks to develop, would produce a 50 percent "better" decision. The law of diminishing returns applies to investment in analysis as it does to efforts at developing meaningful participation in decision-making.

The literature of public administration and organizational behavior is full of research findings and theoretical treatments of decision-making. They can all contribute to understanding the conduct of public affairs. Although it is not essential that the program mover have full command of this literature, it is important that he have a thorough understanding both of his own decision-making processes and of available strategies applicable to different circumstances. For decision-making is the current that flows through and activates the governing process from goal-setting to
evaluating, and back to goal-setting. Just as the components of the
governing process are interdependent, the many decisions which consti-
tute those components are interdependent. The types and categories of
decisions for a given program may be more closely associated with one
governing process component than another. For example, a decision to
adopt a zero-base budgeting system might be classified as bearing most
directly on the resource allocation component, but with some implica-
tions for each of the other components. Similarly, the elements of
decision-making may be represented as organizational units associated
with particular governing process components or with a series of deci-
sions comprising the application of all of the components to an issue/
program. As Allison has demonstrated, the analysis of decisions must
take into account the environment in which the decision is made, the
characteristics of the problem, and the point of view of the decision
maker. Few program movers have the opportunity (or perhaps the
resources or need) to analyze the decisions which constitute the outputs
of their governing processes. The concepts described in this unit are
designed to enhance the program mover’s ability to understand the way
in which program characteristics are transformed into decisions and
actions.

To return to the local water quality manager, we can see how these
ideas concerning decision-making might apply in a specific case. The
program characteristics, as manifested in his particular situation, may
lead to disposal of stormwater generated by rainfall. In its entirety, the
solution to the problem involves both substance and process decisions
(what to do and how to do it). Because one of his major concerns must be
water quality, the substantive decisions are likely to be innovative in
nature (the traditional approach to stormwater disposal has been quan-
tity oriented to prevent flooding). Depending on the nature of his staff,
(perhaps as represented by his position in the Public Works Depart-
ment), the tendency towards routine decision (Public Works) may over-
shadow innovation (Environmental Resources). A technical problem-
solving approach (involving rational decision-making) is likely, but polit-
ical and socio-economic criteria may not receive systematic attention.
Guidelines imposed by state and federal agencies may accentuate plan-
ning and programming at the expense of resource development and
implementation. Citizen participation requirements may strongly influ-
ence the decision-making process as developers, conservationists, and
civic associations attempt to protect their interests in light of alternative
stormwater policies. Even though the general program characteristics
are familiar across the 80 or so federally financed water quality manage-
ment projects, local circumstances shape the specific forces which de-
terminn the program mover’s opportunities and decision-making pro-
cesses. It is this uniqueness which makes public administration a sometimes fascinating, sometimes frustrating, profession.

**APPLICATION OF PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS.** As stated in the *Introduction* the basic hypothesis of this sequence is that the ends and means of program moving are determined primarily by program characteristics. Since this is central to a comprehension of the concepts of this sequence, an analysis of an issue/program in terms of its characteristics follows.

The program is one of the major air defense missile systems of the Department of the Army. It is managed in a field installation. Project offices provide for the total system management, planning, coordination, and integration as well as day-to-day management and technical oversight of the program.

A. *Substantive Characteristics:*

1. What are the program objectives? The primary objective is to provide for the national defense of the United States. A sub-objective is to provide air defense for the Field Army. In a broader sense, the program is more encompassing than national defense. NATO and other of our allies throughout the free world use the system for air defense of their countries. Therefore, the objective actually encompasses air defense of the free world. There are many sub-objectives associated with the foreign use of our air defense system. From the standpoint of the foreign countries, the system is often used to upgrade both personnel and economies.

2. Who are the clientele? The clientele vary significantly depending upon the chosen objectives. They can be defined as narrowly as the citizens of a foreign country or as broadly as the free world. With regard to air defense for the Field Army, the clientele are the infantry soldiers on the front line. With regard to our allies, numerous jobs are provided and the clientele are varied. These jobs provide social as well as economic advantages. Many of the jobs upgrade the personnel skill levels with attendant increase in social prestige. The personnel often receive training in electronic circuitry when only months before they had little knowledge of the benefits of electricity.

3. Is the program routine or developmental in nature? The program provides a mixture of routine and developmental aspects. Most programs of this type are developmental in nature when they are initiated, since the ends and means are usually untested and are often controversial. The system has been deployed for over 20 years, and much of the program is routine in nature. However, the system has been continuously upgraded and product improvements are usually in process. Im-
34

provements worth millions of dollars are in process at the present time. In this sense, the program is definitely developmental in nature.

4. What is the degree of interaction with other programs? The program is highly interactive with other programs. Efforts have to be complementary in nature between the program and other Army, Navy and Air Force defense programs in order to provide a balanced defense. However, there is competition between the air defense agencies and the military services since all must compete for the same limited funds, and without continued funds the program will die. However, the major competition is between defense and the social programs of health and human services.

The program is also highly interactive with foreign governments and private industry. It is complimentary with foreign government programs in that the defenses must mesh in order to be properly effective. In addition, military assistance and foreign military sales programs are generally complimentary in nature. However, there are governments which buy directly from U.S. contractors and others who co-produce the system in conjunction with U.S. contractors. This creates conflict in two ways. The direct sales cases are in direct competition for the time and manpower resources of U.S. contractors. Contractors desire more direct sales and co-production cases since they make more profit when they deal directly. This sometimes complicates efforts on foreign military sales cases.

There are also interactions with other efforts. The program is complementary with efforts to upgrade disadvantaged companies and communities. Specific contracts are used to train employees in high technology to upgrade companies with minority employees.

Direct conflict exists with energy and ecology programs. The significant amounts of travel required to conduct the program and the diesel generators required to test and run the system use significant amounts of fuel. There are ecological pollution considerations from radiation, smoke, and noise.

5. What is the geographic scale of the program? Approximately one-fourth square mile is required for operation of one system component; it provides approximately 1,000 square miles of defense. Even on this scale, foreign regional governments become involved. However, due to supply and repair functions, coupled with operational functions, it would appear that the smallest geographic scale for the program is worldwide
with present limitations to the free world.

6. What is the degree of technological complexity? The system has been at the cutting edge of technology for over 20 years. However, the level of technical sophistication is moderate at this time. The system has advanced radar technology, particularly in the area of continuous wave radar which is used in enforcement of speed laws. Electronic technology has been improved, particularly in the area of high powered electron tubes. It was the first Army system to use computer technology tactically. Due to mobility requirements, the system continues to lead improvements in strength-of-materials technology. Other complex technology continues to be involved in developmental efforts. It also should be noted that the management technology involved in controlling a multi-national corporation is quite complex. The organization must function much the same as an industrial corporation even though it is a governmental organization. Matrix management and complex managerial problem solving techniques are typical in this environment.

The system uses many different kinds of technology and finds different uses for the same technology. This is due to the different ages of various major items of equipment and the world-wide application of the system throughout the years in varying environments.

7. What is the degree of program balance between service and regulation? Defense efforts are primarily service in nature, and this is the case with the program. There are, however, some regulatory aspects of relations with contractors.

B. Financial Characteristics:

1. What are the sources of funds? Funds are provided from the federal budget, which is financed from general tax revenues. Of a federal budget of approximately $550 billion, Defense accounts for approximately $125 billion and approximately $70 billion is for air defense. Although this is significant from an overall cost of ownership, it is even more significant from a gold flow standpoint. At the present time, a small part of our general operating funds comes from foreign military sales. In addition, specific funds may be provided to accomplish a specific task for a foreign customer.

2. What is the degree of financial interdependence with other programs? The project office has its own budget, which is a separate line item in the DOD budget. There are other sources

4 Fiscal year 1978 budget
of funds which are buried within the DOD budget. For example, military assistance funding to a foreign country is sometimes channeled back into the project office to provide air defense for that country. However, in most cases, these funds are relatively small.

3. What is the degree of perceived adequacy of funding? Defense and Army generally believe funds are adequate to do the mandated air defense job. The project office seldom feels that the funds are adequate; there is usually a list of unfunded yearly requirements which exceeds $10 million. There have only been three or four occasions over the past 20 years when the project office was satisfied with the resources. However, program staff seldom considered funds to be so inadequate that the quantity or quality of performance was impacted. The funding availability does dictate that most efforts are justified on the basis of cost effectiveness models and studies.

4. Is the program distributive or redistributive in nature? The R & D efforts in the program are generally redistributive in nature since the primary immediate benefactors are in areas where the funds are spent. This provides specific benefits to the contractors involved and their employees, as well as secondary benefits to the areas where they shop. Once the generated concepts are implemented and fielded, the defense provided is distributive in nature since the general taxpayer is being protected.

C. Political Characteristics:

1. What formal political jurisdictions are involved? The U.S. air defense system is similar to the old British empire upon which the sun never set. Equipment is dispersed almost world-wide. Therefore, from an operational standpoint, the program operates within the local government boundaries or jurisdictions worldwide. However, even though the program must react indirectly to other governments, the project office is under the jurisdiction of only the U.S. government. The U.S. government is greatly involved with foreign political jurisdictions as a result of the program.

2. What interaction does the program have with legislative bodies? The project office has very little interaction with the legislative process except for funding and occasional interfaces with Congressional committees and GAO investigations. However, the program enjoys excellent Congressional support. This may partly be attributable to the fact that funds for development efforts provide political plums for city, state, and Congressional politicians in the form of jobs. In the United
States, the majority of the funds are used in California, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Illinois, Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia.

3. What is the nature, intensity and source of political reactions? Very little political activity is directed specifically toward the program. Business interests favor more and more air defense because it provides more profit. These defense contractors often apply political pressure directly upon their Congressmen. This is sometimes encouraged by government employees in order to initiate or continue a favorite program. Foreign governments are sometimes politically active with regard to the program when they desire improvements to the system to keep it updated and cannot afford the changes by themselves. There are also general interest groups who are becoming more and more vocal in saying that the U.S. now has less defense capability than its enemies and that we, therefore, need to spend more money for defense. The major non-specific activity against defense is provided by programs for Health and Human Services and other competitors for funds. The same is true within DOD where there is competition among supporters for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

4. What are interest group strategies and impact? The primary strategy is directed toward Congressional and DOD influence. This is sometimes effective. However, the impact is long-term due to the length of the planning and budget cycles.

5. What is the elitist/pluralist nature of decision-making? The project management concept is an integral part of the management philosophy for development of Army weapon systems. This concept vests in the Project Manager the full line authority for accomplishment of the mission assigned by his Charter. One would assume from this that the decision-making on our program was dominated by one person or organization and is, therefore, elitist in nature. This is not the case. Decisions are often made jointly with the U.S. and foreign users, Department of Army, Defense, and defense contractors and occasionally Congress. Since decisions are dominated by many different groups, the process is basically pluralistic in nature.

D. Institutional Characteristics:

1. How suitable is the formal structure and process of the program? The organizations in our formal chain of command are typical layered, military model hierarchies. These bureaucrat-
ic organizations provide a formal structure with fixed positions, responsibilities, and rules. The project office follows these same structural patterns. Project offices are generally used in areas where intensified management is required or desired. The project management concept is one of the best management techniques to use in order to complete a major task-oriented effort. Therefore, the formal mechanism is established and it appears to be adequate and proper for the program.

2. How adequate are the informational and analytical resources? Information is provided in the form of daily messages, detailed reports and records, and computer print-outs. Simple and complex computer models help in the analytical processes. Significant amounts of training and planning are oriented toward insuring that informational and analytical resources are available and that they are understandable and understood. Most key decisions are based upon much analysis. Although some analytical efforts may be of questionable validity, in most cases, more analysis appears to provide better answers. Critical technical issues are based upon the complex computer models. Assuming the computers are properly programmed, this also leads to better decisions.

3. Are the human resources adequate? From a quantitative viewpoint, recent surveys have indicated that the project office has sufficient quantities of people, except for engineers. It may be of significance that most of these surveys were conducted by the engineers. From a qualitative viewpoint, the critical nature of the tasks and the pressures of the project office tend to "weed out" the less capable. Therefore, project offices tend to have a high quality of personnel.

