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Interview with President Abraham S. Fischler - President

Abraham S. Fischler
Nova Southeastern University

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Interviewee: Dr. Abraham S. Fischler

Interviewer: Julian Pleasants

Date: June 9, 2009

P: This is Julian Pleasants. It's June the 9, 2009. I'm at Nova Southeastern University speaking with Dr. Abraham S. Fischler and this is part of an institutional history of the university. Dr. Fischler, talk a little about your early background and where you grew up and your early education.

F: Well, I was born in Brooklyn, New York. I'm a product of the public school system. Public School 97, **Bootie** Jr. High School—Lafayette High School. I came from what you might call "upper lower class". My father was a salesman—never made much money—but we had a place to live. Mom took home work, so by the time I was 10 years old, I was able to travel the trains, and took the bundle on a Saturday, and took it in and then took a new one back home so mom could work. So she helped out in that way. I have a sister—an older sister—and by the time I was born, she was five years old and was playing a violin, so music was part of the culture. Saturday at 2 o' clock, we listened to the Metropolitan on the radio, so I had that in my background. I played the piano a little bit. Then I was at City College—I went there my first year—then I went into the military, the Navy, and I served twenty-four months in the Navy as a medic.

P: And where were you stationed?

F: I was stationed primarily in Chelsea Naval Hospital. I enlisted as a medic, so I followed that path when I was in the Navy, and when I came out, I finished City College. I got a

Masters in science teaching.

P: You got your undergraduate degree in 1951, is that correct?

F: That's correct, Bachelor of Science—social science—and I majored in Biochemistry from a social science background because I was interested also in history, having come out of the war and the background, and then I got a Masters in science teaching called a MAT—Masters of Arts and Teaching—from New York University. I taught in arts and science, middle school, high school . . .

P: . . . Sing Sing Prison?

F: Right, Sing Sing Prison. I did some research in Sing Sing Prison, by the way, with **Gock**, the psychologist . . . actually, the psychiatrist. And then I went on and got my Doctorate. I got a six-year certificate from NYU and then I met Dr. Evans—Warren Evans—who was the science consultant to Ossining, who asked me to come to Columbia—to leave NYU and come to Columbia, and he gave me a DuPont Fellow JHIP, so I was able to go full time at Columbia for the year that I needed to do my residency. Did a book on teaching science in a Junior High School as a project dissertation that they asked me to do. Then I went to Harvard.

P: And so you got your Ph.D.—or Ed.D. from Columbia in '59, and then you went immediately to Harvard. That's a pretty good first job.

F: Well, it was not a first job, because I spent several years in Ossining.

P: But this is your first academic, professional job.

F: Oh yeah, I spent the summer teaching at Columbia, and then I went to Harvard. I spent three years there because I had a terminal appointment, but I worked with a great mentor—Fletcher Watson—who was an astronomer. And then I went to Berkeley as an associate professor—made full professor in four years. Actually, in three, but I left in the

fourth year to come here.

J: There was one of the things I noted immediately—that you made full in four years.

P: That's correct.

J: That is very unusual.

P: It was. They were fairly good to me and I worked hard in that period of time.

P: Obviously at this time both Harvard and Berkeley are two of the finest institutions in America. So you were what we call academically blessed in your career to have the opportunity to work at those two schools. How did that experience impact your career?

F: Well, I didn't start out—that was never one of my goals was to end up at—I had to deliver some papers for the National Science Teachers Association, and it just so happens that Fletcher Watson was there and he listened to my two papers. I was planning on going back to Ossining when I finished my year at Columbia. And we sat on his bed and he said that he wanted somebody to be an assistant professor—terminal appointment, let it be known—and I had the kind of background he was looking for, and I was interested in the things that he was interested in. He had never taught K-12—he was an astronomer. So they offered \$1,000 less than I was going to make at Ossining, which was \$8,000 a year when I returned after, and I said no. I didn't spend a year bringing my family and three kids here to start with \$1000 less than I had, so they actually had to increase the salary to \$8000, and I went to Harvard. I didn't make any friends in doing that at Ossining, but it was good for my career.

P: And obviously, you honed your academic skills and your research skills while you were at Harvard and Berkeley.

F: Mainly at Harvard. When I got to Berkeley, it wasn't like Harvard, and Frank Kepple taught me a lot about—he was the dean in Harvard—I studied much more statistics at

Harvard than I ever did at Columbia. When I got to Berkeley, most of the studies being done were historical studies, biographical studies, things of that nature. I had come with a background from Harvard, which was much more research, much more experimental in terms of what was going on. My assignment at Harvard was an interesting one—I was half-time as a professor, and half-time I worked in Lexington and in Newton on a project that was the soft money that enabled me to come to Harvard. We did teaming of principals, we did some teaming of teachers, I taught science as a verb instead of a noun, I mean there was a lot going on at Harvard at the time, especially after they were changing over in that period. In fact, the person who came from this school system here in '62 spent the summer with me at Harvard when I was the director of the Harvard Lexington summer program, and that was Arthur Wolf. His responsibility as the assistant superintendant was to build the public sector across the street. So I had a lot to do with the context of the whole Nova Complex, which is one of the reasons that I was willing to give up what I had earned in Berkeley, to come here and be in a [. . .]. So my friends thought I was like you—crazy!

P: Obviously, as a full professor at a major university with tenure, many academics would not give up that opportunity, so explain how you ended up coming to Nova. I think you were on your way to Chile or somewhere and you just sort of stopped over, and you had gotten an invitation from Dr. Winstead, is that correct?

F: Well, it just-so-happens that Ed Mead, that I had done a seminar for over at Harvard in the Administrative Career Program, called the ACP Program. He was now a program officer for the Ford Foundation, and I had spoken—he had asked me to speak to that particular group at Harvard on the science so that they would be up on that, and there was a lot of science going on because of Sputnik that went up in 1957. So, they were interested in PSSC and chem study and all of that stuff that was going on at that time

supported by AAAS. So I did that, and that's how I met Ed Mead. So when he became a program officer at Ford, Ford Foundation was funding a number of projects in Chile, and he asked me in '62 if I would go to Chile as a person in science and try to help them re-orient the way in which science was taught in Chile as part of a project that Ford had. I wasn't the only one there, but I went. And I used to commute back and forth. During the summers, I would spend my summer there, but during the year, I would go back and forth to Chile, and I did that from '62 to '68, so I even did that while I was here. It was written into my contract when I came that I could continue that. And Ed Mead knew Warren Winstead, who was head of the American Schools in Germany. Because he was a graduate of ACP before Ed Mead graduated. So it was kind of an incestuous relationship with Harvard.

P: Well, now is it true that Mead recommended Winstead as the first president?

F: Yes. I turned it down when he did that. I wasn't really interested in leaving Berkeley at that time.

P: And the choice of Winstead was his background and he was the type of president that would be capable of getting a new university off the ground?

F: I don't know really why Ed recommended him, because this was going to be the MIT of the South at that time, and Winstead was not a science person.

P: That's why I asked that, since he wasn't a science person, one would assume that his skills would be in administration.

F: I think there was more . . . well, he had been a principal. He was also head of the American schools in Germany, which was an administrative position. So he had good administrative background, but never in higher education. This was all K-12. But I think it was difficult to find someone who wanted to come to sand. You know, there was no

university here at the time, but, you know, conceptually it was there, but nowhere else.

You really had to see it as a challenge in the area of science. So I think Ed was trying to bring in an administrator that he knew would at least have the administrative skills to do this.

P: I don't want to get into great detail about the Oatmeal Club and the beginning of the concept because you weren't here, but I think it's a rather extraordinary concept that a bunch of local businessmen would sit down in a civic enterprise, and create this cradle to elderly education, and they would have such an extraordinary vision where you would have the high school, where you would have Broward Community College then, and you would have the process of going through higher education. And they decided they would start with graduate students, not with undergraduate.

F: No, they actually started . . . BCC was already in existence, so they started with BCC moving out to the campus, and they started seven through twelve, so the first groups that were on this campus were the public school, seven through twelve, and BCC. What happened was that FAU was just funded in '62 by the state. And politically, the power for the state wasn't enough, not in the South. The population growth was in the South, but the political power was in the North. So when they built FAU, they weren't about to fund another university in Broward—that wasn't going to happen. So the group that started the South Florida Education Center—that particular group of citizens—was spearheaded by the Oatmeal Club. But there were added businesspeople outside the Oatmeal Club on that, and there were about thirteen or so. Tinsley gave you that . . .

P: . . . He did, he gave me all of the names yesterday . . .

F: . . . Exactly. That group was the South Florida Education Center. They were responsible for everything. When they needed to do something for the university piece, that's the group that became the university's board. They raised seventy-five thousand dollars.

P: Tinsley said it was the hardest money he ever raised.

F: By the time I took over the university and I learned all of this, I used to periodically talk to them, they were businessmen—I mean, they were bright businessmen—bankers. I asked them, how did they ever think they could build a university with seventy-five thousand dollars in the capital investments. I used to question them, because from the time I came, the university was in trouble. I mean, even the concept was in trouble. So, to me, this should have never been. I mean, business people do it, but I see that with a lot of organizations now that I'm involved in the community. A group of people connected to the federation here in Broward County, they fired they guy who had been there for ten years, but I didn't blame him when I went there to work for them. What happened was, they were spending money they didn't have. They would budget on what they thought they would get. They only got this much, but they budgeted and made pledges at this level. So over a five year period when I came in—this was just recently—they were losing a half-million dollars every year, and their line of credit at 2.5 million was gone!

P: One of the things that struck me in studying the history of this university was not only the vision, but the commitment. And as you know, there are several occasions in the history of this university when it could have very easily have gone under, and the process is extraordinary. It demonstrates not only vision and commitment, but a lot of flexibility, because the original concept when they first started was seventeen graduate students and all of their tuition was paid, so there was no income . . .

F: . . . But that was Winstead . . .

P: Yes.

F: That was Winstead. He came in '65 . . . '64, really, at the end of '64. He had the concept—having never been experienced in higher education at that time—he had the

concept that you bring in the top professor who was already funded, and normally the funding would provide money for some research assistance and associates. And he thought this would be the way to go, and the only way you can do that is if you start at the PhD. level. He used Texas as his model—the graduate school in Texas. What he didn't realize was there was a big undergraduate thing holding it up. Here, we had nothing. Not even a building. Just sand. So, that's the naïveté, even of my good friend Warren. I mean, even he didn't realize that that model wasn't going to work. And if you're going to be the MIT of the South, you're going to have to get professors who are in the sciences and engineering, et cetera, to come down here. And what did we have to offer them?

P: An old airfield.

F: An old airfield.

P: But in another sense, the belief that this community—Broward County, Fort Lauderdale, South Florida—would support this kind of school, that initial support was really not there, was it?

F: Well, two things occurred. Parker, Louis Parker was here, and he was the one who did the color television mix. He was getting \$250,000 a year, just from Japan. He showed me the check. He was already working on electric automobiles in his own research in a laboratory out here on Dixie Highway, and so all he did was say, "Look, over four years, I'll give you a million dollars." But he wanted the million dollars to just be the shell of the building . . . that's what he wanted. Because he wanted to really have a building. So they accepted the money under that condition. So the Louis Parker Building was built as the first building on campus, and they thought it was easy, I mean, here was a guy . . . And we had another man by the name of [Edwin M.] Rosenthal who just happened to finish an operation—was operated on—and they put in the first plastic vessel in the

chest, and Dr. Myron Siegel was the person who did that surgery, and Myron Siegel was the son-in-law of Abe Mailman, who was interested because he was a banker in Hollywood and a land developer and a very wealthy guy, and was a trustee—they put him in the trustees. Well Rosenthal said, “What can I do, Mike?” So Mike said, “Why don’t you build a nursing home with half of the money you want to give, and half build a small student union.” So that’s how the Rosenthal Center got built. So one man gave us the money for the Parker Building, and one man gave us the money for the Rosenthal Student Center, but we never used it as a student center—we used it for everything else but a student center. So now we have two buildings.

P: But in the Parker Building, you just built the first floor, is that right?

F: That’s correct, and it wasn’t built for science, it was just built to be used as offices and stuff, and the library, and all kinds of stuff. Yeah. It wasn’t until the third floor was built by [Leo] Goodwin giving us access to his stock so we could put it up as collateral—that’s senior Goodwin—that we ended up getting money to finish the third floor, in which we put the germ-free laboratory.

P: So when you come here, you came initially in August of 1966, and so this vision of the MIT of the South was in somewhat limited development. Can we put it that way? I mean, it was really just getting off the ground.

F: Yes. I mean, when I came, Winstead had already hired Bill Richardson in oceanography. And he already had hired Ray Pepinsky in physics area. And there was someone—George, I think his name was **Gouse**—who had been at Washington University in St. Louis in more of the social, philosophical area. And there was someone else—president of another corporation. So there were four people here already, plus his colleague, Duval, who was assistant to the president. And Duval was the one who wrote the first project that got us the three graduate buildings, the dormitories from HUD. He was the

one who did that. So we had to . . . In the planning stages, when I got here, Richardson was here, Pepinsky was, and I was. Warren's office was 232, Pepinsky was 340, my office was on top of that one. They were doing the plans for the Parker Building, they were doing the plans for the Rosenthal Building.

P: Well, but when you accepted that job, you must have had some sense that this would come to fruition. And what was it that persuaded you that this was an idea that would be ultimately fulfilled?

F: When I came on my first visit, I left and I wouldn't go—I wouldn't move with it. I called Ed Mead, I said I knew about Nova. Remember I said, Arthur Wolf came in '62 to spend the summer with us, and that's where he learned about the teaming of teachers—that's where he learned about large and small group instruction. We were doing all of that in the summer at the Lexington School, and we had one at Newton and one at Lexington. Newton was an elementary and middle school, and I ran the middle school, and we did that. So we were involved in a lot of structural changes and seeing the effect of that and learning, and I was involved mainly to look at science, because that was where my orientation was. But I learned about large group instruction and small group instruction and self instruction and all that kind of stuff because we had **Skinner** with us and we had resources—intellectual resources—graduate students to look at what we were doing. So when Arthur came, he talked about this concept, and we worked during the summer, putting together a schematic idea of what we could do to create a better climate for learning in a Nova Complex.

P: So the university school was something that you were particularly interested in?

F: No, I was interested in the laboratory across the street. By the time I came, they were already graduating their first class, so they had been in business five years, and I was interested in what was going on across the street. Prior to that, when I was at Berkeley, I

was travelling to Palo Alto in the capacity of an assistant Superintendent working with Santee, doing work there. I was also consulting in Carmel, California, with **Medill Bear**. So I was spending a lot of time doing my own studies and my own work at Berkeley, which I can incorporate here.

P: So you're interested in innovative approaches to teaching science?

F: Correct, and to reorganizing school. I was interested in moving the context of a class to the student. The problem in public education is that the classroom teacher has to try to keep 25 to 30 children together, because June is the end of a semester—the end of a year. They're expected to learn so much in that year, but by the time I left Harvard and studied in the areas of cognitive psych, et cetera, that's an impossibility. So what you have is more like a college where we tend to present the information. Everybody has to be ready to receive it at the same time. Well that's what's going on in the public school, only there they have a little more flexibility. So they have three reading groups, they have two math groups, hopefully when they have social studies, they can keep the class together, but by the time you get to the seventh and eighth grade, you have kids that are reading at the fifth and sixth grade level—they just happen to be in the seventh and eighth grade. So you give them a science book—they can't read the science, they can't read the book.

P: You are pushing toward an independent study each develop at their own skill level?

F: Correct. So what we did across the street in the Nova school when I got here was we created learning activity packages. So I didn't really come because I was interested in this place per se. What it did was it gave me the opportunity to implement something I could do here which I couldn't do at Berkeley, because you're not going to change Berkeley. Just like you don't change Harvard.

P: Now when you were first hired here, as I understand it, you were hired as a professor of education.

F: Correct.

P: You were also the dean of the graduate school.

F: Correct.

P: You also had another responsibility. There was also a sort of science center that you headed as well.

F: Correct.

P: So you were taking on three different jobs, and part of it is teaching, and part of it is administrative.

F: Yeah, yeah. That's true.

P: And did that appeal to you?

F: Well, if you look at professors at universities, they teach six hours a week. You know, you don't prepare . . . after the first year, you don't worry so much about six hours per week. I used to argue with my law professors, since law is taught through presidents, once you've outlined your first hundred years, you're only going to change this little piece up here. So don't tell me it takes you fourteen hours to prepare for a lecture. So, I always was **exalting**, I always was doing work outside the university, and that's where I did my research—that's where I wrote my books and that's where I did my research, so working didn't bother me. I never complained about work.

P: Talk a little bit about what happened once you come on in 1966. You discussed a little bit the beginning of the physical plan. What was the process you were going through in terms of graduate students, hiring the faculty, and developing a curriculum?

F: The faculty—remember, we start at the Ph.D. level. Each center was autonomous. So, I was in charge of one center, Richardson another center, Ray Pepinsky another center, and we brought in Joel Warren when we brought in the germ-free laboratory. So, each one was developing their own center. What I was doing was trying to get them to understand the nature of research in a way that they would see the need for students to be trained not to do the technical parts for research, but to be able to ask questions that are researchable. And I wanted also to be able to get away from spoon-feeding the doctoral students. If you're a person with a Ph.D., your job is to be able to look at the world, ask a question that is important in a context which is theoretical, so that you can then begin to understand what has to be done to answer and refine the concepts that you're functioning with. What we do primarily in the sciences—you have an Abe Fischler, or you have an Einstein, or whatever you have, and you come in and you work with them, and they give you the question, and it meant to you—it's a question that the big one is interested in answering, because it is a small piece of his concept. So you do A, and the next one does B, and the next one does C. So you're working as a doctoral student on a question that was given to you by the professor, and that doesn't produce the kind of learner that is a PH.D. in my mind. So, when I came, I left Berkeley because, first of all, they're shooting gold with 68's, so whether you're there or not, it makes no difference. Second of all, the professors that are successful there are not interested in anything but producing themselves in their students. I don't know if you know that Dr. Teller was teaching a Physics 10 course. **Carples** took it over later on. The Physics 10 course . . .

P: . . . This was Edward Teller?

F: This was Ed Teller.

P: Of the atomic bomb?

F: Atomic bomb Teller. He would teach in the great hall—800 students—and if you got there late, 400 students saw it on a television in a smaller hall. That was the only science course educators took who were non-science majors. That's how they satisfied their undergrad science—they took Physics 10. And it was taught, and he was good, by the way, a good teacher, good professor, but science to him was a noun. They didn't "do" science.

P: You use it as a verb.

F: It is a verb. Its not a noun. Science is engaging people and asking questions and deriving solutions to the questions they are asking, and they fit into some context. It's a "search for truth," in quotes.

P: In 1966 and 1967, well the university began its first session in 1967. It must have been difficult because lacked you buildings, you lacked resources, you lacked funding . . .

