

2020

The Impact of Globalization as an Economic Theory on the Mass Migration of Vulnerable Populations

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The Impact of Globalization as an Economic Theory on the
Mass Migration of Vulnerable Populations

by

Amalia Luxardo

A Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Nova Southeastern University
2020

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
Amalia Luxardo
January 2020


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

Dustin Berna, Ph.D.
Chair

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Abstract

As the world becomes increasingly globalized, the question of economy, of who hinders it or allows it to blossom, has become a point of contention that has led to many acts of violence. This research utilizes globalization as an economic theory as the underlying factor that causes these violent conflicts and imminent mass movements of migration. In using this lens, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the migration of populations and their ultimate elimination. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate and draw data from major violent conflicts in different nation-states and perform a quantitative analysis that demonstrates that economics is indeed the root cause of conflict. I also seek to prove that economics is the driving force of mass-migration. The central research questions of this study are: what is the relationship between globalization and violent conflict and what is the main cause of mass migration? Here, we will be examining population, GDP, and structural balance (economic infrastructure) are the variables in correlational calculations. In using quantitative methods and nation state and its economic stability in relation to conflict and migration can be used as predictors in order to prevent or deter devastating consequences.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The question of economy, of who hinders it or allows it to blossom has been around for centuries and has been a point of contention that started many acts of violence, including war. As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short. Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last century than there ever was; and with acts of violence come large movements of people. Thus, this research analyzes and provides an assessment that concludes that globalization is an underlying factor that causes violent conflict and the imminent mass movement or eliminations of populations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background of the problem, outline vital research questions, and present the significance of the study as it relates to modern theories and conflict research.

Background

At its core, globalization is an economic phenomenon whose implications are largely bound to a state's welfare (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state's welfare, in turn is associated and affected by the flows of goods for economic advancement, largely cross-border flows that turn domestic transactions into international ones (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 285). In utilizing globalization as an economic theory, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the migration of populations. In doing so, we can begin to understand the push and pull factors of migration of mass populations and address one of the most prevalent political issues of

the 21st century; how to deal with international migration. International migration (people moving across national borders) is a global challenge that has been made prevalent in the Obama administration. In fact, if the world's migrants were in one place, they would be in the top ten most populous countries, among the likes of China, India, or Brazil (Martin and Widgren, 2002, p. 1). The presence of international migrants has raised major socioeconomic issues in both their countries of origin and destination, and the major question asked is why do so many people across national borders. In the United States, 1.1 million migrants are admitted each year (this number is not inclusive of the migrants who arrive undocumented or migrants that have overstayed their visas). This was not always the case. US immigration occurred in waves, the first of which was mostly English speakers from the British Isles that started in 1820. The Germans and Irish dominated the second wave in the 1840s through the 1850s. The third wave brought 20 million European immigrants in a 35-year period reaching through 1914, followed by a brief pause during the depression (Martin, 2013, p. 6). Immigration increased in the mid-20th century and has been admitting over 1 million every year since 1990. Considering the staggering jump in numbers in a short period of time, debates arose in relation to the education and welfare systems that are in place and have continued to cause heat in the political arena for nearly four decades. While unauthorized migration is a primary concern for public policy, it is still important to consider the implications behind all migratory movements.

As it relates to violent conflict, large migratory movements are essentially one of the consequences that occur after a major act of violence, particularly one in which the state's welfare has already deemed to be one that is unstable or lacking. Yet, there has

never been a scholarly study to explain the nexus between the two. In doing so a comprehensive pre and post war analysis will be performed in order to prove that economic infrastructures is the primary thread behind violent conflict, thus a principal factor behind mass migration.

Violent Conflict: An Overview

It has been said that since the beginning of man, conflict in any of its forms, has existed. As such, a myriad of theories has developed in order to explain the rationale behind it. Scientists have come up with psychological theories that claim man is inherently violent, and in large part because we are of the same genes as chimpanzees. Interestingly, chimpanzees have been studied for several years and under observation will go to war with each other. More modern-day theorists pose that violent conflicts occur because it is a matter of territory that they are trying to protect; although this was counter-posed with the idea that man was even in conflict 12,000 years ago, when territory was not a matter of scarcity. Regardless of what theory has been confirmed or debunked, it is clear that conflict is caused by human beings and given the growth of the modern-day state system, it is important to understand the factors behind conflict in today's world so that it can be avoided tomorrow.

Before we look at what causes violent conflict, we must have a working definition of what violent conflict is. Violent conflict is often a term that is used loosely to define an act of war or maybe an act of genocide. However, these are not mutually exclusive to violent conflict, but rather are in categories of their own right (due to their detrimental nature as it relates to death tolls and other varying factors). As per the Payson Conflict Study Group of Tulane University, violent conflict is “the use of armed force by two

parties, of which are grouped into three categories: minor armed conflicts, in which the battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1,000; intermediate conflicts, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, and in which between 25 and 1,000 deaths have occurred during a particular year; and wars, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during one particular year. The two latter categories are sometimes referred to as major armed conflicts.” Under this definition, war falls under the category of a major armed conflict.

That said, international violent conflict is the type of conflict that involves more than two nation states. These conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The first is that of structural systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition for power, alliances, and resource appropriation. The second is dyadic conflict, which involves territorial contingencies, geographic proximity, and historical grievances. The third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. This study does not examine international violent conflict per se, it is important to understand the concept of a systemic conflict, as it stems from inequality in resources. A systemic conflict is most clearly grasped in a cause and effect model in varying stages, “if X, then Y.” The first stage is if there is resource inequality, then once of the parties will undoubtedly face resource scarcity. The second stage is if there is resource scarcity, then alliances will begin to form in order to retain those resources from the opposing party. The third stage is if there are alliances that form, then there will be an overlap of opposing parties (i.e., if A and B are having a conflict, and C joins A, then B and C have a conflict). The fourth stage notes that if there is an overlap in opposing parties, then there will be a change in the balance of power, and once this occurs the systemic conflict is at hand.

The former Yugoslavia is a perfect example of this. One of the primary arguments that have been presented to cause the fall of Yugoslavia is that of ethnic hatred; and while that is an important catalyst of the problem, the economic argument needs to be further explored. A major point of contention was the high unemployment rate (impart due to a myriad of factors that will be examined in more detail later this study). In applying this aspect in the model of systemic conflict, one can deduce that the resource of employment was scarce; therefore, opposing parties (both political and otherwise) saw the opportunity to form alliances and change the balance of power. This imbalance of power, thus, led to the dissolution of what we now know as Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Yarashevich and Karneyeva, 2003, p. 3).

Statement of the Problem

In a world that has become increasingly globalized, the fear of losing resources and the opportunity to gain financial power has become greater; particularly with countries that are competing in the same geographic region. The question of nationalistic survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and those who have more, will ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to scratch the surface where globalization and violent conflict come together. In fact, more the more recent analyses of violent conflict are often indicated to stem from terrorism or acts of terror, when in fact not all acts of violence are necessarily related to politics.

There is an undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance of a nation to its resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Thus, it is critical to conduct a thorough historical analysis of a nation's economic infrastructure as it relates to its stability and time of peace. Indeed, serious violent conflict has been

detrimental to humanity, as it has led to the movements of large populations. As such, it is vital to understand the causes behind violent conflict in order to foresee and deter the possibility of mass movements that have had intrastate impacts.

Purpose and Goals of Study

While globalization is considered a modern theory in international relations, its essence has been present since the beginning of man. In other words, when man is suffering economically there will be a point in which man must find a solution in order to overcome their economic dilemma, and should there be something or someone in the way of that, man will find any means by which to eliminate the impediment. In order to demonstrate that conflict increases when a country's economic welfare is impacted, I utilize data that will provide concrete deductions where poor economic infrastructures inevitably lead to conflict in any nation. With this paradigm, I outline the related theoretical and conceptual frameworks that support the notion that conflict, and economy are perpetually connected. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate and draw data from major violent conflicts in different nations and perform a quantitative analysis to demonstrate that economic is inherently the root cause of conflict. In doing so, I exhibit real data that it is economics is also the driving force behind mass migration. Here there are two independent variables, conflict and a nation's economy and one dependent variable, the population index. In using quantitative methods, a nation's economic stability in relation to conflict and migration is quantified, which, in turn, can be used as predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future.

In examining academic work, much of the studies that have been done are related to the political aims that violent conflict stems from, as opposed to taking it from an

economic perspective. For instance, let us consider the case of Colombia. Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world (Ibanez and Velez, 2008, p. 2); and this displacement is largely due to internal violent conflict. While the writers note that armed groups deliberately targeted civilian populations in order to migrate, it is not clearly evidenced as to why it was the case. This further explains the need to perform this study in order to bridge gaps.

More specifically, the goals of this study are:

- To engage in a historical study of the economics in nations that have been affected by violent conflict, which include Rwanda, Colombia, [former] Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany, and Cambodia
- To highlight and provide concrete data that economic breakdown and violent conflict are indeed related
- To debunk the argument that violent conflict is politically fueled
- To explore new territories of conflict prevention
- To explain the relationship between violent conflict and mass migration
- To develop a quantitative tool which can be utilized in practice by conflict resolutionists

Considering the lack of scholarship on this subject, this study involves exploring the economic state of several countries pre and post violent conflict. In doing so, it will provide a context that explains the phenomenon that we are largely faced with today – international migration. This historical examination provides numerical patterns that allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it does, what are the conditions in which it can be deterred or prevented, should the outcomes be of serious detriment.

Significance of Study

The lack of accountability of a nation's economic infrastructure is the driving force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that economics does not have an impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will continue to push large populations into foreign countries, further fueling political administrations to take a stand on more restrictive immigration policies as opposed to providing aid in a person's darkest hour. It is difficult to imagine that thousands of migrants have a burning desire to move to a foreign country to which they have no ties with, along with their families, only to start from the beginning. It is even more difficult to believe that the nation that "welcomes" these migrants does so without rejection or criticism from the citizens within, that they themselves have fears of economic stability.

While there is literature on economics pulling migrants towards a nation that would be economically wealthier, there are virtually no studies that demonstrate that economics pushes migrants. The only real hypotheses that have been studied are those involving violent conflict and political uprisings causing a migrant to "voluntarily" move from one country to the next. Therefore, this study is an attempt to bridge that gap and demonstrate the nexus between economics and movements of populations.

Theoretically, the foundation of this study is based on a more modern approach to international relations. I did not develop a new theory; however, I did examine current theories with a critical eye to redirect the root of the problem, which would contribute a working tool in the field of conflict resolution. The ever-changing dynamics of our world has been increasingly difficult to follow; therefore, academia has lost its footing on patterns and trends that could potentially change the realm of international relations.

In that respect, I employed an analysis to determine the conditions that would lead to violent conflict. By using data pre and post violent conflict along with modern theoretical framework, the study will explain the pivotal breaking point that drove that nation to violent conflict and what can be done to prevent not only the conflict, but also mass migration.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The central research question that this study is aimed to answer is, what is the relationship between globalization and violent conflict? One of the most dominant findings in literature is that economic conditions, such as low income, slow growth, and severe economic downturn are the drivers that are directly related to the outbreak of violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). In fact, empirical studies have found that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict (*Ibid*, p. 32).

The study also examines what roles resources play in the power of a nation. The power of a nation state is what allows it to define itself in the international realm. These days, while the more dominant powers are prone to have a pseudo big brother keeping checks and balances, they are also more likely to have more leverage in dealings related to foreign policy and international trade. The power of a state that be separated into three categories. The first is that of resources or capabilities, which are frequently material and include (but are not exclusive to) agriculture, technology, energy, and environmental resources (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. ix). The second is how that power is converted through national processes, and the third I which state prevails within specific scenarios (*Id.*). Here, the category of resources and capabilities and its relation to power is what is

most important. In assessing world powers, Strategic Assessment Groups used metrics in gross domestic product, which was then summed as a percentage of a total world power. In doing so, it demonstrated that the US holds about 20% of global power, the highest percentage among 164 countries (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. 3). The assessment also examined the most likely locations for future conflict and Asia was noted as the most dangerous region, and not coincidentally with six (of eight) conflict prone situations involving China, which holds the second highest percentage of 14 (*Id.*). This asserts that power begets power, and for a nation such as China to gain more strength, it must flex its muscles and often clash with conflict amongst its neighbors.

Finally, this study takes an in depth look at the global implications of continuous violent conflict, as it relates to large migratory movements of populations. Since the 1990's there has been a substantial increase in the number of intrastate violent conflict around the world. In fact, in the last two decades there have been more than 125 violent conflicts resulting in 7 million deaths (Smith, 2013). As it relates to globalization, economic shocks caused by violent conflict can be dangerous because their impacts can be long-lived, particularly in developing countries (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). Continuous violent conflict may transform itself into a regenerating cycle, which destroys the physical, social, and human capital (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). Studies have shown that once there has been a conflict (either inter or intrastate) the probability of it reoccurring is high (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). This means that those nation-states will be in a constant state of social, political, and economic vulnerability. Thus, violent conflict is a major threat to human development. If a country has low levels of human development it "has more difficulty in improving institutions, and in increasing

productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of conflict, potentially trapping a country in a loop.” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). As a country becomes more and more defined by its reoccurring cycle of conflict, its citizens begin to realize that it is no longer a place in which they can thrive as human beings; thus giving them the opportunity, or rather reason, to move elsewhere and seek economic stability and growth there. Therefore, the overarching hypothesis examined here is: if there is a causal link between economics and violent conflict, then we can make assessments on the emigration and immigration of international populations. More specifically, if violent conflict is economically driven, then we can conclude that mass migration is inevitable.

Philosophical Assumptions

In its most classic of forms, international relations as a theory has focused on the analysis of cause and effect between war and peace. (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 2). More contemporary scholars pose several other questions outside of that analysis, including what are the limits and possibilities in tackling urgent world problems? Urgency, of course, is subjective, and among those urgent problems are economic crisis, violent conflict, and migration. While policymakers can describe the urgent situation that they are in, their question often is ‘how did we get here?’ And, in explaining it, they are thrown into the realm of theory (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3). “Theories offer accounts of why things happened (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3),” in this research social theory and Marxism is offered as theoretical perspectives as to the cause and effect between economy and violent conflict. In addition, globalization, which is under the umbrella of international relations, is the theoretical foundation that dictates the

importance of a stable economy in a nation state. Finally, social movement theories (as it relates to the escalation of violent conflict) is briefly examined as theoretical perspectives behind human conduct.

Violent conflict, even in the most historical sense has never been an expression of inherent aggression, but rather serves as a tool of social destruction and economic construction. It is used as an attempt to settle disputes over power, money, and resources with violent means (Stewart, 2002, p. 345). This attempt is used so frequently that “8 out of 10 of the world’s poorest countries are suffering or have recently suffered from large scale violent conflict” (Stewart, 2002, p. 342). Economic factors which predispose countries to war are separated into four categories: group motivation, private motivation, failure of the social contract, and environmental degradation. The hypothesis of group motivation stems from the groups that are deprived (relative to their geographic location) and seek economic equality; and where politically it is not possible, a violent course of action often follows (Stewart, 2002, p. 323). The hypothesis of private motivation is when the possibility of enrichment through violent conflict lures those who are uneducated and unemployment to follow. This often leads to an enduring conflict if the recruitment is substantial. The failure of social contract stems from the proverbial contract between the state and its people, whereas the state delivers reasonable economic conditions so that the people accept its authority. When there is economic decline, the power of the contract (and the state) weakens, giving the people a purpose to react. Finally, as it relates to environmental degradation, the scarcity of resources is notorious for provoking conflict in that people will fight to protect their security of having food and water for their families (Stewart, 2002, p. 323).

While violent conflict has been widely recognized as a matter of international concern for a number of years, it was not until around 15 years ago that migration was recognized as an important phenomenon in international relations, and more recently capturing attention as it relates to violent conflict, and not just as a by-product (Mitchell, 2011, p. 125). In revisiting the categories of economic factors predisposing countries to war, migration may be a strategic economic response. For instance, in the case of linking conflict to the scarcity of resources, (forced) migration of populations would be necessary in order to secure a reasonable volume of resources for the state. This, in turn, is linked with the failure of the social contract, in which the state did not deliver reasonable economic conditions for every citizen, thus weakening the state and provoking violent conflict. In provoking the violent conflict, the hypotheses of group and private motivation emerge in that groups begin to feel the deprivation and in turn seek personal enrichment through the participation of violent conflict. Migration and violent conflict, therefore, have an undeniable cyclical relationship that scholars have only begun to examine.

The first assumption is that this study largely utilized archival data based on previously examined violent conflicts that were prominent over the last century. This analysis relies heavily on literature published by other authors; thus, the data comes from secondary sources. Scholars that have written on these matters are both native and non-natives of the countries that are presented as case studies; therefore, while some information was skewed, the data extracted was numerical in nature and was objective and neutral.

It is also important to consider the assumption that globalization, as a theory is not one with one definition. Therefore, if one were to study globalization, it would not

necessarily capture the economic piece that will be presented in this study. This study only examines the economic piece of globalization as a theory and does not take into consideration its other well-known components such as communications. To that end, the assumption here is that while globalization is not limited to its economic drivers, it is only those drivers that have the direct impact on violent conflict and mass migration.

Limitations

One of the limitations of the study is the lack of primary sources that would support my theory in bridging the gap between globalization, violent conflict, and mass migration of vulnerable populations. I believe that this is largely because the idea of placing vulnerable populations (i.e., refugees) in the same category as an economic migrant would de-bunk the idea of a refugee as an immigration status and cause the major breakdown of the UNHCR – who was in fact formed to protect refugees (and rightly). It is critical to emphasize that while my purpose here is not, in any way, to diminish the circumstances by which the immigrants arrived and remained in their country of resettlement, it sheds light to a more pure meaning of what cause their movement in the first place.

Another limitation of the study is that a large part of the data is extracted from historical events. That is, I used economic figures of a country pre and post violent conflict, which would render more recent events moot, as the data would not be available. My intention here was to collect data from countries that have suffered violent conflict from different regions of the world. In doing so I believe this approach can be treated as a global phenomenon whose projections can be applied at an international level and used as a preventative tool of measurement. The approach to this study will undoubtedly be met

with criticism, but the hope is to provide hard information that can be utilized in conjunction with contemporary theories of international relations.

The delimitations contained within this research helped in condensing what could have been an exhaustive study in terms of analyzing any and all countries that have experienced an act of violent conflict. In terms of what countries were presented as case studies, I attempted to capture a large framework using a limited number of case studies. In doing so, I performed an in-depth quantitative analysis that would also be supported by the literature that is published on those case studies. That said, I have not limited myself to a specific region of the world, but rather used case studies from all areas so that generalizations would be avoided.

In terms of theoretical perspectives, I used scholarship from theories whose orientations were pre-globalization and those that have been developed in more recent years. The reason behind this is to demonstrate that the theme of economics being a driving force behind [violent] conflict has existed since the beginning of man. In paying close attention to the language in the varying theories, one begins to see a pattern that the overall survival of man depends on his economic well-being.

Structure of the Dissertation

The structure of my dissertation has been established in order to provide a thorough understanding of globalization as the phenomenon behind mass migration of vulnerable populations. In Chapter One, I present the background on globalization and international migration, with a small piece on violent conflict, the scope and significance of the problem, and the purpose of the study and research questions. Chapter One also

includes definitions that would clarify open questions, in addition to assumptions, limitations, and delimitations.

Chapter Two provides a literature review, which includes major theoretical perspectives used as the foundation for my premise. This involves an in-depth examination of international relations theory and social theory. Theories that stem from these that are also included in the literature review are those of globalization and Marxism. Relative Deprivation as a social movement theory will also be examined as it relates to the escalation of violent conflict. In addition, Chapter Two provides a literature of the conceptual framework of the study namely that of globalization and violent conflict. Finally, Chapter Two provides an overview of the case studies that will be utilized as a basis for the analysis.

Chapter Three includes the methodology and philosophical paradigm used to examine the nexus between globalization and the mass migration of vulnerable populations. It also provides the empirical analysis to highlight the relationship between the variables and establish concrete measures that would facilitate projections.

Chapter Four lays the groundwork for this research by way of presenting case studies for five different countries that over the last century have endured violent conflict. These overviews include the economic transformations that transpired post conflict, the state of affairs in which these nations were left in, and what it all means for the future of our global impact.

Finally, Chapter Five provides some of my concluding thoughts and implication for the future.

Definitions

Globalization

Globalization is frequently confused with internationalization, but they are two different animals. Internationalization “refers to the increasing importance of international trade, international relations, treaties, alliances, etc....among nations” (Daly, 2004, p. 41). Globalization is a theory within international relations that can be applied socially and economically, both of which involve an integration of many to form one. Economic globalization is comprised of two components; the first is that of flows of trade and the second is that of policy restrictions of the trade measured by tariffs and capital controls (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 5). For the purposes of this study I will largely focus on the former, which would essentially represent the outcome of the economic game (*Ibid*) -- in this case large population movement. Hashimov describes economic globalization as “the increasing interdependence among economies...with the effect of expanding international trade of goods and services...” (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 2). In other words, economic globalization implies the free movements of goods, services, and capital in the global economy (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 2). What we must consider here is that not all nation-states can provide (or purchase) goods and services at the same economic level. Therefore, if economic globalization means the increasing interdependence, then relationships among different nation-states can be highly skewed.

Socio-Economic Status

Often utilized to uncover social inequities as it relates to resources, privileges or control, socio-economic status is the social standing of an individual or group in relation to others based on income, education, and occupation.

Migrants

Migrants are people who move from one place to another; not to be confused with immigrants who are people who leave their home country to permanently reside in another. Based on definition alone, both migrants and immigrants considered to be people who move voluntarily.

Economic Migrant

Economic Migrants are those who travel from their home country to another in order to improve their socio-economic status.

Refugee

Someone who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion, is outside his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (1951 Refugee Convention).

Asylee

An alien in a foreign port of entry who is found unable or unwilling to return to their home country, or to seek the protection of that country because of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Unlike refugees, asylees must seek approval to remain in the country in which they are seeking asylum.

Push/Pull Factors

Economic, social, and physical motives behind why people migrate or emigrate.

Violent Conflict

The use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active conflict uses arms against the other party. However, it is important to note that the use of arms does not necessarily result in death.

Arms

Anything material other than corporal strength – this can include weapons of mass destruction, firearms, or even sticks and stones (www.pcr.uu.se, 2016).

Armed Conflict

- A. Conflict between two or more parties, but usually between the state and an anti-state group or groups using weapons on a sustained basis (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
- B. Combat between forces that both possess weapons. Hostilities of a kind, which breach or threaten to breach, international peace and security, such as invasions, interventions, border clashes and incursions, and civil strife with some external dimension. Most commonly, this dimension would involve either support from external patrons, or the threat of spillover effects in neighboring countries from refugee flows and the like (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Balance of Power

Conflict management method in international relations counter-balancing the hegemonic tendencies of any single power by an alliance or realignment among other states. A balance of an interstate power system is generally considered stable if no single state achieves a dominant position, the independence of the great powers is assured, and major wars are avoided (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Basic Needs

Minimum requirements of a community for a decent standard of life: adequate food, shelter, and clothing plus some household equipment and furniture. They also include essential services provided by and for the community-at-large such as safe drinking water, sanitation, health and education facilities, protection against human rights violations and gainful employment (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Conflict

Conflict is commonly defined as two or more parties that have or perceive incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16).

- A. The struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the groups or individuals involved are to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).
- B. Two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may be individuals, small or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in many ways, such as over access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); control of power and participation in political

decision making; identity, (cultural, social and political communities); status; or values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Dynamic Variables

Short-term, often sudden, political, economic, or other developments or perceptions that impact a country's stability. These variables must be traced to assess whether a country is moving toward or away from violent conflict (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Economic Infrastructure

The underlying amount of physical and financial capital embodied in roads, railways, waterways, airways, and other forms of transportation and communication plus water supplies, financial institutions, electricity, and public services such as health and education. The level of infrastructural development in a country is a crucial factor determining the pace and diversity of economic development (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Nation

A large group of people bound together by common tradition and culture and usually language. Sometimes used synonymously with state, but this can be misleading, since one state may contain many nations. For example, Great Britain is a state, but contains the English, Scottish, Welsh, and part of the Irish nations (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Nation-state

A. Usually used to describe the modern state, but strictly speaking applies only

when the whole population of a state feels itself to belong to the same nation. This is certainly more the case now than it was in the nineteenth century and earlier, when large empires, such as Austria-Hungary, were states but contained many nations. But many states today still contain many nations (partly because of the arbitrary way that the borders of states were redrawn after both World Wars, and by the colonial powers as they withdrew from Asia and Africa), and with the rise of nationalism that has followed the fall of communism, this has been one of the main reasons for instability in states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

- B. The definition of the nation-state is really a combination of the nation and the state. It is a special form of state with people seeing themselves as belonging to a nation. This state has the legal right to enforce its power in a defined piece of territory with the aim of uniting the people through a shared or common culture (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Revolution

Forcible, pervasive, and often violent change of a social, political, or economic order. Revolution is the most extreme political option of a dissenting group, a course taken generally when more moderate attempts to achieve reform have failed. A revolution is distinguished from a coup d'état, which is a sudden seizure of state power by a small faction that does not necessarily change the social system, and a revolt or rebellion, which may be either a failed attempt at revolution or a violent expression of grievances (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The complexity of violent conflict and the rationale behind its occurrence deserves a comprehensive analysis, which will provide objective data to scholars. As such, it is important to understand that one of the primary driving forces of violent conflict is that of economics. Current literature provides brief explanations as to why economics and violent conflict are connected, further blurring things by simply stating the interplay between economics and conflict is complex and providing no substantial rationale behind this logic.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in depth look at theoretical perspectives that lay the foundation to this study; in addition, it provides a general understanding of violent conflict and a synopsis of the countries from which the data will be extracted. In order to develop a thorough understanding of the relationship between globalization as an economic theory and violent conflict, my primary focus will be to examine violent conflict through an economic lens. In doing so, I will be able to explain the dynamics of violent conflict and its outcomes as it relates to large population movements. Using the historical data of countries pre and post violent conflict, I will provide the groundwork that will allow scholars in the field of conflict resolution to really understand how much of an impact economics truly has on violent conflict. Furthermore, it will provide, by design, an assessment of international migration that has previously not been developed. As a result, the literature review in this chapter provide a comprehensive assessment of theories that relate to economics and human conduct and

will be used to set up the general framework of the explanation between globalization, violent conflict, and its consequences.