4. What is the degree of complementarity or conflict among areas of program expertise? There are many different groups involved in the program. There are project, laboratory, and other government related personnel as well as contractors and consultants. There also are many specialties within each of these groups such as program management, quality assurance, test, supply, support, engineering, and international staff. All of these are molded together in a team concept which appears to work as it should. For better or worse, this overall team concept seems to be dominated by the government engineers. The only significant conflict potential comes from the fact that the government personnel are task motivated and the contrac-
tor is additionally motivated by profit. However, since this is recognized by the team, conflict can be avoided and the groups work together well.

5. Morale, motivation and ethical attitudes? The attitudes are good and optimistic with the approach that the job can be done properly. Most are motivated by patriotism as well as professional pride and their ethics are scrupulous.

E. Most Significant Factors. The most significant factors appear to be the degree of technological complexity and adequacy of analytical resources, the perceived distributive nature of the program, the pluralist nature of decision-making, and the adequacy and motivation of personnel.

The degree of technical complexity and adequacy of analytical resources play a large part in the ability to justify money and staff. It is much easier to justify resources for a highly complex project just because it sounds complicated. The analytical resources are necessary to properly resolve some of the more complex technical problems and the availability of analytical data also is important in the current constraints on obtaining funds and people.

The perceived distributional nature of defense is important from the standpoint of being able to concentrate upon the tasks assigned. In many instances, people spend so much time defending the program that they have little time to actually do the job. The lack of this type of problem in most Defense programs makes the tasks more pleasant to address and easier to accomplish.

The pluralist nature of the decision-making process is extremely important for all government functions in a democracy. This often makes the tasks of the program mover more difficult since it is necessary to interface effectively at many different levels simultaneously. However, since the cure is worse than the disease, it is important that the program mover understand the problem and meet the challenge.

Although they are sometimes overlooked, the people who actually perform the assigned tasks are extremely important to any program. This is particularly true in a program as complex and widespread as this. If there are not enough people or if they are not properly trained or motivated, the work quickly migrates to a few who become so overworked that nothing can be done properly. Therefore, the workforce is extremely important. This must also include the leaders of a project since the people will not likely rise above their leadership.
Participants Please Note: All assignments—commentaries and exercises—and all reading—required, suggested supplemental, and recommended—are subject to change, and are regularly revised. When changes are made, however, participants will be notified by the Cluster Director and/or the DPA Program Director. Until changes are made in this way, the instructions regarding assignments and reading stand as stated in this curriculum statement.

COMMENTARY ASSIGNMENT:

1. The components of the governing process not only represent the program mover’s responsibilities, they also represent identifiable organizational functions or activities. Prepare an analysis of how the components of the governing process are reflected or represented in the organizational structure and procedures applicable to a particular agency handling a particular program with which you are familiar. If some of the components are entirely or partially handled outside the particular agency, indicate the nature of the relationship involved. Also indicate how the substantive, financial, political, and institutional characteristics of the program tend to accentuate or subordinate certain components of the governing process.

2. The value of Allison’s three models of decision-making lies in their potential for applicability to other situations, including those far less imperative than avoiding World War III. Prepare an analysis of a particular program decision with which you are familiar, as participant or as observer, applying Allison’s models, as appropriate.

If you apply one model, you should indicate the reasons for your choice. If you apply more than one, you also should indicate in what way they are related, whether or not one appears to be dominant and, if so, why. Be sure to demonstrate your understanding of Allison’s models, and avoid the temptation to tell an interesting story devoid of the required analysis.

DISCUSSION TOPICS:

1. How are the components of the governing process, as defined, operationally and organizationally distinct? How and why are they interdependent? What impact do they have on one another?

2. Budget analysis and budget processes (as the essential aspects of resource allocation) appear to represent the dominant vehicles of interdependence among governing process components. Does appearance match reality? What is the evidence? Why is it or is it not so? Most important, how do budget analysis and budget processes affect and reflect the other components? What are the determinants of budgetary incrementalism?
3. What differences, if any, would you expect to find in the decision-making process applicable to the different components of the governing process? Explain.

4. In what ways were the processes of decision-making in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as described in Allison’s Essence of Decision, functions of the nature of the crisis (i.e., its substantive, financial, political, and institutional characteristics)? Assuming an “essence” of validity in each of the models, which do you consider the lead or determining model in the case? Do you consider its dominance unique to “Cuban Missile Crises” or generally applicable to public decision-making? Explain.

EXERCISE:
In groups of six to eight participants each, analyze one of the following issues/programs in terms of its program characteristics—violence in the schools; drug abuse prevention and control; nuclear waste transportation, storage, and disposal; or the registration and draft of persons above the age of 18. The Preceptor will provide the requisite background information. Select a chairman, a recorder, and a reporter. One hour will be set aside for the analysis. Each group then will make a report of its analysis which will be critiqued by the full body of participants.

READINGS:

Required

Suggested Supplemental
Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L., (Editors), Papers on the Science of Administration (3rd Edition), Institute of Public Administration, 1937 (Especially Chapter I — Notes on the Theory of Organiza-


UNIT 2 (6.2):  CENTRAL ISSUES FACED BY THE PROGRAM MOVER

The previous analysis of the components of the governing process tells us little of how or why they are applied, and why applications differ in nature and extent from situation to situation. Nor does it consider adequately the values and forces involved in decision-making. The basic thesis of this Unit is that the nature and extent of the program mover’s application of the governing and decision-making processes are significantly affected by four central issues: (1) discretion and control; (2) the individual and the organization; (3) purpose and process; and (4) stability and change. The assumption is that these are the principal issues in public administration and that other identifiable issues are either subsets of, or subordinate to, these four. Inherent in the four issues are the contrasts between the behavioral (individual) and structural (organizational) concepts of bureaucratic theory, as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEHAVIORAL ORIENTATION</th>
<th>STRUCTURAL ORIENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discretion</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These separate but related choices constitute strategies that underlie the operation of the governing process. They are inevitable in that the program mover is constantly faced with having to make choices, some of major importance, some of minor significance, some of crisis proportion, some of routine nature, some that will make or break him, some that will mean one more or one less commitment.
These issues frequently force the program mover to choose between two or more opposing sets of values and corresponding courses of action, where the more one course is followed, the more the benefits of that alternative are obtained, and the benefits that might have been derived from the alternative choice are progressively less favorable.

BALANCING DISCRETION AND CONTROL.
Discretion implies permission or freedom for an organization to operate its governing process generally as it sees fit. Control implies external direction conveyed in the form of mandate, incentive, standard, or prohibition that prevents or limits self-determination. They are linked as two sides of a coin as neither condition is absolute; neither exists without the other; a change in one (e.g., an increase) normally means a change (e.g., a decrease) in the other. The means of providing discretion and exercising control lie within resource allocation arrangements (e.g., pre- and post-audits, performance criteria, reporting, inspection, etc.) and organization arrangements (e.g., formal organization linkages, channels of communication, and authority). An example might be a county mental health department that is financed by a grant from the state government. The director of the department has discretion in providing a program of therapy but he may be prohibited from seeking commitment of a mentally ill person to a hospital without the approval of a state agency.

From the perspective of the program mover, the balance between discretion and control is both applied to him by outside, and presumably higher, authority and by him on the units within his organization. For example, the director of a mental health center may be authorized to give final approval to all purchase orders as long as he keeps within his authorized budget, but he may instruct his staff to submit all purchase orders for over $500.00 to him for approval. The nature of the balance between discretion granted to him and control placed upon him has a great bearing on the balance he exercises within his organization.

These “external” (determined by someone else) and “internal” (determined by the program mover) balances between discretion and control are influenced by the impact of the substantive, financial, political, and institutional characteristics of the issue or program (as defined on pages 7-23 above) that necessitates the establishment of the balances. For instance, other characteristics being constant, the more specific the stated objectives of a particular program, as directed at a particular sector of the public interest (e.g., clientele or regulated industry), the more control-oriented will be the imposed external balance. Conversely, the more general the stated objectives and the more general and varied the public sector affected by the program, the more discretion-oriented will be the imposed external balance.
The responding internal balance between discretion and control as applied by the program mover to the components of his organization reflects the imposed external balance. An imposed control-oriented balance will probably be met by a relatively neutral internal balance or possibly by a compensatory discretionary balance; that is, an attempt to create a measure of freedom and flexibility within the confines of the control orientation. As a case in point, a dean of a school of public administration may be subjected to strict budgetary controls, with every course required to pay its way. He may exercise almost no control over the choice of the faculty of the school as to the teaching methods in the courses given.

Conversely, an imposed external discretion-oriented balance will most likely be met by a relatively control-oriented internal balance. Being obliged to interpret and apply the discretion-oriented mandate from "topside", since he is both responsible and accountable, the program mover will feel compelled to impose some control on the components of his organization to achieve his specific interpretation. For example, the mayor or the city manager may tell the police chief to reduce crime in the city by 25 percent within six months, with no instruction as to his methods. The chief will probably be very specific when he issues his instructions to his department for implementing the new crime reduction program.

The program mover’s objective will be to establish a relatively control-oriented balance of flexibility sufficient to spur discretionary activity consonant with his interpretation but not so controlling as to stifle initiative and produce mindless conformity. Whatever balance he does establish will usually be applied to most of the components of the governing process as operated by his organization.

The issue of discretion and control is illustrated in the cases of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Program movers in both organizations long had very broad discretion. But with the death of J. Edgar Hoover, the Watergate affair, and ensuing revelations about the excesses of the man and the Bureau, much of the discretion has been removed and control has been imposed upon the Bureau and its Director. The same has happened to program movers in CIA. The Watergate break-in, the Agency’s mismanagement of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bumbling efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro, the “destabilization” of Chile, the unauthorized mind-changing experiments on U.S. citizens, etc. have resulted in ever tighter control being imposed upon CIA program movers. As a result, CIA now is subject to oversight by eight Congressional committees, (four in each House — Intelligence, Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs/Relations) consisting of around two hundred members of Congress and
several hundred congressional staff aides. National security and intelligence matters become a source of great concern when so many persons are privy to them.

RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS.
Balancing discretion and control is in part a function of how the program mover attempts to meet the needs of the individuals in his organization while fulfilling the needs of the organization. As covered in Sequence 4, the professional and personal motivations of individual workers may complement, depend upon, and/or conflict with the objectives of the organization. The overwhelming need of the organization for competent and motivated employees is consistent with the employees' need for the organization and its program as a means of fulfilling their professional and personal objectives. It would seem logical that achieving organizational objectives would contribute to job satisfaction; in reality this often is not the case.

The program mover is forever trying both to maximize the reciprocity and minimize, if not eliminate, the conflicts between individual and organizational needs. In so doing, he makes choices on behalf of his organization and on behalf of each individual on his staff. (A related consideration is the program mover's decision for himself, as an individual on his superior's staff.) How the program mover mobilizes and maintains his staff, how he assigns work, how he supervises work, and how such assignments become rewarding to staff involved in varying components of the governing process depend on how he chooses between personal and institutional perspectives.

The capability and motivation of available personnel determine the participation in, and success of, the program mover's governing and decision-making processes. The critical need of the individual and the organization for each other determines both manpower development strategies and the standards of performance across the components of the governing process. As examples, the program mover is faced with such questions as: In terms of available or "recruitable" staff, to what extent can I strengthen my leadership and/or my control by enlarging my planning staff? To what degree and in what areas can I afford or am I forced to delegate my implementing authority? Are standards from above such that to interpret or to make the most of them I need a cost/benefit analyst, an internal expediter, or a communications system expert?

Beginning with Woodrow Wilson's landmark essay in 1887, "The Study of Administration" and continuing to the present, great attention has been directed to the issue of balancing individual and organizational needs and a very substantial, and often confusing, body of literature has evolved. Wilson believed that the study of public administration should
be concerned not only with personnel matters but also with organization and management. He advocated the study of "organization and methods of government to determine "first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or energy". He was concerned with organizational effectiveness and with employee efficiency—the primary ingredients of productivity.

