The Cyprus Problem and Greek Cypriot Preferences for a Solution after Their “No” to the Annan Plan

Craig Webster

College of Tourism and Hotel Management, Craig@cothm.ac.cy

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Webster, Craig (2005) "The Cyprus Problem and Greek Cypriot Preferences for a Solution after Their “No” to the Annan Plan," Peace and Conflict Studies: Vol. 12: No. 1, Article 3.
DOI: 10.46743/1082-7307/2005.1056
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol12/iss1/3

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Abstract

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Keywords: April 2004 referendum, Cyprus Problem, Greek Cypriots, Kofi Annan Plan, separation, unification

Author Bio(s)

Craig Webster earned a PhD in political science from Binghamton University, USA. He has taught at Binghamton University and Ithaca College. At present, he teaches at the College of Tourism and Hotel Management in Nicosia, Cyprus. His chief research interests are human rights policy, comparative foreign policy, and public opinion analysis. He is presently involved in in-depth econometric analyses of Greek Cypriot public opinion pertaining to issues related to the Cyprus Problem. He can be reached at Craig@cothm.ac.cy.

This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol12/iss1/3
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND GREEK CYPRIOT PREFERENCES FOR A SOLUTION AFTER THEIR “NO” TO THE ANNAN PLAN

Craig Webster

Abstract

The Greek Cypriots made a clear choice to reject the Annan Plan for their country in a referendum in April 2004. The Annan Plan offered a dichotomous choice to the electorate to accept or reject a federal solution to reunite Cyprus. In this paper, the author investigates the Greek Cypriot population’s preferences for a solution to the Cyprus Problem by performing multivariate analyses of data obtained from one thousand Greek Cypriots following the April 2004 referendum. The analyses find that preferences for solutions are a function of age and attitudes towards the ability of the two communities to interact successfully. Younger Greek Cypriots tend to prefer some form of separation while the older ones prefer some form of unification. Those who feel that the communities can co-mingle tend to favor unification. Refugee status, socio-economic status, and educational levels appear to play little or no role in shaping preferences for a solution.

In April 2004, both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot electorates went to vote on a referendum to decide whether to accept or reject the Annan Plan, a UN plan to unify Cyprus into one federal state. The Annan Plan is a proposal to end the longstanding Cyprus Problem via the unification of the island into a federal state with two equal constituent states, one Turkish Cypriot and one Greek Cypriot. There are many controversial issues dealt with in the Annan Plan such as territorial modifications to the current de facto states, the question of the return of refugees, property provisions, the creation of a Reconciliation Commission, and the demilitarization of the island.

The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in simultaneously held referenda had a dichotomous choice on April 24th, 2004 and apparently had very different views on the UN’s plan. The majority (65%) of the Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the Annan Plan. However, the majority (76%) of Greek Cypriots voted to reject the Annan Plan. With the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan, it is back to the drawing board and a panoply of solutions, including permanent separation.

The Cyprus Problem has a long history and has been dealt with in detail by many (e.g., Attalides, 1979; O’Malley & Craig 1999). In brief, the current political situation is a direct result of the 1974 coup by Greek Cypriot nationalists who attempted to attain unification with Greece, in violation of the Republic’s independence agreement. Turkey replied to the coup with an invasion and subsequent occupation of 37% of the island’s landmass. Eventually, the areas of the
island occupied by the Turkish military were declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” a political entity that lacks international political recognition. Two *de facto* states govern areas that are mostly ethnically cleansed. Nearly all Turkish Cypriots live in the unrecognized state in the northern areas of the island and nearly all Greek Cypriots live in the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. There are a large number of refugees living in each part of the island.

Cyprus remains an island divided politically and ethnically under two *de facto* states. With the resounding Greek Cypriot rejection of the UN’s proposal for unification of the island under a federal umbrella, there is need to learn about the Greek Cypriots’ desires for a solution. While Turkish Cypriots are generally willing to embrace an offer that puts them in a federal situation with Greek Cypriots, Greek Cypriots are not.

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots likely view the UN’s proposal differently because of their very different political and economic situations. Greek Cypriots view a federation negatively because it implies recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state. This is a contentious point among Greek Cypriots because they frequently describe the Turkish Cypriot *de facto* state as “illegal.” In addition, Greek Cypriots know that they will be paying for much of the costs of unification because they are the wealthier of the two ethnicities.