A Brief Explanation of International Migration

The history of migration begins with mankind, where colonization and expansion depended on migration (Koser, 2007, p. 2). In more recent history, international migration is what allowed for economic growth in “new worlds” that needed cheap and expedited labor. And, while migration did not carry the stigma that it does today, it continues to rise every year – more than doubling in the last 25 years (Koser, 2007, p. 5). There is a myriad of perspectives on the notion of international migration. More specifically, it has been widely seen that the consensus falls under two categories; one of which supports free movement of people with programs that would assist migrants with the full integration of their new home country. The other one that would place heavy restrictions on the movement of people and would go out of their way to extradite migrants who have been settled for several decades but have no legal documents that would permit them to stay. Considering this, the scholarly work that is readily available is largely based on those notions (either for or against) and is often times accompanied with push-pull factors that do not really address movements of mass populations. For instance, Martin and Widgren argue that international migration is a decision that is carefully considered and the factors that encourage a migrant to move are grouped into three categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors (Martin and Widgren, 2002, p. 8). In further explaining these categories they use examples that would classify all migrants in what we know now as economic migrants, leaving migrants with no economic motivation (noneconomic) out of the equation. Therefore, the general public

concludes that all migrants must be economic migrants, which is not the case, and therein lays the belly of the problem.

There are three main categories of international migrants. The first is that of forced migrants, which are usually described as refugees, but are not exclusive of that. Forced migrants are those who are forced to leave their own country due to conflict, persecutions, or environmental reasons such as draught or famine (Koser, 2007, p. 16). The second category of international migrant is a voluntary migrant, which are what people often identify as economic migrants as described above. The most common type of voluntary migrants are the spouses and children of those individuals who were able to obtain work and will be joining them abroad through the process of family reunification. As of 2007, 190 million migrants were voluntary. The final category, and most controversial, is that of irregular migrants. Irregular (undocumented) migrants are those who enter a country without documents or with forged documents, or those who enter a country with documents and overstay their visa or permit (Koser, 2007, p. 17).

Irregular migration is often depicted as one of the threats to state sovereignty, where a state has the right to control their borders and allowing irregular migration to occur undermines the control of the state that is trying to assert their sovereignty. In the United States irregular migration has also been perceived as a threat to national security. This suggests that migration is a channel for terrorists to enter; and while there have been more recent cases of this seen in national news, the actual rate of occurrence is extremely low. Another widespread sentiment related to irregular migration is the fear of job security. Following the mindset that large corporations would rather pay unskilled workers less money to produce more work than pay a skilled worker a substantial salary

for the same result. While the more prevalent topic that involves migration are those individuals who fall under the category of irregular migrants, it is imperative to understand that the number of legal migrants far exceeds the number of irregular migrants both within and outside the United States.

However, the types of migrants that exist are not as distinct as their categories. For instance, a migrant can legally enter a country on a work visa, overstay, and suddenly become an irregular migrant. On the same token, an individual can return to their home country, a war has occurred, and then they become an involuntary or forced migrant. Regardless of the migrant category that an individual fall under, it is critical to remember that the lives of these individuals are no less important than ours.

Controlling Immigration

As it has been previously noted, international migration has been around for an extensive period, and largely due to the need and demand of labor in advanced economies or economies that are attempting to catch up to the superpowers of today's world. And, while there is a consistent need for affordable labor, governments continue to impose restrictive limits on immigration that have been difficult to enforce.

One of the reasons why this is happening is because foreign workers have been embedded in the structure of some nations for decades (Cornelius, et. al., 2004, p. 9). This means that the economic structure of those nations is dependent on those immigrants, not only because of they provide a work force, but also because their families (in turn) give back to the local economy simply by residing there (paying rent, purchasing essentials for the family, etc.). If a government were to impose laws that would uproot these families back to their "home countries" (which in some cases is no

longer existent if their families have resided in that foreign country for several generations), they would essentially be uprooting millions of dollars and forcing thousands of people to become part of a society that is foreign to them. For example, in the United States our current presidential administration has come to the realization that the immigration system is not only broken, but a detriment to our national growth.

In response an immigration reform was previously formulated to streamline the system. In order to ensure the reform is successful, it has been largely based on four legislative pillars: (1) creating a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants already residing in the United States; (2) reforming the immigration system so that will build the American economy; (3) creating an effective employment verification system; and (4) established an improved system for accepting future workers (www.whitehouse.gov, 2016). Creating a path to citizenship does not automatically mean that every one of the 11 million undocumented individuals will be eligible for US citizenship. Individuals must be able to pass a criminal background check, must come current with their tax payments, and will have to pay the fees associated with their application prior to going through the process of naturalization.

Another reason that governments have been finding it difficult to implement measures of restrictive immigration are due in part to the international pressures that advocate for human rights. While there is not an international convention that would protect the rights of a migrant (whether legal or irregular), there are organizations that argue that all individuals have the freedom of movement and are free to leave any country as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The departure from one country to another does have its complications; but nonetheless, it is a factor that is

contributing to the difficulty that has become of implementing measures to control immigration.

Finally, and likely the most controversial of why policies are difficult to enforce is that of the actual policies' ambiguity (Corneluis, et. al., 2004, p. 14). In other words, the declarations of the immigration policies are not always what they intend. This is usually because societies have the tendency to turn the other way, particularly when they are beneficiaries to what they are turning away from. For instance, in the states that border Mexico, there are several local businesses that are willing to pay cash to a migrant worker as opposed to paying minimum wage to a person that is authorized to work in the United States.

Conflict: An Expanded Overview

Generally speaking the structure of conflict can be divided into three components: (1) conflict situation (which is the actual conflict); (2) conflict behavior (the way that the opposing parties act and react to the conflict): and (3) conflict attitudes and perceptions (those attitudes, emotions, and perceptions that arise from a conflict situation) (Mitchell, 1981, 26). As defined in Chapter One, conflict is commonly defined as two or more parties that have or perceive incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16). It involves two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may be individuals, small or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in many ways, such as over access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); control of power and participation in political decision-making; identity, (cultural, social and

political communities); status; or values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).

Understanding the Phases of Conflict

Scholars believe that the foundation for conflict in general lies in the relationship between the opposing parties. While this may be true as an overall assumption, for the purposes of this study it would be the inequalities in [economic] resources that cause friction between the adversaries (Young, 2010, p. 400). With, violent conflict is generally not one that occurs from one day to the next. Rather it is the type of conflict that usually stems from a series of economic inequalities that have developed over an extended period. Often when violent conflict erupts, the international community appears to be in astonished, as if they were unaware of the internal turmoil that the nation(s) were facing.

Considering this, it is crucial to understand the phases of conflict because it has been understood that conflicts move through theses phases and eventually form a recurrent outcome. This provides for a framework, which allows for an in-depth analysis and possibly determines the juncture in which conflict transforms into a violent and largely catastrophic event (Young, 2010, p. 400).

1. *Emergence*: In this phase, there is the initial overt manifestation of the conflict. Essentially this is where the ‘argument’ would begin but violent acts are not taking place at this point.
2. *Escalation*: Young writes that conflict at this phase begin to grow in two dimensions. The first is that of scope, where conflict increase is indicated by the growing number of parties (whether in groups or as individuals) who

engage in the conflict. The second dimension is that of intensity, which is commonly indicated by the growing violence.

There is a de-facto transitional phase that occurs between escalation and de-escalation that generally results from a change from one (or more) of the parties in the conflict; or in the case of [international] violent conflict, when external parties begin to intervene as the death tolls rise.

3. *De-Escalation*: When the scope and intensity of the conflict subside, the conflict enters the phase of de-escalation. De-escalation is not necessarily a joint movement by the adversaries but is often the case for violent conflict, particularly because the adversaries are multiple individuals that have to undergo serious crisis management when the resulting deaths are catastrophic.
4. *Termination*: The termination phase, like conflict itself, is a process and likely the most time consuming of all phases in conflict. In most conflicts, the adversaries decrease their demands or alter their expectations so that they meet at a middle ground in order to settle their differences, at least temporarily. In some extreme cases where violent conflict is concerned, the termination phase can occur when one of the adversaries is no longer present to engage in conflict with.
5. *Post-Termination*: Scholars have varying opinions as to whether conflicts ever fully resolve, or the parties involved simply negotiate terms until the next disruption occurs (only to bring in the issues of the previous conflict). However, large scale conflicts often transform to smaller scale conflicts that

continue in a non-destructive manner and involve a third party that participate in mediation and peace-building efforts.

It is important to note that these phases are not limited to time and space. In other words, different conflicts can and will spend varying times within each phase, and sometimes will move forward in one phase only to return to the previous phase sometime later. Due to the erratic nature of violent conflict it would be difficult to discern how long a conflict would remain in a stage. Therefore, it would be almost impossible to quantify when a violent conflict would move on to the next phase (i.e., from escalation to de-escalation) in order to assist and possibly alleviate the countries that have been through a violent conflict. However, this study will demonstrate that the juncture in which a conflict transforms itself into a violent conflict is indeed quantifiable through the analysis of the factors that contribute to the development of such conflict.

The phases of conflict are best examined through the lens of the violent conflict that occurred in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Where violent conflict moves from one phase to another, but not necessarily in a particular order. To provide some context, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (which will be further discussed in Chapter Four) was said to be carried out primarily by the Rwandan elite who were vastly richer and better established than the masses, was a conscious effort to keep people in order and keep themselves in power (Rayner, 1999, p. 8). After the death of an estimated one million people (at the astounding rate of 5 lives per minute), the Congolese military saw good reason to fight back when the Rwandan army entered.

In the case of the war between Congo and Rwanda, it would appear as though the emergence phase of conflict was virtually non-existent, as the Rwandan army invaded

Congo to destroy Hutu refugee camps in 1996, which continued for a period of two years. During this time the conflict escalated, and the Congolese military fought back (escalation); primarily for two reasons. The first was to protect the Tutsi group from discrimination and violence, and the second was to prevent genocide from happening within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33). While the Rwandan forces were present, they also controlled the major provinces in Kivu, which had extensive mineral and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998 The Rwandan forces were asked to leave, to which they complied (de-escalation), but then returned for a second time (escalation), and grew to what is known as the Great War of Africa, which involved Congolese forces supported by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe against the soldiers of Rwanda and Uganda (www.enoughproject.org, 2011). After four years, the invading troops ultimately pulled out (de-escalation) and peace deals soon followed (termination). As of 2006, Congo has seen a successful democratic transition (post-termination), and the Kivu province has been economically integrated into Rwanda, accounting for 50% of their GDP (Cohen, Herman J. 1999, p. 34).

International Conflict

International conflict is the type of conflict that involves more than two nation states and can include violence, usually unfolding due to a crisis with identity. These conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The first is that of structural systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition for power, alliance (how it affects balance of power), and resource appropriation. A systemic war is described in stages by an “if X, then Y” model. The first stage notes that when there is multipolarity, then there will be resource inequality because as resource scarcity increases in a

multipolar setting, then inequality in resource distribution increases. The second stage states that where there is resource inequality, then alliances will form because as inequality in resource distribution increase, then less-favored actors seek stronger allies to attain resources. The third stage notes that once there is alliance formation, there is an overlap in conflict structures, which means that in forming alliances each nation-state assumes both the good and the bad of the other state. For example, if nation-states A and B unite and B has a conflict with C, then A will have a conflict with C. The fourth stage says that once there is an overlap in conflict structures, then there will be an inevitable change in the balance of power. Once the conflict reaches this stage, it becomes the point of no return. The fifth and final stage of this model is that once that change in balance of power occurs it will result on systemic war. Systemic wars are few and far between, as they usually involve a high number of deaths and last for an extended period in light of the fact that it is multipolarity.

One of the most notable examples of systemic war is World War II (of which Nazi Germany will be further examined later in Chapter Five). Here, the first stage really occurred pre-World War II, after the Treaty of Versailles was signed to end the state war between Germany and the Allied Powers. Due to its financially punitive provisions Italy and Germany fell by the wayside, creating their notion of resource inequality. The second stage of systemic war in relation to alliance building occurred early in the mid 1930's, when the Rome-Berlin axis was formed, followed by a pact signed by Japan and Germany (Dickson, 2008, p. 38). The United States issued warnings as the war entered its third stage and conflict structures began to overlap. In 1938 Germany announces that it is no longer bound by the Treaty of Versailles and proceeds to sign a pact with the Soviet

Union (Dickson, 2008, 41). Soon after, Great Britain and Poland sign a treaty of mutual assistance and are later allied with France, China, and the United States (Dickson, 2008, p. 43). As we are all well aware, several outbreaks of war throughout Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean follow for several years after, which encapsulated the fourth stage of systemic war and inevitably bled into the fifth stage where there were surges of shifting powers across the globe.

The second is dyadic conflict, which involves territorial contingencies, geographic proximity, and historical grievances. Dyadic conflict is directly correlated with democracy and democratization. It is important to note the following premises; (a) democracy is different from democratization, as democracy is something that is actualized and democratization is a process that has the potential to be actualized (in fact most nations only want democratization and not full blown democracy of their state), (b) democracies do not wage war against each other, and because of this the idea of spreading democracy emerged, and (c) democratization is a principle source of ethno-political conflict. Because of the nature of democratization, which is to take over a nation state and implement regulations that may not be sought after, there are several conditions that should be avoided. The first is that of identifying the regime with a specific ethnic group, this is because the entire population will then turn against that ethnic group during democratization resulting in the failure of the democracy process. The second is to avoid any reference to historical grievances, because that would only add fuel to the fire and skew the public's perspective. References to historical grievances can develop a precondition for ethnic strife and it would serve to ignite tensions between groups and because intrastate instability based on grievances that are not easily resolved. The third is

to avoid any manipulation of ethnic mix. The fourth is to avoid conflating democracy with liberal democracy as liberal democracy is usually not the intended goal.

Since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have been active in 150 locations, many of which are dyadic conflicts (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008, p. 697). One dyadic conflict that will be discussed in Chapter Six is that of the Colombian government and its struggle with FARC (Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia). It is claimed that Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, largely due to internal violent conflict over a ten-year period (Ibanez, A.M. and Velez, C. E. 2008, p. 2). As with dyadic conflict, it can be deduced that the conflict in Colombia was highly influenced by territorial grievances. High populations were forced to migrate in light of the need for land in order to produce, among other things, illegal drugs, that would be a primary financial stream for the Colombian elite for several decades, and in some instances in present day.

The third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. The root cause of international conflict, as mentioned previously, is usually identity as it relates to ethnicity. It is the collective cultural identity of the ethnic community. There are six elements of collective identity that should be noted: (1) the notion of identity is not using biological or genetic means, (2) collective identity is not static or a fixed state of affairs, it refers to stories passed from generation to generation, (3) language is a key identifier in distinguishing groups, (4) territorial attachments and descendants from common land or region play heavily in international war, (5) ethnic community exists through the recognition of communal actions that are usually contingent on literacy, transportation, and communication, and (6) religion is a vital factor in group identification.

Elite generated conflict is said to be concentrated within the military regime itself, rather than between the masses and rulers. In particular it can be expected that, for elites that have a monopoly on power and resources in countries with low government constraints, non-institutional means of asserting control and authority (such as violent conflict) will be utilized (Carment and James, 1997, p. 202). Again, to put this type of conflict in less abstract terms the genocide in Rwanda is a prime example of elite-generated conflict. Whereas the Belgian Troops (the elite in this case) took full advantage of their power and manipulated the Hutus to believe that they were different than the Tutsis in order to main their control over the mineral resources. The most compelling factor of this conflict is that both the Hutus and Tutsis met most, if not all, of the factors that would classify both tribes as a collective identity, and a foreign nation was able to make them believe otherwise.

Violent Conflict

As with conflict, violent conflict is the struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the goal of one party is to neutralize injure or eliminate the opposing party. What makes violent conflict its own category, is that it involves the use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active conflict uses arms against the other party. The use of arms is generally known as the use of anything material that is not corporal force (such as guns, nuclear weapons, or even sticks). While we generally associate the use of arms as resulting in deaths, it is not necessarily the end of its means.

On Religion and Conflict

In the last several decades more and more acts of violent conflict have been said to be done in the name of God, and yet religion never really played a dominant role in violent conflict, and when it did, literature and teachings set out to restrain it. For instance, Islamic traditions mandated for good treatment of prisoners and forbade looting and the killing of children (Pearse, 2007, p. 121); the church's Christian Knighthood warriors were supposed to respect their enemy, defend the weak, honor women, refuse harm to noncombatants, and ensure that even when killing was necessary it was civilized (Pearse, 2007, p. 122-123); and Orthodox monarchs recognized that making war on co-religionists was a sin, thus deterring them from doing so (Pearse, 2007, p. 121). The question is, when did religion become the fundamental premise for violent conflict?

If violent conflict has existed since the beginning of man, it can be said that it all began when Cain murdered Abel outside the gates of Eden. This was the first incident of the fall of humanity and the consequent estrangement from the presence of God (Pearse, 2007, p. 111). What is implicated further in this account is that violent conflict flowed from the first appearance of property (i.e., resources that one party had and the other saw an inequality). This only leads us to understand that religion is not a primary driver of violent conflict, but rather intermingles with a party's justification to be involved in such acts so that others may follow in their footsteps with a sense of morality.

Genocide

Lemkin's definition of genocide is the destruction of a nation or ethnic group. Genocide, according to Lemkin, does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation except when accomplishing mass killings of all members of a nation. It is

intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.

One of the most notorious occurrences of genocide is that of the Holocaust, led by Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. “The Holocaust was the systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators” (www.ushmm.org, 2016). During the era of Holocaust, Nazi authorities also targeted groups due to their perceived “racial inferiority” including, gypsies, the disabled, Poles and Russians; and other groups based on political and ideological grounds including communists, socialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals (www.ushmm.org, 2016). Hitler wrote that he wanted a government for the people, and he was merely an instrument that would help Germany get there. The primary goal of Hitler was to destroy Germany as a nation by way of destroying specific ethnic groups that he found intrusive, and then rising as a global leader with unconfined measures of control.

Explaining genocide in terms of why perpetrators begin can be boiled down to four questions. The first is that how does the machinery of destruction get set in motion? A common theory on how destruction sets in motion is largely dependent on the nature of the state (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64). In theory when a state is unstable, the government is held responsible for the instability; therefore, they react by killing those who they see as a potential threat. For the case of Germany, post-World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was essentially told that they would have to take financial responsibility and aid will not come their way considering what had happened. Hitler fed off this and was able

to create his regime because he believed that if no one was going to help Germany as a nation, then he should be the one to lead the nation into helping itself. Another reason why the wheels of genocide begin to turn is that of the social and ethnic composition of the state; in other words, where there is large competition there will be death. A third and final reason behind the beginning is that of poverty. It is noted that “because the political and economic spoils are so meager, deadly struggle ensues” (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 65). It is either kill or be killed in this scenario.

The second question is that of why do some groups get targeted and others do not when they live in the same country? (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64) The nature of this question leans more closely to that of a trick question. The reality is that the state’s leaders (or the perpetrators that are in power) are not necessarily hungry to kill masses of people because they are affiliated to that of a group. The motives behind the mass killing are ones to promote fear (so that they feed off of it to gain more power), to promote nation-building projects in their favor, or to lead that nation to war so that they may gain total power and control of that state. Therefore, ethnicity becomes more of a non-issue and it is really a matter of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

For instance, let us assume that the perpetrator decided to target the group of people with large noses in country X for their mass killings; had a group of people with small noses been in the place of the group with large noses, then they would have been killed instead. In other words, the perpetrator must target a specific group in order to ignite fear and the movement of genocide and in order to gain power through that terror – so whether a group has a large or small nose, it is irrelevant. This is notable in the Rwandan genocide, particularly because the opposing parties had such similar traits; it

just so happened that the resources that were being sought after was on land that did not belong to the perpetrators.

The third question is when a group is slated for elimination, why is this (destruction of the group) chosen? The reason behind the destruction of people is the promotion of re-building or starting anew (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 68). The destruction of the weak allows people to feed of the energy of feeling victorious and triumphant. If a perpetrator happens to also be a state leader and that leader gives the people the euphoric feeling of being unstoppable, then it is likely that the perpetrator will be supported by those who do not suffer from the mass killing.

In addition, there is the idea of mass killing in order to “start fresh.” Often a perpetrator sees their target group as the negative opposition. As people who are trying to stop the growth and progression of their nation, thus, in order to be able to move forward, then that group of people must be eliminated. Once the people begin to believe in this idea of rejuvenation by elimination, then everything else becomes somewhat of a domino effect.

The fourth and final question is why does the assault begin when it does – why not earlier or later? There is no real explanation behind why genocide begins when it does. Genocide is does not have a real systematic process (Goldhagen, 1990. P. 68). The only thing we do know that is true to genocide is that it goes through a cycle of phases.

Lemkin’s two phases of genocide:

1. Destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group. The oppressor will attempt to destroy the cultural practices, religious beliefs, economic parties, social institutions, or identity of the targeted group. National pattern is

synonymous with characteristics of the oppressed group. Imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. Attempt to convey/replace previous national pattern (of the group) with new national pattern (of the oppressor).

2. Assimilation is coded in the opportunity (although, there really isn't an opportunity) to become part of the new population. To become part of the social group of the oppressor to reap whatever benefits that may provide. Imposition of the national pattern does not always follow the extermination of a group of people (enforced assimilation).

Lemkin's eight techniques of genocide:

1. Political: destruction of a local government and imposition of a new national pattern. Can be done by a) name changes, b) sabotage (fifth column), c) special privileges (to increase unity)
2. Social: abolition of local laws, courts, clergy, and intelligence, and replace them with those of the oppressor
3. Cultural: prohibition of speaking the native language (largely used as a genocide tool in African nations) and imposition of the oppressor's language and educational system → everything ends up being regulated (all matters of aesthetics)
4. Economic: affects all other techniques
5. Biological: policy of depopulation through acts of euthanasia, abortion, and forced sterilization
6. Physical: actual extermination/destruction of human lives a) racial discrimination, b) endangering health, c) mass killings

7. Religious: destruction of religious buildings and artifacts, and destruction of forced migration of religious leaders
8. Moral: “moral debasement” promotion drugs, alcohol, and prostitution → encourage violence to create more violence, in order to kill each other off.

In the field of academia, there are five distinct terms that have been developed in defining genocide. These are as follows:

1. Crimes against humanity (CAH): crimes that have willfully been directed to civilian populations (i.e., noncombatants – people that do not participant in war); this is devoid of intent
2. Genocide: intentional destruction of group or nation
3. War crimes: war has a standard of conduct – the idea of just war; a war crime is identified of a violation of that proper conduct in war. These crimes are classified as mala in se, “evil in themselves”
4. Ethnic cleansing: attempt to purge or remove, either through extermination or forced emigration, civilians from their native lands
5. Mass murder: deliberate killings of four or more civilians consecutively

Terrorism

One of the most contested terms of our time, terrorism and understanding how to define it is notoriously challenging (Held, 2004, 62). Widely known as a tool used to manipulate international relations, terrorism is a concept that has been increasingly difficult to define. In fact, it has been noted that the term “terrorism” is problematic to clearly define due to objectivity, its lack of connection to a specific ideology, and the idea that understanding terrorism will curb it. Even still, somehow the media and political

leaders have managed to adhere the idea of terrorism to conflicts that are related to ethnic identity and the need for power between those individuals (or groups) in conflict. In fact, governments have defined terrorism as something that only their opponents could commit and something only those who seek radical change engage in (Held, 2004, 62).

Over the years, terrorism has evolved and developed a new face. For the most part, today's terrorism/terrorist factions lack hierarchical organization, where only the "architects" have full knowledge of the group, they maintain clear political goals, they have a high influence over public opinion, and they attempt to doctor terrorism into something that is justifiable, giving it a human face – "we are not terrorists, we are the victims of the state."

While terrorism certainly is violence, and generally violence that is intertwined with matters of political freedom, the reality is that the only real effect that terrorism has is that of increasing fear of the foreigner. In a globalized era, terrorism has taken a toll on international relations and has become a tool widely used in ethno-political conflicts, particularly the structural systemic conflicts that involve a competition for power.

