

2022

Exploring Resistance Movements in Interstate Conflict and Integrated Deterrence

Michael G. Harris

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#), and the [Military and Veterans Studies Commons](#)

Share Feedback About This Item

This Dissertation is brought to you by the HCAS Student Theses and Dissertations at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Conflict Resolution Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Exploring Resistance Movements in Interstate Conflict and Integrated Deterrence

by

Michael G. Harris

A Dissertation Presented to the
Halmos College of Arts and Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Nova Southeastern University
2022

Copyright © by

Michael G. Harris
May 2022


**Nova Southeastern University
Halmos College of Arts and Sciences**

This dissertation was submitted by Michael G. Harris under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the Halmos College of Arts and Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

Approved:

May 24, 2022


Date of Defense



Alexia S. Georgakopoulos, Ph.D.
Chair

Urszula Strawinska-Zanko


Urszula Strawinska-Zanko, Ph.D.



Laurie O. Campbell, Ph.D.

June 20, 2022

Date of Final Approval



Alexia S. Georgakopoulos, Ph.D.
Chair

Dedication

This work is dedicated to the living God; the Prince of Peace. 2 John 1:3

Acknowledgments

I am very thankful for the love and support of my wife and children. They encouraged me, walked with me, and sacrificed with me on this journey. I am also thankful for the love and sacrifices of my parents. They always believed that I was saved for something good. I am grateful for the help and mentorship of Dr. Laurie Campbell and Dr. Alexia Georgakopoulos. They were a Godsend.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	iv
List of Figures	vi
Abstract	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study	1
Problem Statement	5
Purpose Statement	6
Research Objectives	7
Significance of Study	7
Summary	9
Chapter 2: Literature Review	10
Introduction	10
Philosophical Foundations	11
Theoretical Foundations	12
Combat Power Theory	15
Resistance Theory	21
Deterrence Theory	26
Security Discourse-Great Powers Competition (Russia and China).....	32
Researchable Literature Gaps	35
Research Questions	36
Chapter 3: Research Method	38
Introduction	38
Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Methodology	38

Data Collection and Sampling	39
Data Analysis	46
Complementary Study #2: Content Analysis.....	49
Data Collection and Sampling	56
Data Analysis	58
Ethical Considerations	59
Summary	59
Chapter 4: Results.....	61
Introduction.....	61
Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Results.....	61
Color Revolution Success Findings	70
Color Revolution Progress Findings.....	71
Color Revolution Additional Findings.....	71
Complementary Study #2: Qualitative Results.....	74
Russian Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution	76
Russian Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare.....	83
Russian Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action	86
Chinese Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution	97
Chinese Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare	101
Chinese Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action.....	104
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations.....	111
Discussion	111
Combat Power Theory	112

Protecting or Targeting the Loyalty of Security Forces.....	124
Key Variables and Takeaways from Color Revolutions.....	126
Resistance Theory	126
Integrated Deterrence Options	130
Conclusion	135
Recommendations.....	139
References.....	141
Appendix A: Exemplars of Russian Security Discourse	170

List of Tables

Table 1 Summary of Study Components and References	9
Table 2 Crosswalk of Literature, Gap Analysis, and Research Questions	11
Table 3 Existing Deterrence Matrix.....	32
Table 4 Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset.....	41
Table 5 Selected Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset	45
Table 6 Resistance Movement Outcomes coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset.....	45
Table 7 Resistance Movement Methodologies coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset	46
Table 8 Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables.....	48
Table 9 Spearman’s Rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables	49
Table 10 Primary Sources: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022	51
Table 11 Scholarly Articles: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022	52
Table 12 News Reports: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022	53
Table 13 Primary Sources: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022	54
Table 14 Scholarly Articles: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022.....	55
Table 15 News Reports: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022	56
Table 16 Results: Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables.....	61
Table 17 Results: Spearman’s Rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables	64
Table 18 Resistance Combat Power Variables Associated with Overall Success and Progress	66
Table 19 Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Regime Change	68

Table 20 Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Territorial Secession	69
Table 21 Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Anti-Occupation.....	69
Table 22 Combat Power Variables Present in Selected Color Revolution Campaigns	72
Table 23 Variables Associated w Success/Progress: Regime Change, Secession & Anti-Occupation.....	73
Table 24 Coding Frame	76
Table 25 Integrated Deterrence Matrix.....	135

List of Figures

Figure 1. Security studies resistance taxonomy	26
Figure 2. “The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict Resolution”	90
Figure 3. Synthesis of study #1 and study #2	137
Figure A1. Methodologies and locations of Color Revolutions	170
Figure A2. Role of external actors in Color Revolutions	171

Abstract

Despite an increase in interstate conflict, including manipulation of information and civil populations by state actors in gray zone campaigns, the study of resistance has concentrated on intrastate conflict. A detailed literature review of resistance was conducted, revealing researchable gaps in understanding of the topic, including: the resistance movements from a security studies and interstate conflict perspective, the resistance as a form of interstate conflict from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders, and the integrated deterrence options in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention. Two complementary studies were conducted to explore the identified areas. These studies were based on three theories: 1) resistance theory, 2) combat power theory, and 3) deterrence theory. The first complementary study involved utilizing quantitative methods to analyze the NAVCO 2.0 dataset of global resistance movements from 1945-2006. The positivist analysis explored relationships between resistance movement variables and combat power theory, identifying variables significantly associated with progress and success in resistance campaigns. The quantitative findings informed the second interpretivist complementary study that utilized content analysis of primary sources, scholarly articles, and news sources to explore resistance from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders in the contemporary period of 2006-2022. Overall, the complementary studies described in this dissertation are situated within international conflict resolution studies, exploring resistance movements as a form of strategic interstate conflict and integrated deterrence as a strategy of international conflict prevention.

Keywords: resistance, conflict prevention, integrated deterrence, gray zone, Russia, China

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Research indicates a rise in the success of non-violent resistance movements as a form of intrastate conflict from 1945-2006 (Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011). This period was influential to the practice and study of resistance and included the rise of key resistance movement leaders and scholars, such as Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, Ernesto Laclau, Frank Parkin, and Gene Sharp. The early 2000s continued with the advent of “Color Revolutions”, which are high-profile resistance movements challenging national governments. Color Revolutions of the 2000s included the Orange Revolution in former Soviet Ukraine and the Jasmine Revolution in China. These movements are the subject of significant academic scholarship, highlighting the key elements of “people power”, and the effectiveness of resistance movements as a means of conflict resolution.

The efficacy of Color Revolutions garnered the attention of national governments, including those of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (President of Russia, 2022; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, 2022). Reports indicate that these regimes felt threatened by the Color Revolutions, however, they saw an opportunity to employ the element of people power as a form of interstate conflict. In the years following the Color Revolutions, from 2006-2022, the Russian and Chinese regimes appropriated resistance paradigms to prioritize population-centric and information-centric irregular approaches as a means of achieving national security objectives below the level of armed conflict. These approaches took the form of people movements, which became strategic tools of the state to threaten, or bring about, regime change or to compete for territory within gray zone campaigns, or efforts occurring between the space of peace and war (Freier, 2016). These efforts often include appropriating the lexicon of resistance, such as Russian information

efforts to coin their gray zone activities in the Ukraine in 2014 as the “Russian Spring” following the popularization of the term “Arab Spring” in 2012, and other historical events to refer to anti-government social movements (Lankina & Watanabe, 2017). Ongoing aggressive Russian activities focused on the Ukraine and Chinese activities focused on Taiwan indicate continued maturation and operationalization of these gray zone activities. The most recent U.S. National Security Strategic Guidance document captures the relevance and urgency of better understanding and addressing these forms of conflict, by calling the security sector to “develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions” (Biden, 2021, p. 14).

The term gray zone encompasses a range of interstate conflict situated between the war and peace (Freier, 2016; Pomerantsev, 2015). A key characteristic of gray zone activity is that it intends to harm another state while remaining below the legal thresholds of open warfare (Brands, 2015; Cambridge, 2022). Gray zone activities take many forms, including information warfare, economic coercion, political warfare, legal warfare, disguised forces, and manipulation of populations (Hicks et al., 2019). The activities associated with the gray zone are not necessarily new. Russia leveraged many of these activities during the Cold War (Freier, 2016; Hoffman, 2018; Votel et al., 2016). However, the maturation and operationalization of these activities by both Russia and China present a unique set of simultaneous and complex security challenges (Carment & Belo, 2020; Chan, 2021; Hicks et al., 2019; Hoffman, 2018; Layton, 2021).

Multipolar conflict between powerful nations is an increasingly dominant characteristic of the 21st century global security environment. From the perspective of U.S. defense officials, the emergence of multipolar conflict is “the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2). Likewise, updated Russian and Chinese national

defense strategies focus on aggressive, multi-prong competition with the United States (Heath et al., 2016; Katzman, 2019; Oliker, 2016). While competition between nations is not a new phenomenon, the updated national security strategies of Russia and China place increasing emphasis on approaches that blend the use of conventional military force with population-centric efforts, including the use of proxies, information, and appropriation of resistance movements as means to compete short of open conflict (Lee, 2016). These approaches often leverage resistance movements with goals of anti-occupation or regime change. However, despite the relevance of resistance to security studies, leading resistance scholars note, “the serious study of strategic nonviolent action has remained something of a pariah within security studies” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, p.17). These realities have driven the security discourse to seek better understanding of this form of conflict (Hicks et al., 2019; Hume et al., 2016; *The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare*, 2017). This pursuit includes calls to “aggressively adapt key institutions, concepts, and capabilities for persistent gray zone campaigning” (Hume et al., 2016).

The principal theories to understand state actor appropriation of resistance movements are combat power theory and resistance theory. Combat power theory, derived from the work of British military theorist J.F.C Fuller, provided a positivist framework to examine how resistance movements work from a security sector perspective as a form of unconventional warfare (Boslego, 1995; Fuller, 1926). Combat power theory is widely used within security sector discourse as a means of measuring and describing the means and capacity to conduct security operations. The written doctrines of many countries codify combat power theory, including those of the United States, Russia, and China (Anderson & Engstrom, 2009; Martin, 2013; Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017). Combat power represents the totality of capability that an organization can put forth for a specific duration and

purpose. It is a theory of organizational capacity that, despite the name, is not limited to combat undertaken by military forces (Cox et al., 2018).

Resistance theory provided an interpretivist framework to examine how groups threaten or bring about political change using civil populations (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012; Sharp 1973). Scholars define resistance as a “type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily circumvents normal political channels and employs non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an opponent...to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012, p. 12). The study situated resistance movements as a type of social movement and a form of unconventional warfare (Chenoweth & Stephen 2012; Dudouet, 2015; Sharp 1990). Deterrence theory provided an additional framework, emphasizing conflict prevention, to explore options to deter interstate conflict that appropriates resistance movements (Väyrynen, 1997). Chapter 2 provides additional exploration of the three frameworks of this study.

The present study encompassed two complementary studies exploring resistance. The first complementary study utilized quantitative methods and employed combat power theory to analyze global resistance movements from the formative period of 1945-2006 as coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The analysis explored resistance combat power variables significantly associated with progress and success in resistance campaigns with the goals of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation. The quantitative findings informed the second complementary study.

The second study utilized qualitative methods, including content analysis, and the framework of resistance theory to explore the appropriation of regime change and anti-occupation resistance methods by Russia and China in the contemporary period of 2006-2022.

The qualitative findings provide theorists and practitioners insight into the critical variables that were significantly associated with success and progress in resistance movements, allowing for deepened understanding resistance as a form of interstate conflict.

Overall, the research studies presented in this dissertation are situated within the literature pertaining to international conflict resolution studies, exploring resistance movements as a form of strategic interstate conflict, and deterrence as a strategy of conflict prevention (Väyrynen, 1997). The study further includes considerations of conflict management alongside reassurance and diplomacy (Lebow 2022). The study focused on the analysis of archival data and documents and did not include human research. Taken together, the theories, methodologies, data collection, and data analysis result in an interpretivist study of state actor appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict.

Problem Statement

Research has shown an increase in the use of resistance methods by state actors in gray zone campaigns that represent a form of interstate conflict, however, the study of resistance has largely been concentrated on resistance in the form of intrastate conflict with moral or principled usage of nonviolent resistance by non-state actors against oppressive state actors (Howe, 2009). Stated another way, the majority of scholarship pertaining to resistance examines the methods of resistance (violent/nonviolent), rather than the specific goals/outcomes of resistance (e.g., regime change/ territorial secession/anti-occupation). Accordingly, there are multiple gaps in the literature regarding state appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict. The primary research gaps are as follows:

1. The literature lacks holistic study of resistance that does not center on bifurcation of violent/non-violent methods, and without bias towards non-violent methods.

2. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory to examine resistance from a security studies perspective to gain a better understanding of specific variables significantly associated with success or progress of regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance campaigns during the formative period of 1945-2006 that are akin to the types of resistance movements appropriated by Russian and Chinese security forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022.
3. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022 as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate gray zone interstate conflict.
4. The literature lacks concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of the study was to expand understanding of resistance as a form of interstate conflict. From a conflict prevention and security studies perspective, this study examined the formative period of resistance from 1945-2006 to understand the variables significantly associated with success and progress in three specific types of resistance movements: regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation. These types of resistance movements were appropriated by the regimes of Russia and the People's Republic of China in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. The specific purpose of this aspect of the study was to explore these three types of resistance movement goals (e.g., regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation) in detail, to discern nuanced differences in the variables associated with their success or progress. By gaining a specific understanding of critical variables of these three

types of resistance in the formative period, including the Color Revolutions, a security studies basis was developed to further explore Russian and Chinese policies, doctrines, and actions regarding the appropriation of resistance in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. Content analysis of primary sources, scholarly articles, and news sources was employed to evaluate these sources. The purpose of examining Russian and Chinese artifacts pertaining to the appropriation of resistance in the contemporary period was to contribute to the understanding of the critical factors in Russian and Chinese interstate conflict methods, to add to the literature regarding how to prevent this form of interstate conflict, and to prompt further research on resistance from a security studies perspective.

Research Objectives

The study has three objectives: (1) to explore resistance cognizant of and minimizing of bias towards non-violent methods; (2) to advance exploration of specific critical factors, including information activities, in regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance movements during the formative period of 1945-2006 and their influence on state appropriation of resistance in contemporary interstate conflict; and (3) to contribute to the study of resistance in conflict prevention and security studies discourse.

Significance of Study

The study makes three primary contributions to the fields of conflict resolution, political science, and military science. First, the findings frame resistance movements from the perspective of state actors within the context of international conflict as a form of interstate conflict and social movement. Through this study, resistance literature is expanded beyond a principled approach taken by non-state actors in intrastate conflict, and resistance is explored as a viable form of proxy activity within a state actor's interstate security strategy. As a result, the

framing of this dissertation informs scholarly work regarding resistance movements into conflict prevention, deterrence, and national security discourse.

Second, this study advances exploration of resistance methods in specific types of resistance movements, including an emphasis on the information component of resistance. Findings provide theorists and practitioners with insight into the variables significantly associated with success and progress in specific types of resistance movements, which allows for the identification of critical variables to defend or pursue when considering resistance as a form of interstate conflict. The results of this investigation are particularly impactful to the field as the first known study that includes both quantitative and qualitative investigation to explore the state appropriation of resistance in the context of strategic, integrated deterrence. The analysis of resistance as a form of interstate conflict and unconventional warfare benefits theorists and contributes to the field of conflict resolution by adding to the body of knowledge regarding international conflict and conflict prevention.

Finally, the findings of this study contribute to broadening and bolstering a deeper understanding of the appropriation of resistance by Russian and Chinese government officials. The results contribute to the literature and provide an opportunity for additional discovery and learning among practitioners and the public regarding the appropriation of resistance and provides considerations for deterrence.

The table below provides a summary of the general study components, including the theories, methodologies, data collection procedures, and analyses incorporated in this study and the key references for each element (see Table 1).

Table 1*Summary of Study Components and References*

General Component	Specific Components	Key References
Theories	Resistance, combat power, deterrence	Agan et al., 2019; Brodie, 1946; Chenoweth & Stephen, 2011; Cox et al., 2018; Dudouet, 2015; Hobbes, 1651; Jervis, 1976; King, 1958; Schelling, 1966; Scouras et al., 2013; Sharp 1990; Smyth, & Mahnken, 2014; Waltz, 1979; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, 2018
Methodologies	Content analysis and quantitative	Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Krippendorf, 2019; Pallant, 2001
Data collection	Text mining, NAVCO 2.0 dataset	Carter et al., 2007; Chenoweth & Lewis 2013; Karatnacky & Ackerman, 2005; Schock, 2005
Data Analysis	Content analysis, non-parametric design	Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Krippendorf, 2019; Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007; Pallant, 2001

Summary

Chapter 1 described the purpose, objectives, design, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review that provides the philosophical, theoretical, and contextual foundations for the study. The literature review identifies four researchable gaps in the literature regarding resistance as form of interstate conflict. The study addressed these four researchable gaps with three research questions.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

Chapter 2 explores the scholarly literature relevant to the research investigation. Specifically, this chapter provides an analysis of existing literature regarding combat power theory, resistance theory, deterrence theory, and the appropriation of resistance by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China within gray zone campaigns. The purpose of the chapter is to thoroughly present the body of knowledge related to the research problem, identify researchable gaps in the literature, and clearly link these gaps to the research questions and design of the study. The chapter is comprised of four topic areas arranged in the following sequence: philosophical foundations, theoretical foundations, literature gap analysis, and research recommendations. The keystone topics discussed are resistance theory, combat power theory, and deterrence theory. The framework of this study builds upon Crotty's (1998) research design approach of conceptual nesting (Creswell & Clark, 2011). This approach begins with identification of philosophical foundations, which informs the selection of theoretical perspectives, which guide the methodical approaches and methods of data collection.

The literature review identified four researchable gaps. This chapter will illuminate these gaps in the literature, provide a rationale for the inclusion of each concept, and link the literature to the study's research questions. The table below previews the relationships between literature gaps, and research questions explored in this chapter (see Table 2).

Table 2*Crosswalk of Literature, Gap Analysis, and Research Questions*

Literature	Gap	Research Questions
Combat Power	Bifurcation between violent/non-violent with bias towards non-violent resistance Research that utilizes combat power theory to examine resistance from a security studies perspective to gain a better understanding of specific variables associated with success or progress of regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance campaigns during the formative period of 1945-2006 that are akin to the types of resistance movements appropriated by Russian and Chinese security forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022.	1. What are the significant relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?
Resistance	Research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022 as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate gray zone interstate conflict.	2. How do the elements of combat power significantly associated with success/progress in resistance movements from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns from 2006-2022?
Deterrence Security Discourse	Concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention.	3. How can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns?

Philosophical Foundations

This section provides a brief overview of the philosophical foundations of this study, which draw upon classical traditions and emphasizes ideas of pragmatism. This study employs

the ontological perspective that the concept of reality contains both singular and multiple realities and the epistemological consideration that knowledge can be attained through reliable sources of perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony (Steup, 2018). According to Creswell and Clark (2011), both quantitative and qualitative data can provide valid sources of knowledge, with qualitative considerations requiring the understanding that “worldviews can change during a study...[and] may be tied to different phases in the project, and that researchers need to honor and write about their worldviews in use” (p. 46). With respect to these philosophical underpinnings, an appropriate design for this research study was chosen, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative methods (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). This study design is further supported by Mertens (2007) transformative paradigm, which emphasizes utilization of both qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as inclusion of implicit value assumptions to better understand issues such as oppression and domination.

Theoretical Foundations

The classical theoretical foundations most influential to this study derived from the social science fields of conflict resolution, sociology, and political science. This section briefly presents these classical theoretical foundations to provide the basis for the working theories utilized in the study and to account for the theoretical lens informing the researcher’s perspective and approach to the study.

Stemming from the field of conflict resolution, this study examined state appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict. Conflict is “an expressed struggle in which two or more interdependent parties are experiencing strong emotion resulting from a perceived difference in needs or values” (Katz et al., 2011). Conflict is also, “the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 30). Furthermore, the study situates

deterrence within international conflict resolution, as a strategy of interstate conflict prevention (Väyrynen, 1997).

Considering the contributions of sociology, classical theorists expanded positivist application of the scientific method to social science. This shift contributed to the theoretical foundations of combat power theory, which is one of the central theories utilized in this study (Carneiro, 1974).

From the political science field, theories from the subfields of comparative politics and international relations influenced the study. In consideration of comparative politics, the study positioned resistance movements as a form of social movement (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Berna, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Lee, 2016; Schock, 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2000; 2003). New social movement theorists associate the formation of social movements to qualitative issues, not to class and socioeconomic issues as proposed by the social conflict theories of Marx (Parkin, 1969; Buechler, 2000). According to these theorists, in post-industrial societies, social movements with identity, self-actualization, and equality objectives are more likely to form. These include civil rights, environmental, and nationalist movements (Parkin, 1969; Berna, 2008; Buechler, 2000). Aberle further identified four primary types of social movements that were dependent on the scale and objective of the social movement and coined alternative, redemptive, reformative, and revolutionary (Braham, 2013). The present study applied this lens through the focus on resistance movements with regime change or territorial objectives, which are classified as revolutionary social movements utilizing Aberle's typology. Further, social movement theory contributed critical theoretical foundations for resistance theory, which is the second of the working theories utilized in this study. New social movement theory provides theoretical insights to better understand resistance movements with nationalistic and identity

objectives, such as resistance movements with goals of anti-occupation and regime change, which are the focus of the present study.

From the international relations subfield, the study positioned deterrence paradigms and state appropriation of resistance movements from a realist perspective. Realists view international conflict as a struggle for power between state actors who will always prioritize their self-interests above the interests of other states and seek to maximize their own power (Morgenthau, 1973). Classical theorists associated with realism include Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau. Later, neorealist thinking refined aspects of realism; most notably identifying the primary interest of the state as self-preservation. Leading neorealist theorist Kenneth Waltz articulated the dynamics of neorealism in terms of competition between great powers (Korab-Karpowicz & Julian 2018). Waltz (1988) maintained that a multipolar world is inherently more unstable than a bipolar world, as the risk of miscalculation between great powers is much higher in a multipolar world. The emphasis on power and security in realism leads to an emphasis on military matters: “realist theory, old and new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces that fix the fate of states and their systems” (Waltz, 1988, p.70).

Military strategies have a key focus on deterrence. According to Waltz, “improving the means of defense and deterrence relative to the means of offense increases the chances of peace. Weapons and strategies that make defense and deterrence easier, and offensive strikes harder to mount, decrease the likelihood of war” (Waltz, 1988, p. 71). Realism and neorealism provide the classical theoretical foundations for deterrence theory, the third working theory utilized in this study. Emphasis on military deterrence strategy within neorealism as a form of conflict prevention supports the link between conflict resolution, international relations, and military

science within this study and situates the topics of state appropriation of resistance and deterrence within a multipolar context, as presented in this study.

This section briefly presented three classical theoretical perspectives that inform the working theories that are central to the study. Classical positivist sociology theories provided the foundation for combat power theory. Social movement theories, including new social movement theory, provided foundations for Resistance theory. Conflict resolution and realist theories, including neorealism, provided foundations for deterrence theory. Combat power theory, resistance theory, and deterrence theory are the three working theories central to this study. The next sections explore these three theories in detail.

Combat Power Theory

Combat power theory is widely used within security sector discourse as a method of measuring and describing the means and capacity with which to conduct security operations (Luo, 2016). Utilization of this theory is central to one of the objectives of this study, which is to expand scholarly work regarding resistance movements into deterrence and national security discourse. Combat power theory describes, “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit can apply against the opponent at a given time” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. 1-4). More simply stated, combat power is the full capability that an organization can put forth for a specific duration and purpose. The written doctrines of many countries codify combat power theory, including the United States, Russia, and China (Anderson & Engstrom, 2009; Martin, 2013; Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017). Utilizing combat power theory as a positivist framework contributes to quantitative examination of resistance as a deliberate means of achieving security objectives from a military science lens.

Combat power theory is derived largely from the work of British military theorist, J.F.C. Fuller (Fuller, 1926; Boslego, 1995). Fuller's work emerged in the early twentieth century, heavily influenced by Social Darwinism. Fuller's ideas were valued within the historical context of theorists seeking to reconcile emerging technologies, such as tanks and airplanes, with the works of classical military theorists such as Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun Tzu. Fuller maintained that emerging technology would fundamentally alter the character of war. With the advent of armored vehicles, he theorized that warfare would assume this new characteristic and become armored in nature (Reid, 1995). Some scholars consider his volume, *The Foundation of the Science of War*, to be one of the most significant theoretical military science contributions of the twentieth century (Reid, 1985).

Critics of Fuller's theories, including his contemporary, Liddell Hart, maintained that Fuller's overly positivist and numerical approach focused too much on technological performance and did not adequately account for the intangible and humanistic nature of warfare (Hart, 1944). In his prominent work, *Thoughts on War*, Hart critically noted, "the cult of numbers is the supreme fallacy of modern warfare. The way it persists is testimony to the tenacity of stupidity. Even Napoleon, the god of war old-style, declared: 'In war it is not men, but man who counts.'" (Hart, 1944, p. 69).

U.S. military theorists further adapted and refined Fuller's and Hart's concepts throughout the twentieth century (Reid, 1985). In 1976, Huba Wass de Czege, a U.S. military theorist, distilled Hart's and Fuller's concepts into four key elements: leadership, survivability, firepower, and maneuver in his work, *Understanding and Developing Combat Power*. He expressed Fuller's technological emphasis in terms of firepower, survivability, and maneuver. He expressed Hart's humanistic emphasis in terms of leadership. His work, and the resulting

development of professional doctrine and practice, including the manifestation of his principles during the rapid defeat of Iraqi armed forces in 1991 by U.S. and Coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm, proliferated the theory of combat power globally amongst academics and practitioners.

In the late 20th century, as practitioners and scholars began to recognize the scope and significance of the burgeoning “Information Age”, combat power theorists began to ask questions similar to those posed by Fuller regarding the impact of new technology on the nature of warfare (Franz, 1996; Kern, 2015). Accordingly, in 2017, theorists formally added information as an element of combat power. Currently, combat power theorists recognize seven dimensions of combat power: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).

A similar non-military concept is organizational capacity. Organizational capacity is a multidimensional organizational concept comprised of six dimensions: leadership, strategy, structure/governance, skills, human capital, and accountability (Cox et al., 2018). However, as Hart identified, there are limits to the positivist approach of Combat Power theory leveraged within military science circles. An interpretivist approach, or the “art” of military matters, continues to evolve in theoretical circles, with an increasing emphasis on “design” thinking among security sector practitioners (Voelz, 2014). The dichotomy of these viewpoints is often reflected in the use of the term, “military art and science” among security sector practitioners and scholars (Voelz, 2014). This dichotomy influenced the methodological approach of this study, as it is comprised of both a positivist quantitative study and a qualitative study.

Utilizing combat power theory as a framework, this study examined resistance utilizing all seven elements of combat power. The study was conducted through a positivist military

science lens to help explore a subject that is held largely within interpretivist social science circles. Further, inclusion of combat power theory enabled a comparative framework to assess the likelihood of operational success by exploring relative combat power indexed against an adversary's combat power (Martin, 2013; U.S. Department of the Army, 2015). The next sections briefly present each dimension of combat power to enable a more detailed application within the study.

Command and control. Command and control includes the exercise of authority and direction by a leader to accomplish the organizational mission (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). The concept involves the management and synchronization of the other dimensions of combat power to accomplish organizational objectives. Command and control represents the leadership function associated with combat power.

Intelligence. Intelligence is the ability to understand the environment and enable the organization to act inside the decision cycle of an adversary (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). In business terminology, it involves the ability to gather, analyze and share knowledge within the organization about the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) related to the organization and relative to its environment. Intelligence supports the decision-making ability of the organization.

Fires. Fires involves the use of weapons and other systems to create specific effects in the environment (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). The concept of fires is often associated with destructive effects; however, it also includes non-destructive effects. Non-destructive fires cause an effect in the environment without necessarily causing physical damage, this can include disruption of revenue streams, interruption or distortion of information flow, or reduction of an

adversary's will to compete. Fires are strongly associated with intelligence and movement and maneuver functions of an organization.