F: Well, it wasn't so difficult from that point of view because Richardson was able to fund himself. Pepinsky only lasted a year because he was unable to fund himself, okay. I funded myself by doing the research and brought students into what I was doing. So there wasn't that much here to worry about from a small financial point of view. The laboratory didn't cover its overhead for the university, but it covered its own. Richardson was very successful with that model.

P: He raised quite a bit of money.

F: Very successful. Pepinsky raised no money, and he had seven students. Someone had to come up with money for seven students.

P: And in the first class at Nova, there were seventeen students.

F: Correct.

P: And I understand they were selected from something like 250 applicants.

F: Absolutely.

P: How did that process go? Did all of the members of the faculty and Winstead sit down and cull through the applicants. How did you pick them?

F: No, we picked them! Those who wanted to go to oceanography, Richardson picked them. Those who wanted to go to physics, Pepinsky picked them. Those who wanted to come with me, I picked them.

P: So how many did you personally have in the beginning?

F: I had . . . one, two, three, four . . . I think five. Something like that.

P: The *Miami Herald* hailed the opening of the first privately endowed technological graduate university of the age, and it said it would begin with a small note that would be heard around the world, which is a rather extraordinary opening line for a local newspaper. So I think locally, there was a great deal of anticipation because it was a new concept. I know there was an article in *Time* magazine about it, *Newsweek* had an article, it was innovative. Dr James Killian . . . thought it was a great idea, but as Tinsley Ellis told me, he said, “Well, Killian didn’t have to actually take that idea and organize it and begin a university. It’s a good idea, but when you get down to the process, it’s a little more difficult.”

F: Killian played a very important role, though. Killian said to the trustees, “If MIT was starting out today, it would not be the MIT it is today. He’s saying that—and my being present when that was said; this was at a meeting—was the thing that gave me the courage to do some of the things I did. That was a profound statement. You go to realize what that did from a freedom point of view for someone who came here from two of the best universities in the country, and to be able to say to people, “I’m not here to build

Harvard, I'm not here to build the institution you left to come here. If that's what you want, don't come here." That was very important, because what it did was it gave me the freedom to change the whole direction of this university.

P: And one of the areas that's going to be successful early on is . . . Jim Farquahar is going to donate land, Mather is going to donate land, and this early land was sold off to get the funds to . . .

F: . . . Not Mather's land.

P: The Farquahar land was sold.

F: The Farquahar land was sold off.

P: And as Tinsley Ellis said yesterday, of course obviously, if they held on to it up until present day, it would be worth millions. But at that time, the issue was funding, right, you needed the money to operate the institution.

F: Well, if Pepinsky had been successful, if he had been successful in emulating the Richardson model, we might have not made the change as quickly as we were forced to do. Winstead was a good guy, but he lost sight of why he came here. He thought he was like Goodwin, but he didn't have the money to be like Goodwin.

P: This is Leo Goodwin you're talking about?

F: Junior. Senior had died, Junior was . . . and I use him just as an illustration. He lost sight of the difference between the donor and himself, and by the time '69 came, we were in deep trouble. Part of it was that I was fooled. When I came in '65 and examined the face and talked to people, the yachts are going by and you're seeing all this wealth flying by, and it didn't take me long in '67 to realize that all of that money is not here, and even if it is here, it's going back home, because that's where the body is going—that's where the children were. So when they died, they didn't die and bury themselves here, because

their children weren't here. They died . . . so one of the largest businesses we had at that time was the mortuary business. They would fly the body home. So if they were going to donate money, they would donate it home. So, there was an illusion that I looked at when I came. They put me up in the old ocean mile, and I was looking out the window—I was here by myself because I was going to Chile, or coming from Chile—and I wouldn't even take any money from them because I didn't want to be obligated. So I used to do this on the trip from Berkeley—instead of going to the west coast, I'd come to the east coast—so, it was . . . I didn't come here prepared to say yes.

P: And you probably, as I understand it from reading one of the letters you wrote, you didn't really understand the financial situation until you became associate vice president.

F: That's correct.

P: Then you really realized that it was a lot worse than you thought it was.

F: I was busy trying to do what I was doing . . . You know, I was trying to keep my head above water, because I was responsible for five students and five of these, plus my wife and three kids and things like that. And I was getting paid, by the way, about \$25,000 a year, so we weren't making a lot of money.

P: Well, at one point, you did get a federal grant for the Hollywood Education Center.

F: Yes.

P: That was about \$552,000, is that right?

F: Something like that; a third of what we needed.

P: Yes, but nonetheless, that's a major grant.

F: Yeah, I took the responsibility for raising money when the fellow died from Tambllyn Brown, I took the responsibility for the campaign for the Hollywood-Mailman Building.

And we ended up building that building without any debt.

P: Which in this case was a great achievement.

F: Well, there were two grants, one was the Kellogg grant at the end, which paid it off, and Abe Mailman helped. He gave some money. Bill Horvitz gave some money. Yeah, you know, it took a while, but it was difficult to get money because if you asked me, "Could my child come here?" my answer would be, "Probably not." And if he asked me, "Could his child come here?" I would have to say, "I'm sorry, I don't think so." Because we were only taking in a small number, and we were getting in lots of applications, and the reason we were getting lots of applications was apparently we were offering a free education.

P: That's right, all tuition, books, everything was paid.

F: Everything was paid for, so, I mean, you didn't have trouble getting applications.

P: Well let me read you something in the Hollywood paper, a description of you—

F: —of me?

P: Yes. "Dr. Fischler is a pipe-smoker with a keen, flashing wit and smile. He isn't one to get excited, but he is gratified by the recent federal grant of \$552,000 for the construction of the Hollywood Educational Center." Then you responded, "It is a breakthrough, a first in the field, and we are enthusiastic over the impetus the grant will give our project."

F: Yeah, it was a good sum of money. I think the building cost a million six or something like that.

P: And so ultimately in terms of what you had done professionally, that was a major breakthrough for you and your idea of scientific education.

F: Right.

P: Now, in the early development of the school, I've looked at Winstead's papers and some of what you were talking about at the time, and let me sort of give you what my overview is at this point. We're talking '67-'69 and what the University was about—trying to do. First of all, the argument was that with technology and science, that was the future, in order to prepare for the 21st century, science and technology were going to be key, and that was going to be the focus of the university. Secondly, innovative and fresh approaches to teaching and research. This would hopefully be a kind of model that would be copied nationwide. And it was also critical in the beginning to connect with the community in Broward County and to be a servant and have strong relationships with the county, and then the same thing for business and industry, that this school would ultimately be a magnet for industry, and originally, they were going to have an engineering school, but it didn't come about, but that was part of the idea. Does that sort of sum up in general what the school was about at that time?

F: Yes. And, by the way, in education, we did accomplish that, because across the street, we had a laboratory. We didn't build it, but it was a laboratory. Up until '68-'69 . . . there was no plan for me when I came here to build a University school, because across the street, I had a laboratory. My students were doing research across the street.

P: But isn't that what happened with new universities, they evolve, don't they? And as circumstances change, and as funding issues change, you do what you can do.

F: When you're young.

P: (Laughs)

F: See, in most universities, the president has given away the power for the kinds of decisions we're talking about.

P: You're talking about faculty senates and that sort of thing.

F: That is correct. So, the reason that public schools don't change is because they can't. And the reason Harvard doesn't change is because Harvard can't.

P: Tradition.

F: And you went there because of certain conditions. The true story here was that the law school taught me a lesson. I didn't realize that in law, we took in 200 students, approximately 200. We divided them into two sections—A and B—and A was taught, and B was taught in the numbers of 120 and 120. So you had the professor of Rules and Estates, you taught 120 students, and the professor in Property taught 120 students. Well, when you teach 120 students, don't tell me you're using the Socratic Method. What you're doing is you're lecturing with an intermittent question—somebody who has the audacity to raise their hand. So that's what's going on in law school. What was worse, I found out, is they give you no tests, because the professor would have to read 120 papers. And he wasn't about to do that, either. So when I watched what was going on in the law school, I said, "No, no, we've got to change." So I said to you as a professor, "You're going to teach 9 hours a week. You're going to teach two sections of the same course. Now I'm going to divide the group." Okay? And they did that, and we went from here to here in the college when they took the boards. The point I'm going to make is—I resigned in '92 from the presidency, and in '93, they went back to teaching six hours.

P: I'm glad you brought up this business about a private institution because in '68, there were many overtures to the University of Miami, to Florida Atlantic, to Florida State, even the State Board of Regents. The theory was that Nova is in financial trouble, we either need to make an association or have the state take over the school, and there were a lot of people, or at least some—I noticed the *Sun Sentinel* had an editorial that said, "Don't go state, don't go public, keep the school private." That is the essence of what the school is about. If it goes public, as you indicated, then you would have all of these state

regulations, you have to deal with the legislature, and on, and on, and on, and that we ought to do everything that we can do to keep this institution private.

F: That would be my point of view all the time, but I don't call it private. It's just independent.

P: Independent, okay.

F: That's the term I use.

P: Yeah, well that's the term that's used—independent colleges and universities. But it is the concept that is different, as you indicated.

F: Well, because the term “independent,” what are we independent of? We're independent of the controls that the state puts on you because you become dependent on the state for the income that you need to run your institution. So, my philosophy was, I didn't come to build a dependent university, I came here to build an independent university—one that would be different.

P: But it was a very close thing, wasn't it. I mean, the trustees were really in search for some sort of accommodation that would keep them afloat.

F: Well, not between '67 and '69. By '69, everybody had realized—including Abe Fischler—that we weren't going to make it, that that model wasn't going to happen, that physicists weren't going to come down here, that engineers were not going to come down here. We had nothing to offer them. We didn't even have the resources to build them the laboratory that they needed. So, I mean, we were at that kindergarten level, and you didn't have to be a genius to see this. So, in '69, in a meeting that took place in Farquhar's Orleans thing, in his apartment, Richardson and Joe Warren and I were called to a meeting by Farquhar, at which time he was going to fire Winstead, and when I listened, I said, “You don't fire a president. He's been here from '64 to '68. You

don't fire him." And we convinced Farquahar to give him a year's sabbatical and pay him, but to get him away, and that's how I developed, that's why I did that for one year.

P: And so, what were the major reasons for why—

F: --Because he wasn't competent to see, he kept his eye on the hole and not on the donut.

P: Well, in reading letters and board trustee's meetings and things like that, there were some suggestions that he had been too involved in social activities, that he had not been good enough as a fund-raiser, that his administrative skills had not been what they had hoped.

F: Well that's true.

P: And so that he was a good—and I think, Tinsley Ellis said this yesterday—that he was a very good front man, that he made a good impression, that he was good at talking to people and meeting people, but he didn't have the administrative skills to get from point A to point B.

F: That's all true. That's all true. When I came in September, I was amazed at what had just surfaced between July and September. I mean, I couldn't believe things were so bad. In his drawers, he had bills that had never been posted. I mean, it was really a catastrophe. And that's when Farquahar sold the 80 acres of land. He kept a share from closing our doors. The *Time* article that you are making reference to where Winstead says, "Well we're not so worried about the Southern Association because we have such a great Board of Advisors." I had to call back—first, read the article. Second of all, when I got the call from Gordon Sweet [Director of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools], he was one angry man.

P: Well, let me hold that, because the accreditation process is really significant, obviously, and because of Winstead's controversial statement, you're already in trouble. And at one

point, they actually took you off the list to be considered for accreditation.

F: Exactly.

P: So, if you're not accredited, you really couldn't get the whole university up and running, right?

F: Absolutely.

P: So, let me go back to Winstead. At this point, the trustees are going to ask you to be the associate vice president.

F: Just Jim, just Jim Farquahar. He was the chairman of the Board.

P: It was not approved by the Board?

F: Oh, it was approved by the Board.

P: That's what I mean.

F: The discussion took place just between the four of us.

P: Okay, but the Board did approve of the—

F: —Oh, yeah.

P: And as I understand it, you were willing to take this on an interim basis.

F: One year.

P: You had no plans at that point to be President of the University. And in fact, it would have been quite a thankless task, because in essence, what you were doing now is you were acting as President of the University.

F: Yeah.

P: Because Winstead in effect is gone.

F: Yeah, he cleaned out his office and he left.

P: And so, your major goal as you took over is paying the bills.

F: The first year...

P: ...I mean, the taxes hadn't been paid...

F: ...there were class-action suits that were pending, the law...it was a mess, I'm telling you, it was an absolute mess. We hadn't paid the pension funds, we hadn't paid social security, that's when the trustees were all up in arms, because they're liable for that---the one thing they're liable for was the social security. And it wasn't paid six months—

P: —if you didn't pay your social security taxes, you're really in trouble!

F: That's why Jim—when I got all this information, I sat with Jim, and I convinced Jim that if he's going to give us land anyway, he should give it to us now, and sell it yourself. I mean, we don't need any committees. Just sell it. And we need the money.

P: And so you were, at that point, ready to close the doors.

F: I was going to close the doors in June of '70. Yeah, in May, maybe it was the April meeting—you would know better than I now—maybe it was the April meeting where we were going to close the doors, because I wasn't going to keep the institution going the way it was.

P: Let me go back to the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools—again, the process is very complicated, as you well know, particularly in a beginning institution, and you have to have all of these requirements that are met. And apparently what happened at some point was you were put on—I forget what they call it—provisional status to be accredited, and there were reports that had to be made every year, and Nova didn't make the reports—Winstead or whoever was responsible, and so Gordon Sweet, by the time you were there, he says, "You guys are off the list." And so you had to physically go and meet him, I guess in Atlanta?

F: Oh, I had met him before—

P: —I mean, but you had to go to appeal this, right?

F: Absolutely, I went with Jim. The two of us went to Atlanta.

P: Sweet was not happy, was he?

F: Oh, no (laughing)! He was not a happy camper. Heck, no! Just the opposite!

P: Well, I have the list of the accreditation, which started in July of 1964—the process begins. And what happens in the beginning is you get from SACs, you get the procedures. This is what you have to do; these are the standards, on, and on, and on. And as you go through this process, or as the University goes through this process, in December 23, 1969, Nova had been removed from the candidate status due to a failure to continue to communicate with the Southern Association, and that's almost inexplicable, isn't it? As we indicated earlier, without accreditation, nothing really matters.

F: Well, because even Richardson was not able to get his grants.

P: You couldn't get grants, it would have been the end of the institution in another context. So, you're in the middle, as you start, of two major problems.

F: The first two things that happened in September, honestly, I got letters that said we're going to have to shut the lights because we hadn't paid the light bills. Then I got the letter telling me about the pension funds. And then I got the letter from the Southern Association. This is all in September. I just sat in that desk—that's when I said to myself, "What else is going to happen?"

P: You start thinking about going back to Berkeley at this point.

F: I could have gone back because Elberg—I was still in communication with Elberg. But

that's when I sat down with Farquahar. Its too bad you had never met him.

P: On the issue of accreditation, I have here a letter, November 22, 1969, from you to Gordon Sweet. "Two weeks ago, I assumed the Executive Vice Presidency of Nova Southeastern University and your telephone call came as a shock. I did not realize nor was ever told that the status report had to be filed each year until the institution became accredited." So this is what you were just were discussing at that point, another one of these problems that is absolutely critical to survival of this institution. Now, once the financial trouble got to a certain level, there seemed to be no other option within the state—you couldn't make an agreement with FSU or Florida Atlantic or Miami, and so at this point, and it really begins in 1968 with Dr. Winstead, he gets in touch with Alexander Schure at New York Institute of Technology and begins this process of trying to make an accommodation, a federation, an association, within NYIT. But the initial process was not successful. Would you explain a little bit about who Alexander Schure was, a little about NYIT, and—I'm not sure how involved you were with the early negotiations which did not come to fruition—but would you talk about that first stage.

F: Let me go back a little bit before we get to that. There was associated with this park in South Florida—National Association for Research and Development, NARAD—it was started by Arthur Wolfe, who was the person who was the associate superintendent of schools who came to Harvard and spent the summer with us way back in '62. He created NARAD, and even though I was in Berkeley, he asked me to become a member of NARAD. Alex Schure was the president at NYIT—New York Institute of Technology. New York Inststute of Technology took students who couldn't get into other institutions, and during the summer, he brought them in for English and Math in a self-paced mode, and if they did well, they were admitted to NYIT. So NYIT was an independent school—his father created Crescent Electronics—Alex Schure had two earned doctoral degrees,

one in Communications and one in Education. He was the one who was responsible for starting the training program in Crescent Electronics during the war, he's about ten years older than I am. So education was something that—Alex himself was a learner, and he also was someone who created this concept of self-learning through the use of technology. I could spend a lot of time on Alex Schure. Because at NYIT, he actually was responsible for that institution. His family was on the Board. He put it up as a non-profit eventually. But he allowed the faculty up there to control what was going on within the school, and he wanted some place to do some exciting things. NARAD brought us together, Alex and myself.

P: He came down to visit the Nova School, didn't he?

F: No, I'm back. We're not there yet.

P: Oh, okay.

F: So, I knew what he was doing, and I was excited about what they were doing at NYIT because they were implementing some of the concepts that I was interested in, which was self-learning, time as a variable instead of a constant, et cetera. They were doing that. He also had a number of grants for the teaching of science at the college level with that concept in mind, and he had two people doing nothing else but developing programs in the field of science which students would do on their own. He also created computer graphics as a major field. Pixar had many of his students in California. In fact, they just honored him two years ago. So, we had an affinity that way, so I went to visit NYIT not for any other reason but to see what they were doing. And it was exciting to see these kids during the summer working, and the only technology they had were these little machines that would start and stop, you know, those recorders. They didn't have computers at that time, so it was much more difficult than it would be today to do what he was doing. So we knew each other, and we always had our meeting at NARAD and

we would see each other. So when the group came down from NYIT that was invited to visit, Dave Salten and the others that had come down, I had already met them. So I wasn't excited about it. But they didn't come down to take over Nova, they never wanted—what they were looking for was a place where they could start an NYIT in the South, and we had the land. That's what they were looking for.

P: Well, it's interesting, the evolution of this, because the first notice in Winstead's papers that there was some interest here was May 5, 1968.

F: Right.

P: May 24, Winstead goes to New York, goes back in June for another meeting, then they—the first proposal was what you indicated—placed a division of NYIT on the Nova campus, and they kept going back and forth. There were apparently some changes that had to be made, and they got to the point of August 29, and in September of '68, they thought the deal was going to go through. September 4, Schure writes Winstead, the articles of incorporation look fine, and then by 1969, the attempt had failed. Do you know why that first attempt had failed?

F: Yeah, they didn't trust him.

P: They didn't trust Winstead?

F: The advice he got from the people he had sent down was to verify—

P: David Salten and those people?

F: David Salten and the other fellows, they went back and said "Alex, don't do it." So the recommendation from his visiting team down here, because of Winstead, and because of what they found and talked to people, they ended up making the recommendation, "Don't do it."