Theoretical Perspectives

Theories Related to Human Behavior

Social scientists have come to believe that, people do things in certain situations because those are the rational things to do. In other words, there is a reason behind actions or our human behavior (Mohr, 2009, p. 8). The question is, are humans' rational actors? And, if so, does that mean that all actions are/should be considered rational? As a rational scholar, one can conclude that no, not all human behavior is rational, but the

theories that follow can shed light as to why certain individuals act in the manner that they do.

Social Theory

In formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying the relationship between globalization and violent conflict, social theory provides a platform by which human behavior and patterns can be identified, that can later be utilized to foresee and prevent catastrophic consequences. Social theory as a basis for the comprehension of man was developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies developed and people were permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert, 2010). Its foundation began as the attempt to account for what was different between modern societies and its preceding traditional ones (Lemert, 2010).

Today, social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or around them” (Lemert, 2010). As children, we begin to formulate our own social theories, why do girls play with other girls, why don’t we talk back to adults, why do we have to listen to our parents when they tell us to do something – these are all questions that will eventually lead to our own understanding of race, gender, socioeconomic status, sexuality, poverty and occupation status. Indeed, it is social theory that leads to the understanding of a society that is observed and analyzed in all facets. But what is a society, and why should it be under the scrutiny of observation?

Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can identify societies. And a society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially be wiped out (Lemert, 2010). Because social theory is adaptable to varying conflicts, it also

means that at times it can cast a net that goes too far. As such, social theory's effort to draw boundaries around social facts or generalizations has its limitations (Lee, 1999, p. 551); this is because societies change as time progresses.

Societal norms shift as societies develop; it would be infinitely impossible to form actual boundaries. The inability to form boundaries within societies is directly reflected on the current state of economic affairs, whereas countries (in particular developing countries) have become more dependent on other nations to fill in the gaps of missing resources, whether it is through imports, exports or aid. This highlights that economic communication has become more global, which leads to us to discuss what we have come to know as globalization, a theory that has fallen under a myriad of umbrellas to explain economy in our world, as we know it today.

This, in turn, goes back to the central theme of social theory where we as humans attempt to decipher what others to do, and in this case, for gain of power economically and politically. As social theory is expanded, it is also important to remember that the theory is based on learning from historical events, and what nations or societies do to adapt and evolve from them (Lemert, 2010, p. 9). In fact, often, political leaders have used historical references to rally up people's emotions and get them to understand their point of view. In doing so, a conflict can largely be emotionally driven based on an individual's interpretation of the past.

With, there has been a wrench to derail our own nature to learn from the past. Western societies have been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and the explosion of social media that has brought about an ahistorical worldview. This means that there has been a historical amnesia of sorts, causing the consciousness of

history to become what it is, followed by the relentless importance of the “here and now.” It enforces the notion that historical references have become more mystified than actual reality and are dismissed as irrational occurrences that have no substantive weight on its lasting effects (Sardamov, 1998, p. 56). Phenomena such as these are the very reason why studies such as this one are critical to the fields of conflict resolution and international conflict. It is imperative that scholars in academia and politics have the tools that will allow our leaders make rational decisions based on hard evidence.

Social Movements Theory and Social Revolutions

Social movement theory began in the late 19th century and refers to the study of social mobilization, including its social, cultural, and political manifestations and consequences. Social movements are defined as “a persistent and organized effort on the part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social change” (Defronzo, 2011, p. 9). Social movements are not necessarily classified as events that bring about violent conflict; but modern-day theorists that have taken social movement theory to explain modern day revolutions are aware and have noted that violent means are not exclusive. Social revolutions are “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts” (Skocpol, 1993, p. 33). The concept of social revolution is different from other revolutions in that it makes successful sociopolitical transformation; in other words, it changes the state and its class structures, not necessarily for the better of that state, but nonetheless it is changed. Social scientists have attempted to classify revolutions into two types; the first is a left wing revolution, in which the central goal is perceived to change major social and political institutions in order to alter the dominant economic, social, or

political relationships and the other is a right wing revolution, in which the primary aim is the restoration of traditional institutions (Defronzo, 2015, .p 12).

Like conflict, there are several factors that contribute to the development of social revolutions, five of which have proved to be enough for the success of revolutionary movements. They are as follows (Defronzo, 2015, p. 13-14):

1. Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings among urban or rural populations. Here, a large portion of the population is unsatisfied with either the government or their socio-economic status, so much so that it leads to protests and mass rebellions.
2. Dissident elite political movements. Here we are dealing with the division among the elite groups within a society and are pitted against each other for power and control.
3. Unifying motivations. As it is presented, motivations that cut across several classes within a society are among the more powerful factors behind a revolution.
4. A severe political crisis paralyzing the administrative capabilities of the state. A state crisis can come in several ways, including defeat in war, natural disaster, catastrophic economic downturn, or withdrawal of financial or military support from allied states. Should a state become subject to a crisis, it only weakens the administration, giving more power to the population(s) that are seeking to make changes by way of social revolution.
5. A permissive or tolerant world context. This is likely one of the more controversial factors of our time considering our globalized world. On the one

hand, we want to intervene when a nation is suffering because we know that a social revolution would only devastate that nation and likely affect others (that likely have economic partnership with them, which leads to an economic domino effect). On the other hand, we refrain ourselves from intervening when there is an uprising in a foreign country because we want to allow that nation to make claim to its sovereignty and allow it to exercise their authority. A myriad of theories has been developed to understand the drivers of social movements and revolutions, among them is relative deprivation, which is also a theory that assists in the understanding behind human behavior in violent conflict.

Relative Deprivation

First developed as a theory in psychology by Samuel Stouffer to explain the satisfaction of internal promotions of military police in different regions of the United States, relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1) they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want X (4) they see it as feasible that they should have X. the relativity of the concept come from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3 (Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

Relative deprivation has been assumed to increase according to three different patterns. The first is known as decremental deprivation, where an individual's

expectations remain stable but receive less and less. This is usually as a result of an increase in the difference of power between the actors (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). For instance, when someone new comes into power of a nation state their power is subjectively weaker than when they are in office for a second or third term. Thus, in their first term of being president/dictator/ruler, the head of the nation will generally keep the citizens' standard of living stable, and as they have an increase in power they would be more inclined to slowly chip away of the resources that the citizens may have.

The second pattern of relative deprivation is aspirational deprivation, where an individual's expectations rise while their achievements remain stable (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). This pattern is more visibly seen in relationships between peers (individuals of equal standing) or individuals that do not have high degrees of separation as it relates to power. For instance, if two colleagues performed the same duties, the expectation of reward has the same baseline, but there will come a point where one of the other has a higher expectation of reaping (more or better) benefits because they believe that their performance is superior to that of the other.

The third pattern of relative deprivation is that of progressive deprivation. Progressive deprivation occurs when there is a relatively steady improvement on an individual's social and economic condition, which leads to increased expectations, but is followed by a sharp reversal in that trend (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). This pattern has the tendency to occur with individuals that fall under the low to low-middle class economically, have had a sudden improvement in their lifestyle, and then their new success is taken from them; either because they themselves have fallen into a financial blunder or their country has taken an economic hit that affects most citizens under the

same umbrella (i.e., when the real-estate bubble caused thousands of families to lose their homes). Regardless of the pattern, an increase in relative deprivation strongly affects the probability for collective violence.

Relative deprivation theory is distinguished in two categories, egoistic and fraternal. Egoistic deprivation refers to a single individual's feeling of comparative deprivation, whereas fraternal deprivation (also known as group deprivation) refers to the dissatisfaction arising from the status of an entire group (Victoroff, 2005, 101). As it relates to violent conflict, relative deprivation will largely fall under the category of fraternal deprivation, as an individual [intrinsically] cannot wage an act of violent conflict that would cause serious detriment to a nation's economic welfare.

Theories in Economics

Economics is the social science that deals with tangible wealth, in general the goods that are produced by people (Foldvary, 2014, p. 6). Economics enables us to understand reality empirically, because wealth is not an end, rather it is a means by which utility is measured and then pursued by individuals. In order to understand economics (and its driving theories) it is important to consider the following universal principles (Foldvary, 2014, p. 8-9) (in no order):

- Some natural resources are scarce relative to human desires
- Resources vary in quality
- All human beings belong to the same species and have the same human nature
- Humans have ends (i.e., goals and needs)
- Humans are able to rank their needs on importance
- Human desires tend to be unlimited

- Human values are subjective
- Humans beings economize
- People tend to have time preference (desiring different goods at different times)
- The future is uncertain

These principles lay the foundation for an economic theory. “An economic theory is defined as a theory that has economic structures as its relational structures...” by which are distinguished by a set of rules (Klein, 1998, p. 7). An economic theory has a mathematical component where the theorist is concerned with an economic structure, for instance an individual consumer. Thus, an economic theory, in its classical sense, would explain the means by which a consumer would perform choices based on patterns and facing different budget situations. (Klein, 1998, p. 22).

Theories in economics can be confined to strictly explaining phenomenon as it related to market prices, wages rates, and GDP. History has taught us that our social lives have an inseparable relationship with its elements (i.e., economics). Therefore, human behavior goes beyond the economic doctrine. The theories below will explain the economic reality of individuals and allows us to make the connection between human behavior, economics, and conflict.

Marxism

In general, a theory is at the center of the economic realities of human culture; and with Marxism getting and keeping economic power is the motive behind all social and political activities (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). This would make economics the foundation of the social and political constructs that are in place within a society at large (*Id*). In

Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his *Communist Manifesto* Marx writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle (Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day's bourgeoisie (*Ibid*, p. 251).

Marx further notes that each development of today's high-class society is accompanied by a responding political advancement of that class; which marks an important point in the relationship between economic globalization and large migratory movements. Let us take for instance the notion of the oppressor and the oppressed. If an oppressed class exists under the oppressor (in this case a class of high stature) and the oppressor wants to build a system of successful industry where the oppressed class resides, the oppressor has the upper hand by way of resources. Therefore, in finding the means to build this industry the oppressor forces the oppressed to relocate resulting in their likely economic ruin. The same is understood today. If a higher power (political or otherwise) wants to create an infrastructure where a society of low-income citizens reside, the high power has the upper hand and will essentially "buy" them out of their homes, or in some cases result in movement by force by way of violent conflict.

Between 1975 and 1979, under the regime of Pol Pot, Cambodia lost 1.5 million people due to starvation, execution, disease, or over work. Pol Pot wanted a classless peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took particular aim at intellectuals, city residents, ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders (www.history.com, 2016). In order to build his successful industry amongst the Cambodians, 2.5 million

were evacuated, and the remaining population was stripped of their possessions and forced to work in the fields as part of their reeducation. Under his regime, the state controlled all aspects of a person's life. Money, private property, most reading material, and religion were outlawed; agriculture was collectivized; children were taken and forced into the military; and strict rules governing sexual relations, clothing, and vocabulary were laid down (www.history.com, 2016).

The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical perspective is infinitely more significant than the division of race, religion, or gender (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise in the global society. It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is more important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in their own battles.

Globalization

Over the last decade, the idea of globalization has grown to have several different interpretations. Some have deemed it as an economic concept that supports market forces; others have called it the gateway for international communication, removing borders and barriers to make for better negotiations, and reconfiguring the fundamental properties of the nation-state (Lemert, 2010, p. 625). At its core, globalization is an economic phenomenon whose implications are largely bound to a state's welfare (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state's welfare, in turn is associated and affected by the flows of goods for economic advancement (*Ibid*, p. 285).

Globalization has so many facets (encompassing themes of economics, politics, and society) one can say that it is challenging to gauge; but, economic flows, unlike other themes, can be recorded and quantified (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 289) to provide hard data to nations as to what direction they should take. Economists Hecklman and Young provides an in-depth statistical analysis on the social and economic dimensions of globalization, where they describe globalization as an “extension going beyond borders...” (Hecklman and Young, 2013, 2). The social dimension (which will not be further developed in this research) is comprised as personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity (Hecklman and Young, 2013, p. 6). The economic dimension is comprised of two components actual trade flow and policy restrictions (*Ibid.*). The primary goal in their research was to determine whether globalization was indeed global. In gathering data from 129 countries, Hecklman and Young found that no matter what the economic status of a nation, whether it is a superpower or a third world country, globalization did exist; which further asserts that boundaries are indeed disappearing as societies economic needs shift. While globalization here is not applied to violent conflict on its face, this research is important in that it proves statistically that a de facto global economy exists, which means that if a country is lacking resources, they will find a way to fulfill that need – even if it is by violent means.

In developing the notion of the role of a nation and economic globalization, Hashimov states that it is characterized by the application of economic policy tools to maintain growth. These policy tools are related to rate control, which we know as tariffs, quotas and subsidies (Hashimov, 2013, p. 6). For developing countries, however, where a government is continuously unstable, infrastructure is not available, and economics are at

a constant downturn, these policy tools may be acts of violence, which will be demonstrated later as particular countries are examined.

In the 1950's the "third world" referred to the nation-states who were reluctant to take sides in the Cold War. In the 1960's, the term was cited as the European colonies in Asia and Africa. More notably at that time, third world countries were those regimes that formally allied with the USSR and had a political and economic path that was between liberal capitalism ("first world") and state socialism ("second world"). Following the wars between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in the late 1970's, the term third world was used to represent the countries that struggled economically in a world-system that was continuously expanding (Berger, 1994, p. 261-263).

Third world countries, or now more aptly known as developing nations, are the main construct of this study. With that being said, it is important to note that there have been several publications in the last decade by well-regarded economists, including Robert Zoellick (former President of the World Bank), who have made claims that third-world countries are coming to an end. This is largely in part due to what he calls "sustainable globalization."

Globalization is largely driven by the free flows of goods and capital, but if we pay close attention, we would notice that the consequences of the globalization are equivalent to those that would be attached to the free flow of labor (Daly, 2004, p. 41). What has been a common notion is that nations out-source for labor in order to obtain the best value (i.e., the cheapest wages); but what has actually been occurring in our current state is that there is a growing population of workers moving to the wealthier country

because even within borders companies have been managing to secure employees at a low cost.

As per Zoellick (2010), globalization is not limited to the movement of populations to other countries for better opportunities. In fact, he claims that within the developing countries themselves there has been a shift in their economic growth internally, with an increase of nearly 10% in purchasing power lone in the last 30 years. While this number may appear to be small in the amongst the larger scales of the super powers (i.e., the United States, China, and Brazil); it is important to note that in the grand scheme of things that within that small percentage 60 million people were lifted out of poverty (www.worldbank.org, Zoellick, 2010).

As it relates to this study, I will analyze and evaluate the reasons behind the economic growth of these developing countries. We must ask ourselves, how is it possible that millions of people on Africa who earn less than \$2 a day can return that into their own country's growth? The truth is, that they cannot, therefore, conflict occurs. Thus, globalization has been an accelerator of social change, and acts as a catalyst for conflict (Tidwell and Lerche, 2004, p. 47).

Globalization and Banking with Developing Nations

If a state is unable to make economic advancements independently, economic institutions are in place to alleviate debt and provide financial assistance as the institution see fit in accordance to the needs of the state. Three economic institutions in particular are well known in the context of economic globalization, these are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Intrinsically these institutions are global banks that supply loans to developing countries

and in return demand the nation to implement a structural adjustment program (Sterger, 2009, p. 54). While the process is seemingly uncomplicated, the list of qualifiers in order to obtain the loan is extensive (Sterger, 2009, p. 55), and it includes:

1. A guarantee of fiscal discipline, and a curb to budget deficits
2. A reduction of public expenditure, particularly in military and public administration
3. Tax reform, aiming at the creation of a system with a broad base and effective enforcement
4. Financial liberation, with interest rates determined by the market
5. Competitive exchange rates, to assist export-led growth
6. Trade liberation, coupled with the abolition of import licensing and a reduction on tariffs
7. Promotion of foreign direct investment
8. Privatization of state enterprise, leading to efficient management and improved performance
9. Deregulation of the economy
10. Protection of property rights

Despite this, developing nations have been consistent in obtaining loans from the institutions, and yet often the political leaders do not follow through in complying. In fact, it has been recognized that large portions of the loans end up being pocketed by authoritarian political leaders or enriching local businesses that serve those political leaders. As such, those developing nations continue to see poor growth and internal

conflict because they do not have the enough wealth (liquid or otherwise) by which to support their citizens.

Theories Related to Conflict

Rational Choice Theory

In his greed theory of conflict, Paul Collier writes that people will conduct civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of the rebellion (Denmers, 2017, 100). He further argues that wars are often not about winning but serve economic and political functions. As it relates to this study, Rational Choice and Greed Theory provide the framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by individuals or a group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with the hope of establishing a form of equality and stability. Collier's greed theory of conflict is now more commonly known as rational choice theory, where the premise is the same and the idea is that "people are rational agents, and have choice, [even] in settings of war." Thus, violence is the product of a rational actor perceiving that the benefits of that violence outweigh its costs/consequences.

There are two assumptions both theories share; the first is that the individual is the starting point for all social action and the second is that the individual's objective is to achieve the maximum of their goals (otherwise the purpose of that violence is deemed irrational). Because this theory is largely based on the action of the individual Collier set out to study what people do and not what they say (Denmers, 2017, 102) – the "true cause...is not the loud discourse of the grievance, but the silent force of the greed." Collier breaks down motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed, where violent actions arise because opposing parties aspire to acquire wealth by capturing

resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust regime (Denmers, 2017, 102).

The explanation that Collier provides as to why greed drives violent conflict is that individuals are utility maximizers and would be willing to put their lives on the line for a cause that is likely to benefit them (Denmers, 2017, 104). Consequently, Collier provides an economic perspective that violent conflict based on greed is like a market, whereas individuals make investment in violence and reap a return; and violent conflict based on grievance involves investments with no potential for returns. Therefore, grievance-based conflict would not produce a 'sufficient amount' of violence (Denmers, 2017, 105).

In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, Collier developed an empirical model quantifying such factors using proxies. Greed's proxies are primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males within a total population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers, 2017, 103). Grievance's proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable growth rate in the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (*Id.*). While it is not of my opinion that grievances themselves are not sufficient to propel violent conflict, for the purposes of this study it is important to note that limited proxies from both categories will be examined in order to quantify the point in which a conflict becomes violent. These would include primary commodity exports in GDP, land ownership (as it related to economic inequality), and the variable growth rate (of which pre and post will be examined). The proxy of the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and

religion will briefly be discussed to debunk the myth that it is a primary driving force of violent conflict.

Prospect Theory

The prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky; it is a theoretical process that attempts to see what results will be based on what an individual has. The prospect theory analyzes how much we will gain or lose because of our decisions – it is decision making with a risk. Built on the concept with reference dependence, the ability make a decision that is contingent on reference, the prospect theory (a) emphasizes asset changes rather asset levels (posing the question of “if I get something then what will I lose?”), (b) analyzes asset changes pertaining to the gains and losses, and (c) considers reference points as the implications for our choices, as in our gains and losses reflect on some previous reference point. It is noted that specific behaviors pertain to decision making under risk, it is a form of behavioral theory that attempts to describe individuals’ behavior based on their decisions. As such, people respond differently to gains and losses, often overvaluing losses relative to comparable gains. For instance, if someone is offered a choice between a 75% chance of having \$5,000 with a 25% chance of having nothing versus a 100% chance of having \$3000 most people would choose the latter because there is a guarantee of no losses. More people are risk averse with respect to gains; this means that people will choose something with a guarantee as opposed to anything else. On the same token, if a person is offered the choice between a 100% chance of losing \$3,000 or a 75% chance of losing \$15,000, most people would choose the latter because people are risk seeking with respect to losses. This means that people

would rather take a chance and not lose something as opposed to a guaranteed loss – even if that means that the risk would be greater.

In light of these observations the prospect theory found that (1) people value things they have more than things that they do not, (2) it is more difficult to lose something than to gain something, this is known as the endowment effect – loss is a greater trauma than gain, (3) people are generally risk averse with respect to gains and risk seeking with respect to losses, (4) the change in choice is a consequence of a change in frame, in other words how our choices are framed will greatly influence our decision making – also known as the framing effect, (5) reference points are not always fixed and will be discussed with respect to X, and (6) reference point reorientation after gains occur faster than losses, it is often easier to “renormalize” or readjust after a gain than a loss.

The prospect theory is comprised of two phases. The first is the editing phase, which is the assessment of options, outcomes, and valuations, all of which are compiled in the decision-making process. The second is the evaluation phase, which is a combination of value of possible outcomes with eight probabilities; this phase emphasizes guarantees (although there are thresholds) and places an emphasis on retention pertaining to losses. While the prospect theory is a useful tool in the analysis of our decision making with respect to gains and losses, there are also problems that come with its application, including (1) the prospect theory only applies to individuals and international relations is concerned with nation states (not individuals), 2) it is difficult for nations to adapt to economic deficiencies, which means that national renormalization would be the state adjusting to surplus, making it difficult to explain national renormalization, and (3) collective risk assessment is different from individual risk

assessment, there is a distinction in the logic of risk assessment between an individual and a group.

Because of these difficulties with the prospect theory, there are numerous state implications that follow. The first is that the state will always attempt to preserve the status quo, in other words they will always try to preserve what the current government norm is. The second is that in the application of prospect theory, territorial defense receives greater weight than territorial acquisition or encroachment, which makes it difficult to assess which party is the risk seeker. The third implication is that states maximize their security by aiming to preserve the status quo in the international system; this is also known as defensive realism. The fourth is that political candidates are more concerned with the avoidance of alienating key constituents rather than strengthening the support among those groups.

The idea of maintaining and preserving political relationships that already exists is something that politicians should stay away from because “democrats will vote for democrats” anyway. The fifth state implication is that framing of the issue is essential in attaining public support, as framing issues is directly correlated to the public interest. The sixth and seventh note that frames above the status quo define the status quo as a loss (for example, the national education expenditure) and frames below the status quo define the status quo as a gain (for instance, pre-social security America), respectively. The eighth implication asserts that the decline in relative power is typically framed as a loss with a reference point in the past as goal from power. This means that incremental increases in power are avoided for a return to the original reference point, going back to the instant endowment effect. The ninth notes the notion of bargaining is at the expense of another,

and the final implication is that in dyadic bargaining, concession aversion leads to a greater tendency on both sides to risk the consequences of a non-agreement or deadlock, and hence a lower probability of a negotiated agreement.

Parable of the Tribes

The Parable of the Tribes (“parable”) notes that if we have different ethnic groups living in close proximity and one becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms the state of affairs of the relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity, causing them all to become aggressive. The parable demonstrates this: ethnicities A-D live in proximity, if D goes into war with C, then C has two options, to refuse to fight or to fight back. If C refuses to fight, then one of four things could happen, (1) they can withdraw from the region, or be cleansed from the land, (2) they can allow themselves to be destroyed or if C is pacifist then it would be genocide, (3) they become tributary, in other words, permit to remain but become members of D, or (4) they can completely assimilate, which often times is done by mass rape by the opposing group. In refusing to fight, C in one form or another will lose its identity as C and disappear, or become D. If C decides to fight back, because the possibility of winning does exist, then the conflict becomes the ambition to preserve identity. Because of this notion, the parable concludes that identity preservation requires conflict.

One of the worst ethnic related conflicts on the 20th century is that of the genocide in Rwanda, where nearly 500,000 Tutsi were killed (Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 483). The Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language and culture, the same clan names, the same customs, and symbols of kinship served as a unifying bond between them (Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 484). Yet, the bloodshed that occurred during that time would lead

people to believe otherwise. The truth is that ethnic conflict began for the Hutus and Tutsi decades before, when Belgian politics shifted within Rwanda, provoking Tutsi who had maintained higher authority to press their claim. In response, the Hutu-led, Belgian assistance coup forced into exile nearly a quarter million Tutsi into surrounding countries (Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 485). The ethnic conflict here was manifested by a third party who saw an economic opportunity in mineral resources and created a system of apartheid where Hutus came to accept the physical dissimilarities and started to view the Tutsis as foreign immigrants (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 50).

People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies (Ross, 2001, 160), however, when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has been proposed that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out because the only morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity (Victoroff, 2005, 21). Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of losing the ability to protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups are sought after in order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity the factors that embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for igniting and escalating conflict. Some of these factors include emotions, attitudes and perceptions (of one another), and dehumanization and deindividuation.

Emotions have a powerful effect on human behavior; one of the emotions that are commonly identified in conflict related to identity is that of image threat. A threat to a party’s image is a great source of escalation, as having power, resources, and status are what give that group a legitimate stance in the world. Once that image is tarnished, a

collective will feel the need to defend itself by developing an image that sends out a message of being ready to fight (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, 104). The attitudes and perceptions of each group is also an identity factor that can lead to the escalation of conflict. Attitudes and perceptions can often take form of stereotypes (Pruitt and Kim, 2004 107), and once in a state of conflict there is no gray area to negotiate. Negative attitudes will invoke negative ones, and positive attitudes will invoke positive ones.

Looking at conflict de-escalation through the lens of the parable, one can assume that ethnicities in proximity have at least one overlapping common bond. This bond can be political, social, economic, or religious. Once a common bond is formed, then the groups can further de-escalate their conflict by learning more about the other and learning to accept each other's limitations through compromise and negotiations.