Movement and Maneuver. The concept of movement and maneuver involves the employment of people and resources to accomplish the organizational mission. Maneuver occurs when movement and fires occur in concert with one another (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). Movement and maneuver activities are often observable acts associated with physical terrain. However, the concept of maneuver broadly applies to actions taken to gain positional advantage over an adversary and can involve positioning organizational strength against adversary vulnerabilities or weakness.

Protection. Protection involves the preservation of the organization's combat power (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). This component includes physical protection of organizational members and resources as well as the morale and well-being of the organization. Protection is closely associated with an understanding of where the organization is vulnerable to adversary offensive capabilities and strengths.

Sustainment. Sustainment involves the endurance and reach of the organization's combat power (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). It includes the ability of the organization to provide resources to its members to accomplish organizational objectives. It includes the ability to recruit and maintain the membership of the organization. Sustainment activities integrate closely with protection and maneuver functions.

Information. Information involves the deliberate management of information to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human decision-making (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). U.S. military doctrine added Information to the combat power framework in 2018, representing the first addition to the

framework since its inception. Inclusion of Information was an acknowledgement of the impact of the information age, including prolific use of communication technologies, such as social media, on military operations. The addition of Information to the framework also indicated a realization of the significant use of information by other nations, such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, to support their defense strategies (Grynkewich, 2018).

Of interest, when revealing the inclusion of Information as an element of combat power in a leading U.S. defense professional journal, a senior U.S. defense official added emphasis to the significance of the addition by opining, "within the changing environment, information may prove to be the preeminent commodity and decisive factor in military operations" (Grynkewich, 2018). According to another article in the same defense journal, "the need for this addition to the joint functions has become increasingly obvious to military leaders over time. It reveals itself in the difficulty of addressing gray zone challenges, which often displace the strategic utility of physical power" (Thomson & Paul, 2018). Another scholar described the increased prioritization of information in gray zone campaigns by saying, "There is, of course, nothing new about using information as a vital instrument of war. But in the past information tended to be a handmaiden to action. Now the informational element appears to be as important as, if not more important than, the physical dimension" (Pomerantsev 2015).

While security discourse increasingly views the information dimension of combat power as central to gray zone approaches, the integration of information as an element of combat power remains underdeveloped in comparison to physical maneuver (The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare, 2017). The design of this study placed an emphasis on exploring the role of information in resistance campaigns.

This study utilized combat power theory as a positivist framework to help transition thinking related to resistance movements into security discourse. Of particular focus within this study is the information component of combat power. The positivist nature of combat power theory provides an appropriate theoretical framework to conduct a quantitative study focused on the first researchable gap identified in the literature review: to improve understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective.

Resistance Theory

Resistance theory is interpretivist. It is applicable at all levels of conflict, ranging from interpersonal conflict (Scott, 1985), inter-organizational conflict (Sharp, 1980) and international conflict (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). This study situated resistance movements within contentious politics as a form of political warfare (Agan et al., 2019; Steward, 2015; Tilly, 1997), within comparative politics, as a type of social movement (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Lee, 2016; Schock, 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2000; 2003), and within military science as a form of unconventional warfare (Chenoweth & Stephen 2011; Dudouet, 2015).

Concepts of resistance in the context of warfare are not new. From a political warfare perspective, Tilly defined contentious politics as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (1997). From an interstate armed conflict perspective, during the Cold War, European populations prepared for organized resistance efforts in the event of a large-scale Soviet invasion and occupation (Stringer, 2017; Sharp 1990). Post-Cold War, these concepts largely faded from security discourse (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), however they are beginning to reemerge (Flanagan et al., 2019). Not all theorists agree that resistance, especially nonviolent

resistance, is a form of unconventional warfare (Schock, 2003). These scholars maintain that nonviolent resistance does not connect to security discourse, as it often is associated with pacifist approaches selected for principled reasons, such as Mohandas Gandhi's 1930 Salt March and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s leadership of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s (Howes, 2009).

On the surface, there is merit to this viewpoint. King did derive his nonviolent approach from his Christian faith and study of Gandhi's tactics and classical theorists, including Marx, Thoreau, Hobbes, Nietzsche and Rousseau (King, 1958). King himself wrote in his first book, *Stride Toward Freedom*, "the Christian doctrine of love operating through the Gandhian method of nonviolence was one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom" (King, 1958; 1960). However, a closer reading of King's work reveals a key distinction from critics of pacifism, such as Niebuhr. King noted that Niebuhr:

Interpreted pacifism as a sort of passive nonresistance to evil expressing naïve trust in the power of love. But this was a serious distortion. My study of Gandhi convinced me that true pacifism is not nonresistance to evil, but nonviolent resistance to evil...Gandhi resisted evil with as much vigor and power as the violent resister...true pacifism is not unrealistic submission to evil power...it is a courageous confrontation of evil by the power of love. (King 1958, p. 98)

King further summarizes key distinctions related to resistance in this passage from his first book:

First, it must be emphasized that nonviolent resistance is not a method for cowards; it does resist. If one uses this method because he is afraid or merely because he lacks the instruments of violence, he is not truly nonviolent. This is why Gandhi often said that if

cowardice is the only alternative to violence, it is better to fight. He made this statement conscious of the fact that there is always another alternative: no individual or group need submit to any wrong, nor need they use violence to right the wrong; there is the way of nonviolent resistance. This is ultimately the way of the strong man...for while the nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent, his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent that he is wrong.” (King, 1958, p. 102)

The distinctions made by King here are critical and go to the heart of framing of resistance in this paper. First, King emphasized the use of resistance as a rational, practical, and strategic option, debunking the view that resistance is a passive choice of only/last resort. King’s viewpoint contradicts the assertion of some security studies scholars that “the idea that resistance leaders might choose nonviolence as a strategic choice may be considered naïve or implausible” (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Second, King explored the nature of resistance characterized by trade-offs between violent and nonviolent tactics, both requiring vigor, energy, and courage. This perspective is an important consideration for this research as it seeks to understand resistance as a holistic concept, not conceptually cleaved into bifurcated areas of study. Third, in the last sentence of the quoted paragraph, King emphasized the importance of the mind, emotions, and persuasion in resistance movements. The roles of information and cognitive campaigning are a significant focus area of this study.

As highlighted by Dr. King (1958), scholars often characterize resistance movements by the degree to which the movement employs violent or nonviolent tactics (Caney, 2015). Interestingly, the literature review indicated a bias towards violent means in resistance literature from within military science discourse, as compared to a bias towards non-violent means in

resistance literature from within social science discourse. In recent years, leading scholars have begun to discern that the success rates of nonviolent resistance movements have steadily increased, while the success rates of violent movements have steadily decreased (Chenoweth, 2012; Cramer, 2015; Nepstad, 2011).

Scholars define resistance as a “type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily circumvents normal political channels and employs non-institutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an opponent...to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries’ sources of power (Chenoweth, 2011, p. 12). Stated another way, “At the heart of resistance are people who choose to oppose government authority. Resistance begins in the human heart and later expresses itself through protests, demonstrations, strikes, clandestine organizations, underground newspapers, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and eventually civil war” (Agan et al., 2019). There are a host of terms often used in concert with resistance such as insurgency, revolution, coup, rebellion, and insurrection. The key distinction between these various forms of uprising is the centrality of the civil population. A coup typically involves the use of a violence by a state’s institutions, typically the military, to change the state’s ruling regime. Whereas in a resistance movement, members of the civil population are the key actors, not state institutions.

The present study considers resistance as a form of unconventional warfare characterized by the mobilization of members of the civil population to challenge the power of a regime. Like resistance scholars, military science theorists categorize resistance by the centrality of the role of the civil population. U.S. doctrine defines resistance as “an organized effort by some portion of the *civil* population of a country to resist the legally established *government* or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Furthermore,

similar to resistance scholars, military theorists consider state support to resistance as a form of unconventional warfare (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010; 2011). Unconventional warfare is defined as “operations and activities that are conducted to *enable a resistance movement* or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014). Interestingly, this definition aligns closely with the explicit assertion by Chenoweth (2011) that civil resistance is a form of unconventional warfare. Further, the definition unambiguously addresses the two major objectives of resistance movements that are a focus of this study: regime change and competition for territory. U.S. doctrine further defines unconventional warfare as a form of irregular warfare, which is “a *violent* struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016; Ucko, 2020). The last definition presupposes violence as a central characteristic of unconventional warfare, as do many scholars in the security sector (Abrahms 2006; Arreguin-Toft 2005; Byman & Waxman 2000; Horowitz & Reiter 2001; Lyall & Wilson 2009; Pape 2005; Stoker 2007). Interestingly, the literature review indicated a bias towards violent means in resistance literature from within military science discourse, as compared to a bias towards non-violent means in resistance literature from within social science discourse. The bifurcation and bias between violent and non-violent means of resistance, as opposed to a holistic view of resistance is a gap in the literature. The figure below depicts the nesting of resistance within security studies discourse (see Figure 1).

Figure 1*Security studies resistance taxonomy*

The interpretivist nature of resistance theory provides an appropriate theoretical framework to conduct a qualitative study to better understand, discover, and learn about the Russian Federation's and the People's Republic of China's appropriation of resistance methodologies.

Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is the third working theory utilized in this study. The study situates deterrence within international conflict resolution as a strategy of conflict prevention (Väyrynen, 1997). Deterrence theory has been a critical component of conflict prevention paradigms for a long time and remains central and relevant to contemporary security scholars and conflict prevention practitioners (Mazarr, 2018). In 2021, The U.S. Secretary of Defense referred to

deterrence as “the cornerstone of defense” when describing a recent evolution of deterrence theory called integrated deterrence (Austin, 2021). Integrated deterrence concepts build upon leading deterrence theories such as deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial, cross-domain deterrence, robust deterrence, extended deterrence and tailored deterrence. The following section reviews these concepts and considers evidence that existing deterrence paradigms do not sufficiently address state appropriation of resistance as a method of gray zone campaigning by state actors.

Deterrence is one of five distinctive conflict prevention strategies: reassurance, inducement, deterrence, compellence, or preemption (Väyrynen, 1997). Reassurance and inducement are positive strategies that leverage diplomacy, incentives, and rewards, whereas deterrence, compellence, and preemption are negative strategies that leverage costs on an adversary (Väyrynen, 1997). According to U.S. military doctrine:

Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a *credible* threat of unacceptable counteraction and *belief* that the costs of the action outweigh the perceived benefits...deterrence stems from an adversary’s *belief* that the opponent’s actions have created or can create an unacceptable risk to the adversary’s achievement of objectives, thus the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs are too high. Therefore, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for *fear* of failure, risk, or consequences. (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017)

Of note, the use of italics is intentional to highlight the centrality of cognition and perception to deterrence paradigms. Influencing adversary cognition is a critical element of deterrence theory (Davis, 2014; Jervis et al., 1985). The cognitive component of deterrence theory is key to understanding the difference between deterrence by denial and defensive

strategies. Kroenig and Pavel (2002) highlighted the criticality of influencing adversary decision-making in deterrence, “defensive policies are designed to fend off an opponent in the event of an attack and deterrence policies intend to convince an adversary not to attack in the first place.”

There are two prominent components of deterrence theory found within the literature - deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial (George & Smoke, 1989; Mazzar, 2018).

Deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by punishment aims to prevent adversary action by threatening an adversary with overwhelming adverse counteraction in response to the contemplated action (George & Smoke, 1989). U.S. deterrence strategy has been punishment focused for decades. Traditional nuclear deterrence emphasizes the nuclear triad (e.g., intercontinental missiles, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched missiles) as the means of punishment (CATO, 2013; Futter & Williams, 2016). A well-known concept related to nuclear deterrence by punishment is mutual assured destruction (MAD). Under MAD, deterrence stemmed from the threat of mutually catastrophic punishment between the United States and Soviet Union (Brodie, 1973).

Scholars note these nuclear-centric deterrence paradigms have limitations and credibility problems. According to Jervis (2009), “the stability that MAD was supposed to provide actually would have allowed U.S. adversaries to use force below the nuclear level whenever it was to their advantage to do so.” Undeterred Russian Federation gray zone aggression in the Ukraine in 2014 provided a prime example of this assessment.

A contemporary variation of deterrence by punishment is cross-domain deterrence. Cross-domain deterrence involves the threat of punishment “from one domain to prevent attacks from another” (Scouras et al., 2014). The cross-domain deterrence approach has potential for broad application across multiple domains, especially in the cyber domain, as “deterrence

through cyberspace by means of cyberspace is limited due to its inherent character and purpose” (Trujillo, 2014). An example might be preventing an adversary from conducting a nuclear attack by threatening attack in the cyber domain. Extended deterrence seeks to expand the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” of prevention to non-nuclear allies, often including forward staging of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces (Chubin, 2009). However, scholars point out that extended deterrence lacks credibility, “or, as it was often put, how could an American president credibly persuade his Soviet counterpart that he was prepared to risk Chicago for Hamburg?” (Pifer et al., 2010).

Efforts by the United States to develop non-nuclear long-range strike capability, known as conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), might address some of these credibility concerns by providing additional conventional means for the U.S. to conduct deterrence by punishment. In 2012, the U.S. undersecretary of Defense for Policy, noted that programs like CPGS could help strengthen U.S. non-nuclear forces as a part of U.S. deterrence paradigms (Woolf, 2017). Some argue in comparison to the Cold War, in the current multipolar global security environment, it is getting harder for the United States to punish multiple near peers (Wess, 2015). Taken together, these factors highlight limitations of deterrence by punishment and help situate deterrence by denial concepts.

Deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial focuses on denying an adversary the benefits of the contemplated action, as opposed to punishing the adversary (George & Smoke, 1989; Wess, 2015). This approach increases the adversary’s perceived risk of failure (Kroenig & Pavel, 2012). Two of the primary ways to achieve deterrence by denial are to make an objective hard to take or hard to keep (Wess 2015). Analysts noted to “achieve denial; one has to have the demonstrable warfighting capability to win in the conflict” (Koffman, 2016). Therefore, denial

concepts aimed at making an objective hard to take often call for the forward staging of large-scale conventional forces, sometimes referred to as ‘robust deterrence’ (Chubin, 2009; Koffman, 2016). These activities often include large-scale exercises and “shows of force” aimed at demonstrating the U.S.’s capability and will to amass overwhelming conventional power, thereby threatening adversary failure of the contemplated aggression.

However, some analysts characterize conventional denial as a no-win situation when facing a near peer adversary. Analysts noted that if the U.S. positioned sufficient conventional force to win against a nuclear-armed adversary, it might result in escalation to nuclear conflict (Jervis, 1976; Koffman, 2016). Both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have stated such approaches to escalation management (Chase & Chan, 2016; Sokov 2014). Conversely, if the U.S. fails to position sufficient conventional force to win, it does not present a credible deterrent. Stated another way, “making the U.S. Army presence more robust in a militarily untenable situation [does not] translate into more robust deterrence, [but rather] a greater liability” (Koffman, 2016). As experienced by the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, large-scale ground forces can present lucrative targets to irregular forces. Additionally, adversary advancements in anti-access area denial capabilities, combined with anti-western sentiments and political sensitivities to basing or forward staging U.S. forces, challenge the deployment of large-scale conventional forces for deterrence means (Chubin, 2009). Finally, resource and political constraints, especially long-duration, large-scale deployments of land forces, may curb U.S. conventional denial options (Shlapak & Johnson 2016). Another approach to deterrence by denial is to make adversary objectives harder to keep, rather than harder to take; essentially making them, a ‘bitter pill’ once swallowed (Wess, 2015). These deterrence concepts include imposing costs on occupation forces through resistance forces (Sharp, 1990). These concepts of

deterrence by denial through resistance forces are relevant to the research questions and research objectives.

Tailored deterrence. Another approach to deterrence is tailored deterrence. It emerged after the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; U.S. Department of Defense, 2006) identified shortcomings in traditional deterrence concepts and called for a “fully balanced, *tailored* capability to deter both state and non-state threats” (Bunn, 2007). According to some scholars, tailored deterrence is a distinct approach because it is “actor specific” and emphasizes deep understanding of adversary cognition with the intention to influence the adversary (Schneider & Ellis, 2011). Tailored deterrence includes concepts for deterrence in the cyber domain (Kramer & Teplinsky, 2013) and deterrence of non-state actors (Kroenig & Pavel 2012).

Overall, tailored deterrence was an effort to advance deterrence theory beyond the generalizable, punishment-centric Cold War approach. Tailored deterrence advocates saw this evolution of deterrence concepts as necessary to better address emerging areas of conflict including space, cyber, and multi-domain warfare. Tailored deterrence concepts began to shift strategic deterrence discourse beyond nuclear punishment-centric dominated paradigms and towards the contemporary emerging concept of integrated deterrence.

Integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence aims to go beyond tailored deterrence by bringing to bear all elements of national and allied power, including diplomatic, information, military, financial, intelligence and law enforcement means (DIMEFIL) to achieve deterrence by punishment or denial (Austin, 2021; Cronk, 2021; Oskarsson, 2017). These concepts are similar to those described in Chinese concepts of ‘strategic integrated deterrence’ (Chase & Chan, 2016). However, critics of integrated deterrence question the credibility and effectiveness of non-military means to influence Chinese and Russian decision-making (Spoehr, 2021).

Current deterrence paradigms do not specifically address gray zone campaigning or state appropriation of resistance (Green et al, 2017; Crombe et al, 2021; Hicks et al, 2019; Jones, 2019; Robinson, 2020; Delafield et al, 2022). The table below provides a summary of the various forms of deterrence discussed in this section (see Table 3).

Table 3

Existing Deterrence Matrix

	Punishment	Denial
Nuclear	Triad	Extended
Conventional	Global Strike	Robust
Cyber/Space	Cross-domain	Tailored
Gray Zone	<i>Gap</i>	<i>Gap</i>

Security Discourse - Great Powers Competition (Russia and China)

The most recent U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies (2018; 2021) established new priorities and approaches for U.S. security discourse with significant focus on the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The first paragraph of the most recent Interim National Security and Defense Strategy (2021) places emphasis on the “growing rivalry with China and Russia”, and the 2018 strategy is characterized as “compete, deter, win.” In the first sentence, the 2018 document establishes the primacy of deterrence to U.S. defense strategy, “The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). It clearly articulates that the “central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the *reemergence of long-term strategic competition* with [China and Russia]” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The strategy emphasizes how state actors, including the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are “using

other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g. information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion). These trends, if unaddressed, will challenge our ability to deter aggression” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The 2018 strategy explicitly states a strategic shift towards interstate conflict, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance further highlighted this shift and focused on deterrence of gray zone activities, “we will develop capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions (U.S. White House, 2021).

Russian Federation security discourse codifies gray zone concepts (Bowen, 2021; Koffman, 2021; Thomas, 2019). Russian gray zone methods have evolved but are not new. The most recent innovations began to emerge in 2000, as Russia sought to counterbalance U.S. conventional military superiority and prevent additional Color Revolutions from challenging the Russian Federation regime. In 2000, Russian doctrine included the use of limited nuclear strike to defend against large-scale conventional forces. This strategy, referred to as “escalate to de-escalate” (Sokov 2014), marked a shift towards an integrated approach, instead of keeping nuclear, conventional, and irregular methods separate.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov (2013), published one of the most influential Russian writings on this subject, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight”. In this article, Gerasimov notes that “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed” with an emphasis on nonmilitary means of interstate conflict as demonstrated by the Color Revolutions (Gerasimov, 2013). Noteworthy in the article was an emphasis on information warfare and the blended use of violent and nonviolent methods. In context, scholars understand this article as Gerasimov’s attempt to describe the methodologies employed by the West, not a

prescription for future Russian activity (Hoffman, 2007; 2009; Solmaz, 2022). However, during influential presentations to the Academy of Military Science in 2013, Gerasimov called for the development of “new-type” warfare methods and practices that would incorporate his observations eleven times (Thomas, 2019). The next year, Russian activities began in the Ukraine that blended information, military, and population-centric means to foment population uprisings with a goal of regime change in Crimea and Donbas. While Russian security discourse continues to emphasize traditional nuclear deterrence, the Russian Federation places significant emphasis on evolving “new-type” means of deterrence and defense (Russian Federation, 2020). The ongoing Russian gray-zone conflict methodologies in the Russo-Ukrainian War from 2014-2022 are reflective of Gerasimov’s influence on Russian security discourse, doctrine, and decision-making (Leonhard & Phillips, 2016; Malyarenko & Kormych 2022; Newton 2018).

Security discourse of the People’s Republic of China codifies gray zone concepts that appropriate civil resistance movements. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China conducts a wide range of gray zone activities characterized as “active defense”, influenced by the early works of Mao Zedong, the Color Revolutions, and more recent civil resistance movements in Hong Kong (2014) and Taiwan (2014) known as the Umbrella and Sunflower Movements (Lin, 2015; Mattis & Joske, 2019; U.S. Department of the Army, 2021).

CCP leadership viewed the Color Revolutions as a threat to their regime and national interests (Chen 2010; Keyue 2021; Reuters 2019; Sheng & Qingqing 2021). Under the Great United Front (大统战) concept, the CCP revitalized the United Front Work Department as a “magic weapon” to appropriate and control social groups and social movements in support of Chinese government security objectives (Cordesman, 2021; Hala & Lulu, 2018; Kyngge et al., 2017; Lee & Hung, 2014; Mattis & Joske, 2019; Xinhua, 2022). Additionally, Chinese

“unrestricted warfare” strategy asserts “the battlefield is everywhere”, therefore, “*nonmilitary* tools are becoming equally prominent and useful for the achievement of previously military objectives” (Mazarr, 2015, p.83; Liang & Xiangsui, 1999). China’s doctrine of “The Three Warfares” encourages high-volume cognitive campaigning by employing legal, psychological, and media warfare alongside conventional and irregular warfare (Burke et al., 2020; Pomerantsev, 2015).

Furthermore, China’s strategic deterrence paradigm includes the use of irregular deterrence by denial as a fifth pillar alongside nuclear, conventional, space and cyber capabilities. Chinese doctrine refers to this as People’s War. It calls for “using a country’s population to draw an enemy deeper inland, where the population can then use mobile and guerilla warfare to bleed the enemy dry” (Chase & Chan, 2016; U.S. Department of the Army, 2021). China also utilizes its civilian population as a means of interstate conflict in the South China Sea. The Chinese government co-opts civilian fishing crews and then provides them with “satellite-based marine radios that help China to surveil and picket the South China Sea and harass “trespassing’ vessels” (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015; Freier, 2016). This approach enables a denial strategy without directly confronting the United States militarily. Taken together, the Chinese appropriation and exploitation of civilian populations, resistance, and information takes many challenging forms. As within deterrence theory, these gray zone forms of interstate conflict are largely unaddressed by existing deterrence paradigms.

Researchable Literature Gaps

A review of the literature pertinent to this study highlighted four primary gaps in knowledge.

1. The literature lacks holistic study of resistance that does not center on bifurcation of violent/non-violent methods, and without bias towards non-violent methods.
2. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory to examine resistance from a security studies perspective to gain a better understanding of specific variables significantly associated with success or progress of regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance campaigns during the formative period of 1945-2006 that are akin to the types of resistance movements appropriated by Russian and Chinese security forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022.
3. The literature lacks research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the contemporary period 2006-2022 as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate gray zone interstate conflict.
4. The literature lacks concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention.

Research Questions

The present study addresses the four identified literature gaps through consideration of three research questions.

1. What are the significant relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?
2. How do the relationships between elements of combat power and the success/progress in resistance movements in the formative period from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese

government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns in the contemporary period from 2006-2022?

3. How can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns?

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The research methodology included a two-stage, complementary, dynamic mixed methods design suited to address the three research questions of the study (Creswell & Clark, 2011). In the first complementary study, quantitative methods were employed to analyze the NAVCO 2.0 dataset of global resistance movements from 1945-2006. The analysis explored the relationships between combat power variables and progress/success in resistance campaigns. The quantitative findings identified critical resistance variables. These variables informed a second complementary study that utilized qualitative content analysis of primary sources, scholarly articles, and news sources to explore the appropriation of resistance by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China from 2006-2022. The nature of relationship between the quantitative and qualitative samples is multilevel, as the quantitative sample focuses predominantly on tactical characteristics of a broad range of resistance movements, and the qualitative sample focused more on the strategic characteristics of state appropriated resistance movements (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). The selected methods of analysis involved evaluation of existing data and archival sources and did not require human subject research.

Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Methodology

The first complementary study quantitatively explored the first research question utilizing combat power theory and nonparametric statistical analysis: What are the relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation? The quantitative methods employed support the exploratory purpose of the study by examining a

large quantitative dataset to identify key resistance variables during the formative period of 1945-2006.

Data Collection and Sampling

The data set analyzed in this study was derived from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data Project 2.0 (Chenoweth & Lewis 2013). The NAVCO Data Project is a research effort led by the University of Denver Sie Cheou-Kang Center of International Security and Diplomacy. According to the University of Denver, the NAVCO project “is an attempt to provide researchers with data to understand the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of nonviolent mass campaigns” (University of Denver, 2013). The NAVCO 2.0 dataset was selected for this study for its completeness, rigor and applicability to the research questions.

The NAVCO 2.0 data set codes 57 variables across 250 resistance campaigns annually from 1945-2006, spanning 1,162 total campaign years. In total, the dataset is comprised of 1,726 unique cases and 98,382 data points. The dataset is coded by tactical choices of resistance movements and the ways opponent governments and third-party actors respond to resistance movement choices (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). The formula provided by Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) to determine the needed sample size for significance is $N > 50 + 8m$ (m = number of independent variables). According to this formula, only 506 cases would be required for significance in this study. Therefore, the sample size of 1,726 cases exceeds the requirement to achieve significant scientific value.

It its completeness, the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is a compilation of disparate datasets regarding social movements and resistance campaigns. The data related to nonviolent campaigns derived from three sources (Carter et al., 2007; Karatnacky & Ackerman, 2005; Schock, 2005). A panel of a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict and social movements reviewed the

compilation of these data sources for completeness and appropriateness. The data related to violent campaigns primarily derived from five sources. These sources are: The Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Gleditsch, 2004), the Encyclopedia of Armed Conflict (Clodfelter, 2002), Kalev Sepp's list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005), Lyall and Wilson's (2008) dataset on insurgencies, and Fearon and Laitin's data set on civil wars (2003). Regarding the rigor of the data set, since its public release in 2013, the NAVCO 2.0 dataset has been peer reviewed and utilized in several studies (Anisin, 2016; Bethke, 2017; Chenoweth, 2018; Kirisci & Demirhan, 2019; Stewart, 2015; Thurber, 2013; 2018; Tompkins, 2015).

Regarding the applicability of the dataset to the research question, the population from which the sample is drawn includes resistance movements between 1945 and 2006 with at least 1,000 observed participants with goals of overthrowing the existing regime or expelling foreign powers. The sampling procedures provide a representative sample through purposive, diversity, and non-probability sampling. Distinguishing features of the dataset relevant to the research questions are inclusion of (a) variables pertaining to the nature of the resistance movement (primarily violent or non-violent); (b) the yearly progress of the resistance movement (status quo, visible gains short of concessions, limited concessions, significant concessions or complete success); and (c) resistance campaign goals (regime change, significant institutional reform, policy change, territorial secession, greater autonomy, or anti-occupation).

Multiple alternative datasets were explored, including the Transnational Social Movement Organization Dataset (Smith & Wiest, 2012), the Strategies of Resistance Data Project (Cunningham et al., 2020), the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (Acosta, 2019), the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Lakey, 2016), the Global Digital Activism Data Set (2014), the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al., 2012), and the

Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (Boschee et al., 2015). These alternative data sets were not suitable for the current study due to concerns with completeness of the data set and relevance to the research questions.

Not all of the variables in the NAVCO 2.0 data set were relevant to the research questions or theoretical lens of this study. These variables focused on resistance movement diversity and social change objectives that were outside of the scope of this study. Many of the variables coded resistance movement diversity, including the number of new organizations in the campaign, unity amongst resistance sub-groups, gender diversity, age diversity, class diversity, urban-rural diversity, ideological diversity, party diversity, regional diversity, ethnic diversity, and religious diversity. Other variables coded in the data set included social change objectives: educational system, social welfare system, judiciary system, human rights, discrimination, and repression. The table below provides a crosswalk of 15 of 57 variables in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset relevant to combat power theory (see Table 4).