In the early 1900's, Frederick W. Taylor, the father of the "Scientific Management" movement, undertook a series of studies in steel mills and other industrial activities, using, among other things, time and motion studies. In 1911, he published "Principles of Scientific Management" which was based upon the findings of his studies. His central conclusion was that there was "one best way" of performing any given task and that scientific management could increase productivity by identifying the fastest, most efficient, and least fatiguing production methods.

A third significant contributor, during the 1920's and 1930's, was Mary Parker Follette who devoted most of her career to social service. She noted that people in groups produce results in terms of thought and action that could not have been produced by any of them individually. She became increasingly concerned with the psychology of human interaction, the nature of constructive leadership, and the application of these fields to management (her focus was on the business community). Among her fundamental concepts were: (1) "circular or reciprocal response" (there is always a mutual influence between the parties to an interaction; the stimulus is always in some measure influenced by the response); (2) "integration" (a harmonious marriage of differences which come together to produce a new form, a new result); (3) "the law of the situation" (being sensitive to the reciprocal responses and evolving changes that constitute the situation, recognizing integrations that are still viable and accepting new differences and conflicts as they occur, keeping as the standard the goal of ever new integrations, and instituting the process early, before separate, intractable positions have had a chance to harden), and (4) "power with" rather than "power over" (if both parties obey the "law of the situation" and "put all their cards on the table", neither will have power over the other and integration can be achieved. She believed that effective management consisted of the application of the above concepts.

In 1938, Chester I. Barnard, a former President of The New Jersey Telephone Company, published "The Functions of the Executive." He attempted to provide a comprehensive theory of cooperative behavior in formal organizations. He accepted the concept of an organization as a

---

social system, defined formal and informal organization, distinguished between effectiveness (achieving organization purpose) and efficiency (satisfying individual needs), incorporated noneconomic motivation into theory of incentives, and developed an interesting notion of authority (a communication or order which is accepted by a member of the organization as determining what he does or is not to do so far as the organization is concerned); to support this definition of authority, he invented the "zone of indifference", i.e., there exists for every individual an area in which orders are accepted without being questioned: implicit in his definition, of course, is the idea that authority lies with the subordinate individual.)

A fourth major early contributor was Elton Mayo, a professor at Harvard University. He, and his colleagues, conducted seven studies at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company in Chicago during the years 1924-1932; all seven were concerned with employee productivity and the results were interpreted as reinforcing Barnard's concept of the power and significance of informal groups. Four experiments, conducted in the relay assembly room, were designed to determine how changes (increases and decreases) in illumination would effect the production rates of five women (their composition changed at times) who inspected parts, assembled relays, or wound coils. The women were reported as producing at an even higher rate as the illumination was increased or decreased, until the lighting was reduced to that of ordinary moonlight. Since nothing of a positive nature was learned about the relation of illumination to industrial efficiency, the investigators concluded that the experiments demonstrated the importance of employee attitudes and sentiments to increased productivity and the significance of what was happening had for them — the "Hawthorne effect".

The fifth experiment examined the effects of a new piecework payment method adopted for the relay assembly test room. While functioning as independent operators, the new payment plan resulted in an average increase in production of about 12 percent. Unlike the earlier experiments, however, the production rates of this group did not rise during the eight weeks that the five-person unit was used as the basis for piecework payment. The sixth experiment included five women who split, guaged, and trimmed mica that was used for insulation. Each operator was paid according to the number of items produced. The experiment was designed to determine the effect that ten minute rest breaks — one in the morning and another in the afternoon — might have on productivity. The output of the women was compared when they worked independently and as a group in a special room. The investigators found a 15 percent increase in productivity when the women worked as a group.
The last experiment was carried out with a group of 14 men in the bank wiring observation room, and incorporated no independent variables. The only way the men could increase their earnings was by increasing the total output of the group. The study resulted in a steady production rate. Each operator restricted his output to keep it relatively constant and the group wired two equipments a day. If one operator worked too fast, the others indicated their disapproval. They behaved in this manner because they believed that, if high production levels were reached, management would lower the piecework pay rate and they would be required to perform more work for the same amount of pay.

The interpretations of the experiments are numerous. Mayo believed that the relay assembly group produced more and more because they found themselves in a new industrial milieu in which their own self-determination and their social well-being ranked first and the work was incidental. Other analysts concluded that the rise in output was due to team work, to cohesiveness, to interpersonal relations, or to social unity. Whatever the actual cause and effect, the Hawthorne effect was to become a central concept in individual-organization needs.

The Great Depression of the 1930's—work and jobs were at a premium and individual needs tended to be subordinated to organization needs—and World War II—individual needs were met to a great extent by the positive values and attitudes created by contributing to the nation during a period of great crisis—put a damper on research in this area, except as it related to military requirements and operations, e.g., behavioral scientists were engaged heavily in designing methods for screening and selecting persons who would become, with proper training, combat pilots, navigators, radarmen, submariners, demolition experts, "frog-men", intelligence agents, etc.

After the War, interest and activity in the area of balancing individual and organization needs was renewed and accelerated. Strange phrases and words-of-art began to appear, each supposedly contributing something of significance to understanding. These phrases included "participative management"—employees should be given a voice and stake in policies and decisions that affect them; "flat organizations"—bureaucracy and red-tape are minimized and employee growth and development are facilitated when a manager has many persons reporting to him; "incongruity"—the needs of healthy individuals in the U.S. culture for individual expression and action tend to be incongruent with the demands of the formal organization for conformity and submission; "Theory X-Theory Y"—"X" places exclusive reliance upon external control of human behavior (treating people as children) whereas "Y" relies heavily on self-control and "self direction" (people as mature adults); the "hierarchy of basic human needs" varying from physiological-
so cal through safety, love and esteem, to "self actualization"; the "motivation-hygiene" — "satisfiers — dissatisfiers" concept in which the hygienic factors make employees happy with their jobs because they serve the basic need to become more competent; "sensitivity training" — group analysis designed to provide a person with insight into how he affects, and is perceived by, others; "transaction analysis" — a systematic framework for the therapy of ailing groups and organizations; and "job enrichment — horizontal or vertical" — increasing the content of a particular job.

By the end of the 1970's, a mind-boggling array of different notions and approaches to the issue of balancing individual and organization needs— the most fundamental and pervasive of the four central issues— had been invented. A new and rather perplexing classification had appeared, including: (1) organization behavior, defined as consisting of those aspects of the behavioral sciences — psychology, sociology, social psychology, etc. — that focus on the understanding of human behavior in organization; (2) organization development which concerns increasing the effectiveness of an organization through improving its problem-solving capabilities and its ability to cope with changes in its external environment; and (3) organization theory which focuses on how groups and individuals behave in varying organizational structures and circumstances. Each of these three categories has its set of disciples and semantics.

Despite the concern and attention given to the problem during this century, balancing individual and organization needs continues as the most intractable problem of public administration, as indicated by the following cases. On November 9, 1979, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management issued a news release containing preliminary findings of the first Government-wide survey of federal employee attitudes about their jobs and work environment. A survey questionnaire was completed by 14,000 federal employees who were randomly selected to ensure a representative cross section of agencies pay levels, pay systems, and supervisory and non-supervisory personnel. The release states, among other things, that "In addition, the survey enables us to draw some comparisons between the attitudes of the Federal and private sector workforces. These comparisons contradict many of the stereotypes of the Federal worker." Indeed, it revealed high levels of satisfaction with supervisors, jobs, meaningfulness of work assigned, and job security. Federal employees indicated strong commitment to their organizations, stated they worked hard on their job, and felt that the people they work with generally do a good job. Their principal dissatisfactions were with
the likelihood of promotion even if they perform their job well. Clearly, in many respects, the federal government seems to be doing a credible job of meeting the needs of its employees.

A report by the White House reorganization team, released November 3, 1977, contrasts starkly with the 1979 employee attitude survey. The report found that many federal agencies and programs were perceived as doing a poor job. Some of the worst were (the quotes in parentheses are those of various Senators or Representatives concerning a particular agency)\(^2\):

1. **Workers' Compensation.** The survey found that this office is probably the most unpopular in the government ("The claims examiners are insensitive and rude, and several don't know enough about the law to adjudicate properly.").

2. **Black Lung.** This program is perceived as stalling claims and ruling unfairly ("The Labor Department administers the black-lung program in a manner which indicates it is determined never to provide benefits").

3. **OSHA.** The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Department of Labor) is a special irritation to farmers and businessmen who cite it for nitpicking and harassment. Several congressional offices report strong pressure by constituents to abolish this office.

4. **Labor Department.** This Department seems to aggravate Capitol Hill offices more than any other Cabinet Department. ("After doing casework one year, I dread dealings with the Labor Department; treatment I have received repeatedly has been insolent, dilatory").

5. **Immigration and Naturalization Service.** Complaints go far beyond the problem of legal aliens to abuse of legal visitors, loss of birth documents, and delays of up to five years in processing naturalization cases. ("It would be easy to form the impression that Immigration employees hate all foreigners and wish they would stay home.").

6. **Internal Revenue Service.** While drawing sympathy for being the agency in most frequent direct contact with the public, the IRS is cited as the least responsive in Government. ( Constituents are "treated like criminals before being heard"; "The IRS demands payment on time or subjection to stiff penalties, but lags considerably when fault is theirs.").

7. **Social Security Administration.** Many respondents lauded the agency and observed that criticism is due in part because it serves so many people — one in seven Americans. But ("They have to be

---

nearly dead to get disability. Social Security doctors barely examine them”; “Most constituents who contact the Social Security Administra­tion about overpayments are treated as if they had intentionally stolen from the government.”)

8. Bureau of Indian Affairs. This agency was criticized by practically everyone. (“BIA is considered by most knowledgeable constituents to be an unnecessary, inept, corrupt group—which permits exploitation of native peoples.”)

9. Mixed returns. Other Departments—notably Health, Education, and Welfare, and Housing and Urban Development—were criticized for confusing, contradictory, and excessive regulations. Both were criticized for failure to return calls—to Congress as well as to the public.

Most often praised were the Veterans Administration and the State Department’s Passport Office, noted for its efficiency. The Department of Defense also was praised for giving straight answers to questions that put it in a poor light.

10. Other findings. Throughout the survey, virtually every federal agency was criticized for abusing the people it was created to serve. Senator Howard Metzenbaum, (Democrat of Ohio), in comments on the survey, said, “My major complaint is that most bureaucrats forget that is a real, live, usually hurting, human being waiting out there for what is his right.”

These two studies would seem to indicate that the individual needs of federal employees are being met to a large degree, but that the needs of federal agencies for effective performance and service delivery are not.

During the latter half of the 1970’s and into 1980, the situation in local government was the reverse—individual needs of local employees were not being met as indicated by strikes, sick outs, resignations, and other manifestations of employee discontent. A major cause of such discontent was, and is, double-digit inflation and especially the increase in the price of basic necessities—energy, shelter, food, and health care. For the decade of the 1970’s, the price of basic necessities rose 129 percent, compared to a 74 percent increase for non-necessities. In 1979 alone, the cost of the necessities of life rose 17.6 percent. Understandably, the behavior and actions of local employees were motivated by efforts to obtain pay increases to help offset the escalating increases in the costs of living. But deep-seated non-economic motivations also were at work. Two groups clearly illustrate this phenomenon—teachers and police.

Increasingly, elementary and secondary school teachers, who constitute over 40 percent of all government (federal, state, and local) civilian employees are suffering from teacher “burnout”—the emotional, phys-
ical, and attitudinal exhaustion that causes them to question their value and dedication—and is causing teachers in significant numbers to resign their jobs. Occasionally, burnout manifests itself as a physical problem from headaches and stomach cramps to alcoholism and drug abuse. But more often, it is a matter of mental fatigue and a growing distance from a once-held dedication to the profession. Teachers cite the following factors as among the causes of burnout: too much testing, drug-fed violence and vandalism by students, students’ lack of respect for authority, current pressures for accountability (teachers held responsible for what students do not learn), too little support from educational administrators, school boards, or the community, and anxiety and fear.