For instance, let us assume that ethnicities A-D are land locked communities, in proximity, in an arid region of Africa and water resources are often scarce. Commonly, each of the ethnicities would get in conflict with each other so that the winner takes the water from the loser. The better solution to this dilemma is to acknowledge the fact that they all need water to survive (the common bond), and instead of wasting time and other resources on war, they should work together on building a plan where they could each have water in equally distributed amounts. Now, this example of course is not pragmatic, but it scratches the surface on what could erupt to be a very complicated conflict.

Drivers Behind the Cause of Ethnic Conflict

There is a myriad of theories that have specific premises that lead to a certain number of conclusions or consequences that can explain conflict, including ethnic conflict. However, there are overarching drivers behind ethnic conflict that should be

acknowledged. These include insecurity, greed, social-psychological motivations, and the dynamics of the international dimension. Generally, it has been posed that insecurity is heightened when segments of an ethnic group are geographically isolated or vulnerable to small bands of armed forces that are willing to commit acts of violence at a moment notice (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 26). These small bands are usually formed in response to fear, so that an ethnic group is ready to act. To dig deeper, this fear is produced by government breakdown, geographic isolation or vulnerability, changing balances of political or demographic power, redistribution of resources, and forced or voluntary arming (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 27). There are three dilemmas that arise on the basis of these fears; the first is that of information failure (the opposing parties are either lacking or misinformed, thus, causing unnecessary conflict); the second are problems of credibility as it relates to commitment (one party is not reassured by the other that they will not defect from the accorded agreement); and the third is that of pre-emptive use of force, which is essentially derived from the former dilemmas (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 28).

Greed explains that ethnic conflict is more economically motivated than traditionally believed. The primary argument here is that conflict occurs if the economic incentive is sufficiently great in relation to the costs (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 32). The findings behind this argument is that violent conflict is largely:

- A phenomenon of low-income countries (where military labor costs are low),
- Where the presence of natural resources is a lootable commodity of which is often scarce (therefore, must be fought for),

- Said countries have higher populations (which often are those that are low-income) have a higher risk of violent conflict,
- And a high degree of ethnic division exists (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 33).

With social-psychological motivations, the conflict is perceived by the individual who places themselves in that conflict. Here, the basic assumption is that people strive for a positive social identity. Social identity is derived from membership in groups; therefore, a positive social identity would be one where the membership enhances an individual's self-esteem and develop loyalty for that group. This, in turn, develops a strong "band of brothers" should a violent conflict erupt.

The dynamics of the international dimension essentially explains that ethnic conflict isn't confined to the limits of the opposing ethnicities (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 41). Rather, outside minorities, surrounding states, and in some cases international organizations may see it as appropriate to become involved in order to prevent or deter serious violent conflict or a degree of economic sabotage that would be detrimental to that nation and nations that are involved in importing or exporting good to them.

On Globalization and Culture, as it Relates to Identity

Cultural globalization refers to the expansion of cultural flows across the globe; concerned with the symbolic construction, articulation, and dissemination (Steger, 2009, p. 71). Individualism, consumerism, and religious discourse now circulate more freely and widely thanks to easier access to technologies such as the Internet that facilitate world-wide communication. There are two ends to cultural globalization spectrum as it relates to conflict. On one end, there are the theorists that believe that cultural globalization is slowly chipping away at an individual's identity as it relates to race,

religion, ethnicity, tradition, etc. Some proponents advocate that this is a good thing, because finding “sameness” amongst each other will allow conflict to subside. Others say that having “sameness” will strip us from our heritage and mean that we will have no identity at all. On the other end of the spectrum there are theorists that believe cultural globalization is forming a unified front because it allows us to learn about the differences that exists in the world; therefore we will be more educated on all the elements of different cultures, which would subside conflict because we know the rationale behind why cultures act as they do. I believe that whether cultural globalization is depicted as a positive or negative notion, it is something that is undoubtedly here to stay, and it is important to accept the fact that our modern world is becoming more and more intermingled as technologies become more advanced.

Current Conflict Regulation Tactics

Conflict regulation today is comprised by three elements: prevention, management, and settlement (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict prevention refers to “a set of policies adopted at an early stage in a conflict, before violent escalation or after a ceasefire has been negotiated to prevent the resumption of violence” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Generally, this would take place in either the emergence phase of a conflict or de-escalation/termination phases of a conflict. The primary aims for conflict prevention is provide incentives for peaceful means of negotiations; for instance, making the costs of violent conflict high so that the opposing parties are not inclined to engage in violent conflict. Conflict management is “the attempt to contain, limit, or direct the effects of an ongoing...conflict” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict management can potentially be implemented at any stage of the conflict should the opposing parties be

willing to do so, in order to minimize the costs of both lives and resources lost during a conflict. Finally, conflict settlement aims at “establishing an institutional framework in which the opposing parties...can be accommodated to such an extent that incentives for cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent conflict” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict settlement takes place in the post-termination phase of conflict (should both parties continue to exist after a violent conflict). Because of the elements of conflict regulation is that of settlement, as research scientists we would need to determine: (a) the concerns and demands of the conflict parties; (b) the relevant actors at the local, state, regional, and global levels; and (c) the factors that shape their opportunity structure and motivations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81).

The condition for violent conflict often deals primarily is preservation (of the self, resources, or surroundings). This means that individuals and groups alike will have concerns that deal with the conditions that they are living in and normally fall into the categories of security political participation, cultural identity, and economic opportunities (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81). When presenting claims that fall under these categories concerns and demands can look like the need for more liberal political rights (i.e., the inclusion of women of people of color to vote), or the need for more territory to reap the benefits of natural resources (i.e., land for agriculture, so that the farmer will not only be able to feed his or her family by what they produce but also by what they sell).

Once these claims are properly recognized, the relevant actors must be established in order to address the claims and avoid conflict (or prevent violent conflict). For instance, in the case for more political rights, depending on where the individual lives the

relevant parties can either be in a state or regional level, or a combination of the two – depending on what the rights call for. In the case of accessing more land for agriculture, the potential relevant parties could be at a local level (land from another individual) at a state level (land within the nation) or a global level (land from a neighboring nation that is necessary to acquire in order to fulfill the needs of the individual(s)).

When the relevant parties are clearly identified, then (and only then) can the parties begin to set structures that will motivate everyone involved equally so that conflict is evaded. Again, taking the example of political rights; if what the people are asking for is the right to vote by women or another minority, then a potential politician coming into office can make those changes so that in their next term they are guaranteed those votes by the minorities and, therefore, secure a second term in office. In the case of acquiring land for the ability to produce goods for self-use or sale, a city (county, state, nation) can potentially provide this land to an individual at a low-cost and then collect taxes on everything they produce and then an additional tax when items are sold (much like a state and federal tax). This way the individual can provide the basic necessities for their family and the government is reaping the benefits financially.

Having the elements of settlement determined, the settlement itself follows a process, which is the negotiation of the terms, the implementation of that settlement, followed by the actual operations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 89). The negotiation of the settlement is often interlaced with the identification of the elements, which depending on the number of factors involved can be a short or lengthy process. The idea behind the negotiation is to attempt to put into writing terms that all relevant parties are partial to in order to avoid conflict in the future. Once the terms are established, then the

implementation phase begins. Implementation is the process of putting those terms into place, which often runs parallel with operation. At times, this could mean that the implementation process is not fully complete because the terms are being placed in a more “trial and error” situation where the relevant parties would have to go back and re-negotiate terms that are not necessarily working for either of them. In doing so, the agreement can be designed in several phases or packages until the implementation period is complete and the phase of operations is one of stability and predictability.

It is important realm of conflict (violent or otherwise) and conflict regulation is not confined to the finite processes that have been delineated in this chapter. Perspectives behind what constitute violent conflict and political regulations are constantly changing based on the needs of the individual. What can be deduced is that no matter the circumstances, individuals will be involved in violent conflict if they are driven to do so; and the following chapter will provide the methods in which this study will be done so that those drivers are identified with hard evidence.

Chapter 3

Methods

Current theories and studies have been limited in the realm of globalization as it relates to violent conflict, and in turn its effects on mass migrations. These studies have examined only the nexus between violent conflict and voluntary movements from one country to the next or the economic pull factors of migration (with the exclusion of the push factors). Here, I will provide an empirical analysis to bridge the gap and demonstrate the relationship of economics and mass migrations while simultaneously formulating a tool would serve as indicator of when violent conflict will erupt on a large scale. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the research design and explain the rationale behind the methodologies that will be utilized.

Quantitative Research: An Overview

Quantitative research is the attempt to summarize data and describe relationships using numbers (Crammer and Howitt, 2004, p. 134). Quantitative inquiry requires evidence that is observable and testable, where researches must give explanations for their conclusions (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001, p. 31). Quantitative methods are focused on highly specific problems and the ways to deal with them (Vogt, 2011, p. 5).

Quantitative research and its designs are more commonly known by the methods used in which data is extracted and then manipulated by formulations in such a way that the data is no longer actually what it once was. In fact, often, it is a practice where words are turned into numbers so that it can be utilized as hard data to prove or disprove theories. While there will be extraction of data in this study, the research here will largely

be comprised of what is known as archival research, which will be further explained in the methodologies section of chapter.

Research Design

The central research question that this study aims to answer is, what is the relationship between migration, globalization (as an economic theory), and violent conflict? Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that poor economic infrastructure is associated with higher incidence of violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 32); but what does that mean for the national that have an established economic infrastructure? Why has violent conflict occurred there? In attempt to answer these questions, this study will follow the structure of two research designs. The first is that of causal research design, where the phenomenon will be understood in terms of conditional statements that take the form of “if X, then Y.” The second is that of case study research design, where an in-depth study takes place and is then used to narrow down a broad field of research. The idea of using a combination of the two designs is two make broad numerical assumptions while still having the ability to apply it to a specific number of countries that can serve as representatives for a more global perspective. The overarching hypothesis that will be examined in this research is: if there is a causal link between economics and violent conflict, then we can make assessments on the emigration and immigration of international populations. More specifically, if violent conflict is economically driven, then we can conclude that mass migration is inevitable.

Causal Design

A casual law is a statement that a change in the value of one variable is sufficient to produce a change in the value of another. John Stuart Mill wrote on the law of

universal causation, where a cause is said to be the cause of another (Mill, 1875, p. 375). Thus, “between phenomena...there is an invariable order of succession where the invariable antecedent is termed the cause and the invariable consequent is termed the effect...” (Mill, 1875, p. 377). In this first systematic analysis of a causal relationship, Mill further argues that three fundamental conditions must be met; the first is that the cause must precede the effect, the second is that the cause must be statistically associated with the effect, and the third is that there has to be no other plausible alternative explanation for the effect other than the cause (Rutter, 2007, p. 3).

Causal research designs assist researchers in understanding why the world operates in the manner that it does through the process of proving a causal link between variables and through the process of eliminating other possibilities. In order to identify the causal link, there must be an empirical association (a valid conclusion based on the association between the independent and dependent variables), and appropriate time order to conclude that causation was involved, and a demonstration that the relationship between the two variables was not caused by a variation in a third variable that is not within the study (www.usc.edu, June 2016).

As mentioned in Chapter One, when man is suffering economically, there will be a point in which man will find a solution in order to overcome their economic dilemma. Thus, the causal relationship in this study posits is that poor economic infrastructure will lead to conflict. This relationship is depicted in a study on the economic crisis, violent conflict, and human development. Where as far as drivers of conflict are concerned, “one of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions (low income, slow growth, and severe economic downturns) are correlated to the outbreak of

conflict...” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Considering this causal relationship, a self-reinforcing cycle from conflict to low human development illustrates that conflict destroys physical and human capital, forcing replacement of labor, and deteriorating institutional capacity.




Figure 1. Conflict – Low Human Development Cycle (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 32)

In exploring the theory behind the outbreak of conflict, there are several models that have been studied; and, a distinct model that is consistent with the nexus of human development and conflict is that of the contest model. The contest model provides framework where two competing parties allocate resources to be produced and appropriated, predicting that if human development is low, the resources will not be allocated efficiently, which in turn could potentially be exploited by skillful revolutionary leaders, only to increase the incentive to organize and rebel or create conflict, (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 35).

This research will further assert should violent conflict erupt, then populations will begin to migrate (as depicted in the chart above) to places that are safe for themselves and for their families – asserting that poor economic infrastructure is also a driver for movements of large populations.

Limitations

Indeed, causal effect occurs when variation in one phenomenon, an independent variable, leads or results to variation in another phenomenon, the dependent variable. This is essentially the relationship between cause and effect, whereas as X caused Y. One of the most provoking assertions in causal relationships is the idea that they can be used for change, where the manipulation of the cause will inevitably result in the manipulation of the effect (Reiss, 2009). The problem here is that not all causal relationships are permeable to manipulation where the effect will change in that manner. Furthermore, with causal research design it is assumed that the causal links are automatic (i.e., because X will always affect Y in manner Z). This is not the case; Reiss writes of three instances that are not automatic:

1. Knowing that X makes a difference to Y, does not automatically allow the inference that there is a continuous process between X and Y. Here, Reiss discusses that while X and Y have a possible causal relationship, the omission of X will negate that automatic relationship (Reiss, 2009).
2. Knowing that X and Y are connected by some causal process does not automatically allow the inference that X raises the probability of Y. This instance lends itself to statistical data as it relates to cost benefit ratios. Reiss uses the example of having more wives means having more individuals to

provide for, thus a decline in wealth. However, it does not consider the contribution that those additional household members can potentially make to increase wealth (Reiss, 2009).

3. Knowing that X raises the probability of Y does not automatically allow the inference that we control Y via X. This inference is the most controversial as it relates to this study; as the primary function for this study is to bridge the gap in the relationship between globalization and violent conflict, to then make a measurable tool to prevent and deter violent conflict through the knowledge that a state's economic welfare is a primary driver of that violent conflict.

Case Study Design

In approaching case study research, there is no one ideal methodology; it all comes down to the questions the researcher is seeking to answer. Case studies are an in-depth analysis of one or multiple cases that are often used for teaching to further explore topics. Due to the uncertain nature of case study research, the researcher must justify their work, and then that could be used to generate new theories. Case studies can be used as a method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of theories and ideas. It also allows an empirical inquiry to investigate a complex phenomenon where the parameters are not clear (Yin, 1984). To date, much of the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have been related to the political aims that violent conflict stems from. In utilizing case studies, we will examine the effects of violent conflict of Rwanda, Colombia, [former] Yugoslavia, and Cambodia from an economic perspective. In doing so, the argument that violent conflict is solely

politically fueled will be debunked. In addition, it will allow for exploring new territories of conflict prevention.

There are six types of case studies. The first is known as single exploratory, a single case study aimed at defining questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study. The second is single descriptive, a single case study presenting a complete description of a phenomenon within its context. The third is single explanatory, a single case study that is used to present data on cause and effect relationships (explained which cause produced which effect). The fourth, fifth, and sixth types of case studies are the same as the first three (respectively) only using multiple case studies as the foundation for the research.

Each of these case studies can be further classified as particularistic, naturalistic, thick descriptive data, inductive and heuristic. This case study in this research is inductive, where “generalizations, concepts, or hypotheses emerge from the examination of data grounded on the context itself” (Willis, 2007, p. 239). Furthermore, due to the nature of the data the variation of this case study design is considered to be interpretive, where the data will be used to develop conceptual theories (Ibid, p. 243) and provide an understanding as it relates to economics, violent conflict and its relationship to mass migration.

A case study research design excels in bringing and understanding of complex issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their relationships. However, utilizing a small number of cases offers little basis for establishing the generalization of wider theories. What is more interesting about this research design is that it does not facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu, June 2016); which is why a combination of the two will be used in this research. A final

limitation found in case study design research is that the use of unique criteria to decipher a study will more than likely be applicable only to that particular case (www.usc.edu, June 2016), which can depict the research to be an invalid contribution to that field.

Correlational Research

A correlational study is a method in which there are two or more variables within a group and the researcher is attempting to determine whether those independent variables have a direct relationship (correlation) with the dependent variable. In this study the dependent variable is violent conflict and independent variable is economics.

Correlations can be either positive or negative; whereas if X increases, then Y increases, or if X increases than Y decreases, respectively. The degree of correlation is calculated by obtaining what is known as a correlation coefficient, known as the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, and would be found in the range between -1 and 1, where 1 would be the perfect positive correlation (which rarely occurs). While correlation does not necessarily prove causal relationship, in this study it will be utilized as a tool for prediction to support the hypothesis that globalization is a primary driver of violent conflict, thus opening the doors for mass migration.

Variables and Target Populations

A variable is a concept, which can have two or more values, and is defined in a way that one can tell what those values are. The simplest kind of variable is one that has two values, which is often represented by a one or zero. The most complex of variables are continuous, and those must be consistently observed so that it is connected to a single value. In using quantitative methods, a nation-states economic stability in relation to conflict and migration will be able to be quantified, which, in turn, can be used as

predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future. While there are not target populations per say, there are several countries that will be analyzed, and they include Rwanda, Colombia, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and [former] Yugoslavia. These countries were selected because not only are they geographically located in different hemispheres of the world, but they are also representative of different governing bodies that have ultimately led their own nations to catastrophic events.

As it relates to economics the independent variables that will be analyzed includes GDP, of which will be examined pre and post conflict. This will be examined to explain the relationship with the dependent variable of violent conflict; length of time (of conflict) and the death toll (if any) will be factored in (see Figure 1). As it relates to the populations that have migrated, both economic infrastructure and violent conflict serve as the independent variables, whereas the number of individuals that have relocated will be considered the dependent variable (see Figure 2). For this study, it would be important to include what the socio-economic status was pre-conflict for those populations that have migrated to determine whether that could have been a push factor.




Figure 2. Variables

The data that will be gathered throughout this research will largely be sourced from publications of government entities, such as the US Department of State. These publications will represent the best sources of data because they have previously demonstrated their integrity, as a nation's administration is highly dependent on the published data. For instance, an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is published annually by the Department of State covering drugs and chemical control activities, money laundering, and financial crimes. Reports such as these are useful in the case of Colombia (which will be analyzed in Chapter Six).




Figure 3. Variables

Data Operation and Analysis Plan

Multiple Linear Regression

The statistical test that will be used in this study will be multiple linear regression. Multiple linear regression is often used in studies to make predictions that are based on causal design. It is a statistical method used for studying the relationship between one dependent variable and multiple independent variables. Within this study, there will be two linear regressions: the first to illustrate the relationship between globalization and migration, the second to illustrate the relationship between violent conflict and mass migration. To date, there have not been any published studies that quantify the relationship between violent conflict and mass migration; however there have been publications that demonstrate the relationship between economics and violent conflict,

and publications that have quantified mass migration movements based on factors other than violent conflict.

In 2010, a multiple linear regression study was published on the economic crisis and violent conflict, with the framework that low human development leads to conflict, which in turn destroys that nation's economic system (Kim and Conceicao, 2010). The study showed a positive correlation, whereas the higher the political stability, the higher the human development index became (as obtained from the World Bank in 2008).




Figure 4. Migration

From 2005 to 2012 a migration study was developed to highlight the motivation behind migration in the European Union, in particular movements from East to West. In this study, the independent variables included GDP, unemployment, minimum wages, and childbirth (Molnar, 2013) and the dependent variable was net migration. After calculating the standard deviations within each of the independent variables, the study concluded that the real push factor with net migration (the different between immigration

and emigration) was unemployment (Molnar, 2013). This was largely seen in the countries that are considered to be under in Europe. The table below (as extracted from the study) demonstrates a net migration forecast in the thousands in 2010, 2011, and 2012 strictly based on unemployment rates.

Table 1

Migration Forecast

Member State	Net Migration 2010	Net Migration 2011	Net Migration 2012
Austria	21.9	33.3	-18.7
Belgium		-2.7	72.6
Denmark	10.8	11.8	-75.3
Finland	13.7	9.8	63.6
France	72	70.5	57.8
Germany	152.6	150.4	80.5
Greece	-0.9	2.3	-34.8

Based on those previous studies, below is a brief overview that would depict the relationship between GDP and mass migration during the time period in which conflict erupted in the selected sample.

See Table 2 below:


Table 2

Sample Countries Mass Migration in the Thousands

Location	1965 - 1970	1970 - 1975	1975 - 1980	1980 - 1985	1985 - 1990	1990 - 1995	1995 - 2000	2000 - 2005	2005 - 2010
World									
Africa									
Eastern Africa									
Rwanda	20	- 20	- 20	- 50	30	1348	1210	- 73	- 75
Asia									
South-Eastern Asia									
Cambodia	225	-	125	- 85	- 89	- 78	409	348	- 35
Europe									
Southern Europe									
Bosnia and Herzegovina	- 100	- 75	- 75	- 30	- 56	748	160	35	4
Latin America and the Caribbean									
South America									
Colombia	281	290	287	274	254	224	190	159	143

IMF Data Mapper ®

Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)



©IMF, 2016, Source: World Economic Outlook (April 2016)

Figure 5. Sample Countries GDP Index

Table 3

Data

Sample Country	X (mass migration)	Y (GDP Index)
Colombia (1975-1980)	287	2
Rwanda (1990-1995)	1348	-42
Cambodia (1965-1970)	225	5

Pearson Correlation Coefficient Formula

$$r = \frac{n(\sum xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{[n\sum x^2 - (\sum x)^2][n\sum y^2 - (\sum y)^2]}}$$

Table 4

Correlation Coefficient Data

X	Y	XY	X ²	Y ²
287	2	574	82,369	4
1,348	-42	-56,616	1,800,000	1,764
225	5	1,125	50,625	25

$$\begin{aligned}
 r &= [3(-54917) - (1860)(49)] / \sqrt{[3(2,560,000,000) - (1860)^2][3(3,200,000) - (-35)^2]} \\
 &= [-164,751 - 91,140] / \sqrt{(7,680,000,000 - 3,500,000)(9,600,000 - 1,225)} \\
 &= -0.94
 \end{aligned}$$

This coefficient indicates a near perfect negative relationship where was the higher GDP index, the less people will migrate from their native country.




Figure 6. Linear Regression

$$y = \alpha + \beta x$$

where:

α is the y-intercept

β is the slope of the line (formula below)

$$b = \frac{n(\sum xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2}$$

The slope for this sample is -0.033, which means that the deviation between the relationship of GDP and mass migration is nearly null.

Threats to Validity

The primary threat to the validity to this study is that there are no current studies that can be used as primary sources to cross check the statistical analysis. This means that this study is largely based on historical figures that will be manipulated to project findings that may or may not be valid. In addition, statistical analyses will only provide

measures of association between variables, which can trace causal relationships but cannot assert them (Healy, 2012, p. 308). However, “measures of association...are amongst the most important and powerful tools for documenting, measuring, and analyzing cause and effect relationships (Healy, 2012, p. 30).

Ethical Procedures

“Social research is a dynamic process that often involves an intrusion into people’s lives...central to this is ethical responsibility...[whereas] a mutually respectful relationship is established, valid results are obtained, and the community considers the conclusions constructive” (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 96). This is especially important when social research is being conducted with live subjects (i.e., people) and requires researchers to extract data or information from people via interviews or surveys.

However, for the purposes of this study, the data that will be utilized is largely archival; this means that data will be extracted from public records and scholarly articles that provide the economic state of countries that have been inflicted with violent conflict. This means the ethical rules that would normally be applied when dealing with live subjects will not necessarily be effective here. Yet, it does not mean that ethical implications are negated. This is because ethics within social research does not rest on the relationship between the researcher and participant alone (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 99). For studies such as these there is an ethical responsibility upon the researcher to their academic community. Ethical violations in that respect involve the following: (a) falsification of results, including the inappropriate analysis and reportage of findings, (b) the concealment of shortcomings that are related to the research, (c) replication of results

as their own, and (d) criticizing other research studies on the basis of personal bias (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 100); all of which will be avoided.

Methods Summary

As this chapter comes to a close, it is important to consider that there are a myriad of research methods that can be implemented for the analysis of this data, but only a select few have been chosen to accurately highlight the relationship between variables and confirm the underlying causal relationship. Doing so will provide findings to establish a reliable tool that can be utilized in the realm of international relations to prevent or deter violent conflict, or at the very least start a conversation that will motivate academics to explore other avenues of conflict resolution.

Chapter 4

Findings

In this chapter I will provide the overarching background on the countries that lay the groundwork for this research. I will examine Rwanda, Colombia, [former] Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and [former Nazi] Germany as they were in their most turbulent eras. In doing so, we will be able to put the theory of quantitative measures into practice. For each case study, I provide a brief introduction, the historical context and background, an abbreviated synopsis on the violent conflict that shifted the country's future along with notable current affairs and highlight the underlying economic lens. With each data set, the variables that will be examined are structural balance (which serves as the index to quantify the impact of violent conflict), purchasing power (which serves as the index to quantify the economic state for each case study), and a nation's population in a specific year (which demonstrates the influx or efflux compared to other years). As the chapter ends, each case study will conclude with the data operation at work, with statistical tables and charts demonstrate the accuracy of my overall hypothesis: if economics is the driver to violent conflict, then mass migration is inevitable.

Rwanda

Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, bordered by the Democratic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi (www.worldbank.org, 2016). Traditionally, Rwandan society was comprised of three ethnic groups, Twa, and more notably Hutu and Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9). All three groups shared the same language, religious beliefs, and coexisted and intermingled within the same territory –

which juxtaposes the subsequent documentation of the country's ethnic polarization (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9).

