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Abstract

Excerpt

In 1931 Gandhi spoke of the possibility of overcoming violent conflicts with "a living wall of men and women" who would interpose themselves between conflicting parties without any other weapons than themselves (Weber, 1988). Some students of nonviolent intervention have written histories of interpositionary experiences from Gandhi's first idea until recent years (Keyes, 1978; Weber, 1988; Walker, 1981; L'Abate, 1993a). Maybe it is time to try an evaluation of these types of interventions.¹

Keywords: *armed conflicts, nonviolent interposition, UN peacekeeping interventions, United Nations*

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NONVIOLENT INTERPOSITION IN ARMED CONFLICTS

[Alberto L'Abate](#)

In 1931 Gandhi spoke of the possibility of overcoming violent conflicts with "a living wall of men and women" who would interpose themselves between conflicting parties without any other weapons than themselves (Weber, 1988). Some students of nonviolent intervention have written histories of interpositionary experiences from Gandhi's first idea until recent years (Keyes, 1978; Weber, 1988; Walker, 1981; L'Abate, 1993a). Maybe it is time to try an evaluation of these types of interventions.¹

Various successful attempts of spontaneous interposition demonstrate that people closely related to the conflicting parties (mothers, fathers, children, special categories of workers, etc.) may interrupt a conflict (Keyes, 1978). For example, in Algeria, after the liberation from France, the group that had liberated Algiers did not want to leave that town to Ben Bella's regular liberation army. In other areas of the country the fighting caused 100 dead and 400 wounded. On September 1, 1968, at Bogheri, a small town south of Algiers, the two groups came to fight each other; one person died and seven were wounded. At that point, a large crowd of men and women opposed to the fight created a human barrier between the two conflicting forces, shouting "Stop pouring blood!" On the following day another armed conflict broke out, but a large number of civilian Moslems "filled the road in a Gandhian-style resistance," bringing the leaders to a cease fire and to seek an agreement (Keyes, 1978, p. 10). According to Keyes, one of the most important applications of a nonviolent solution since the Gandhian campaign for the freedom of India occurred in China, in 1968, in a conflict between two groups of students of opposing factions. In this case, a crowd mostly of factory workers -- their number was estimated at 60,000 -- marched completely unarmed between the two fighting groups, crying out "Use reasoning, not violence" (Keyes, 1978, p. 7). One of the groups stopped firing immediately, while the other continued, killing 5 workers and wounding 731. But the workers did not retaliate, and the following day the second group stopped firing as well. The two groups formed a committee with representatives of the factory workers who had participated in the demonstration and after a year's work reached an agreement. Keyes (1978, pp. 5-6) reports another similar case in Aden. There are also more recent examples. In the Philippines millions of unarmed people interposed themselves between Marcos' army and the secessionist troops of Enrile and Ramos, saving the latter and convincing Marcos to retreat (MIR Padova, 1989; L'Abate, 1993a, p. 27, 1993b, p. 184). In Beijing, China, in 1989, thousands of common people interposed themselves between soldiers and students occupying Tianamen Square, and repeatedly convinced the military to back off. In Russia, in 1990, thousands of unarmed civilians surrounded the Parliament, preventing the Army from taking over, and causing the *coup d'etat* to fail.

But do the above experiences indicate a role for the United Nations, as many have asked since Gandhi's time? This author does not see reasons to be too optimistic. Efforts to build international nonviolent armies by voluntary organizations (for example, the "Peace Army" and the "World Peace Brigade") were not successful.² But unquestionably the efforts to organize such endeavors through the League of Nations, and later through the United Nations, have been equally unsuccessful. In 1932, Maude Royden, a Protestant minister and friend of Gandhi, along with other religious figures, proposed to create a "Peace Army" capable of interposing itself

between clashing Chinese and Japanese forces after the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese. They then proposed to the General Secretary of the League of Nations that he should keep this "Peace army" under his aegis. However, they were informed that a formal discussion and approval by the Assembly could only take place on the basis of a formal request by one of the member states (Weber, 1988, p. 204). In 1961, J.P. Narayan, leader of the Indian "Shanti Sena" (Peace Army) and Salvador de Madariaga, a noted Spanish writer, wrote a letter to the Secretary of the United Nations proposing the organization of an unarmed interpositionary corps (Keyes, 1978, p. 4). Historians do not indicate whether Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary General at the time, replied to that letter, but he probably would have had to answer like his predecessor.