Table 4

Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset

Combat Power Element	NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables
Command and Control	campaign leadership structure (1)
Intelligence	
Fires	
Maneuver	existence of a radical flank, security force defectors to resistance (2)
Protection	public official defectors to resistance (1)
Sustainment	state support for campaign, diaspora support for campaign, NGO support for campaign, foreign support (5)
Information	resistance media campaign, resistance traditional media, resistance new media, domestic media coverage, international media coverage (6)

The study further selected 9 of the 15 combat power variables as independent variables in the study based on their specific relevance to the research questions. The variables chosen were: (1) security forces defection, (2) state defection, (3) international traditional media coverage, (4) domestic traditional media coverage, (5) resistance movement outreach to traditional media, (6) resistance movement creation of social media system, (7) resistance movement creation of traditional media system, (8) whether a radical flank exists within the resistance movement, and (9) whether or not the campaign has formal overt support from foreign nations.

The selected variables have directly connections to the underpinnings of this study, however, the relevance of four of these variables might be less intuitive, including (1) security defectors; (2) state defectors; (3) radical flank; and (4) foreign support. Regarding the first of these variables, a security force defection is defined in the NAVCO codebook (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013) as, “people formerly associated with the state, who publicly announce their support for the campaign.” These individuals, or “security officials”, are those associated with the official police or military apparatus. Often, these individuals are generals or military leaders, but they can include police that follow state directives to crackdown on the resistance. For the second variable, state defectors represent “people formerly associated with the state, who publicly announce their support for the campaign. This means that former state officials formally or tacitly support the campaign.” The third variable, radical flank is defined as “a group that adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue their goals.” Finally, foreign support is defined as, “other states have voiced their support for the opposition campaign, provided arms to insurgents or provided them with other material resources and support” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). In consideration of their definitions, each of these terms is related to the considerations of resistance emphasized in this study.

The variable “camp_goals” in the NAVCO 2.0 data set codes key data regarding resistance movement objectives (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). This variable coded six possible resistance campaign goals: (1) regime change; (2) significant institutional reform; (3) policy change; (4) territorial secession; (5) greater autonomy; and (6) anti-occupation. The study examined three of the six coded campaign goals due to their direct relevance to the research questions: regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation. The study did not include the other three campaign goals in this study, as they are primarily associated with domestic, principled resistance movements, which are not within the scope of this study. Within the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, the campaign goal of “regime change” is coded as “0” and is defined as “a goal of overthrowing the state or substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would cause a de facto shift in the regime’s hold on power” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Within the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, the campaign goal of “territorial secession” is coded as “3”. The campaign goal of “anti-occupation” is coded as “5” and defined as “conflicts waged against a foreign power” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). These data fields closely align with the U.S. military definition of unconventional warfare as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

Another variable from the NAVCO 2.0 essential to the scope and focus of the data analysis and the purpose of this study on resistance is “primary method”. This variable coded the primary methods of a resistance campaign. A campaign that is primarily violent in nature is coded “0”, while a campaign that is primarily nonviolent is coded “1”. Analyzing these distinctions is critical to answering the research questions and addressing the purpose of this study: to address gaps in the literature of examining resistance from a security studies

perspective. Further, this emphasis provides additional intellectual space for contemplation and examination of violent resistance as a deliberate strategic choice by nation states and moves beyond implicit bias against violent resistance by researchers focused on examining resistance from a non-violent bias.

Two variables from the NAVCO 2.0 were dependent variables in the study: “success” and “progress.” These variables coded the outcomes of the resistance campaign. “Success” was coded as a “1” and represented movements that achieved campaign outcomes within one year of peak activity. “Progress” coded into separate categories: status quo (“0”), visible gains short of concessions (“1”), limited concessions achieved (“2”), significant concessions achieved (“3”), complete success (“4”) and (“-99”) for unknown. As noted in the previous paragraphs, this study examined the success or progress, coded as described in this paragraph, of resistance campaigns with the goal of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation. The tables below depict the variables explored in this study.

The first of the tables directly describes the coding of variables pertaining to combat power elements (see Table 5).

Table 5*Selected Combat Power Elements coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset*

Combat Power Element	Combat Power NAVCO 2.0 Variable	Variable Description
Maneuver	Radical flank	ordinal: 0 (primarily violent campaign), 1 (no radical flank), 2 (radical flank)
	Security forces defection	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
Information	Domestic traditional media coverage	ordinal: 0 (little to none), 1 (moderate), 2 (high), -99 (unknown)
	Resistance movement outreach to traditional media	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
	Resistance movement creation of social media system	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
	Resistance movement creation of traditional media system	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
	International traditional media coverage	ordinal: 0 (little to none), 1 (moderate), 2 (high), -99 (unknown)
Sustainment	Resistance foreign support	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)
Protection	State defection	nominal binary: 1 (yes), 0 (no) or -99 (unknown)

The next table details the coding of the variables pertaining to resistance movement outcomes (see Table 6).

Table 6*Resistance Movement Outcomes coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset*

Movement Outcomes	NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables
Progress	ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1 (visible gains short of concessions), 2 (limited concession achieved), 3 (significant concessions achieved), 4 (complete success), -99 (unknown)
Campaign Success	nominal binary: 1 (yes), or 0 (no)
Stated Goals of the Campaign	ordinal: 0 (regime change), 1 (significant institutional reform), 2 (policy change), 3 (territorial secession), 4 (greater autonomy), 5 (anti-occupation), -99 (unknown)

The final table lists the variables of resistance movement methodologies and their associated NAVCO coding (see Table 7).

Table 7

Resistance Movement Methodologies coded in NAVCO 2.0 Dataset

Movement Method	NAVCO 2.0 Dataset Variables
prim_method	Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year. nominal binary: 0 (primarily violent campaign), 1 (primarily nonviolent)

Data Analysis

The quantitative study of this dissertation explored the resistance-focused variables of the NAVCO data set in three stages without privileging the method of resistance (i.e., violent/nonviolent) during the analysis. Rather, the analysis focused on the relationships between the elements of the movement (e.g., combat power variables) and the outcomes of the movement (i.e., success or progress). By examining progress as an ordinal variable, this analysis provided a deeper understanding of the relationship between different combat power variables at varying levels of success. This first stage analysis provided a macro understanding of key combat power variables associated with success and progress without regard to resistance methodologies (i.e., violent/nonviolent) or campaign goals (e.g., regime change, anti-occupation).

A second stage of analysis focused on the aspect of the research question to examine resistance movements with specific goals: regime change or anti-occupation. As in the first stage, this analysis did not bias or bifurcate between violent and nonviolent resistance movements. Through this open consideration, the findings provide a fuller understanding of the relationships between combat power variables and specific resistance campaign goals, which are the focus of this study.

Finally, the study analyzed three specific data fields within the NAVCO 2.0 dataset with particular relevance to the research focus on Russian Federation appropriation of resistance movements. Specifically, the researcher examined three specific resistance movements: (1) Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003; (2) Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2002-2005; and (3) Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. These resistance movements informed Russian formulation of resistance appropriation methods.

The study explored the relationships between 57 variables in a dataset comprised of 1,726 cases using non-parametric statistical techniques. The dataset is suitable for non-parametric analysis based on assumptions of independence and expected frequencies. Regarding independence, the data collection is not a repeated-measures design. Regarding expected frequencies, no expected values should be below five when using 2 x 2 tables, and no more than 20% of values should be below five when using larger tables (Field, 2013).

To explore relationships between a dichotomous nominal variable and an ordinal variable, the study utilized a Chi-square test for independence linear-by-linear results (Mangiafico, 2018). Statistical significance was calculated at the traditional alpha level of $p < .05$ (Field 2013; Pallant 2011). The results of Chi-square tests were reported using the following format: $\chi^2 (df, n) = , p = , \phi =$. Phi coefficient was .10 for small effect, .30 for medium effect and .50 for large effect (Pallat 2016). The following table depicts the chi squared tests conducted in the study (see Table 8).

Table 8*Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables*

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)		
	Success nominal binary: 1 (yes), or 0 (no)	Progress ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1 (visible gains short of concessions, 2 (limited concession achieved), 3 (significant concessions achieved), 4 (complete success), -99 (unknown)	Campaign Goal ordinal: 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti- occupation), -99 (unknown)
Resistance movement outreach to traditional media (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
Resistance movement creation of social media system (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
Resistance movement creation of traditional media system (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
Security forces defection (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
State defection (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
Resistance foreign support (nominal)	nominal x nominal	nominal x ordinal	nominal x ordinal
International traditional media coverage (ordinal)	ordinal x nominal		
Radical flank (ordinal)	ordinal x nominal		
Domestic traditional media coverage (ordinal)	ordinal x nominal		

To explore relationships between two ordinal variables, the study utilized Spearman's rho (ρ) tests (Pallant 2016; see Table 9). The results of Spearman's rho were reported using the following format: There was a [negative or positive] correlation between the two variables, $r(df) = [r \text{ value}], p = [p\text{-value}]$. The strength of correlation interpreted as follows: $r = .10$ to $.29$ (small), $r = .30$ to $.49$ (medium), and $r = .50$ to 1.0 (large; Field, 2013).

Table 9*Spearman's Rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables*

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)
	<p>Progress ordinal: 1 (status quo), 1 (visible gains short of concessions), 2 (limited concession achieved), 3 (significant concessions achieved), 4 (complete success), -99 (unknown)</p> <p>Campaign Goal ordinal: 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation), -99 (unknown)</p>
International traditional media coverage (ordinal)	ordinal x ordinal
Radical flank (ordinal)	ordinal x ordinal
Domestic traditional media coverage (ordinal)	ordinal x ordinal

Complementary Study #2: Content Analysis

In the second complementary study, qualitative methods and resistance theory enabled further exploration of the relationships identified in the first study. Complementary study #2 addressed the second research question: how do the relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance movements from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns from 2006-2022? Deterrence theory enabled additional exploration of the third research question: how can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns?

Complementary Study #2 utilized content analysis techniques. Content analysis “is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 24). This definition allows “content to emerge in the process of a researcher analyzing a text relative to a particular context”

(Krippendorf, 2019, p. 24). From an epistemological perspective, this approach maintains that texts can be read from numerous perspectives and derive multiple meanings and inferences (Krippendorf, 34, 2019). The epistemological orientation aligns with this study, which is an exploratory study to address gaps in the literature by increasing the understanding of resistance movements from the perspective of state actors, not only from the perspective of non-state actors, which currently predominates the literature. Content analysis places emphasis on abductive logic to derive inferences, including extrapolations, trends, patterns, and differences (Krippendorf, 2019).

The components of content analysis are unitizing, sampling, coding, reducing, inferring, and narrating (Krippendorf, 2019). In content analysis, there are three kinds of units: (1) sampling units; (2) recording/coding units; and (3) context units defined by physical, syntactical, categorical, prepositional, and thematic distinctions. The study utilized relevance/purposive sampling and statistical sampling theory to derive significance level of 0.05, requiring 29 units in the sampling population (Krippendorf, 2019, p. 125). The table below provides a summary of the primary sources examined in this study pertaining to Russian Security Discourse (see Table 10).

Table 10*Primary Sources: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Gerasimov, Valery (2013)	The Value of Science is in the Foresight	https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/militaryreview_20160228_art008.pdf
Gerasimov, Valery (2018)	Thoughts on Future Military Conflict	https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2019/Gerasimov-2019.pdf
Putin, Vladimir (2022)	Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China	http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770
Putin, Vladimir (2021)	National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation	http://scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/14wGRPqJvETSkUTYmhepzRochblj1jqh.pdf https://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=704
Brychkov, A.S. (2017)	Color Revolutions in Russia: Possibility and Reality	https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/Color-Revolutions-Brychkov-Nikonorov.pdf
Cordesman, Anthony (2014)	Russia and the “Color Revolution”	https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Summary.pdf
Putin, Vladimir (2021)	On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians	https://static.poder360.com.br/2022/03/Article-by-Vladimir-Putin-On-the-Historical-Unity-of-Russians-and-Ukrainians.pdf
Putin, Vladimir (Mar. 18, 2014)	Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-will-protect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
Putin, Vladimir (Feb. 24, 2022)	Address by the President of the Russian Federation	http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843
Gerasimov, Valery (2018)	The Development of Military Strategy under Contemporary Conditions. Tasks for Military Science	https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2019/Orenstein-Thomas.pdf

In addition to the primary sources reviewed in the content analysis, several scholarly articles were analyzed (see Table 11).

Table 11*Scholarly Articles: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Thomas, Timothy L (2019)	Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements	https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf
Kofman, Michael etal (2021)	Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts	https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/pdf/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf
Sokov, Nikolai (2020)	Russia Clarifies Its Nuclear Deterrence Policy	https://vcdnp.org/russia-clarifies-its-nuclear-deterrence-policy/
Hinkle, Katherine (2017)	Russia's Reactions to the Color Revolutions	https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/52991
Bowen, Andrew (2021)	Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy	https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11625.pdf
Bērziņa, Ieva (2014)	Color Revolutions: Democratization, Hidden Influence, or Warfare?	https://www.naa.mil.lv/sites/naa/files/document/1_WP2014%20Color%20revolutions.pdf National Defense Academy of Latvia
Nikitina, Yulia (2014)	The "Color Revolutions" and "Arab Spring" in Russian Official Discourse	https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326387?seq=1
Fisher, Sarah (2014)	Sovereign Democracy: Russia's Response to the Color Revolutions	https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=honors
Bouchet, Nicolas (2016)	Russia's "militarization" of colour revolutions	https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP4-2.pdf
Mitrokhin, Nikolay (2015)	Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbass	https://spps-jspps.autorenbetreuung.de/files/07-mitrokhin.pdf
Shapovalova, Natalia and Jarábik, Balázs (2018)	How Eastern Ukraine Is Adapting and Surviving: The Case of Kharkiv	https://carnegieeuropa.eu/2018/09/12/how-eastern-ukraine-is-adapting-and-surviving-case-of-kharkiv-pub-77216

Lastly, to ensure a comprehensive analysis of data, news reports pertaining to security discourse in Russia were included in the content analysis (see Table 12).

Table 12*News Reports: Russian Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Nikolsky, Alexei (2022)	Russia-Led Military Bloc Will Not Allow 'Color Revolutions' in Post-Soviet Countries – Putin	https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/01/10/russia-led-military-bloc-will-not-allow-color-revolutions-in-post-soviet-countries-putin-a76000
BBC (April, 2014).	Ukraine: Pro-Russians storm offices in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26910210
Reuters (April, 2014)	Protests in eastern Ukraine aimed at bringing in Russian troops, warns PM	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-storm-idUSBREA350B420140407
Sputnik International (2015)	'Slavic Brotherhood' Exercises Aimed at Crushing Potential Maidan Scenario	https://sputniknews.com/20150903/slavic-brotherhood-russia-serbia-belarus-1026549545.html
BBC (April 7, 2014)	Ukraine crisis: Protesters declare Donetsk 'republic'	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26919928
France 24 (2022)	From the Maidan protests to Russia's invasion: Eight years of conflict in Ukraine	https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220228-from-the-maidan-protests-to-russia-s-invasion-eight-years-of-conflict-in-ukraine
BBC (May 11, 2014)	Ukraine rebels hold referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27360146
DW (Feb. 21, 2022)	Russia recognizes independence of Ukraine separatist regions	https://www.dw.com/en/russia-recognizes-independence-of-ukraine-separatist-regions/a-60861963
Euromaidan Press (Sept. 1, 2014)	The Russian Spring and Its Outcome	https://euromaidanpress.com/2014/09/01/the-russian-spring-and-its-outcome/
Radio Free Europe (Dec. 3, 2004)	Russia: Putin Defends Reforms, Condemns 'Revolutions'	https://www.rferl.org/a/1056558.html
Roth, Andrew (2014)	Russia Tourists Stir the Protests	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/russias-hand-can-be-seen-in-the-protests.html

Regarding Chinese Security Discourse, similar procedures were used to evaluate primary sources, scholarly articles, and news reports to achieve a comprehensive view. The table below describes the primary sources included (see Table 13).

Table 13*Primary Sources: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC (2022)	Wang Yi Speaks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the Phone	https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202201/t20220111_10480941.html
Embassy of the PRC in the USA	The State of Democracy in the United States	http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/202112/t20211205_10462535.htm
Xinhua Sept. 25, 2021	National Security Office of Central Gov't Says U.S. Plotting to Wage "Color Revolution" In Hong Kong	http://www.news.cn/english/2021-09/25/c_1310208553.htm
Xinhua Jan. 13, 2021	Mainland spokesperson rebuts DPP's slander on united front work	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/13/c_139664665.htm
Xinhua (Dec. 12, 2020)	Xi Focus: Xi stresses building holistic national security architecture	http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/12/c_139584669.htm
Sheng, Yang and Qingqing, Chen (Apr. 15, 2021)	West-backed color revolution a 'top threat' to China's national, political security	https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1221182.shtml
China Daily (2019)	Hong Kong 'color revolution' signs seen	https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201909/06/WS5d71ac70a310cf3e3556a085.html
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia (2022)	President Xi Jinping Held Talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin	https://china.usc.edu/russia-china-joint-statement-international-relations-february-4-2022
China Daily (2014)	Hong Kong's color revolution	https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2014-10/15/content_18739914.htm
Global Times (Dec. 2, 2021)	US Wages Global Color Revolutions to Topple Govts For the Sake Of American Control	https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml

The scholarly articles included regarding Chinese security discourse are outlined in the following table (see Table 14).

Table 14*Scholarly Articles: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Bowe, Alexander (2018)	China's Overseas United Front Work	https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf
Hsiao, Russell (2021)	Political Warfare Alert: CCP Updates United Front Regulations Expanding Foreign Influence Mission	https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/02/vol-6-issue-3/#RussellHsiao02102021
Dreyer, June (2018)	China's United Front Strategy And Taiwan	https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/02/19/chinas-united-front-strategy-and-taiwan/
Chen, Titus (2010)	China's Reaction to the Color Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism in Full Swing	https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1644372
Lo, Wing T (2021)	Securitizing the Colour Revolution: Assessing the Political Role of Triads in Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement	https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/61/6/1521/6261040
Dotson, John (2021)	Spring 2021 Activities by China's United Front Bureaucracy for Taiwan	https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/06/vol-6-issue-11/
Marris and Joske (2019)	The Third Magic Weapon: Reforming China's United Front	https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-third-magic-weapon-reforming-chinas-united-front/
Scobell, Andrew et al (2020)	China's Grand Strategy Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition	https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2798.html
Mankikar, Kalpit (Jan. 2022)	Preserving National Security, the Xi Jinping Way	https://www.orfonline.org/research/preserving-national-security-the-xi-jinping-way/
Singh, Mandip (Sept. 23, 2020)	Learning from Russia: How China used Russian models and experiences to modernize the PLA	https://merics.org/en/report/learning-russia-how-china-used-russian-models-and-experiences-modernize-pla
Dimon, Liu (2021)	'Entice the Enemy's Best and Wisest': China's War of Stealth	https://cepa.org/entice-the-enemys-best-and-wisest-chinas-war-of-stealth/

Lastly, the news reports pertaining to Chinese security discourse that were included in the content analysis are described (see Table 15).

Table 15*News Reports: Chinese Security Discourse 2006-2022*

Author (Date)	Title	Source
Yisheng, Zhang (2021)	World Insights: What lurks behind U.S.-advocated "color revolutions?"	http://www.news.cn/english/2021-12/16/c_1310376299.htm
Business Standard (2019)	Instigation Of 'Coloured Revolutions', Ousting of Legitimate Govts Reasons For World Turmoil: China	https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/instigation-of-coloured-revolutions-ousting-of-legitimate-govts-reasons-for-world-turmoil-china-119102100948_1.html
Ranade, Jayadeva June 11 , 2021	Xi Jinping and CCP Leadership Wary of Colour Revolution before 20th Party Congress	https://www.vifindia.org/article/2021/june/11/xi-jinping-and-ccp-leadership-wary-of-colour-revolution-before-20th-party-congress
Dorfman, Zach (July 27, 2018).	How Silicon Valley Became a Den of Spies	https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/27/silicon-valley-spies-china-russia-219071 .
Cole, Michael (Jan. 7, 2017)	Pro-Unification Groups, Triad Members Threaten Hong Kong Activist Joshua Wong, Legislators in Taiwan	https://sentinel.tw/pro-unification-hk-tw/
Ping, Xin (April 6, 2022)	NED Stands For Anything But Democracy	https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/06/WS624ce8a4a310fd2b29e55308.html
Lopez, Linette (June 15th, 2015)	China Has Taken Up Russia's Deepest Fear	https://www.businessinsider.com/china-has-taken-up-russias-deepest-fear-2015-6
Ma, Lawrence (May 28th, 2020)	HK National Security Legislation Will Thwart Color Revolution Attempts	https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/HK-national-security-legislation-will-thwart-color-revolution-attempts-QRFz7IeLra/index.html
Mudie, Luisetta (July 14th, 2020)	China Says Hong Kong Primaries Show Attempt at 'Color Revolution'	https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/primaries-07142020120324.html
Ranade, Jayadeva (2021)	Spectre of 'Colour Revolution' Worries PLA	https://www.sanjhamorcha.com/page/37/

Data Collection and Sampling

The qualitative component of this study utilized a non-random sampling scheme for data collection. Initial purposive sampling was derived through analysis of three specific cases from the first stage NAVCO 2.0 dataset to emphasize the Russian formulation of resistance

appropriation methods, including: (a) Rose Revolution in Georgia; (b) Orange Revolution in Ukraine; and (c) Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. These Color Revolutions drove Russian adaptation of security discourse to include violent and nonviolent resistance methods in a gray zone campaign. Through a process of pattern matching, text mining, and explanation building of the data on these Color Revolutions, this study explored the Russian development of a gray zone approach to address the Color Revolutions, which Russia operationalized in the Ukraine in 2014. The data collection relevant to the study of Russian gray zone methods derived 30 sampling units centered on Russian security discourse regarding the Ukraine from 2006-2022. Furthermore, the research derived 30 sampling units centered on Chinese security discourse regarding Color Revolutions from 2006-2022.

Multiple sources of evidence helped ensure validity and reliability in this study. As highlighted by Yim (2014), news accounts are excellent sources of data; however, they were thoroughly reviewed and corroborated by the researcher before being included in the data collection for this study. The sampling units are texts derived from: (a) primary sources of Russian and Chinese policy, doctrine, and official statements; (b) scholarly articles related to Russian and Chinese policy, doctrine, and official statements; and (c) news reports of Russian and Chinese actions and decisions. The data collection derived from public, English-text internet websites in three categories: (a) government websites of the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the U.S.; (b) bounded, recorded, repeatable text mining of variable strings using a search engine; and (c) selected news websites that pass validity and reliability testing. The parameters for inclusion are dates (2006-2022).

The methodology includes content analysis of documentary evidence through identification of author bias and data triangulation methods. The qualitative data set is comprised

of 60 sources of documentary evidence independently coded for this study. The data collection methodology was a three-step process: (1) scanning based on sampling criteria and relevance to research questions; (2) detailed reading based on relevance to research questions; and (3) decision to select or reject the sample based on relevance to research question (Krippendorff, 2019). Utilizing this data collection methodology, the researcher examined more than 300 documents in order to derive the 60 documents utilized in the study.

Data was separated into three categories: (1) government primary sources; (2) scholarly articles directly analyzing primary source documents; and (3) news reports. The researcher conducted data collection in English language, which limited collection to translated primary source materials from Chinese or Russian language. One way to address this limitation was to conduct data collection from English language scholarly articles, which presented data translated from primary source documents. Of note, several English language media outlets, including the Daily Times and China Daily, are government media publications, not independent media reports, and were collected and coded as government sources, not media sources.

Data Analysis

The researcher analyzed the sample population utilizing problem-driven analysis, and factor analysis. Once collected, the samples were coded according to established coding instructions to reduce the data to manageable representations. Next, the researcher abductively inferred contextual phenomena utilizing resistance theory as a framework, building upon the variables of combat power that were associated with success or progress in the first complementary study, to generate critical factors through the content analysis. Finally, the findings of the study resulted in a narrative answer to the research questions to facilitate

increased understanding of the phenomenon of information and resistance appropriation methods by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China (Krippendorff, 2019, p. 88).

Ethical Considerations

This research study comprised analysis of existing data sources and did not involve human subject research, limiting potential ethical concerns. An essential ethical consideration given the nature of this study is identification of potential researcher bias, including confirmation bias, as the researcher has spent over twenty years in the military working in the field of resistance movements. The researcher took active and reflective measures to identify, record, and account for any potential bias in the research. These steps permitted the researcher to conduct the data collection and analysis in an objective manner.

Trustworthiness. The quality of this research design aligned with the four tests of empirical social research: (1) construct validity; (2) internal validity; (3) external validity; and (4) reliability. To ensure construct validity, the content analysis utilized multiple sources of evidence, including primary sources and scholarly journals. The researcher achieved internal validity through pattern matching and addressing rival explanations.

Summary

This study focused on four literature gaps that centered on additional research on nonviolent methods and resistance movements from a security studies perspective (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Further, the study was designed to support the goal of U.S. national security analysts to better understand Russian and China's gray zone strategies to help "aggressively adapt key intuitions, concepts, and capabilities for persistent gray zone campaigning" (Hume et al., 2016). Three theories provided the theoretical framework for this study: resistance theory, combat power theory, and deterrence theory. Quantitative methods analyzed global resistance

movements from 1945-2006, identifying resistance variables significantly associated with progress and success in resistance campaigns. Additionally, qualitative methods explored the appropriation of resistance methods by Russia and China from 2006-2022. The resulting research conclusions support security sector leaders in understanding critical variables of Russian and China's appropriation of resistance and inform deterrence strategies to address these activities.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

Chapter four provides an overview of the results of the complementary quantitative and qualitative investigations included in this study.

Complementary Study #1: Quantitative Results

Complementary study #1 focused on the first research question: what are the relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation?

This research question was addressed utilizing nonparametric quantitative methods to analyze global resistance movements from 1945-2006 coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The following table depicts the findings of the chi squared tests conducted in the study (see Table 16).