Historical Context and Background

The first inhabitants of Rwanda are said to be the Twa, hunters and gatherers, who were followed by the Hutu and then the Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 10). In the 17th century Rwanda was divided and ruled by kings, and from then on, the monarchy was given its essential government institutions (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 13). The centuries that followed were ruled by Tutsi kings with varying clans living in harmony until the 1900's, when it was colonized by Germany (www.gov.rw, 2016).

The first elected president of Rwanda, President Gregoire Kayibanda came into power in 1924, replacing the Tutsi monarchies and asserting a Hutu majority (www.gov.rw, 2016). It has been said that the Hutus had long been resentful of Tutsi power and were encouraged by the Belgians (who ruled the territory) to campaign against the Tutsi and emancipate their freedom. The three decades that followed caused thousands of deaths and led to the creation of militarized political parties who desired immediate independence. Although on its face, it was an independence of the two tribal nations, the reality that had it not been for the German infiltration and their influences it would have been moot.

Known as the Hutu Emancipation Movement that began in 1959, is the violent uprising that led to the fall of the Tutsi monarchy (www.un.org, 2016), and where the cycle of ethnic conflict that would swallow an entire nation began. In a matter of months, there were hundreds of deaths and refugees in the tens of thousands, with several hundred government officials losing their positions. Having control at the local level, the Hutu

leaders presented the UN with a report that would dissolve the monarchy and give Rwanda independence. Independence did indeed follow, but with constraints.

Upon gaining independence, the UN instituted that as a part of the agreement the UNAR (Rwandese National Union), led by the Tutsi, would have two ministerial posts, two posts of secretary of state, two prefect (chief officer) and two sub-prefect posts, and one post in the Refugee Commission (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 33). Waves of violence followed and nearly 300,000 refugees were registered with the UNHCR by 1964. Between 1963 and 1966 about twelve rebel attacks took place, marking the beginning of genocidal massacres in Rwanda (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 34). President Kayibanda took advantage of this, as the ideal moment to promote is anti-Tutsi ideology; up until then the racist anti-Tutsi propaganda was primarily the work of party officials, but soon spread to state institutions and schools (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 35-36). It was at this time that Hutu political affiliations usurped any Tutsi political parties and abolished any political influence that remained in place. After the Tutsi's were forced to exile, President Kayibanda realized that his plan went beyond ethnic conflict and seeped over into an open and brutal regional conflict. Unable to restore peace, President Kayibanda's administration was overthrown in July of 1973.

Major-General Habyarimana led the Rwandan National Guard in a coup in response to the hatred, injustice, and regionalism that President Kayibanda had instilled in the previous 50 years (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 45). That October, the first circulator was sent out, regulating the return for refugees and the repossession of their property (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 47), any property that went unclaimed by 1975 was to be considered abandoned and redistributed (although there are no indications as to whom or how much

property was left to be redistributed). It was clear from here that the largest battle that the Rwandan had to climb post-civil war was the refugee crisis.

In 1976, President Habyarimana's sent out a directive that asked for "systemic but discreet census of refugees living in neighboring countries...the return of refugees must be strictly controlled and only encouraged when those applying to return are useful to the country...embark in a...campaign to persuade Rwandan nationals to remain in their host country...[and] those without steady employment, and undesirable elements should be prevented from entering the country..." (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 51). In short, the policy read that the only refugees allowed to return were those elites who had only recently left and were seen as harmless to the new political regime.

After having made this position public, President Habyarimana went on to justify the achievements of the revolution in 1959 and followed by putting in place an ethnic and regional quota system for access to education and employment as part of his policy of "ethnic balance" (Kimyono, 2015, p. 55). During attempting to enforce these rigid ethnic quotas, it had become apparent that identifying people was not as easy feat. This was mainly for two reasons: the first was that indications of the ethnicity of individuals in government positions would have proven problematic for other family members and secondly, there was an influx of Tutsis that falsified documents their documents to pass as Hutus (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 56). Considering this, falsifying identification became crime in the Rwandan penal code punishable by one to five years in prison and/or a fine of 50,000 francs.

In 1978, the people of Rwanda officially elected President Habyarimana into office, carrying nearly 99% of the vote. The agenda was for the president to insert

himself into every aspect of the citizens' lives, creating a regime of totalitarianism. Every year he crafted a theme for his national campaign, in which everyone had to participate; this created a blanket for the economic and social crisis that did not trail far behind (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 64). Towards the end of the 1980's, given the rapid deterioration of the nation's socio-economic status, the defiance of authority was inevitable (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 70). By 1990, Rwanda was only doing slightly better than the "worse off" states in Africa (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 67) socio-economically, and would soon take a turn for the worse only four years later.

In October of 1990, The Rwandan Patriotic Front, comprised of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda and neighboring countries infiltrated Rwanda demanding the rule of law, the abolition of discrimination policies, and the right of return for refugees (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 80). Authorities responded to this with massacre and the imprisonment of those affiliated with the enemy. The following year President Habyarimana publicized the new constitution and had a new action plan, which included: "negotiate peace with the opposition party, enhance efficiency and neutrality, revive the economy, organize the opportunity for a national conference, resolve the refugee problem, and organize general elections" (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 82). From then until his assassination in 1994, President Habyarimana would be faced with protest after protest comprised of thousands of people and the continuation of killing citizens in mass numbers.

Organizers of the genocide used racist ideology to bring the Hutu to fear and hate the Tutsi; they used state institutions to turn this fear into the acts of hunting, raping, and

killing that comprised the genocide. Among the false ideals promulgated by the regime included (www.hrw.org, 2016):

- Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there
- Despite the first revolution (and the thousands of lives lost) the Tutsi continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were [somehow] responsible for the ongoing Hutu poverty
- Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, therefore the Hutu had not only the right, but a duty to defend themselves

“The regime [had] established arm caches, distributed weapons to militia, set up a rapid communication network between the commanders of the militia, and drew up lists of sympathizers designated as the first to kill” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 87). Nearly one million people died in the genocide, including nearly 75% of the Tutsi residents living in Rwanda (Kimyono, 2015, p. 88).

Social Theory

Social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or around them” (Lemert, 2010). Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can identify societies. A society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially be wiped out (Lemert, 2010). Following the coup that overthrew President Kayibanda in 1973, Rwanda was seemingly at its lowest point, where “The government feared its whole environment...The inhabitants were inward looking and bore the country’s slow shrinkage in silence...To the generalized lack of trust, rumor, secrecy, lack of breathing space: on top of material deprivation – the country was one of the poorest in the world

and lacked almost everything – was added something like mental paralysis” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 38).

In this state, it was only “natural” for the people to stand up and attempt to gain what was one lost, including pieces of their culture, religious beliefs, and the little political drive they had left. While many were left with no other option but to seek refuge in neighboring countries, the Rwandan citizens that were left, both Hutu and Tutsi took whatever measure they saw fit in order to maintain their social identity – which drives to the Parable of the Tribes.

Social identity begins to develop at the earliest stages of life (Ross, 2001, 160), where it explains why people are the way they are and why they do the things they do. People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies (Ross, 2001, 160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). The theory of the parable of the tribes illustrates this idea by linking the preservation of identity with the ability to protect one’s own group, and when there are various groups of different ethnicities living in close proximities, if one becomes an aggressor, the others will follow suit.

Government officials, soldiers and militia who had participated in the genocide fled, along with over one million civilians (mostly Hutu) with the threats that they would be killed if they remained. Genocide trials began in 1996, and by 2000 over 100,000 suspects were awaiting trial (www.un.org, 2016). As this was going on Rwanda’s military entered the Democratic Republic of Congo to extradite Hutu extremists who had used the country as a safe haven after the genocide. During this time the conflict escalated, and the Congolese military fought back; primarily for two reasons. The first

was to protect the Tutsi group from discrimination and violence, and the second was to prevent genocide from happening within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33). While the Rwandan forces were present, they also controlled the major provinces in Kivu, which had extensive mineral and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998 The Rwandan forces were asked to leave, to which they complied, but then returned for a second time, and grew to what is known as the Great of War of Africa. After four years, the invading troops ultimately pulled out and peace deals soon followed. In 2006 the Rwandan government implemented a restructure of the administration, replacing twelve chief officers with five larger multiethnic provinces with the intention to promote power sharing and reduce ethnic conflict (www.britnnica.com, 2016).

The Economic Lens

In 2006 the Human Rights Watch published a report stating that the genocide in Rwanda had several circumstances that surrounded it, including poverty, land scarcity, a population of two groups that faced a power struggle, and a history of colonial rule (that never provided the opportunity for freedom). It is critical to understand that the racist ideologies that were used as propaganda were a mask that justified the more fundamental goal of regime survival under the conditions of a severe economic crisis (Hintjens, 2016, p. 242).

While there is no raw data for the early 20th century, during the early years of colonialism, when workers were forced to migrate to the mines in Congo, the country's limited resources caused an unprecedented famine (Kimyono, 2015, p. 21). When Rwanda gained pseudo independence in the mid-1960's, the nation was hit with waves of conflict and violence, subsequently (and not surprisingly) the economy was impacted

negatively, particularly in the area of agriculture, where commodities such as coffee was the country's main foreign exchange earner (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 37). From 1974 to 1981, the country experiences a growth rate of over 5% per year, and this was in large part due to the growth in international aid that followed the regime of President Kayibanda. The years that followed corresponded with long period of drought and famine, and by 1990 the GDP growth was 1% (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 63).

Intense demographic pressure, the shortage of land for agriculture, and the lack of access to a seaport were always major issues of contention for Rwanda's economy; but, after the murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens, the economy was devastated. The effects of a poor economic infrastructure and violent conflict are cyclical and undoubtedly entangled.

Data Operation

The variables presented in this dataset (and the datasets throughout this study) are populations, enumerated in the thousands, the purchasing power during that year with that population, and the government structural balance in that same time frame. The government structural balance refers to the political, social, and economic structures that are in place at the time. For all of the data sets, the study examines a thirty-five-year period, from 1980-2015, in large part because further historical data has not been made available to provide a more in-depth analysis. All of the datasets presented in this research were extracted from data reports as provided by the International Monetary Fund, and are the most recent and accurate datasets available for this dissertation (World Economic Outlook Database, www.imf.org, 2019).

Table 5

Data Subset Rwanda

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
4.654	0.016	8.346
4.825	0.016	8.623
5.006	0.016	11.921
5.195	0.017	11.936
5.321	0.018	13.038
5.502	0.018	12.335
5.691	0.018	11.789
5.89	0.018	11.723
6.097	0.017	10.781
6.304	0.015	9.986
6.453	0.015	9.403
6.652	0.014	9.789
6.656	0.013	11.71
6.247	0.012	12.637
5.79	0.007	7.084
5.468	0.008	15.616
5.406	0.009	15.027
5.66	0.009	13.44
6.176	0.01	12.659
6.843	0.01	13.18
7.495	0.01	13.314
8.013	0.011	13.747
8.361	0.012	13.551
8.578	0.012	13.897
8.711	0.012	15.008
8.833	0.012	15.764
9	0.013	16.572
9.2	0.013	18.632
9.5	0.014	23.654
9.7	0.015	23.055
10	0.016	22.691
10.2	0.016	22.907
10.5	0.017	25.394
10.739	0.017	26.517
11.003	0.018	25.302
11.263	0.019	26.458

As we consider the data, it is important to consider the primary aim of this research, which is identify the nexus, between globalization (i.e., economics) and violent conflict and what are those implications on the migration in masses. As it relates to Rwanda, you will notice that R Square (see Table Nine) demonstrates a 77.8% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power X1 (globalization) and structural balance X2 (whose presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 76.5%, in likelihood of a small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at approximately 1.60, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook and whether or not they have endured violent conflict at any level.

Table 6

Summary Output Rwanda

Summary Output

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
	0.882236
Multiple R	789
	0.778341
R Square	752
	0.764907
Adjusted R Square	919
	0.985148
Standard Error	461
Observations	36

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	112.46146	56.23073	57.93891	1.59876E-11
Residual	33	32.027077	0.970517		
Total	35	144.48854			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	3.012683	0.7706550	3.909250	0.000434	1.444774	4.580593
X1	-	-	-	-	-	-
(GDP/Purchasing Power)	41.40444	52.905966	0.782604	0.439439	149.0424	66.23355
X2 (Structural Balance)	0.327500	0.0311976	10.49760	4.73217E-12	0.264028	0.390972




Figure 7. Line Plot Structural Balance for Rwanda




Figure 8. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda

As charted, the dataset demonstrates its correlation with the independent variables individually. Table Ten shows that Rwanda's population was directly impacted by violent conflict. The center of the chart has the population both increasing and decreasing in a short period of time, and this is large part due to the genocide happening in the time frame, where both masses of individuals were either murdered or pushed out, and other populations came into power. However, Table Eleven shows more uniformity in the data set, whereas the economic stability increased, so did the population, and vice versa.

Table 7

Residual Output Rwanda

Residual Output				
<i>Observation</i>		<i>Predicted (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
	1	5.08352995	-0.42952995	-0.449023241
	2	5.174247531	-0.349247531	-0.365097378
	3	6.254343498	-1.248343498	-1.304996878
	4	6.217851559	-1.022851559	-1.069271473
	5	6.537352438	-1.216352438	-1.271553973
	6	6.307119732	-0.805119732	-0.841658357
	7	6.128304572	-0.437304572	-0.457150698
	8	6.106689553	-0.216689553	-0.226523541
	9	5.83958872	0.25741128	0.269093336
	10	5.662034874	0.641965126	0.67109933
	11	5.471102203	0.981897797	1.026459113
	12	5.63892176	1.01307824	1.059054613
	13	6.309454267	0.346545733	0.362272965
	14	6.654451482	-0.407451482	-0.42594279
	15	5.042864572	0.747135428	0.78104256
	16	7.79569263	-2.32769263	-2.433329945
	17	7.561390514	-2.155390514	-2.253208268
	18	7.041647548	-1.381647548	-1.444350645
	19	6.744465376	-0.568465376	-0.594263952
	20	6.915093028	-0.072093028	-0.075364815
	21	6.958978068	0.536021932	0.560348133
	22	7.059381251	0.953618749	0.996896681
	23	6.95378675	1.40721325	1.471076591
	24	7.067101852	1.510898148	1.579467006
	25	7.430954677	1.280045323	1.338137422
	26	7.678544899	1.154455101	1.206847558
	27	7.901760692	1.098239308	1.148080532
	28	8.576411296	0.623588704	0.651888933
	29	10.17971333	-0.679713325	-0.71056065
	30	9.942136206	-0.242136206	-0.253125036
	31	9.781521656	0.218478344	0.228393513
	32	9.852261719	0.347738281	0.363519634
	33	10.6253505	-0.125350505	-0.131039267
	34	10.99313333	-0.254133334	-0.265666628
	35	10.55381603	0.449183966	0.469569212
	36	10.89100193	0.37199807	0.388880401

X2 (Structural Balance) Residual Plot




Figure 9. Residual Plot Structural Balance Rwanda

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Residual Plot




Figure 10. Residual Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda

Residual data in linear regression allows us to analyze the dataset with standardized values to show the accuracy in the relationship between the variables. Like Table Eleven, Table Thirteen is less predictable by way of violent conflict (though violent conflict as it is an unpredictable phenomenon), and Table Twelve and Table Fourteen are more succinct in their projections for accuracy.

Colombia

Ravaged by decade long violent outbreaks lead by armed groups, political leaders, and drug cartels, Colombia has been making significant progress towards its national security (www.bbc.com, 2016). With 47.5 million inhabitants, Colombia is the fourth largest country in South America and is one of the economic leaders among Latin American countries, trailing just behind Brazil and Argentina. Today, 14% of the Colombian population identifies themselves to be ethnically different than the mestizo majority or European Whites (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 23). Even with a comparatively large indigenous populations, Colombia as a nation has continued to show strength in their economic growth.

Historical Context and Background

Colombia was a nation-state that was at peace until 1932, when they engaged in a brief war with Peru. Circumstances surrounding this violent conflict included labor and land, as coffee was a major agricultural resource. When the Great Depression spread to a global level after the First World War, the demand for coffee and other agricultural commodities took a downward spiral (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 83). This led to the expulsion of thousands of poor, rural residents from their lands and the pressure of the government to react. These two factors culminated in the mass migration into ecological regions that were easily impacted by human residency (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 25). The war with Peru was short lived, but it was not an indication that the violence in Colombia had come to an end.

Jorge Eliacer Gaitan Ayala was the popular candidate for the Colombian presidential elections in 1950, a person who denounced the Colombian government for

attacking its own workers in Peru and worked towards improving the lives of impoverished citizens (www.ic.galegroup.com, 2016). However, the unrest that he had ensued with his public opinion led to his assassination in 1948 and a decade long civil war known as La Violencia followed, a destructive phenomenon that was purely social and had no regard for race or economic status.

La Violencia was given its name, not because of the property or resources that were lost, but because the methods of the actual killings were brutal and widespread. In some cases the techniques were give nicknames, including “picar picar tamal” which consisted of cutting up the body bit by bit; “bocachiquiar” which was a process involving hundreds of small punctures for the victim to be bled out; and “corte de mica” which was a form of beheading (Bailey, 1967, p. 563). “Crucifixions and hangings were commonplace, political prisoners were thrown from airplanes in flight, infants were bayoneted, schoolchildren...were raped in masse, unborn infants were removed by crude caesarian and replaced by roosters, ears were cut off, scalps removed...to indicate...a phenomenon of unparalleled ferocity” (Bailey, 1967, p. 563). President Mariano Ospina Perez won the election and remained in control of the military during the violent conflict. President Ospina attempted to suppress the violence with dictator like policies that were deemed ineffective. Considering his populist politics, Laureano Gomez won the uncontested election in 1950 (President Gomez ceded his presidency to Roberto Urdaneta Alvarez due to illness, but then resumed until 1953 when he was overthrown by a military coup) (Bailey, 1967, p. 565). Outside of the capital, La Violencia was predominantly rural, transforming itself from a politically driven conflict to one that was based on economics. As a result, the movement was under the auspices of highly

organized rural bandits (Bailey, 1967, p. 568). In 1957 (nearing the end) leaders of both political parties overthrew General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla with aims to restore national unity (Bailey, 1967, p. 566).

After the loss of so many lives Conservatives and Liberals agreed to form a National Front and banned all other parties. The time period between La Violencia and the mid 1960's is not notable in history. This is not because Colombia as a nation was stagnant, but rather it was during recovery and unknowingly bracing itself for guerilla warfare and a new economy that would be dominated by cocaine.

The Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed by survivors of the government's crackdown on a communist-inspired peasant collective in the mountainous area of Marquetalia (www.nytimes.com, 2016). During that time, the Colombian government made a \$30 million dollar investment to the isolated region that would include military occupation and build new roads, schools, and health centers. This was in response to the guerilla violence that had grown in the area. What is known as "Operation Marquetalia" no longer marks a program of support, but rather a clash of the powers between government and rebels. Leaders Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas met with communities and unified approximately 350 local guerillas that codified themselves as the Southern Bloc (later renamed FARC) calling for land reform and better conditions for those in the countryside of Colombia. Their strategy at first was to defend their communities of followers from the Colombian government, largely by responding with acts of violence with Colombian military infiltrated the area. This soon changed and FARC started providing educational and medical services to loyal communities, trained militias for combat, and carried out attacks (www.stanford.edu, 2016). FARC was able to

“provide these services” largely by kidnapping for ransom. In the 1970’s, FARC began trafficking cocaine for funding, and with its newfound wealth the number of members increased, nearly tripling in size.

As the members increased, so did the number of kidnappings (disappearances) and systemic killings. Systemic conflicts are few and far between, as they usually involve a high number of deaths and last for an extended period of time in light of the fact that it is multi-polarity (by way of several guerilla groups); and the FARC was a prime example of this. Despite the peace accords in the 1980’s, and the attempts of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002 to dismantle FARC. FARC continues to coexist among the Colombian populations; and with peak numbers nearing 20,000 members, FARC is a forced to be reckoned with.

In Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his *Communist Manifesto* Marx writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle (Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day’s bourgeoisie (Love, 2006, p. 251).

The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical perspective is infinitely more significant than the division of race, religion, or gender (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise up in the global society – because it is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is the most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create

revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in their own battles.

In the case of Colombia, Marxists have identified La Violencia as a movement representing the class struggle (Bailey, 1967, p. 569). The problem with this theory is that the rebellion did not exclude anyone from death, regardless of race or socio-economic status. The killing that took place had no scale (Bailey, 1967, p. 570). Thus, it was not the elite watching the murder of those in despair; it was a case of full-on participation on all sides. However, the notorious guerilla group, FARC, was very much a Marxist group, founded to overthrow the Colombian government. Many FARC leaders sought inspiration from leftist social movements around the world, opposing the privatization of natural resources and claiming to represent the rural poor against the Colombian elite (www.cfr.org, 2016).

Born in 1949, Medellin Cartel kingpin, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, played a large role in the formation of Colombian politics and its economy, as we know it today. Escobar was born into a lower-middle class family, and as a young man became involved with crime when he began stealing cars. This, of course, is clouded in comparison with his path to wealth through drug trafficking. In 1975, when Escobar was 26 years old, he stepped into power after the death of Fabio Restrepo, a local Medellin drug lord. In less than ten years, Escobar made billions, murdered hundreds, and was elected to Colombia's Congress. Escobar's methodology was simple, following one paradigm "plata o plomo," money or lead. Much like the movement of La Violencia, Escobar's victims were not exclusive to race or social and economic status; he ordered assassinations of presidential candidates, judges, journalists, and even criminals within his network.

Narco-violence further ensued when drug lords like Escobar, took advantage of poverty and hired sicarios (assassins), mostly teenage boys from the slums, to assassinate people for \$100 a head. Among the murders, car bombings, and kidnappings became part of the daily life in Colombia (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 91). By the mid 1980's, Escobar was one of the most powerful men in the world, with the ability to order the murder of anyone, anytime, anywhere. The government and elite feared him, and the common people of his country loved him; he spent millions on parks, schools, stadiums and housing for the poorest of the poor in Medellin. In 1991 the Colombian government and Escobar came up with a prison arrangement in response to the U.S. pressure to extradite him. Essentially, Escobar would turn himself in and serve a five-year sentence, so long as he could build his own prison and select his own guards – and so it was. Living in a resort like Fortress, Escobar ran his empire from the inside, but after word spread that he tortured and killed traitors the Colombian government ordered for him to be transferred. Escobar escaped without hesitation and went into hiding until his death in 1993.

The number of deaths, kidnappings, and displaced persons that is marked by Colombia's last 50 years is staggering. In fact, by the early 2000's there were so many kidnappings held for ransom, that a weekly radio show was established to allow relatives to broadcast messages to those who have been kidnapped (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 27). When President Uribe was elected in 2002, he pledged to expand Colombia's military and police in order to demobilize any paramilitary and officials involved in narco-trafficking. By the following year, the homicide rate in Medellin alone fell 46% (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 27).

In the years that followed Colombia underwent a crucial social and political transformation. High-quality, public infrastructures were built in the poorest neighborhoods, digitized maps noting where drug gangs operated were created, the thousands that were previously demobilized were reintegrated into society and introduced to new social [welfare] programs (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 28). Hundreds of millions dollars were invested in the “new Colombia,” and while there have been some upticks in crime along the way, the nation has been on a steady path of renewal and the odds of it being controlled by crime and drug driven leaders is not in the horizon.

Inspired by the Cuban revolution, FARC believed that popular forces could defeat national armed forces in a war, that a revolution could be launched, and that the revolutionary effort had to be initiated from the countryside (Lee, 2012, p. 30). After over a decade of violence, FARC first participated in peace negotiations in the 1980s and formed a political party in 1985 the Patriotic Union (UP) in hopes of legitimizing their role in Colombian politics (Lee, 2012, p. 31). Despite these efforts, the experiment failed, and FARC members responded once more with crime and the escalation of military action. In the 1990s, FARC asked for official control of a territory in southern Colombia. The administration at the time ceded this request to solidify peace talks, but this action only confirmed what FARC believed all of these years, that they are powerful enough to alter or overthrow the government. By 1998 FARC’s power had grown tremendously (Lee, 2012 p. 31,), and used this territory to train members and as a site for narco-trafficking. In 2002, Colombia seized the territory, which resulted in an increase of attacks and kidnappings over the next several years.

In 2008 it was reported that hundreds of thousands of Colombians flooded the streets of the capitol to protest FARC, the people of Colombia had finally had it. The supporters that FARC thought they once had been no longer at their platform, they no longer had territory to control, and they were losing members by the hundreds. This was followed by the death of many high-level leaders, including FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. Losses like these demoralized FARC and demonstrated that their reign was nearing its end. Soon after, peace talks with the Colombian administration began.

On December 10th 2016, president Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia accepted the Nobel Peace prize for helping to end his country's 50 year long civil war (www.theguardian.com, Dec 10 2016). Dedicating his prize to all Colombians, including the 220,000 killed and 8 million displaced during the conflict, President Santos won the award for reaching a deal with FARC earlier that year. To the surprise of many around the globe, voters in congress rejected the peace agreement, noting that it was too soft on the members responsible for war crimes. But, after the modifications of more than 50 points outlined in the agreement, congress approved the new deal, and FARC began the process of demobilization and handing their weapons to the United Nations.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1) they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want X (4) they see it as feasible that they should have X. the relativity of the concept come

from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3 (Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2).