Turkish Cypriots generally desire unification because it puts them firmly into the European Union without making the sacrifices to make it possible. This is a definite plus for the Turkish Cypriots because, at present, they live in a gray zone in which they are technically in the European Union, although they live under a government that is unrecognized. In a federative set-up, Turkish Cypriots would benefit from gaining implied recognition of their current *de facto* state. In addition, Turkish Cypriots know that they will not be expected to pay for much of the unification costs, because they do not have the means to do so.

But viewing the two major ethnic groups as monoliths lacks depth, since both of the ethnic groups on the island of Cyprus may have segments with different perspectives of unification on the island (Coufadakis, 2004, p. 77). Indeed, 24% of the Greek Cypriot electorate voted in favor of the Annan Plan, illustrating that there is not unanimity of opinion in Cyprus based upon ethnicity. The purpose of this research is to delve into the political preferences of Greek Cypriots, since it is the ethnicity that seems to be the major stumbling block to the international community’s best offer to assist in solving the Cyprus Problem. Much more must be known about the preferences of Greek Cypriots, if future proposals by the international community are to be developed. This research seeks to determine if refugee status, age, socioeconomic status, opinions toward coexistence of the communities, and educational background plays a role in conditioning Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution to the Cyprus Problem.

This analysis is not an evaluation of the Annan Plan nor an analysis of the problems encountered while marketing the Annan Plan to the Cypriots. Others have dealt thoroughly in the issues brought up by the Annan Plan and the failure to convince Greek Cypriots to embrace the UN proposal (see Coufadakis, 2004;
Jakobsson-Hatay, 2004). Instead, this piece is an investigation of the demographic and attitudinal attributes influencing Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution typology. Such preferences are important to understand since the solution to the Cyprus Problem may ultimately be placed in the hands of the electorate, as it was in April 2004.

**The Literature and Hypotheses**

There is substantial literature written about Cyprus and its politics, much of which is centered on how to solve the Cyprus Problem. Demetriou (2004) produced an impressive work linking most of the academic articles dealing with the conflict over Cyprus. In her analysis, the social science literature on the topic has developed through three stages. The major stages of development of the literature, she argues, went through an “early” period (1950-1974), a “positioned approach” period (1975-1990) and an “analytic plurality” period (1990-2003). She argues that early studies of the politics of Cyprus dealt largely with the ethnic problems on the island, including the different perspectives on the role of British administration of the island. In the “positioned approaches” phase of the academic works, authors generally deal with the ethnicities on the island and their positions vis-à-vis the other major nationalities on the island. In this period, writers tended to write about the positions of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as groups with certain interests and the external players in the Cyprus conflict (Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the US) in much the same way. In the final period, the period of “analytical plurality,” the literature has showed a blossoming of the issues within the study of the conflict over Cyprus but also an increasing plurality of approaches away from the statist and realpolitik approaches in the earlier analyses.

What is especially notable about the research on Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem is the overwhelming bulk of the writings on the topic deal with the structural difficulties in solving the problem (see Hutchence & Georgiades, 1999; Joseph, 1999; Joseph, 2000; Kyriakou, 2000; Peristianis, 1998; Richmond, 2001; Theophanous, 1996; Theophanous, 2000). These structural approaches usually entail illustrating which structural arrangements are necessary in order to make a solution work or stress the role that external actors can play in solving the Cyprus Problem. Out of analytical necessity, these approaches tend to view Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions as a monolith. Typical in these approaches is the notion that Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots “want” or “need” a specific political concession, something that Demetriou (2004, p.9-10) has pointed out.

It is understandable that the structural aspects of the Cyprus Problem since the political aspects of the problem involve an internal and external dimension, as Milne (2003) illustrates. He argues that the Cyprus Problem is complicated because the island has to deal with an internal set of relationships while also dealing with a related set of external relationships. The internal relationships are the questions pertaining to making a situation in which the two major ethnic groups on the island can live together peacefully and successfully, while the external relationships deal with the external stakeholders in Cyprus (Turkey, Greece, the UK, the USA, the UN, and the EU). With this complicated mix of stakeholders in the political
situation in Cyprus, it is understandable that the literature tends to use what Allison and Zelikov (1999) describe as a “classical” model. Indeed, the basic model, viewing the conflict over Cyprus from a macro perspective can do a great deal in terms of describing the political situation and making judgments regarding a possible solution without having to go into detail about the standard operational procedures of the organizations involved nor the particular perspectives of the individuals involved in the conflict and negotiations for a settlement.