P: Now, one of the statements that they made, and this may have just been a public statement to cover everything, was that they said that Nova wanted to be the MIT of the South and that was too grandiose of a concept, they didn't have enough money to fund something like that, and they just decided that this was not a good match.

F: That's correct.

P: However, within a year, you were back in touch with Schure, and you go through the process of actually giving him a formal listing of all of the assets and liabilities of the school, so what has changed is not so much the relationship of the institutions, but the relationship between you and Schure. Is that a fair statement?

F: It's a fair statement, yeah.

P: So, once you went to him in 1970—

F: That meeting took a half-hour.

P: You made the deal.

F: Half-hour.

P: Had the Board approved that before you went to Schure?

F: No.

P: But they understood that this was going on, obviously.

F: No, at a meeting in April—you'd have to go back to the minutes—on a meeting in the executive committee of the Board, of my Board, in April, I told them that I need a million dollars, a million-two, and one person said, "I'll try to get it," et cetera, another person said, "I'll go to the University of Miami," I said I would go visit Alex Schure again, even though he had said no. That was that meeting.

P: By the way, the other guy's name was Theobald.

F: John Theobald. But there was also another person who was a third person that came down, anyway...

P: The system that was now going to be set up is now going to be formalized in an official agreement, and I actually have an official copy of that agreement. Would you give me the very essence of that agreement? Once you talked with Schure—

F: —No, no. The agreement—I'll get to that agreement. It was a one page statement. One page.

P: What I have here—

F: —Don't worry about what you've got there. I'm telling you, in thirty minutes, we shook hands, I came back to the next Executive Committee meeting which is in May, I think May, at which time, the two others failed, and I came back with an agreement, a one pager.

P: And what did that agreement say?

F: Who?

P: This agreement, one page...

F: The one page, it said that they would put nine people on our Board, they would ask nine of us to resign. They would do that. Two, that he would become the Chancellor of NYIT, of Nova. I become the Vice-Chancellor of NYIT. I would also serve as President of the University. It ended up where the million-two was supposedly given to us, but in order to cover it in a formal agreement, he would have to call it pre-paid rent. So the million-two was for pre-paid rent to have the NYIT program on our campus. And the reason they gave me the title of Vice-Chancellor was so that I could oversee it. So I'd be the president of Nova, but I'd also be overseeing the NYIT program on this campus.

P: So they had an MBA, and they had some undergraduates?

F: They had an MBA, and they had undergraduate. And in return, I would go up and become a Board member up there.

P: In fact, you had two members on their Board.

F: Yes, Farquahar I think, and myself.

P: Now, the issue for the Board of Trustees here—there were some members on that Board who were not in favor of this agreement, and the argument that I've heard is that we would be selling out to a New York-based institution. Another argument was that it was not a very prestigious institution—

F: That's—all that's true.

P: And that some people thought that this was not in Nova's long-term best interest, but the majority of the Board. As I understand it, said, "We have no other choice. They're going to give us \$1.2 million."

F: There was no problem. I mean, the problem was that we had to shut the door, or we had to make a deal. I thought that he [Schure] would want us to become an NYIT. That never happened. He never even wanted that.

P: He could have.

F: He could have.

P: Because as I understand, on the Board so you could have been out-voted on every issue, right?

F: Absolutely, absolutely. But I knew him, and I knew that he was more interested in the entrepreneurial spirit of Nova, which he had lost at NYIT because he has set it up with an academic center and all of the other things that they put together there, so he couldn't

do any of the things that we had talked about at NYIT, and he needed a playground, which fitted my philosophy, because that's how we became good friends.

P: Now, did he not appoint his wife and his son to the Board—family members.

F: Oh, yeah, family members at NYIT, not here.

P: Not here. Now in order to make this accommodation, some Board members at Nova had to resign.

F: That's correct.

P: Were there some hard feelings about that?

F: Yeah, because we lost some really good people. Don't get me wrong. There were good people on this Board.

P: Well, there would have to be to sustain the effort.

F: There were good people on this Board.

P: And in fact, I know some of them resigned for the good of the institution, because they thought that was the only option.

F: That's correct, absolutely.

P: Now, in this document I have, which is essentially what you have told me in a—

F: —That's the lawyers, that's what they put together.

P: That's the legal document.

F: Right, that one I never even read.

P: Okay, and this is dated July 1, 1970.

F: Correct.

P: Now, tell me what the \$1.2 million was used for.

F: Pay bills!

P: What's that?

F: Pay the debt!

P: Well, the way it states, you have long-term obligations, the first year they would pay you \$147,000, the second year, \$129,000, for long term debt, that you would get an immediate payment of \$224,000 for TIAA, FICA, withholding tax—

F: There you go!

P: Accounts payable, all creditors, right? And then \$60,000 a year for operating expenses. And how long did that \$60,000 a year last?

F: I can't answer that in that context. We had a deal. The deal was that he would keep the income, he would cover all of the expenses of the undergraduate and the MBA, and he would keep the residual.

P: And he was using your facilities, therefore—

F: A million-two, I told you, we eventually came to an agreement in there for pre-paid rent, okay, because he can't just take a million-two out of NYIT and give it to us.

P: So, in essence, in the end, you're going to repay that 1.2 million.

F: In essence...

P: When you end in '85...

F: In '85, his total—what I did to end in '85 was to take 1.2 million, and go to the bank—

P: —See what it would have earned—

F: —and it earned four-point-something million dollars. He had already taken out—putting his salary aside—he had already taken out for NYIT about \$2.4 million.

P: That was about \$500,000 a year, plus one other payment, which would have been half of your gross, something like that? Notice those were payments that were going to NYIT every year, right?

F: No, not every year. It was depending upon how much he earned from his programs. His programs were growing on this campus. He was taking more and more of these programs, and they were occupying more and more room, but we have to go back to see how this thing worked out, okay? We were out of debt in '71-'72, he wanted a law school. Alex Schure wanted a law school.

P: Well now let's hold off on the law school, because I want to discuss that in some detail, but...

F: The reason that's important is, we changed that three or four times as a result of events down here. Each time we changed something, it came to us in our favor. So we're starting out with no money from his programs that he kept here, no net, no net of his programs.

P: Well, at one point you got ten percent.

F: Then I got ten percent. That's why I'm saying—it was not a fixed, it was a variable depending on how much he was earning through his programs.

P: But in the end, the \$1.2 million is going to be repaid.

F: It was repaid.

P: Yeah.

F: It was repaid because in the end, we paid him as though he put that \$1.2 million in the bank, and it amounted to \$4.6 million. He had already taken out—through the efforts here—more than half of it. So we were left with \$200,000 that had to be paid, we signed

a note that over the next five years, we would pay him an x-amount of money 'til 1990 which would equal that sum of money.

P: Okay, right. Well, wait, I want to go back and talk about that '85 situation. Let me go back to 1970. One of the issues that comes up is that he's going to be paid as President of NYIT and also have a salary as President of Nova, and at some point—

F: —As Chancellor.

P: Yes, at some point, there was some—as time goes on and he spends less time at Nova and more time at NYIT, I know that there were some members of the trustees that were not real happy with that arrangement. Somebody told me at some point he was one of the highest paid University Presidents in the country because he was getting two salaries.

F: What happened was that we were operating as an independent institution from NYIT, okay. We add some trustees to the number so eventually we were nine and nine. Or eight and eight, I forget, but nine and nine. There were some people here like Dave Salten who said to him, "You should be getting more money than Abe Fischler—one dollar more—but you should be getting more money than him. You're the chancellor. He's the president. He reports to you, you should be getting a higher salary." And when he asked for that, I realized that I didn't care what he made. Didn't make a difference to me. It wasn't effecting my salary. So I said to myself, "Don't make a big fight over that. He was kind enough to bail you out." Do what he had to do, and he bailed us out another time, and another time. So, I didn't care what he was making.

P: So, in essence, he really saved the university twice.

F: Absolutely, absolutely. In '78...

P: In '70 and '78.

F: In '78 we went to court again with Della-Donna on that same issue, and he—we were using his line of credit.

P: Now, one of the issues that I'm a little confused about—let me read you this. This is a statement you made to the Board of Trustees in '78, when you're again in a financial crisis. "During the initial 3-year period, '70-'73, NYIT made available \$1.2 million, loans for the Mailman Building, \$150,000 for the Foreman Building, and an additional loan of \$250,000. Today, I'm happy to finally say that all of these loans have been repaid." Now was that part of the \$1.2 million?

F: No.

P: That was extra? Okay, so not only did you get \$1.2 million, but from '70 to '73, he lent you another, oh, \$500,000. Okay, so that was again a separate commitment he had made in addition to the \$1.2 million. Okay. Now as you go through this period—

F: —By the way, all that money that you're talking about was earned down here. We just didn't give it to them.

P: What do you mean?

F: Those loans, those were the end-of-the-year earnings that they had earned down here which I didn't send up.

P: Oh, I see. Okay.

F: Okay.

P: Now, at one point—

F: —Does that make sense to you?

P: It does.

F: Okay.

P: But at one point in '76, you had asked him for a loan of \$250,000, and that was refused. So is this the beginning of some strains in the relationship? I mean, it still goes on another nine years. He'd been pretty generous up until that point, so...

F: I don't know whether, um... there was never really a strain between myself and Alex. I forget what the \$250,000 was for. Do you know what the \$250,000 was for, why I asked him for it?

P: No, but the Trustees officially asked him, and what happened at that point, you went out and got some money from local banks—I think they borrowed money from a bank in California. And some of the Trustees—as they consistently did during this time—came up with enough money to keep the University going. I remember reading in the board meeting at some point—there was a bill of \$27,000, and in fact, they passed the hat. Farquahar said, "Well, I'll give five," Mailman said, "Well, I'll give three." And literally, at that Board of Trustees meeting, they raised money among themselves to pay off that debt.

F: You've got to go back, because you're leaving out the development of the university.

P: Yes, I'm going to come back to that. I'm going to go through that process in just a minute.

F: Okay.

P: Let me mention one other thing: The university name is going to be changed in 1974 to Nova University Incorporated. Why was that done?

F: Because we weren't going to be the MIT of the South.

P: So, the technological aspect is off the table?

F: We weren't going to be the MIT of the South.

P: Give me some idea of what influence Schure and NYIT had over the decision-making and functioning of Nova from 1970 to 1985.

F: Alex would come down here and we'd walk on the beach, on the boardwalk in Hollywood, and we would talk, and I would talk to him about the things I was going to do, and he would talk about the things he would like to see done, et cetera, and out of those talks would come a series of ideas, some of which I could do, and some of which I couldn't do. But he never—he always allowed me to make the choice after the Law School.

P: That's the one exception, because he was very adamant that that needed to be built.

F: That is correct.

P: And he turned out to be correct, as well.

F: He turned out to be correct. That's where we started to get back in trouble, so, there's a period of time when I didn't have any debt. They wanted a law school—they being Alex Schure and some members of the board. But Alex carried nine votes, so I'm not stupid. So I made a deal in '73 with the Trustees. If you raise one million dollars, we'll have a Law School operating in '74.

P: But they didn't raise that money.

F: They raised \$300,000.

P: So, from your perspective, what you're seeing is added debt.

F: In January of '74, I was sitting here with a dean and a librarian. In fact, go to the January meeting of '74, first meeting of the year. And I said to them, "We have an option. We can forget about the Law School, or we have to open it. And if we open it, we're going to have a million-dollar library debt immediately. Immediately. Because we're going to have

to fill that library with at least the books that are necessary for that law school. And we're going to have to hire, at minimum, four professors."

P: And a dean?

F: A dean we had already hired. Okay. So, Alex wasn't here for that meeting. We called him on the phone. And he said, "I want the law school, and I'll help you." They heard it, I heard it.

P: So, other than that time, by and large, other than inter-personal conversations, he and his Board stayed out of the functioning and decision-making of Nova.

F: No. His Board was present, his Board was present. I'm not privy to things they talked about up there, but they were present. But I always knew that his voice carried nine votes. So if I was going to take him on in a Board meeting, I'd lose.

P: Now I found the April 1976 request for a loan that was specifically to meet payroll, and to have enough funding to carry the school through August. So that's what that '76 request was about, for \$250,000.

F: But the point of the law school, that got me in trouble!

P: Well, let me hold that, because I want to get back to that in a minute. Now let me go back to what we were talking about earlier. Let me sort of go back now that we've dealt with NYIT, let me go back and get you in your beginning years of your presidency. One of the things you had to do is you not only had to cut costs, you had to lay off people, you had to try to meet your budget, and for any institutional head, that's always a tough job, because you have to let people go, and you have to deny people research funding. So I have to imagine that was a difficult time period for you. I mean, you eliminated six staff jobs that reported to you.

F: Well, if you look at the hats that I had, I just added the hats to me. So it wasn't so difficult

because people left and it wasn't bad—I don't recall having any concerns.

P: Wasn't it difficult to get faculty to come under those conditions?

F: I didn't need too many faculty.

P: You were staying where you were.

F: Well—

P: —Did many leave?

F: No. They didn't start leaving until—a couple left, but not many. We got rid of Pepinsky in '69. In '68, '69. You'll see that in the minutes when we had a hearing at the Board level. This is during Winstead's time. We cleaned out the Physics, and we picked up the cost of sending students who were enrolled in this University, we paid their first year tuition at any other university they wanted to go to. So we took care of that. So no students were really hurt. But Pepinsky was gone. One of his professors that he had brought here _____ and moved into Oceanography. The other professor left and went to someplace else. The director of development left. The only vice president I kept was in Finance. Everyone else left. He had a big catch-rate. Warren Winstead had a big catch-rate. Everyone else left.

So I ended up being the dean or director of the Behavioral Science Center, which was the science that's now doing psychology. I ended up being my own Provost. I ended up being the President. So I really had three heads—three hats that I was wearing. My secretary took on the responsibility as I added my own responsibilities. She took on—Helen took on responsibilities. She was also Human Resources. She was an unusual lady. So, I don't remember firing people, except for one or two of them. We didn't lose them. Oceanography was okay, they operated. And science people—only one left to Behavioral Science Center, Stewart, which he didn't get.

P: Although there was that great tragedy with the—

F: —The boat—

P: —death of Richardson.

F: That was '74, I think.

P: That was '74.

F: Right.

P: They had done extraordinarily well to that point, and they had to sort of retune—

F: So, we ended up with a loss there, which was bad. But I wouldn't shut down Oceanography. Just fought that battle through. The Administrative Council would have liked me to shut it down, but I wasn't shutting it down. Then we ended up being much more a school of Psych. We brought in a DBA, and that saved us in that field. So, Behavioral Science became much more a school of Psych. And Science-Ed was just a peripheral, small little thing, and I got out of teaching because I couldn't do that as well. So that changed that complexion. And that's what got us into trouble. The loss of Richardson, the Law School never—because we were adding each year another grade, so I had to hire more professors, and that wasn't self-paying initially, so that was a problem.

P: It's a good long-term investment, but to get it started is very expensive.

F: Yeah, and the numbers were always there, but the expenses were not covering the growth of the institution. And I had moved the University School here, which was another piece that was not throwing off much money.

P: Actually, that ends up costing the University money, right?

F: That does end up costing the University money.

P: But, in terms of prestige and experimental teaching opportunities, it's a great asset.

F: Well, now it is because it's well known not only in this country, but all over, and books have been written, but it takes time to get there. And Mickey Segal, who came with the University School, created the Zero-to-Five University afterwards. So she was taking care of zero to eighteen.

P: Well, she started out with a small little school of her own because she comes from the right family, Mailman.

F: Well, I met him in '65, that was one of the reasons I came.

P: She got her degree here, and went and had this small little experimental school, right? And from that, she really developed the concepts into what we have today as the University School.

F: Exactly.

P: Without her contributions, that would have been much more difficult, right?

F: Well, the Mailman Family Foundation gave her \$60,000 a year, and that covered her salary, so she took that money from the University and put it right back into the school here.

P: In fact, it seems as I recall, the experimental school she had was at Temple Beth El.

F: That's correct. That's when I first saw her.

P: And that started with very limited resources, and good ideas.

F: Yeah, no no. She was good.

P: And also, it seems to me, while we're talking about the University School, one of the things that interested you—one of the reasons you wanted to move it to the campus here is that for educational purposes, you needed study groups so that you could use

these kids in terms of experimental educational philosophy and a school without walls and no time frame and clusters and all of this sort of thing.

F: Well, in '68, there was a big change in the School Board, and we were told that we could not use the Nova schools across the street for research purposes, which is one of the reasons I came. Because in Berkeley I had to travel 50 miles each way to get to Palo Alto where I was doing research. Here, I was right across the street, so from my point of view, that was a very bad decision that the School Board made. And that's when I decided that it would be better to have our own school that we could control. Because I was interested in how children develop educational science concepts. I mean, why do they think that black is heavy and white is light? Where does that come in?

P: A part of this it seems—I recall from one of your statements—you wanted a humanistic environment for learning. I mean it's science, but it's really applied science, understanding science.

F: There was one school called Pine Crest here, which was a very good prep school. Everyone was trying to get into Pine Crest. I knew there was a need for a school, but I didn't want a school like Pine Crest. That's contrary to what I'm looking for. So I brought in Joe Randazzo from Hartford, Connecticut, who was an early childhood educator, because that's where I was doing research as well. Remember I mentioned Medill Bear in Carmel? Well, he was superintendent in Hartford. So I was able to continue my work, only it was in a different school system. And I was able to get money from my students to do research, so I wanted a school where normal kids could go—the range could go, as long as they didn't have emotional problems.

P: And this was open enrollment?

F: It was open enrollment except for emotionally disturbed children. So we only screened

for that. But these were not kids that were all going to go to Harvard.

P: These were a mix of poor kids and—

F: —Absolutely. And we had scholarship money for African American children. So we wanted to keep it to make sure that it was—And for me, it was a way to create an environment where we could study cognitive psychology and social psychology and grouping and things of that nature, and we—Mickey, as one of my students developed that knowledge, because she was with me from '66 to '70. During the period of time when she was the only interested in that area—the others were interested in Science Ed—but not Mickey.

P: I also see in this process as the University evolved, a lot of cross-disciplinary studies as well. Was that also a part of what you were focusing on?

F: Absolutely.

P: And this was before that was—

F: —Fashionable. Well, because the unit wasn't the department.

P: Right. Well with you, the kids were the classroom.

F: The students, even at the PhD level. Instead of having courses, I'd say to you, "Read each week, here's a bunch of books to read. We'll talk once a week for three hours."

P: While we're on this, in addition to the University School, one of the things you're going to develop is going to be this Educational Leadership Program. And here, the concept is, if I have this correct, it's externally-based. It's a field-based program. In other words, Nova hires faculty in Newark, New Jersey, or wherever it might be. You rent a building, and you teach your courses there, and—

F: —Not the faculty. There are two models, there are two models. One model is you put a

cluster of students that are interested in the same thing, and you hire local faculty—the best local faculty you can find. That wasn't the initial program. The initial program asked, "Who are the best people in the country?" And we hire them. And wherever that cluster was taught, the same three people taught that cluster. So the model limited us to 32 clusters. Because during the three-year period, I want every cluster exposed to you. And then you, and then you.