Scholars have argued that the history and the depravity of the Colombian system have been the primary drivers for FARC to have a powerful, armed resistance; being a movement that was willing to participate in the mass struggle without abandoning its demands for radical changes on land tenure, property ownership, and foreign trade (Lee, 2012, p. 29). The reality was that political movements like FARC and people like Pablo Escobar had a Robin Hood air about them. They claimed that they were against the national government because the national government was exclusionary of those who lived out on the countryside, those who were predominantly of mixed races, and those who were predominantly of lesser mans. This gave them a rise to power that no one would have ever anticipated.

For nearly half a century Colombia as a national and its government was not stable, constantly cleaning up after FARC's terror attacks, utilizing resources to rescue those who have been kidnapped, and attempted to recuperate an economy that was deeply penetrated by narco-trafficking. This was largely because those targeted factions truly believed that they were the have-nots, and FARC and Pablo Escobar were the iconic heroes that were going to rescue them from the depths of their despair by providing what the Colombian government had not been able to. FARC and Escobar had acquired wealth through the drug trade, they built schools and hospitals for the people, and supplied food and clothing to community when they needed to gain notoriety. The truth of what was happening in Colombia was that the relative deprivation of the people only sunk them

into a deeper hole, of which took the nation over 50 years to get out of and continues to recover in present day from all of the damage that has been done.

The 21st century marked the beginning of a new Colombia. President Pastrana (elected in 1998) implemented what he called “Plan Colombia” and gained nearly \$1 billion dollars in support from the United States to fight drug-traffickers and rebels who profited from the illegal trade (www.bbc.com, Nov 15 2016). This marked the renewal of peace talks with FARC rebels, which failed until the second term of the president that follows, President Alvaro Uribe. President Uribe was highly praised for his ability to work with FARC members to release hostages and declaring cease-fires while conferring peace talks. In 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos was elected and in his first term he successfully implemented a peace plan that is said to stabilize a nation.

An Economy on Drugs

While the drug cartels and rebels have been at the forefront of Colombia’s history for decades, it is important to note that both its infrastructure and economic health have also been impacted and followed the waves of highs and lows. The reality is that FARC and Escobar’s motives were never really to support their base, but rather to gain power and overthrow a government so that they can continue to accrue wealth and land. Unfortunately for the Colombian people, this had a tremendous impact on their natural resources and international trade of goods. Among its other natural resources and agricultural exports, Colombia was famously known for its coffee industry. The expansion of coffee laid the groundwork for its economic power after world war two, and continued to experience sustained growth until the 1980s, which is no coincidence that it was around the time of Escobar’s rise to power and the expansion of the drug trade. As

the demand for cocaine grew, so did the need for land, labor, and structures that would support the industry. Coffee growers were no longer meeting the needs for their families, and soon were forced to provide labor and their territory to the more profitable resources, cocaine. The effects of the drug trade were now intertwined with most aspects of Colombian life and took nearly 20 years of economic growth away from a country that is now recorded to have one of the highest GDP's in the world.

Data Operation

Table 8

Data Sheet Colombia

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
28.447	0.592	0
29.08	0.595	0
29.718	0.599	0
30.36	0.594	0
31.004	0.588	0
30.794	0.585	0
31.433	0.598	0
32.092	0.607	0
32.764	0.605	0
33.443	0.603	0
34.125	0.604	0
34.834	0.604	0
35.53	0.566	0
36.208	0.586	0
36.863	0.599	0
37.49	0.608	0
38.1	0.598	0
38.6	0.594	0
39.2	0.582	0
39.7	0.539	0
40.296	0.529	-3.721
40.814	0.525	-3.153
41.329	0.523	-2.384
41.849	0.522	-1.159
42.368	0.523	0.09
42.889	0.522	0.571
43.406	0.529	-1.328
43.927	0.537	-2.02
44.451	0.539	-1.099

44.979	0.547	-2.16
45.51	0.542	-2.535
46.045	0.559	-2.789
46.582	0.563	-1.542
47.121	0.57	-2.67
47.662	0.577	-3.185
48.203	0.574	-3.598

Table 9

Summary Output Colombia

SUMMARY OUTPUT

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
	0.787425
Multiple R	685
	0.620039
R Square	21
	0.597011
Adjusted R Square	283
	3.820026
Standard Error	016
Observations	36

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	785.8270129	392.9135065	26.92553347	1.1633E-07
Residual	33	481.5557593	14.59259877		
Total	35	1267.3827	72		

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	79.44208083	14.25845117	5.57157856	3.41228E-06	50.43304381	108.4511178
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	75.5353432	24.5024965	3.082761106	0.004123449	125.3860472	25.68463925
X2 (Structural Balance)	2.380976689	0.573652534	4.150555516	0.000219015	3.548081545	1.213871833

As the dataset relates to Colombia, you will notice that R Square (see Table Sixteen) demonstrates a 62% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 59.7%. Significance F, at approximately 1.16, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. However, the data tells us to reject the notion of population having a relationship to both violent conflict and globalization as the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) are less than the alpha 0.05. This means that while the data demonstrates that violent conflict is economically driven, thus causing migration movements, it also tells us that the probability of it being accurate is low, making the hypothesis null.




Figure 11. Line Plot Structural Balance Colombia




Figure 12. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia

Despite the P-values being low in test value, both Tables Seventeen and Eighteen tell us that violent conflict and globalization have an impact with Colombia's population, as both variables are nearly linear to the dependent variable.

Table 10

Residual Output Colombia

Residual Output			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	34.72515765	6.278157651	-1.692555618
2	34.49855162	5.418551621	-1.460810718
3	34.19641025	4.478410248	-1.207353948
4	34.57408696	4.214086964	-1.136093893
5	35.02729902	4.023299024	-1.084658548
6	35.25390505	4.459905053	-1.202365052
7	34.27194559	2.838945592	-0.765363595
8	33.5921275	1.500127503	-0.404425848
9	33.74319819	0.979198189	-0.263986266
10	33.89426888	0.451268876	-0.121659524
11	33.81873353	0.306266468	0.082567699
12	33.81873353	1.015266468	0.273710069
13	36.68907657	1.159076574	-0.312480456
14	35.17836971	1.02963029	0.277582474
15	34.19641025	2.666589752	0.71889744
16	33.51659216	3.973407841	1.071208169
17	34.27194559	3.828054408	1.03202171
18	34.57408696	4.025913036	1.085363271
19	35.48051108	3.719488917	1.002753071
20	38.72853084	0.971469159	0.261902564
21	48.34349853	8.047498533	-2.169559863
22	47.29324515	6.479245147	-1.746767664
23	45.61334476	4.284344759	-1.155034995
24	42.77218366	0.923183658	-0.248885067
25	39.72280843	2.64519157	0.713128612
26	38.65309399	4.235906015	1.141976185
27	42.64582132	0.760178684	0.204939852
28	43.68917444	0.237825561	0.064116419
29	41.34522422	3.105775778	0.837299497
30	43.26715774	1.711842256	0.461502942
31	44.53770072	0.972299282	0.26212636
32	43.85836796	2.186632037	0.589503568
33	40.58714866	5.994851342	1.616177847
34	42.74414296	4.376857038	1.17997578
35	43.44159855	4.220401446	1.137796241
36	44.65154796	3.551452044	0.957451285




Figure 13. Residual Output Structural Balance Colombia




Figure 14. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia

However, Tables Nineteen and Twenty show the dataset as more dispersed without concrete evidence that the variables have a connection.

Yugoslavia

“With the end of the first world war and the fall of the Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire, the conditions were met for proclaiming the Kingdom of Serbs Croats, and Slovenians in December of 1918” (www.kosovo.net, 2016). Yugoslavia, literally means the land of the Slavs, had long been an idea cultivated by nations, monarchs and

politicians alike, and soon came to fruition after the assassination of King Aleksander I, as he hoped to curb separatist tendencies and mitigate nationalist passions.

Yugoslavia as a sovereign state is known to have one of the most troubled and violent histories in Europe, having been dismantled and reincarnated on more than one occasion. While there were periods of stability, the demise of Yugoslavia as a republic that was inhabited by people of differing political, economic, religious, and social traditions was bound to fall apart. These differences were rooted in their experience of conflict. Today, there are four major principles that explain the Yugoslavia's collapse. The first is that of the ancient hatred between the Serbs and Croats; that because the ethnic hatred was so deeply rooted a united front was never viable (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The second holds that a combination of economic weakness and strategically motivated international prying have prevented the evolution of a unified nation, because it would not allow for a tangible balance of power (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The third argument for the fall of Yugoslavia is the clash between cultural roots and the political ideology. The communist rule repressed the variety of languages, religions, and cultural identities, but did not eliminate them; causing groups to constantly attempt to claim their dominance as the single defined entity (Lane, 2004, p. 4). The fourth and final principle highlights the failure of major powers giving enough attention to the existence of external threats to Yugoslavia, leaving the "little guy" to fend for itself (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The reality is that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the response of a fractured community that is comprised of bits and pieces of all these principles and a nation tried too hard too soon to become something that it was not.

Historical Context and Background

The identity of the South Slav was the notion to preserve a distinct cultural and political identity that would preserve a measure of independence. This was during the time where European political legitimacy was tied to the strength of a nation who had solid foundations to identity (Lane, 2004, p. 8). The problem with the Balkan Peninsula (not yet established as Yugoslavia) was that the people were largely migrants that had no real affinity to the territory, therefore creating a “loosely structured multi-ethnic empire” (Lane, 2004, p. 8). This led to the production of societies within a society, with no strong leadership, poor communication systems and the continued existence of feudal traditions that rivaled the great powers of neighboring Germany, France, and Italy.

The events that transpired in the century preceding the First World War only further defined the separation of a nation by its religion (Orthodox vs. Muslim vs. Catholic) and their socioeconomic class (well-educated and poor vs. the oligarchy of the aristocrats). The Balkan Peninsula was dismembered and put back together at least a half dozen times before 1914 through treaties, uprisings, the Balkan Wars and local political movements that led to assassinations of monarchs and politicians. Furthermore, it was a major player territorially speaking in the First World War, which consequently further weakened their economic, national security, and sovereign power.

Three weeks following the first cease-fire of World War I, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later named Yugoslavia) was created (Lane, 2004, p. 34). The Serbs were quick to create a united political front with three distinct, but ethnically related people with the desire for stability and security. However, the kingdom did not make for a free nation-state. European countries that surrounded the region did not

recognize the SCS Kingdom for what it was (or for what it was trying to become) and continued to engage in dispute over territory. Considering this, King Alexander renamed the region Yugoslavia in attempt to remain above factionalism and soon followed with the introduction of a new constitution that allowed for the return of a partial parliamentary government (Lane, 2004, p. 60).

Less than five years later, King Alexander was assassinated as he was on his way to France to discuss alliances. Leaving the crown to his eleven- year old son, a senior regent, Prince Paul was appointed until the heir came of age (Lane, 2004, p. 64). Prince Paul, an inexperienced but cultured young man, looked largely to others for political advice and appointed a rather radical prime minister to do implement what he saw fit. The problem here was that World War II was in the horizon and alliances needed to be made with the right countries for the still unstable Yugoslavia to survive any sort of warfare. Unfortunately for Prince Paul, after demonstrations broke, he was overthrown in a coup that brought the eighteen-year old heir, Peter to the throne. King Peter's first cabinet only lasted three weeks, and soon after Hitler's Germany invaded, causing Peter, Paul, and any cabinet members to flee into exile. The years that followed the invasion destroyed any sort of political structure that was in place. Yugoslavia was in crisis yet again.

Josip Broz Tito was a Yugoslav revolutionary and statesmen that held various political positions that began in 1939, just a few years before World War II. Tito was the head of the Yugoslav communist party, who helped liberate parts of the country, successfully obtained military aid from America, and above all defied Stalin and the mighty Soviet Union as he fought for a consolidated Yugoslavia. Fortunately for Tito,

Stalin's death in 1953 marked the end of tension and uncertainty, and Tito was able to cultivate the perception of a unified front comprised of Serbian and Croatian nationalists (Lane, 2004, p. 115). Over the next several decades Tito experimented with communism in Yugoslavia and was able to preserve the country's independence, preserve the country's unity, create new types of socialism, foster a decentralized economy, and lead a nonaligned movement that gave Yugoslavia the power to influence world affairs (Campbell, 1980, p. 1049). By the 1960's a new generation of political parties emerged, revealing that the divisions among the people were not eliminated but rather covered up by the communistic ideal. A fresh constitution was later adopted in 1963 (Lane, 2004, p. 131) to support the reform of the Yugoslav economy that included the reduction of federal powers. This marked the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.

Yugoslav ideologists claimed that the nation was comprised of three tribes, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; and while they had nearly identical ethnic origins, a common majority language, and complementary economies, because state integration was more important than social integration. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the nation was faced with division. The problem here was that the country was held together more by military police, political, and administrative power than it was by economic, religious, cultural, and civilization links (Stojanovic, 1997, p. 74). After the death of Tito in 1980, growing nationalism among the republics threatened to split their union apart (www.history.com, 2016). The language problem was revived, student demonstrations ensued, and groups could choose flags to show their autonomy. By 1990, Yugoslavia "was a multi-ethnic sovereign state without a functioning center of power...[and] none had the power to coerce the remainder into cooperation and the international community

did not attempt to supply the necessary power until the process of dissolution was already beyond the point of no return.” (Lane, 2004, p. 172).

Yugoslavia’s collapse began in 1991, when the republics once again descended into war in times of declaring independence. That year Slovenia and then Croatia declared independence. The Yugoslav regime responded by sending an army composed largely of Serbs to Croatia (under the guise of protecting ethnic Serbs) and carrying out mass executions of hundreds of men. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed with their declaration of independence, which was again followed by the same military response as Croatia. The remaining republics that comprised Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro also declared their independence in the same time frame. However, their independence was not succeeded by mass murder and terror, as they were seen as minority countries that did not pose a threat that could not have been easily controlled by the other republics of the regime. The war launched in Bosnia, which lasted for nearly three years, is noted as the largest massacre that occurred in Europe following World War II. Mass executions, concentration camps, rape and sexual violence, and forced displacement were prevalent in this ethnic cleansing that resulted in the death of nearly 100,000 and the displacement of 4.4 million (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 509).

What makes the campaign of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina unique is the level and kind of atrocities that were committed, even in the safe areas. Girls and women were raped, often in front of family members as a tactic of terror; they were later sold to other soldiers or killed when no longer deemed useful (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 511). In a matter of less than one week, 7,000 boys and men were systematically slaughtered. Bosnian Serbs took safe areas without resistance; 42,000 refugees were removed and

taken to Muslim controlled territories that were bound to face violence. When Serbian forces refused to comply with the United Nations, NATO stepped in and proceeded with bombing Bosnian Serb positions. Not two months after, in 1995, a federalized division with Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia was created.

Scholars and political leaders alike have argued that at the core of the genocide in the Balkan lands is that of the ancient hatreds. In fact, a theory known as parable of the tribes notes that if we have different ethnic groups living in close proximity and one becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms the state of affairs of the relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity, causing them all to become aggressive.

People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies (Ross, 2001, 160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has been proposed that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out because the only morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity (Victoroff, 2004, 21). Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of losing the ability to protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups are sought after in order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity, the factors that embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for igniting and escalating conflict. The reality is, that the wars that ensued after the death of Tito were bound to happen whether the ethnic factors were present or not. This is because during the time of Tito, Yugoslavs enjoyed the highest standard of living and that they ever had freedom (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 514). Once that pillar (Tito) was removed, the

entire economic “infrastructure” collapsed and people in power had to find a means by which to convince their citizens to fight for what was rightfully theirs; and nothing is more powerful than the unification of identity and the protection of that individualism. Here, we will demonstrate that in removing the element of ethnic identity, and solely using the economic history of Yugoslavia, a war would have still erupted and could make projections as to how to deter history from repeating itself.

Following the war, the Yugoslav nation was tasked with major economic reconstruction. The damage was largely covered by UN aid the future was now mapped out by Five Year Plans, prepared by the chairman of the Economic Planning Council. The first Five Year Plan was raising output by accelerating rates of agriculture and feeding the rapidly expanding army that Tito had created (Lane, 2004, p. 111). While the plan was successful in meeting its goals (by the end of the five years, 25% of the national income was reinvested in the state) it was deeply flawed in part because Yugoslavia was a comparatively a small nation and unable to compete with the world powers at the time, and because it only focused on one industry, leaving everything else to fall behind on the wayside. Considering this, when a succession of bad harvests occurred, the economic crisis began to emerge (Lane, 2004, p. 113).

The economy during this period largely focused on rapid industrialization. By 1953 Yugoslavia recovered, retaining control of the exchange rate and monetary system, and was ready for their second installment of a Five-Year Plan. The new plan was implemented in 1961 (after receiving \$275 million in aid from the United States), which marked the beginning of economic reforms. But, after the cost of living spiked 30%, the rise in unemployment for older, uneducated political appointees, and the devaluation of

the dinar, the plan had to be abandoned. Economists believed that this time around the plan would work, as they had a structure that would revise the plan every year, but the emphasis on short-term solutions and poor strategic planning is what caused its failure (Lane, 2004, p. 127).

A new constitution was adopted in 1963 along with the implementation (and failure) of the third and fourth five-year plans take us to yet another economic crisis. By the 1970s two problems had become prevalent, the first was that of the growing bureaucracy in the economic system and the second was the regime's inability to control inflation. This means that there were thousands of self-managing units, each support by one of the two million self-managing bureaucrats who had essentially their own bank for each of their enterprise and borrowed funds at interest rates that would lead to an investment boom (Lane, 2004, p. 145). The fifth Five-Year Plan was implemented in 1971, with the aims of promoting greater unity of the state through economic cooperation. By 1979 the regime had received nearly 1 billion dollars in aid and by 1980, Yugoslavia was regarded as an economic catastrophe.

In 1981, foreign debt had piled up, inflation took off, and standards of living plummeted 40%. International lenders were no longer motivated to provide economic support (unless terms were punitive) and there was no one element strong enough to provide direction or enforcement. Each of the Yugoslav entities were now running their economies as their own republic with its unique, modern industries (Lane, 2004, p. 158). In the decade that followed Yugoslavia was trapped in a cycle of price freezes, devaluations, restructuring plans, price and wage freezes, and bridging loans (Lane, 2004, p. 159).

In 1987, Prime Minister Branko Mikulic admitted that over half of the loans were used for consumption or ill-advised projects. In 1989 Mikulic was replaced by Ante Markovic and executed the last attempt for economic reform with the aim of turning Yugoslavia into a market economy. (Lane, 2004, p. 160). Self-management was immediately abolished, and the banking system was given independence. A balanced budget was introduced, a six-month wage freeze imposed, and promissory notes were cancelled. International response was positive, as relationships with lenders were restored, but this sentiment was not shared within the country. Markovic was seen as a communist that undermined socialism and was ruining the nation (Lane, 2004, p. 161).

Yugoslavia is now known by its separate sovereign nation-states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. While international response was present in the later years of the atrocities that occurred, the process of establishing what actually occurred during the Yugoslav wars has been a cumbersome one (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 525), and what has been even more challenging is the rebuilding of several powers simultaneously while its citizens were still recovering from the scars left behind. As evidenced by the data operations below, it is clear that there has been an increase in the economic stability of all of the affected nations, and with that increase in stability was an accompanying growth in immigration. However, the data also demonstrates that violent conflict continues to be a living underlying factor whose fear has not completely dissipated.

Despite the qualitative historical data that is widely published on former Yugoslavia, datasets as it relates to migration, economics, and violent conflict are not as readily available. This is in part because the data that is currently in use reflects the

nation as it is now, comprised of not one, but several sovereign nations. For the purposes of this research, I will be using datasets for three of the countries that comprised former Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia all of which endured violent conflict. Furthermore, it is important to note that the datasets, because of their “newness” in nature (as these nations did not ‘exist’ as independent powers prior to 1991), the correlations may be skewed.

Table 11

Data Sheet Bosnia & Herzegovina

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
7.597	0	0
7.568	0	0
7.54	0	0
7.516	0.092	0
7.503	0.095	0
7.5	0.098	0
7.481	0.099	0
7.463	0.102	0
7.441	0.107	1.548
7.412	0.107	-1.762
7.382	0.108	-2.201
7.35	0.111	-4.114
7.321	0.109	-3.859
7.291	0.104	-3.988

7.237	0.102	-4.678
7.201	0.098	-5.488
7.167	0.098	-5.231
7.132	0.093	-4.991
7.095	0.091	-2.999

Table 12

Summary Output Bosnia & Herzegovina

SUMMARY OUTPUT

<i>Regression Statistics</i>						
	0.834906					
Multiple R	018					
	0.697068					
R Square	059					
	0.678708					
Adjusted R Square	548					
	2.118566					
Standard Error	435					
Observations	36					

<i>ANOVA</i>					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	340.8224789	170.4112394	37.96767998	2.76818E-09
Residual	33	148.1146834	4.48832374		
Total	35	488.9371623			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	1.152389731	0.473023264	2.436222104	0.020404297	0.190016665	2.114762798
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	62.26872569	8.88925214	7.004945378	5.18301E-08	44.18340623	80.35404515
X2 (Structural Balance)	0.047420851	0.23371972	0.202896233	0.840461982	0.428085495	0.522927196

As it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina one will notice that R Square (see Table Twenty-Three) demonstrates a 69.7% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose

presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 67.9%. Significance F, at 2.77, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook and whether or not they have endured violent conflict at any level.

X2 (Structural Balance) Line Fit Plot




Figure 15. Line Plot Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Line Fit Plot




Figure 16. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Bosnia & Herzegovina

While both data tables depict the correlation between migration with violent conflict and globalization Table Twenty-Five does so with more clarity, as the slope has a more tangible increase in growth.

Table 13

Residual Output Bosnia & Herzegovina

RESIDUAL OUTPUT			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
2	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
3	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
4	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
5	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
6	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
7	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
8	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
9	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
10	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
11	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
12	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
13	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
14	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
15	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
16	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
17	1.152389731	1.152389731	-0.560188701
18	1.152389731	6.444610269	3.132792452
19	1.152389731	6.415610269	3.118695249
20	1.152389731	6.387610269	3.105084156
21	6.881112495	0.634887505	0.308625456
22	7.067918672	0.435081328	0.211497584
23	7.254724849	0.245275151	0.119230816
24	7.316993575	0.164006425	0.079725239
25	7.503799752	0.040799752	-0.019833186
26	7.888550857	0.447550857	-0.217559152
27	7.731587841	0.319587841	-0.155354992
28	7.773038813	0.391038813	-0.190088057
29	7.869128903	0.519128903	-0.252353989
30	7.756683768	0.435683768	-0.211790436

31	7.43922285	-0.14822285	-0.072052678
32	7.281965012	0.044965012	-0.021857962
33	6.99447922	0.20652078	0.100391911
34	7.006666378	0.160333622	0.07793985
35	6.706703754	0.425296246	0.206740953
36	6.676628638	0.418371362	0.203374695




Figure 17. Residual Output Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina




Figure 18. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Bosnia & Herzegovina

With a residual analysis of the dataset, we see a tremendous drop in correlation with both violent conflict and globalization, both of which negate the premise that migration (population) is impacted by either variable.

Table 14

Data Operation Croatia (Data Sheet)

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
4.73	0.116	0
4.624	0.105	0
4.524	0.108	0
4.453	0.111	0
4.494	0.113	0
4.572	0.116	0
4.501	0.115	0
4.554	0.11	0
4.381	0.109	0
4.305	0.11	0
4.305	0.113	0
4.306	0.114	0
4.439	0.113	0
4.442	0.112	0
4.44	0.112	0
4.436	0.111	0
4.434	0.111	0
4.429	0.103	0
4.418	0.096	0
4.281	0.092	0
4.268	0.087	0
4.256	0.084	0
4.238	0.081	0
4.204	0.08	0

Table 15

Summary Output Croatia

SUMMARY OUTPUT						
<i>Regression Statistics</i>						
	0.987766					
Multiple R	706					
	0.975683					
R Square	065					
	0.974209					
Adjusted R Square	312					
	0.339644					
Standard Error	202					
Observations	36					
ANOVA						
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>	
Regression	2	152.74334	76.37167	662.0394	2.33075E-	27
		25	124	704		
Residual	33	3.8068200	0.115358			
		82	184			
		156.55016				
Total	35	26				
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
	0.082444	0.0969269	0.850581	0.401131	0.114755	0.279643
Intercept	271	8	245	717	152	695
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	40.86677	1.1230998	36.38748	3.25151E	38.58181	43.15173
	488	48	145	-28	105	87
X2 (Structural Balance)	0	0	65535	#NUM!	0	0

As it relates to Croatia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty) demonstrates a 97.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 97.4%. Significance F, at 2.33, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and

X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook.




Figure 19. Line Plot Structural Balance Croatia




Figure 20. Thirty-Two: Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Croatia

While both datasets demonstrate the correlation between migration and the variables of violent conflict and globalization, the trend of clarity around globalization in this region continues in that a more distinct increase in population aligns with an increase in healthy economics.