A similar phenomenon has developed among policemen. The symptoms are high blood pressure, lower back pain, problem drinking, skin disorders, cynicism, divorce, apathy, passivity or overaggressiveness, brutality and suicide. The build up of tension and stress stems from such factors as living with danger so much of the time in a society where crime and violence seems endemic — the nation’s crime rate has risen 300 percent in the past 19 years, (a part of this increase reflects greater attention to reporting crime), and the FBI Uniform Crime Report of 1977 stated that, nationally, there was one Crime Index Offense every three seconds, one violent crime every 31 seconds (one murder every 27 minutes, one forcible rape every eight minutes, one robbery every 78 seconds, and one aggravated assault every minute), and one property crime every three seconds (one burglary every ten seconds, one larceny-theft every five seconds, and one motor-vehicle theft every 33 seconds). A society seemingly growing more violent and permissive and a criminal justice system characterized by plea bargaining, “revolving door” justice, and seeming incapability to make punishment fit the crime in many cases, creates tension and stress in policemen which are manifested in many ways, including brutality, illness, and resignation.

It is imperative, in the 1980’s, that improved means of balancing individual and organization needs be developed and that, in large part, these new approaches must include substantial attention being devoted to the external environment and the forces and factors therein which impact heavily on the jobs and behavior of many government employees. A potentially important step in this direction was taken in President Carter’s 1978 reform of the federal civil service system in its provisions designed to provide protection to “whistle blowers” (e.g., Ernest Fitzgerald, a career analyst in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Fitzgerald, concerned about the sizeable cost-overruns in conjunction with the C5A, a very large jet transport aircraft, as well as its inability to meet the designed performance characteristics, and frustrated by the fact that Department of Air Force and Department of
Defense officials refused to take corrective action, felt compelled, in the public interest, to go outside the Executive Branch. And, so he informed members of a Congressional committee of the problem during hearings on the Air Force budget. He was fired. The (then) U.S. Civil Service Commission upheld his firing. Fitzgerald took his case to the courts and a judge ordered the government to re-employ him. It did but assigned him to a job of little consequence, albeit at the same salary level.

Pertinent provisions of the 1978 Act State:

Whistle blowing involves situations in which an applicant, former or current employee, accuses an agency official of violating a law, rule or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, or acts constituting a significant danger to the public health or safety. The accusation may be made to the Special Counsel of MSPB (Merit Systems Protection Board), an Inspector General, or publicly.

The Special Counsel has two types of duties. First he must protect the employee against retaliation and may for that purpose temporarily stay an agency action. MSPB may stay the action permanently. The Special Counsel must also refer the employee's substantive complaint, without revealing his identity, to the agency. Within 15 days he must advise the agency whether it is required to investigate the charges. Investigative reports must meet certain criteria specified in the law and are sent to the Special Counsel, the President and Congress. A report is also provided by the Special Counsel to the complaining employee.

The Special Counsel also must decide whether the investigation, on its face, appears to meet the requirements of the Law.

RECONCILING PURPOSE AND PROCESS. The relationship of ends to means survives as perhaps the most durable issue or "trade-off" in public administration. Its roots are in the complementary/conflicting interaction between politics and administration. For the practicing program mover today, it boils down to making process responsive to purpose and not an end in itself. But purpose requires program and program requires the mobilization and conscious collaboration of human beings applying over time their skills with the aid of equipment and facilities. There must be some process; therefore, some rational arrangement of structure and function is essential.

The problem is that the pursuit of rationality so often detracts from, and even substitutes for, the pursuit of social objectives. Problem-solving becomes the legitimate and laudable melding of ends and means. Developing decision-making processes that assure adequate investigation, full consideration of alternatives, and "maximum feasible participation" may become its own reward, and thought to be an adequate return on a costly investment. As essential as they are, the components of planning, programming, budgeting, implementing, and evaluating can sometimes absorb more financial and human resources, as well as time and political resources, than they contribute to program success. For example, the time consumed in maintaining the search, via necessary
procurement procedures, for the lowest qualified bidder may be such as to sabotage the program for which the procurement was needed. Moreover, a literal following of the rule of three in personnel selection may preserve the sanctity of the merit principle, but it also may cost an organization a capable and well motivated professional. Hewing to necessary but elaborate communication procedures can stifle association, creativity, and cooperation. Procedures to assure accountability can absorb excessive amounts of an agency’s program budget into administrative overhead.

But what constitutes “excessive” if there must be accountability? When do communication procedures, essential to any organization, begin to stifle, or stifle more than they facilitate? It is not only that procedures may become excessive as ends in themselves but also that, not being neutral to what they serve, they affect the substance of public policy. Quantitative systems analysis, as a procedure, will inevitably exclude program factors, “good” or “bad”, that do not lend themselves to quantification, and hence skew programs in other directions. As Schick’s assigned article on the death of PPBS suggests, the programmatic and political potency of such non-quantitative factors can lead to a change of procedures. The constant pursuit of procedural rationality in order to bring order and economy out of the presumed chaos of large and complex public programs nevertheless continues to press a means-end choice on the already hard-pressed program mover. How does he combine and, at the same time, distinguish between program success as a purpose and agency survival as a process? Consider another personnel process, where a city civil service commission has the authority to reinstate a dismissed employee, and they do so in four out of five appeals. The process of appeals may seriously interfere with the city manager’s program, especially if he removes a senior administrator for what he considers good cause, and the administrator is reinstated.

The Veterans Preference Act of 1944 is an example of the frustration of purpose by process. By this Act, the U.S. Congress, in attempting to recognize and reward veterans for their contribution to the nation, removed much of the “merit” from the Civil Service (Pendleton) Act of 1883. Section 2 of the 1944 Act stipulates that “In certification for appointment, in appointment, in reinstatement, in reemployment, and in retention in civilian positions in all establishments, agencies, bureaus, administrations, projects, and departments of the Government... preference shall be given to (1) those ex-servicemen and women who have served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States and have been separated therefrom under honorable conditions and who have established the present existence of a service-connected disability or who are receiving compensation, disability retirement bene-
fits, or pension by reason of public laws administered by the Veterans Administration, the War Department or the Navy Department; (2) the wives of such service-connected disabled ex-servicemen as have themselves been unable to qualify for any civil service appointment; (3) the unmarried widows of deceased ex-servicemen who served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States during any war, or in any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized), and who were separated therefrom under honorable conditions; and (4) those ex-servicemen and women who have served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States, during any war, or any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized), and have been separated therefrom under honorable condition.

Section 3 states “In all examinations to determine the qualifications of applicants for entrance into the service ten points shall be added to the earned ratings of those persons included under section 2 (1), (2), and (3), and five points shall be added to the earned ratings of those persons included under section 2 (4) of this Act: ...”

It is Section 7 of the Act in particular, that drains away merit from the U.S. civil service system. This Section provides that “The names of preference eligibles shall be entered on the appropriate registers or lists of eligibles in accordance with their respective augmented ratings, and the name of a preference eligible shall be entered ahead of all others having the same rating: ...” (underling supplied)

Over the years, these provisions of the 1944 Act have resulted in the blocking of many civil service registers of eligibles and the recourse to such dubious procedures as “name requests” from operating agencies and “selective” certification by the Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management).

In his 1978 reform of the federal personnel management system, President Carter proposed some modifications to the above provisions of the 1944 Act. The veteran lobbies were so effective in bringing pressure to bear in the U.S. Congress that no change resulted.

The Savas-Ginsburg article (required reading) elaborates upon the extent to which personnel processes frustrate the purposes of the merit system.

Budgeting is another area in which purpose and process have conflicted, at least in recent years. As Lindblom, Wildawsky, and others, have pointed out, the recent emphasis on a systems approach to budgeting (PPBS, zero based budgeting, and sunset mechanisms), has emphasized process while yielding little evidence to indicate that actual budgetary decisions have become more rational or less incremental than was previously the case. The importance of these various techniques lies not
so much in the vocabulary and procedures as in the concepts. It is apparent that the various systems approaches have increased the awareness of managers concerning other components of the governing process. "Measureable objectives," "decision packages," and "extended planning horizons" have become commonplace ideas. What is not clear is the extent to which these techniques have influenced the way in which budgeteers or legislators have made decisions about the relative importance of national defense, education, and curing cancer, (for example). There exists a very real question as to the ability of any system to rationalize the costs and benefits of program alternatives across program areas. The most consistent indicator of probable expenditure levels for next year continues to be the current year budget.

CHANGE AND STABILITY. The internal desire and external pressure to be ever current is forever countered by the internal pressure and external desire to be stable. Like process, institutional survival becomes an end in itself. Bureaucracies, whether they be in public agencies, corporations, or unions, seek nothing so much as security from outside forces. The history of reorganization suggests that most reorganizations are externally pressured rather than internally motivated. A newly elected official, as a program mover, is often pressured by political considerations, not by management needs, to reorganize. With circumstances constantly changing, the career program mover will try to adapt his governing process accordingly. More likely, however, he will seek to hold on by doing things in the established way, not upsetting his organization or his internal-external power equilibrium any more than necessary and hoping that circumstances will change again to a more favorable climate. A different climate with different forecasts may develop into a long-term opportunity that creates the difficult choice between changing and remaining the same. If the choice becomes "change", there immediately arises the sub-choices centering on what change, affecting who, creating what support and opposition, carried out by what means, and all at what cost?

In many ways, change and stability is the most significant of the four issues because it is so closely intertwined with the other three. Changing the structure or procedures of a given governing process reflects or causes changes in the balance of discretion and control, in the relationship of the individual to the organization, and in the responsiveness of process to purpose. By the same token, change also may reflect adapting to different external forces in order to maintain the same equilibrium inherent in the resolution of the other major problems the administrator faces.

CRITICAL FACTORS IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE. A June 1975 report of the National Academy of Public Administration addressed the change-
stability issue and its complexities in a study of reforms or attempted reforms in U.S. foreign affairs agencies from the end of World War II to 1973. The report abstracted from the research eight critical factors within which the level of performance is likely to augur well or ill for success in virtually any organizational change effort. They include:

1. Source of Power or Authority. This is one factor which not only applies to all of the cases but is invariably "critical". By definition, an organizational change effort must have a source of power or authority, or it would have to be called something else. The relevant questions have to do with: identification of the power base, its nature, how genuinely it supports the proposed change, how sustained that support is, and whether it is strong enough to deal with opposition and achieve the desired results.

   By definition, the power source provides power, not necessarily creativity. The power source may indeed be the instigator of a change effort, but by no means is this always the case. Even more rarely does it actually implement the change (see discussion of change agents below).

   The role can include either the instigating or legitimizing of the change effort, providing of logistical support, dealing with formidable opposition, building support elsewhere, and making crucial decisions such as approving or altering the content of the change, whether or not to compromise, and whether to persist or give up.

2. Nature of Change Agents. The presence of a change agent is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success in organizational change. The chief considerations are status, function, ability, and relationship to the power base.

   There are three functions that a change agent can perform: (1) identification of a problem or need; (2) development of a proposed solution; and (3) implementation. All three functions may be performed by one individual or group, or by separate parties. The involvement of a power source as a change agent is often limited to the first function of problem identification. But frequently the initiative comes from a change agent who "sells" the existence of the problem (and usually a proposed solution) to the power source.

   Usually, implementation is the most difficult and neglected of the three functions. Here the change agents are fighting in the trenches of bureaucratic warfare. They must be salesmen, negotiators, monitors, and compromisers or re-designers, since a

---

change model almost always must be refined or modified as it goes up against organizational realities. And, whether the effort succeeds or fails, the implementers not infrequently are casualties in the classic manner of revolutionaries everywhere.

The relationship to the power case is crucial. The history of any organizational milieu is replete with stories of eager change agents who were carried away with the rightness of the cause or the power of their idea but run afoul of the Realpolitik of organizational change.

High status and good ideas are certainly useful, but without power and zealous implementation they are not nearly enough.

3. **The Stating of Objectives.** A sense of purpose is an obvious element of organizational change, as obvious as the need for a power base. Any one contemplating a change effort must have some objective in mind. The analyst of a change effort normally will seek answers to three questions: (1) What was the change intended to accomplish; (2) What actually happened; and (3) Why?