P: So over a period of time, everybody would teach every cluster.

F: That's correct. That is correct. And so we had curriculum. We had school finance. We had some courses in leadership. We had a course in evaluation. But it was taught always by the same three people. They got on a plane Friday night, they taught eight hours on a Saturday. Some of them stayed over on Saturday and went home on Sunday. So think about it when you talk about a University. It was a parasitic model. I didn't pay their fringe benefits. I paid their airfare. I paid their hotel. I gave them \$3000 for the cause. At that time that was good money. But I didn't have to pay their secretary. I didn't have to pay their retirement, et cetera.

P: You had to rent the facility.

F: In many cases, I didn't have to rent facilities. If I had to rent them, I rented them.

P: So you're sort of redefining what a college campus is, in essence.

F: But I replaced the campus with a cluster.

P: Yes.

F: And each cluster had a coordinator who already had a doctorate. So that person had a budget. So if a student needed some help in statistics, he could bring in a local person to help the student. He had the money to do that.

P: And he was on site with that cluster?

F: He lived there.

P: But the faculty came in?

F: Right.

P: Okay.

F: So my argument with Friday was collectively there isn't one university that had what we have in faculty.

P: Let me take this a step farther because one of the programs as I understand is this Educational Leadership.

F: That's correct, that's what it was called.

P: That was an EdD for secondary principals or primary school principals, that sort of thing. Then you had—

F: —Oh, by the way, to get in that program, they already had to have a Master's Degree, and they had to be in an administrative position.

P: And then you had another EdD for community college administrators. And then you had, I guess—

F: —A DPA.

P: Well, you had Public Administration—for people who would be county managers or city managers, so there were three different EdD programs, right?

F: No, the DPA was a DPA.

P: Okay.

F: That was a Doctorate of Public Administration.

P: Okay.

F: We also had a Doctorate in Business Administration.

P: But that was not part of the cluster, Business Administration?

F: Well, we had the DPA and the DBA together.

P: How did that work?

F: Very well.

P: (Laughing) I mean, how did you organize it, to rephrase?

F: There were twelve modules, five of them were the same, and then they splintered off.

P: So there were basic similarities in the two programs?

F: Yeah.

P: Now, the statistic I have—by 1973, you had 873 participants in 23 states, and that the income from these clusters amounted to about half of your budget.

F: I would say that's probably true.

P: Well, that's pretty significant, isn't it?

F: Right now, that school represents, right now, the Fischler Center represents somewhere between a fourth and a fifth of the University's income—about a hundred million dollars.

P: At this time, it was critical.

F: It's critical now!

P: Well yes, of course, but less so now. There are other sources of income. This program in some way really sustained the University, and now—

F: —Because it had a cash flow.

P: Cash flow, which is exactly what you needed, right?

F: Everyone paid tuition. Everybody paid tuition!

P: Finally (laughter)! We realized that tuition is the key.

F: But it didn't grow in that way. In my mind, when I created the first Doctorate for elementary and secondary principals, it grew out of a 1968-'69 summer program at Hartford, Connecticut. I told you I was consulting at Hartford. And during the summer, I had a program for administrators—elementary school principals—they had 29 schools, and about 20 principals came in for the summer, and they kept school in the morning with the kids, during which time we took television of what was going on, and in the afternoon, we discussed what was going on in the classrooms with two different curricula: one was the Behavioral Research Laboratory self-paced individualized English Program, and science was the _____. So the principal saw these children in two different learning environments; one where they worked as a self-phased student, and one where they worked together with these kids, so they had a share. And these were their own kids. When I say their own—inner city kids. And we talked about it, and we saw behavior problems. And we picked up certain cues. Then, we paid Harvard and the ACP Program to send in a group of people to evaluate what was going on in the schools, and in the schools of the principals who had attended the Summer Institute, they were talking about the things they were doing, and there was excitement in their schools. And the schools where the principals did not attend the summer program, they were talking about why they could not do certain things. So in one four-week session, using what we were doing, we were able to change the behavior of the principals.

P: As opposed to the kids.

F: As opposed to the kids. The kids were the kids, but we wanted to use their kids, because

they were the same kids who's father wasn't working or wasn't in the home—their kids. You know, I didn't import any children. These were the kids that came with us in summer. In fact, I had a principal for the kids, and I was the principal for the teachers. But the teachers were the principals. So we had them in teams, and we had those teaching, and we had, for a certain day, and then they were observers. So we were able to see.

P: So the change is from the top down.

F: That's correct. And that's what led to the concept paper that Lou Rubin and I wrote to the Southern Association, which gave us permission to create the EdD Leaders with the understanding that that program would be evaluated every year. The Southern Association would send people in every year to evaluate that program. And Gordon was the one who shepherded—

P: —Sweet, Gordon Sweet?

F: Gordon Sweet is the one that shepherded that program through for me.

P: When you did this program, did you use positive reinforcement? Were you a Skinnerian?

F: No, no. I was a Skinnerian, but not in terms of positive reinforcement.

P: Okay, well explain how you used his philosophy in your educational theory. We're talking about B.F. Skinner here, just to be clear.

F: Right. If you look at students, if they complete a project and know they completed it, all a teacher has to do is say, "That's good." So it was much more with a Montessori orientation than it was that I have to give them something.

P: Give 'em a star.

F: I didn't have to give them a star. They got the star. They knew they had the star. There

were no pieces left over.

“Look at the colors I got!”

“How did you get them?”

“I did this and I did this, isn’t that exciting?”

“That’s exciting.”

So what’s important is, I wanted them to have—you know, its no different than when I broke a hundred par in golf, you’d think I won the Master’s.

P: It was your accomplishment.

F: Absolutely, absolutely. That’s what I wanted to instill in the kids, and when I walked around, the principal saw that I would say to a kid, “Hey, you’re smart,” and they look up at me and say, “No one has ever said that to me!” And I put my hand around her, and I say, “Look, you got all of these right!”

P: Now, how important was Don Mitchell to this program?

F: Oh, I don’t think it would have been as successful without him. Don Mitchell is one of a kind. He’s got an uncanny political sense...uncanny. The guy anticipated the struggles we would have, he anticipated when we needed things to show, the guy was uncanny.

P: And he was officially the director of the program?

F: Well, we started with four clusters. Rubin taught curriculum, I taught supervision, and that gave us the time to do four clusters. And then, Don came here in ’70, we started in ’71...yeah, we started in ’71, and Don came here to consider being dean at the University of South Florida. But he stopped here to talk to me, and he never got there. I knew Don from Harvard. He also went to start the Washington Intern Program. He had just finished writing a book; *Principal is the Key to Change*, just finished the monograph.

P: He was perfect for the position.

F: Perfect. Absolutely perfect. And all of a sudden, the only condition that he wanted was that he would report to me. That was easy. It was only me anyway. So, he came.

P: Now how about John Scigliano?

F: Scigliano finished his doctorate at U of F, and he came here in Admissions in that office upstairs, and he saw what Don was doing for principals in elementary school and secondary school. He said, "You know, the junior colleges are going through to be community colleges, we should do the same thing for community colleges as Don is doing in his program." I said, "You know, John, you're right. Write me a concept paper." He wrote me a concept paper. I took it to Gordon, got that approved. Gordon came to every Summer Institute.

P: Because you would bring them back to this campus in the summer, right?

F: No, we'd bring them back...not to the campus, because we didn't have a campus to bring 800 students back. But we'd bring them together. One year in the internship in Washington, and one year here. Because the kind of people that Don could put together in Washington you couldn't put together here. But the Summer Institute was not the plain professors that they had during the course of the year.

P: Different group?

F: Different people.

P: But you did have that institute every year?

F: Every year, and they had to go to two out of three. They had to go to two out of three Summer Institutes.

P: And normally, if you would start with a Master's degree on the Leadership Program, how

long would it take?

F: Three years.

P: Three years.

F: Whether you had a Master's degree or no Master's degree, three years. If it weren't for the VA, we wouldn't have given you the opp—you wouldn't have had the constraints that we had, but the VA said, "You have to give credit for each module," and you have to do this, and you have to do that, you had to put the credits down, how many credits. Originally we started, it was a program.

P: Because all of these people are on VA loans.

F: Some of them. Some of them. But you didn't know where the pressure was coming from. But all of a sudden, the VA turned up as another reason to put you back in a box, because we didn't fit their box. So if you wanted to fit their box, they'll give you VA [loan]. If you don't fit that box, they won't give you VA. So why punish the student?

P: So, once again, flexibility.

F: Well, what we did is we took our program, we divided it up, and we got credit for whatever.

P: Now, obviously as you expand these programs to 23 states, you're going to have a lot of states that see you as unwanted competition, they're going to protest, they're going to say that these programs need to be taught by our institutions, and perhaps the best example was in North Carolina. I understand some states were even going to pass laws prohibiting your institution from coming to their state and offering this program. And in North Carolina, the Board of Regents, and here again, this is an unusual set of circumstances, because the Board of Regents, which is over the entire state school system is going to be making the decision as to whether or not you are allowed to come

into that state and teach, and they turned you down. What was your reaction to that?

F: I went to court. I went to court.

P: And you had a State Senator as your attorney?

F: Mmmhmm.

P: And the argument is essentially that U.N.C. is a competitive institution, and has no right to have exclusive jurisdiction over any educational institution or concept, right?

F: If you see the evolution of technology, now they can't stop you, because you're not providing any physical presence in the state. Now you have the airways.

P: And at some point, I don't recall—I think it was the *Cincinnati Inquirer*—had called Nova a diploma mill.

F: Correct.

P: And that you actually sued them or threatened to sue them?

F: Yep, we did. I got my lawyer to write them a letter. They said, "You can write your own article," and I wrote my own article, and that appeared in the same space. I wasn't looking for anything, I just...you can't call some institution a diploma mill until you check with the accrediting agencies. They didn't check. We're not an unaccredited institution. In fact, we were accredited umpteen times already.

P: Now, also it's important that you won that suit in North Carolina, because that brought an end to that kind of opposition. No other state is going to bother to go through this process.

F: Oh yeah, they all bother to go through the process, but they understand that they better have valid reasons to say that something is not correct, and now that we have tons of stuff in the public domain because through Eric and all of this stuff. All of the products

are out there, we're not hiding what our students are doing or anything. It is more difficult to do a MRP, a Major Research Project, than it is to do a thesis, because you can't say "If I had," because this is their laboratory. They have to pick a problem that is in their laboratory under their control. They've got to do something and it talks back to you. You can't just say "if," there's no "if" to the practicum. That's why we changed the name.

P: So the idea of the cluster learning and having Nova literally all over the country is really the beginning of what is going to become the central part of the University, distance learning, and that ultimately, technologically where you'll get to is a virtual classroom.

F: That's correct, but the cluster is essential. It replaces, at the Doctoral level, it replaces the camaraderie, the interchange of dialogue that you'll have if you're in residency. These 30 people, or 25 depending on how large a cluster is, share one another's experiences. They read each other's papers, they dialogue with one another. They're in proximity because they're in an area. They have someone who is knowledgeable who can help them or get help, so it provides an interchange among the students more so than when I had full-time residency at Columbia. Much more so. So the cluster plays an important piece in the educational process. In fact, I used to say to them, "If you turn in a paper that has not been read by two or three of your colleagues, that's not good for you. Because you want their feedback." I'd say, "You have to learn to take professional criticism."

P: So as a result of this, it's a little bit later down the line, but I think about 1984, you set up this Center for Computer Based Learning, so you're starting this approach emphasizing computers, a wired campus, all this new technology. Ultimately, you're going to be able to beam classes to Panama.

F: Correct.

P: And literally, all over the world. And this concept sort of begins at this point?

F: Well, it begins...The concept of flying the professors to the students instead of asking the students to give up their job comes out in—in the traditional institution, you had to put in your year of residency. I did that. I had to move a wife and three kids into New York City for a whole year, because that's what they required. But I had to do research in a false environment where I didn't even have to worry about the consequences. The beauty of this program, the beauty of the Cluster program, is that they live the consequences of their intervention, because it's their laboratory. In the Administrative Career Program at Harvard, you had to do a residency somewhere. Now you're doing the residency in a three-year period in your environment.

P: You come to the student.

F: But you as a student are the principal of a school. I'm not asking you to give it up. I want you to use it as a laboratory. I want you to pick out a problem or two that you're going to solve. You're going to do research, you're going to do something, and you're going to look at the return. SO there is a consequence to you, its not a make-believe.

P: And we'll talk a little bit more as we go forward with that. Let me mention a few things that are starting to evolve on campus. At this juncture, if we would take about 1972, how many undergraduates would there have been at Nova? Were they night classed? There were some NYIT students, I presume?

F: The undergraduate—there were two things, one was a full-time, beginning as a full-time undergraduate school, 18 to 22, normal kids—

P: —And how many?

F: Oh, a hundred, two hundred.

P: Not many.

- F: No. And the night school, there were a little more, mostly working adults.
- P: Another development here, you're now offering MA's in Psych, you're offering MA's in Business Administration.
- F: But that's all Nova.
- P: That's all Nova, yeah. You're starting to get the community involved in the campus, people are starting to come to campus to take night classes and Master's classes. So one of the problems, as you know early on, most of the people in Broward County didn't know what was going on on this campus, and that much of your external work was not relevant to people in Broward County. So that there was some difficulty according to people who I've talked to, to get the essence of Nova into Broward County. People really didn't know what was going on over there.
- F: Outside of education, its true. Oceanography had a little bit. Yeah, at that time, we still didn't have the resources to do much.
- P: At one point in 1971 there was a full page ad, if I can find it, in the *New York Times*, trying to attract more students: "How to get your Doctorate without giving up living." Which is sort of the concept that you were just talking about, and you got 9,000 responses from that one ad, so obviously one of the things that the university needed to do was get its message out there.
- F: See, that message, it got us a negative article in *Phi Delta Kappa Magazine*, by someone who never bothered to come to campus, but just had the bulletin that they requested. That statement...
- P: Sometimes it works both ways, doesn't it?
- F: Did you pick up that stuff also, from Phi Delta Kappa? That's the consequence from that one line.

P: Yeah. But it seems to me that in terms of the favorable responses that it was a good idea.

F: It depends where you're sitting.

P: I know, but that's why I'm asking you. Did you think it was a good idea?

F: I thought it was, but I didn't expect that feedback.

P: No, I'm sure not. Now in 1973, Jim Farquhar is going to resign as Chairman. Would you take a couple of minutes and talk about his contributions to this institution.

F: I can't really do justice to that question. This was an unusual man. He graduated Penn State. He was in the agricultural area. He brought Black Angus to Florida. He was cultured in the arts and music. His son is actually a professor of art now. He didn't have a bad bone in his body. I never saw him angry. I never saw him overly-upset. He would do it rather than ask you. An absolute unusual guy.

P: Who gave land, money, time, advice...

F: If you talk about somebody who will save the University, it was his early commitment to this University. There were times when he would loan us money to meet the payroll. He was on the Bank Board. There were times when he would sign notes.

P: And he was Board Chairman for ten years.

F: For the first ten years—the roughest ten years.

P: I think at one point you called him Mr. Nova University.

F: Absolutely, absolutely. He was the one who I made a pledge to that I wouldn't leave until it was stable. I kept that pledge. There were times when I was offered positions elsewhere, and I wouldn't even consider it, because I knew if I left, we would still be in trouble. So I wouldn't go.

P: But now people like Farquhar and Mailman and Tinsley Ellis, I guess it's true of almost any institution; it doesn't matter how good of leadership you have at the office of President, you have to have that kind of support to make it good.

F: Absolutely. Imagine if you had 17 acres of land and going to the bank and saying, "I have the land, but I need to build something on it as well. What can you give me for the collateral?" I came back and I gave him two cameras, which weren't hot yet. For him to free up 17 acres of land, Dave Alcamp said, "Okay, we'll take it." And he freed up the land so I could build the University School. Seventeen acres of land. I mean, you—

P: —Very valuable land!

F: But you couldn't build a Nova today. There would be no way for you to get the kinds of resources that we were able to get.

P: And one other thing that I've noticed in the history of this University is this commitment to diversity. And I noticed in the initial class, there is a guy named Leroy Bolton who was seventeen and an African American, and that over a period of time in terms of Hispanics and African Americans, at one point, I don't know what it is today, but Nova was, like, second in the country in MA's and PhD's to minorities.

F: Well, when I came here, and I realized what this place was like—

P: —This was Davie.

F: Right, this was Davie, and this was also Fort Lauderdale. There was high levels of Anti-Semitism, there was the KKK in Davie, I didn't know that until later. I had people resigning when they made me Executive Vice President, and then when I became the President, it was worse. Two or three Board Members resigned. When I brought [United States Congresswoman] Shirley Chisholm here in 1962 to be a speaker at the Summer Institute, there was a movement to get me fired because "I was rubbing their nose in it,"

that was a quote. I mean, this was not...so, when I picked the first students, I brought **Leroy Bolton** here, because he was at the Behavioral Research Laboratory, and he was the African American you're talking about. He was a football player, by the way, for the Cleveland Browns. Then I brought Joaquin Lira from Venezuela, who got a Master's with me in Berkeley.

P: And by the way, they couldn't go to lunch at the Rolling Hills Country Club.

F: No way.

P: I would be surprised if you were able to go there.

F: I was able to go to lunch, but I could never join, but I was able to go to lunch. But the Yacht Club here in Fort Lauderdale, Jim Farquhar didn't know it was restricted until one day, I found out. I said, "John, I can't meet you at the Yacht Club anymore." He said, "Why not?" I said, "I can't belong." He said, "What do you mean?" He didn't even know. The thought, that thought never even entered his head.

P: I should point out Shirley Chisholm at the time was a Black Congresswoman who was actually running for President.

F: You mean Shirley Chisholm?

P: Yeah, she was a highly visible public figure, and so the Klan and other people agitated—I've looked at some of the newspapers from back at that time, and there was criticism of you, they called for you to be fired because you had invited her, and I noticed you didn't back off the invitation.

F: I don't back off.

P: Well, but some people do. Let's go back and talk about the building of the Law School. And when I was talking to Tinsley Ellis, who was obviously very much in favor of the Law

School, so he indicated to me, and other members of the Board who favored the Law School, they thought it was critical for several reasons. Number one, it would give a solid base in the community that this would be the Fort Lauderdale Law School, that there would be money from tuition, that there would be prestige, that there was a need for this school. There weren't, other than University of Miami, other law schools in this area of any consequence. And therefore, some members of the Board were very enthusiastic. In the beginning, as you mentioned earlier, your reluctance was the cost, and you are just in a period where you're starting to get a little stable, and now, all of a sudden, it's going to be very expensive to build this law school. So, the key to this whole thing is Alex Schure guaranteeing that it would be built. Is that correct?