Table 16

Results: Chi Squared Tests Between Nominal and Ordinal Variables

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)			
	Overall Success (nominal)	Overall Progress (ordinal)	Success Campaign Goal (ordinal)	Progress Campaign Goal (ordinal)
Resistance movement outreach to traditional media (nominal)	$\chi^2 (2, n = 1591) = 3.056, p = .217, phi = .044$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1590) = 4.872, p = .027, phi = .113$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 684) = 4.482, p = .034, phi = .081$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 298) = .451, p = .502, phi = .107$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 327) = .083, p = .774, phi = .076$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 683) = .167, p = .683, phi = .147$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 298) = 1.609, p = .256, phi = .184$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 327) = .015, p = .903, phi = .283$
Resistance movement creation of social	$\chi^2 (2, n = 1194) = 1.91, p = .385, phi = .040$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1194) = 1.915, p = .166, phi = .096$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 523) = .339, p = .560, phi = .060$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 523) = .167, p = .683, phi = .144$

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)			
	Overall Success (nominal)	Overall Progress (ordinal)	Success Campaign Goal (ordinal)	Progress Campaign Goal (ordinal)
media system (nominal)			3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 204) = .483, p = .487, phi = -.049$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 223) = .511, p = .475, phi = -.048$	3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 204) = 2.873, p = .090, phi = .321$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 223) = .905, p = .341, phi = .077$
Resistance movement creation of traditional media system (nominal)	$\chi^2 (2, n = 1461) = .895, p = .639, phi = .025$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1461) = 2.233, p = .135, phi = .098$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 612) = .178, p = .673, phi = .051$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 266) = 1.290, p = .256, phi = .070$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 333) = 2.755, p = .097, phi = .091$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 612) = .261, p = .610, phi = .133$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 266) = .606, p = .436, phi = .086$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 333) = 8.391, p = .004, phi = .162$
Security forces defection (nominal)	$\chi^2 (2, n = 1459) = 60.82, p = .001, phi = .204$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1459) = 13.133, p = .001, phi = .228$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 573) = 2.462, p = .117, phi = .251$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 300) = 4.131, p = .042, phi = .220$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 307) = 2.002, p = .157, phi = .081$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 572) = 6.674, p = .010, phi = .279$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 301) = 4.309, p = .038, phi = .432$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 307) = 2.671, p = .102, phi = .224$
State defection (nominal)	$\chi^2 (2, n = 1459) = 58.839, p = .001, phi = .201$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1459) = 8.438, p = .004, phi = .249$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 573) = .431, p = .511, phi = .218$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 300) = 4.291, p = .038, phi = .234$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 307) = .113, p = .737, phi = .054$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 572) = 4.153, p = .042, phi = .285$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 301) = 4.976, p = .026, phi = .322$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 307) = .835, p = .361, phi = .251$
Resistance foreign support (nominal)	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1633) = 3.331, p = .068, phi = .045$	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1634) = 5.429, p = .020, phi = .121$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 675) = .512, p = .474, phi = .028$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 336) = 1.105, p = .293, phi = .057$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 348) = 2.613, p = .106, phi = .087$	0: $\chi^2 (1, n = 675) = 2.117, p = .146, phi = .171$ 3: $\chi^2 (1, n = 337) = 2.503, p = .114, phi = .092$ 5: $\chi^2 (1, n = 348) = 1.049, p = .306, phi = .161$

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)			
	Overall Success (nominal)	Overall Progress (ordinal)	Success Campaign Goal (ordinal)	Progress Campaign Goal (ordinal)
International traditional media coverage (ordinal)	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1678) = 2.605, p = .107, phi = .152$		0: $\chi^2 (2, n = 706) = 20.979, p = .001, phi = .172$ 3: $\chi^2 (2, n = 334) = 15.809, p = .001, phi = .218$ 5: $\chi^2 (2, n = 349) = 38.700, p = .014, phi = .156$	0: $\chi^2 (12, n = 706) = 65.029, p = .001, phi = .303$ 3: $\chi^2 (8, n = 335) = 38.171, p = .001, phi = .338$ 5: $\chi^2 (8, n = 349) = 26.309, p = .001, phi = .275$
Radical flank (ordinal)	$\chi^2 (1, n = 1704) = 101.002, p = .001, phi = .273$		0: $\chi^2 (2, n = 709) = 82.696, p = .001, phi = .342$ 3: $\chi^2 (2, n = 347) = 31.101, p = .001, phi = .299$ 5: $\chi^2 (2, n = 357) = 128.851, p = .001, phi = .101$	0: $\chi^2 (8, n = 708) = 166.303, p = .001, phi = .485$ 3: $\chi^2 (8, n = 348) = 52.130, p = .001, phi = .387$ 5: $\chi^2 (8, n = 357) = 46.169, p = .001, phi = .360$
Domestic traditional media coverage (ordinal)	$\chi^2 (3, n = 1504) = 2.664, p = .103, phi = .086$		0: $\chi^2 (3, n = 633) = 4.939, p = .176, phi = .088$ 3: $\chi^2 (3, n = 288) = 5.657, p = .130, phi = .140$ 5: $\chi^2 (2, n = 300) = 2.954, p = .228, phi = .099$	0: $\chi^2 (21, n = 633) = 23.026, p = .028, phi = .191$ 3: $\chi^2 (2, n = 289) = 24.558, p = .017, phi = .292$ 5: $\chi^2 (2, n = 357) = 18.485, p = .018, phi = .248$

Note. Success Campaign Goal variable are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation). Progress Campaign Goal variables are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation).

The following table provides the results of the Spearman's rho (ρ) tests conducted between ordinal variables of the study (see Table 17).

Table 17

Results: Spearman's rho (ρ) Tests Between Ordinal Variables

Combat Power Variable (Independent)	Outcome (Dependent)			
	Overall Success	Overall Progress ordinal:	Success Campaign Goal (ordinal)	Progress Campaign Goal (ordinal)
International traditional media coverage (ordinal)		$r = .260, n = 1679, p < .001$		
Radical flank (ordinal)		$r = .346, n = 1711, p < .001$		
Domestic traditional media coverage (ordinal)		$r = .168, n = 1711, p < .001$		

Note. Success Campaign Goal variable are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation). Progress Campaign Goal variables are coded as 0 (regime change), 3 (territorial secession), 5 (anti-occupation).

Three of nine combat power variables were associated with success of all resistance movements at a statistically significant level. These variables are: (1) radical flank; $\chi^2 (1, n = 1704) = 101.002, p = .001, phi = .273$; (2) security force defectors; $\chi^2 (2, n = 1459) = 60.82, p = .001, phi = .204$; and (3) state defectors; $\chi^2 (2, n = 1459) = 58.839, p = .001, phi = .201$. Statistical significance calculated at the traditional alpha level of $p < .05$ (Pallant, 2011). Phi coefficient evaluated .10 for small effect, .30 for medium effect and .50 for large effect (Pallant, 2016). The association between success and the existence of a radical (violent) flank was the strongest of the three, interpreted as medium effect. Additionally, crosstab analysis of the entire data set indicated that only 191 of 1,704 (11.2%) coded resistance years were purely nonviolent movements, meaning that the primary method of the movement was coded as nonviolent in the data set, and the movement did not have a radical (violent) flank.

This analysis provided initial insights regarding RQ#1: what are the relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession or anti-occupation? While this first stage of analysis does not answer the question completely, notably lacking the fidelity of variables associated specifically with the campaign goals of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation, it does provide an initial framework for a macro understanding of the variables associated with success/progress of all resistance movements in the data set. This analysis begins to improve understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective by expanding understanding of resistance beyond a principled approach that is biased towards emphasis on non-violence. Findings shift to a more holistic understanding that allows for consideration of practical implications of a blended use of violent and non-violent methods in resistance movements. This insight is valuable to provide context and discern whether the variables associated with success/progress of the specific types of resistance movements of this study (i.e., regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation) have common or distinct variables associated with their success/progress and to provide a baseline for comparison and discussion in the next chapter.

The next step in the first stage of analysis was to examine overall progress (vs. success) of resistance movements. This analysis revealed a broader range of variables associated with the progress of resistance movements. The elements of combat power that were statistically significant in their association with overall progress of resistance movements (violent and nonviolent) included: (1) existence of a radical flank $r = .346$, $n = 1711$, $p < .001$; (2) international media coverage (3) state defectors (4) security force defectors (5) domestic media, and (7) foreign support. Interestingly, the analysis of progress in resistance movements resulted

in a higher association with the radical flank variable to the medium level at $r = .346$ (see Table 18). This analysis helps to improve the understanding of resistance movements beyond the bifurcated approach, which tends to overly simplify resistance movements as either violent or nonviolent, instead pointing to an understanding of the blended nature of resistance movements. In addition, this analysis supported the association between the variables representing defections (e.g., security forces and public leaders) and information activities indicated in the literature.

Table 18

Resistance Combat Power Variables Associated with Overall Success and Progress

	Foreign Support	Security Defectors	State Defectors	Int'l Media	Domestic Media	Media Outreach	Radical Flank
Success		.204**	.201**				.273**
Progress	.121*	.228**	.249**	.260**	.168**	.113*	.346**

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

The second stage of analysis focused on examining resistance movements with specific goals of regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation goals. As in the first stage, this stage of analysis examined the data set holistically, not bifurcated between violent and nonviolent resistance methods. The analysis indicated both similarities and variance in combat power variables associated with success/progress in regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation movements. In other words, an oversimplified answer to RQ#1, seeking to understand which variables are associated with success/progress, would be “it depends,” or varies, with the goals of the movement. Each movement had a unique set of combat power variables associated with success/progress. This level of fidelity and insight is additive to the literature, which generally places analytical emphasis on the method of the movement (violent/nonviolent), not the goals of the movement.

There were however, two variables significantly associated with success and progress with all three types of movement goals: (1) radical flank; and (2) international media coverage. The association and effect between the radical flank variable and progress in a regime change movement was the highest observed in the study $\chi^2 (8, n = 708) = 166.303, p = .001, phi = .485$. Similarly, the association between the radical flank variable and progress in territorial secession ($\chi^2 (8, n = 348) = 52.130, p = .001, phi = .387$) and anti-occupation goals ($\chi^2 (8, n = 357) = 46.169, p = .001, phi = .360$) were among the most significant in the study.

It is noteworthy that progress in resistance movements with a goal of regime change the violent flank variable has a higher effect ($phi = .485$) than movements with a goal of territorial secession ($phi = .387$) or anti-occupation ($phi = .360$). In addition, within the dataset, the violent flank variable is found more in regime change movements ($n = 706$) than territorial secession ($n = 335$) or anti-occupation movements ($n = 349$). As noted in the previous paragraph, the regime change variable is associated with the highest effect on success ($phi = .273$) and associated with progress ($r = .346$) of all movement goals. Taken together, the first stage of analysis indicates the combat power variable of radical flank is significantly associated with success/progress in the study. The next chapter explores these findings in detail.

International media coverage is the second variable significantly associated with success and progress among all three movement goals. The association and effect between the international media variable and progress were among the most significant in the study. The association and effect between the international media variable and progress in a territorial secession movement was the most significant at $\chi^2 (8, n = 335) = 38.171, p = .001, phi = .338$. The association and effect with a regime change movement was $\chi^2 (12, n = 706) = 65.029, p = .001, phi = .303$ and anti-occupation movement was $\chi^2 (8, n = 349) = 26.309, p = .001, phi =$

.275. Of interest, there was not a significant relationship identified between the international media variable and all movements. This variable is uniquely associated with the success of regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation movement goals. The next chapter explores these findings in detail.

Beyond sharing a significant relationship with the regime change and international media variables, success and progress of each movement goal had a unique combination of significant relationships with combat power variables. The success of regime change movements was significantly associated with (1) resistance outreach to the media; (2) international media coverage; and (3) the radical flank variable. However, the progress of regime change movements was significantly associated with (1) security force defections; (2) public/state leader defections; (3) international media coverage; and (4) the radical flank variable (see Table 19).

Table 19

Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Regime Change

	Radical Flank	Security Defectors	State Defectors	Int'l Media	Media Outreach
Success	.342**			.172**	.081*
Progress	.485**	.279*	.285*	.303**	

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

The success of territorial secession movements was significantly associated with (1) security force defections; (2) public leader defections; (3) international media coverage; and (4) the radical flank variable. However, the progress of territorial secession movements was significantly associated with (1) security force defections; (2) public leader defections; (3) international media coverage; and (4) the radical flank variable (see Table 20).

Table 20*Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Territorial Secession*

	Radical Flank	Security Defectors	State Defectors	Int'l Media	Media Outreach	Resistance Trad. Media
Success	.299**	.220*	.234*	.218**		
Progress	.387**	.432*	.322*	.338**		

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

The success of anti-occupation movements was significantly associated with (1) international media coverage and (2) the radical flank variable. However, the progress of anti-occupation movements was significantly associated with (1) international media coverage; (2) radical flank; and (3) the establishment of resistance traditional media (see Table 21).

Table 21*Combat Power Variables Associated with Success & Progress in Anti-Occupation*

	Radical Flank	Security Defectors	State Defectors	Int'l Media	Media Outreach	Resistance Trad. Media
Success	.101**			.156*		
Progress	.360**			.275**		.162*

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

The analysis yielded numerous relationships valuable in addressing RQ#1 and meeting the study objectives of providing additive understanding for both scholars and practitioners. For example, the establishment of resistance traditional media is uniquely significant to progress in anti-occupation resistance movements. At the same time, anti-occupation movements uniquely did not have a significant relationship with security or state defectors. The fidelity of variables significant to success and progress in different movement goals specifically addresses RQ#1 and is additive to the literature. The next chapter explores these findings in detail.

The third stage of analysis utilized the findings from the first two stages to analyze three specific data fields within the data set focused on Russian Federation appropriation of resistance

movements. The study examined three specific campaigns from the NAVCO 2.0 dataset: (a) Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2001-2004; (b) Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003; and (c) Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. These resistance movements are highly relevant to the research questions because these movements contributed to the Russian formulation of resistance appropriation methods. This section of the paper presents findings from the analysis of these data fields indexed against the findings from the first two stages of this analysis, specifically exploring the degree to which the individual data fields regarding the Orange (Ukraine), Rose (Georgia), and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan) Revolutions are consistent with the findings of the first two stages of analysis. Stage three utilized the same analytical approach as stage one and two, exploring relationships between nine variables of combat power with three resistance outcomes: success, progress, and goals (regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation).

Color Revolution Success Findings

According to stage 1 analysis, the combat power variables significantly associated to success of all resistance movements (i.e., violent and nonviolent) included (1) existence of a radical flank; (2) security force defectors; and (3) state defectors. The selected individual Color Revolution datasets are consistent with these findings. Of the three selected resistance movements, two achieved complete success. One of these two, the Tulip Revolution, contained two of three variables significantly associated with success in stage one analysis: a radical flank and state defectors. The other movement that achieved success was the Rose Revolution. This movement contained two of three variables significantly associated with success in stage one analysis: security defectors and state defectors. Overall, these stage three findings are consistent with the findings from stage one analysis that the existence of a radical flank, security defectors, and state defectors are associated with resistance movement success.

Color Revolution Progress Findings

According to stage one analysis, the combat power variables significantly associated with progress of all resistance movements are (1) existence of a radical flank; (2) security force defectors; (3) domestic media coverage; (4) state defectors; (5) international media coverage; (6) foreign support; and (7) resistance movement media outreach. Of the three selected movements, only one, the Orange Revolution, was a multi-year movement with graduated levels of progress. Examining the details of this multi-year movement yielded valuable insights. In the years where the Orange Revolution achieved little or no progress (2001, 2002, 2003), the movement contained three out of seven of these variables. Interestingly, in the year where the Orange Revolution achieved the most progress (2004), the movement contained six out of seven of these variables. The addition of security defectors, state defectors, and foreign support in 2004 were the additive variables in the most successful year of the movement, which resulted in the achievement of significant concessions. This finding is consistent with the results from the stage one analysis.

Color Revolution Additional Findings

Analysis of the selected data regarding the Orange, Rose and Tulip Revolutions in the stage three analysis yielded additional insights beyond those identified in stage one and two. It is important to note that stage three analysis examined six selected resistance years out of the 1,726 resistance years coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The dataset coded the four-year duration of the Orange Revolution and the one-year durations of both the Rose and Tulip Revolutions for six resistance years. The study examined the six selected resistance years for their relevance to the research questions focused on understanding Russian appropriation of resistance, not necessarily their statistical significance.

The study identified two patterns within the six resistance years selected. First, of the three resistance years where significant success or progress was achieved (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005), all three movements contained resistance traditional media, resistance new media, and resistance outreach to traditional media (see Table 22). Additionally, in the years with little or no progress in the Orange Revolution (Ukraine 2001, 2002, 2003) the movement did not contain resistance traditional media capability. However, in the year the Orange Revolution achieved significant concessions (2004), the movement added resistance traditional media capability. The stage one and two analyses did not identify each of these relationships between resistance information activities and success or progress of the movement. While these findings are not necessarily statistically significant, they do provide insight specific to the research questions regarding Russian experiences with resistance that have informed the Russian approach to the appropriation of resistance.

Table 22

Combat Power Variables Present in Selected Color Revolution Campaigns

	Primary Nature	Rad. Flank	Goal	Resist. Trad. Media	Resist. New Media	Resist. Media Outreach	Sec. Dfect	State Dfect	Dom. Med.	Frgn Spt	Intl Med	Progress
Ukraine (2001)	Non-Violent	No	Reg. Chg.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	High	No	High	0
Ukraine (2002)	Non-Violent	No	Reg. Chg	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	High	No	Mod	1
Ukraine (2003)	Non-Violent	No	Reg. Chg	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	High	No	Mod	0
Ukraine (2004)	Non-Violent	No	Reg. Chg	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High	Yes	High	3
Georgia (2003)	Non-Violent	No	Reg. Chg	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	High	Yes	High	4
Kyrgyzstan (2005)	Non-Violent	Yes	Reg. Chg	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Mod	Yes	Mod	4

The table below is a tabulation of the analysis of regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance movements analyzed in complementary study #1 (see Table 23).

These findings do not bifurcate or bias between violent/nonviolent methods. These factors provide the primary focus for data collection and data analysis in complementary study #2, in which content analysis explored Russian and Chinese actions, words, and security discourse from 2006-2022 using abductive logic to derive inferences, including extrapolations, such as trends, patterns, and differences (Krippendorf, 2019).

Table 23

Variables Associated w Success/Progress: Regime Change, Secession & Anti-Occupation

	Rad. Flank	Resist. Trad. Media	Resist. Media Oreach	Sec. Dfect	State Dfect	Dom. Media	Foreign Supt	Int'l Media
Regime C Success	.342**		.081*					.172**
Regime C Progress	.485**			.279*	.285*			.303**
T Secession Success	.299**			.220*	.234*			.218**
T Secession Progress	.387**			.432*	.322*			.338**
Anti – O Success	.101**							.156*
Anti – O Progress	.360**	.162*						.275**
Overall Success	.273**			.204**	.201**			
Overall Progress	.346**		.113*	.228**	.249**	.168**	.121*	.260**

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Complementary Study #2: Qualitative Results

Complementary study #2 utilized qualitative methods to explore the contemporary period of 2006-2022 from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders. The aim of the study was to answer Research Question #2: How do the elements of combat power significantly associated with success/progress in regime change, territorial, or anti-occupation resistance movements in the formative period from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns in the contemporary period from 2006-2022? To answer this question, the researcher indexed the statements, doctrines, and actions of Russian and Chinese security leaders against the combat power variables that were significantly associated with success/progress in resistance movements based on the findings of complementary study #1. These variables were (1) radical flank; (2) resistance traditional media; (3) resistance outreach to media; (4) security defectors; (5) state defectors; (6) domestic media coverage; (7) foreign support; and (8) international media coverage.

Complementary study #2 examined the Russo-Ukrainian War and resistance movements from the perspective of Russian security leaders as documented in Russian security discourse, scholarly works, and media reports. Russian approaches in Ukraine in 2014 were heavily influenced by lessons learned from the Ukrainian Orange Revolution from 2001-2004. A key precipitating event to Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 was the Ukrainian 'Revolution of Dignity' in late 2013. The Revolution of Dignity, commonly referred to as Euromaidan, was a successful regime change movement characterized by some scholars as a "continuation of the Orange Revolution" (Shveda et al., 2016). President Putin viewed the resulting Kiev regime change as a threat to Russian interests. However, instead of responding with traditional military

force, Putin initially responded to the successful resistance movement by battling it with other popular resistance movements. Consistent with the findings in complementary study #1, Russian agents employed a blend of information activities and violent resistance methods, including the use of a Russian outlaw motorcycle gang known as the “Night Wolves,” to support a resistance movement in the Donbas region of the Ukraine (Losh, 2016). Consistent with the findings in complementary study #1, Ukrainian security force defectors were a key element in the success of the Russian-backed resistance forces (Lanoszka, 2016). Interestingly, in response to international criticism of Russian activities in Ukraine, President Putin highlighted that Moscow must take defensive measures against “another Color Revolution”. He noted, “We have to do all that is needed to ensure that similar things never happen in Russia” (BBC, 2014).

Complementary study #2 also examined the Color Revolutions and resistance movements from the perspective of Chinese security leaders as documented in Chinese security discourse, scholarly works, and media reports.

In examining the 60 documents collected for the qualitative study, three themes emerged: (1) regime fear of the Color Revolutions; (2) regime shift to information warfare; and (3) regime adaptational actions. During the coding process, subcategories emerged for each of these themes. During the data analysis and abductive process, the researcher iteratively examined each document through this coding frame. The table below depicts the coding frame (see Table 24).

Table 24*Coding Frame*

Category	Sub-categories
1 Fear of Color Revolutions	a. Regime fear of regime change b. Regime fear of cultural change c. Regime fear of U.S. intent/capability
2 Shift to Information Warfare	a. Justification for Information Warfare b. Methods of Information Warfare
3 Adaptational Action	a. Defensive Measures b. Offensive Measures c. Appropriation of democracy itself

In the next section, the researcher discusses each of these themes and categories in detail. The information begins with a presentation of the results of the content analysis of thirty archival and scholarly documents identified in the data collection phase that met inclusion and analysis criteria representing the experiences and viewpoints of Russian Federation security leaders in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. The researcher then presents the results of the data collection and analysis of the experiences and viewpoints of security leaders of the People's Republic of China in the contemporary period.

Russian Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution

Within category #1, the study identified three subcategories: (1) fear of regime change; (2) regime fear of cultural change; and (3) regime fear of own population. The researcher then presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories.

Subcategory #1 – Regime fear of regime change. The content analysis indicated that the Color Revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, jarred senior leaders in the Russian Federation. They were fearful that the Russian regime might be overthrown next. In the years immediately following the Orange Revolution up to the present time (2006-2022),

Russian security leaders, foremost among them, the top ranking political and military leaders of the Federation, President Putin and General Gerasimov, spoke and wrote veraciously on the subjects of understanding and preventing becoming a victim of a Color Revolution. Another round of Color Revolutions that swept through the Middle East beginning in 2010, known as the Arab Spring, exacerbated these fears. In 2004, referring to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Putin noted his “worries” regarding regime change via Color Revolutions, “As it concerns the entire post-Soviet area, what worries me, first of all, are attempts to resolve political issues in an unlawful way,” Putin said. “This is the most dangerous thing. It is very dangerous to [attempt] to create a system of permanent revolutions,” (Putin, 2004). The fear of the sudden demise of the Russian regime due to a Color Revolution is evident in the following speech that the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Gerasimov, gave to senior Russian military leaders in 2013, “The experience of military conflicts—including those connected with the so-called color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East—confirms that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war,” (Gerasimov, 2013). In a 2014 statement, referring to the Euromaidan Revolution in the Ukraine, Putin described the regime change stemming from popular protests as a coup, “those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup,” (Putin, 2014). A 2017 article published in the premier Russian professional military journal, *The Journal of the Academy of Military Science* describes Color Revolution regime change as an implosion, “color revolutions are the result of miscalculations of

the government on internal and external policies, when the existing protest capability is increased from outside to the point of explosion that could bury the government under the ruins”

(Brychkov, 2017). Finally, in a 2022 statement, Putin used the following emotion-laden words to describe the regime change in Ukraine following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution:

Radicals and neo-Nazis were open and more and more insolent about their ambitions.

They were indulged by both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed the people of Ukraine and kept their stolen money in Western banks, ready to sell their motherland for the sake of preserving their capital. To this should be added the persistent weakness of state institutions and the position of a willing hostage to someone else's geopolitical will (Putin, 2022)

Subcategory #2 – Regime fear of cultural change. The content analysis indicated that senior leaders in the Russian Federation frequently cited a fear of cultural change driven by external elements as part of their overall fear of regime change through Color Revolutions. In a major 2014 speech focused on events in Ukraine, Putin highlighted the negative impact of Color Revolutions on national culture, “There was a whole series of controlled ‘colour’ revolutions...Standards were imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, outbreaks in violence and a series of upheavals” (Putin, 2014). Russian security leaders also note that the Color Revolutions “imposed Western conceptions of democracy on Russian civilians, and this interference is an attempt to influence Russia’s political philosophies and institutions” (Fisher, 2014). The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation provides almost four pages of emphasis on preserving Russian “cultural sovereignty” and the “defense of traditional Russian spiritual-moral values, culture and historical memory”

(Russian Federation, 2021). In a 2022 speech preceding the invasion of Ukraine, Putin lamented cultural changes stemming from the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution,

Let me remind you that the new ‘Maidan’ authorities first tried to repeal the law on state language policy. Then there was the law on the ‘purification of power’, the law on education that virtually cut the Russian language out of the educational process... but the fact is that the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. (Putin, 2022)

In this vein, the emphasis on protecting “cultural and civilizational diversity” is noteworthy in this 2022 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People Republic of China,

The sides believe that the advocacy of democracy and human rights must not be used to put pressure on other countries. They oppose the abuse of democratic values and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting democracy and human rights, and any attempts to incite divisions and confrontation in the world. The sides call on the international community to respect cultural and civilizational diversity and the rights of peoples of different countries to self-determination. (Joint Statement, 2022)

Subcategory #3 – Regime fear of U.S. intent/capability via Color Revolutions. The content analysis indicated that senior leaders in the Russian Federation fear the intent and capability of western powers, mainly the United States, regarding Color Revolutions. Russian security leaders root this fear in the efficacy of the Color Revolutions at enacting regime change in former Soviet states, fear of the combination of regime change movements and U.S. conventional military power, and fear of incursion or dominance by the U.S. It is clear from the collected data that Russian security leaders are convinced that the U.S. orchestrated the Color Revolutions and is eager to harm Russia by exploiting the “protest potential of the population” (Kofman, 2021).

In 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted its third Moscow Conference on International Security. Russian analysis of U.S. will and capability to foment regime change through a combination of Color Revolution tactics and traditional military power featured prominently throughout the conference. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov opened the conference with an explicit claim that the U.S. and Europe used Color revolutions to “serve their own interests, impose their own values, and end in creating new global tensions” (Cordesman, 2014). He was followed by General Gerasimov who provided an overview of the methodologies and locations of Color Revolutions, stating that Color revolutions are “a form of non-violent change of power in a country by outside manipulation of the protest potential of the population in conjunction with political, economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures”. Slides from General Gerasimov’s presentation are reproduced as dataset exemplars (Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A1).

Following General Gerasimov’s presentation, the Minister of Defense of Belarus provided similar content that emphasized the role of the external actors, namely the U.S., through

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Noteworthy in the presentation is the conclusion that that the international community (UN) is ineffective in addressing these matters, thereby necessitating proactive military countermeasures by Russia and Belarus. The slides of the presentation depicted below indicate significant deliberation regarding U.S. capability and intent to foment Color Revolutions and cooperation on the issue between Russia and Belarus. Depicted on slide 6 and slide 9 of the presentation are the corporate logos of private American security firm Blackwater, later renamed Academi (Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A2).

Following the presentation by the Minister of Defense of Belarus, a senior leader from the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces provided a presentation that further underscored the framing of Color Revolutions as a form of U.S. “aggression” alongside traditional U.S. military activity. The presentation depicts Color Revolutions as a form of warfare and a threat to Russian security, thereby justifying Russian military action against Color Revolutions (Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A3).

In addition to the exemplars in Appendix A, the theme of Russian fear of U.S. intent and capability to foment Color Revolutions as a form of regime change featured prominently throughout the data set. In 2017, a senior Russian defense official wrote the following in a leading Russian Defense periodical:

A special office was formed within the US Department of State in charge of staging and managing “democratic revolutions” in any country chosen by the US Government. By enacting this law all nations on the planet deemed “undemocratic” are considered as unable to exercise their governance, thus needing US assistance. Chiefs of missions at US consulates and embassies in sovereign countries are tasked with executing these directives of the State Department. Liberal and pro-Western opposition groups as well as

NGOs are forming part of what the US State Department on behalf of so-called “international community” proclaims to be the “true” representatives of their people and uses them to overthrow the undesirable government. In violation of fundamental principles of international law and intergovernmental relations the United States are denying the inalienable right of UN members to determine their own principles of governance and form their governments. (Brychtov, 2017)

Throughout the examined period (2006-2022), Russian discourse became increasingly pointed regarding fear of U.S. intent and capability to foment Color Revolutions as a form of warfare. In 2004, Putin referred to the Color Revolutions as “attempts to address political problems in an extralegal fashion” (Nikitina, 2014). In 2005, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia referred to them as, “regime change by nondemocratic and unconstitutional means” (Nikitina, 2014). By 2014, Putin referred to the Color Revolutions as externally provoked coups:

More and more often in the world today one hears the language of ultimatums and sanctions. The very concept of national sovereignty is becoming eroded. Undesirable regimes, countries that pursue their own policy or simply stand in the way of someone’s interests, are being destabilized. For that purpose the so-called color revolutions are set in motion; if one were to call things by their real names they are simply coups, provoked and financed from outside. (Nikitina, 2014)

In 2015, Russia and Belarus began conducting military exercises called Slavic Brotherhood, and rehearsed the use of military forces to “prevent unrest and agitation” from Color Revolutions (Bouchet, 2016). In 2019, during an annual speech to senior Russian military leaders at the Academy of Military Science, General Gerasimov made the following statement

explicitly characterizing Color Revolutions a form of military operation and technology, “The United States and its allies have specified an aggressive vector for their foreign policy. They have developed military operations of an aggressive nature, such as “global strike” and “multi-sphere battle,” and are using the technologies of “color revolutions” and “soft power” (Gerasimov, 2019).