At times, objectives are not stated at all. When there is a more or less formal statement of objectives, important motivations or goals are frequently left out. Sometimes a change effort will be attributed to high-sounding, unassailable purposes that have little to do with reality. At other times, objectives will be overstated, either because of the zeal of the reformers or to help sell the reform. Conversely, objectives may be understated in order to avoid arousing opposition. Frequently, objectives may change in the course of implementation. Often there will be unintended effects, which later may be attributed to deliberate intent on the part of the reformers. All of these factors can be multiplied in a given change effort when there are multiple objectives, as is frequently the case.

4. **Inherent Value.** This factor addresses the nature of a proposed change assessed against conditions in the environment within which it is to be effectuated. The concern here is with the timeliness of the proposed change, the degree to which the existence of a problem or need is recognized, and the degree to which the proposed solution is seen as reasonable. Basically, the concern is with the importance of the change in terms of prevailing conditions.

5. **Leaders and Staff.** The people dimension is invariably crucial in organizational change. The planner of change would be well advised to give careful consideration to the availability of capable leaders and competent staff, not only in the design and sales
stages but also in the implementation stage where the personnel needs are sometimes overlooked or left to chance. Good staff work is extremely important, but no more a guarantee of success than any other single factor.

6. Involvement of Those to be Affected. A corollary to the previous category is the importance for change agents of considering the involvement of those who are to be affected by certain types of change efforts. When a reform is highly innovative or specialized in nature, a specially recruited or drastically reorganized staff is almost always vitally important. But the situation is quite different when a reform is going to change the conditions of life for an existing bureaucracy. A special staff may still have an important role to play as the cutting edge of the reform.

Basically, there are only two ways to achieve an important change in an existing bureaucracy. One is the authoritarian way, the decisive application of power, which is tantamount to telling employees to like it or leave. The other is the participative way, the patient, long-term effort to involve employees in both the design and execution of the change with the hope that, in that process, they will fully internalize it.

Any serious change in an organization involves some redistribution of power and new influences on the self-images, career incentives, and comfort of employees. There is, therefore, an element of risk in either model, which is why the choice often can be a critical one for change agents. An authoritarian change might cause too many employees to leave or, more likely, result in too large a cost in terms of damaged morale and lowered effectiveness. A participative approach requires great skill and allows full latitude for bureaucratic gamesmanship. A frequent result is that the bureaucrats simply outlast the change agents, reverting ultimately to old and comfortable norms. This can happen in the authoritarian approach, too.

Both approaches have their benefits. The authoritarian approach is not as messy, it saves time, and it reduces the chances of the change being compromised. The participative approach increases the chances of more genuine acceptance, improved morale, and better performance.

Up to now at least, the authoritarian approach has been attempted much more often than the participative one. One of the difficulties in the authoritarian approach is that very often the will or resolve or sheer ruthlessness is lacking, so that the approach has only an authoritarian illusion rather than a reality.
7. Scope, Constituencies, and Methods. This multiple category begins to get into the area of the tactical considerations in mounting change efforts.

It is almost axiomatic that the less sweeping a desired change is, the more likely it is that it will succeed. On the other hand, the more sweeping a change effort, the stronger the power base must be to attain success and the more that attempts must be made to build support in other constituencies.

Building constituencies can be an important tactical consideration when there is a need to establish counter-veiling power as a hedge against the likelihood of opposition elsewhere.

Generally, of course, the need to build support is based on an assessment of whose interests are going to be affected by the contemplated change. This can be important even when the change is internal to an agency. The need is more manifest when the interests of other agencies are involved.

High-level committees, especially when eminent private citizens are among the members, are likely to see their role as limited to analysis, diagnosis, and prescription. It is up to somebody else to play the power games and get involved in implementation. This suggests that the high-level committee, though it may have attributes of visibility and status, is a weak method of bringing about change unless strong external support is provided and a band of change agents is waiting to move the product at the earliest opportunity.

The point is that no particular method of change is inherently strong or weak. It all depends on how it is used. The problem is that organizational leaders frequently delude themselves in attempting to bring about change. They often appear to think that making a hortatory statement, issuing a directive, establishing a study group, creating a committee, or reorganizing is sufficient to accomplish the desired result. It is rarely sufficient. What must be done is to select methods appropriate to the change and to fortify them with effective performance in all of the relevant critical factors discussed here.

8. Timing and Linkages. A sense of timing and a concern for linking one change effort to another can be important tactical considerations. They should be differentiated from the strategic considerations of "timeliness" discussed earlier.

The linking of one change effort to another may help each reinforce the other. In a larger sense, a concern for linkages recognizes that an organization is a system of interacting parts, and that a significant change in one area often has important
effects in other areas, whether intended or not. Therefore, maximum success may require coordinating several changes. Timing is obviously a key consideration in such coordinating efforts.

In early 1980, the pressures for change are gathering forces as government appears less and less competent to cope with problems and to move in new policy directions. At the federal level, for example, a leading Congressman is urging a sweeping reorganization, as indicated below in an article of February 10, 1980, by the Miami Herald Washington bureau:

"America is reeling blindly from crisis to crisis because its entire system of government is outdated and unworkable, according to one of the most powerful and scholarly members of Congress.

'Government is a mess,' says Rep. Richard Bolling (D., Mo.). And even though the subject of government reorganization is 'dull as dust', Bolling said, there is no more urgent problem today than the need to rehabilitate the government so that it can start coping effectively with the other crises—energy, inflation and foreign chaos—confronting the nation.

Bolling rarely holds press briefings and seldom introduces legislation. He said, however, that he is so concerned about what he termed 'the breakdown of government' that he is offering a bill to try to do something about it.

Bolling's bill would establish a high-powered Commission on More Effective Government to study the federal government, including its relations with state and local governments, and then offer recommendations for reorganizing it.

'We've got to find better ways of dealing with our social, economic, defense and foreign policy matters, he said. 'The old policies, forged in the two decades after World War II, no longer serve us. But we haven't formulated new ones, and I don't believe we will until we create a climate for the emergence of new coalitions on these issues.'

The commission, similar to but more comprehensive than the celebrated Hoover Commission that drew the blueprint for government reorganization in the late 1940's, would have two major purposes, Bolling said.

It first would restructure the government to eliminate waste, inefficiency, duplication of services and contradictory policies and programs.

Then it would serve as a catalyst to speed up the formation of new bipartisan, public-private coalitions to push for new policies to deal with current and future problems.

He (Bolling) said that a growing number of people are losing faith in government as a problem-solver.
“Not because people don’t think government ought to be involved,’ he added, ‘but because authority is so diffused and accountability is so confused that people don’t know where to go to find out who’s in charge.’

Bolling also said that problems today seem to be so intractable because the old coalitions have broken down and new ones—composed of business, labor, conservationists, etc.—have not sprung up to replace them.

He sees the commission as a way to focus on those problems and as a vehicle to encourage the formation of the new coalition he believes necessary.”

The February 1, 1980, issue of Public Administration Times, carried an article entitled, “Restructured Government May End Fiscal Crisis” in Wayne County, Michigan. It stated, among other things:

“The Michigan Senate has approved a bill to restructure the government in Wayne County, where a 1979 cash flow crisis led to an $18.2 million budget deficit and the elimination of 418 positions in the county work force.

The Senate-House compromise bill . . . provides for the election of a charter commission. Governor William G. Millikan has refused to release state funds owed to the county until an election date has been set.

Financial problems in the county have been tied to the current structure of government, which gives authority to the 27-member Board of Commissioners, the 3-member Board of Auditors, the County Treasurer, and elected department heads.

If approved, the commission will be able to propose to the voters an elected official of government or give the voters a choice between an elected official and an appointed county manager.

Millikan has already voiced his approval for an elected official in the county. The current bill provides that this official would have veto power over the board of commissioners. The board could override the official’s decision only by a two-thirds vote.

Participants Please Note: All assignments—commentaries and exercises—and all reading—required, suggested supplemental, and recommended—are subject to change, and are regularly revised. When changes are made, however, participants will be notified by the Cluster Director and/or the DPA Program Director. Until changes are made in this way, the instructions regarding assignments and reading stand as stated in this curriculum statement.

COMMENTARY ASSIGNMENT:

1. Analyze your program in terms of its characteristics—substantive, financial, political, and institutional.
   a. To the extent possible, identify the factors which are most signifi-
64

cant in terms of your governing and decision-making processes.
b. On the basis of the analysis, indicate what the likely balance
between discretion and control will be insofar as the program is
concerned.
c. In delegating to subordinates, what likely will be the discretion-
control strategy you will adopt? Why?

2. Prepare an in-depth analysis of the impact of one of the central issues
confronting you in the fulfillment of your responsibilities within your
agency and/or within the context of a particular program. The
analysis should include:
a. a description of the conflicting and reciprocal aspects of the cen-
tral issue;
b. the causes thereof;
c. attempts to resolve the issue; and,
d. if applicable, the interrelationships among the four central issues.

EXERCISE:
As was done in Unit 6.1, in sub-groups and with the same procedure,
consider:
1. what change-stability problems were encountered in the Office of
Education Case (one of the required readings)?
2. what other central issues arose?
3. what factors (among the program characteristics were the most sig-
nificant in the O E case?
4. what conclusions should be reached regarding the nature of the
reorganization and the way in which it was implemented?
5. how could the reorganization have been carried out more effectively?
6. what lessons?

READINGS: Required
Bailey, Stephen K., "The Office of Education and the Education Act
of 1905", Inter-University Case Program, Inc – #100. Syracuse, N.Y.
Natemeyer, Walter E. (Ed.), Classics of Organizational Behavior,
Symposium on Organization Decline and Cutback Management, Public
Administration Review, July/August 1978.
Richard Rose, "Implementation and Evaporation: The Record of
Savas, E.S. and Ginsburg, Sigmund G., "The Civil Service: a merit-
less system?", The Public Interest – #32. pp. 70-85.
Schick, Allen, "A Death in the Bureaucracy". The Demise of Federal

Suggested Supplemental
"...New Worlds of Service", Report to the Profession from the ICMA
Committee on Future Horizons, International City Management
Association, October 1979.
Kloman, Erasmus H. (Ed.), Cases in Accountability: The Work of the
The program mover is part of, not apart from, the pluralistic polity in which he operates. His operation of "his" governing process, as well as his handling of "his" major challenges, are in large measure determined by the way he and "his" organization respond to the day-in and day-out combination of opportunities and pressures from the many sources on which he depends and which have a stake in the outcome—good or bad—of "his" program. No bureaucracy is entirely immune to such outside forces. Nor is any bureaucracy completely helpless before them if it learns to work within the "power structures" which impinge on its decisionmaking.

The pluralism in which the program mover exists can be seen in the different types of representative roles played by the bureaucrat himself, by the elected executive and legislative officials, and by the judges. Pluralism can also be seen in the systemic nature of issue/programs that involve the many governmental institutions of the Federal system and in the involvement of non-governmental interests. And it can be seen, finally, in the underlying force of complementary and conflicting values, the power of which activates the various roles and determines their significance.

**A. Plural Representation.**

Each of the four representative roles within government, i.e. legislative, executive, bureaucratic, and judicial, has its own unique representative characteristics in both composition and operation. Each represents a different cross-section of all or part of the "public interest"; each impinges differently on the governing process, and each exerts its own
force or power within the process. That each role inevitably contains a bit of the other does not destroy the central uniqueness of each. What's more, the nature and significance of both impingement and overlap vary from issue/program to issue/program in accordance with the different characteristics of each. These variations occur within the legal and structural boundaries of their respective roles. Those boundaries, marked most clearly by political jurisdictions, election processes, and legislative processes are generally well understood when applied to the representative role of the elected official; not so, however, with that of the bureaucrat.