F: The key was his willingness to give up some economic resources that were legitimately his in the original agreement so that we would have a source of income to compensate for the million dollars that I needed up front, before I could take in any students. If he didn't say what he said, or somebody that wasn't going to give us the money, I wouldn't have had a law school.

P: And the NYIT Trustees did approve of it. They voted in favor of it, didn't they? So he was able to persuade them.

F: I told you, he had nine votes.

P: But here again, it looks like, to me, and I'm not sure how to express this. Somebody said that the only reason Nova has been successful is because they're willing to take measured risks. We talk about the NYIT, we talk about the Law School, later we talk about the Dental School. These were entrepreneurial decisions that could have gone either way, so obviously, in terms of the long term benefits of the University, it turned out to be the right decision, but as an independent institution, you were able to make these kinds of decisions. If you had to go to the state of Florida to get permission for a law

school, you'd still be looking. And so the system that you operate under with your Board of Trustees, you didn't have a Faculty Senate.

F: We don't have it now.

P: You don't have it now, okay, and so you don't have the kind of obstacles, as it were, to overcome to do the Law School, that a state school would have.

F: It's not only a state school. Harvard doesn't have the freedom it would have when it first opened up. Stanford doesn't have the freedom it had. What's happened is the Presidents of these institutions have delegated to the faculty things they should keep to themselves. The problem with the faculty is Maslow's theory. I come first, okay? So you've got a conflict in an entrepreneurial spirit, because of the very structure and organization, which, by the way, you didn't have to do. The only place that there's tenure in this University is in the Law School. The only place, and it was only because ABA would not send a team in to even look at us.

P: It had to be a traditional school.

F: It had to be. Now, by the way they've dropped that. They dropped that requirement. But at that time, and I already had 150 students, so either I was going to close it—by the way, I closed up Nursing because they wouldn't let me do what I wanted to do, but I only had 50 students and one professor, so I closed it up. The Law School, I already had four professors, I had invested in the library, it was too late for me. I didn't know at the time that we opened the Law School that the tenure would be that big of an issue.

P: And there is no tenure for other faculty?

F: There is no tenure here.

P: Do you give a three year contract?

F: We'll give a one year contract, two year contracts, three year contracts, but you are under review every three years.

P: But, again, the American Bar Association which is the accrediting facility for all this, wouldn't even think of it.

F: They weren't going to send a team in to look at us.

P: Now at this point, you have no building, you have no library to speak of, and so what you do in the beginning, I think, it was on the third floor of the Parker Building—

F: —First floor.

P: First floor.

F: First floor and the second floor.

P: First and second floor, but the library at that point was not sufficient, and Tinsely Ellis was telling me that he went around to some of the lawyers, and they gave books to build up, because the library had to be of a certain standard to be accredited. And so, how did you get the money, ultimately, to build the Law School. I guess you borrowed the money somewhere, didn't you?

F: They raised—what's-his-name who's no longer alive, August Paoli was the chairman of the fundraising group. He was a lawyer, and we raised three-hundred and some-odd dollars if I recall correctly—in that vicinity—and I used that money to pay the professors, et cetera, then we borrowed money. Again, I went into hawk. Borrowed money to have an accredited library, and we started in September with a sufficient library to handle the first-year students, we borrowed some money to go to the second-year students. By the first and second year, we had enough money coming in, so I didn't have to borrow any money.

P: Tuition?

F: Tuition. But I wasn't taking any money out, so in a way, I kept the overhead of the University the same as though we didn't have a law school. I didn't increase the overhead. Except maybe adding a secretary or something like that.

P: Was it hard to get faculty for a new law school. I mean, you hired Dean **Peter Thornton** in '73, which is really before—

F: —The person who helped me the most was Jerry Prince. His wife died—he would have been the Dean, only his wife died, and he had to go back. He just couldn't live here without her. And he was the one who—**Peter Thornton** was a student of his when he was the dean of Brooklyn Law School. And he hired **Peter Thornton** to come here. Jerry was a very influential person for the Law School. And when he brought in **Peter Thornton**, we were able to get fairly good faculty, but most of them were young. We brought in Dean Hyde, who was Dean of the School of Judges, who was a lawyer, and he came. And then Thornton got **Baydard** to come, a distinguished lawyer in New York with the unions. So they called on friends and brought them in, and we hired Joe Berman, we hired _____ from Miami.

P: And so you were able to offer them competitive salaries at this point?

F: Oh, yeah.

P: And so, at some point, you moved over to this Olympia York Building over on Ninth Avenue and sort of redid that as a temporary location for the Law School, and you were over there a year or so?

F: Well, that was another serendipitous event. On a Monday morning, a guy by the name of Shapiro read the article in the newspaper that although we had accreditation, we wouldn't have full accreditation until we had a building, and the Operating Engineer

Building on Ninth Avenue, they only used the first floor and the auditorium. They never completed the second through the fifth floor. In walks into my office Shapiro with some young lady, and he said, "I read this article. I'd like to help you." I didn't know Olympia York from a hole in the wall. And first, you know, "Who are you?" He shows me Olympia York, big construction company out of Canada. One of the largest. So I said, "If you want to help me, you read about the Law School. There's a building that I'd like to buy, but I don't have the resources, and I have to fix it up into a Law School." And he said, "Well I'll do that." And again, we made a deal, and Olympia York bought the building, that we could buy it at the same price that they bought it, and they would fix it up to what our specifications were, and we would pay them whatever they put into the building. And they did that. And we took it off the tax rolls by going to the county and saying, "Olympia York is a bank, and I borrowed money from the bank, and it's our building once we have the money to pay the mortgage." And they even got that done. So it worked.

P: Now did he give you any money aside from the—

F: —No, no. He did exactly what he said he was going to do.

P: Okay. So at that point, you're going to go to...the first class is in '74, where you established what I think was called the Center for the Study of Law.

F: Right.

P: Okay, and the first class graduates in '77.

F: That's my wife.

P: Oh, really? Okay.

F: My son was in the second class.

P: Okay. Well you got it built just in time!

F: That's what I tell people. I had to send my wife to law school.

P: Now once that's completed, you are fully accredited.

F: Correct.

P: Once the first class graduates. When did you get into what is the current Broad Law Center, Sheppard Broad Law Center.

F: Oh, that was, um, in the nineties.

P: Again, I think it was something like '92.

F: Just before I left, I think.

P: Yeah, '92.

F: Yeah, that was my last year as President.

P: Once that is accomplished, once you've got this nice new building, it becomes a huge asset for this University in both prestige and tuition.

F: Oh, sure. Once you got the three classes in, it covered its own expenses. I mean, it did that.

P: And technically what you have now is a hybrid university in a way, because you've got one traditional element that is different from the original concept of—

F: —Yeah, we're a hybrid.

P: And again it seems to me you have this combination of vision, flexibility, entrepreneurship. You do what you have to do to keep it moving, and you may have to take a turn that was not envisioned in the beginning. But that's what it takes to be successful.

F: Well, the key is to have people at the helm who understand the philosophy of doing what

you're talking about. The advantage we have with Ray—Ray Ferrero—he and George did a tremendous job. I came to build a University, and Pusey educated me—we used to have lunch together periodically—and he said, “If all the buildings of Harvard burnt down, there would still be a Harvard.” Because Harvard is really students and faculty with a place to interact.

P: And by the way, this is Nathan Pusey, who was the President of Harvard.

F: He was the President, right. And I was a neophyte, having just come to Harvard. I'll never forget that. So when I came here to build a university, and we had some struggles at my council level by the other Deans, if they weren't paying their way, then we had to share all of that. If bills weren't being paid, if your bills weren't being paid, then the money that you should have been paid, I should give to you. You brought it yourself, but I was using it somewhere else. So, there was always a certain amount of tension, because centers were not all meeting what we needed to run the institution, and it takes time for them to build up where they are in that position. So I was always robbing Peter to pay Paul. So you have a certain tension which is economically driven, and you just have to fight through that battle.

P: And this institution is somewhat unusual because all of these centers are really autonomous, are they not?

F: Semi-autonomous.

P: Semi-autonomous. For example, would you have any influence over who the Law Center hired?

F: Only at the Dean level.

P: But the faculty, the Dean of the Law School would hire those. You wouldn't be involved, right?

F: Yes, it would come to me as a recommendation from the Dean, but I would not—

P: Yes, if the dean recommended them.

F: Exactly.

P: But lets say, if the Law School did not meet its obligations to the University, you would have to bail them out. You would bail them out once or twice, then they would have to somehow figure it out themselves then, right? In other words, they need to be self supporting.

F: The goal is to...the responsibility is...I didn't call them Deans by the way, the term is Directors, and there was a reason for that in my mind, crazy, but in my mind. As a Dean, you're responsible to the faculty. In the Law School, the faculty actually hires the Dean. Well, they send me three names, names that they approved. That's the only place where I had a dean. Every place else, I had a Director. They served at my pleasure, not at the faculty's pleasure. And if they would come and say if the faculty—I'd say, "Look, I'm not interested in the faculty. You're the Director, I expect this to be what you have to do." And there are two things—you have to maintain quality of the academic institution, and economic viability of your center. That's your responsibility. They know that when they take the job. It's no secret. If you have good quality going on from an academic point of view, I leave you alone. So, that's the rubric.

P: Did you have meetings when there was a Council of Directors?

F: Twice a month. There's minutes, by the way, of those meetings.

P: And you would, in that, you were talking about the overview of the University, per se, and getting their input, as opposed to dealing with them on an individual basis.

F: That's correct.

P: And on the financial side, your obligation was to pay the overall cost of the University. They paid their cost. Is that right?

F: I needed approximately 25 to 30 percent from each of the Operating Center.

P: For your Operating Center?

F: For what I call the service arm of the University.

P: Okay.

F: We provided financial aid, we provided secretarial service, we paid all the bills.

P: Electricity, all that stuff.

F: Correct. I was an overhead. There was never any income next to my name. Because I wanted to encourage Development to use me. So if I went with a Dean somewhere to ask for money, that money was listed in the Dean's program, not where we are. So, again, there's a certain amount of tension.

P: But wouldn't it, in some ways, if you care about your philosophy of "power to the President," wouldn't you be more effective if the money came to you?

F: Where is the money being earned? If you have ownership and you have responsibility, that's the best of the world. So as long as you are meeting the two obligations, you owned it.

P: But you had to come up with your 20 percent?

F: If you didn't have it and came in with 18, nobody was punished—no Dean was ever let go for that because—a Dean was let go for lying to me. That was done.

P: The gifts would come directly to you.

F: Certain gifts would go directly to the Center—the Shepherd Broad gift went directly to the Law School.

P: So were there some gifts that—

F: —Sure!

P: The Horovitz money would have gone directly to you?

F: The Horovitz money went through the Central Development Group.

P: That's interesting because in many, state universities, all the money funnels either through the foundation or through the President's office and then he deals it out.

F: That's what happened with the person who replaced me. That's what happened to Feldman. He came here from ten years of being President of the University of Central Connecticut.

P: Connecticut State University.

F: Connecticut State, right. When he came into my office one time and he said to me, "How do you run this University?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "If I say its green, even if its yellow, I expect him to say its green." I said, "This is not the University for you. This is not the University for you" That's what I told him.

P: It's a huge difference between an independent university and a state school.

F: Where's the money coming from? The bulk of the money is coming from the faculty and the students, or the directors of the centers, or the Deans. I'm an overhead I'm not bringing in any money directly.

P: What percentage, at this point, of your budget would come from tuition? Probably 80 percent, something like that?

F: Right now?

P: No, in the mid-seventies.

F: Yeah, I think about 80 percent.

P: I think that's where it is about now, still. In 1976, Nova College is set up.

F: Nova College grew out of Gordon Sweet's demand. Gordon Sweet came and said, "Abe, I would like the college to be reviewed by SAC's as part of this University, and I know NYIT is accredited by Middle States, et cetera, et cetera, but I'd like the college to be accredited by you, by us." So, I went to Alex Schure, and we made another decision. We changed.

P: And the basic idea here, as I understand it, it's sort of two-fold. It's an experimental undergraduate school, but its also an attempt to build up the numbers in an undergraduate population, to sort of balance out an all-graduate or predominately graduate—

F: —I only looked at it as a financial, I didn't care about the numbers. I only cared about the finances.

P: But in the long run, this is a goal that this University seems to be pursuing.

F: Now, now. Yeah, now it is

P: But at that time, it was less important.

F: For me it was less important.

P: You were more interested in the experimental aspects, in the educational aspects of it. So how is it set up. The curriculum is rather fascinating to me. I read somewhere that you had a series of topics that were given to each of the students, and you could major in Political Science, you could major in History, whatever. Could you give me a little background of how you designed the curriculum?

F: There were—it was a three-year college. The first year, there were five circles. Each circle was nine weeks. Circles were broad-based, like Behavioral Science, Business and

Finance was a circle. Leadership was a circle. I forget all of the—there were five circles. And then you took English and Math as your outsides of those circles. And those circles met three hours a day, four times a week. And I used to say to the students, “If they lecture you, don’t pay attention. Stamp your feet. Do whatever you can do to make sure that the guy isn’t lecturing to you every day for three hours.”

P: Well here, ten inter-disciplinary themes, which were very interesting. Change and Tradition, Human Nature and the Individual, Leadership and Greatness, the Individual and Social Organizations, Essence and Existence—seems like that would be a very interesting one—Wealth and Poverty. So these are ideas—philosophical concepts, where students approach these issues and gather facts and understand and debate and argue and write about them.

F: And visit.

P: And visit. And interact.

F: But I also wanted them to see where these things existed in their society. I mean, you talk about poverty—go take a look at poverty.

P: But this is, this is beyond course, beyond departments, I mean, it’s unrestricted—

F: —That’s correct, but the only departments, the two that I mentioned, English and Math, which were outside those circles.

P: That’s what I’m saying, but the circles were inter-disciplinary, outside, its not Political Science 203.

F: Because in most institutions, at least that I’ve looked at, the general education is nothing more than one course that you may take, or two courses that you might take, where you learn the language, which you forget as soon as the tests are over. It’s not designed conceptually, so when you leave, you have very few working tools, intellectual working

tools.

P: And you're talking about here, intellectual tools.

F: Intellectual tools. Then you've taken your sixty credits and you've satisfied. Where you've really ended up with your intellectual tools is the area you major in. I argued that if you're going to major in Economics, you're going to start in Economics 101, and you're going to work your way through and you're going to be okay. But 101 is not designed as a course in general education. Most of them are language courses. In science, you study theridophytes and pteridophytes. Who cares unless you're going to be a biologist. So in my mind, the general education ought to leave you at a position where if you read the *New York Times*, you'll understand it more effectively.

P: So you'll understand what inflation is, you understand what the Federal Reserve Board does.

F: And also, you understand the relationship between gold and the standards and all of the things that are going on and the dynamic environment. So you can do that rather than Economics 101 satisfying your general education. So you didn't start your major until your second year when you are able to get rid of your English and all your Math.

P: So you took English and Math and the circles.

F: And the circles. Second year, you took the circles—My hope was, if done well, the English would be related to the circles.

P: Well you need English. In order to write, to be able to express yourself.

F: So the paper would be read by two people, the English professor for that, and the circle professor, because the theme of the English paper was going to be related. The Math—I wanted you to study Math through Calculus. That's it. If you wanted to go beyond that, you pick it up as a Math major somewhere. But Math is another language.

P: But who taught these courses? Obviously it had to be interdisciplinary—

F: —They were taught by team teaching.

P: How did that work?

F: It worked as long as I was president.

P: I think it works if you've got two people who are committed to the concept.

F: The concept grew out of Charlie Foreman, who's dead now. Charlie came to see me, by the way, there are two Foreman's, there's Ham and there's Charlie. Now there's Austin. But Charlie was a vet—a veterinarian—who was on the Board of Regents for the Oatmeal Club who's politically **shrewd**. He came to me one time in December, and he said to me, "I think we need something for Nova and the undergraduate as an Honor's College," something like that. He says, "I need you to write something for me." I says, "Charlie, I'm going on vacation, it's Christmas time." He says, "I want it." So I went home, and I wrote this thing about the circles, and I gave it to him in January. Next thing I know, it's before the legislature. Next thing I know, it gets approved.

P: They actually gave \$1800 a year, funding.

F: \$1800, no, much more than that.

P: That's what I have. "Approved and partially funded by the Florida Legislature, the cost for Florida residents was \$1800 a year, outside students, \$7650.

F: That was the tuition.

P: Yeah.

F: Oh, but the state gave us, the Science, the little Science Building that's out there, they gave us the money for that, they gave us the money for the library, so I think the grant was close to \$350,000 to \$400,000. It was a good size grant for us. But then I had to

give it to the faculty, which was the crazy thing. So I ended up giving it to the faculty, and with the money. This is gonna, you know, we've got to implement it.

P: Now, what was called Nova College, this is, I think what you call the Liberal Studies Program.

F: Correct.

P: And once that was presented, the Legislature thought it was a really great program, apparently.

F: Yeah, and it was. And the kids, by the way, they paid some professor from New England—Massachusetts or New Hampshire or something, who came down to evaluate it. The state paid money for that. And the kids, by that time, there were a lot of them taking some night classes because that's where most of the classes were. And they could pick out the students that were in this college by the way in which they interacted with the professors at night, by asking questions, et cetera, et cetera.

P: So they've been taught to analyze and synthesize and evaluate, then respond to issues in what we'd call a logical, coherent manner.

F: They would also give the professor a hard time—especially in the night school. So this guy came, and the evaluation is really worth reading. But when I left, he was gone.

P: So it lasted until you retired?

F: Yeah.

P: How successful was it over that period of time?

F: Very successful, from my point of view.

P: How many students would have been involved?

F: About a hundred, maybe, a little more than a hundred.

P: So you're very concentrated, and the students were chosen because of their ability, interests?

F: No, they came in.

P: So there's no standard. For instance, you didn't have to have a B average to get in?

F: No, but it worked.

P: Well then here's a question—why was it not continued if it were successful?

F: Because the professors worked harder during that than they could ever imagine. They were teaching four days in a week. Come on, it's like the law school—as soon as I left, they went back to big classes.

P: Well, as a professor, I found that I've always believed that we never teach enough. You know, I think the very minimum is that everybody ought to teach three and three and grade papers.

F: Think about what we're doing—we're putting a cap on students. Instead of accomodating students in a state college, in a state university system, they're capping students. Instead of saying to professors, "We want you to teach an extra three hours a week, one class more." I mean, if the public knew what you and I know, they'd never tolerate it.

P: Well it's academically wrong, and its also financially ridiculous.

F: It can't be done. Absolutely.

P: And logically, it doesn't make any sense either way, does it?

F: No, not for me, and I was a professor, it was the best university. I only taught Tuesdays. I taught my two courses on Tuesdays and had the rest of the week free.

P: Now, let me go through a series of events that take place during this period of time.