Russian Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare

During the examined period, there was a marked shift in Russian security discourse regarding the centrality of information in conflict. The first shift was towards identification of the increasing role of information in contemporary conflict, including the Color Revolutions. Later shifts included words and actions by Russian security leaders to justify and formulate both defensive and offensive information measures. Within category #2, the study identified two subcategories: (1) justification for information warfare; and (2) methods of information warfare. The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories.

Subcategory #1 – Justification for information warfare. In his 2013 seminal diagnosis of the Orange Revolution and prognosis for the future, “*The Value of Science is in the Foresight,*” General Gerasimov formulated justification of information warfare as something thrust upon Russia by the U.S. and the Color Revolutions,

The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational,

humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population. (Gerasimov, 2013)

In the same document, Gerasimov further underscores the justification for information warfare as a defensive measure to U.S. information and Color Revolution activity:

Asymmetrical actions have come into widespread use, enabling the nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed conflict. Among such actions are the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that are constantly being perfected. These ongoing changes are reflected in the doctrinal views of the world's leading states and are being used in military conflicts. (Gerasimov, 2013)

In 2014 at the Moscow Conference on International Security, the Minister of Defense of Belarus utilized the term 'information confrontation' as a key weapon against Color Revolutions (Cordesman, 2014; see Appendix Figure A4):

In 2018, Gerasimov continued to link U.S. actions leveraging "internal protest potential of the population" and the need for Russian activity in the "information sphere" in presentations to Russian military leaders (Gerasimov, 2018). In 2019, the Deputy Chief of the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff, stated, "that the use of information was now of utmost importance in order to create the proper conditions for a victory, and that information means can even achieve effects "comparable to the results of large-scale application of troops and forces" (Kofman, 2021). The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation also called for increased Russian information activities domestically necessitated by western "informational-psychological diversion" (Putin, 2021). Taken together, the data set indicates that Russian

security leaders justified increasing manipulation and control of information as a response to western provocations and the Color Revolutions.

Subcategory #2 – Methods of information warfare. Russian utilization of information is not new; however, it accelerated during the examined period (2006-2022). Russian military guidance focused on 2020 envisioned a transformation “from direct destruction to direct influence...from war in the physical space to a war in the human consciousness...from war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life” (Berzins, 2014). Analysts point out the voluminous emphasis on information warfare in Russian doctrine, including deception and misinformation, known as “Maskirovka” (Roberts, 2015). Russian military theory and practice indicates, “The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind” (Berzins, 2014). This view of information warfare results in a lens that “every business deal, retweet, and Instagram post becomes a way of influencing...‘the psychosphere’,” (Pomerantsev, 2015).

In the case of Ukraine, Russian information activities were meant to “destabilize Ukraine psychologically and advance a narrative of the country as a ‘failed state,’ thus destroying the will and support inside Ukraine,” (Pomerantsev, 2015). Furthermore, to create internal discord and build pro-Russian sentiment, the campaign is likely to “manipulate existing cleavages to sow internal dissension and foment local discord,” (Lanoszka, 2016). The explosion of social media and communications technology enabled the rapid operationalization of these concepts. Examples include the seemingly overnight proliferation of pro-Russian Facebook groups “demanding the deployment of ‘little green men’ to support greater independence for Russian and Polish speaking populations” (Lanoszka 2016). These Russian methods of information warfare include a concept known as “reflexive control” likening information warfare to a

computer virus, “to win in information warfare, it is necessary to infiltrate elements that obey foreign commands into the command system of an adversary,” (Bērziņa, 2014).

Scholars identify four factors bearing on Russian choice of cognitive objectives to support gray zone activities. These factors are ethnic heterogeneity, latent historical grievances, weakness of local civil society, and regional complexity (Lanoszka, 2016). By focusing on these factors, the information campaign, or cognitive campaign, seeks to build cognitive mass in support of the overarching gray zone campaign. In this way, the cognitive campaign is the central feature of the overarching gray zone campaign, not only supporting later physical maneuver objectives, but making them “appear indigenously led,” to “create” the reason for any campaign in the first place through “cognitive co-option,” (Lanoszka 2016). Russian aggression in Ukraine highlighted the operationalization of well-developed strategies to integrate information activities and resistance methodologies (Leonhard & Phillips, 2015; Putin, 2021).

Russian Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action

Immediately following the Orange Revolution, 2005-2013, Russian security leaders took numerous actions aimed at preventing a regime-change resistance movement inside Russia. Once confident in protective measures taken to prevent a Color Revolution, from 2013-2022 Russian security leaders began to focus on countering or appropriating resistance movements offensively, “moving from securitizing the issue of anti-regime protests to militarizing it” (Bouchet, 2016). Within category #3, the study identified three subcategories: (1) internal protective measures; (2) militarization of resistance; and (3) appropriation of democracy itself. The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories.

Subcategory #1 – Defensive Measures (Securitization). Fearing the possibility of a successful regime-change resistance movement in Russia, Russian security leaders set about to

better understand the Color Revolutions and to develop options to prevent or counter them. Russian security leaders identified “the protest potential of the population” and “information-psychological effects” as the critical elements to understand and control (Bērziņa, 2014; Gerasimov, 2018). Following the Orange Revolution, from 2005-2014, Russian security leaders focused actions in four areas to limit the ‘protest potential of the population’ inside of Russia: (1) reduction of opposition parties; (2) redirecting of student social movement potential; (3) restriction of foreign NGO influence; and (4) restriction of domestic media (Hinkle, 2017).

In 2005, Russia enacted electoral reform that resulted in reduction of opposition parties to one, minimizing the possibility of contested election outcomes (Hinkle, 2017). Russian leaders established a pro-regime national youth movement in 2005 to offset the student anti-regime groups, which featured prominently in the Color Revolutions. The “Youth Democratic Antifascist Movement”, commonly referred to as Nashi, meaning “Ours” was officially designed to protect Russia’s sovereignty by defeating foreign and domestic threats to Russia, and to create an active civil society. Nashi copied the color revolution youth movements by engaging in rallies and marches with artistic and musical performances, dressing in costumes, and using social media to advertise their presence (Bērziņa, 2014; Hinkle, 2017).

Additionally in 2005, Russian leaders created a state institution called the Civic Chamber to mimic the role of mediator between Russian citizens and the regime that western NGOs played during the Color Revolutions (Hinkle, 2017). In 2012, Russia passed the Foreign Agents Law of 2012 requiring NGOs receiving foreign funding to self-identify as “NGOs, conducting foreign agent functions” (Bērziņa, 2014; Nikitina, 2014). In 2017, Russian security leaders identified numerous NGOs by names as complicit in generating “protest potential” within Russia, stating:

We can see the connection between street protests and grants/fellowships offered by such U.S. funds as Open Society, a George Soros Fund, Harvard University, Albert Einstein Institute, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, International Center for Nonviolent Conflicts, International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and many others. Considerable funding for “color revolutions” was provided through SEED (Support of East European Democracy), which is fiscally supported by the US State Department. (Brychkov, 2017)

Following the Orange Revolution, Russian security leaders also began to exert more control over the domestic media and social media (Hinkle, 2017). A 2022 report in the *Moscow Times* noted that, “Putin has been a longtime critic of social media’s potential for influencing young people and has recently taken more aggressive steps to limit the kind of content that can be shared online, slapping multimillion-dollar fines on the likes of Google and Facebook” (Nikolsky, 2022). To compete against the images and media coverage of anti-regime protestors marching in the streets, Russian security leaders began to stage pro-regime rallies and demonstrations. According to a leading scholar from the National Defence Academy of Latvia, these rallies:


...make the situation more complicated, making the removal of an existing government much more difficult. It is a simple, but powerful non-violent tool of resisting a color-revolution, because there is a crowd against a crowd, and not the people against the government. Pro-government protests also challenge the pattern of color revolutions by raising a question – how many protesters are enough to force the government in power to resign legitimately? (Bērziņa, 2014)

This appropriation of resistance methodologies has proven to be an effective means of subverting or preempting would be anti-regime change resistance efforts. Putin preemptively used this tactic in the days after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when protests began to emerge inside Russia and Russian military casualties began to mount. Images of tens of thousands Russia citizens gathered in an enormous stadium waiving Russian flags as Putin spoke provided effective pro regime images and headlines (Dixon, 2022).

Subcategory #2 – Offensive Measures. While domestic protective measures were being emplaced, Russian security leaders began to develop methods and means to counter and appropriate resistance methodologies. Previously elaborated upon sub-category analysis clearly indicated that by 2013, Russian security leaders had formulated detailed concepts, plans, and intentions to proactively leverage resistance methodologies as a ‘new type’ form of warfare. The Russian conflict strategy is depicted in “The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict Resolution,” published in 2013 by Gerasimov. The model is below (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

“The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in Interstate Conflict Resolution”



The model consists of “six stages of conflict development, each characterized by the primacy of *nonmilitary* measures” (Leonhard & Phillips 2016, p.18). The six stages are (1) covert origins; (2) escalations; (3) start of conflict activities; (4) crisis; (5) resolution; and (6)

restoration of peace (Leonhard & Phillips, 2015). Gerasimov described the shift to gray zone activities in the following way: “the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures – applied in coordination with the *protest potential of the population*” (Romanchyshyna, 2016).

A detailed description of the first stage, the initiation of conflict, is especially relevant to the research question. Researchers describe the first stage as follows:

During the initial stage [covert origins], which will likely be protracted, political opposition forms against the opposing regime. This resistance takes the form of political parties, coalition, and labor/trade unions. Russia employs strategic deterrence measures and conducts a broad, comprehensive, and sustained information warfare campaign to shape the environment. (Leonhard and Phillips 2015)

Italicized for emphasis are three key characteristics of the first stage of Russian gray zone activities, which are highly relevant to the research questions and findings from complementary study #1 and study #2: *resistance*, *strategic deterrence* and *information warfare*. This model provided a template for Russian military operations conducted in 2014 in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

Following the 2013 Euromaidan regime change resistance movement in Kiev that resulted in the replacement of a pro-Russian Ukrainian President with a pro-western one, Russian forces began to operationalize a campaign of Color Revolution warfare, or interstate conflict appropriating resistance methodologies in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. As depicted in the model, these efforts began with the formation of pro-Russian political opposition in the Donbas among disaffected segments of Ukrainian society. Russian agents then organized these

disaffected individuals into protest groups. These protest groups included a small faction that later broke away from the peaceful protests in the main square, and violently clashed with police and stormed the regional government center. Consistent with the findings from study #1 regarding security force defectors, according to news reports, some Ukrainian police officers refused to use force against the protestors and “moved away from the government building after the pro-Russian supporters broke in” (BBC, 2014). Other reports indicated that as many as 5,000 police and 3,000 Ukrainian service members defected to join the separatists (Kofman et al, 2017). Consistent with the model was the use of covert or non-uniformed Russian agents inside of Ukraine who provoked and supported the burgeoning separatist groups (Roth, 2014; Shapovalova & Jarábik, 2018). The Ukrainian Interior Minister noted, “About 1,500 radicals were in each region who spoke with clear Russian accents and whose activity was being coordinated through foreign intelligence” (Reuters, 2014). He also directly “accused Russian Vladimir Putin of orchestrating the ‘separatist disorder’” (Reuters, 2014).

Consistent with the model’s depiction of “information conflict” and the findings from study #1, which indicated a significant relationship between information activities and success/progress, the Russian operation involved several aspects of information warfare. Russia blocked pro-Maidan and amplified pro-separatist content on the “two most popular social-media platforms in Ukraine, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, hosted on Russian servers” (Kofman et al, 2017). Further, Russia attempted to rally support for the incursion, both in Russia and in the separatists regions, through the purposeful use of the historical terms “Novorossiya” (New Russia) and “Russian Spring” in public messaging to generate a sense of legitimacy and emotionality to the “cause” of reunification of Russia-speaking peoples (Kofman et al, 2017). While these information efforts seemed to have had a galvanizing effect on those already

committed to the separatist cause, they did not result in significant growth of popular support for the cause, or large-scale protests among the general population (Kuzio, 2019). Nevertheless, leaders of the pro-Russian movement called for a referendum of independence from Ukraine and requested Russian military peacekeepers to protect them (BBC, 2014). After a few weeks of continued protests and agitation, the separatist leaders proclaimed their secession from Ukraine and the establishment of the People's Republic of Donetsk and the People's Republic of Luhansk (BBC, 2014). Consistent with the model, a few months later Russian leaders escalated the conflict with overt military force to conduct an incursion into these separatist areas under the pretext of peacekeeping and protecting the Russian diaspora located there, initiating years of armed conflict and casualties between Ukrainian forces and the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region from 2015-2022, referred to as the Russo-Ukrainian War. These numerous iterations revolving around resistance movements and the Color Revolutions all provide the context and pretext for the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin's statement at the outset of the invasion refer explicitly to these events and paradigms,

“This brings me to the situation in Donbass. We can see that the forces that staged the coup in Ukraine in 2014 [Maidan] have seized power, are keeping it with the help of ornamental election procedures and have abandoned the path of a peaceful conflict settlement. For eight years, for eight endless years we have been doing everything possible to settle the situation by peaceful political means. Everything was in vain. As I said in my previous address, you cannot look without compassion at what is happening there. It became impossible to tolerate it. We had to stop that atrocity, that genocide of the millions of people who live there and who pinned their hopes on Russia, on all of us. It is their aspirations, the feelings and pain of these people that were the main motivating

force behind our decision to recognise the independence of the Donbass people's republics... In this context, in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter, with permission of Russia's Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to carry out a special military operation. The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation." (Putin, 2022)

In addition to the manipulation and modification of resistance methodologies in the Ukraine, the Russian military began advancing their capability to apply these methodologies in other locations. In 2015, airborne and special forces from Russia, Belarus, and Serbia rehearsed the utilization of military forces in a Color Revolution scenario in a neighboring country during an exercise named 'Slavic Brotherhood' (Sputnik International, 2015). Referring to the exercise, Gerasimov specifically verbalized the militarization of color revolutions, "seeing colour revolutions as a form of warfare meant it was necessary to seek ways to use the military in response" (Bouchet, 2016). Russia demonstrated this capability in 2022 when it deployed troops to Kazakhstan to help quell protests and civil uprisings. Upon sending the Russian forces to Kazakhstan, Putin stated, "We will not allow the realization of so-called color revolution scenarios...unidentified "outside forces" interfering "in the internal affairs of our states...they used well-organized and well-controlled militant groups... including those who had obviously been trained in terrorist camps abroad," calling Kazakhstan the target of "international terrorism"

(Moscow Times, 2022). Noteworthy in the word choice of this statement is the purposeful characterization of domestic protests as “international terrorism,” thereby further delegitimizing, vilifying, and objectifying protestors as deserving of maximum use of military force. This point was reinforced a month later, “Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions, intend to counter interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of sovereign countries under any pretext, oppose colour revolutions, and will increase cooperation in the aforementioned areas” (Putin, 2022). Taken together, the data clearly depicts that Russian Federation security leaders have taken significant steps to implement deliberate and detailed measures to protect the regime from being toppled by a resistance movement, while at the same time, appropriating the lexicon and methodologies of resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict in gray zone campaigns.

Subcategory #3 – Appropriation of democracy itself. This theme emerged from the data set somewhat unexpectedly. The research questions centered on the appropriation of people movements as a form of social movement and contentious politics. While the data set depicted this appropriation, Russia has taken and manipulated people movements as tools of the state, it has done so within a broader framework that appropriates and manipulates the key premises underpinning people movements and the Color Revolutions. In particular, there is evidence of appropriation of the principles of liberal democracy, free and independent media, and peaceful protest. The statements and actions of Russian security leaders have attempted to redefine democracy itself, appropriating and manipulating the signature value proposition of the West. A joint statement of the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China make this clear:

The sides share the understanding that democracy is a universal human value, rather than a privilege of a limited number of States, and that its promotion and protection is a

common responsibility of the entire world community. There is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural characteristics. It is only up to the people of the country to decide whether their State is a democratic one. (Russia and China 2022)

Additionally, the dataset indicates that Russia's adaptations and appropriation of resistance methodologies deliberately exploit the principle of peaceful protest and human rights embedded in western resistance paradigms. Russia's adaptations purposefully intend to "break the strategy of non-violent resistance...by escalating violence...adding a military dimension to the concept of the "color-revolution". In this way, it's possible to resist strategic non-violence which is at the core of the Western understanding of "color-revolutions" (Bērziņa, 2014). The implications of this approach are horribly on display in Russian's ongoing 2022 Ukraine incursion, which have inflicted massive violence and suffering on the civil population of Ukraine.

Taken together, the words and actions of Russian security leaders found in the data set clearly indicated that the Russian Federation has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict. Russia's methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1, heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power variables of information, security/state defectors, and radical flank. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 further indicated that other variables critical to the "protest potential" of a

population include NGO activity, youth/student organization activity, oligarch influence, and legal permissiveness.

Chinese Regime Category #1 – Fear of Color Revolution

Within category #1, the study identified three subcategories: (1) fear of regime change, (2) regime fear of cultural change, and (3) regime fear of own population. The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories.

Subcategory #1 – Regime fear of regime change. This theme emerged from the China dataset with different characteristics than the Russian dataset. The China dataset featured four unique descriptors regarding regime change: “party”, “political security”, “law and order”, and “mainland”. Chinese security discourse places specific emphasis on the security of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP) more than is found regarding the United Russia Party in the Russian dataset. The China dataset uniquely emphasized the concepts of “political security” and “law and order” as distinguishing and desired characteristics of the regime. Additionally, much of the Chinese security discourse is dedicated to the topics of PRC governance and control of Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore, the regime views concerns about Color Revolutions starting in Hong Kong or Taiwan almost existentially due to the possibility that these activities might threaten the CCP in Beijing. The following government news report is an exemplar of these characteristics, “some are related to the Hong Kong turmoil in 2019, which try to expand the Western-backed color revolution from the special administrative region to the mainland... but the color revolution that directly targets our political security is trying to harm the stability and public order in our country, so it's much more serious and destructive," (Sheng, 2021).

Another feature of descriptions of fear of regime change in the Chinese data set often include descriptions of negative impacts on businesses. The following exemplar from a state media outlet includes this feature as well as the previously identified features:

The director of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies claimed that "Occupy Central" was in essence a "Hong Kong version of a color revolution" which is a conspiracy to undermine China's political system... these revolutions share one thing in common - mass destruction and wanton disregard for the rule of law. The "Occupy" campaign in Hong Kong has greatly affected social stability and taken a heavy toll on businesses. The collateral damage caused by the campaign may be impossible to calculate... Color revolutions usually have fancy names...but in reality, these movements were poison laced with honey... The way "Occupy" evolved and unfolded, in retrospect, strongly indicates that the protests were spurred on by external forces, who aim to trigger a "color revolution" that ignites in Hong Kong but spreads to the mainland. (China Daily 2014)

Another interesting aspect that emerged from the China dataset is that much of the Chinese discourse views resistance and the Color Revolutions through the lens of the Russian experience. In other words, Chinese security leaders observed and learned from the Russian experience and seemingly through dialogue with Russian counterparts. The following statement from Chinese state media is an exemplar of this feature, "the main danger of color revolutions is putting a country with all its people and resources under external control," Andrei Manoilo, a professor of political science at Moscow State University, told the media in 2019 as turmoil ensued in China's Hong Kong (Global Times, 2021).

Subcategory #2 – Regime fear of cultural change. Regime fear of cultural change in the Chinese dataset is characterized mostly by fear of ideological threats that would challenge the dominant role of the CCP in society, as compared to fear of loss of ethnic, linguistic, or historical identity found in the Russian dataset. A statement by the PRC Embassy in the United States is an exemplar of this sentiment, they “brainwash local people with American values and make them identify with America’s economic model and political system” (Embassy of PRC in USA, 2021). The following excerpt from a People’s Liberation Army memo is an exemplar of many of the distinctive features of Chinese security discourse presented thus far, including emphasis on the Party (CCP):

“Western hostile forces and a small number of "ideological traitors" in our country use the network, and relying on computers, mobile phones and other such information terminals, maliciously attack our Party, blacken the leaders who founded the New China, vilify our heroes, and arouse mistaken thinking trends of historical nihilism, with the ultimate goal of using "universal values" to mislead us, using "constitutional democracy" to throw us into turmoil, use "color revolutions" to overthrow us, use negative public opinion and rumours to oppose us, and use "de-partification and depoliticization of the military" to upset us. (Lopez, 2015)

Subcategory #3 – Regime fear of U.S. intent//capability. Like Russia, Chinese security leaders are convinced that the U.S. was the dominant external force behind the Color Revolutions. Furthermore, their discourse indicates that they assess that Hong Kong and Taiwan are under constant threat of a U.S. supported resistance movements, or Color Revolutions. According to the Embassy of the PRC in the USA, “The US State Department openly admitted playing a “central role” in these “regime changes” ... In October 2020, the Russian Foreign

Intelligence Service revealed that the US planned to instigate “color revolution” in Moldova. (Embassy of PRC in USA, 2021). Frequent articles on state media reinforce a fear of U.S. intentions and activities to initiate resistance movements against the PRC, “A fact sheet on U.S. interference in Hong Kong affairs released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed that the United States has been plotting to wage a "color revolution" in Hong Kong, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has said (Xinhua, 2021). According to another state media outlet:

The color revolution is being used a major tactic to disrupt China's development, and it seems like the last card that the US can play to stop China from realizing great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation... It's not surprising to many that Western forces used Hong Kong's open city status to incite color revolution through various channels, including media outlets, student unions, political parties and labor unions by funding, training, advising them or organizing illegal assemblies, protests and riots, all tactics that could be found in the 2019 turmoil. (Global Times, 2021)

Chinese state media outlets are rife with reports on detailed allegations of how the U.S. leverages and supports resistance movement such as this statement, “Xing said the typical pattern of countries such as the United States that advance color revolutions include supporting nongovernmental organizations, cultivating the opposition and their leaders, fueling public fury through stunts and scandals, defying election results and supporting efforts to seize power (China Daily, 2019). Yet another state media article is an exemplar of the detailed reporting of the role of NGOs and student/youth groups in Color Revolutions:

"NGOs" under the US government's control are often used to carry out long-term infiltration in targeted countries. The infamous National Endowment for Democracy (NED) of the US, a self-proclaimed "NGO" for instance, has been using state funding to preach the hegemonic doctrine of the US government. As of 2016, NED had provided some \$96.52 million to at least 103 anti-China entities, including notorious separatist groups, such as the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC). (Global Times, 2021)

Overall, there was much discourse regarding resistance movements and Color Revolutions found in the dataset, indicating a topic of importance to Chinese security leaders.

Chinese Regime Category #2 – Shift to Information Warfare

Within category #2, the study identified two subcategories: (1) justification for information warfare; and (2) methods of information warfare. The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the sub-categories pertaining to the People's Republic of China.

Subcategory #1 – Justification for information warfare. The dataset indicated that Chinese security leaders assess the availability of uncensored information on the internet, particularly to youth, is a major vulnerability in the state security apparatus. An article featuring concerns shared by People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership is a good exemplar of this sentiment, "regarding Chinese President Xi Jinping's warning that "some Western countries are stepping up to instigate 'colour revolutions' in our country, stepping up the implementation of online 'Cultural Cold War' and 'political genetic modification' projects in an attempt to root out our military officers and soldiers and pull the military out of the party banner." Xi Jinping asserted that "The challenges we face in the field of ideology and political security are very

serious” and it is imperative “to first strengthen positive publicity and guidance of public opinion... Consolidate and strengthen the mainstream ideological and public opinion... and guide officers and soldiers to grasp correct standpoints and viewpoints” (Ranade, 2021). These concerns are far more widespread than just the PLA, the CCP views the inability to control information as an overall national security risk:

The internet and new social media platforms have also challenged the CCP’s control by providing Chinese citizens with avenues through which to share information, vent frustration, and organize protests. Leaders in Beijing are particularly sensitive to any activities by foreign powers that might exacerbate threats to its control. China continues to accuse foreign powers of inciting discontent in Hong Kong and among Chinese internet users. (Scobell 2020)

These exemplars from the data set represent a consistent theme found in the words and actions of Chinese security leaders. To protect the Party and the regime, they place significant emphasis and resources on information warfare activities.

Subcategory #2 – Methods of information warfare. The doctrine of the Three Warfares is central to China’s approach to seize the “decisive opportunity” (先机) through cognitive campaigning (Kania 2016). The legal, psychological, and media components of the strategy orient the cognitive objectives within the campaign. The goal of ‘legal warfare’ is to “bend or rewrite the rules of the international order in China’s favor,” (Navarro 2016). The goal of psychological warfare is to “deter, demoralize, or otherwise shock an opponent nation and its civilian population and thereby discourage the opponent from fighting back,” (Navarro 2016). The goal of media warfare is to “shape public opinion to accept China’s version of events,” (Navarro 2016). Woven together in space and time, these three types of cognitive objectives

generate significant cognitive mass in support of China's gray zone campaigns. The following is an example. If China engages in a territorial dispute within the South China Sea, it will:

First assert false [legal] territorial claims based on vague history...it next projects non-kinetic force in the form of flotillas of white-hulled civilian fleets [to intimidate] ...finally the Chinese Central Television Network repeatedly portrays a 'peaceful China' as a victim of foreign power domination only trying to right an historic wrong. (Navarro 2016)

Control of information is a prevailing theme in the data set. Thus, state control of media outlets features prominently within Chinese security discourse. The following excerpt from a scholarly assessment of how the Color Revolutions influenced Chinese policy and actions provides a succinct description of how control of the media features heavily in the outcomes of resistance movements:

Ideological fortification and political domination require cooperation of the mass media to justify and disseminate pro-regime accounts, establishment scholars further argued. Shockingly, witnessing the liberalizing processes during which pro-opposition media took over and marginalized government-fed information in each instance of the Color Revolutions, Chinese propaganda specialists emphatically reminded the top leadership of the deadly risks incurred by overthrown regimes once censorship was lifted and unlimited press freedom took effect. (Chen 2010)

As noted in the previous section, an interesting feature of the Chinese security discourse is that it often views the Color Revolutions through the lens of the Russian experience. The following excerpt from the dataset interestingly describes PLA learning from Russian

experiences in Syria and Ukraine to integrate various elements of information warfare for greater effectiveness:

Perhaps the PLA's biggest takeaway from the Russian experience was the establishment of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). China's military officers and strategists are schooled in Russian thinking on "New Generation warfare" and have paid keen attention to Russia's success in Ukraine and Syria, where they identified the Russian information warfare strategy as the key battle winning factor. The PLA has therefore created one integrated structure, which is responsible for all military space, cyberspace and electronic warfare (EW) operations and forms the core of China's information warfare force. (Singh, 2020)

Chinese Regime Category #3 – Adaptational Action

Within category #3, the study identified three subcategories: (1) internal protective measures; (2) militarization of resistance; and (3) appropriation of democracy itself. The researcher presents exemplars of quoted material from the data set for each of the subcategories pertaining to the People's Republic of China.

Subcategory #1 – Defensive measures. The dataset indicated that Chinese security leaders have contemplated and implemented a range of internal measures to protect the regime from Color Revolutions or resistance movements. President Xi has placed significant emphasis on 'comprehensive national security' that "incorporates traditional security areas (e.g., political, territorial, and military) alongside new areas, such as cultural and scientific security and of China's overseas interests and "political security" (Mankikar, 2022; Xinhua, 2020). This focus included a new national security law for Hong Kong in 2020 that would "cut off "the invisible hands" behind the chaos caused by foreign troublemakers... [by allowing for life imprisonment

sentences] as an effective deterrence to those lawbreakers who endanger national security (Sheng, 2021). China's internal protective measures include laws limiting political activity, such as election primaries, to prevent public discord and the potential for protests. This excerpt from a media report is an exemplar of the sternness and seriousness to which Chinese security leaders communicate internal protective measures:

China on Tuesday said last weekend's democratic primaries were an attempt at a "color revolution" in Hong Kong. A spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO) under China's cabinet, the State Council, said the primaries represented an "erosion" of the powers of the Hong Kong government and a "flagrant provocation ... which must not be allowed." "Hong Kong has become a base for color revolution, infiltration and subversive activities against Beijing," the spokesman said. "This was illegal manipulation of the election ... and a blatant challenge to the ... national security law for Hong Kong," a spokesman said in a statement posted to the HKMAO's official website. "We strongly ... support the investigation and punishment of violators".