What is also notable in the literature is the role of external actors in solving the Cyprus Problem. Many writings focus on the role of the UN or foreign powers in creating or fixing the Cyprus Problem (see Attalides, 1979; Diez, 2002; O’Malley & Craig, 1999; Richmond, 2002). Such approaches delve into how the problem was created and suggest which international actors can play a role in helping to bring about a solution. These approaches generally look into the causes of the split on the island and do make suggestive remarks about the necessary pre-conditions for a solution. The European Union and entry into the European Union for many, was seen as a major catalyst for solution, although Richmond (2001) argues the opposite.

Another segment of the literature concentrates on the role of nationalism and underscores the competing nationalisms’ influence on developing the current problem and as impediments to a solution (Richmond, 1999; Stravrinides, 1975). Although not void of the international dimensions of the ethnic conflict, such approaches view the political problem on the island as a function of the ethnic conflict, rather than the outcome of foreign influence. Such works generally view the solution to the problem via communication across ethnic lines and confidence-building measures, while recognizing the positions of the nationalities on the island have different needs from a solution.

Although the vast majority of the literature on the Cyprus Problem deals with the macro political position of Cyprus, there is a substantial literature dealing with questions pertaining to refugees (see for example, Hadjiyanni, 2001; Loizos, 1975; Loizos, 1977; Loizos, 1981; Zetter, 1994). This particular segment of the literature is that it deals in-depth with the major issues of a part of the population in Cyprus that has suffered directly from loss due to the invasion and the subsequent political developments. A major thrust in the research is that refugee status is an important point of a person’s identity and is even transmitted to the young, as Hadjianii (2001) points out. There are repeated references in the literature to the desire of the refugees to return to their lands. This is especially understandable in Cyprus, a country where land is seen as the most important way for investing for the future (Zetter, 1994). Loss of land, for those who became refugees meant a loss of investment that many are eager to get back.

The vast literature on the Cyprus Problem deals with macro issues of the structure of a solution and the necessary international environment to make a solution workable. However, few have delved deeply into the public opinion issues. One notable exception to this is Broome’s (1998) essay in which he reported the outcome of conflict resolution activities. In his essay, Broome (1998) explains
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what Allison (1975) argues the basic model, a great deal in models regarding a standard operational perspective of the factors in solving foreign powers 2002; O’Malley the problem was helping to bring the split on the conditions for a (for many, was O1) argues the of nationalism the current (Finides, 1975). conflict, such a of the ethnic generally view and confidence­ s on the island

The literature pertaining to Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem is highly limited. There is a substantial literature written about the Problem but there are limited perspectives. The literature is filled with assessments and commentary about the particular perspectives of the major ethnic groups on the island and the perspectives of the international stakeholders but there is little in-depth analysis of public opinion in the academic literature. No works have systematically tested propositions about the preferences for a solution using a large dataset.

This piece will attempt to fill in the need of the literature by rigorously testing hypotheses to learn about Greek Cypriot perceptions of the acceptability of various structural solutions to the Cyprus Problem. We seek to test the following five hypotheses:

1. Refugees tend to prefer solutions that lead to unification of the island.
2. Younger Greek Cypriots prefer solutions that stress division of the island.
3. The higher social classes prefer solutions that stress division of the island.
4. More educated Greek Cypriots will favor continued division of the island.
5. Greek Cypriots who are more optimistic about interacting with Turkish Cypriots will tend to favor solutions that stress unification of the island.

The literature has established that refugees are different from other citizens due to their life experience. This life experience has also been passed down to those who were born after the events of 1974. As a group, refugees have a strong personal stake in some form of reunification. Many of the refugees hold land claims and therefore are likely to receive financial rewards either by having their lands returned to them or by payment in kind following a political solution on the island. Land, as Zetter (1994) pointed out, is a major source of savings and investment in Cypriot society. Refugees are unlikely to receive the economic windfalls if the status quo is continued or if a formalized separation of the country is agreed upon. Therefore, we expect refugees to be more in favor of solutions that stress unification of the country.