Along with appointed members of the courts, the program mover as a professional bureaucrat is not a formally elected representative, but he has a representative role nonetheless. As his "in" basket, his associations, and the priorities thrust upon him constantly demonstrate, he too has a constituency. It is a constituency made up in large part of program beneficiaries, supporters, and professionals. Although it cuts across formal electoral jurisdictions with a band of program demand and supply, it shares with elective representative the phenomena of proponents and opponents, of accountability and survival. As suggested by Norton Long, bureaucratic representation may indeed differ from that of legislative bodies but it is equally important, both in its own right and also as both counterpart and complement to legislative representation. The program mover must maximize the complementarity and minimize the conflict between the many interests he represents and his concept of the program which he is responsible for conducting. The attached diagram, developed by the late Professor Wallace S. Sayre in a very perceptive and pragmatic analysis of the "actors" involved in the Federal decisionmaking process, suggests the span of "power structures" and representational relationships. With appropriate adaptations, the Sayre model can be used to identify similar relationships at the local (including municipal governments) and state levels of administration.

B. Systemic Program Relationships.

The plurality of institutional representation as established by our constitutional system of government is complemented by a complex of program interrelationships dictated by the interacting behavioral patterns of different public issue/program systems. The shape and functioning of these patterns are in large measure determined by the substantive, political, and institutional characteristics of the issue/program system.

As indicated, for instance, in the Ostrom description of the "water industry," there is a natural affinity among programs concerned with water supply and usage in terms of related policy objectives and clien-
* The presidential and congressional lines of influence have been modified to reflect organizational changes since the Sayre model was developed.
tele, common or related technologies and scale, integrated economics and cost/benefit relationships, horizontal or vertical process linkages and patterns of professional career mobility. All are subject to the same value conflicts between water quantity and quality, economic development and environmental preservation.

These shared characteristics give integrity as a functioning system to the water sub-industries of irrigation, hydro-electric power, navigation, flood control, and recreation. The system is not always smooth nor devoid of conflict, but it is, essentially, more continually and internally interdependent than are systems based upon different characteristics.

The complex web of program interdependencies both function within and shape institutions that have formal jurisdiction over components of the water industry. Most important, it is the dynamics of program-behavior interdependency that activates the governing process within and between formal institutions. The association visible in the water industry can readily be recognized in other policy areas as well—health, education, welfare, law enforcement, transportation, to name but a few.

By the same token, the substantive, political, and institutional characteristics of the administrator's program as the system or as part of another larger system determine to a major degree what components of his governing process he can internalize, i.e., effectively operate without significant outside interference. They determine what components he can or must negotiate over regarding outside participation by other bureaucracies, superior authorities, clients, and/or affected interests. They also determine his actual—as well as attempted—participation in the governing processes of others. As described by Norton Long in his analysis of “Local Government as an Ecology of Games,” each participant, in carrying out his own mission, depends upon the participation of others and is himself essential to the fulfillment of other participants' missions; all of this cumulates into some generalized concept of the community's social will.

This concept of systemic interdependence among separate bureaucracies is, to varying degrees, applicable throughout all governmental activity. It explains why public policy represents a bewildering, fascinating, awesome, and often frustrating complex of program interactions—interactions that are only partially represented by the chains of command and communication links of formal organizations. No identifiable program is entirely self-contained or independent of other programs. Similarly, each program is further complicated by being an integral part of a highly pluralistic and diverse set of non-governmental “power structures” (or “actors” in Professor Sayre's terms) which impinge directly or indirectly on its decisionmaking and operations. Thus, though it may claim or yearn for sovereignty, each program necessarily
must acknowledge and adapt to its dependence. Each public program and agency has its system of numerous interdependencies—of support given and support received.

C. The Underlying Force of Plural Values.

In the final analysis, the motivating force behind the patterns of representation and the complex dynamics of programmatic and organizational interaction is the multiplicity of substantive, political, and institutional values. Rooted in American culture, these values pump life and vitality into the corpus of issue/program characteristics. The content and operation of public programs, to say nothing of their force and intensity, their currency and image, reflect the synthesis of conflicting and complementary values.

Herbert Kaufman suggests the evaluation of governmental activity in terms of values of representativeness, neutral technical competence, and leadership. The program mover is concerned with all three. The overriding value of administration appears to be that of rationality, i.e., logical choice of the most efficient and effective alternatives based on objective consideration of all relevant facts. Yet, as all administrators have experienced, rationality is plural. Every participant in the government process has his or her logical choice in terms of his or her values. And the nature and extent of participation (itself a value in the democratic process) are functions of the perceived impact on the values held.

Thus we see Boston’s superintendent of schools operating on his own values of maintaining the city’s educational systems while at the same time threading his way between many values including racial integration, educational quality and efficiency, ethnic survival of South Boston, law and order, political survival and others. Long’s article on the “city as reservation,” to say nothing of the 1975 issue of New York City’s financial difficulties, contrasts the existing value premises upon which current assistance and service programs are based. Stephen Bailey’s description of the passage of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 shows how the emergence and ultimate acceptance of new values led to new policies, new programs, and reorganized institutions reflecting those values. Similarly, President Nixon’s General Revenue Sharing Program reflected acceptance of widely-held and heralded values regarding efficiency and local determination; it also reflected less obviously the acceptance of the value of majority will over minority interests. Both values are having an impact on local priorities and how these priorities are determined. The development of General Revenue Sharing and its cousin, Special Revenue Sharing, which reflects other values of program objectives and accountability, has to be interpreted against the continuing reliance upon categorical grant strategies, their supporting values, and the bureaucracies that maintain them.
In short, the program mover makes no move that is value-free. He strives or survives, succeeds or fails, within the bounds of complementarity and conflict. Consequently, the ultimate challenge facing his managerial leadership tomorrow is not merely one of administering today well within conventional values but of helping to shape and act upon new values for responsible and responsive representative government.

D. The Program Mover’s Challenge: The Dynamics of Pluralism.

The multiple interrelationships and interdependencies of numerous interests, both within and outside of formal governmental structures, as well as the complexities resulting from differing values require the program mover to be as knowledgeable as possible in the dynamics of the environment in which his operations and decisionmaking are conducted. Change is a constant factor which requires analysis and action as it impinges upon those elements affecting “his” program.

A useful “tool” for maintaining currency in the management environment, i.e. understanding changing relationships and values, is Professor Sayre’s model of Federal decisionmaking, with appropriate modifications. (Decisionmaking in the Federal Government: The Wallace S. Sayre Model is a required reading assignment for this Unit.) By locating himself in the appropriate place in the model and providing for adequate research and information, the program mover can maintain managerial strength in directing operations. Such an approach will enhance his comprehension of significant changes in relationships between the several “actors” involved as well as those of significance which occur within institutions or sets of “actors”. And it will enhance his ability to make appropriate decisions on a timely basis. Some selected comments on several of the “actors” in the Sayre model will illustrate and elaborate on the kinds of changes which are occurring at the Federal level of government — and other levels as appropriate — which have major impacts on the program mover’s decision making.

“Bureau” Leaders/Program Movers. First, it should be noted that though there tends to be general stability in significant numbers of “bureau” leaders at the Federal level, there is also continuing change. Programs are divided, transferred, curtailed and eliminated or new ones are created. For example, the estimated 350-400 “bureau” leaders/program directors are currently undergoing major changes as the result of the November 1980 election and the new Administration’s trend toward a reduction in the Federal government’s role in our society. It is reasonable to expect that some lessening in the total number will emerge as modifications are effectuated. And associated results will occur at the state and local levels of government as they receive transferred responsibilities or as new demands emerge. The relevance of these changes to the program mover is obvious.
Similarly, the dynamics of pluralism can be expected to require adaptations in the decisionmaking of the program mover at the local level of government. For example, the current organization of Broward County, Florida, with just over one million residents, consists of 43 divisions (equivalent to "bureaus"), including Agriculture, Fire Protection, Motor Vehicle, Parks and Recreation, Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Services, Health, Consumer Affairs, Criminal Justice, Social Services, Veteran's Services, Youth Development, Aviation, Engineering, Mass Transit, Streets and Highways, Water Management, Solid Waste, Water and Waste Water, etc. These "bureaus" may also require adjustment by the program mover as actions of the State of Florida and the Federal government impinge upon local responsibilities or as the basic forces of social and demographic change alter the program mover's decisionmaking problem.

The Presidency and Congress. The newly emerging roles of the President and Congress as well as their principal staffs are also illustrative of dynamic pluralism at the Federal level. They are creating a key set of factors for the Federal "bureau" leader which cannot be ignored.

For example, Presidential staffs and their operation within the system tend to reflect primarily the "personality" and values of the Chief Executive. Thus, the "bureau" leader must stay attuned to the formal and informal communications of the Executive Office of the President—including the White House Staff—if he is to be effective.

Since most major Federal programs today concern, in one way or another, a number of departments and agencies, a central task of organizations in the Executive Office of the President is coordinating the policies and programs of these agencies. "Bureau" leaders, therefore, must be able to evaluate the importance of the varied and frequently conflicting signals and formal communications that emanate from the powerful units in the EXOP. Judgments as to when to respond positively, to ignore the signal, or to initiate counter action are critical. "Bureau" leaders must learn when and how to respond to attempts to influence their action, if they are to long survive.

In commenting on the Presidency, a panel of the National Academy of Public Administration reached the following conclusions as to the proper role of the Office of the President. These were summarized by David S. Broder in a December 5, 1979, article in The Washington Post:

*The only good thing to be said about the continuing agony in Tehran is that it has put a quietus on the Presidential campaigning here in the United States. And in that enforced silence, it is possible to think—

*The National Academy of Public Administration's report, "The Presidency for the 1980's" has since been published and contains an extended analysis of key aspects of the Presidency.
perhaps for the last time—about the top office to be filled in the first election of the new decade.

That was the objective which drew two dozen people to an early 19th Century house, surrounded by a park, in a quiet corner of Mr. Jefferson's university, for two days last week.

The conversation at the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia was informal and off-the-record, designed mainly to forward the work of a committee of the National Academy of Public Administration, which will be making a report on the Presidency next year.

But for those who were included in the group because they will be covering the 1980 Presidential campaign, the perspectives of the assembled scholars challenged a good deal of the conventional wisdom about what needs to be done to restore the office to its proper place in the political and Governmental spheres.

The conventional wisdom, it seems fair to say, is that we need a bigger person than Jimmy Carter to fill the Presidency. What was suggested here was that we may need, even more urgently, a smaller and more-flexible notion of what a President is and what he can do.

This was, let me hasten to say, hardly a Carter rally. Far more critical things were said of his term as President than were said in praise of his stewardship. But the comments heard here raised a substantial question, at least in this listener's mind, about whether the "cure" for what ails the Presidency lies in a fresh application of activism by one of the Carter challengers keen to breathe new vigor into the White House by a transfusion of his own excess energy.

Most of those who gathered here were, in one sense or another, "President's men." They were scholars of the Presidency, students of public attitudes toward the Presidency, holders of high-level jobs in the Carter Administration or its predecessors.

Yet, the notion that kept bobbing back to the top of the discussion was the somewhat heretical thought that the Presidency is in trouble, not because occupants of the Oval Office have been of insufficient stature, but because their concept—and ours—of the office has been inflated out of proportion.

The idea of the Presidency, it was argued, has been bent out of shape by all of the demands that have been placed on the office. People campaign too hard and too long to get there, make too many promises to too many people about what they will accomplish, and then work too frantically on too many fronts to keep from "failing" by the exaggerated standards which they—and we—have set.

As a result, the Presidency has lost the flexibility, the coiled-spring power, which is vital to the nation, and probably to the world, when a challenge of truly Presidential dimension comes along.

People who for two decades, in some cases, have been advising Presidents on how to accumulate and exercise power, now say the clearest requirement for a successful Presidency is to limit its objectives and resist extraneous or secondary demands.

If it was not exactly a suggestion to "think small," it was certainly a command to "be realistic about what a President can do."
Make fewer promises. Give Congress a more restricted menu of legislative "musts." Stick to the big issues in the budget. Share more of the glory—and blame—with the Cabinet. This is the path to survival in the Presidency that was suggested here.

If it was not that, it was certainly a warning against the muscular or he-man approach to the Presidency, embodied in the speeches of John Connally and Ted Kennedy.

The failures that have weakened the Presidency, they seemed to be saying here, have resulted from over-reaching not underachieving. It is a point worth keeping in mind.