(Mudie, 2020)

Like Russia, China has identified western NGOs as a critical element to control to limit resistance movements or Color Revolutions. The following statement from a Chinese government expert, Yang Jin, an expert at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, on state media illustrates the shared approach with Russia to restrict the influence of Western NGOs, "fighting color revolutions is an important task for China and Russia to not just protect themselves but also safeguard regional peace and stability. The two countries could cooperate on intelligence sharing, joint operations

against Western illegal NGOs that would create disinformation to hype instability and cybersecurity," (Global Times, 2021).

Subcategory #2 – Offensive measures. The approach taken by Chinese security leaders to leverage resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict varies significantly from Russia. Whereas Russian security leaders developed detailed military concepts and capabilities to replicate resistance movement methodologies to foment large-scale informational, political and civil movements in the Ukraine, there are few indications in the dataset that China has “militarized resistance” in the same fashion. Chinese gray zone activities are characterized by “intimidation, coercion and veiled aggression” (Freier, 2016; Cordesman, 2021) across multiple domains. To achieve this, China skillfully employs a “campaign-like approach to gray zone competition and conflict that liberally mixes political, military and commercial instruments...as weapons” (Freier, 2016). This approach includes using financial institutions, commercial businesses and “disruptive and destructive” cyber activity to pressure and influence adversaries when necessary (Freier, 2016). An example of this type of activity is when China “imposes an economic boycott or bans Chinese tourism” as a means of financially coercing Japan to give-in to Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea (Navarro, 2016).

China implemented a maritime variant of gray zone activities to implement its policy of claiming territory in the South China Sea. Irregular means to operationalize the strategy include leveraging commercial vessels, so called “Little Blue Men” to compliment commercial Chinese Navy capacity to patrol the South China Sea (Erickson & Kennedy, 2015). To accomplish this, China subsidizes civilian fishing vessels and then provides them with “satellite-based marine radios that help China to surveil and picket the South China Sea and harass ‘trespassing’ vessels”

(Freier, 2016). This approach helps enable a denial strategy without directly confronting the United States militarily.

Additionally, China's strategic deterrence paradigm includes the use of irregular deterrence by denial as a fifth pillar alongside nuclear, conventional, space and cyber capabilities. Chinese doctrine refers to this as "People's War" as it calls for "using a country's population to draw an enemy deeper inland, where the population can then use mobile and guerilla warfare to bleed the enemy dry," (Chase & Chan, 2016). The doctrine of 'People's War' highlights state actor use of anti-occupation resistance methodologies as a strategic choice against another state actor.

The CCP response to an alleged western-backed Color Revolution in Kazakhstan in 2020 is illustrative. Simply stated, where Putin sent troops, Xi sent words:

President Xi Jinping has specifically sent a verbal message to President Tokayev, publicly expressing that China firmly opposes any deliberate attempt by external forces to provoke unrest and instigate a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan... and guard against "color revolutions" and the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism. (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022)

Instead of militarization of resistance, the data indicated that China decided to leverage people movements for interstate conflict via a more subtle political warfare approach called the Great United Front to wage a "war of stealth" (Dimon, 2021). Mao initiated the United Front methodology in 1939. However, in 2012 President Xi began revitalizing and reformulating the approach as the 'Great United Front' to be a "magic weapon" to secure Chinese strategic objectives (Marris & Joske, 2019). The Great United Front seeks to, "influence through connections that are difficult to publicly prove and to gain influence that is interwoven with

sensitive issues such as ethnic, political, and national identity, making those who seek to identify the negative effects of such influence vulnerable to accusations of prejudice” (Bowe, 2018). Said another way:

The United Front is a series of stratagems directed by the CCP and implemented by swarms of agents and moles, often masquerading as dissidents, journalists, researchers, academics, interns, maids, nannies, and chauffeurs, to gather information, but far more critically and usefully, to spread disinformation; so enemies are misdirected, leading to badly judged and self-destructive decisions. (Dimon, 2021)

Specifically applicable to the research questions, the Great United Front “oversees influence operations targeting Taiwan and Hong Kong...to suppress independence movements, undermine local identity, and promote support for Beijing’s political system” (Bowe, 2018). Examples of United Front activity include orchestrating pro-China protests in San Francisco, including transporting 6,000 – 8,000 protestors, to counter anti-China protestors gathered along the Olympic Torch run route. This effort enabled a key propaganda objective for the PRC, as San Francisco was the only city in the U.S. where the torch would pass through enroute to Beijing for the Olympic Games (Dorfman, 2018). The United Front is associated with NGOs that promote PRC policies, such as Confucius Institutes and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations. The purpose of the Great United Front is to “co-opt the movements, organizations, and people that provide social...goods and mobilize or manipulate them into aiding the Party in its endeavors” (Bowe, 2018). Internationally, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification (CPPRC):

has at least 200 chapters in 90 countries, including 33 chapters in the U.S. The CPPRC promotes China’s unification with Taiwan globally. In Taiwan, the United Front operates

through several organizations that “suppress independence movements, undermine Taiwan’s government, and recruit politicians in Taiwan and third countries to advocate for CCP policies. (Bowe, 2018)

In Australia and New Zealand, the United Front has “targeted a range of organizations and actors and achieved significant success exerting political influence, controlling important media outlets, and subverting narratives China believes to be unfavorable to its interests” (Bowe, 2018). While the theme of the Great United Front clearly emerged from the dataset, there is much more to learn. The covert and seemingly innocuous nature of Great United Front activity makes it difficult to fully assess and understand, “even among the majority of experts on China” (Dimon, 2021).

Subcategory #3 – Appropriation of democracy itself. While the preceding Russia section of study #2 discussed the significance of the joint statement issued by the President of China and the Russian Federation in 2022 in detail, the China dataset revealed additional distinctions of how the PRC has actively attempted to define and appropriate democracy in the context of resistance movements. For example, Chinese state media reports in the dataset revealed the juxtaposition of China claiming the centrality of ‘democracy’ while at the same negatively casting civil participation in democratic practices, “democracy and the rule of law are the two pillars that ensure Hong Kong is a rule-based society. The city's prosperity and stability rest heavily on whether all stakeholders can find a solution that prevents the city being torn apart. In this regard, no one can be completely protected by chaotic street politics, and law and order is the best guarantee,” (China Daily, 2014). Similarly, a recent Chinese state media article regarding the ongoing Russian incursion of Ukraine negatively characterizes U.S. democracy,

while implicitly advancing an acceptance of the reality of multiple definitions of democracy and implying a more preferable Chinese formulation of democracy:

While the plumes of smoke clouding Europe are yet to settle, the US is again seeking to monopolize the definition of "democracy" to serve its political and hegemonic agenda. It has been proven many times that democracy by the US standard is rarely based on the will of the people but the US hegemony and self-interest. (Ping, 2022)

These exemplars from the dataset indicate a joint Russia-China effort to redefine and appropriate the signature proposition of the West, liberal democracy, as a means of competing with the U.S. by creating global conditions more favorable to Russian and Chinese autocratic political systems.

Taken together, the words and actions of Chinese security leaders found in the data set clearly indicated that the PRC has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict. China's methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1, heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power variables of information, and security/state defectors. However different from the Russian dataset, the combat power variable of a violent radical flank did not significantly emerge from the dataset. Instead, the Chinese methods of appropriation of resistance moves seems to preference subtle and non-violent methods. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 of Chinese discourse indicated additional variables associated with success/progress in resistance movements include NGO activity, legal permissiveness, impacts on business, degree of deniability/stealth.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to benefit theorists and practitioners by (a) learning more about resistance methodologies from the formative (1945-2006) and contemporary (2006-2022) periods, (b) increasing understanding from the perspective of Russian Federation and People's Republic of China security leaders of resistance as a form in interstate conflict, and (c) exploring options to enhance integrated deterrence paradigms. The study resulted in findings that address four researchable gaps in the literature centered on gaining better understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and to contribute to the development of “capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions,” (Biden, 2021).

The research utilized two complementary studies to explore the research questions and objectives. Complementary study #1 was a quantitative study of resistance movements during the formative period 1945-2006. Complementary study #2 was a qualitative study of Russian Federation and People's Republic of China perspectives on resistance as a form of interstate conflict in the contemporary period 2006-2022. The structure of the study linked literature, gaps, and research questions as indicated below. In this chapter, the researcher will utilize this framework to provide key takeaways from the study and provide implications. The researcher will sequentially proceed through this framework beginning with a horizontal crosswalk of resistance theory, gaps, questions, and findings followed by a similar horizontal crosswalk of combat power theory and deterrence theory with elements of security discourse employed throughout (see Chapter 1, Table 2).

Combat Power Theory

The literature review highlighted key aspects of combat power theory necessary to inform and frame the research. First, in structuring the research, the researcher paired the positivist nature of combat power theory with research question #1. This formulation resulted in complementary study #1. Utilization of combat theory was central to one of the objectives of this study, which was to expand scholarly work regarding resistance movements into national security, interstate conflict prevention, and integrated deterrence discourse. Since many countries utilize combat power theory in their doctrines and discourse, including the United States, Russia, and China, it provided a recognizable, understandable, and trusted framework for analysis that would resonate among security studies scholars (Anderson & Engstrom, 2009; Martin, 2013; Montgomery, 2014; Roberts, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs, 2016; Vest, 2017).

Utilizing combat power theory as a positivist framework contributed to quantitative examination of resistance as a deliberate means of achieving security objectives from a military science lens. Study #1 yielded several specific and relevant findings for theorists and practitioners. The findings depicted in chapter four (see Tables 16 and 17) enable a wide range of exploration of the dataset specific to the outcomes of interest, such as comparing the variables associated with success/progress in regime change vs. territorial secession vs. anti-occupation movements to determine patterns, outliers, vulnerabilities, or opportunities. For example, international media coverage is associated with success/progress of all of the examined movement outcomes and is therefore a critical variable to either defend or degrade when supporting or opposing resistance movements. Similarly, the findings enable the exploration of differences and similarities between variables associated with success or progress. These layers

of additive understanding of resistance movements are useful to the exploration of multi-year movements, where progress occurs overtime, not in a single year.

Information ubiquity has changed the nature of interstate conflict. The review of combat power literature identified three key theoretical distinctions worth revisiting and discussing here to assist in reflecting on findings and essential takeaways of the study. First, the researcher noted in the literature review that the origins of combat theory stemmed from early twentieth century military theorists seeking to reconcile emerging technologies, such as tanks and airplanes, with the works of classical military theorists. Combat power theory derived largely from the work of British military theorist, J.F.C. Fuller, who posited that emerging technology would fundamentally alter the character of war. This proposition goes to a core pondering when reflecting upon the findings of the research – how has the technology of mass communication (e.g., internet, social media, satellite communication etc.) affected the definition and conduct of interstate conflict in the contemporary environment? In consideration of this prompt, a primary finding of complementary study #1 was the significant relationship between international media coverage and success/progress in all types and forms of resistance movements. It is worth noting that the dataset for study #1 (1945-2006) corresponds with the early stages of the Information Age, however, the period of examination for study #1 does not include the saturation of information associated with ubiquitous internet, social media, and personal devices in the contemporary period (Borkovich & Noah, 2014).

The literature review regarding information activities indicated that information activities would be critical to the success of all resistance movements. The data analysis did not support this supposition. However, information activities are associated to progress of resistance movements (international media; $r = .260$; domestic media; $r = .168$, and resistance outreach to

the media; $\phi = .113$). The information activity with the greatest effect in the study was the effect of international media coverage on the progress of a territorial succession movement (.338).

Surprisingly, study #1 did not indicate a significant relationship between resistance new media and success/progress. One possibility is that this finding illuminates a shortcoming of the data set in that it only codes resistance movements up to 2006, which would not include the effects of mass communications expansion experienced with the launch of the iPhone (2007) or widespread use of social media, such as Facebook (2010). Therefore, study #1 points to the significance of information activities to resistance success/progress; however, it does not indicate a change to the very nature of interstate conflict in the contemporary period. However, study #2 revealed a great richness and complexity of contemplations, communications, and actions from the most senior security leaders in the U.S., Russia, and China regarding the fundamental shift in priority to information as a form of interstate conflict and competition.

In recent years, the term ‘information warfare’ has grown in usage in Western, Russian, and Chinese professional military journals and doctrine (Gery et al., 2017; Simons, 2020; Wortzel, 2014). Of note, the detailed study of information as a critical operational element is still a burgeoning characteristic of security studies, as U.S. security doctrine only added information to the combat power framework in 2018. Furthermore, as noted in the literature review, when revealing the inclusion of information as an element of combat power in a leading U.S. defense professional journal, a senior U.S. defense official emphasized the significance of the addition by opining, “within the changing environment, information may prove to be the preeminent commodity and decisive factor in military operations,” (Grynkewich, 2018). A myriad of official statements and media reporting regarding the Russian incursion of Ukraine in 2022 further

indicate the primacy of information within interstate conflict, including deliberations at the United Nations Security Council. During these deliberations in June 2022, leaders from around the world, including Russia and China, posited a range of views highlighting the centrality of information to interstate conflict in the contemporary period, bringing “information warfare to the forefront of geopolitical conflicts” (United Nations Security Council, 2022). One speaker at the deliberations, Jared Cohen, CEO of Jigsaw and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations noted, the Russian incursion of Ukraine provided a “crystal ball” for the future of interstate conflict where, “like land, air and sea, the Internet has become a critical domain to occupy during war,” (United Nations Security Council, 2022).

Viewed through Fuller’s theoretical lens of combat power, the findings of this present research are consistent with multiple viewpoints extant in the literature, indicating that the technology of mass information has greatly impacted, if not altered, the character of interstate conflict and war in the contemporary period. Therefore, the findings of this research, which indicate the central role of information in resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict, are germane and additive to the literature. From the perspective of conflict resolution, conflict management, or conflict prevention, these findings present opportunities and challenges to the field. The identification of opportunities for conflict resolution includes extant research that indicated “shifts in international public support reduce conflict intensity” through social media (Zeitsoff, 2016). Other research indicated, “newer communication technologies are being used to amplify and harmonize for conflict management, prevention and peacebuilding [including] improve early warning, monitor peace, and promote peacebuilding before and during conflict” (Mamoona & Fozia, 2018). The prominent role of information in conflict presents challenges to conflict resolution approaches, including concerns over individual privacy on social media

(Mamoona & Fozia, 2018), and “increased polarization and group-targeted violence” (Brown & Livingston, 2018).

Fear drives Russian and Chinese approaches to resistance. The second theoretical distinction identified in the literature review worth revisiting was the critical perspective of Fuller’s overly positivist and numerical approach that focused too much on technological performance and did not adequately account for the intangible and humanistic nature of warfare. This theoretical distinction was important to the design of the study, which sought address this call for balance between quantitative and qualitative methods. Furthermore, Hart’s emphasis on the humanistic nature of warfare was essential to exploring the topic. In study #1, the dataset captured some of the humanistic aspects of conflict in limited, but important ways. For example, the data fields in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset that coded defection from security forces and defection of state leaders attempted to capture a complex humanistic variable involving change in loyalty, emotions, and personal risk. Study #2 allowed for deeper exploration of humanistic variables with its qualitative design, resulting in a much more nuanced and richer understanding of the topic that embedded historical, cultural, and personal factors behind the perspective, thoughts, and decisions of the most senior security leaders in the U.S., Russia, and China. During the iterative content analysis process, themes emerged that revealed the humanistic considerations advocated by Hart, including palpable fears of regime change, fear of cultural change, and fear of loss of control among Western, Russian, and Chinese security leaders. Hart’s theoretical lens emphasizing humanistic aspects of interstate conflict helped provide insights in study #2, particularly the content analysis of Putin’s statements regarding the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine. These statements indicate a stark sense of fear within the Putin regime of resistance movements and a corresponding fear of loss of control of the population.

The findings of this research are consistent with other contemporary scholarly works. These include works which indicate that Putin's fear of people movements was the driving force behind his decision to invade the Ukraine in 2022 (Cuomo & Latypova, 2022; Mitchell, 2022; Person & McFaul, 2022). Similarly, PRC security leaders continue to implement measures to control information and view a variety of interstate matters, such as trade, through the lens of fear of people movements for the purposes of "protecting China's political security" (Nakazawa 2019; Slaten 2020).

Combat Power Theory adds depth for practitioners and scholars. The third theoretical distinction identified in the literature review worth revisiting was a detailed description of how and why combat power theorists recognize seven dimensions of combat power: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). This consideration provided a positivist framework to explore a subject held largely within interpretivist social science circles and enabled a different and novel approach to the subject. Further, this basis enabled a comprehensive and layered analysis of a large data set resulting in both statistically significant and relevant findings from the formative period of resistance (1945-2006). The resulting identification of significant relationships between success/progress in specific types of resistance movements and specific variables relevant to security studies scholars and practitioners provided tangible points of comparison, discussion, and application.

Further, the utilization of the seven dimensions of combat power as a framework for analysis had the effect of clearly revealing shortcomings in the dataset and the body of scholarly work it represents. The most robust dimension of combat power coded in the dataset was information, which greatly benefited the study. However, the critical dimensions of intelligence,

protection, fires, sustainment, and command and control were mostly absent from the dataset, resulting in an incomplete picture of the organizational variables most related to success/progress in resistance movements. This limitation creates the potential for a skewed understanding of the relative significance of the variables coded in the dataset.

This shortcoming of inclusion of these critical dimensions of resistance in scholarly work is further evident upon examination of practitioner discourse regarding resistance. One resistance practitioner resource, *Full Spectrum Resistance*, dedicated entire chapters to discussion of protection, sustainment, command and control, and the role of intelligence in resistance movements stating, “good intelligence allows small groups with few resources to defeat larger opponents; resistance movement have specific intelligence needs and ample sources for good information” (McBay, 2019). Likewise, regarding the fires dimension of combat power, extensive reporting from the Russian incursion in Ukraine indicated widespread use of homemade incendiary devices, known as Molotov cocktails, by members of the civilian population violently resisting the Russian invasion (Mateus, 2022). Similarly, anti-Taliban resistance forces in Afghanistan known as the National Resistance Front, noted their efforts to stockpile weapons in preparation for a protracted resistance effort, “We still have a large stockpile of weapons from the war against Soviet occupation, and the first wave of resistance against the Taliban in the 1990s, because we feared this day would come” (Ershad, 2021). Similarly, in Taiwan, fear of a Chinese invasion akin to the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine, spurred renewed planning and training to arm civilian resistance forces (Yang, 2022). Overall, contemporary media reports and practitioner discourse indicate gaps in scholarly work regarding the functional components of resistance movements. Utilizing combat power theory as a lens to examine resistance movements allows for a more robust exploration of the resistance from a

security studies perspective. Overall, study #1 utilized combat power theory as a positivist framework to help transition thinking related to resistance movements into security discourse. The positivist nature of combat power theory provided an appropriate theoretical framework to conduct a quantitative study focused on RQ#1: what are the significant relationships between combat power variables and success/progress in resistance campaigns during the formative period from 1945-2006 whose goals are regime change, territorial secession, or anti-occupation? The researcher addresses RQ#1 in more detail in the following paragraphs by exploring specific variables from the dataset.

Blended, not bifurcated study of resistance. Study #1 found that the variables of combat power that significantly associated with overall success of resistance movements were: radical flank, security force defectors, and state defectors (Table 17). Of interest, although the literature highlights a higher success rate of non-violent movements compared to violent movements during the examined period (1945-2006), the literature does not highlight many non-violent resistance movements that also include a violent component. Furthermore, only 191 of 1,704 (11.2%) coded resistance years were purely nonviolent movements (e.g., the primary method of the movement was coded as nonviolent in the dataset, and the movement did not have a radical (violent) flank).

This analysis begins to improve understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective by expanding the understanding of resistance beyond a principled approach emphasizing non-violence to a more holistic understanding that allows for consideration of the practical implications of a blended use of violent and non-violent methods in resistance movements. Taking a deeper look at resistance movements by examining progress (vs. success) of all resistance movements revealed a more nuanced understanding of critical resistance

variables: radical flank, security force defectors, domestic media coverage, state defectors, international media coverage, foreign support, and resistance movement media outreach. The analysis of progress in resistance movements resulted in a larger effect of the radical flank variable when compared to success.

The findings of this study improved understanding of resistance movements beyond the bifurcated approach, which tends to simplify resistance movements as either violent or nonviolent. Instead, this study points to an understanding of the blended nature of resistance movements. This concept is consistent with recently published practitioner resources, which note, “militancy can work by itself, but militancy can also up crucial space for larger moderate groups; and militancy can magnify the impact of moderate tactics” (McBay, 2019). As a contemporary example, the blended use of nonviolent and violent resistance methods, including both nonviolent protests and the use of incendiary weapons by the civilian population, has also been a distinguishing feature of Ukrainian efforts to resist the 2022 Russian incursion (Mateus, 2022; Sky News, 2022).

While this research study was not designed to specifically evaluate or advocate for the use or nonuse of violent or nonviolent resistance methods, these findings are additive to a significant body of western scholarly work that may preference nonviolent methods, often with an unspoken underpinning of a western academic world view and liberal value system that may or may not reflect the universe of thought within the security sector or within the halls of government in Russia or China. The intent of discussing these findings is to address one of the stated purposes of this study: to gain an understanding of resistance from a security studies perspective and from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders, perhaps reducing

blind spots and helping to gain a holistic understanding of resistance that is beneficial to scholars and practitioners.

From the perspective of state utilization of resistance as a form of interstate conflict, the Ukrainian national resistance to the Russian incursion provides additional insights into the research focus of this study looking at resistance as a form of interstate conflict. According to media reports, the Ukrainian ability to resist the Russian incursion resulted from several years of efforts to develop the concepts, laws, organizations, and resources to enable a national resistance effort. According to a senior U.S. security leader:

Kyiv saw this coming and prepared its people. Ukraine passed a law in July of 2021 authorizing the creation of the Territorial Defense Forces and laying out a structure for integrating local militias in each of the 25 oblasts, or regions, and in the largest cities. That law also made provisions for the formation of a resistance force in the event of Russian occupation. The Territorial Defense Forces were largely in place when Russia invaded this past week. When more than 130,000 citizens volunteered to take up arms, there was a designed structure in place for them to step into. (Repass, 2022)

The law, known as, “On the Fundamentals of National Resistance” was developed with the help of Western security planners and based on a practitioner model of resistance called the Resistance Operation Concept that includes both violent and nonviolent activities (Winkie, 2022). Western scholars that advocate for the traditional privileging of nonviolent methods, and bifurcation of resistance between violent and nonviolent methods, maintain that primarily nonviolent campaigns “often succeed despite intra- or extra movement violent flanks, but seldom because of them” (Chenoweth & Schock, 2016). This perspective is grounded in their assessment that violent flanks tend to reduce overall levels of participation in the movement, thereby

negating their model that indicates that the primary strength of nonviolent movements is mass participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2016).

However, study #2 cast doubt on these perspectives. Content analysis findings indicated that Russia has developed deliberate methods that “break the strategy” of these western resistance methodologies that are grounded in nonviolent methods by ruthlessly escalating violence against them beyond a level deemed acceptable by western value systems. The purpose of these actions is to reduce participation in the movement, while at the same time orchestrating mass public pro-regime demonstrations to counteract anti-regime protests. Scholars note that violent regime repression of resistance movements can backfire. However, this requires media coverage to an audience that can affect regime decision-making (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2016). Other scholars point out the limitations of this approach in cases where the regime can manipulate media coverage or the media coverage is otherwise ineffective at spurning action within an audience that can influence regime decision-making (Beissinger, 2022). These dynamics were observable during the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine. During the incursion, the Putin regime manipulated information about the incursion to the domestic Russian audience, minimizing domestic pressure on the regime, despite international media coverage that mobilized a global audience which had a minimal influence on regime decision-making (Beissinger, 2022).

As noted in the previous section, the findings of study #1 and study #2 are consistent with several practitioner models. One model slightly shifted away from the bifurcated approach by describing a resistance continuum. The continuum depicts a range of resistance where the level of violence is indexed against the legal status of participants and third-party involvement (Agan et al., 2019). In the first stage, non-violent illegal political acts (civil disobedience) are conducted by citizens/residents of the affected country, and third-party involvement would be unlawful. The

next stage, referred to as rebellion, involves short-term violent engagements, such as riots, conducted by rebels subject to domestic criminal law. The third stage is insurgency, and the fourth stage is belligerency, characterized by open warfare and control of territory conducted by formalized groups of armed belligerents. A useful evolution beyond bifurcation of methods of resistance, this methodology still falls short of accounting for blended use of nonviolent and violent methods (Agan et al., 2019).

Another emerging practitioner model, called the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), depicted a blended vs. bifurcated view of resistance. Germane to the focus and research questions of this study, the ROC defined resistance from the perspective of state actors as a form of interstate conflict, called national resistance. As opposed to a form of intrastate conflict, national resistance is, “a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power” (Fiala, 2020). This Western practitioner model provides a robust depiction of resistance as a form of interstate conflict and reinforces the findings of study #2, which indicate that Russia has already conceptualized and operationalized the appropriation of resistance as a form of interstate conflict within gray zone campaigns.

Taken together, the findings of the present study, contemporary research, and ongoing resistance practices indicate a set of nuanced tradeoffs necessary to explore when examining resistance holistically. Overall, the findings of this research, which indicate the blended nature of violent and nonviolent methods, are additive to ongoing scholarly discussions on an unsettled area of study regarding resistance movements.

Protecting or Targeting the Loyalty of Security Forces

When it comes to the maneuver element of combat power, study #1 indicated that security force defectors had the greatest effect on success/progress of resistance movements. This variable associated with the greatest effect on the progress of territorial succession movements (.432). This finding is consistent with the findings from study #2, which revealed pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas in 2014 experienced initial progress in their secession movement when joined by several thousand defectors from Ukrainian security forces. Security defectors were associated with a similar level of effect (.204-.279) with progress in regime change movements and success in territorial succession movements.

Both study #1 and study #2 indicated the criticality of regime loyalty of security forces. This conclusion is consistent with the literature and actions of Russian and PRC security leaders. The PRC places great emphasis on the loyalty of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the regime. In the words of PLA senior leadership, the military must "resolutely listen to Chairman Xi's command, be accountable to Chairman Xi, let Chairman Xi rest assured," (Tian, 2021). Underscoring the importance of preventing security force defections amongst popular uprisings, in 2021, the PLA opened an "exhibition center about the PLA garrison in Hong Kong, where there have been large-scale anti-government protest," (Tian, 2021). An analysis of the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine noted that Russian security forces have not defected in large numbers, despite numerous setbacks, because Putin has implemented numerous measures to screen, monitor, and disincentivize members of security forces from defecting (Casey, 2022). Interestingly, apparently understanding the value of security force defectors, during the Russian incursion, the Ukrainian government sought to incentivize defectors from Russian security forces

by offering up to \$1,000,000 and “secrecy, a safe stay in Ukraine and support in obtaining new documents and an exit for a third country,” (Papenfuss, 2022).

The findings of this study were consistent with other scholarly research on security force defections, which indicated that security force loyalty is effectively maintained through a shared national identity (Hancock & Gurung, 2018), not necessarily determined by whether a resistance movement is violent and nonviolent (Anisin, 2020). The emphasis on shared national identity as a means of preventing defections among Russian forces, while encouraging defections among Ukrainian forces was evident in Putin’s statement announcing the 2022 Ukrainian incursion:

I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Comrade officers, Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people. I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. (Putin, 2022)

Overall, the variable of security force loyalty/defectors is a complex and critical element of how state actors approach resistance movements as a form of interstate conflict. This study, the literature, and recent events indicate that, for a state actor to leverage a resistance movement as a form of interstate conflict, it is important for the state actor to place emphasis on security force loyalty, as was the case of Ukrainian security forces defecting to the side of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas in 2014. Alternatively, in the case of a state actor defending against resistance movements, it is important for the regime to cultivate the loyalty of security forces, as is the case with Russia’s and PRC multi-layered efforts to maintain the loyalty of security forces.