We also expect major differences in preferences based upon age. We expect that younger respondents will show a preference for continuation of the status quo or a two state solution as younger respondents have lived under the status quo and know no other situation and a two state solution is merely a de jure acknowledgement of the status quo political division of the island. This has been brought up in explaining why the Annan Plan was rejected (Jakobsson-Hatay, 2004, p. 5) but this may also reflect upon the basis of the solution. The young have grown up in separation and to them it may not only seem a normal state, but also a preferred state. For the older respondents, we expect that they would prefer unification or a federal solution, as many of them grew up in an environment in which there was not a political division of the island and wish to have the political situation ante bellum restored.

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This work will also experiment with two other demographic attributes, socioeconomic status and highest education received. Socioeconomic status is also a suspected influence on preferences for a political solution. Socioeconomic status indicates an individual’s benefits from the economic and political status quo of a society. We expect those respondents with a higher socioeconomic status to prefer division, either in the form of a continuation of the status quo or a two state solution, as they are the ones who benefit from the division of the island. Highest education level achieved is also a consideration in the analysis as we expect that those respondents with lower levels of education have been exposed to greater amounts of nationalism and ideology and have not had the chance to experience higher educational levels in which critical thought and reflection are more valued.

Finally, in this work, we will explore the notion that attitudes, and not just demographic characteristics, play an important role, as Broome (1998) has pointed out. Optimism regarding the ability of the two major ethnicities to peacefully live side by side is a major hypothesized influence on preferences. This is not a tautological relationship because the opinion toward the ability of the two major ethnicities to interact does not imply a preferred political structure. Indeed, ethnicities may be able to interact quite well under very different structural types.

**Fieldwork and Data Collection**

Several questions were asked to learn about Greek Cypriot public opinion relating to rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots following the April 2004 Annan Plan referendum. CYMAR Market Research Ltd., a respected market research company operating in Cyprus, was commissioned to do the fieldwork and data processing for the study. The study was done as part of a commercially available omnibus study, a study that is run on a regular basis by market research companies, allowing for persons to purchase questions.

CYMAR conducted face-to-face interviews with respondents throughout the Greek Cypriot areas of the island during May of 2004. The sample was generally representative of the population of the island in terms of gender, region, and urban/rural location. Random selection methods were used to find the respondents. Interviewers arrived in neighborhoods in urban areas and villages in rural areas and walked from door-to-door, using guidelines determined by CYMAR to ensure as random a sample of the population in Greek Cyprus as possible.

Using omnibus services for such a study has strengths and weaknesses. Because omnibus studies are shared studies, costs are minimized and this is beneficial to the academic with limited resources available for research. In addition, professionals organize, gather, and make the data machine readable, making it much easier for the researcher to concentrate on and specialize in formulating the crucial questions and analyzing the data. A weakness is that modification of the sample used by the market research firm is not possible, since such modifications are not feasible on a standardized product offered by a market research firm. As a result, respondents in this study were only between the ages of 18 and 65, since older respondents, apparently, are not interesting to most business customers.
Dependent Variables: Preferences for a Solution

There are several dependent variables for this analysis. Respondents were asked, "What do you think the best permanent solution for the island is?" Responses were pre-coded as "like now/status quo," "two separate states," "federal solution," or "unification." Interviewers placed the open-ended response into the category that best fit the respondent's response to the question. Around a third of those interviewed reported that they preferred some sort of division—about 16% said that they favored the status quo and 13% stated a preference for a two state solution. However, the majority favored forms of unification—15% stated a preference for a federal solution and 51% said unification is best. The remaining respondents did not have a preference, did not know, or refused to answer.

Because some of the responses are not mutually exclusive, there are some problems of overlap. For example, unification does not necessarily exclude a federal solution. Therefore, many responses have been dealt with by creating dichotomous variables coded with a "1" for each response and a "0" for all other responses. There are three different dichotomous variables signifying preference for division with one denoting those who prefer a status quo solution, one denoting those who prefer a two state solution and one denoting a preference for either a status quo or two state solution. Likewise, there are three different dichotomous variables indicating preference for unification with one denoting preference for a federal solution, one for unification, and one for federation or unification.