We've talked about Computer Science, we've talked about Nova College, and you're going to start expanding the Oceanographic Center, there's going to be a Center for the Study of Administration, you're going to get in 1981 the Mailman Family Center Building. Florida Professional School of Psychology, a PhD program in Clinical Psychology, so you're really starting to expand—in addition to your liberal studies—the graduate program as well.

F: Yeah.

P: And then we have at one point, they start building dormitories. Eventually, the idea is to be able to house a certain number of students on campus and build up the infrastructure on campus so students won't constantly be driving to campus every day, but there won't be a contingent, on campus—

F: —Well, yeah, that's our thing, but along here, you'll see that the independent sector, the business sector builds housing all along the campus. So as long as they were building housing and the students could walk across the street, I didn't have to worry about it.

P: But it was fairly expensive at one point, was it, or more reasonable?

F: Yeah, \$600, so...

P: And then the Oral School was acquired, talk a little about that and how that took off.

F: Jack **LaBonte**, who was a trustee here, was Chairman of the Oral School. The Oral School was created to help students in an oral system. Even though they had hearing impairments, it was a school for hard-of-hearing children. And the Gore Family was primarily interested in that because they had a child, and the Gore family was an old family here—the Fort Lauderdale Newspaper was theirs, one was a governor. So anyway, they had that school going, and its just behind where the Law School is now. They had **acreage** of land. And Mickey Segal one day took me by the hand, she says, "I

want you to go with me to see the Oral School.” I says, “Mickey, anything you want I’ll do.” So we went down there and I saw it. It had six children between age three and 16. And I looked at the school, and she said, “Look at the shame that’s going on here.” I said, “What do you mean?” She said, “These kids are so distant, they have this thing and they have rooms and they’re not being used. I think we should bring them to the main campus and mainstream them and have a small unit up there so that they can have the individualization that they need, but the three-year-old will be able to be with three-year-olds, and the six-year-old will be able to be with six-year-olds, and the 16-year-old will be with 16-year-olds, except for the time when they need their independent self-tutorial.” So then the next thing I know, Jack **LaBonte** is coming to see me. Then I knew I was in trouble. So we made a deal that we would build a \$1 million building on our campus if they would raise the money. And in return, we would take over the extra acreage behind the Law School. And in that year, Jack raised the building and the money for the building on campus. Jack **LaBonte** was a builder down here. And we got five acres behind the Law School, which we still have, and that’s where the U.S. Geological Group is now. And the Baudhuin School was integrated into the University School, and Marilyn Segal was overseeing it, and that’s where it is, and it’s called the Baudhuin School because Baudhuin was the man who gave us all the paint that was necessary for the building—it came out of Cleveland.

P: And now they have a new building, and it is, as I understand it, they’re really involved in Autism now as well.

F: That’s the big program.

P: Which is crucial in part of research.

F: It’s about 150 kids now. I chair that Board.

P: Here again, this is—and we're getting to Southeastern later—this is the beginning of a movement from Psychology and the Oral School toward a health component at this University. I'm not sure if that's the plan, but it seems to me that that's where the University is moving at this juncture.

F: Well, the health was a little different. Back, I think, in '81 or '82, I had a talk with Moore Terry—

P: —Look, I'm sorry, let me, let's just hold that, because I want to talk about Southeastern, but I want to talk about how the University was evolving, so there were more Graduate Programs, there was Psych, and then there's also a connection with the business community that I think somebody called it a "corporate consortium," now, you're training IBM and AT&T employees here. Now, you were trying to connect with the business end of Broward County as well.

F: Well, we took the MBA and we put it into a distance format, but we taught it at the places, for example, Eastern Airlines, we had team-teaching. We would bring in a professor to teach, and then we would have someone to show how the theory is. So we did a lot, we did it with American Express, we did it with Florida Power and Light, so we had quite a large MBA program in the cluster format. Then we had other programs in the same way at the Doctoral level, we had Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, et cetera—South Korea.

P: You have this program in Panama, and so, how important has this international component been?

F: It's been very important. It's been very good for us, it's given us worlds of opportunity. We now have a big program in Malaysia, so—

P: —Jamaica.

F: Jamaica, Jamaica was big with Kaiser Bauxite and Reynolds, et cetera. Yeah, and that's all through the Business School.

P: I know that Panama was an MBA program. And so, that expands the knowledge and experience of the University, and to international components.

F: And at that time, remember, NYIT is sharing the finances.

P: Yeah, right, we're not to '85 yet.

F: Yeah, no, but I'm saying, all of that's, yeah...

P: And one other little element that comes along here that I thought was interesting, and I guess is still a critical issue of the state was what they called tuition vouchers. The state would provide tuition to students at private institutions, and I can't remember what it was during this period of time, but around \$1200 a year.

F: Yeah, it was _____.

P: And that, you know, created conflict, because people would say we shouldn't be spending state money at private schools. So this is kind of a contentious issue, but was it a big help to you. It wasn't a lot of money, but money is money.

F: Sure, sure it was a help.

P: Yeah. But eventually, they stopped that practice.

F: No, we still have a voucher.

P: Oh, they still do?

F: We have a voucher. Its about \$3000 now.

P: Oh, is it really?

F: Yeah, ask George **Amberry**.

P: Well at some point, they had decided that they weren't going to continue it. I remember that was an issue at—

F: —Well, it was an issue, but we won that.

P: I remember when George Kirkpatrick was head of community colleges and all of that, private schools, that issue had come up in the legislature.

F: It may, but during my time, we always got it.

P: Oh, good.

F: And in Medicine, they always get a big one.

P: Oh they do, even bigger, yeah. A crucial development in the history of this university was the Goodwin Unit Trust. Leo Goodwin Sr. had left 87 percent of his unit trust essentially to Nova University. There was some money to Holy Cross Hospital, a little bit of money to the Oral School, but the bulk of the money was to go to Nova. He was, and you can expand on this, but he founded or was the head of Geico Insurance Company, and had accumulated a significant amount of money. And he set up the Trustee—the Trustees were his son Leo, at least initially, his secretary—

F: —Helen **Fury**.

P: Yeah, which I thought was interesting. And the attorney Alphonse Della-Donna. And what happened in this trust, the initial statement was that it could be used only for buildings at Nova and in Broward County, nowhere else, and at some point, and you can give me the details here, they rescinded that gift. So, pick up at that point and tell me what happened and how you responded.

F: The Goodwin Trust, I think it was put together in '71.

P: And by the way, it was, the gift was announced in '76.

F: The original document was written I think in '71. And then Senior died, Junior was the Trustee of Nova, but he resigned when we traded with NYIT, he was one of the trustees that signed off.

P: Did he leave with bad feelings?

F: No. When we brought in the Gentry Laboratory and we had to complete the third floor of the Parker Building during that period in the early '70's, Winstead had made the deal, and Junior had put up some Geico stock at the Bank of Chicago to collateralize the money for the third floor. So we could finish the third floor. Leo is concerned about the stock. So we put together the Women's group with Theresa Castro called the Royal Dames.

P: This is the Castro of Castro Convertibles?

F: Right, Theresa Castro, the wife of Bernard. And that was set up to raise the money for the cancer research on the third floor.

P: Which was the Goodwin Cancer Center.

F: Correct. And that money would be used to pay down the loan and would feed back up the Geico stock so Junior could have the stock back.

P: So it was just collateral?

F: Just collateral. Senior died. The following year, I think it was about '72, '73, Junior decided that he would pay the loan off and get the stock back. So Junior became interested in Nova University through the Goodwin Institute. And he did pay off the stock, he did pay off the loan, and now the stock was free. But we still had the Royal Dames for cancer research. And they would run a function every year, the Royal Dames, and it was fine, I mean, it was good, and I went to those functions and I spoke at the functions. And we found out that the Law School needed that building, and, but we had this NYIT

relationship. And what Della-Donna did was not just to do what he wanted to do with us, but he did it with others. He would find the reason not to give the money when he was able to give it. He kept control of the money, and Fury and Leo Junior knew that, so before Junior died, he called me into his house. By the way, asleep in the bedroom or next to the bedroom was an AK weapon. He had built a whole factory of instruments for security purposes that was part of the CIA operation. Anyway, peculiar guy. This is Junior.

P: And he died relatively young.

F: Yes, he died relatively young. Anyway, so what happened was, Della-Donna was beginning to try to find an excuse to not release what was in the trust, and he said that we were not an independent institution, we were a part of NYIT and controlled by NYIT. And we depended on that money because we knew about it in '75, so we already had begun to pave stuff here to put the Law School where the Law School is, and we were beginning to do work, and I had expenditures against anticipating.

P: But you planned to use Goodwin to pay that.

F: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. And we had signed an agreement. Della-Donna came up and wanted another agreement on how the money would be used, and we said how we would use it. We would use it for Visiting Scholars, we would use it to finish the building, et cetera, and we do what we had to do. And he agreed to that, but he didn't release the money. So, in 1978 we had a big meeting here, and that's when we also had a full Board Meeting with Alex taking a firm position on going to court, and we had the votes collectively now to do that.

P: Almost everybody thought at that point—

F: —Not everybody, not everybody.

P: But the majority.

F: Majority. Both boards, enough of each Board, it wasn't just NYIT.

P: Well, several people mentioned to me that had you not gone to court, you would never have gotten the money.

F: That's the conclusion that we all came to.

P: Well let me back up a minute, one of the things that I found out in doing a little research. It's clear in retrospect now, because the Bar Association of Florida and the United States and Florida Supreme Court made a judgement against Della-Donna, and that he wanted to control the money because as long as he controlled the money, he got the legal fees. One of the things that came up was he originally wanted to set up a foundation, you know, and he would control the foundation. And you didn't think that was a good idea. Another thing he wanted, which I thought was extraordinary, he wanted to move the Law School. And I think you said, "Well, you can have the faculty, but the building and everything else is ours." And all of this is with an unrestricted gift. Now, unrestricted means unrestricted. Tinsley Ellis told me, he said he met with Della-Donna and every time he's meet with him, he'd add something or change something or come up with a different concept, and all this time, for two years, you're going to be litigating this issue. And he wasn't making it easy for anybody.

F: That's right. That's absolutely true. He was just not a nice person, but he had done that to some other people, which is why he got disbarred.

P: Now, what ultimately, once you agree to go to court, part of the argument that kept coming up and coming up is that we can't give you the money because you really are controlled by NYIT, and as a matter of fact, he accused you and the Board of providing him with false information, lying to him about these issues, and obviously you were very

upset about that, and I came across a letter that you had written, explaining in no uncertain terms that you had not in fact withheld any information from him.

F: This is a man who had sat on our finance committee.

P: Della-Donna?

F: Della-Donna was appointed to the Finance Committee, so he knew what was going on in this University, he knew who controlled the University, he knew what NYIT was getting and not getting, because every month, we had a meeting. So he couldn't say that he was not informed.

P: I mean, he went so far as literally to charge the University with fraud.

F: You know, you can charge anybody.

P: Yeah, but I mean, this is odious by any standard, isn't it?

F: We had no choice. We ended up going to court—the outcome you read.

P: Now, Judge Richardson of the, I believe this is the 17th Judicial Circuit Court, he ruled that Nova should receive the money, and his argument was that basically, it was an unrestricted grant, the Board had no right to rescind the original commitment to Nova, but even at that point, we still continue to have arguments from Della-Donna. Even after the judge had ruled, right?

F: But remember, because he controlled—

P: —He still had the money!

F: He had the money, but he also, Leo Goodwin, Jr. died, and they appointed Fran Goodwin, Leo Jr.'s wife, so Della-Donna was the only knowledgeable person sitting on that Board who had any background. Helen Fury was a secretary. So, whatever he wanted, he called all the shots.

P: Now, let me back up, just look to my notes, at some point, the initial vote by the Trustees was nine to nine about going to court, is that correct?

F: Yeah, that was an early vote.

P: Yeah, an early vote, but some dispute, why were people reluctant, because of the cost of going to court?

F: Yeah, because of the cost.

P: It would have cost you a million dollars.

F: It would cost you more, because, absolutely. Della-Donna got a million dollars in the settlement. It was eating up—remember, I'm trying to run an institution—talk about the issue. I'm trying to run an institution, I've got a dozen hats to worry about, and all of a sudden I'm drained for two years working with Terry Russell. He has fourteen attorneys and I have one. And he's taking us into three jurisdictions at two levels. He took us into Miami, he took us into Broward, he took us into Palm Beach County, two appellates—Miami and Palm Beach.

P: You were in the federal courts as well?

F: In the federal courts! So, I mean, it's only me and my one attorney.

P: Who was doing most of the work?

F: Well, the attorney was writing up all of the stuff and answering all of the—

P: —Who was there? Was it Tinsley Ellis?

F: Terry Russell. No! None of these guys were! No, I was doing it!

P: Okay, but the issue at this point for you is this money that will solve your problems. Also, the ABA at one point in the middle of the law school comes on campus and says you guys need a law school building.

F: Oh yeah.

P: Well maybe these guys aren't going to get it together. Plus it was a time when you were back in a financial crisis from '76 to '78.

F: I know, I know. And that's the time when Alex Schure, because he was so adamant, said, "I'll help you. I'll let you use NYIT's line of credit.

P: So in essence, he guaranteed that there would be a new law building.

F: Alex Schure guaranteed that we would have access to the resources to keep ourselves alive.

P: So, he saves the University again.

F: We did it.

P: I did find the court decision, the Florida Supreme Court, this is all the way from 1989 before they actually deal with Della-Donna, and he had some other issues, not just Nova, but problems with a series of other clients.

F: That's what I said.

P: And he was disbarred for five years, and if I may quote the Supreme Court of Florida—I mean, this is fairly significant—we're again, we're not talking about the ABA. He of course had to appeal the ABA decision, they had an attorney who looked into the case and made recommendations to the court. And the argument was that Della-Donna, instead of acting for his clients, he acted for personal and financial gain, violated his ethical and judiciary responsibility. He ended up getting a million dollar fee for his work just on this case. And the court, interestingly enough, did not order that money to be given back. He did not have to give back that fee because the court said, "Its not our jurisdiction to decide fees." The court ruled that whether it was excessive or not, that's

not part of what we're dealing with here. But he will be disbarred because of his activities. So very clearly, from all of this situation that I understand, this one person dealt a really lethal blow to this University.

F: Absolutley.

P: I mean, in the end, I think you got \$16 million, is that right?

F: That's correct.

P: And what did you do with the \$16 million?

F: I paid back NYIT's line of credit, I gave the Law School \$5 million in an endowment, which we said we would do.

P: This was in Geico stock, is that right?

F: Geico stock.

P: And you sold the stock?

F: Sold the stock, and we put a million dollars into the visiting professorship. I don't know. Some of it, we paid off bills, did what we had to do.

P: But this is again, I understand that once you had done all of your accounts payable, credit with NYIT, you had about \$7 million left over, is that about right?

F: Could be.

P: Yeah. Well, once again, this is a crucial point in the evolution of this University. Had you not gotten the Goodwin Trust—

F: —We would have never made it. It's hard to say.

P: It would certainly have been difficult circumstances.

F: It was difficult up until we got the money. But Della-Donna didn't let up anyway. He took

us back in to court.

P: You at least had that \$17 million, and you needed to start spending money.

F: Oh, I spent it right away.

P: It was a good thing. The way the system worked, you might not see it again.

F: Well, it wasn't so much that as it was that we had accumulated, I think over the years we had accumulated a \$385,000 bill for the lawyers. Our bill, we also had the line of credit to keep ourselves going in the University because we had the Law School. It causes conflict between myself and the Law professors. Some professors wanted to take the money, geniuses that they are. I said, "You can leave, but you're not getting any money." They said, "We'll take the Law School." I says, "Be my guest. Goodbye." Everything is ours.

P: That reminds me of one thing that is not directly related to the Trust, but at one time, Alex Schure had come to you and the Board of Trustees and had proposed setting up some sort of investment system like a foundation or something like that and said if you take a percentage of this money and put it in this, then it would grown and make money and it would be a good investment. Do you remember him discussing that?

F: Let me tell you, we'll come back to Alex Schure in '85.

P: We're getting ready to get to that.

F: Right. Alex Schure, his wife died, Dorothy dies, and he gives up the Presidency to his son, Matthew, and friction breaks out at NYIT, and now they're under pressure themselves for money. I'm sitting on their Board and I know that. I see what's happening, and his behavior is different. And it was only—and I looked at the university, at our university, and I came to the conclusion that once we paid off our debts and stuff, that it would be better for us to separate. And I spent time with Mary McCahill, who was the

Chairman—Chairperson. But talking about this in the eighties, we just had gotten the Geico money, we paid off everything, we had money, and the goal was to see, because the federation wasn't working from an intellectual point of view. Their faculty and this faculty didn't mix. They had a different set of problems. They operated under different conditions than we did.

P: I think you said at one time that Schure acted like an employer, and you were an employee. You worked for the Board, and that there were some differences.

F: Yeah, because Alex viewed himself as the employer of NYIT. From the very time I took the job on, I never viewed myself as the employer. I used to say when we were all together having something, because every three month I would bring in something, so all of the employees would know where the university was and where it was. And I would say to them, look, we all have job descriptions, you have a job description, you have a job description. If the custodian doesn't clean my office, after a while I won't want to go in. And if the bathrooms aren't clean, you're calling me and telling me the bathrooms aren't clean. We all have jobs to do. If we work together, we'll make it. If we don't work together, we won't make it. I know I can find another job. I don't know what jobs you guys are going to find. So, we all have to do whatever what we have to do. I always talk about, they have to do the walking in the *Yellow Pages*. They didn't understand that in the beginning. I say "Who pays our salary? The students pay our salary." If a student calls up and you don't know the answer, get the student's telephone number, and you find out the answer, and you call them back, or you make sure that the person you said to call called. Because they pay your salary. We're a service arm to the professors and students. That's what we're here for. I used to say that over and over again. So I never viewed myself as the employer. I'm an employee. Nobody owns this institution.

P: That's a pretty significant difference between the two institutions.

F: It's a big difference between the two institutions. And it permeated the institutions. He had a union. I never had any union problems. I never had a salary problem. The way salaries were put together was by that Board we put together. They sat with me, we tried to balance the budget. We'd ended up balancing the budget collectively, and then I would say, "How much more could you contribute to a pool? Can you give three percent? Four percent? That pool becomes the raise, and I'll give you back your percentage." That's how we got raises. Then I would take it to the Trustees, and they would approve the budget. Included in the budget was a three percent raise, a two percent raise, a four percent raise. Because that's what we could raise. You also should know, Tinsley never gave a penny to this institution during my whole career.

P: Tinsley Ellis?

F: That's correct. Never gave us money. He gave us time. Bill Horovitz, pretty wealthy man with Hollywood, Inc. When he died, he had \$222 million. He didn't give me any money until 1988, he was on the Board—founding trustee. And in '85 when we had the first balanced budget of \$385,000, at a board meeting, he looked at me and said, "You must be fudging numbers." And sitting across over there is Jim Gerden who is VP for Finance and Administration. And at first I shook my head, I couldn't believe he said that, especially at a Board meeting. But I finally said, "You see that man over there? First of all, I don't know how to fudge the numbers. And B, if I knew, he wouldn't let me. And he'd be reporting to you instead of me." I said, "So, this is the first time we had a \$385,000 surplus."