Moreover, scholars who have researched UN peacekeeping interventions have found that these are often subordinated to the interests of the more powerful nations which control the UN Security Council. For example, Prof. Casadio, Director of the Italian Society for International Organization, studying interventions of the UN in the Middle East, observed at a Conference specially organized to promote the idea of nonviolent and unarmed UN forces,³ that the US and USSR had decided on a common policy to regulate the region. They agreed on not letting the Middle-Eastern conflict improve to a level at which Syria would no longer need arms from the USSR nor Israel from the US, while at the same time not allowing the conflict to grow so much as to threaten to start World War III (Casadio, 1989, p. 163; Unitar, 1987). This has led to the absurdity that "the greater and the more dangerous a conflict is, the less they (i.e., the great powers) ask for UN intervention" (Casadio, 1989, p. 161).

More recently, Jacobsen (1993) presented a study at the European Peace Research Association (EUPRA) Conference in Budapest explaining why nations prefer direct intervention, called "peace coercion" or "peace enforcement," rather than let the UN peacekeeping interventions go forward. Jacobsen, studying the cases of intervention in the Gulf War, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, suggests that the reasons are economic and political. When political interests and public opinion polls indicate support, the more powerful nations prefer to intervene directly; only otherwise do they favor UN peacekeeping interventions. To understand their rationale it is necessary to clarify the difference between "peace coercion" and "peacekeeping." Peace coercion is achieved through aerial attacks aimed at the "enemy" geopolitical area, in an attempt to destroy its strength and compel it to retreat. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is usually brought about by armed interpositionary forces which try to divide the conflicting parties and make them look for pacific and diplomatic solutions. In the latter case the risks are high given that these troops carry only light weapons to defend themselves. On the other hand, peace-coercion interventions give the appearance of being less risky because they require high-tech and sophisticated weapons, but few soldiers. The fact that they are carried out through aerial bombing -- which in fact destroys civilian equipment and kills civilians as well as soldiers -- makes them seem capable of achieving quick results at a low cost in terms of loss of human lives among those intervening. Moreover, this kind of intervention is very useful for advertising new sophisticated armaments and creating demand for modern weaponry.

The preference of the great powers for peace enforcing rather than for peacekeeping was clear during the war in former Yugoslavia. As reported by Morrison and Rose, chief commanders of UN peacekeeping forces, the interposition was having good results, but when Boutros Ghali, UN

Secretary General, requested more than 30,000 soldiers for this kind of operation, the US and European powers gave him only a few thousand soldiers. Russia sent 4,000, hoping to avoid a military intervention by NATO (as "peace enforcing") against Serbia, their traditional ally. The other great powers preferred direct intervention of the "peace enforcing" type (using NATO forces instead of UN troops) rather than giving the United Nations the support needed for peacekeeping.

Since the great powers controlling the UN's Security Council (USA, England, France, Russia, China) are the world's largest arms dealers -- from 1985 to 1989 they sold 85.6% of all heavy armaments -- how can we expect the UN to promote "nonviolent and unarmed forces"? Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, while allowing hope in this direction, is totally contradicted by the behavior of the great powers. One is led to conclude that, although we must strive for a better UN -- a UN not of Nations but in which peoples could be represented,⁴ we must not be too optimistic about the possibility of having, in a short time, a "nonviolent and unarmed peace corps" in this organization.

A more definitive answer to whether nonviolent interventions in armed conflict can be really effective, requires a better analysis of past experiences in this field. The diagram of Figure 1 may help this analysis. The diagram has four squares arranged along two coordinates: a level of conflict (small-scale or large-scale); and a type of intervention (internal or external to a country). In the four squares are placed some of the above mentioned episodes of nonviolent interposition, along with others which have not yet been discussed.⁵

The first square contains those types of interventions which are usually not called interpositionary but which lead to the introduction of a third party in a conflict between two adversaries. The third party tries to help in finding a nonviolent resolution to the conflict. This type of intervention is very common in a number of different fields, such as, for example, the family setting (often as a form of family psychotherapy), the judicial field (the conciliator or justice of the peace), and in labor relations (e.g., interventions of arbitration or conciliation in a litigation between owner and workers). It is, in fact, so widespread that nobody could think of doing without it. Similar interventions are also developing in large-scale conflicts (e.g., International Court; Committees for the mediation of certain conflicts, etc.).⁶ These could be placed in square 4, but this paper will consider in that square only the interpositionary experiences of nonviolent direct action.