Table 16

Residual Output Croatia

RESIDUAL OUTPUT			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
2	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
3	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
4	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
5	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
6	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
7	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
8	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
9	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
10	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
11	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
12	0.082444271	0.082444271	-0.249870583
13	4.822990157	0.092990157	-0.281832859
14	4.373455633	0.250544367	0.759345266
15	4.496055958	0.027944042	0.08469229
16	4.618656282	0.165656282	-0.502068018
17	4.700389832	0.206389832	-0.625522513
18	4.822990157	0.250990157	-0.760696358
19	4.782123382	0.281123382	-0.852023583
20	4.577789508	0.023789508	-0.072100802
21	4.536922733	0.155922733	-0.472567755
22	4.577789508	0.272789508	-0.82676543
23	4.700389832	0.395389832	-1.198340242
24	4.741256607	0.435256607	-1.319167731
25	4.700389832	0.261389832	-0.792215503
26	4.659523057	0.217523057	-0.659264887
27	4.659523057	0.219523057	-0.66532645
28	4.618656282	0.182656282	-0.553591306
29	4.618656282	0.184656282	-0.55965287

30	4.291722083	0.137277917	0.416059389
31	4.005654659	0.412345341	1.249728686
32	3.84218756	0.43881244	1.329944685
33	3.637853685	0.630146315	1.909835878
34	3.515253361	0.740746639	2.245041311
35	3.392653036	0.845346964	2.562062054
36	3.351786261	0.852213739	2.582873749




Figure 21. Residual Output Structural Balance Croatia




Figure 22. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Croatia

With the residuals for Croatia, it is striking that a jump in structural balance would lead to an influx of immigration, but an increase in purchasing power shows an increase in emigration – both of which are conflicting with the plotted data in tables Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five.

Data Operation Slovenia

Table 17

Data Sheet Slovenia

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
1.999	0.067	0
1.989	0.068	0
1.989	0.07	0
1.989	0.07	0
1.99	0.07	0.622
1.987	0.07	-1.033
1.985	0.071	-0.336
1.978	0.072	-0.584
1.988	0.071	-1.048
1.99	0.072	-0.822
1.994	0.072	-1.005
1.995	0.072	-0.665
1.996	0.071	-1.292
1.998	0.07	-1.383
2.003	0.07	-2.2
2.01	0.072	-2.73
2.01	0.072	-3.284
2.032	0.067	-4.551
2.047	0.064	-4.825
2.05	0.062	-4.386
2.055	0.059	-2.098

2.059	0.056	-1.519
2.061	0.056	-2.303
2.063	0.055	-0.912

Table 18

Summary Output Slovenia

SUMMARY OUTPUT						
<i>Regression Statistics</i>						
	0.988840					
Multiple R	332					
	0.977805					
R Square	201					
	0.976460					
Adjusted R Square	062					
	0.147533					
Standard Error	479					
Observations	36					
ANOVA						
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>	
Regression	2	31.64435476	15.82217738	726.9174244	5.16589E-28	
Residual	33	0.718282209	0.021766128			
Total	35	32.36263697				
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	0.026264987	0.042342903	0.620292559	0.539325545	0.059882296	0.11241227
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	28.10679883	0.86693631	32.42083472	1.32582E-26	26.34300364	29.87059401
X2 (Structural Balance)	0.04969338	0.019805458	2.509075065	0.017193783	0.089987887	0.009398873

As it relates to Slovenia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty-Seven) demonstrates a 97.8% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square

demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at near duplicate rate of 97.6%. Significance F, at an astounding 5.17, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. In fact, with the Significance of marker being so high, this dataset not only demonstrates that the correlation is present, but that the accuracy of this study is high. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook.




Figure 23. Line Plot Structural Balance Slovenia




Figure 24. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia

In this last sample dataset for former Yugoslavia, the pattern of having a clearer picture between the nexus in migration and globalization is again outlined in Table Thirty-Nine of the line plots. In light of the dataset available for this region being so limited, there is a high possibility that perhaps that missing data is one of the reasons for the repetition in outputs.

Table 19

Residual Output Slovenia

RESIDUAL OUTPUT			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
2	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
3	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
4	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
5	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
6	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
7	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
8	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
9	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
10	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
11	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717
12	0.026264987	0.026264987	-0.183342717

13	1.909420509	0.089579491	0.625309546
14	1.937527308	0.051472692	0.359305076
15	1.993740905	0.004740905	-0.033093885
16	1.993740905	0.004740905	-0.033093885
17	1.962831623	0.027168377	0.18964883
18	2.045074167	0.058074167	-0.405386665
19	2.03854468	-0.05354468	-0.373768583
20	2.078975437	0.100975437	-0.704858935
21	2.073926367	0.085926367	-0.599808915
22	2.090802462	0.100802462	-0.70365148
23	2.09989635	-0.10589635	-0.739209364
24	2.083000601	0.088000601	-0.614288104
25	2.086051552	0.090051552	-0.628604764
26	2.06246685	-0.06446685	-0.450010783
27	2.103066342	0.100066342	-0.698512999
28	2.185617432	0.175617432	-1.2258973
29	2.213147564	0.203147564	-1.418071364
30	2.135575083	0.103575083	-0.723005762
31	2.064870673	0.017870673	-0.124746215
32	1.986841681	0.063158319	0.440876578
33	1.78882283	0.26617717	1.858049458
34	1.675729967	0.383270033	2.675416073
35	1.714689577	0.346310423	2.417419551
36	1.617459286	0.445540714	3.110096496




Figure 25. Residual Output Structural Balance Slovenia




Figure 26. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia

With residual outputs, while the plotted chart seems lacking in any real trend, Table Forty-Two depicts the contradictory premise that with an increase in a positive economic outlook, there would be an increase in emigration (rather than an influx in immigration to Slovenia).

Cambodia

Officially known as the Kingdom of Cambodia, Cambodia is a country located in Southeast Asia that is border by Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Today, Cambodia has a population of nearly 15 million with a reestablished monarchy that has provided almost 20 years of stability following the horrors of the Khmer Rouge. For years an entire nation was kidnapped; “freedom of the press, movement, worship, organization, association, and discussion all completely disappeared... [as did] everyday family life” (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 341). The aim was to eradicate Buddhism (among other things), but Pol Pot was unsuccessful, as Buddhism remains the primary religion in Cambodia and what follows are his real motives and the reasons why he failed.

Historical Context and Background

Buddhism was first introduced to Cambodia over 800 years ago, before Phnom Penh was founded. This was also around the time that the construction for Angkor Wat began – now noted as one of the largest religious complexes in the world. Up until the 1400s the city of Angkor was recognized as the capitol city of the Khmer Empire, a city that was established on the taxes of the people and where the kings lived. What followed in the next several hundred years for Cambodia was nothing short of catastrophic. It was attack followed by invasion, conquest, and mass murder. Cambodia today is a true reflection of the strength and resiliency of people.

In 1432 Cambodia faced a major turning point in their history, they were captured by the Siamese (Thailand) after the kingdom developed closer ties to China for trade (Corfield, 2009, p. 11). Two years later, the capitol of Phnom Penh was erected, largely due to its location; specifically, farther from Thailand and with easy access to China on boat. While there were no serious attacks over the century that followed, Europeans began to take notice when traders entered the port of Phnom Penh (Corfield, 2009, p. 11). Waves of Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors arrived first, marrying locals and finding positions on the royal court. The Dutch arrived for trading in the 1600s and the British followed around 45 years later with plans to settle. In the 1700s the Scottish arrived, and documented that Cambodia produced gold, raw silk, and ivory, with meat and fish available at low prices (Corfield, 2009, p. 14).

While Phnom Penh was becoming a central hub for tradable goods, the reality was that a large part of the population still resided in the rural villages and it was very rare for people to leave where they lived. Thus, the arrival of Europeans to Cambodia did

not have much of an effect on everyday life. The real threat to Cambodia during this time period was Vietnam, as the Vietnamese gradually extended their boundaries outward, to the south, to settle in what they claimed was their land. This, of course, opened the door of opportunities for Thailand. Cambodia was weak, it was their chance to attack and claim the land that was rightfully theirs as well. By 1848 both Vietnamese and Siam soldiers were exhausted by the Cambodian guerillas and retreated. For the first time in over fifty years Cambodia would have peace and live without outside military forces (Corfield, 2009, p. 20).

With Vietnam and Thailand on either side of the country, the primary concern for the kingdom in the late 19th century was to ensure an alliance with a country that was more powerful than either one of its neighbors. Crowned king in 1860, when he was only 26, King Norodom I established the French Protectorate, a “Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and French Protection” (Corfield, 2009, p. 23). At the time that the treaty was signed, there were already several French missionaries in Cambodia, so the French were not unfamiliar with the country or with the attacks that had transpired just years before. Terms for the treaty among European powers were fairly standard: the Catholic Church gained special privileges (although Buddhism remained the state religion), a French representative was appointed to the Cambodian Royal Court, and France would be able to trade freely throughout the kingdom (Corfield, 2009, p. 23-24).

Despite the revolts that occurred intermittently, the treaty was a success, at least temporarily. Vietnam and Thailand were in such disdain of the decision that the kingdom made that there were periods that their monarchy offered their throne just to work in conjunction to remove the French establishment. In 1884, King Norodom was held at

gunpoint when he signed the revised agreement that would annex Cambodia to be run as a colony of France (Corfield, 2009, p. 27). The following year, war erupted. Cambodians attacked the French, and unable to compromise, the French resorted to burning in the villages and launching reprisal attacks. Six years later Cambodia was at peace once more, but 30% of its population was dead.

After Norodom's death, his brother Sisowath became king in exchange for his support of the French. Indeed, the support was present; when the First World War broke out in 1914, Cambodia did its part for France by enlisting 2,000 men for the infantry (Corfield, 2009, p. 30). In light of this, rebels began to demonstrate and protest against the decisions that Sisowath was making, and now it was not just against the French, but also the Cambodian middle class. Sisowath died in 1929, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Monivong (Corfield, 2009, p. 34). The events that surrounded the death of Sisowath and the eventual departure of the French were global incidents that affected Cambodia. In the 1930s the Great Depression hit the global economy and Communist ideology began to emerge. Ten years later World War II erupted, where Germany took France and Japan deployed 8,000 soldiers to Cambodia (Corfield, 2009, p. 38) ensuing the support for Japan and opposing French rule. In 1945 Japan seized Phnom Penh, nullifying any Franco-Cambodian agreements, and while there was French resistance, Cambodia was granted autonomy in 1946. Democracy and socialism were introduced, and violence erupted. Democracy had failed in a nation that had been under a monarch for thousands of years.

Full independence was gained in 1953. With a serious fear that Cambodians on the countryside would continue to be killed and that Communists would come to power,

King Sihanouk (Norodom's grandson) appointed himself as Prime Minister and abolished Democracy. Sihanouk was triumphant. The newly appointed leader of Cambodia made it a point to be a "good international citizen," treating visitors with hospitality, befriending international scholars, and finding an ally in the United States (Corfield, 2009, p. 51). In 1955 he shocked the nation when he gave the throne to his father to rule as king, while he would remain the political leader as Prime Minister. As Sihanouk continued to focus on increasing Cambodia's international prestige, Communism was brewing within its borders. Dubbed the Red Cambodians, Khmer Rouge, by Sihanouk himself, the Communist movement was held together with the belief that they would be able to take over the country, and they were right.

January 1925 "...Pol Pot was born Saloth Sar, the youngest in a family of six boys and a girl. His parents owned nine hectares of rice land, three of garden-land, and six buffalo...Rich or poor, everyone tilled the fields, fished the river, cooked tasty soups, raised children...they were the most deeply Cambodian...But the Saloth family were Khmer peasants with a difference. They had royal connections" (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 342). Pol Pot had a strict upbringing, spending a year in the royal monastery, followed by Catholic School. He later moved to Phnom Penh to attend high school, just as his cousin, King Sihanouk was taking the throne. Pol Pot later received a scholarship to study radio-electricity in Paris, where he became a member of the Cambodian section of the French Communist Party (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 342). When Pol Pot returned to Cambodia, he found that his closest brother joined the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists and went along. They taught him that they had to work with the masses and build up member by member.

In the 1960s a group of young French educated communists, by the name of Communist Party of Kampuchea, rose against the Sihanouk government and later proclaimed the Democratic State of Kampuchea (DK, which was comprised of members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea). Pol Pot was their secretary general. Pol Pot and his members fled to the countryside after they failed to seize Phnom Penh, but this was only the beginning. As Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge were growing in power and numbers, the Vietnamese were at war against the United States. The United States viewed Vietnamese communism as an international threat and proceeded to bomb not only southern Vietnam, but also parts of eastern Cambodia, where Vietnamese communist members were said to be in hiding. Tens of thousands of Cambodian peasants died in a four-year period, and when U.S. military forces ousted Sihanouk, he joined Pol Pot. All of this destabilized a centralized country and opened the doors for a full-on take over.

Like the other nations that were presented in this study, Pol Pot's paradigm was primarily concerned with national and racial grandiosity (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 346). This meant that national impurities, including the foreign-educated (with the exception of Pol-Pot and his Paris educated group), hereditary enemies like the Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Cham had to be abolished, and Buddhism had to be eradicated to purify Cambodia and eliminate the old society. Khmer Rouge propaganda proclaimed, "what is rotten must be removed," and they did just that during Pol Pot's reign of terror.

Pol Pot's first step was sealing off Cambodia both internally and externally. "Borders were closed, the use of foreign languages banned, embassies and press agencies

expelled, local newspapers and televisions shut down, radios and bicycles confiscated, and telephones suppressed...[Cambodians] quickly learned that any display of knowledge or skill..." especially if it was contaminated by foreign influence, it was their certain death (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 344). Logistically, DK was divided into major zones and 32 regions throughout Cambodia that were then comprised of districts, subdistricts, and villages. The purging had a common pattern of plowing through districts, subdistricts, and then the villages (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 345).

Calling it "year zero" Pol Pot was swift in his plan for his new country. The wealthy, educated, police, doctors, teachers, and former government officials and their families were killed. Monks were massacred in masses, eliminating Buddhism from the country in just one year. The U.S. expelled half of the Vietnamese (during the Vietnam war), and Pol Pot's regime drove out another 100,000, murdering the ones who remained (eliminating nearly half a million Vietnamese). The Chinese population was reduced to half and seen as prisoners of war, and around 100,000 Muslims Chams were massacred. 20,000 Cambodians that were an enemy of the state were tortured and jailed, and others who were considered to be suspects were shot on the spot. In the last six months of the regime, murders reached 100,000, and numbers total in the arena of 2.5 million deaths by 1979 (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 350). To date, it is one of the most horrifying events in modern history.

Rationale Behind the Violence

Even after his death in 1998, scholars cannot properly identify the motives behind Pol Pot's desire to cleanse Cambodia. Perhaps it was because he raised on the countryside, and while he never really lived the village life, he wanted to demonstrate to

the rest of the lower-middle class that there was more out there, and in order to see that he had to remove those who he thought were in his way. This train of thought parallels what is known as rational choice theory, where Pol Pot's war was not about winning, but rather served his economic and political functions. As it relates to this study, this theory provides that framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by individuals or a group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with the hope of establishing a form of equality and stability.

With this theory, the motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed, where violent actions arise because opposing parties aspire to acquire wealth by capturing resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust regime. In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, an empirical model was developed to quantify such factors through the use of proxies. Greed's proxies are primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males within a total population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers, 2017, 103). Grievance's proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable growth rate in the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (Denmers, 2017, 103). While grievance's proxies are currently highlighted as the primary drivers for the genocide that occurred in Cambodia, it is important to consider the economic health of the nation and what those conditions were prior to the loss of so many lives.

Perhaps Pol Pot was driven by the idea of power and wealth, as he had familial ties with royalty. With Marxism, getting and keeping economic power is the motive behind all social and political activities (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). Pol Pot wanted a classless

peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took aim at intellectuals, city residents, ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders. The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical perspective is infinitely more significant than the division of race, religion, or gender (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). It is this worldview that allows for the elite to rise in the global society. It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is the most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in their own battles. In short, under the Marxist theory Pol Pot's cleverly placed the significance of race and religion at the forefront to gain support of the masses and then allowed them to eliminate who they thought were less worthy on their own accord.

International response did not make itself present as the thousands of Cambodians were being slaughtered. Finally, in 1979 Vietnamese soldiers invaded and drove out the Khmer Rouge. The people who were once seen as enemies and ethnically infected were now the pseudo heroes to the repressive nation. Vietnamese troops remained in Cambodia until 1989, after they trained a new Cambodian army (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 352). October 31, 1991, peace agreements were signed in Paris making both the United States and Cambodia signatories of the Genocide Convention. Between 1999 and 2006 the United Nations negotiated with the Cambodian government and established a joint tribunal in Phnom Penh to ensure legal accountability for the Khmer Rouge's crimes (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 356).

Shortly after the peace agreements were signed, several political parties began to register for the new wave of democracy in Cambodia. Many of which were formed by

those who were exiled during the reign of Pol Pot (Corfield, 2009, p. 112). As this was happening, Pol Pot was preparing himself for more bloodshed since the UN officials were unsuccessful in disarming him. The Khmer Rouge took it upon themselves and attacked small villages in Vietnam, killing several hundred and expelling hundreds of thousands.

Elections took place in 1993, the first since 1972. The royalist party won, but the Cambodian People's Party did not take the defeat well. Considering not breaking up the freshly unified country, both parties created a joint constitution that involved power sharing. For Cambodia, the road towards a democratic government was awkward. As the first term came to an end, the CPP had set themselves up for total political control for the elections in 1998; this was also the time that the Khmer Rouge was rumored to be split. When the royalist party realized what the CPP had planned, they sought a political alliance with the Khmer Rouge and a coup d'état launched in Phnom Penh (Corfield, 2009, p. 120). By spring, the national was at a stalemate; nevertheless, elections took place in the summer and the CPP won most of the seats. That same year, Pol Pot died, marking the end for the Khmer Rouge.

At this point, Cambodia was a pseudo peaceful nation – there were no major attacks present, but the wealthy and famous continued to be assassinated. The 2003 elections came, and the CPP won the majority once more. Alarmed after their second victory, the throne decided that it was best for the country to join forces with CPP and re-create a power sharing institution that remains today. Cambodia is now constitutional monarchy, where the king serves as the head of state, has a bipartisan legislature with an elected national assembly, and provinces and municipalities have a local government in place.

Economic Background

Cambodia had one of the most underdeveloped economies in Southeast Asia, having only rice and rubber as strong commodities. The Europeans, the French, were fully aware of this and therein began the symbiotic relationship between the two nations. Cambodians needed France for protection and the French needed Cambodia for its rubber. Because of this relationship Cambodia was largely self-sufficient, famine was low as most families lived in the countryside cultivating the produce and raising the livestock they ate. However, the economy took a fall when Pol Pot came into power and deemed foreign investment as toxic. Of course, the removal of any foreign investment was not the only reason for the collapse of the Cambodian economy; the mass killings, the burning of villages (and their land) and the seclusion from communications and trading all had major impacts as well.

In 1979, when the Vietnamese invaded with the aim to bring down the Khmer Rouge, the economy was in complete disarray. Food shortages were widespread, a large part of the population was relocated, no central currency existed, and electricity and transportation services were non-existent (Than, 1992, p. 271). Economic reforms were finally introduced in 1985, the private sector grew, government industries were granted autonomy, and international support for the country's economic freedom was reignited (Than, 1992, p. 271). The agricultural sector, except for droughts and floods, became nearly self-sufficient once more.

Humanitarian aid from the international community was implemented in the reconstruction of the economy, highlighting that Cambodians must assume their responsibilities and part of this was to ensure the nation's peace. The pillar of keeping

peace in a nation that been involved in decades of war, mass destruction, and economic downfall was seen as more difficult than the actual economic reconstruction. For several years after the reconstruction and rehabilitation plan was signed, Cambodian nationals and foreigners were killed that demonstrated the political uncertainty. Despite everything, Cambodia rose from the ashes and is now paving its way to success domestically and as an international partner.

Data Operation

Cambodia has been a country that has long suffered the consequences of violent conflict and overall governmental instability for decades. Considering this, the dataset for this case study does not include structural balance, as the information that is currently published has been unable to quantify such measures. Like Yugoslavia, the results to these outcomes will inevitably be skewed against those countries that have the complete dataset available.

Table 20

Data Sheet Cambodia

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
0	0	0
7.99	0	0
8.228	0.02	0
8.467	0.021	0
8.724	0.021	0
9.009	0.02	0
9.324	0.021	0
9.659	0.02	0
10.007	0.021	0
10.43	0.022	0
10.769	0.022	0

11.091	0.023	0
11.396	0.023	0
11.685	0.023	0
11.96	0.025	0
12.223	0.026	0
12.473	0.028	0
12.709	0.029	0
12.934	0.03	0
13.149	0.032	0
13.356	0.034	0
13.555	0.036	0
13.747	0.038	0
13.941	0.039	0
14.144	0.039	0
14.365	0.039	0
14.605	0.041	0
14.78	0.042	0
15.026	0.044	0
15.27	0.045	0
15.521	0.047	0

Table 21

Summary Output Cambodia

SUMMARY OUTPUT						
<i>Regression Statistics</i>						
	0.943132					
Multiple R	698					
	0.889499					
R Square	286					
	0.882802					
Adjusted R Square	273					
	1.714141					
Standard Error	719					
Observations	36					

ANOVA					
	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	780.52695	390.2634	132.8203	1.64257E-16
Residual	33	96.963300	2.938281		
		52	834		
Total	35	877.49025			
		88			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	2.152221	0.5612548	3.834660	0.000536	1.010339	3.294102
	419	04	129	597	935	903
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	324.9793	19.967496	16.27541	2.4942E-17	284.3551	365.6035
	673	69	862		898	448
X2 (Structural Balance)	0	0	65535	#NUM!	0	0

Despite its missing links, as it relates to Cambodia, you will notice that R Square (see Table Forty-Four) demonstrates an 88.9% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 88.3%. Significance F, at approximately 1.63, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1.

Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables X1 being greater than the alpha 0.05, which indicates that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook.

X2 (Structural Balance) Line Fit Plot




Figure 27. Line Plot Structural Balance Cambodia

X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) Line Fit Plot




Figure 28. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia

Again, the dataset for Cambodia is unique in that it is impossible to demonstrate the correlation between migration and violent conflict by way of quantitative measures. However, Table Forty-Five clearly demonstrates the nexus between the two variables, as it shows that when the economic outlook of Cambodia grows, so does the population.

Table 22

Residual Output Cambodia

RESIDUAL OUTPUT			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
2	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
3	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
4	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
5	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
6	2.152221419	2.152221419	-1.278582217
7	2.152221419	5.837778581	3.468081777
8	8.651808765	0.423808765	-0.251774444
9	8.976788132	0.509788132	-0.302852687
10	8.976788132	0.252788132	-0.15017526
11	8.651808765	0.357191235	0.212198595
12	8.976788132	0.347211868	0.206270097
13	8.651808765	1.007191235	0.598347731
14	8.976788132	1.030211868	0.612023727
15	9.3017675	1.1282325	0.670255393
16	9.3017675	1.4672325	0.871647019
17	9.626746867	1.464253133	0.86987705
18	9.626746867	1.769253133	1.051070106
19	9.626746867	2.058253133	1.222757952
20	10.2767056	1.683294399	1.000004119
21	10.60168497	1.621315031	0.96318369
22	11.2516437	1.221356297	0.725577967
23	11.57662307	1.132376929	0.672717497
24	11.90160244	1.032397562	0.613322195
25	12.55156117	0.597438827	0.354923826
26	13.20151991	0.154480093	0.091772853
27	13.85147864	0.296478642	-0.176130725
28	14.50143738	0.754437376	-0.448192832
29	14.82641674	0.885416744	-0.526004478
30	14.82641674	0.682416744	-0.405407132
31	14.82641674	0.461416744	-0.274116426
32	15.47637548	0.871375478	-0.517662905
33	15.80135485	1.021354846	-0.606761986
34	16.45131358	-1.42531358	-0.846744011
35	16.77629295	1.506292947	-0.894851877
36	17.42625168	1.905251682	-1.131863524




Figure 29. Residual Output Structural Balance Cambodia




Figure 30. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia

Like many of the other datasets in this research, the residuals for Cambodia do not numerically exemplify the thesis. While the standardized residuals in this case study have increased, the probability of the variables being related has remained low.

Germany

Having the largest landmass of any European nation (www.europa.eu, 2016), Germany shares its borders with nine different countries and has access to both the North and Baltic Seas. It is no wonder that every Reich tried for global domination. Germany was and continues to be one of the epicenters of Europe, having one of the highest GDPs and where 16% of the European Union's population resides (www.europa.edu, 2016). Today, Germany is part of the G8, one of the eight most industrialized nations in the world, and a power player in global economics. This, however, was no easy feat. The German Republic comes from nearly a century of social and political division and has survived one of the most notorious acts of genocide in history. What follows is the history of a torn nation, what led to its ultimate demise, and its extraordinary rise to the top.

Historical Context and Background

Created in 1871, the German Empire was governed under the constitution designed by Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178). The constitution by design would grant the Kaiser ("Holy Roman Emperor") primary decision power, which by definition means that the decisions on whether to go to war or stay at peace would be left to the hands of one person (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178). In principle "the Kaiser had, at his disposal, the use of military force and could set in motion a violent solution to any domestic political conflict..." (Berghahn, 179, 2005). To this end, Bismarck launched a cultural struggle, *Kulturkampf*, a campaign to destroy political Catholicism, which failed. Bismarck abandoned this battle as a failure and yet another

campaign, this time with socialism as his target. This campaign also failed, and when the new emperor, Wilhelm II began his reign in 1888, he asked Bismarck to resign.