Perhaps one of the most fundamental systemic changes which has occurred at the Federal level in the 1970's was in the Congress—its character, composition and operation. This has presented the "bureau" leader with a new "ball game" requiring continuing adaptations to the dynamic pluralism in the legislative branch.

Among the major characteristics which "bureau" leaders have come to recognize in the changing legislative environment are:

1. The shift in power from the Executive Branch to the Congress which has largely restored the balance of power between the two Branches; the 1973 War Powers Act and the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act were two of the major reasons for the reversal of the 40 years during which power had shifted from Congress to the President.

2. The fundamental change that has occurred in the Membership of Congress in recent years—in the (1977-78) second session of the 95th Congress, more than half of its members—61 Senators and 231 Representatives—were first elected within the past nine years; more than one-third of them had been in office for three years or less; they tended to be young, well-educated, and independent of Congressional leadership and the White House and they continued the Congressional revolution that began in 1974.

3. Many veterans of Congress have decided not to stand for re-election. One, who served in the House for 12 years and who decided not to run again, said: "Congress used to be a lifetime career. You died in Congress, or you tried to become Governor or Senator. On a clear day, some guys even saw the White House (the President). Now members are cashing in early. Congressmen are being watched more closely, criticized more and prosecuted more. And pay (now $60,662.50 a year) is not that munificent. Lobbyists make twice that much."

4. It is more difficult for Congressional leaders to exert leadership and "bureau" chiefs find it increasingly difficult to determine in advance what the likely outcome of a legislative initiative will be.

5. Congressional election campaigns are costly and becoming ever more so; special interest groups continue to establish "Political Action
Committees" which contribute to campaign costs and thus feel they have some claim on a Congressman's behavior. Former Congressman Moss, who spent 26 years in the House, said, in 1977, that campaign finance reforms begin with public financing: taking power from the special interests was the major task confronting Congress — without it, Members’ independence would diminish further.

6. One tradition remains sacrosanct, impervious to the sweeping changes Congress has undergone in recent years. Although there are no exceptions, generally speaking, it is the "Tuesday-to-Thursday Club" or the three-day work week: no serious work is done on Mondays or Fridays because so many Members go home to their districts and are not around to vote. One group of Members, formed in January 1980, regarded this phenomenon as being to blame for many of the problems that plague the House and suggested that, as a small step, committees meet on Tuesday and Thursday without the interruption of a floor session, with floor debate scheduled for Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

7. The growing power and number of Congressional staffers. In 1976, they numbered 18,295 — up from fewer than 7,000 in 1960. There were 3,400 aides working directly for the Senate’s 100 Members and 1,500 more attached to Senate Committees. On the House side, about 6,800 staffers serve 435 Members and another 1,500 are assigned to committee work. And the increase in numbers has continued. They write speeches, put out releases, handle complaints from constituents, and, most importantly, work with legislators, lobbyists, and one another to shape the laws. Harrison Fox, Chief counsel to a Senate Subcommittee studying the committee system in 1977, said, "All research is done by staff and perhaps 90 percent of all legislature ideas are generated by staff. In oversight, that is, checking that the laws are being properly carried out by executive agencies...99 percent is done by staff." Senator Robert Morgan (Dem., North Carolina) said in a floor debate in the fall of 1976, "This country is basically run by the legislative staffs of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives."

Walter Pincus, of the Washington Post’s national staff, and a former Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer, also is concerned with this situation, as indicated in the following article of August 19, 1979, from the Miami Herald:

I stopped by the Senate Caucus Room the other day to watch the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on SALT II and was struck by the 17—count ’em, 17 — staff aides who lined the wall behind the six senators who were present.

Side by side they watched and listened to the questioning of retired Gen. Alexander Haig — and did little else. There was almost no note-taking and little talk among them, or with the senators.
Sixteen years ago, while employed as a Foreign Relations Committee staffer, I worked the ornate Caucus room one day during hearings on the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty.

The Committee, back in what now must be considered the "old days," had a rule that only three aides could attend such a glamorous session. The reason was that the staff had already prepared a broad range of questions for all the committee members, whether Republican or Democratic. The senators back then didn't want aides hanging over them or around them, treating one or another of them like a puppet.

Furthermore, the committee professional staff in 1963 was just a handful compared with the roughly 50 staffers who work for the committee or are specially employed by each member these days to handle foreign-policy matters.

In 1963, each staff member had specific regional responsibilities or—as in my case—a particular investigation under way. We couldn't afford to sit around and watch the show—which is what the give-and-take of a good congressional hearing is all about.

The Staff director at the time, Carl Marcy, enforced the three-staffer rule with the unanswerable response to a plea to sit in: "There'll be a transcript tomorrow and you'll only have to wait a few hours for it."

Having been a staffer, I think I know what's drawing those to the bright lights of the SALT II sessions.

At best, the few who have prepared tough questions for one senator or another want to see how they play.

At worst, they want to show their importance, perhaps get on television or in a still picture that makes the newspapers and, at the least, be able to talk that night or later about "how it really was" when Henry Kissinger, Harold Brown or Haig appeared.

But more than just ego is involved. The "reform" of the congressional staffs the past 10 years has created a growing, exorbitantly paid Capitol Hill bureaucracy. It started out as an attempt to provide some equality for legislators in the battle with the Executive Branch for information. But it's gone far beyond that now.

To justify their $30,000 to $40,000 salaries, staffers now push their senators or congressmen into all sorts of new fields. Attempting to do more, Congress is doing less.

To satisfy the Foreign Relations and Armed Service Committees' staffs, the administration has had to provide hundreds of briefings, special reports and letters. Perhaps it is my own myopia, but the only result I can see of the new Hill SALT II staffing is that phalanx of staffers sitting by at the Haig hearing.

If there is one place to start attacking the fat that now bulges over "big government" in Washington, I think it's the legion of high-paid congressional aides.

Thus it seems clear that the Congress and the Presidency have been subject to the forces of intensified dynamic pluralism in the last decade. And the future promises new trends in the internal operations of both branches as well as in their interrelationships. The reverberations from these changes will have a ripple effect as they impact on other units and levels of government and the program movers in them.
Political Parties. Political parties as "actors" in the process of dynamic pluralism are a special problem and of somewhat different significance to the "bureau" leader. For almost a century, political parties have been under attack as an illegitimate force or influence on decision-making by bureau leaders. In general, the attack has been fairly successful due, in large measure, to the extension of the merit system throughout most federal agencies. Most careerists in the Executive Branch feel rather hostile toward the National Parties when their staff attempts to intervene in personnel or policy decisions. The parties, however, are important factors to some "bureau" chiefs in the Department of Justice, the U.S. Postal Service, the General Services Administration, and the Agency for International Development with regard to personnel practices.

The political process has been weakened by the polls and by television which have accelerated the decline of the political parties. The polls and television have become the preselectors of who can run for office. Modern technology overwhelmed the political process and drives out good people who cannot adapt to it. Is a professional class of politicians being produced who pose for TV cameras but do little else? Are not the parties and the process more isolated from the people than ever before? Have not the interest groups grown in power as the parties have weakened?

As noted by Professor Sayre, however, political parties are durable institutions and still find ways to exercise influence. They now exert pressure mainly through middlemen in the Presidential and Congressional sub-systems—Congressmen, senior staffers in Congress, White House staff, department and agency heads, and other political executives in the Executive Branch.

A number of scholars believe that the successful attack upon the political parties has had detrimental results in terms of effective governance. They maintain that the parties should be made more accountable for their role in influencing personnel and other decisions and that they then should be given greater influence in such matters. This point-of-view is argued by Robert D. McClure in the article entitled “Mis-guided Democracy: The Policy of Freelance Politics” which is one of the assigned readings for this part of the sequence. The article concludes:

More than 30 years ago, E. E. Schattschneider tried to teach the politically concerned the elementary lesson that large-scale democratic politics is not an enterprise of individual give-and-take and it can be conducted in one of only two ways—by organization around political parties or by organization around interest groups. In political struggles, the public, "the people", is an unorganized mass without power and significance. For the people to exercise power they must first organize themselves into some kind of group.
According to Schattschneider, if public policy destroys the party as one reliable form of group organization, interest groups, not "the people" or "the public" inevitably will control the political process. As "Free-Lance Politics" indicates, Schattschneider was right.

The Media. The Media also presents a special kind of problem in dynamic pluralism for the "bureau" leader-program mover, particularly, as noted in the Sayre model, since its emphasis in recent years has been on investigation and interpretive reporting. As a result, they are given special attention for operational purposes. Many decision-making strategies and tactics are influenced by the perspective which the "bureau" leader has of the media and this is use of the media in giving visibility to strategies favored.

Many "bureau" leaders would identify the following as characteristics of media reporting:

1. In general, there is a built-in conflict between government and the media. The media, in consonance with what polls reveal about public attitudes, are distrustful of government and government officials. The media believe that they have a responsibility to search and expose graft, corruption, and bribery which they feel exist at all levels and in all institutions of government.

2. The media are in business and must sell time on the electronic media, newspapers and magazines and get and keep sponsors.*

3. The media often use gimmicks as a way to attract public attention. The media tend to sensationalize highlight, conflict, and use a strategy of attack. They believe the public is more easily interested in a fight than in a straightforward discussion of a problem, a policy, or a program in depth.

4. They believe that many who go to the polls are "against" voters, apathetic unless stirred to discontent sufficient to energize them into action.

5. The mass communication media constitute anonymous communication. The consumer is rarely able to check the accuracy of the information provided and he is rarely able to evaluate the charge by its source.

6. Mass communication is communication of the few to the many, of an elite to a heterogeneous public.

In November 1976, Pollster George Gallup, who has been taking the pulse of American public opinion for over four decades, gave his per-

*As business enterprises, the general media are highly successful. During the five years from 1975 through 1979, they were the most profitable category of business in the United States; their average return on investment over that period was 19.6 percent annually.
sonal views on the American press and on U.S. domestic and international news broadcasting. He said:

I think we have credibility and that’s important, but it’s credibility for what end? I mean, what good is credibility if you don’t go on to tell people what’s good.

I believe that if a foreigner, someone in Europe or Africa, reads The New York Times everyday, I’m not all that certain he wouldn’t have a much worse opinion of the United States than he would otherwise — The Washington Post — you could put in any paper.

I think in this era of investigative reporting and so on, his (the journalist’s) job is digging out the dirt. I am not even certain this is good journalism.

He remarked further, that he found himself “at odds with most of the working journalists of today” and that most journalists assume that “if it isn’t bad news, it isn’t news. That seems to be it.”

In the assigned article, “Memo To The Press: They Hate You Out There,” Louis Bender, in reference to a conference on leadership which he attended, wrote:

“On the second day of the panel session, antimedia bitterness breaks out spontaneously, in nearly every group. In my own session (I was an observer, not a leader) four of the most impressive, attractive young political leaders we could ever hope to elect to office agreed without a quibble that the press was a totally negative influence on their attempts to advance positive programs of reform. I have to live two lives, said one young governor whose name is cherished by Common Cause. ‘One, to work on my programs and another to cope with the irrelevant, personal, frequently trivial interests of the press. They don’t care very much about what I’m really trying to get done.’ This spontaneity of criticism so stunned Hedley Donovan, the host and editor-in-chief of Time Inc., publications that he later remarked. “I thought it was particularly striking that a group of people who on the whole have prospered from the attention the press has given them, and indeed had been brought together by an organ of the press — were quite emphatic in their concerns about, as they saw it, superficiality in the press, unexamined power in the press, problems of accountability in the press, and the press’ general place in American Life.”

In another assigned reading, “The Media’s Conflict of Interests,” Donald McDonald, among many other points, commented:

Two facts about the media bear most heavily on the performance of working journalists and on the quality of their public affairs reporting. They are the big-business nature of the media and the increasing concentration of their ownership in fewer and fewer hands. Neither of these developments was foreseen by the founding fathers. Both of them jeopardize the freedom and diversity of expression and therefore they make problematic the possibility of realistic and wise decision-making by the American people.

Today, the business of the media is very big and very profitable. The compulsion to grow bigger and more profitable, while understandable — though often unattractive — in say, the oil, steel, and automotive
industries, introduces a profound conflict of interests in the media... it invites hypocrisy in media owners whose function, as A. J. Liebling once noted, is "to inform the public, but whose role is to make money.