Figure 1

LEVELS OF CONFLICT			TYPES OF INTER-
	Small-scale	Large-scale	
Internal to a country	1) Frequent interventions of a "third party" for	3) Shanti Sena (India), and various spontaneous experiences of nonviolent (or	

	mediation, unarmed) interposition (Algeria in 1961; China VEN-TION arbitration, in 1968 and 1989; Philippines, etc.) or resolution of a conflict
External to a country	2) Peace 4) Peace Army (1931); World Peace Brigade Brigades (1960); Witness for Peace (Nicaragua, 1989); International Peace Volunteers in the Middle East (1990-91); (Guatemala, We Share One Peace (Sarajevo, 1992); Mir El Salvador, Sada (1993) Sri Lanka); Amnesty International (in various countries of the world); Gulf Peace Team (Jordan); Stobriec (Mir Sada)

In the second square are placed the activities of Peace Brigades International (PBI), an organization born in 1981 from the ashes of the World Peace Brigades. PBI tried to avoid what had caused the crisis of the former organization by limiting their interventions to areas where the conflict was latent or still on a small scale. Their basic type of intervention has been providing peace escorts (protective accompaniment) for individuals or organizations fighting for human rights through nonviolent means. After a period of work in Nicaragua (where they were replaced by Witness for Peace), they intervened in Guatemala, El Salvador and Sri Lanka. They escorted people often threatened by governments or by death squads. These volunteers are connected to local groups all over the world, groups they can activate to send faxes, telegrams, give press releases, etc., whenever a threat makes it necessary. The presence of these volunteers, completely unarmed but bearing the insignia of the nonviolent organization to which they belong, has saved many people from being killed or tortured; and it has given the work for human rights in those countries the visibility it deserved. Even Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Manchu was, for a time, escorted by PBI volunteers (Dijkstra, 1986, 1992; PBI Italy, 1993). In square 2 belong also the activities of Amnesty International (AI), a well-known organization striving for the liberation of political prisoners and opposing the death penalty. It has some similarities to PBI, it creates local support groups and utilizes faxes and telegrams to authorities of countries where the prisoners are kept, and in general gives widespread publicity to these cases. Through the work of AI many political prisoners have been freed, and some people who had been condemned to death have been saved. Their work is not usually considered as interposition, but the author feels that they belong in this square because this organization interposes itself between governments that infringe upon human rights and those individuals whose rights are threatened. There are two

other groups in this square whose work relates to escorting medicine and food convoys. Although medicine and food were excluded from the embargo declared by the UN Security Council on Iraq, multinational forces often attacked such convoys headed for Baghdad.⁷ The presence of the Gulf Peace Team, known to the Allied Forces, has diminished this risk. The second experience happened at the end of international march "*Mir Sada*" (August 1993). A group of trucks bringing food and medicine to the Moslem population of Bosnia Herzegovina was stopped by Croatian authorities in Stobriec, not far from Split. The drivers were not allowed to go any further. UN authorities said that they did not have enough tanks to escort them, so they could not continue. Croatian police, accusing them of transporting weapons instead of food and medicine, took some of the trucks, and arrested the drivers when they resisted. At the time when *Mir Sada* volunteers intervened, and went to live in the area where the trucks were stopped, three drivers were imprisoned. The presence of volunteers succeeded in preventing the Croatian police from confiscating another truck. In addition, they brought international press and TV to the camp, thus giving publicity to what was happening. They pressed the Croatian government to release the imprisoned drivers and UN authorities to give them an escort. As a result of the operation, two of the three drivers were released and the trucks were allowed to get to their destination.⁸

Before considering square 3, the main distinction between small- and large-scale conflict needs to be clarified. The difference is not the extent of the conflict but the regular use of weapons. For example, the so-called "low intensity war" on which much of the US policy against Communism in South America, Italy, and elsewhere, was based, is here considered in the first two squares, because the use of weapons (in the form of terrorism, death squads, etc.) was considered to be exceptional, even if it happened quite often.⁹ This being said, we can place in square 3 the experience of *Shanti Sena*, which has been active in India in trying to prevent or overcome conflicts between different religious groups, especially between Hindus and Moslems.¹⁰ In this square we can also place the experiences of spontaneous unarmed interposition discussed before.