It is important to recognize that the constitution and the founding of the German Empire was made possible after years of war and pseudo liberalization from the Kingdom of Prussia (which then constituted present day Germany Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Denmark, Belgium, and the Czech Republic). Thus, it was [almost] natural for Bismarck to be in constant state of fear of losing his power. For Bismarck, giving into political parties with opposing views would have been letting his years of work in foreign policy go in vain and destroying what he considered the unification of a German nation. The most interesting note what of what comprised Bismarck's constitution was the little was written on economics, party structures, political systems, and anything that involved the growth of German infrastructure. In fact, 80 to 90 percent of the Reich's expenditures (Berghahn, 2005, p. 190) were marked for military spending. This alone is an indicator that the only concern for Bismarck and his political cronies was military stability and control – which in history has shown is not enough for the growth and stability of a nation.

The dismissal of chancellor Bismarck was surrounded by a short disruption of political power, as Wilhelm II attempted to steer the Reich government in a direction of peace (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). The new emperor's aim was to be beloved by all by way of improving laws that surrounded the Reich's economic welfare; however, was not taken lightly by anyone. Wannabe politicians, like Otto von Volderndorff, wrote, "We must limit ourselves to securing the country...[pursue] a re-founding of the Reich...our industry is not worth much anyway. It is in the hands of the Jews; it produces 'cheaply and

poorly' ..." (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). People of influence (and affluence) such as Volderndorff were part of the group that planted that first seed of deep-seated hatred in the events that followed decades later. Wilhelm II's need to be the emperor of the people is what led to his comparatively short-lived reign; he was forced to give up his throne after WWI in 1918.

Triggered by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Yugoslav nationalist, the 'war to end all wars' pitted the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire) against the Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan). Named after German General Alfred von Schlieffen, the military strategy known as the Schlieffen Plan was implemented to destroy the enemy in one swift move, weakening its economic power and destabilizing military capability (Berghahn, 2005, p. 274). The idea behind this plan was to have a 'lightning war' by attacking France through the West and Russia through the East; this, was undoubtedly one of the most jeopardizing military strategies deployed by the German government and to their own surprise were defeated in France and came to a stalemate in Russia. German forces suffered over two million casualties in a period of four years, but this only marked the beginning of the horrors that were to follow.

Born in 1918, The Weimar Republic was Germany's first attempt at a parliamentary democracy. The newly indoctrinated constitution provided for an election of a popular president (to hold office for a seven-year appointment), policy design by majority leaders, and a creation of a socioeconomic framework that would serve as the charter for the next thirteen years (Pachter, 1978, p. 86). The Weimar Republic is made notable largely in light on the high involvement of what became known as the Junker

class, the wealthiest of the wealthy, and the rise of political parties who would be in opposition (i.e., peasant parties). Germany became highly politicized (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 25) and polarized. This newfound democracy was met with political violence, frequent assassinations, coup attempts, strikes, and demonstration in its first four years (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 27). It was a combination of these acts, a sense of passive resistance, and poor socioeconomic conditions that led to the election of Paul von Hindenburg in 1925, a 'tolerable' president (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 50).

Heinrich Brüning was elected chancellor in 1930, into a government relied more and more on the sole authority of the president (Pachter, 1978, p. 191). Refusing to take any measures on Germany's economic distress, Brüning reduced wages, prices, and social services, while increasing taxes. As this was occurring, the Nazi Party had already been active for ten years and was only increasing in power when they joined communist forces, and eventually create a cohort of anti-capitalist forces (Pachter, 1978, p. 197). Fearing the worst, Brüning handed the office to an aristocrat who was later replaced by Adolf Hitler as a chancellor – this was the beginning of the end of the German Reich.

Born in 1889, Adolf Hitler was one of six children to working class parents. Growing up, Hitler had strong interests in the fine arts, but his father, who died when Hitler was fourteen, rejected this idea. Hitler struggled as a young man in school, particularly after his youngest brother died not long after the passing of his father, so his mother allowed him to drop out when he was sixteen so that he could pursue his career in the arts. The following year, in 1907, his mother died. That year Hitler moved to Vienna where he sold his work, only to make enough to feed himself. The years that followed

would leave to live a life without a home and filled with political ideology that planted the seeds of anti-Semitism.

Though he was born in Austria, when World War I began, he was able to enlist in the German army and fought in some of the bloodiest battles in the war. It is believed that Hitler had a strong hatred in the multi-culturalism that was found in Austria at the time and proving his loyalty with Germany would be his answer – he was right. Hitler became a well-regarded and decorated soldier for his bravery in action, taking everything, he learned at the front lines to create his national party. Because of the serious impact that WWI had on Germany, it was made clear to Hitler that he needed to create a party for the people, a party that would allow Germany to rise up once again and become the powerful nation that he wanted it to be. This led to the formation of the German Workers Party (that we now know as the Nazi Party) and the period in which Hitler launched himself into politics, shaking hands with other national leaders that had similar ideals. And, despite his setbacks in school during his youth, Hitler had tremendous oratory skills; skills that would bring in crowds in the thousands to listen to what he had to say, creating one of the largest support bases in history at the time.

In 1925, Hitler published *Mein Kampf* (“My Struggle”), outlining his political ideology and future for Germany. For Hitler “the state was not an economic entity but racial. He declared the superiority of a white Aryan race, with particular vitriol reserved for the Jews he viewed as ‘parasites.’ Their elimination, he said, ‘must be necessarily a bloody process’” (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017). This of course, keeping in mind the fact that Hitler believed that Jews (among others) betrayed the German Army, which led to their ultimate defeat in WWI. In January 1933, Hitler was given the post of German

Chancellor, and with swift political moves, by March he was able to pass laws without approval, and the only thing he has left to do to fulfill his vision was to build an army.

In 1934, as Hitler was preparing himself to transform Germany into a racially pure community, he was whipping the military votes with the reminding officers that the Jews had a large part in the humiliation and defeat of Germany. He then would obligate officers to swear into policies that some morally rejected. Those who did not comply were exterminated, and the Nazi reign of terror began (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 62). By 1938, Hitler was well underway in the expansion of Nazi Germany, starting with Austria, then Czechoslovakia, and finally Poland. It was at Poland when the rest of the world began to notice that there might be some trouble coming their way. In 1939, France and Britain declared war, leaving Germany to form an alliance with fascist Italy and Japan. Upon the invasion of USSR, WWII became the largest land war in history; German troops had spread to over six countries in less than a five-year period and Hitler had no plans to stop, no matter the cost.

In the early 1940s the war was starting to take a toll on the German citizens themselves. Women and children were living through air raids and surviving in ruined cities; millions were uprooted from their homelands (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 84) – it was clear that a ‘normal’ life was far from reach. The war ended in 1945, when Berlin was captured by Soviet troops and Germany was forced to surrender. 11 million lives were lost, and millions more were injured in a war that was led by one of the most notoriously dangerous men on Earth.

The first concentration camp was established in 1933, the year that Hitler first came into power; at the time, the idea was to hold those who were in political opposition,

not for the imprisonment of Jews. Introduced in 1935, The Nuremberg Laws were set in place to “protect” German blood, which meant that Jews and other minorities were reduced to second-class citizens due to their impure blood (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017). By 1939, a systemic extermination program was underway, needing to weed out those who were hereditarily diseased. Incorporating eugenic ideas, those who were deemed worthless were sterilized, the mentally ill and handicapped were executed, children with abnormalities were taken for experimentation for medical advancement, and groups including Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and gypsies were brutally killed without mercy (Pichot, 2001, p. 176). Then there was the mass genocide of the Jews, Hitler’s “Final Solution.”

Concentration camps, as we know them today, were overcrowded, poorly maintained, and cruel and harsh treatment often resulted in death. “Disease, starvation, torture, shooting, and hanging were all common, and violence, brutality and murder were weapons which had been employed by the Nazis throughout their period of power” (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 90). Despite this horror, physical extermination of the Jews (in the camps or otherwise) was not an order until 1941. This operation essentially consisted of gathering Jewish communities in herd, taking them to the woods (or camps), having them dig their own graves and then shooting them on site so that their bodies would fall in their burial site (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98). By the end of 1945, the lives of 6 million Jews were lost, and the man responsible to bringing the world to the brink of destruction took his life upon defeat.

One of the most interesting things about Hitler his political ideology was very personal. This was a person that grew up constantly being rejected, by his family, by his

friends, by society. The notion that he could create a unified front based on his ideals, and in a country where he was not born citizen, is truly what drove him to become who he was. That said, Hitler's persona and the events that transpired during his time of power could astutely be explained with social theory. Social theory as a basis for the comprehension of man was developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies developed and people were permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert, 2010). Its foundation began as the attempt to account for what was different between modern societies and its preceding traditional ones (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98).

Today, social theory is defined as "the normal accomplishment of socially adept human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or around them" (Lemert, 2010). One such branch that stems from modern social theory is that of cultural trauma [as a social theory], where as individuals feel as though they have been subjected to a (or several) horrendous events that leaves marks on their consciousness; therefore, changing their identity and fundamental ideals forever (Alexander, 2012, p. 6). This suggests, then that in light of Hitler's traumatic experience (i.e., the consecutive deaths of 3 family members in a time of his life that known to be challenging for a young man), what could have been a somewhat normal politician, turned into a monster because his identity was changed. Traumas are said to be naturally occurring events that shatter an individual's sense of wellbeing (Alexander, 2012, p. 7), "...it is a blow to the psyche that breaks through one's defenses so suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively..." (Alexander, 2012, p. 9). Based on this, it can be deduced that Hitler was never able to overcome the traumatic experiences in his life, and his coping mechanism was project his trauma on his fellow

men (including the Jews) when he laid down the law that anyone who was considered impure or unworthy should be killed. I am not suggesting that Hitler or his actions are forgivable simply because he was [clearly] a sick man, but rather am providing a possible baseline that could stipulate an explanation as to why he did what he did.

What was left after the war was a demoralized nation in ruins. Husbands and sons were gone, food and clothing for those who remained were scarce, and a general emptiness was the only thing that filled the air. Allies were unsure on what to do with the Germany that remained; they had to administer a war-torn country while being cautious of those who were in position to rattle cages.

By 1949, two German states were founded, one free dictatorship and communism (west) and the other who was attempted to gain new order under the auspice of Stalinism (east). The decades that followed became the true indicator on how different the divided nation had become; West Germans industry and economy flourished, while East Germany underwent a major dismantling campaign headed by the Soviet Union. In 1961, the division was literally cemented with the Berlin Wall. The difference in industry, economy, and population were staggering. West Germany was urbanized, with less than 6% of the population living in small cities, with high number of advance white-collar works, and a population that grew from 43 million to 61.6 million (despite the terror attacks that happened in the 1970s and 1980s); East Germany, on the other hand, had 24% of their population living in rural areas, where work was largely blue collars, and whose population remained identical (16.7 million) in a forty-year period (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 188-189). The disparity in education, policing, and politics was just as apparent. In 1989 East Germany was shaken by a serious of revolutions, which inaugurated the

process of the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and destruction of the Berlin Wall between the two republics and paving the way for a Germany as a unified front.

The year that followed gave way to rapid reunification and introduction to a unified Germany. Currency union was in effect July 1, 1990; East German shops were stocked with a wide range of goods, subsidies were removed, properties were re-appropriated, a common political administration was planned and institutionalized, and the by end of 1990 Germany had their first free election since 1932, and the division of the European superpowers had finally come to an end (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 287-289).

Data Operation

Table 23

Data Sheet Nazi Germany

Y (Population)	X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	X2 (Structural Balance)
76.843	6.536	0
76.988	6.435	0
76.933	6.365	0
76.664	6.303	0
76.355	6.21	0
76.166	6.128	0
76.219	6.063	0
76.233	5.924	0
76.697	5.881	0
77.463	5.895	0
78.949	5.987	0
79.973	6.14	-5.067
80.5	5.617	-4.019
80.947	5.454	-2.755
81.148	5.424	-2.367
81.308	5.315	-2.839
81.467	5.164	-2.888
81.51	5.052	-2.436
81.446	5.016	-2.294
81.423	4.939	-1.685
81.457	4.85	-4.791
81.518	4.816	-3.405
81.579	4.671	-3.599
81.549	4.456	-2.681
81.457	4.283	-2.76

81.337	4.116	-2.375
81.174	4.057	-1.944
80.993	3.963	-0.926
80.764	3.889	-1.023
80.483	3.681	-1.056
80.285	3.643	-2.662
80.276	3.636	-1.403
80.427	3.54	0.003
80.647	3.439	0.607
80.983	3.397	1.163
81.687	3.344	1.182

Table 24

Summary Output Nazi Germany

SUMMARY OUTPUT

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
	0.897630
Multiple R	733
	0.805740
R Square	933
	0.793967
Adjusted R Square	656
	0.928198
Standard Error	503
Observations	36

ANOVA

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	2	117.92606	58.96303	68.43812	1.81256E-12
Residual	33	28.431231	0.861552		
Total	35	146.35729			

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>
Intercept	85.64550	0.7855896	109.0206	8.66526E-44	84.04721	87.24380
	725	74	631	-44	304	146
	-	-	-	-	-	-
X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power)	1.371439	0.1511821	9.071438	1.75236E-10	1.679022	1.063857
	788	76	334	-10	238	338
	-	-	-	-	-	-
X2 (Structural Balance)	0.672051	0.0941807	7.135756	3.56409E-08	0.863663	0.480438
	07	76	353	-08	299	84

As it relates to Germany, you will notice that R Square (see Table Fifty-One) demonstrates a 80.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 79.4%, in likelihood of a small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at approximately 1.81, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country's economic outlook and whether or not they have endured violent conflict at any level.




Figure 31. Line Plot Structural Balance Nazi Germany




Figure 32. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany

Given the history of Germany, the dataset in both Table Fifty-Two and Table Fifty-Three are the most accurate depiction of the central premise to the research, whereas migration is impacted by both violent conflict and globalization.

Table 25

Residual Output Nazi Germany

RESIDUAL OUTPUT			
<i>Observation</i>	<i>Predicted Y (Population)</i>	<i>Residuals</i>	<i>Standard Residuals</i>
1	76.6817768	0.161223203	0.178880802
2	76.82029222	0.167707784	0.186075592
3	76.916293	0.016706999	0.018536795
4	77.00132227	0.337322268	-0.37426671
5	77.12886617	0.773866168	-0.858622073
6	77.24132423	1.075324231	-1.193096634
7	77.33046782	1.111467817	-1.233198763
8	77.52109795	1.288097947	-1.429173901
9	77.58006986	0.883069858	-0.979786046
10	77.5608697	0.097869701	-0.108588654
11	77.43469724	1.514302759	1.680153273
12	80.63014972	0.657149723	-0.729122529
13	80.64310321	0.143103211	-0.158776259
14	80.01717534	0.929824656	1.031661554
15	79.79756272	1.350437277	1.498340802
16	80.26425776	1.043742235	1.158055694
17	80.50427567	0.962724325	1.068164484
18	80.35410985	1.155890152	1.282486353
19	80.30805043	1.137949572	1.262580871
20	80.00437219	1.41862781	1.573999745
21	82.21382095	0.756820954	-0.839710021
22	81.32898712	0.189012876	0.209714075
23	81.6582238	0.079223801	-0.087900604
24	81.33614047	0.212859527	0.236172475
25	81.62649159	0.169491591	-0.188054766
26	81.59678237	0.259782374	-0.288234438
27	81.38804331	-0.21404331	-0.237485909
28	80.83281066	0.160189339	0.177733706
29	80.99948616	0.235486159	-0.261277237
30	81.30692332	-0.82392332	-0.91416162
31	82.43835205	-2.15335205	-2.389192962
32	81.60183983	1.325839832	-1.471049379
33	80.78859425	0.361594248	-0.401197023
34	80.52119082	0.12580918	0.13958814
35	80.2051309	0.777869103	0.863063421
36	80.26504824	1.421951765	1.577687749




Figure 33. Residual Output Structural Balance Nazi Germany




Figure 34. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany

In this final overview of residuals, again the plots in Tables Fifty-Five and Fifty-Six do not make the argument that migration is in fact impacted by other variables. If, for the purposes of this research, residuals were to be taken into consideration, the numerical data would negate the hypothesis and the reasons for which this research is created could be easily counter measured.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short. Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last century than there ever was; in fact, since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have been active in 150 locations.

The question of nationalistic survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and those who have more, will ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to scratch the surface where globalization and violent conflict come together. There is an undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance of a nation to its resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Considering the lack of scholarship on this subject, this study provides a baseline that explains the phenomenon that we are largely faced with today – international migration. This historical examination provides numerical patterns that allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it does, what are the conditions in which it can be deterred or prevented, should the outcomes be of serious detriment. The lack of accountability of a nation's economic infrastructure is the driving force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that economics does not have an impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will continue to push large populations into foreign countries, further fueling tensions. The only real hypotheses that have been studied are those involving violent conflict and political uprisings causing a migrant to “voluntarily” move from one country to the next.

The purpose of this section is to offer some concluding thoughts, to comment on the contribution of my research, as well as to identify areas for further exploration. What does the above analysis tell us about the phenomenon of migration, a premise that has been part of our humanity for centuries? What areas of theoretical constructs can be used to understanding these complex relationships? Can social science provide a new platform in which we can better understand the causal effects behind violent conflict without diminishing the underlying vulnerabilities of humanity? These are some of the overarching questions that emerged throughout the development of this research and questions that academia needs to ask itself as it moves forward in creative alternative frameworks as they relate to the internationalization of our world.

Throughout this research I have made the case for the inevitable linkage between mass migration, globalization, and violent conflict, in that: economic performance is a driver for violent conflict, and consequently migration (in masses) will occur. Indeed, history, and each of the highlighted case studies in this research, has shown us time and time again in that the three are undeniably interconnected. This is because all three factors are bound to the welfare of a state. While each unit of analysis represents a casual affect, the world context today challenges us in that they are not exclusive from one another. In large part this is because the fear of losing resources and opportunities to gain financial power has become more tangible, bringing premise nationalistic survival to the proverbial table.

In creating the foundation for this research, much of the studies that have been previously presented are related to the political rationale behind violent conflict, as opposed to taking it from an economic standpoint. Furthermore, historically it has been

names that armed groups deliberately targeted marginalized populations to migrate, but no concrete evidence has been provide as it why it was the case. Thus, one of the goals of this study was to provide the hard numbers that not only are economic breakdown and violent conflict are related, but to expand their relationship to mass migration.

Furthermore, this research, with relevant historical context, to an extent debunks that violent conflict is solely politically fueled, but rather it occurs because the political agenda is driven by economics.

A New Model for Preventative Measures?

As it relates to human nature, conflict usually unfolds because of crisis related to identity. We can even put that theory to the test today, given our current administration and the general anti-black/brown communities sentiment that has been spreading like wildfire. Violent conflict specifically is the struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scares resources, where the goal is to essentially eliminate the opposing factor (usually people) that presents a roadblock. In large part, however, scholars and policymakers alike have not been able to anticipate when a violent conflict would erupt; this is especially true when a leader of a nation tacks on a faith-based agenda to their politics. On its face, this almost seems illogical, but because violent conflict has not historically been analyzed with an economic lens, it is easy to understand why this last century has been one of the most violent in human history.

This research provides the foundational groundwork for shifting the way that we think about how to implement preventative measures for countries that are seemingly stable from a 30,000-foot view, and also provides the data that quite literally tells us what it is that the country is “fighting for.” For example, in the case of Rwanda, there is the

general knowledge that the genocide that occurred in the mid 1990's was driven by ethnicity and the need for identity preservation. While this may be true on the surface, if we dig deeper, history shows us that the two conflicting populations (Hutus and Tutsis) were in fact provoked by an economic opportunity that was led by foreign nationals.

Social science has taught us that people behave in a certain manner because they believe it is the rational thing to do. The question is, should all acts be considered rational? Social theory tells us that societal norms shift as societies develop; therefore, it would be infinitely impossible to form actual boundaries, making what is rational then irrational today (or vice versa). However, the inability to form boundaries is directly reflected on a nation's current state of economic outlook, in that when countries are developing and are heavily reliant on other countries to fill their gaps societal boundaries have the tendency to be more fluid.

This fluidity has also spread to our consciousness of history. Our societies have been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and social media, skewing our worldview, which means that we are allowing for history to repeat itself despite its detrimental impact. While this last century of genocide has resulted in regime change, social movements, and an increase of people power to challenge the status quo, it stills begs the question on how can we make change differently, and perhaps how can we do it better? Rational choice theory tells us that we are rational agents, and we have a choice, even in setting of war – so why do we continue to use violence as the catalyst for change? The assumption here is that violent conflict will give us the greater rate of return by way of power and resources, thus debunking the myth that ethnicity and religion are the driving force of violent conflict.

Final Thoughts

“One of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions (low income, slow growth, and severe economic downturns) are correlated to the outbreak of conflict...” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Indeed, empirical studies have shown us that poor economic infrastructure is associated with a higher incidence of violent conflict, but quantitative measures around the impact to migration have not been at the forefront of social science research. In this research, five countries (case studies) have been identified and its respective data has been extracted and utilized in casual design, where one variable is directed impacted by one or more other variables. The driving rationale for choosing this research design is that one of the most provoking assertions in casual relationships is the theory that it can be used for change. The limitation with this research in particular is that literature supporting the thesis that economics, violent conflict, and mass migration are interconnected is limited; and, because some of these case studies did not exist as nations in their own right until the fall of the previous regime, hard data is also scarce, skewing the measurements.

As debates continue over the causes and outcomes of violent conflict, the economic lens remains underutilized in academic studies, and therefore we are missing the mark field of conflict resolution. This research has shown us that, yes, history indeed does repeat itself and that we have lacked the creativity to think outside of the confines that we hold ourselves in. Violent conflict continues to serve as a tool of social destruction and economic reconstruction, and it is economic factors that predispose countries to war (developing nations are even more susceptible to violent conflict be a reoccurring travesty).

To date, much of the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have been related to the political aims that violent conflict stems from. But, what if we strictly use a gender lens? This argument allows us to explore new territories of conflict prevention. While, this design in particular excels in bringing and understanding of complex issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their relationships. What is more interesting about this research design is that it does not facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu, June 2016); which is why a combination of the two was used here. Furthermore, this research design is not necessarily limited to large-scale violent conflicts that had international impact. This sort of tool can be broken down and simplified for the use of analysis of local communities; this is even more true if we are taking about preventing conflict. For instance, in the United States there is deep-seated frustration, resentment, and anger in the African American community (that can be traced back to the Civil War era) that has largely been created by unemployment and underemployment, extreme poverty, segregation, and the lack of economic and educational opportunities, among other factors. This is because the African American community has long been looked as a group of individuals that is less than, and generally speaking they are the target population (along with other black and brown communities) of the Anglo communities in spaces where the Anglo [man] is flexing their muscles to gain power. Power here goes back to material goods, and today that could be money, real estate, or property that has access to goods that are profitable. If we looked to the Detroit Riots, for example, one of the most destructive riots in U.S. history, one can deduce that economics was in the front seat

(along with other factors) to that violence. Despite the fifty-year time lapse, in a first world nation, Detroit is still rebuilding itself from that catastrophic event.

As academics in the field of conflict resolution it is important to look at history with a different lens so that the cycle of destruction is disrupted. For decades non-government aid organizations, like USAID, IMF, and the World Bank, have provided billions of dollars of foreign assistance, and to what end? On January 3, 2020, fears around a third world war surfaced, the question is why? Why do we in the field of conflict resolution continue to examine these phenomena with the traditional frameworks time and again? The fear of losing [economic] power continues is one of the most palpable forces in a world where the aim to be a global power has become fiercely competitive. If the tool in this research was put into practice, large public and government conglomerates that provide aid, such as the World Bank, IMF, or USAID can identify the needs of a country (as it relates to resources) so as to inject that country with the support it requires to sustain that need and work with international policy makers on a higher level in order to create preventative measures for any conflict that may be looming; thus, reducing the catastrophic impact drastically.

Despite the shortage in numerical data, every one of the case studies confirmed that in fact violent conflict and globalization have a direct impact on migration. Without fail, the quantitative tests utilized herein demonstrated a probability of more than 60% in accuracy throughout and a significant indicator that vetted that probability to be true. This tells us that these variables should not be confined for individual analysis, but rather in concert in order to make powerful strides in social science. The importance of history should not be deemphasized here, as it has been history and the origins of each of the

violent conflicts that have opened the door for this study, but we can do better. While the bridge between economics, violent conflict, and mass migration has not been widely made, ongoing research will make a tremendous contribution in moving the needle for the field of conflict resolution. The notion of using a different lens, and perhaps creating difficult discussions with other fields, is crucial in this field of study, particularly as new and challenging power dynamics continue to present themselves. These power dynamics are still dominated by economic growth, and the inability to maintain positive growth will continue to threaten the security and stability of a nation. To that end, sustained research in terms of economy (for both global and domestic players) is imperative. As academics, researchers, policymakers, and leaders, it is our responsibility to continue to examine conflict with untraditional lenses so as to develop measures that can be easily quantified and utilized to minimize long-term detrimental impact.

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