It is arguable that the responses could be seen as part of a scale from status quo to full unification. Therefore, a scale was used in which status quo responses were codes as "1," two state solution "2," federation "3," and unification "4." The higher scores indicate a higher level of desire for full unification of the island. One scale was used in which there were four classifications, as mentioned above. Another version of the scale was used in which the first two options were merged as one, leaving a three point classification, assuming that there is commonality in the first two possible preferences, division of the island.

Independent Variables

I. Refugee Status

The refugees are denoted with a dummy variable with "1" representing refugees and "0" representing non-refugees, according to their self-description. About 39 percent of the respondents to the survey were refugees. We expect that refugees will be more in favor of unification and a federal solution and opposed to continuation of the status quo or a two state solution, as it is in unification, even under a federal structure, that they are most likely to receive their lands back.

II. Age

Age is measured in years, according to respondents self-reporting. The mean age of respondents to the survey was 44. We expect the young to favor division and the older to favor reunification of some sort.

III. Socioeconomic Status

Socioeconomic status is classified on a scale of from A to E, with A being the highest tier of the spectrum and D and E the lower tier. Interviewers classified
respondents into the categories of A or B, C1, C2, or D or E. Lower numbers express higher socioeconomic status. Eleven percent of respondents were classified as A-B and 18 percent were classified as C1. About 48 percent were classified as C2 and twenty-three percent were listed as D-E. We expect that the higher levels of socioeconomic status will show a preference for division.

IV. Education

Highest education level achieved is based on self-description and coded as “1” for those with a primary education, “2” for a secondary education and “3” for a tertiary education. Twenty-four percent of respondents reported having a college or university education while 59 percent reported a secondary education and seventeen a primary education. We expect that those with less education will favor unification.

V. Optimism of Coexistence

To measure degree of optimism regarding the ability of the two communities to coexist, respondents were asked a list of activities that indicated interactions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. One of the activities was living together in neighborhoods. Respondents were asked to indicate how long it would take for the two groups to successfully and peacefully live together. Possible responses were “never,” “ten years or less,” “five years of less,” “three years or less,” and “one year or less.” The responses reflect an optimism regarding the ability of the two peoples to peacefully coexist. Higher numbers indicate greater optimism. About one quarter of respondents indicated that they felt that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could live together peacefully and successfully in neighborhoods in one year or less. The most pessimistic response “never” was expressed by about twelve percent of respondents. We expect that the more optimistic respondents will favor unification and a federal solution while the more pessimistic respondents favor some form of division.

Statistical Tests and Findings

To analyze the data we ran a standard logistical regression with the dichotomous dependent variables and the five independent variables and OLS regressions on the two scales of unification. Logistic regression, a form of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure, was necessary to properly analyze the data when the dependent variables were dichotomous. There were 988 respondents in the sample for the MLE tests, once incomplete responses had been eliminated because of responses of “don’t know” to the question of how long it would take for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to live together as neighbors. Only 938 cases remained for the OLS regression on the scale of unification preferred, as responses of “don’t know” and other responses that did not fit into the pre-coded categories for the continuous dependent variable were removed.

The MLE models for dichotomous variables denoting preference for division seems to work well at first glance, as the output in Table One shows. The model is statistically significant with the three different variables denoting preference for division, with a Chi-square that is significant at less than the .01
significance level in each case. However, only one of the constants is significant, the one for the grouping of those who felt that the status quo or two a two state solution were the preferred solutions. The R-squared statistics are fairly low, with the exception of the one grouping of the two solutions (status quo and two states). This indicates that the model in which the two types of solution had been grouped together (preference for the status quo or preference for a two state solution) has the strongest explanatory power, explaining over ten percent of the variation.