In square 4 we can place both the English "Peace Army" and the World Peace Brigade, because, at least their intention was to intervene (to prevent or end) armed conflicts. Other experiences that belong in this square include the one in Nicaragua, where 1,500 volunteers, mostly belonging to the organization Witness for Peace, interposed themselves between the Contra army and Nicaraguan peasants who were harvesting, and thus prevented the former from appropriating the harvest, as they had done before.¹¹ Also included is the experience in which the author participated in the Middle East with a group known as "Volunteers for Peace," an experience which anticipated that of the Gulf Peace Team. Our aim was not only interposition but also finding, in a kind of grass-roots diplomacy, a possible form of mediation (L'Abate, 1992, 1993a). The impossibility of preventing the war was due not only to the determination of the US and Great Britain to use force in order to destroy Iraq,¹² but also, at least in a small part, to a lack of consensus among pacifist organizations about what to do.¹³ The experience of the Gulf Peace Team is much better known in the English speaking world, because much has been written about it. Two recent experiences of nonviolent interposition in former Yugoslavia, Sarajevo I and *Mir Sada* (1993) are also included in square 4. Even if they did not interrupt the conflict, they showed (1) the possibility of breaking, through nonviolent means, the siege of Sarajevo in 1992; and (2), the direct involvement of numbers of pacifists (500 in the first and about 2,000 in *Mir*

Sada), the majority of whom were willing to risk their lives in order to bring peace to a martyred area.¹⁴

A recent experience of nonviolent interposition includes the "Time for Peace" initiative, which brought together Palestinians, Israelis and pacifists from abroad, to ask for a peaceful solution to the problem of Palestine. We have seen that nonviolent interposition has been effective when done by people related to the fighting groups; wives, parents, children. When people of this type put themselves between two fighting groups, the latter tend to interrupt fire, fearing that they might kill their loved ones. But the analysis also shows that in several cases the presence of foreigners, trained in nonviolence and willing to risk their lives can be of great help in keeping down the conflict, while giving visibility to local nonviolent groups of activists who strive for justice and human rights. The experiences analyzed have demonstrated, most of all, that the presence of people, no matter how few, that are connected to the fighting groups, can have positive results; but also that we can reach large numbers of people when the local community gets involved and decides to intervene. The NPF (Nonviolent Peace Forces) connects internal and external interventions, as done by "Time for Peace," so that these two types of actions may reinforce each other.

No single volunteer organization actually has the possibility of organizing such a force by itself. The experiences in Iraq, Israel, and in former Yugoslavia, have demonstrated the need to coordinate the work of different organizations in order to be more effective. The task is not easy, but it is definitely worthwhile.¹⁵

The "Embassies of Peace" is a proposal made by "Volunteers for Peace," based on past experiences by Quakers and other pacifist groups.¹⁶ The Peace Embassies would consist of a group of *long-term* volunteers who would stay at a chosen place and work in contact with local pacifist groups, constantly informing the international coordination committee and local groups about possible actions that are necessary to uphold human rights, justice and peace, or about goods needed by the population of the area. In case the pacifists of the area where the embassy is located think the presence of a larger group of *short-term* volunteers on the spot is necessary (e.g., for a peace march or a demonstration), the situation would be communicated to both the International Coordinating Committee and the local groups, which will try to organize a Nonviolent Peace Force (NPF) to intervene as requested.

Local groups all over the world can be prepared to use nonviolent direct action, and ready to become activated in case of need. There will be different means of activation, from sending a fax or a telegram to authorities in whose hands it is to change the situation, or preparing a press release, to organizing a local demonstration, or even participating in an international march or demonstration. The local group should be involved in training in nonviolence and nonviolent direct actions, and should apply these techniques to deal with problems which affect their own community (racism, corruption, Mafia, process of centralization and militarization of society, loss of democratic values, and so on). Such local organizations would make it possible to have volunteers already prepared, and ready to leave. The speed of the intervention is extremely important. It took nearly one year for the organization "Blessed are the Peace Makers" to find participants and prepare them for Sarajevo I. Had an organization like the one outlined here

already been in existence, the intervention could have started much earlier, before the conflict had become so brutal, and the results of the initiative could have been more effective.

The proposal is not unrealistic. Some kind of "Peace Embassy" has already been organized in Jerusalem by a pool of organizations called "Time for Peace"; in Sarajevo by "We Share One Peace"; in Split and Belgrade by a coordination of Italian humanitarian organizations, the Italian Consortium of Solidarity. Also several international organizations (IFOR, WRI, PBI) have promoted the "Balkan Peace Team," which is active in Split, Zagreb and in Belgrade. The Italian Campaign for Tax Resistance (supported by thousands of people who refuse to pay taxes for arms and ask that their money be used for nonviolent defense or for nonviolent intervention in international conflicts) has approved several proposals which go in that direction. This organization has recently decided to give part of the money reserved for political initiatives to finance the opening of a peace embassy in Pristina. A recent study trip in Belgrade and Pristina, in which several members of the organization of the Italian Campaign for a Nonviolent Solution of the Problem of Kosovo and some active members of the Campaign for Tax Resistance have participated, has found a willingness on the part of the two parties in the conflict, Albanians and Serbs, to try to avoid an open conflict.¹⁷ As Weber correctly claims, it is easier and better to prevent the explosion of a conflict, than to bring it to an end when it has already started (1993, p. 45).