P: So, part of this is that at this juncture, Nova is well established, so you don't really need NYIT anymore.

F: I came to that conclusion, because I also came to the conclusion that NYIT's share of what was happening on this campus was building up every year as our programs got

bigger.

P: And they were taking, what, 50 percent of gross?

F: No, no, no. They were taking 50 percent of the net of the MBA and the undergraduate college instead of 100 percent.

P: But that was increasing?

F: That was growing, and those were the two biggest growth areas. And he wanted me to now bring in some of the other programs and go the other way, to do some of our programs off this campus. And I realized what was going to happen. So I came to the conclusion that we were never going to be a true independent institution if we remained in this **institution**.

P: Of course, they were not spending any money on these programs at all. They had no money being spent, and they weren't bringing in any money.

F: Well, it wasn't they weren't bringing any money, we were running them. The college was ours, so we were running all that stuff, and the MBA, I mean, we were running it. It wasn't working out.

P: But you have to have had mixed feelings, because Schure is a friend of yours, he has saved the school twice.

F: The only thing I wanted to be sure of is that he wouldn't lose the money they he gave us. So that \$1.2 million when I went to the bank and got the figures, which came out to that \$4.6 million, I wanted to be sure that he didn't lose any of the money that he got, that he was supposed to get.

P: Well, I understand that maybe partly because of your situation, the Board of Trustees instructed you to end that relationship.

F: That's the way I wanted it.

P: Certainly it made it easier for you and for Schure, didn't it.

F: Absolutely. Absolutely.

P: And the end result was that Schure resigned, the NYIT Trustees resigned, and then you paid him back the money that we had discussed earlier.

F: Correct.

P: Now, what he gets is rather extraordinary. He gets a sabbatical at full pay, and then half-pay, which is \$45,000, for five years.

F: Correct.

P: That is a very generous settlement, under any circumstances, right?

F: In my mind, it was worth it.

P: Well, of course. He again, if we look at the history of the University without him, you wouldn't have been able to make that payment anyway.

F: We wouldn't have been here.

P: From your perspective, it was a tough decision, wasn't it? I mean, you admired him and liked him and understood that it was time to end it.

F: That's correct. But I had to convince Mary, who liked him.

P: Mary McCahill?

F: He doesn't know that.

P: Now, at some point, as I understand it, and I'm not sure where it comes up in the ending process of 1985, there was some discussion of filing a lawsuit against Schure and NYIT. What ever happened to that idea?

F: We had a person, we would meet on a Monday, we had a person on a Monday morning at the courthouse, because we did not want this case to go to New York.

P: You wanted it filed here?

F: We wanted it filed here. So Mary McCahill was given the job of going into Alex Schure's office and giving him a copy of a brief that we were going to file, and she told him that if he doesn't agree, that we have someone at the courthouse right now to file this brief. And he read it.

P: And I understand what he said was, "Make me an offer." What was in the law suit, what were you going to sue about?

F: I'll think about this.

P: Were they personal as opposed to legal?

F: They were both.

P: And the law suit was never filed?

F: It was sealed.

P: And in a similar position to filing the lawsuit, I know Tinsley Ellis said that—

F: —Tinsley was the only one.

P: Only one. He thought it was not the right decision.

F: The only one.

P: What you're facing here, it looks like again, is the same situation with the Goodman Trust. If you don't file a suit, you're not going to get the money. If you don't file the suit, you're not going to end this federation—or at least threaten to file this suit, maybe.

F: We never filed the suit.

P: No, but you threatened to file the suit.

F: Absolutely, it was written.

P: And you would have.

F: There was a man in the courthouse, because we were not going to fight it in New York.

P: Did you assume that once the decision was made to file the law suit, that that would persuade him to accept the end of the federation?

F: Yes, because he—I knew that NYIT was in trouble.

P: He didn't need another law suit.

F: He didn't need another lawsuit. His son was the president now, so his son wouldn't want the lawsuit. Its all negative, you don't win in a lawsuit. And it eats a lot of time and a lot of money, and I knew that Alex wasn't happy with what was going on at NYIT, and he didn't want to be the cause.

P: Because technically, he was out now. No longer president, so he didn't want to create problems for his son.

F: So his son came down here and worked out an arrangement which he thought was fair, and Alex worked out a similar arrangement, which he thought was fair. And we severed.

P: And in the long run, obviously, to the great benefit of Nova.

F: Absolutely.

P: Because it would have been difficult to proceed as you have with that relationship.

F: You couldn't—well, from an economic point of view, we'd never have been able to end the year with a surplus.

P: Because they'd been siphoning off money all along.

F: Well, the \$385,000 would not have been enough in the following year to meet the obligations of NYIT, et cetera, and the accumulation of what we owed him—

P: —Was getting greater every year.

F: Was getting greater every year. So I realize that we wouldn't have had the \$385,000 if I had paid it, and we were on a losing battle, and it was hurting us down here in Development. It had a negative effect.

P: It would on fund raising, because people would say, "Look, hey, let NYIT pay for it." I don't want to have this university run by a school in New York.

F: Well, even worse, I had to start answering the question, "Well, how much is NYIT taking?"

P: Yeah. Tough question.

F: Well, it wasn't a matter of a tough question, all I did was tell them what the proportion was of what we got.

P: I mean, it's a tough question because you're trying to raise money.

F: Exactly, exactly, because if I didn't have to give that money to them, the money would have been here. And so, I found it difficult to, you know, a thousand dollars I could raise, but when I was talking about a hundred thousand, two hundred thousand dollars, I keep coming up against that wall, and I did what I came to do. I did what I came to do from where I wanted it. I resigned in '92, and I resigned in '92 because I knew what the university needed. And I was not the person to do that.

P: Let me pose a question to you, see how your reaction is: In a way, from the way I look at it as an outsider, there are three different universities. The first one was chartered in '64 and say would last until '70, until NYIT, then from '70 to '85, it's a different University,

and then from '85 to the present, its another University. Is that...?

F: '85 to '92 was, for me, the demonstration that we didn't have to worry about the state, we didn't need a partner, that we could go it alone, that the future was in our hands, and we were strong. We only owed \$22 million when I got out of here in '92, that was the only debt, and that was the housing. We had no debt.

P: Well, I read somewhere that someone, maybe you, characterized '85 to '92 as the stabilizing time.

F: That's correct. That is correct.

P: Because once you got to that point, then you understood what the potential could be.

F: But, and we went every year after that, and we raised—

P: —You were in the black.

F: We were in the black, and we paid NYIT each year the two million dollars we paid off in the five years. So, we did that, which meant that we were making more money in order to pay that debt than we even needed. These were surpluses. So when I reached that point, that was for me an ending point. And Ray Ferrero wanted me to stay on, and I said no.

P: Now we'll talk about that next time.

F: But that was a stabilizing position for me, and then I fulfilled what I promised Jim Farquhar.

P: I understand at some point, and I haven't been quite clear on this, but there is some indication that in '85 and '86, the state of Florida wanted to buy Nova University.

F: It wasn't for sale.

P: It wasn't for sale, but, and I'm not sure they wanted Nova University, but maybe they

wanted the land.

F: Well, they wanted Oceanography.

P: Okay, but did the state actually make an offer?

F: More than once.

P: More than once?

F: More than once.

P: And what kind of money were they talking about?

F: It made no difference.

P: I understand, you don't want to tell, but—

F: It never got to the Trustees.

P: But isn't it interesting that this situation—nobody wanted anything to do with it in 1967-'72, and all of a sudden in '85, the state now is interested.

F: That's because FAU had the responsibility of being the University, the state university in Broward. They weren't going to build another one.

P: Yeah, well that makes sense.

F: They needed land. But they also wanted some of our programs, but not all of our programs. Not all of our programs. But, for me, I knew that the University was going to be here.

P: Well, because you're now past that point. What sort of interaction did you have with FAU and Broward while you were president? FAU has a campus here, Broward has a campus here. Did you share a library? Did you interact at all?

F: Yeah, we let the students use our libraries. They couldn't take it out, but they can come

and do work. The Lowe Library was used by the community, any lawyer could go in there, anybody could go in there.

P: But there were no exchange programs or working with FAU?

F: Nope.

P: Wasn't there some duplication of effort?

F: Absolutely. Every time we had a program that was making money, they'd open one.

P: Well it seems a little counterproductive for FAU to have a campus across the street from Nova in terms of educational purposes for the State of Florida, they talk about duplication of effort, it seems to be to be a perfect example.

F: Ask _____ that question.

P: I think I know what the answer would be.

F: For me, I had no interest in—I did have an interest in the school, the K-12.

P: Of course.

F: I did have an interest there. I was friendly, and I believed—I went out and helped. I always believed we need a strong state institution, and we need a strong independent sector.

P: But this original interaction seems limited now in terms of the Broward Community College. That there's not that much interaction once the University School was on the campus. Than you have less interaction with Broward.

F: I think Ray is workin hard with George to look at ways where we can, to look at ways we can.

P: Okay.

F: I think they're doing that. They're beginning to—there's less—none of us are under the pressures.

P: It was a different time.

F: Different times.

P: Okay, let's end it there.

Project #: NSU 01B
Interviewer: Dr. Abraham S. Fischler
Interviewee: Julian Pleasants
Date of Interview: June 9, 2009

P: There were a couple things I wanted to follow up with that I had discussed earlier. One of the problems you faced as you began to expand your educational programs. You had to deal with different regulations from each state. I understand that there were some specific problems with the state of Texas. Would you elaborate on that?

F: It was an interesting period for me. We had just gotten through the North Carolina struggle that we talked about, and we went into Texas. The agreement that we made with the head of the coordinating council for higher education in Texas, was that we would only have one cluster in each of our three doctoral programs. The Ed leaders community college, higher Ed, and a doctorate in public business administration. We agreed to that. So we opened the EDD and Ed leaders in Dallas. I forget where the other two were opened, but we had three going over a period of time. Then we finished in Dallas. We had good response. The Southern Association had come during that three year period. Even the coordinating council director came in, etc. No problems. So we assumed that the agreement that we had when we should hands was *mumbles* . . . We opened a cluster in Galveston. About halfway through the first year I got a letter from the head of the coordinating council stating that I was to cease and desist in Galveston and we were to continue only in Dallas. We were place bound. Well when you take twenty five administrators in a locale you don't want to go back to

that locale. You go to a place where you can provide the service to another group of 25. That's how we went to Galveston. It was large enough for us to get twenty five or so principals. So I visited Texas and we had a big discussion, and he meant what he said. We could not continue that cluster in Galveston. So I got in touch with Gordon Sweet who was the head of the Southern Association of Colleges in that division. He said that I should follow the coordinating council's directive, but they did not want me to go into the courts and do what I did in North Carolina. They had a letter from North Carolina stating that they would withdraw from the Southern Association and the coordinating council said the same thing. So the Southern Association would lose two states. I decided that I wasn't going to take that on because I needed that. So it ended up to where we had to fly. The professor flew in from Berkley on a Saturday from Dallas. We had to fly the students from Galveston to Dallas for the remaining two years, or year and a half, on Saturday and fly them back. Because that's what they wanted. I believe it still functions that way, that we're okay in Texas as long as we keep that program in Dallas.

P: You also had some issues in New Jersey?

F: New Jersey was an interesting, another type of issue. I'm just using these as illustrations that I think we have to examine as technology comes into vogue and we have the opportunity to use the airwaves which the states can't control. So in New Jersey, the students. . . We had a cluster in New Jersey. The students could take the program but they could not use that program for getting a superintendent's license or certificate. We had the program of course in

Pennsylvania. So what the students did was take the course in Trenton, send their papers to _____ Pennsylvania, get certified as a superintendent in Pennsylvania, and then come back, and because of the reciprocity, they wound up getting their certification via the Pennsylvania program. No reason for that. It has nothing to do with the quality of a program. So if the program meets a certain quality, both in faculty and demands and expectations, that's the only thing that ought to be looked at.

P: But there are always politics and there are always regulations. That's part of the president's responsibility is to figure out how to get around or access what individual can made the breakthrough for you.

F: You mentioned Don Mitchell on Tuesday. That's where Don was superb.

P: Another question I wanted to follow up on about your ascension to the presidency. We had discussed that you had a meeting and decided that Winstead would go. At what point did you know that you were going to be the new president?

F: When I heard at the meeting in _____ in the Orleans and the beach when Dr. Richardson and Dr. Warren were present and myself, that's when I heard that they were going to let Winstead go. My position was, you don't fire the president. Not when you're in this kind of an environment. At that point I convinced the group that we should put him on a sabbatical and let him look for a job in the course of the year but have nothing to do with the University. They agreed that that was the best both for Warren and for the University. It was at that meeting that they asked me to serve as executive vice president which would give them a

year to find a president. Since Joel was head of the Germ Free Laboratory and Richardson was head of the Oceanography Laboratory, I was the only one left. So I said okay, I'll do that, but I wanted to keep my present position. So I took over both. I stayed as Director of the Behavioral Science Center and I added that other responsibility.

P: So at that time did you have any interest in being president?

F: No, I didn't come here to. . . No. I came because I wanted to change the academic environment. I didn't come to be a president. I also came because across the street, as I said, there was the public schools and that was a good laboratory for me to continue my own interest in how children learn misconceptions about science. Like, electricity flows. Electricity doesn't flow. Because children will ask you, well, if electricity flows, why isn't it coming out of the sockets.

P: What happened between the time that you agreed to be Associate Vice President and the time you agreed to be President?

F: You mean in that one year?

P: Yea.

F: What happened was. . . A lot of things happened. In September everything was announced and I moved into that other office. The mail brought interesting things to me. Like, we were going to have a class action suit because our pension hadn't been paid. The social security wasn't paid. Gordon Sweet was going to take away our candidacy status because of the article that appeared in Time magazine. All of that hit right in the beginning. The other thing of course was

cash flow. That was a big problem.

P: We had discussed that earlier, but why under these condition would you then accept the presidency?

F: I didn't accept the presidency at that time. I just accepted the executive vice presidency.

P: But within a year you did.

F: Pardon me?

P: Within a year you became President.

F: Only because of the deal that we made with NYIT. The only way NYIT was going to give use the million two was if I became President. That was the condition under which Alex Schure and I spoke at his home when I flew up.

P: Was that one reason that there was not a formal search for a new President?

F: I don't know what was going on or how many searched were going on. That was the Board's problem. My problem was to do that one year. So I didn't pay attention to the search. There was no search going on, I didn't think. I didn't sense that anyone would want the job, especially under the condition under which I found the University. The more I stayed, the longer I stayed, the more I found that wasn't even on the books. I could have asked Alex Schure for a million and a half or two million, but I didn't know we didn't have some of these expenditures at the time that all of this was going on.

P: So one of the reasons you accepted the presidency was your relationship with Jim Farquhar?

F: The promise I made to Jim sometime during that academic year that we would

have to close or we would have to do something, and the closing was up to him unless we were able to get a million some odd dollars into Nova. That's when he sold his eighty acres. Once he did that then I promised I wouldn't leave.

P: What was your initial contract? How many years?

F: I think it was a three year contract, but I didn't worry about that. Later on what we agreed to was that I would give them a year's notice and they would give me a year's notice. And I lived with that contract. So every year I always knew that I had at least two years, because if they didn't give me notice, then I stayed on. And I wasn't worried about leaving. I'm saying this, you don't have to use this, I'm saying this to you. I think my credentials, having been at Columbia and Ovid and Berkeley, enabled me to say to the visiting teams that came in, what we're doing here is more honest in terms of the goals of a program than what you have in most of the traditional schools. And I could say to the visiting team, don't tell me about Tennessee, because I've been to three of the top institutions in the country and what I'm saying is, what we're doing with these programs is saying to people, we're going to make you a better principal if you come here and learn the skills of management and things that you weren't given in the operation. And to use your school as a laboratory is more effective than being an intern somewhere for six months and then coming back to your school. So you don't have to leave home. We want you to use your school as a laboratory, and the cluster will provide for you the kinds of interactions you need from your colleagues to take advantage of it. It's alright if they help you. It's alright if they read your paper before you send it to me. In fact, I expect you to do that,

because that's what a professional would do.

P: One of the other things I wanted to follow up on was funding. You got, obviously, support from the Board, and I think we mentioned it one time, in a crisis they almost literally passed a hat among the trustees and each person volunteered a certain amount of money. But you also had additional support from a couple of groups, the Royal Dames and the Gold Key group. Would you talk a little bit about them and what contribution they made?

F: Well Gold Key was started by a man by the name of Henry Kenny who was an editor of the *Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel* at the time. It was started in order to bring in some money from the community. So it cost \$1,000 a year to be a Gold Key member. The deal was, we would not ask you to do anything, just give us \$1,000, and once a year we'll have a dinner and the President will give you a state of the University address. But we won't ask you to do anything else except the \$1,000. And it was a recurrent \$1,000. So we had about thirty five or forty members. That became the President's, kind of a fund. I used it for the laboratory that was built here for Bio-feedback lab. I used that money. Student's wanted to give a paper at a conference, I used that money. There was a death in the family and you didn't have money to travel home, I gave them money. I used it for a professor who needed a piece of equipment. But every year I gave them the kinds of things that I used the money for, and it went right through the University's bookkeeping system, so it wasn't hidden anywhere. And that was Gold Key. Gold Circle was started because that was a men's organization kind of. There were no women in Gold Key. So the Gold Circle was started to be the

counterpart of Gold Key, and that was a women's organization. And then we had a third organization called the Royal Dames of Nova University. The Royal Dames were started, as I told you, to help pay off the capital renovations for the third floor of the Parker Building because that's where we put the Germ-Free Laboratory. That was started by Theresa Castro. So those were the three organizations, and that's what we had, and that was their function.

P: One of the things that is critical for any University is an endowment. Looking at the history of this University, as you evolved you had to spend so much money just paying debts and building buildings that you really didn't have time to start this long range project of a huge endowment that some universities have. Was that in the back of your mind all the time, that ultimately you wanted to start building the endowment?

F: There were two things I was learning in the process. I didn't come from a presidency, I came from a professorship. If you're not alive then you don't worry about the endowment. I also didn't come with the notion that bricks and mortar is what a university is all about. I wasn't involved with image. I mean, I drove a Pontiac and then I drove a Chrysler. I didn't need a Cadillac. I didn't need an office that was different than most of the offices that other people had. So image wasn't important. Therefore I wasn't going to take money to beautify the campus or do things like that. Periodically, I don't know if it's in the minutes, maybe it still remains, but periodically someone would say well, don't you want to beautify the campus? And I would say, sure I want to beautify the campus, but that's your job. The trustees, that's your job. You want bricks and mortar, that's your job. I

will try to balance the University from an academic point of view through the resources that we're going to be generating. Your job is to worry about planting trees. But remember, when you plant a tree I want you to also have the money to pay the guy that's going to water that tree, or cut the grass, or do whatever else has to be done. I can't take that on right now. It can't be done. What I have to do is get enough resources to build a university. I used _____'s expression, that's the interaction of professors and students in an environment which possibly is conducive.