Table 1. Preferred Solutions: Division Logistic Regressions (Significance Level)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Status Quo</th>
<th>Two States</th>
<th>Status Quo or Two States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Coefficients</strong></td>
<td><strong>B Coefficients</strong></td>
<td><strong>B Coefficients</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Status</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>-.133</td>
<td>-.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.720)</td>
<td>(.535)</td>
<td>(.478)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.056***</td>
<td>-.028***</td>
<td>-.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>.264*</td>
<td>-.215</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.788)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence Optimism</td>
<td>-.407***</td>
<td>-.303***</td>
<td>-.436***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.207</td>
<td>-.186</td>
<td>-.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.359)</td>
<td>(.426)</td>
<td>(.204)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.351</td>
<td>1.122</td>
<td>2.859***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.174)</td>
<td>(.267)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>87.163***</td>
<td>32.117***</td>
<td>125.686***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

In the models in Table 1, we see that only two of the independent variables work as hypothesized and are statistically significant consistently—age and the measure of optimism of coexistence. Socioeconomic status is only a statistically meaningful factor in those who support the status quo. It appears that refugee status and education play no role in forming opinions about different forms of division on the island as a political solution. The findings illustrate that the younger respondents are more likely to favor solutions that require division and that those who are more pessimistic regarding the ability to live together in neighborhoods do...
The MLE models for federation and unification seem to work well, as the output in Table 2 shows. The model is statistically significant, with a Chi-square that is significant at less than the .01 significance level. All the constants are statistically significant, illustrating the strength of the models. The R-squared statistics are very low, with the exception of the one grouping of the two solutions that are part of unification. As with the model for division of the island, the model with the two types of solution had been grouped together has the strongest explanatory power, explaining about ten percent of the variation of the dependent variable.

### Table 2. Preferred Solutions: Federation/Unification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Federal Solution</th>
<th>Unification</th>
<th>Federal Solution or Unification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Status</td>
<td>.034 (.850)</td>
<td>.039 (.774)</td>
<td>.077 (.611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.025*** (.001)</td>
<td>.017*** (.001)</td>
<td>.038*** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>-.221 (.113)</td>
<td>.140 (.176)</td>
<td>.023 (.840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence Optimism</td>
<td>.022 (.741)</td>
<td>.308*** (.000)</td>
<td>.385*** (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.104 (.612)</td>
<td>.015 (.922)</td>
<td>.113 (.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.480*** (.007)</td>
<td>-2.098*** (.002)</td>
<td>-2.368*** (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>18.936***</td>
<td>58.375***</td>
<td>125.686***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox and Snell R Square</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R Square</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (1-tail)

In the models in Table 2, we see that only one of the independent variables worked as we had hypothesized and is statistically significant consistently—the one denoting the age of the respondent. However, the measure of optimism regarding coexistence of the communities is generally useful as an explanatory variable to explain those who favor unification or preference for a federal solution or unification. It appears that refugee status, education, and socioeconomic status play
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no role in forming opinions about different forms of unification of the island. In general, older Greek Cypriots and those more optimistic about the ability of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together are more likely to prefer a federal solution or unification.

When the continuous variables are used in an OLS equation, it appears that much of the findings earlier are still true. Table 3 shows the outcome of the regression using the same explanatory variables with a continuous dependent variable. The models in Table 3 have a fairly low R-squared value, meaning that the models only explain about ten percent of the variation. However, the predictors of age and attitudes toward living together are statistically significant. It is the older respondents who tend to prefer solutions involving some form of unification and those who have a more optimistic attitude toward the ability of coexistence of the ethnic groups who prefer some sort of unification.

### Table 3. Preferred Solutions: Continuous Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>4 Classifications</th>
<th>3 Classifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.507***</td>
<td>1.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.205)</td>
<td>(3.626)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Status</td>
<td>.0374</td>
<td>.0301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.528)</td>
<td>(.548)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01963***</td>
<td>.01369***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.231)</td>
<td>(6.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status</td>
<td>-.005306</td>
<td>.002388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.097)</td>
<td>(.561)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coexistence Optimism</td>
<td>.203***</td>
<td>.156***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.761)</td>
<td>(7.678)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.005381</td>
<td>.005381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.670)</td>
<td>(.676)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (1-tail)

In each of the eight regressions run, the independent variable indicating the age of the respondent shows a systematic relationship with each of the dependent variables showing preferences for a solution. In each case, the age of respondents illustrates that younger Greek Cypriots prefer some form of division on the island, whether a continuation of the status quo or the legal division of the island and do not prefer federation nor unification. In seven of the eight regressions run, the independent variable denoting the respondents’ attitude toward interacting with...
Turkish Cypriots was successfully predictive. This illustrates that those Greek Cypriots who have more favorable attitudes toward living with Turkish Cypriots are more likely to favor unification or a federal solution. All the other independent variables used in the analysis are almost complete failures in terms of explaining Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution.