The situation in Kosovo seems to be ready for the type of action proposed in this article. In Kosovo, the Albanian majority (nearly 90% of the population) is oppressed by the Serbian government, which uses weapons, secret police and paramilitary groups to control the area. However, the Albanians have decided to struggle for their independence and freedom not with weapons but through nonviolence. They have given birth to one of the most interesting and determined examples of the nonviolent technique of a parallel government. Their President, Prof. Rugova, has been elected by the population. They have an alternative government in exile, their own schools and university, an organization for health and social services, and also a kind of voluntary taxation. In fact, all these activities are made possible by voluntary taxation of all those Kosovars who are still employed (most of them have been fired by Serb authorities), as well as those who have migrated to other countries. But the situation is tense. Nearly every day the human rights of the Albanian population are abused, and this might lead to a sudden explosion.

Prof. Rugova and his coworkers are requesting assistance from nonviolent organizations so that such an explosion can be avoided and a nonviolent solution to their problems may be found. An outbreak of violence in Kosovo would open a southern front of the war in former Yugoslavia, and would bring about a terrible escalation of the conflict. These are some of the reasons for starting the organization proposed in this article from Kosovo. From the study trip in Kosovo, our group concluded that there are still possibilities for preventing the outbreak of conflict. But if we wait too long in organizing the intervention, this may not be the case. This proposal would also fit with Weber's recommendation to concentrate on prevention and on conflicts that have not yet become large scale (Weber, 1993, p. 45). This tactical advice would allow the proposed organization to work with the hope of obtaining positive results and let the project start and grow gradually, moving toward interventions in even more complex and difficult situations.

The author is convinced that this is a challenge for the international nonviolent movement. Considering the proliferation of conflicts, if we don't respond to this challenge, there is the risk of strengthening the already prevalent notion that to deal with large-scale conflicts, it is necessary to use armaments.

Endnotes

1. A very stimulating evaluation is written by Weber, 1993. My paper owes much to this writing, even if I do not completely agree with the opinions of the author.
2. Weber (1993) reports that the time required to organize these initiatives was so long that in some cases, by the time they were ready, the conflict had already ended. In other cases the number of volunteers collected was too small to be effective.
3. See Tullio, 1989. The Conference had been organized to discuss the proposal for a nonviolent peacekeeping corps. The proposal was presented to the UN by Ramsahai Purohit, a coworker of Vinoba and had been subscribed to by many Italian NGOs.
4. Interesting proposals to reform the UN can be found in Papisca, 1991, 1993; Papisca and Mascia, 1991; De Stefani and Tusset, 1994. For new problems brought to the UN by the necessity of protecting human rights, see also Ferris, 1992. About the introduction of nonviolence in UN peacemaking see also the interesting article by Hartsough, 1994.
5. This diagram comes from the suggestion of T. Weber to concentrate the efforts of the NGO's interventions on small-scale conflicts, leaving to the UN the others (see Weber, 1993).
6. See Rupesinghe, 1993. On the same topic see also ASPR, 1993.
7. The description of the brutal attack on the women's navy that tried to bring medicine and baby food from Algiers to Iraq is in a personal recorded interview with a Spanish woman who was in that navy.
8. Oral presentation by one of the volunteers, Mauro Fusi, at the training on "Consensus decision making and Interpositionary Nonviolent Forces," Bologna, 29-30 January and 12-13 February 1994, organized by "Blessed Are the Peace Makers" with the cooperation of trainers from the Italian Network for Training in Nonviolence.
9. See the many publications on the connection between Italian Secret Service and right wing terrorists, and the history of "Operazione Gladio" against Italian communism; especially De Lutis, 1991; Giannuli, 1992; Cipriani et al., 1993.
10. On *Shanti Sena* see particularly the publications of Narayan Desai (1968, 1972, 1990), who has been secretary of this organization for many years. See also Walker, 1981.