Key Variables and Takeaways from Color Revolutions

When it comes to better understanding resistance from the perspective of Russian and Chinese security leaders, examining Color Revolutions is key. The data set from study #1 coded the Rose, Tulip, and Orange Revolutions as regime change movements. According to study #1, the combat power variables significantly associated with success and progress of regime change movements are (1) radical flank; (2) security force defectors; (3) state official defectors; (4) international media coverage; and (5) resistance outreach to the media.

An examination of the individual data fields for the Rose, Tulip, and Orange Revolutions provides several insights relevant to the research questions. The Rose Revolution contained four out of five significantly associated variables when it achieved success in 2003. The Tulip Revolution also included four out of five of these variables when it achieved success in 2005. In the years that the Orange Revolution (Ukraine) achieved little/no progress (2001, 2002, 2003), international media coverage was present, however the movement lacked defectors or a radical flank. In the year that the Orange Revolution achieved significant concessions (2004), four out of five of these variables were present in the movement. The significant change in 2004 was the addition of security and state defectors to the movement. The sudden change from no progress in 2003 to achieving significant concessions in 2004 highlights the impact on the success of a movement when security force defectors support the resistance effort. Each of the three selected movements contained either a radical flank or security defectors in the years they achieved significant progress or success towards regime change.

Resistance Theory

The literature review highlighted key aspects of resistance theory necessary to inform and frame the research. First, in structuring the research, the researcher paired the interpretivist

nature of resistance theory with an exploratory research question and qualitative study. This formulation resulted in complementary study #2. This study focused on addressing the literature gap of a lack of research that utilizes combat power theory and resistance theory to examine Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance forces in the contemporary period, 2006-2022, as a form of unconventional warfare in deliberate gray zone interstate conflict. Study #2 focused on addressing RQ#2: How do the elements of combat power significantly associated with success/progress in resistance movements from 1945-2006 help us understand the doctrines, words, and actions of Russian and Chinese government officials regarding state appropriation of resistance for gray zone campaigns from 2006-2022?

The West, Russia and China each view resistance differently. The review of resistance literature identified two key theoretical distinctions that I will quickly revisit to assist in reflecting on the findings and takeaways of the study. The first theoretical distinction was establishing a multi-discipline depiction of resistance. The study situated resistance movements within contentious politics as a form of political warfare, within comparative politics as a type of social movement, and within military science as a form of unconventional warfare. This framing allowed for a rich exploration of resistance with intellectual space for holistic examination of the diversity of state actor approaches to resistance movements.

This approach proved valuable, as the content analysis in study #2 revealed quite different formulations of resistance by the U.S., Russia, and China. Russian discourse situated resistance mostly as a form of unconventional warfare, whereas Chinese discourse situated resistance via the Great United Front as a form of political warfare, while U.S. discourse tended to situate resistance as a social movement. These are simplistic characterizations; however, they

are useful in providing a lens for gaining better understanding of how others situate and hence operationalize resistance methodologies.

Further, these characterizations are consistent with other scholarly research. Scholars note that Russian approaches to resistance are heavily militarized, including Russian security leaders defining opposition resistance movements as valid military targets and terrorists (Bouchet, 2016; Moscow Times, 2022; Putin 2022). Russian security discourse includes the offensive use of resistance movements within military campaigns as a form of “new type” warfare (Cordesman, 2021; Freier, 2016; Gerasimov, 2013). By comparison, scholars described PRC efforts to coerce and leverage people movements in Taiwan as a form of political warfare (Cole, 2019). These scholars characterize the intent of PRC efforts in Taiwan via the United Front as covert regime change resulting in Taiwan unification with the PRC by, “directly capture local politicians, municipal leaders, grassroots organizations, the agricultural and fisheries sectors, the tourism industry, land development” (Cole, 2019). This political warfare approach includes five objectives consistent with resistance methods:

- (a) corrode, bypass and manipulate democratic institutions, elections, and public trust therein;
- (b) undermine morale of the targeted society and weaken resistance to Beijing’s objectives by exacerbating feelings of abandonment, isolation and inevitability;
- (c) sow confusion, exacerbate divisions and contradictions within society;
- (d) co-opt elites, businesspeople, politicians, retired military officers, civil society, and the media; and
- (e) coerce the CCP’s opponents. (Cole, 2019)

This approach is decidedly non-violent in nature and stands in stark comparison to the militaristic approach taken by Russia. However, it shares many of the same critical resistance

elements indicated in this study: manipulation of information and media, garnering defectors from state leaders and security forces, and instilling and capitalizing on fear.

The content analysis process of study #2 yielded an unanticipated third country of study regarding state appropriation of resistance methodologies for interstate conflict – the U.S. Already discussed in the previous section, was a documented U.S. formulation of state use of resistance methods called, the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC). According to media reports, the ROC formed the basis for the establishment of a national resistance effort in Ukraine and other countries. Additionally, both the Russian and Chinese security discourse datasets were rich with details regarding their perceptions of U.S. appropriation of resistance methods, namely the utilization of NGOs to fund, foment, and fuel Color Revolutions. However, the researcher did not locate a Western scholarly work, or U.S. government archival document, statement, or policy to support these claims. Furthermore, the U.S. government officially debunks this narrative as one of “Russia’s Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives” stating, “These baseless accusations often target local and international civil society organizations, as well as independent media that expose human rights abuses and corruption. The Kremlin seeks to deny that people in neighboring countries could have agency, dignity, and independent aspirations to advocate for themselves, just as it denies these qualities to the people of Russia” (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Nevertheless, the dataset clearly indicated a strong perception of this reality by Russia and China. Additionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC published a “fact sheet” with numerous allegations of the role of a U.S. NGO, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded by the U.S. Congress, in supporting Color Revolutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2022). The veracity of these claims were uncertain. However, they are included here as a depiction of Chinese perception, or a depiction of Chinese misinformation. I

included this finding as a fourth possible formulation of state appropriation of resistance movements, largely a form of pro-democracy social movement, heavily influenced by cultural, legal, and historical bias towards nonviolence.

In summary, the study situated resistance movements within contentious politics as a form of political warfare, within comparative politics as a type of social movement, and within military science as a form of unconventional warfare. This allowed for a rich exploration of resistance with intellectual space for holistic examination of the diversity of state actor approaches to resistance movements. The findings of this research were consistent with other scholarly works. These indicated security leaders leverage resistance for interstate conflict in a variety of formulations. Russia leverages resistance as a form of unconventional warfare, whereas PRC leverages resistance via the Great United Front as a form of political warfare, while Western countries leverage resistance via the Resistance Operating Concept as a form of national defense, and potentially via pro-democracy nonviolent social movements.

Integrated Deterrence Options

The literature review identified a gap in concepts for deterrence of Russian and Chinese appropriation of resistance in gray zone campaigns as a strategy of international conflict prevention. The tenets of deterrence theory, deterrence by punishment, and deterrence by denial, were discussed in the theoretical foundations of the study. This information highlighted gaps in existing U.S. deterrence paradigms and a call by the U.S. Secretary of Defense to establish a more robust deterrence paradigm called, Integrated Deterrence (Austin, 2021; see Chapter 1, Table 3).

These gaps and theoretical foundations formulated the basis for research question three (RQ#3): How can we better understand options to deter Russian and Chinese appropriation of

resistance for gray zone campaigns? The quantitative and qualitative studies provided understanding of specific factors to defend or pursue in regime change, territorial succession, or anti-occupation resistance movements. The identified factors provide insights that contribute to scholarly and practitioner efforts to develop integrated deterrence concepts to discourage Russian and Chinese gray zone activities that manipulate information and exploit people movements to prevent conflict and human suffering.

U.S. deterrence paradigms clearly did not dissuade Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014 or 2022. Russia was undeterred from these actions despite NATO having “an aggregate conventional and nuclear supremacy over Russia,” (Lanoszka, 2016). This reality exposed shortcomings in traditional U.S. and NATO deterrence paradigms centered on nuclear punishment and extended deterrence. Analysis and wargames indicate credible deterrence by denial of Russian aggression using large-scale conventional forces would be costly, militarily infeasible, or risk escalation to nuclear conflict (Koffman, 2016). Furthermore, the deployment of large-scale conventional forces could have the unintended consequence of advancing Russian gray zone efforts by providing additional physical and cognitive objectives for Russia to exploit with irregular and cognitive campaigns. These concerns resulted in the calculated U.S. decision and public messaging to limit the number of U.S. forces deployed to Poland during the 2022 escalation cycle leading up to the Russian incursion into Ukraine (Garamone, 2022). The outcome is a scenario consistent with the one envisioned by Robert Jervis, where mutual nuclear deterrence “allowed U.S. adversaries to use force below the nuclear level whenever it was to their advantage to do so” (Jervis, 2009). In fact, Russian gray zone campaigns seem to create “sub-conventional” freedom of maneuver (Koffman, 2016). Russia does this with the threat of large-scale conventional force, including the Russian utilization and public messaging of

hypersonic weapons during the Ukrainian incursion (Kirby, 2022). Stated another way, existing paradigms resulted in a stalemate between nuclear and conventional force. The problem then is that Russian “irregular capabilities remain largely unaddressed by any ideas put forward so far” (Koffman, 2016).

To address these challenges, an integrated deterrence effort would include both irregular denial and irregular punishment activities suited to gray zone campaigns. Given Russia’s and China’s integration of nuclear, conventional, and irregular capabilities, described previously in the study, it is unlikely that standalone employment of irregular deterrence would be sufficiently effective. However, the integration of irregular deterrence alongside conventional and nuclear deterrence could help achieve effective integrated deterrence.

On the denial side, irregular deterrence would disrupt or degrade capability needed by Russia or China in gray zone campaigns. This action involves denying them the combat power variables, identified in study #1, that are significantly associated with success/progress of resistance movements. These concepts include favorable international media coverage, security/state defectors, and radical flank, depending on whether the contemplated action focused on regime change, territorial succession, or anti-occupation.

The findings from study #2 enable refinement of these options. If Russia is the focus of the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, influence youth/student organization activity, influence oligarchs, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect through cost imposition in these areas. Alternatively, if China is the focus of the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, degrade business, degrade deniability/stealth, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect

through cost imposition in these areas. Similarly, irregular deterrence by denial could include making Russian or Chinese objectives hard to keep, if taken. This approach would involve imposing costs on a level that outweigh the benefits of holding on to the objective, or in other words, “in case all else fails, Eastern European allies must make themselves indigestible to a Russian occupation” (Kroenig 2015). Indeed, in the context of the ongoing Russian incursion in Ukraine, it is worth noting a statement made by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense prior to the incursion, “Moscow’s military dominance in terms of aircraft and conventional weapons would be of limited use against the kind of domestic resistance Ukraine could muster” (Zagorodnyuk and Khara 2021). This statement suggests the viability of anti-occupation resistance approach to deterrence by denial.

Similarly, regarding an overt Chinese military action to occupy and control Taiwan, scholars assess that deterrence by denial anti-occupation resistance methods would likely be more effective than deterrence by denial through traditional military means (McKinney et al., 2021). Consistent with the findings in complementary study #1, scholars assess that Taiwanese resistance information activities, especially international media coverage, and the existence of a radical flank would be essential elements of an effective Taiwanese anti-occupation resistance to Chinese aggression (Ellis, 2020).

On the punishment side, irregular deterrence could credibly threaten Russian or Chinese interests with irregular means that degrade the critical variables identified in study #1 and #2. This tactic involves targeting combat power variables, identified in study #1, that are significantly associated with success/progress. These factors include advancing unfavorable international media coverage and encouraging security/state defectors.

The findings from study #2 enable refinement of these options. If Russia is the focus of the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, limit pro-regime youth/student organization activity, influence oligarchs, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect through cost imposition in these areas. Alternatively, if China is the focus of the contemplated irregular deterrence option, measures to limit/expand NGO activity, degrade business, degrade deniability/stealth, or limit/expand legal permissiveness of people movements could yield an irregular deterrence effect through cost imposition in these areas.

On the punishment side of irregular deterrence, credibly threatening or signaling capability and intent to leverage or support a regime-change resistance movement would likely affect the escalation cycle differently than an anti-occupation movement. The 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine provides an exemplar to explore these dynamics. Keen to manage an escalation cycle dominated by the threat of nuclear exchange, third party nations have sought to balance a level of support to Ukraine sufficiently effective to meet anti-occupation objectives while clearly communicating a lack of intent to provide support sufficient to impose regime change internal to Russia. These dynamics would likely be similar if contemplating the level of support to anti-occupation resistance movements vs. regime-change resistance movements as irregular deterrence options. However, when compared to the other forms of deterrence by punishment options available (e.g., nuclear, global strike, cross-domain), irregular deterrence could provide deterrence by punishment options at a lower level of damage, escalation risk, and counterstrike risk than the others.

Irregular deterrence would offer a more complete solution to the challenge posed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and security scholars to formulate integrated deterrence options

(Austin, 2021; Crombe et al., 2021; Delafield et al., 2022; Green et al., 2017; Hicks et al., 2019; Jones, 2019; Robinson, 2020). It is more complete because it *expands* deterrence discourse to include irregular deterrence alongside conventional and nuclear deterrence. The table below reflects how irregular deterrence addresses gaps in deterrence theory and their relationship with types of resistance movements (see Table 25).

Table 25

Integrated Deterrence Matrix

	Punishment	Denial
Nuclear	Triad	Extended
Conventional	Global Strike	Robust
Cyber/Space	Cross-domain	Tailored
Gray Zone	Regime Change Resistance	Anti-Occupation Resistance

Conclusion


The purpose of the study was to expand understanding of resistance as a form of interstate conflict and irregular deterrence as a form of conflict prevention. From a conflict prevention and security studies perspective, complementary study #1 examined the formative period of resistance from 1945-2006 to understand the variables significantly associated with success and progress in three specific types of resistance movements: (1) regime change, (2) territorial secession, and (3) anti-occupation. Complementary study #2 specifically explored the perspectives of Russian Federation and People's Republic of China security leaders regarding resistance in the contemporary period from 2006-2022. The study had three objectives: (1) to explore resistance holistically; analytically focused on the *outcomes* of the movement, rather than bifurcating the analysis based on the *method* of resistance (violent/nonviolent); (2) to advance exploration of the relationships between specific critical variables of resistance

movements and outcomes in regime change, territorial secession, and anti-occupation resistance movements more specifically than found in the literature to discern nuanced differences in the variables associated with their success or progress; and (3) to contribute to, and spur, the study of resistance in conflict prevention and security studies discourse.

The study benefited theorists and practitioners by (a) learning more about resistance methodologies from the formative (1945-2006) and contemporary periods (2006-2022); (b) increasing understanding of resistance from the perspective of Russian Federation and People's Republic of China (PRC) security leaders as a form in interstate conflict, and (c) exploring options to enhance integrated deterrence paradigms. By gaining a specific understanding of critical variables of resistance in the formative period in complementary study #1, the research established a security studies basis for complementary study #2, which explored Russian and Chinese policy, doctrines, and actions regarding resistance in the contemporary period. Overall, the study resulted in findings that address four researchable gaps in the literature centered on gaining better understanding of resistance movements from a security studies perspective (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) and contributing to the development of "capabilities to better compete and deter gray zone actions" (Biden, 2021). The figure below depicts relationships and synthesis between the findings from complementary study #1 and study #2 (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Synthesis of study #1 and study #2



Taken together, the words and actions of Russian security leaders revealed in study #2 clearly indicated that the Russian Federation has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict. Russia's methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1, heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with emphasis on the combat power variables of information, security/state defectors, and radical flank. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 indicated that other variables critical to the "protest potential" of a population include NGO activity, youth/student organization activity, oligarch influence, and legal permissiveness. For example, the 2022 Russian incursion in Ukraine provided specific observable insights into the interplay between oligarchs and resistance movements, a largely unexplored topic of study within the resistance literature. On one hand, it seems that Ukrainian oligarchs wielded a significant amount of influence in favor of the 2014 and 2022 Ukrainian resistance against Russia (Nitsova, 2022). While on the other hand, despite U.S. sanctions

against them, Russian oligarchs have remained largely unmoved in their support for Putin (Blinken, 2022). The identification of these variables is conceptually consistent with the literature; however, they are additive to the literature as a specific list of variables for further research and analysis to further understanding of resistance movements.

Similarly, the words and actions of Chinese security leaders found in the data set clearly indicated that the PRC has the demonstrated intent, will, and capability to leverage people movements and resistance methodologies as strategic tools of the state for interstate conflict. China's methods and approaches for doing so are consistent with the findings in study #1 and heavily influenced by the Color Revolutions, with an emphasis on the combat power variables of information, and security/state defectors. However, deviating from the Russian data set, the combat power variable of a violent radical flank did not significantly emerge from the Chinese data set. Instead, the Chinese methods of appropriation of resistance seem to preference subtle and non-violent methods. Complementary to findings of study #1, study #2 indicated additional critical variables associated with PRC approaches to resistance movements including NGO activity, legal permissiveness, impacts on business, and degree of deniability/stealth.

Understanding the nuanced differences between critical variables in different types of resistance movements provides valuable insights for theorists and practitioners. From a security studies perspective, defending or pursuing these factors provides a blueprint for options to deter or disrupt Russian or Chinese gray zone actions, depending on the type of resistance movement. For example, irregular deterrence of a PRC invasion of Taiwan could include deterrence by denial through the establishment of a credible Taiwanese national anti-occupation resistance effort that would include the blended use of violent and nonviolent resistance methods to impose costs on potential PLA occupiers, including the robust use of information that amplifies the

negative impact of Chinese aggression on mainland businesses, the use of radical flanks, and proactive measures to encourage defections from PLA forces, while preventing defections from Taiwanese resistance elements or public leaders.

From a deterrence by punishment perspective, the research clearly indicated that the regimes of both Russia and China are concerned with internal challenges from domestic regime change resistance movements. As such, signaling credible capability and will to leverage regime change resistance movements internal to Russia or China could provide an irregular deterrence option within a broader integrated deterrence approach. Both the power and political sensitivity of signaling support for regime change internal to Russia or China was demonstrated during the 2022 Russian incursion of Ukraine when President Biden, and numerous other Western leaders quickly walked back and minimized Biden's statement, "this man cannot remain in power" (Stewart et al., 2022). The U.S. Ambassador to NATO quickly clarified, "The U.S. does not have a policy of regime change in Russia. Full stop." (Stewart et al., 2022). Interestingly, the U.S. Secretary of State added, any decision about Russia's leadership was "up to the Russian people", perhaps leaving an open door to the methods presented in this study. These are a few examples of how the findings of this research could be used to formulate irregular deterrence options through combinations of either the defense of, denial of, or disruption of the critical resistance variables identified in this study.

Recommendations

The study indicated three recommendations. First, additional exploration that expands the study of resistance from a security studies perspective is warranted. As indicated in the study, the majority of the data fields in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset were outside the scope of the conflict prevention and military science scope of this study. Future research and data collection would

benefit from resistance data collection indexed against all seven elements of power. This step would enable a more complete analysis of resistance from a security studies perspective.

Additionally, the creators of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset are developing the NAVCO 2.2 dataset that will code additional resistance movements through 2019. The creators plan a public release of the dataset in 2022. The release of this dataset would support a continuation of the research line of this study and allow for additional insights regarding information activities of resistance movements during the period of ubiquitous information technology from 2006-2022. Second, additional research should further develop conflict prevention framework for gray zone campaigns.

Finally, as this research was completed contemporarily with ongoing developments in the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, additional research on the resistance methods utilized during the Russian incursion of Ukraine would greatly benefit the study of resistance from a conflict prevention and security studies perspective. Numerous scholars and media reports contemporaneously indicate there are substantial lessons to be learned from the 2022 Ukrainian resistance methods employed against the Russian incursion (McManus, 2022; Horton 2022). A similar perspective was reflected by Taiwan's foreign minister who commented, "We try to see what we can learn from Ukraine in defending ourselves...we can learn from Ukraine civil defense" (Cohen 2022). Taken together, it is clear the study of resistance is germane and likely will remain very relevant to security studies and conflict resolution scholars and practitioners for the foreseeable future. It is time to start the next study that will build off the findings of this study to develop better understanding and options to manage this burgeoning form of interstate conflict.

References

- Abrahms, Max. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, 31(2), 42-78.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315648422-7>
- Ackerman, P., & Kruegler, C. (1994). *Strategic nonviolent conflict: The dynamics of people power in the twentieth century*. Praeger.
- Acosta, B. (2019). Reconceptualizing resistance organizations and outcomes: Introducing the Revolutionary and Militant Organizations dataset (REVMOD). *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(5), 724–734. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319835888>
- Agan, S. D., Cosgrove, J., Leonhard, R., Pinczuk, G., & Salehyan, I. (2019). The science of resistance. U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
<https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/science-resistance.pdf>
- Allion, R. (2014). Russian “deniable” intervention in Ukraine: How and why Russia broke the rules. *International Affairs*, 90(6), 1255–1297. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12170>
- Anderson, E. C., & Engstrom, J. G. (2009). *Capabilities of the chinese people’s liberation army to carry out military action in the event of a regional military conflict*. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
<https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/CapabilitiesoftheChinesePeople'sLiberationArmytoCarryOutMilitaryActionintheEventofaRegionalConflict.pdf>
- Anisin, A. (2020). Unravelling the complex nature of security force defection. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 32(2), 135–155. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2020.1767046>
- Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. (2005). *How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict*. Cambridge University Press.

- Austin, L. J., III (2021). *Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change of Command* [Speech transcript]. U.S. Department of Defense.
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarks-for-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/>
- Berzins, J. (2014). *Russia's new generation warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian defense policy* (Policy Paper No. 2). National Defence Academy of Latvia.
<http://www.naa.mil.lv/~media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx>.
- Biden, J. R., Jr. (2021). *Interim national security guidance*. The White House.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>
- Blinken, A. (2022). *Targeting Russia's oligarchs and vessels* [Press release]. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/targeting-russias-oligarchs-and-vessels/>
- Borkovich, D. & Noah, R. (2014). Big data in the information age: exploring the intellectual foundation of communication theory. *Information Systems Education Journal*, 12(1), 15.
<https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1140800.pdf>
- Boschee, E., Lautenschlager, J., O'Brien, S., Shellman, S., Starz, J., & Ward, M. (2015). ICEWS Coded Event Data (V35) [Data set]. Harvard Dataverse.
<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28075>
- Boslego, D. V. (1995). The relationship of information to the relative combat power model in force XXI engagements [Monograph].
<https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll3/id/1013>.
- Bowen, A. S. (2020). Russian armed forces: Military doctrine and strategy. *Congressional Research Service*. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11625.pdf>

- Bowe, A. (2018). China's overseas united front work Background and implications for the United States. *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*.
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China's%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf
- Brady, A. (2017). Magic weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping. Wilson Center [Conference paper]. Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, September 16-17.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf
- Braham, P. (2013). Social movements. In *Key concepts in sociology* (pp. 164-167). SAGE Publications Ltd. <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473914704.n35>
- Brands, H. (2016). Paradoxes of the gray zone. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*.
http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/paradoxes-gray-zone/#_ftn4.
- Brodie, B. (1973). *War and Politics*. Macmillan.
- Brown, R. & Livingston, L. (2018). A new approach to assessing the role of technology in spurring and mitigating conflict: evidence from research and practice. *Journal of International Affairs*, 71(1.5), 77-86. <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/new-approach-assessing-role-technology-spurring-and-mitigating-conflict-evidence-research-and>
- Byman, D. L., & Waxman, M. C. (2000). Kosovo and the great air power debate. *International Security*, 24(4), 5-38. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560291>
- Buechler, S. M. (2000). *Social movements in advanced capitalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Bunn, M. E. (2007). Can deterrence be tailored? *National Defense University*, 225.
<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31364/SF225%20new.pdf>.

- Burke, E. J., Gunness, K., Cooper, C. A., III, & Cozad, M. (2020). People's liberation army operational concepts [Research report]. *RAND Corporation*.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA394-1.html.
- Cambridge University Press (n.d.) Gray Zone. In *Cambridge dictionary*. Retrieved May 12, 2022. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/gray-zone>
- Caney, S. (2015). Responding to global injustice: on the right of resistance. *Social Philosophy & Policy*, 32(1), 51-73.
<http://dx.doi.org.ezproxylocal.library.nova.edu/10.1017/S0265052515000072>.
- Carment, D. & Belo, D. (2020). Gray-zone conflict management: theory, evidence, and challenges. *Journal of European, Middle Eastern, & African Affairs*, 2, 21-41.
<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JEMEAA/Display/Article/2213954/gray-zone-conflict-management-theory-evidence-and-challenges/>.
- Carneiro, R. L. (1974). Herbert spencer's "the study of sociology" and the rise of social science in America. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 118(6), 540–554.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/986404>
- Carter, A. (2017). *Defense posture statement: Taking the long view, investing for the future*. U.S. Department of Defense.
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE_FINAL_MAR17UpdatePage4_WEB.PDF
- Casey, A. E. (2022, March 23). Putin has coup-proofed his regime: Russian security forces are carefully policed for loyalty. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/putin-coup-russian-regime/>

- Cato Institute (2013). The case against the Nuclear Triad. *Cato Policy Report* 35(6).
<https://www.cato.org/policy-report/november/december-2013/case-against-nuclear-triad>
- Chase, M. S., & Chan, A. (2016). China's evolving strategic deterrence concepts and capabilities," *The Washington Quarterly*, 39(1), 117-136.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1170484>
- Chan, E. (2021). Escalating clarity without fighting: Countering gray zone warfare against taiwan (Part 2). *Global Taiwan Brief*, 6(11). <https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/06/vol-6-issue-11/>.
- Chen, T. C. (2010). China's reaction to the color revolutions: adaptive authoritarianism in full swing. *Asian Perspective*, 34(2), 5-51. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704710>.
- Chenoweth, E., & Lewis, O. A. (2019). *Nonviolent and violent campaigns and outcomes dataset* (Version V2) [Data Set]. Harvard Dataverse. <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PLXAFY>
- Chenoweth, E. & Schock, K. (2015). Do contemporaneous armed challenges affect the outcomes of mass nonviolent campaigns? *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 20(4): 427–451. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-20-4-427>.
- Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2016, January 18). How the world is proving Martin Luther King right about nonviolence. *Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/18/how-the-world-is-proving-mlk-right-about-nonviolence/>
- Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2012). *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. Columbia University Press.

- Cohen, D. (2022, May 2). Taiwan learning lessons from Ukraine's stout resistance, foreign minister says. *Politico*. <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/01/taiwan-china-ukraine-invasion-zakaria-00029186>
- Cole, M. (2019). Taiwan and CCP political warfare: A blueprint. *Sinopsis*. <https://sinopsis.cz/en/taiwan-and-ccp-political-warfare-a-blueprint/>
- Cordesman, A. (2021). Chinese strategy and military forces in 2021: A graphic net assessment. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210607_Cordesman_Chinese_Strategy.pdf?fG7hUZdWUVJgaJzyC4E9Qj1m3w13SfjQ
- Cox, K., Jolly, S., Van Der Staaij, S., & Van Stolk, C. (2018). Understanding the drivers of organisational capacity. *RAND Corporation*. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2189.html.
- Cramer, J. M. (2015). *Strategies of resistance*. (Publication No. 3741608) [Doctoral dissertation, University of Arizona]. ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxylocal.library.nova.edu/docview/1755655986?accountid=6579>.
- Creswell, J. W. (2002). *Educational research: planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research*. Pearson Education
- Creswell, J. W. (2007). *An introduction to mixed methods research* [PowerPoint slides]. University of Nebraska-Lincoln. <https://sbsrc.unl.edu/Introduction%20to%20Mixed%20Methods.pdf>
- Creswell, J. W. & Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Sage.

- Crombe, K., Ferenzi, S., & Jones, R. (2021, December 8). Integrating deterrence across the gray zone - making it more than words. *Military Times*.
<https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2021/12/08/integrating-deterrence-across-the-gray-making-it-more-than-words/>.
- Cronk, T. M. (2021, September 28). DOD official says concept of integrated deterrence is call to action. *DOD News*. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2791589/dod-official-says-concept-of-integrated-deterrence-is-call-to-action/>.
- Cunningham, K. G., Dahl, M., & Frugé, A. (2020). Introducing the strategies of resistance data project. *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(3), 482–491.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319880246>
- Cuomo, I. & Latypova, L. (2022, March 23). Fear of popular revolutions drove Putin to attack Ukraine. *Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy*.
<https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/fear-of-popular-revolutions-drove-putin-to-attack-ukraine/>
- Delafield, C., Fishbein, S., Gannon, J. A., Gartzke, E., Lindsay, J., Schram, P., & Shaya, E. (2022). Rethinking deterrence in gray zone conflict. *E-International Relations*.
<https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/95178>.
- Dixon, R. (2022, March 18). Putin’s speech at staged patriotic rally was abruptly cut off. The Kremlin claims it was a glitch. *The Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/18/putin-russia-speech-ukraine/>.
- Dotson, J. (2021). Spring 2021 activities by China’s united front bureaucracy for Taiwan. *Global Taiwan Brief*, 6(11). <https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/06/vol-6-issue-11/>.