Conclusions
This systematic analysis has shown that age and attitudes towards coexistence play an important role in determining a Greek Cypriot’s perceptions of the best solution for the Cyprus Problem. The younger Greek Cypriots show a systematic preference for some sort of division while older ones prefer unification, as Jakobsson-Hatay (2004, p. 5) has noted. It seems that the young Greek Cypriots, who have grown up in partition and have never had to live side by side with Turkish Cypriots do not see unification as desirable. This illustrates that the univariate scanning of the data from the survey reflect something “real,” even when controlling for other factors. So it is of no surprise that 29 percent of 18-24 year olds prefer a continuation of the status quo while only 6 percent of those over 55 do the same.

Those who are optimistic about coexistence tend to prefer some sort of unification while those who are more pessimistic prefer some form of division. This would not be surprising to those who have worked within the field of conflict resolution. Indeed, Broome (1998) indicates that attitudes toward being able to work together are necessary in order for the two communities to move forward.

What is most interesting about the findings is that refugee status plays no role in forming preferences for a solution. This is especially surprising because refugees are people with direct material interests in unification and risk losing out on material benefits if the status quo continues. It seems that the investment in land, as Zetter (1994) argues is very important in Cypriot society is not so important that it will sway a person’s political opinion regarding the desirability of a particular form of solution. This is especially surprising given that even the refugees, who Hadjiyanni (2001) describes as people who continue to suffer from their losses, do not support forms of a solution that will likely profit them directly.

A crucial finding from the study is that attitudes toward the other are a powerful determinant of preferences. From an analyst’s perspective, this brings up some difficulties because it is often easier to look for demographic variables to explain preferences rather than attitudes that may be the function of life experiences. Future research should look into how optimism toward interacting with people from the other community develops as it seems that learning about how optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots plays a major role in forming preferences for a political solution.

One reasonable criticism of the findings would be that the survey took place during a very important and “political” time in Cypriot history. The fieldwork took place less than a month after the referendum on the Annan Plan, during the same month as entry into the EU, and a few weeks prior to the elections for the European
Parliament. Future research should be done to determine whether responses in the month following the referendum were the result of strongly-held preferences for a solution or if such preferences had been radically shaped by the political rhetoric surrounding the referendum on the Annan Plan, the country’s entry into the EU, and the elections for the parliament in Brussels.

For those interested in solving the Cyprus Problem, the study highlights the importance of engaging the Greek Cypriot youth. If a solution is to come about, the younger Greek Cypriots who have grown up in separation from Turkish Cypriots will have to be shown why it is in their benefit to live in a shared state with Turkish Cypriots. This should be a difficult feat since separation of the major ethnicities is correlated with the economic take-off of Greek Cyprus. In addition, it will be difficult to convince young Greek Cypriots that federation or unification really is in their interests since they know they will have to pay for the costs of reconstruction disproportionately and may not feel obliged to do so.

However, the findings also suggest that there is hope for unifying Cyprus. Since Greek Cypriot attitudes toward interacting with Turkish Cypriots are a major influence on the preferences for a solution, creating more favorable opinions will encourage greater support for unification. There is indication that changing attitudes is possible, generally by fostering greater contacts between individuals of the two communities. The research has shown that there is indication that increased contacts between individuals has fostered an increased optimism regarding the ability of the two communities to coexist (Yildizian & Ehteshami, 2004, p. 11). The diplomatic community can make a significant contribution to creating the necessary preconditions to a solution, since diplomatic support for such activities has had some successes (Broome 1998, p. 61-62).

This analysis has shed some light on an interesting and current topic in Cyprus at a crucial point in time. Future research should look into finding other attributes that help to shape a person’s political view of the best possible solution to the Cyprus Problem. Future research should also give respondents a way of expressing variations on unification such as offering them a choice of a federal government with a weak central government or a strong one. The future, for Cyprus, is unwritten and filled with opportunities for many different forms of structure to unify the country or divide the country. However, it appears that time is an element that is not on the side of unification as the generations that have grown up in a divided Cyprus show a preference for a continuation of division.

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