11. Oral presentation of F. Passuello, President of the Association of Catholic Workers of Italy, at the Seminar "A Trent'anni dalla Pacem in Terris," organized by the Franciscan Brothers and other Catholic organizations, Assisi, 14-17 October 1993. Passuello was in Nicaragua in that period as an international observer.

12. Willy Brandt declared this during a press conference in Baghdad, after his meeting with Saddam Hussein. I was present among other Volunteers for Peace.

13. We proposed the following strategy, in agreement with Prof. Antonio Papisca, Director of the School of Specialization on Institutions and Techniques for Tutoring Human Rights, of the University of Padoa: 1) To try, through our visits in Iraq and our discussions with the authorities and with the population, to find a possible solution to the problem of Kuwait. 2) If we could find an acceptable solution, agreed to by Iraqi authorities, a certain number of "sages" (i.e., some of the Nobel Prize winners of our organizations, like Perez d'Equivel and Desmond Tutu, and other well-known people like Padre Ernesto Balducci, Giovanni Bianchi, then President of ACLI, and Prof. Papisca, UN human rights expert) would have brought the proposal to Perez de Cuellar, then UN Secretary General, and to his secretary, G. Picco, friend of Prof. Papisca, pressing them to work for that solution. 3) If they would have answered that they could not do anything, not because they did not like the proposal, but because the UN Security Council impeded them from doing anything for mediating the conflict (as they have declared later in many interviews to the press), the group of "sages," with the help of the American Peace Movement, would have tried to organize a strong demonstration, such as the symbolic occupation of the UN Headquarters (as these movements had already done some years before).

Our mediation proposal, signed by the volunteers, was officially presented at the New Year's Eve 1991 ceremony under the tent of the Gulf Peace Team, at the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia (ceremony filmed by TV cameras from many countries). It proposed declaring Kuwait a "free zone" without Iraqi or multinational armed forces, but under the protection of a corps of UN "Blue Helmets," from nations that had not intervened (a similar proposal had been made by Sweden). They would be assisted by a "nonviolent corps" under the aegis of the UN, formed by people, like us, who were members of organizations with consultative status in the UN.

Since, other Italian pacifist organizations did not support this proposal, we put it aside and limited ourselves to sending the text of the possible agreement to Perez de Cuellar, with a copy to G. Picco. Probably most of the pacifist movements were too optimistic about the possibility of avoiding war, thinking only symbolic street demonstrations in several towns a few days before the January 15th ultimatum to Iraq would be needed (see L'Abate and Tartarini, 1993).

14. For a proposal of nonviolent interposition connected to the *Mir Sada* march, and for a critical evaluation of it, see L'Abate, 1993c and 1993d. On the limits of episodic short-term pacifist interventions, see also "An open letter to peace movements," signed by several members of anti-war groups in former Yugoslavia, in *Peace News*, September 1994, p. 6.

15. One organization very active in this direction is International Alert. This NGO is striving to organize a coalition for war prevention with the support of about two hundred other NGOs. See "Creating coalitions for war prevention," *International Alert Update*, February 1994. A

roundtable on "Advancing global coalitions for war prevention" was also held in Malta, during the IPRA Conference, 4-10 November 1994. For more information, contact International Alert, Glyn Street, London SE11 5HT, UK; fax: 44-71-793-7975. The Green Group of the European Parliament promoted an initiative that tries to coordinate NGOs working in this field with the European Community in order to create an "European Civil Peace Corps" (unarmed and nonviolent) for interventions in conflict areas. Documents on this project can be obtained from E. Gulcher, Green Group, fax: 32-2-284-9143.

16. The proposal for "Volunteers for Peace" to organize Peace Embassies has circulated in mimeographed form, and it has been also published in the journal *Guerre e Pace*, no. 15, September 1994, p. 45. For the peace activities of Quakers, see Miall, 1992, pp. 76-78; Curle, 1986. See also many voices under "Society of Friends," in Sharp, 1973.

17. See the mimeographed report of our delegation, "Prevenire la guerra nel Kossovo: relazione di un viaggio studio," Centro Gandhi, Ivrea; and the paper of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Sweden, "Prevening war in Kosovo". For general information of the situation in Kosovo, see Salvoldi and Giergji, 1994; Miall 1992, pp. 193-194. For an English translation of a selection of the documents of the "Italian Campaign for a Nonviolent Solution of the Problem of Kosovo" (on computer diskette), contact the Italian Secretariat of MIR, Italian Section of IFOR, phone/fax: 99-866-2252.

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