There is, of course, another point-of-view about the media and the role it has played in informing the public and serving as a guardian of the public interest. Cater's *The Fourth Branch of Government* represents this viewpoint.* Cater argues that the media helped make democracy on a large scale possible. He described the role of the journalist as follows:

The American Fourth Estate operates as a de facto, quasi-official fourth branch of government, its institutions no less important because they have been developed informally and, indeed, haphazardly. Twelve hundred or so members of the Washington press corps, having no authority other than accreditation by a newspaper, wire service, or network, are part of the privileged officialdom in the nation's capital. The senior among them claim a prestige commensurate with their continuing power. For Presidents come and go but press bureau chiefs are apt to remain a while.

The power they exercise is continuing and substantial. ... The reporter is the recorder of government but he also is a participant. He operates in a system in which power is divided. He as much as anyone, and more than a great many, helps to shape the course of government. He is the indispensable broker and middleman among the subgovernments of Washington.

...He can illumine policy and notably assist in giving it sharpness and clarity; ... At his best, he can exert a creative influence on Washington politics.

... As the reporters in Washington survey the product of all their labor, the honest ones sometimes feel despairingly that more and more is being written about less and less. Despite the size of the press corps, the vast paraphernalia at its disposal, and all the government facilities for dispensing information, there is growing awareness of the perilous state of our communications. Yet, hopefully, there is also a new sense of awareness that our very survival as a free nation may depend on the capacity of reporters to relate the essential truth, and 'make a picture of reality on which men can act.'

The media warrant close and continuing attention and use by "bureau" leaders/program movers.

*Interest Groups.* In the past decade or so, interest groups have taken on a new dimension in the system of dynamic pluralism in which the "bureau" leader/program mover operates. Single-issue groups have multiplied significantly and have had a major effect not only on the "bureau" leader/program mover but on other interests and organizations in the general environment in which he operates. Congressional organization has been considerably altered by the development of the single-issue interest groups which have in effect "disintegrated" power and weakened party leadership.

Despite the new problems presented for dynamic pluralism by interest groups, as long as they stay within the intent of the laws governing lobbies, interest groups perform a legitimate and necessary function in government. Government has become so complex and large that the individual likely cannot gain an audience. Interest groups provide valuable information to Congress and the Executive Branch, mobilize support within their constituency for new policies and programs, and serve as a source of innovation and new ideas—perhaps to a greater extent than realized.

But their power, tactics, and methods concern many observers of the government scene, particularly their financial contributions to the election campaigns of Congressmen, their single-minded pursuit of their own objectives, and their destructive effect on the political process and the political parties.

As is the case with nearly every issue, there is at least one other point-of-view about interest groups. It is presented by Irving Louis Horowitz in "Beyond Democracy: Interest Groups and the Patriotic Gore", one of the required readings for this Unit. In the article, Gore stated:

...So what we have at the normative level is a fear that these interest groups are somehow evading the basis of American national purpose. But what is that purpose? How is it defined? Here one finds the attack on single-interest politics exposed as an assault on pluralism pure and simple.

...The interest group of today is closer to the Town Hall of yesterday than the political apparatus it supposedly has superseded. It is responsive in ways that are more natively American than the current political climate. The relationships of dollars to demagogues, of donors to recipients is much clearer in single-issue organizations and group associations than in the political party structure as it currently exists.

Career Staff. The final set of selected comments in this section is devoted to those who have pursued careers in government, i.e. career staffs. "Bureau" leaders/program movers cannot ignore the effect of influences created by the career staff which in the Federal government (and many other governmental jurisdictions) is in a state of flux. Most career staffs long since have adopted the military's concept of completed staff work which is extremely effective in preventing "bureau" leaders/program movers who are often migrants from the staff, from exercising independent analysis of even judgment; the staff does all the work, rules out all alternatives save one, makes a decision, and leaves room for the bureau chief to initial the document, indicating his approval of the course of action chosen by the staff. In recent years, bureau leaders have begun to realize what has been occurring and some now require that the
analysis conclude with the presentation and discussion of several alternatives. But “completed staff work” is still prevalent on the federal scene.

In commenting on the power and influence of the career staff in policy and decision-making, Hugh Heclo in “Bureaucratic Sabotage: How Civil Servants Undercut Presidential Appointees”, one of the required readings for this Unit, wrote:

Every day in Washington there are thousands of constructive contacts between political executives and the bureaucrats, usually without dramatic intrigues or ruthless infighting. But it is also a part of life that, when the changes the executives desire are too threatening, cooperation breaks down and bureaucratic opponents try to undermine political leadership. Bureaucratic sabotage is an extreme case, the Washington equivalent of guerrilla war. Yet even in this case, the veterans who survive are those who learn the value of a selective strategy that neither overreacts nor underreacts.

Any number of reasons—some deplorable, some commendable—lie behind bureaucratic opposition. Executive politics involves people, and certain individuals simply dislike each other and resort to personal vendettas. Many, however, sincerely believe in their bureau’s purpose and feel they must protect its jurisdiction, programs and budget at all costs. Others feel they have an obligation to ‘blow the whistle’ as best they can when confronted with what they regard as improper conduct. In all these cases, the result is likely to strike a political executive as bureaucratic subversion. To the officials (the career staff), it is a question of higher loyalty, whether to one’s self-interests, organization or conscience. The career staff, from any viewpoint, is a formidable force in public policy decision-making.

E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

Sequence 6.3 has attempted to identify and discuss the nature of basic management problems which the program mover faces: (1) a highly pluralistic system of “power structures”/interests whose systemic relationships are dramatically dynamic, and (2) a system of decision-making composed of widely varying and continually changing values.

It has also sought to provide a constructive, pragmatic and useful “tool” for the program mover in the form of the Wallace S. Sayre model of Federal decision-making—a model which can be adapted to apply to virtually all levels and organizational units of government. And finally it has elaborated on the nature and functions of selected “actors” in the Sayre model — “bureau” leaders, the President, Congress, political parties, the media, interest groups and the career staff. With appropriate modifications, many of the points made can be applied to the state and local levels of government.

As noted in the description, the system is complex, confusing and difficult for the operational decision-making of the program mover (or any of the “actors” involved), but the system is in essence democracy in
action. As Lewis H. Lapham writes on page 14 of "The Retreat From Democracy", one of the required readings for this Unit:

...If so little can be expected of the cultural ministries and the big media (referred to by one reader as 'an army of occupation'), then what will become of succeeding generations and the promise of the American experiment? Why must the magazine dwell so much on the imperfectibility of man and the failure of his grand designs? Might it not be possible to cast a more cheerful light among the ruins?

I don't know how to answer such questions except to point out that democracy is neither easy, quiet, orderly, nor safe. It assumes conflict not only as the normal but also as the necessary condition of existence, and it defines itself as a continuing process of change. Change implies movement, which implies friction, which implies unhappiness... Its strength, which is the strength of life itself, depends upon stress and the balance struck between countervailing forces. The idea collapses unless the stresses oppose one another with equal weight—unless enough people have enough courage to sustain the argument between government and the governed, between city and town, capital and labor, men and women, matter and mind.

Over the past twenty years, as the world has come to be seen as a more dangerous and chaotic place...the Darwinian interpretation of democracy has fallen out of popular favor. For the most part, it has been replaced by sentimentality and nostalgia. A considerable number of people have been persuaded to think of democracy as a summer vacation or as a matter of consensus and parades. In the ensuing confusion, they come to imagine that the United States constitutes a refuge and a hiding place from the storm of the world. The general eagerness to avoid making trouble results in the intimidation of the American mind. The retreat appears to be taking place across a broad front, in both the intellectual and political sectors of opinion.

If democracy can be understood as a field of temporary coalitions between people of different interests, skills, and generations, then everybody has need of everybody else. The evolution of the species depends upon people who can come to their own conclusions and carry that much further into the future the burden not only of civilization but also of its discontents.

Editors' Note—In the interests of brevity, the authors of this unit of the curriculum statement have adopted a single point from which to view the multiple dynamic factors in the public administrator's world. The viewing point is Washington, D.C. and the focus is on the Federal Government. It is the intention of the authors to complement this, however, in the commentary assignment in which each participant is to examine his own environment to identify and analyze the dynamic influences that confront him there. This for the participant should be but the beginning of a continuing examination of the pluralism phenomena in his own context. Although they may well be significantly different from the curriculum statement model, it can be adapted to be useful in the analysis.
For purposes of convenience, the authors have also assumed a "bureau" base and bureau values. This has long been the realistic (rather than idealistic) view of the national administration. It is not the intention to imply, however, that the professional administrator can be content with a purely bureau perspective and limited bureau values. Integrating goals and performance of a particular organizational unit with the broader goals and program of the whole government, to the benefit of total society, must be the overriding objective — especially for the professional administrator.

Rational integration of dynamic but particularistic forces at all levels of government is more than ever a major problem of society. Constitutionalism, representative government, and universal suffrage, as well as structural reform, have been hopeful steps in the same direction. Professionalizing public administration personnel must also contribute to solving that problem. In short, the professional administrator, as program mover, cannot be content just with moving his program. He must also seek the optimum degree of integration with the totality of governmental problems. This goal may never be fully achieved; but true success must be measured in progress toward it.

The review in these pages of ideas about the decline of parties and the increased number of special interests is intended to be suggestive, not a definitive analysis of causes of the apparent changes. Unfortunately, most available materials on this subject are speculative, rather than thorough analyses of longitudinal data. Many possible causal factors have not been mentioned. Among them may be the individualistic organization of power in Congress and other legislative bodies (long fostered in Congress by the practice of seniority). This inhibited the development of coherent legislative parties exercising collegial power. The absence of a national forum and genuine party focal point in the legislative bodies in turn may have inhibited the development of healthy national parties.

A buried factor in Congress until the 1960's was sectionalism based on racism. Sectionalism for many years stood in the way of coherent national party organization.

Underlying all of these factors, perhaps, was the progressive withdrawal from government of the country's national leaders in the latter half of the 19th century. Was this based on the assumption that the political and economic systems were strong enough to withstand any amount of pulling and hauling and that no one needed to be in charge who had the welfare of the entire society in view? Or were the older elite forced out of government and politics by the waves of New Americans immigrating to these shores in great numbers, from the American Civil War to World War I?
Has there been a two-stage withdrawal of the American elite — first from government, and then from parties to special interest groups in order to achieve their specific objectives? The "influentials" are now two stages removed from responsibility. It is a game that many can play. But the result is, no one is in charge.

This is not the place to speculate on these questions, but the point is clear that if there is no coherent stable and respected element in society which is willing to accept the responsibility of being in charge to govern for the total public welfare, an added burden falls on the shoulders of professional public administrators.

Participants Please Note: All assignments — commentaries and exercises — and all reading — required, suggested supplemental, and recommended — are subject to change, and are regularly revised. When changes are made, however, participants will be notified by the Cluster Director and/or the DPA Program Director. Until changes are made in this way, the instructions regarding assignments and reading stand as stated in this curriculum statement.

COMMENTARY ASSIGNMENT:

1. Within the system of pluralism, which two sub-systems tend, over time, to be most supportive of your program?
   a. Why do they behave in this manner (what are their motivations, rewards, objectives, etc.)?
   b. How do they affect your policy and decision-making processes?
   c. What strategies and tactics have you devised to cope with them (i.e., alliances, bargaining, and compromise)? Be specific.
   d. How does the public interest enter into your relations with these sub-systems? How do you know what it is? If it is ignored, why?

2. Within the system of pluralism, which two sub-systems, tend, over time, to be least supportive of your program?
   a. Why do they behave in this manner (what are their motivations, rewards, objectives, etc.)?
   b. How do they affect your policy and decision-making processes?
   c. What strategies and tactics have you devised to cope with them (i.e., alliances, bargaining, and compromise)? Be specific.
   d. How does the public interest enter into your relations with these sub-systems? How do you know what it is? If it is ignored, why?
READINGS:

Required


Suggested Supplemental