- Dudouet, V. (2015). *Civil resistance and conflict transformation*. Routledge.
- Ellis, S. (2020, October 8). Here's what could happen if china invaded taiwan. *Japan Times*.
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/10/08/asia-pacific/china-taiwan-invasion-scenario/>.
- Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (2015, December 25). The military doctrine of the Russian federation [Press Release]. <https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>
- Ershad, A. (2021, August 30). 'We stockpiled weapons': Afghan resistance remains confident in last holdout against Taliban. *The Observers*. <https://observers.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210830-panjshir-northern-alliance-taliban-resistance-movement>
- Erickson, A. S. & Kennedy, C. (2015, September 11). Directing China's "little blue men": uncovering the maritime militia command structure. *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*. <https://amti.csis.org/directing-chinas-little-blue-men-uncovering-the-maritime-militia-command-structure/>
- Fiala, O. (2020). *Resistance operating concept*. Joint Special Operations University.
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=838149>
- Flanagan, S. J., Osburg, J., Binnendijk, A., Kepe, M., & Radin, A. (2019). Deterring Russian aggression in the Baltic states through resilience and resistance. *RAND Corporation*.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2779.html.
- Franz, G. (1996). *Information – the fifth element of combat power*. [Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies]. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA314297.pdf>

- Freier, N. P., Burnett, C. R., Cin, W. J. Jr., Compton, C. D., Hankard, S. M., Hume, R. S., Kramlich, G. R., II, Lissner, J. M., Magsig, T. A., Mouton, D. E., Muztafago, M. S., Troxell, J. F., Wille, D. G., & Schultze, J. M. (2016). *Outplayed: Regaining strategic initiative in the gray zone*, a report sponsored by the Army Capabilities Integration Center in Coordination with Joint Staff J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch. *US Army War College Press*. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/925>
- Fuller, J. F. C. (1926). *The foundations of the science of war*. Hutchinson & Co. <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Foundationsof-Science-of-War.pdf>.
- Garamone, J. (2022, February 2). U.S. to deploy 3,000 troops to Romania, Poland, Germany. *U.S. Department of Defense News*. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2920844/us-to-deploy-3000-troops-to-romania-poland-germany/>
- Gerasimov, V. (2013). The value of science is in the foresight: New challenges demand rethinking the forms and methods of carrying our combat operations (R. Coulson, Trans.). *Military Review*. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/military-review/archives/english/militaryreview_20160228_art008.pdf (Original work published 2013).
- Gery, W. R., Lee, S., & Ninas, J. (2017, April 1). Information warfare in an information age. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 85(2), 22-29. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1130649/information-warfare-in-an-information-age/>
- George, A. L., & Smoke, R. (1989). Deterrence and foreign policy. *World Politics*, 41(2), 170–182. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010406>

- Green, M., Hicks, K., Cooper, Z., Schaus, J., & Douglas, J. (2017). Deterrence theory and gray zone strategies. In *countering coercion in maritime Asia: The theory and practice of gray zone deterrence* (pp. 21–50). *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23165.6>
- Grynkewich, A. G. (2018). Introducing information as a joint function. *Joint Forces Quarterly* 89(2), 6-7. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-89/jfq-89.pdf?ver=2018-04-19-153711-177>
- Hála, M., & Lulu, J. (2018). The CCP's model of social control goes global. *Sinopsis*.
<https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-ccps-model-of-social-control-goes-global/>
- Hancock, L. E. & Gurung, A. (2018). Capturing the flag: The struggle for national identity in nonviolent revolutions. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 25(2). <https://doi.org/10.46743/1082-7307/2018.1477>
- Hart, C. (1998). *Doing a literature review: Releasing the social science research imagination*. Sage.
- Hart, L. (1944). *Thoughts on War*. Faber and Faber.
- Heath, T. R., Gunness, K., & Cooper, C. (2016). The PLA and China's rejuvenation: National security and military strategies, deterrence concepts, and combat capabilities. *RAND Corporation*. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1402.html.
- Hicks, K. H., Friend, A. H., Federici, J., Shah, H., Donahoe, M., Conklin, M., Akca, A., Matlaga, M., & Sheppard, L. R. (2019). By other means part I: Campaigning in the gray zone. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/other-means-part-i-campaigning-gray-zone>.

- Hoffman, F. (2007). Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars,” *Potomac Institute for Policy Studies*.
http://www.potomac institute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf
- Hoffman, F. (2018, November 8). Examining complex forms of conflict: Gray zone and hybrid challenges. *PRISM*, 7(4). <https://cco.ndu.edu/news/article/1680696/examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges/>.
- Hoffman, F. (2009). Hybrid warfare and challenges. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 52(1), 34-39.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf>.
- Horowitz, M., & Reiter, D. (2001). When does aerial bombing work? Quantitative empirical tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(2), 147-73.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045002001>
- Horton, C. (2022, March 10). Ukraine offers Taiwan a wake-up call, and lessons in resistance. *Breaking Defense*. <https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/ukraine-offers-taiwan-a-wake-up-call-and-lessons-in-resistance/>
- Howes, D. (2009). *Toward a credible pacifism: Violence and the possibilities of politics*. SUNY Press.
- Hume, R., Freier, N., Compton, C., & Hankard, S. (2016, June 23). Confronting conflict in the ‘gray zone’. *Breaking Defense*. <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/confronting-conflict-in-the-gray-zone/>
- Jervis, R. (2009, November 9). The dustbin of history: Mutual assured destruction,” *Foreign Policy*. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/the-dustbin-of-history-mutual-assured-destruction/>

- Jervis, R., Lebow, R., & Stein, J. (1985). *Psychology and deterrence*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Jones, R. C. (2019, May 14). Deterring “competition short of war”: Are gray zones the Ardennes of our modern Maginot line of traditional deterrence? *Small Wars Journal*.
<https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/deterring-competition-short-war-are-gray-zones-ardennes-our-modern-maginot-line>.
- Joyce, M., António, R., & Howard, P. N. (2014). *Global digital activism data set*. (ICPSR 34625; Version V2 [Data Set]). <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34625.v2>
- Jun, L. (2015, March 26). Moscow says U.S. security strategy "anti-Russia". *People's Daily Online*. <http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0326/c90777-8868752.html>
- Kacprzky, A. (2014). Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE divided on the future of NATO policy. *PISM Policy Papers*, 96. <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/182638>
- Kania, E. (2016). The PLA's latest strategic thinking on the three warfares. *China Brief*, 16(13), 10-13. <https://cimsec.org/plas-latest-strategic-thinking-three-warfares/>
- Katz, N. H., Lawyer, J. W., & Sweedler, M. (2011). *Communication and conflict resolution skills* (2nd edition). Kendall Hunt.
- Kern, S. (2015). Expanding combat power through military cyber power theory. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 79(4), 88-95. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-79/jfq-79_88-95_Kern.pdf

- Keyue, X. (2021, March 7). China, Russia continue to cooperate on fighting color revolutions, safeguarding political security: Wang Yi. *Global Times*.
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217551.shtml>.
- King, M. L., Jr. (1958). *Stride toward freedom: The Montgomery story*. Beacon Press.
- King, M. L., Jr. (2005). Pilgrimage to Nonviolence. In C. Carson, T. Armstrong, S. Carson, A., Clay, & K. Taylor (Eds.) *The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. Volume V: Threshold of a New Decade, January 1959-December 1960*. University of California Press at Berkeley and Los Angeles. (Original work 1960)
- Kirby, P. (2022, March 19). Russia claims first use of hypersonic Kinzhal missile in Ukraine. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60806151>
- Koffman, M. (2016, June 23). The expensive pretzel logic of deterring Russia by denial. *War on the Rocks*. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-expensive-pretzel-logic-of-deterring-russia-by-denial/>
- Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2018). Political realism in international relations. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations>
- Kramer, F. D., & Teplinsky, M. J. (2013). Cybersecurity and tailored deterrence. *Atlantic Council*, 1-10. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Cybersecurity_and_Tailored_Deterrence.pdf
- Krippendorff, K. (2019). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology* (4th edition). Sage Publications.
- Kroenig, M. (2015). Facing reality: Getting NATO ready for a new cold war. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 57(1), 49-70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008295>

- Kroenig, M., & Pavel, B. (2012). How to deter terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly*, 35(2), 21-36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.665339>
- Kynge, J., Hornby, L., & Anderlini, J. (2017, October 26). Inside China's secret 'magic weapon' for worldwide influence. *Financial Times*. <https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4?shareType=nongift>.
- Kuzio, T. (2019). Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiia failed. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 52(4), 297-309. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.10.007>.
- Lakey, G. (2016). "Global Nonviolent Action Database." Swarthmore College.
- Lankina, T., & Watanabe, K. (2017). 'Russian spring' or 'spring betrayal'? The media as a mirror of Putin's evolving strategy in Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 69(10), 1526-1556. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1397603>
- Lanoszka, A. (2016). Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe. *International Affairs*, 92(1), 175-195. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12509>
- Layton, P. (2021, July 22). Bringing the grey zone into focus. *The Interpreter*. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bringing-grey-zone-focus>.
- Lebow, R.N. (2022). Rethinking conflict management. *China International Strategy Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-022-00104-3>
- Lee, D. W. (2016, December 7). Resistance dynamics and social movement theory. National Defense University. *PRISM*, 6(3), 131-149. <https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1020230/resistance-dynamics-and-social-movement-theory/>.

- Lee, Y., & Hung, F. (2014, November 26). Special report: How China's shadowy agency is working to absorb Taiwan. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-special-report/special-report-how-chinas-shadowy-agency-is-working-to-absorb-taiwan-idUSKCN0JB01T20141127>.
- Leonhard, R. & Phillips, S. (2016). *Little green men: A primer on modern Russian unconventional warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014*. United States Army Special Operations Command. https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/ARIS_LittleGreenMen.pdf
- Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). Unrestricted warfare. *PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House*. <https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>.
- Lin, S. S (2015, December 10). Sunflowers and umbrellas: Government responses to student-led protests in Taiwan and Hong Kong. *The Asan Forum*. <https://theasanforum.org/sunflowers-and-umbrellas-government-responses-to-student-led-protests-in-taiwan-and-hong-kong/>
- Lopez, C. T. (2021, April 30). Defense secretary says 'integrated deterrence' is cornerstone of U.S. defense. *U.S. Department of Defense News*. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2592149/defense-secretary-says-integrated-deterrence-is-cornerstone-of-us-defense/>
- Losh, J. (2016, January 29). Putin's angels: the bikers battling for Russia in Ukraine. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/russian-biker-gang-in-ukraine-night-wolves-putin>.
- Lyall, J. K., & Wilson, I. (2009). Rage against the machines: Explaining outcomes in counterinsurgency wars. *International Organization*, 63(1), 67-106. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309090031>

- Luo, T. (2016). Augmenting combat power: Military translation in China-Burma-India theater. *Linguistica Antverpiensia, New Series: Themes in Translation Studies*, 15, 143–161. <https://doi.org/10.52034/lanstts.v0i15.396>
- Malyarenko, T., & Kormych, B. (2022, February 23). Words versus deeds: Russia's and Ukraine's strategies in preparing for conflict. *Wilson Center*. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/words-versus-deeds-russias-and-ukraines-strategies-preparing-conflict>
- Mamoona, K., & Fozi, S. (2018). Voices of peace: Role of media in conflict resolution and violence management with reference to Pakistan. *Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities*, 8(2), 146. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/2249-7315.2018.00034.5>.
- Mangiafico, S. (2018, January 22). *I assume the output is from SPSS* [Comment on the online forum post *What should I need to report from chi square test?*] ResearchGate. <https://www.researchgate.net/post/What-should-I-need-to-report-from-Chi-Square-Test/5a65d0d4615e27c2ef252bf7/citation/download>.
- Martin, M. (2013). Relative combat power analysis (RCPA) in the revised NWP 5-01. *United States Naval War College*. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1007&context=moc-warfighter>.
- Marris, P., & Joske, A. (2019, June 24). The third magic weapon: Reforming China's united front. *War on the Rocks*. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-third-magic-weapon-reforming-chinas-united-front/>

- Mateus, S. (2022, February 25). Ukrainians Google 'how to make a Molotov cocktail' after defense minister's call to arms. *Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/25/ukraine-google-molotov-cocktails-resistance-russia/>
- Mazarr, M. (2015). Mastering the gray zone: Understanding a changing era of conflict. *US Army War College Press*.
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1427&context=monographs>
- Mazarr, M. (2018). Understanding deterrence. *RAND Corporation*.
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE295.html>.
- Mcbay, A. (2019). *Full Spectrum Resistance*. Seven Stories Press.
<https://fullspectrumresistance.org/chapter-8-intelligence-reconnaissance/>.
- McKinney, J. M., & Harris, P. (2021). Broken nest: deterring China from invading Taiwan. *US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters*, 51(4), 23-36, <https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3089>
- McManus, D. (2022, March 20). Ukraine's resistance offers a useful lesson to Taiwan. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-03-20/ukraines-resistance-offers-a-useful-lesson-to-taiwan>
- Mertens, D. M. (2007). Transformative paradigm: Mixed methods and social justice. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1(3), 212–225. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1558689807302811>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (2022). Fact sheet on the national endowment for democracy.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220507_10683090.html

- Mitchell, L. (2022, May 6). Putin's orange obsession: How a twenty-year fixation with color revolutions drove a disastrous war. *Foreign Affairs*.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-05-06/putins-orange-obsession>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. Alfred A. Knopf.
- Montgomery, E. B. (2014). Time to worry about China's military rise. *International Security*.
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/time-worry-about-chinas-military-rise>.
- Nakazawa, K. (2019, February 14). US trade demands have China fearful of 'color revolutions'. *Nikkei Asia*. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/US-trade-demands-have-China-fearful-of-color-revolutions>
- Navarro, P. (2016, January 5). China's non-kinetic 'three warfares' against America. *The National Interest*. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-non-kinetic-three-warfares-against-america-14808>.
- Nepstad, S. (2011). *Nonviolent revolutions: Civil resistance in the late 20th century*. Oxford.
- Newton, C. (2018). *The dark mirror: Gerasimov's hybrid war in Ukraine* [Master's thesis, Harvard University]. Harvard Library. <https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37365418>
- Nitsova, S. (2022, April 5). Ukraine's oligarchs are united against Russia. *Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/05/ukraine-oligarchs-russia-invasion/>
- Oliker, O. (2016, January 7). Unpacking Russia's new national security strategy. *Center for Strategic International Studies*. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>.

- Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Collins, K. M. T. (2007). A typology of mixed methods sampling designs in social science research. *The Qualitative Report*, 12(2), 281-316.
<https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2007.1638>
- Oskarsson, K. (2017). The effectiveness of DIMEFIL instruments of power in the gray zone. *NATO ACT Open Publications*, 1(2), 3-16.
- Pallant, J. (2001). *SPSS survival manual*. Open University Press.
- Papenfuss, M. (2022, April 2). Ukraine offering up to \$1 million to Russian defectors with jet or warship. *Huffington Post*. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ukraine-1million-jet-fighters-russian-defectors_n_6248ee54e4b007d38456c75f
- Parkin, F. (1969). Middle Class Radicalism. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 5(2), 163–163. <https://doi.org/10.1177/144078336900500217>
- Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022, February 22). What Putin fears most. *Journal of Democracy*.
<https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/what-putin-fears-most/>
- Pifer, S., Bush, R. C., Felbab-Brown, V., Indyk, M. S., O’Hanlon, M., & Pollack, K. M. (2010). U.S. nuclear and extended deterrence: considerations and challenges. *Brookings Institute*.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.
- Pomerantsev, P. (2015, December 29). Fighting while friending: the grey war advantage of ISIS, Russia, and China. *The Atlantic*. <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12/fighting-while-friending-grey-war-advantage-isis-russia-and-china/124787/>.
- Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia. (2022, February 4). President Xi Jinping held talks with Russian president Vladimir Putin. http://id.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/202202/t20220204_10638923.htm.

- President of Russia. (2022, February 2). Joint statement of the Russian federation and the people's republic of China on the international relations entering a new era and the global sustainable development. *Kremlin: President of Russia*.
<http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770>.
- Putin, Vladimir. (2021). On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. *Kremlin: President of Russia*. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>
- Rainsford, S. (2014, November 22). Ukraine crisis: Lavrov warns over Russia 'regime change goal'. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30158978>
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary conflict resolution* (3rd edition). Polity Press.
- Reid, B. H. (1985). Colonel J. F. C. fuller and the revival of classical military thinking in Britain, 1918-1926. *Military Affairs*, 49(4), 192–197. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1987541>
- Reid, B. H. (1995). Major general J. F. C. fuller and the revolution in British military thought. *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 73(293), 51-62.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/44224905>
- Repass, M. (2022, March 1). Ukraine's stirring self-defense is no accident. *Washington Post*.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/01/how-ukraine-mounted-a-stirring-self-defense/>
- Reuters Staff. (2019, January 18). Chinese police must guard against 'color revolutions', says top official. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-police/chinese-police-must-guard-against-color-revolutions-says-top-official-idUSKCN1PC0BS>.
- Roberts, J. Q. (2015). Maskirovka 2.0: Hybrid threat, hybrid response. *JSOU Press*.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1007494.pdf>.

- Robinson, E. (2020, September 8). The missing, irregular half of great power competition. *Modern War Institute*. <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-missing-irregular-half-of-great-power-competition/>.
- Romanchyshyna, I. (2016, October). Hybrid wars in post-soviet spaces as a challenge to the west. *Humanity in Action*. https://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/hybrid-wars-in-post-soviet-spaces-as-a-challenge-to-the-west/
- Russian Federation. (2020). Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence. <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202006020040?index=0&rangeSize=1>
- Salehyan, I., Hendrix, C. S., Hamner, J., Case, C., Linebarger, C., Stull, E., & Williams, J. (2012). Social conflict in Africa: A new database. *International Interactions*, 38(4), 503–511. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2012.697426>
- Schneider, B. R., & Ellis, P. D. (2011). Tailored deterrence: Influencing states and groups of concern. *U.S. Airforce Counterproliferation Center*. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CSDS/Display/Article/1612720/tailored-deterrence-influencing-states-and-groups-of-concern-2011/>
- Schock, K. (2003). Nonviolent action and its misconceptions: Insights for social scientists. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 36(4), 705-712. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096503003482>
- Schock, K. (2005). *Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies*. University of Minnesota Press.

Scouras, J., Smyth, E., & Mahnken, T. (2014). Cross-domain deterrence in U.S.-China strategy.

Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.

<http://www.jhuapl.edu/ourwork/nsa/papers/CrossDomainWeb.pdf>.

Sheng, Y., & Qingqing, C. (2021, April 15). West-backed color revolution a 'top threat' to china's national, political security. *Global Times*.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1221182.shtml>.

Shlapak, D. A., & Johnson, M. W. (2016). Reinforcing deterrence on NATO's eastern flank.

RAND Corporation.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.

Scott, J. (1985). *Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance*. Yale University Press.

Sharp, G. (1973). *The methods of nonviolent action*. Porter Sargent.

Sharp, G. (1990). *Civilian-based defense: A post-military weapons system*. Princeton University Press.

Sharp, G. (1980). *Social power and political freedom*. Porter Sargent.

Shveda, Y., & Park, J. H. (2016). Ukraine's revolution of dignity: The dynamics of Euromaidan.

Journal of Eurasian Studies, 7(1), 85-91. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2015.10.007>.

Simons, G. (2020). The evolution of regime change and information warfare in the 21st century.

Journal of International Analytics, 11(4), 72-89. <https://doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2020-11-4-72-90>

- Sky News. (2022, March 21). Ukraine war: Kherson residents tell Russian forces to 'go home' as they confront military vehicles. *Sky News*. <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-kherson-residents-tell-russian-forces-to-go-home-as-they-confront-military-vehicles-12571479>
- Slaten, K. (2020, June 26). China ridicules U.S. protests out of fear of its own people. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/26/george-floyd-protests-china-feminism-communist-party/>.
- Smith, J., & Wiest, D. (2012). Transnational social movement organization dataset, 1953-2003 (ICPSR 33863; Version V1) [Data set]. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR33863.v1>
- Solmaz, T. (2022, February 25). 'Hybrid warfare': one term, many meanings. *Small Wars Journal*. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-warfare-one-term-many-meanings>.
- Sokov, N. (2014, March 13). Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike 'de-escalation'. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. <http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation>.
- Spoehr, T. (2021, December 3). Bad idea: Relying on "integrated deterrence" instead of building sufficient U.S. military power. *Defense 360*. <https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-relying-on-integrated-deterrence-instead-of-building-sufficient-u-s-military-power/>.
- Steup, M. (2018). Epistemology. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/epistemology/>>.
- Steward, A. (2015). *Political warfare and contentious politics* (Publication No. ADA632421) [Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School]. Defense Technical Information Center. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36738057.pdf>

- Stewart, P., O'Brien, B., & Pamuk, H. (2022, March 27). Biden says he is not calling for regime change in Russia. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-envoy-nato-no-american-policy-regime-change-russia-2022-03-27/>
- Stoker, D. (2007, January 15). Insurgents rarely win and Iraq won't be any different (maybe). *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2007/01/15/insurgencies-rarely-win-and-iraq-wont-be-any-different-maybe/>.
- Stringer, Kevin D. (2017). Building a stay-behind resistance organization: The case of cold war Switzerland against the Soviet Union. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 86(2), 109-114. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1220620/building-a-stay-behind-resistance-organization-the-case-of-cold-war-switzerland/>.
- Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (Eds.) (2003). *Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioral research*. Sage.
- The evolution of hybrid warfare and key challenges: Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 115th Cong. (2017). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hrg25088/html/CHRG-115hrg25088.htm>
- Thomson, S. K., & Paul, C. E. (2018). Paradigm change: Operational art and the information joint function. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 89(2), 8-14. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-89/jfq-89_8-14_Thomson-Paul.pdf?ver=2018-04-11-125441-307
- Tian, Y. L. (2021, March 23). China military to get loyalty lessons as party gears up for 100th birthday. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-politics/china-military-to-get-loyalty-lessons-as-party-gears-up-for-100th-birthday-idUSKBN2BF18W>

Tilly, C. (1997). Contentious politics and social change. *African Studies*, 56(1), 51-65.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00020189708707860>

Trujillo, C. (2014). The limits of cyberspace deterrence. *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 75(4), 43-52.

<http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577560/jfq-75-the-limits-of-cyberspace-deterrence/>.

Urdan, T. (2017). *Statistics in plain English* (4th edition). Routledge.

Ucko, D. H. (2020, October 14). Nobody puts IW in an annex: It's time to embrace irregular

warfare as a strategic priority. *Modern War Institute*. <https://mwi.usma.edu/nobody-puts-iw-in-an-annex-its-time-to-embrace-irregular-warfare-as-a-strategic-priority/>.

United Nations Security Council. (2022). Warning incitement of racial, religious hatred can

trigger atrocity crimes, special adviser stresses states' legal obligation to prevent genocide [Press release]. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14939.doc.htm>

U.S. Department of the Army. (2021). *Chinese Tactics*. (Report No. 7-100.3). U.S. Department

of the Army. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. (2015). *Commander and staff organization and operations: Army field manual 6-0*. U.S. Department of the Army.

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN35404-FM_6-0-000-WEB-1.pdf

U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). *Irregular warfare, Department of Defense directive*

3000.07. U.S. Department of Defense. https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/d3000_07.pdf

U.S. Department of Defense. (2006). *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Report No FY 1973).

U.S. Department of Defense.

https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1973_DoD_AR.pdf?ver=cClita1yclKflg3F0Rb3bw%3d%3d

U.S. Department of Defense. (2018). *Summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the United States of America*. U.S. Department of Defense.

<https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2022). *Russia's top five persistent disinformation narratives: Fact sheet*. U.S. Department of State. [https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-](https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-disinformation-narratives/)

[disinformation-narratives/](https://www.state.gov/russias-top-five-persistent-disinformation-narratives/)

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2016). *Doctrine for the armed forces of the United States* (Joint Publication 1). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2010). *Irregular warfare: Countering irregular threats* (Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2014). *Special operations* (Joint Publication 3-05). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf>

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). *Joint Operation Planning* (Joint Publication 5-0). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://grugq.github.io/resources/jp5_0.pdf

- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). *Joint operations* (Joint Publication 3-0). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018-11-27-160457-910.
- Väyrynen, R. (1997). Towards effective conflict prevention: A comparison of different instruments. *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2(1), 1–18.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/45037970>
- Vest, R. (2017). Understanding relative combat power analysis: How planners can make the most out of a powerful tool. *MOC Warfighter*, 1(10). <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/moc-warfighter/vol1/iss10/3/>.
- Voelz, G. (2014). Is military science ‘scientific’? *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 75(4), 84-90.
<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/577566/is-military-science-scientific/>
- Votel, J. L., Cleveland, C. T., Connett, C. T., & Irwin, W. (2016). Unconventional warfare in the gray zone. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 80(1), 101-109.
<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80.pdf>
- Waltz, K. N. (1988). The origins of war in neorealist theory. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 615-628. <https://doi.org/10.2307/204817>
- Wass de Czege, H. (2015). *Understanding and developing combat power*. Creative Media Partners.
- Weinstein, J. (2007). *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wess, M. (2015, August 12). The case for deterrence by denial. *The American Interest*.
<http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/>.

- Wood, E. J. (2000). *Forging democracy from below: Insurgent transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, E. J. (2003). *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wortzel, L. (2014). The Chinese people's liberation army and information warfare. *Strategic Studies Institute and US Army College Press*.
<https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2263.pdf>
- Xinhua. (2021). Mainland spokesperson rebuts DPP's slander on united front work. *XinhuaNet*.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-01/13/c_139664665.htm
- Xinhua. (2022). Top political advisor stresses unity in realizing Chinese Dream. *XinhuaNet*.
<https://english.news.cn/20220117/253655e4b76e40499641e3a62e8f65c1/c.html>
- Winkie, D. (2022, March 7). How the US and Europe helped Ukraine prep for insurgency. *Army Times*. <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2022/03/07/how-the-us-and-europe-helped-ukraine-prep-for-insurgency/>
- Wright, F. (2016). Resistance. *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Anthropology*.
<http://doi.org/10.29164/16resistance>.
- Yang, S. (2022, May 26). Fears of a Chinese invasion have Taiwanese civilians taking up target practice. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-05-26/taiwan-civilians-china-invasion-defense-training-bb-airsoft-guns>
- Zagorodnyuk, A., & Khara, A. (2021, November 27). Vladimir Putin's Ukraine obsession could spark a major European war. *Atlantic Council*.
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putins-ukraine-obsession-could-spark-a-major-european-war/>

Zeitsoff, T. (2016). Does social media influence conflict? Evidence from the 2012 Gaza conflict.


Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(1), 29-63. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716650925>

Appendix A: Exemplars of Russian Security Discourse

The following figure include slides from General Gerasimov's presentation pertaining to Color Revolutions as published in Cordesman (2014; see Figure A1).

Figure A1



Methodologies and locations of Color Revolutions




Cordesman (2014) provided additional perspective through slides from the Minister of Defense of Belarus's presentation pertaining to deliberation of U.S. capability and intent to foment Color Revolutions and cooperation between Russia and Belarus (see Figure A2).

Figure A2

Role of external actors in Color Revolutions






An additional presentation pertaining to Color Revolutions was presented by a senior leader from the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as presented by Cordesman (2014; see Figure A3).

Figure A3

Color Revolutions as warfare and a threat to Russian security



Cordesman (2014) provided further understanding of the stance of the Minister of Defense of Belarus regarding "information confrontation" in Color Revolutions (see Figure A4).

Figure A4

Information confrontation against Color Revolutions