P: But over a period of time you were going to be more committed obviously to the physical campus and the endowment.

F: First I had to balance the budget.

P: Right.

F: From 1970 to [19]85 was the first time I had a surplus. You can check it - \$385,000. That's the end of my concern for the viability of the University and whether it was going to make it or not.

P: Some people have called the period up to that point 'stabilization'. That you had at some point stabilized at least the budget.

F: Except we still owed NYIT \$202 million plus a little more _____ something. So I took that on mentally, that not yet. I wanted to pay that off. So I had to give the \$500,000 for four years plus a little residual for the fifth year with no interest. That had to be done. When I did that and was able to continue to stay in the black every year from then on in, then I said to myself, the University is here, it's staying, we've got a couple of thousand students, our doctoral programs our

going, our masters, we started the college taking over NYIT's piece of that college. So there was no NYIT. It was all Nova Southeastern, all Nova University, etc., I could go.

P: Give me a typical day in the life of the University President from [19]85 to [19]92.

I would imagine it would be different from the president of a state university who would have to deal with the legislature. How did you spend your day? Did you spend a certain amount of time on academic issues, with directors, fundraising?

F: I'm trying to think of the year and maybe when you back into your search you'll find it. I thought that this institution, once it became fully accredited, I was through with the political games except for the distance education programs. I think it was like 19[] . . . Bob Graham was the governor and Charlie Reed was his staff person. All of a sudden I got a call from someone I knew in Tallahassee saying that on the cabinet's agenda they were going to prevent Nova from doing anything thirty miles from campus. I had cluster in Gainesville, I had a cluster in Jacksonville, and I'm not quite sure we had the cluster in Tallahassee yet. But I did have a cluster in Gainesville and I had a cluster in Jacksonville, and Palm Beach, and Miami. I said this is crazy. So I got a hold of Tom Panza, who was the lobbyist for the University, and we went to Tallahassee, and we started to speak to the staff members of the cabinet. I found out that the Governor and Charlie Reed got complaints from the institutions in Jacksonville and in Gainesville I guess and they were going to pass this rule. And it was coming up the following Tuesday. So I went to Tallahassee on Monday, and I had three votes out of seven, and I needed the fourth vote.

P: This is the cabinet?

F: This is at the cabinet level. It was about ten o'clock at night -- this is a true story -
- about ten o'clock at night Monday night, and we were sitting in Clyde's.

P: Which is a restaurant right there at the capital in Tallahassee.

F: From that _____ I spent a lot of time in the capital. [laughter] But I was so naïve. I thought since we were an independent institution one of the independence is from Tallahassee because we weren't getting much money from Tallahassee. So I called Ham Forman at ten o'clock at night. Good thing he was entertaining so he couldn't tell me all the things he would have told me if we were alone. And for the first fifteen minutes he chewed me out. And I told him what was happening. He says, I'll be there tomorrow in the morning in time for the cabinet meeting. The next morning he flew up, at his expense, flew up from Tallahassee from here. He went before the cabinet. He spoke, I spoke, and we won.

P: So he made the difference in that extra vote you needed?

F: He got O'Connor, who was in agriculture.

P: Bill O'Connor was Secretary of Agriculture.

F: Right. He got him to vote with us. But there was no vote. The Governor realized it wasn't going to happen. So he voted. So it was there.

P: Well let me go back. Let's take a typical day.

F: I only mention that because when you talk about how I spent my day. From then on in, I was in Tallahassee every single year. With Tom.

P: So let's take a day in 1988. What time would you come to work? What would

your general agenda be? How would you spend your time as President?

F: Well, when I took over in the beginning I taught a course. I taught science students, because that was my field. So I was still wearing the hat as Director of Behavioral Science. Then it just became too much. I used to teach on Monday mornings because I had the weekend to prepare. But then I found myself not even having enough time to do the honest job I wanted to do as a professor. So I gave that up. So what we did was, depending on the day of the week, I would have a meeting at least once during the week with my administrative group. I had one vice-president, and that was the Administration Finance. And then I had a Director of Development. My own secretary was Human Resources. So those were the three that came in addition to Richardson, and Joel Warren, and . . .

P: Well this is the beginning. What I'm trying to get at is, how had that changed by 1988? Did you have a provost by then? Did you have additional. . .

F: I put a provost in in [19]85 or [19]86. Ovid Lewis, he was at the end of law school, I made him a provost. Primarily that occurred because there was too much power, and there was a lot of noise about starting an academic senate. I knew that was not the thing this institution needed. It needed the ownership of these directors, because they were working hard. I didn't need that type of dialogue going on here, because I find the academic senate is built on distrust and not on trust. Ovid had no academic senate, except in the college. Berkley's academic senate – terrible, terrible. So, I think it was about [19]85 or so when noise started to come up. I needed help anyway, so I took Ovid Lewis who was

the dean of the law school and promoted him to Vice President for Academic Affairs so that there would be a little greater communication and someone arguing with the President.

P: And so, how much time, for example, would you spend fundraising?

F: Fundraising? I spent about fifty percent of my time in the community. Part of that was friend making, part of that was giving visibility to the University, and part of that was trying to raise additional funds.

P: Obviously, as President of the University you feel both an obligation to be involved in the community, but also in your case you have an extraordinary level of commitment. Let me just read a few of the associations you were involved in. Broward County Crime Commission, Museum of Art, Chamber of Commerce, Hollywood Medical Center, Philharmonic Orchestra of Florida, United Way of Florida. You were involved with the Mailman Foundation, Temple Beth El, on and on and on. That was a pretty large commitment for a university president.

F: If you look at the way the University was organized, it was organized as a business. It wasn't organized in the traditional university style. Directors reported to me, and it wasn't the reporting that you normally would see in a university kind of thing. It was more a communication vehicle. I didn't tell Bill Richardson how to run his oceanographic laboratory. I didn't tell Ovid Lewis how to run the Law School. I didn't see that as the main responsibility I had. But they all understood that we needed to make the budget, we needed quality, and we needed to make sure the students . . . Because we were not getting the students from Harvard and Berkeley. We weren't getting that level of students

down here. Middle level. Even now in our law school, between five hundred and six hundred on the old SAT scores. We didn't get seven hundred and eight hundreds. They went to the University of Florida because it's one fifth of our tuition and had a better reputation, and if you wanted to be a political _____ you went there. So, when you talk about value added, from an academic point of view, we were literally adding more value from an academic point of view than we had when I was at Ovid. At Ovid those students taught me. I didn't teach them much. Here, we had to teach. So the responsibility on the academic side was much more prevalent here than it is when you get a Gates. In fact, he never finished Harvard.

P: But he did okay.

F: But he did okay.

P: [laughter]

F: He would have done okay if he went anywhere. That's the point I'm making. So I always had that in my head that was very important to me, to turn out a product that could function effectively and pass state exams and all of that stuff. That responsibility I transferred to the directors. Not to the faculty. To the directors.

P: Talk about your relationship over this period of time with the Board of Trustees. Would they do a yearly evaluation? Did you go to every meeting? Did you present periodic reports? Yearend reports? How did you deal with an extension of your contract? How did you deal with pay raises?

F: Pay raises? When we were building the budget everyone knew everything was going on. It was an open system. Every month they got a review from the Vice

President who did all that work. I didn't do that. He did it. And we put the budget together. We'd start in March or so.

P: You say 'we'.

F: The directors.

P: Okay.

F: The directors with the Vice President and myself. But I didn't get involved too early. The first job was, every director had to prepare a budget for his center.

P: The Board of Trustees is not involved in this process?

F: Right now no, absolutely not involved.

P: But they had to approve it?

F: Oh yeah. They had a finance committee. There was an executive committee that met every month. We met with that executive committee every month. And within that executive committee was a finance committee, a personal committee, etc. But they were not involved at this time. So the budget would come up and go through the internal operation, including my budget. Including finance budgets and all of that. And we looked at the first cut and we were short \$500,000 or \$800,000 or whatever. They all had to go back and now they had the numbers. They understood what the University needed. It was a give and take. Sometimes more give, sometimes more take [laughter]. But we battled that battle out. And that's where I got involved.

P: Did you have any major conflicts with the Board of Trustees over any decisions or issues?

F: I don't think I had major conflicts. The biggest conflict was when I first took over

in[19]69 because they didn't have a commitment to the philosophy and things of _____ went on. They were going to build the MIT of the south and it wasn't going to happen. So they were ready to give it to the state or whatever. We talked about that. They were ready to give the University to someone else and take it off their hands. Even in [19]85 when I produced the first surplus, they still weren't sure that we would make it. And that's when I convinced them that, what's the worst case? The worst case is that maybe if we don't make it we'll give it to the state. That's the worst case, because we know they want the land and we don't have as much debt as we did fifteen years ago, so we'll give it to the state.

P: How influential can a chairman of the Board of Trustees be? I guess it depends a lot on the individual. When Ray Ferrero was chairman it appears as though he was much more of leadership quality on his own. I mean he was presenting the view of the Board of Trustees, but he seemed to be very much involved in what was going on at the University.

F: Ray replaced Mary McCahill. I never came to a board meeting without having gone through the agenda with the chairperson. And you're right. Ray was a different style. But I knew Ray because he had served as chair of the Board of Governors. So I knew him as a trustee. He knew what I was trying to do. So philosophically we didn't have any difficulty. With Mary, I actually went to her home a week before any board meeting, went through the whole agenda with her, explained what I was trying to do, etc. If she said to me, I think we ought to wait with this, I waited. I waited. I didn't buck her. I needed her. When Ray took

over, I did the same thing with Ray. I'd go to his office, we'd go through the agenda, we would talk about it, I'd listen to what he had to say. Because I know that that chairperson can influence votes. So I took care of that just by going there and listening and modifying and changing timing and things of that nature.

P: Surely Mary McCahill, she was on the board for twelve years, really the first woman to be chair, had quite an influence on the University.

F: Absolutely. Jim Farquhar made a deal with Mary. If we would give the museum the use of our buildings on campus, she would come on our board. We did that. Jim said do it, we did it. I didn't care, but we did it. We could have sold it, but we didn't. We gave it to them. Even though we needed the money. They made a deal. He picked her to be chair. Jim wanted her to replace him. It didn't quite happen exactly that way, but she was there. Jim didn't get off the board until that was done. Mary picked Ray and she stayed on an extra year as chair waiting for Ray to finish up his obligation with the Florida Bar. He was President Elect then past President. So it was a three year commitment. She stayed on an extra year as chair. She picked Ray to be the chairman.

P: One of the things you said about her is that, sort of in the same context you mentioned, when she retired from the board she would say to me, wait a little while, you will see that it will happen. She was usually right. She guided me through difficult times and gave me courage to continue. So obviously you thought a lot of her.

F: We had a Director of Development for a good number of years who somebody else would have fired a dozen times. He had no use for faculty. Bright, he got a

doctorate in English at Columbia with a PhD. There were days when I called her and said, I got to get rid of this guy, he is causing me more trouble on the inside than the outside. She said, "Let me tell you about the consequences."

I didn't fire him. I never fired him. The man, who replaced me, acquired that same noise in the system. But he only lasted two years and he got fired. So Ovid came in. And Ovid, I never realized, Ovid had a streak. Ovid didn't like confrontations. In all the years that he was Vice-President I was the person that saw him at 8 O'clock. So I knew what he was doing; we talked about it. I never knew what he said to the guys, but I was there, he was the number two guy. When he became the number one man, he made some decision that I would have never made; like he fired Steve Goldstein.

P: Created a huge backlash.

F: Pardon me?

P: It was a huge backlash because—

F: Huge backlash. That's what Mary taught me because anyone else sitting in my chair would have fired him. But every time I was going to fire him, I called her. And she told me the consequences. Then I'd weigh the consequences. So I used to say to my good friend Steve Goldstein, by the way I still see him all the time. I would say to do me a favor, stay out of the office. Don't come to the university, just do what you're doing on the outside, I love you. So go do that.

P: He was very successful in public relations, right?

F: Great. Not only that, he was a homosexual. Husbands didn't worry about the wife being escorted by Steve to some function. Mary loved him, of course Mary lost a

husband who took Mary all over. Steve, he's bright, I told you he had a PhD in English, he traveled around the world. He was a very knowledgeable guy, he is doing very well now here in Ft, much better than he ever did at the university. Lauderdale. He is on the radio, he has a column in the Florida Sun Sentinel. He is making far more money; he charges \$10,000 a speech. Not so bad.

P: Let me go to commencement in 1986 and at this point Sacs had given you the tenure accreditation, which was important. You now have a balanced budget for the second year in a row, which is significant. And you reported at that point, at commencement that Nova now is really on its way. And part of the reason was this balanced budget. Where did those funds come from? Was there increased giving, more students?

F: It came from our field based programs.

P: All of field based?

F: Well it came from our field based programs. The establishment of oceanography as one of the five best oceanographic centers; so it was easier for those guys to bring in some money. We now had psychology, so the internal, more traditional programs were doing well. We had added the PsyD because the PhD in Psych was small. I differentiated sharply, by the way, PhD and the professional degrees. I don't know if you've seen that in your readings. I always said, you wouldn't go to a PhD to get your teeth fixed. You go to a DDS. There is nothing wrong professional degrees. A DPA is a doctorate in public administration. It's not a PhD in public administration. Those are applied programs. They are professional programs that help professionals do a better job as a professional. I

don't expect them to write books and I don't expect them to do research, theoretical research, etc. I always say, we couldn't afford Einstein. Princeton could afford Einstein, we couldn't afford Einstein.

P: One of the things I saw in [19]85, then [19]86 that intrigued me, and I think this is important for universities, particularly new universities. You had a very significant distinguished speaker series to bring these individuals to campus. I'll just read a few of these. Prime Minister Edward Heath, Henry Kissinger, General William Wes Moreland, Gene Kirkpatrick who is the U.S. Ambassador—

F: That was all Steve Goldstein. I take no credit for that. Zero credit. That's what he was doing. He established a breakfast and lunch club. They gave us \$200, it wasn't a fundraiser, friend making. Purely for making friends.

P: But that's big for the university. And later on Jimmy Carter comes.

F: We paid him.

P: But the none the less.

F: We paid him to come.

P: It was important for a fledgling school to have those kinds of people to appear on you campus, right?

F: You and I agree.

P: And that has, as I understand it, continued.

F: No. Well it has continued, but in a whole different way.

P: Okay.

F: It has continued now as a way of making friends, of getting people to the campus, but we don't charge, they don't pay. We had 200 people, so we had

\$60,000 and with that \$60,000 we brought four key people in. Today you want Jimmy Carter it costs you \$60,000. So you had to change the whole dimension. But the context is the same.

P: Well the last time I was here, John Anderson and George McGovern came to the law school and gave a speech, and it was a huge crowd. Obviously, this is a connection between the university and the community.

F: Now you know why I spent a lot of time going over that list. I would spend about fifty percent of my time involved in the community because in [19]66 very few people were coming west of [State Road] 441. So people coming from the East, that is where very important groups are, the new ones are out here, but the real Ft. Lauderdale, Pompano group, they were all in the East. They didn't come here. Abe we'll meet you— [Laughter]. That's why my office on 9th Avenue now is still better than being on the campus. I'm a lot closer to downtown.

P: In 1985, also once the NYIT relationship ended, your title is now CEO instead of President. What was the difference?

F: Well, I told you, Alex Schure became the chancellor.

P: Right.

F: I was the President. I was viewed in my own head as COO. He was the CEO. But he wasn't here, so for practical purposes all I did was continue to do what I was doing; only I didn't have Alex.

P: Is there any quantitative, qualitative difference between being a CEO and a President? I mean, if you look at corporations, the CEO is usually over the President.

F: In the corporate world, you have a chairman of the board who may or may not be involved as a CEO depending on the responsibilities, in many cases, the chairman of the board is the CEO. He holds both positions. But it's a full-time job.

P: Did you see your role as more of a CEO in coaching?

F: Oh yeah, Alex was a friend who could deliver nine votes, and very bright.

P: Talk a little about Maltz Institute for Research and the contribution that Maltz made to this university.

F: Anna Maltz, well Maxwell Maltz had met. I knew him casually, not as a friend, but causally. That's when he wrote the book *Cybernetics*. He was a plastic surgeon who ended up trying to find why when he does a nose on you and a nose on them and both are fine. One likes it and one doesn't like it. So he got into that whole area. He wanted to come down here and teach. So I had him come down here and guest lecture in the school of psych. Then he died. Anna and him were like two kids, of course she was the nurse and took care of the office and everything and did everything for him. Then I kept in touch with Ann. Steve helped with that a little bit because he escorted her to places and I wasn't going to leave my wife at home and escort her. I turned her over to David Barone in Psychology and he followed up by keeping her in the loop. And she ended up giving us quite a sum of money. And we built the School of Psych, the Ann Maltz. That's what Ann's role was and she was a sweet woman, a nice woman. She had a place in New York. So whenever I went to New York, I made sure we went out for lunch or dinner with Shirley. That was the relationship I had with her. The key was to keep her in our camp, the opposite with Josephine Leiser. One of our

Trustees was on the opera guild and took her, she was in the same Ann Maltz mold, and she ended up leaving all of the money to the opera and nothing to us, because Steve, after he was fired, and there was no one here to continue the cultivation process.

P: To make those connections.

F: Nobody realized the importance of what he was doing, except Mary McCahill and Abe Fischler.

P: From [19]86 to [19]92, as you become more stable, there are going to be some significant expansions. For example, the College of Pharmacy admitted its first class. You began to expand in the geriatric field, gerontology, family therapy; you now offer a Ph.D. in family therapy. So you really going to start expanding some of your programs, and I understand that you got a grant from Hud to renovate some building for the gerontology project. And that was a pretty big grant, \$5,000,000 or something like that.

F: Once we balanced the budget, it was easy to look for ways of increasing the universities offerings because there was a residual that one could use to get something started. If you look at the School of Psych, or if you look at schools of psychology, it's more on a medical school model. You have a problem, you're the patient, you come in, they may involve your spouse later on down the pipe, but you're the patient. And the psychologist works with you. I was trained in the sciences and in science we operate through systems. When I was down here, going through other things, I had a sense that most cases, in divorces, having known both spouse, both people, I realized that our school, for example, was

treating one of the other mainly. I looked at the model and said there is something wrong. If you look at the family, the family is the unit and the reason it is not working is because the interaction of the objects within the system is not working. It is the interaction of the two human beings, three human beings, four human beings. If you're living with your mother-in-law, she is part of the system. And I wanted a systemic approach to family therapy. Dr. DePiano, had one class in the program in psych, and the arguments that he gave me was that we have family therapy. It's not that you have a course in family therapy; it's the way in which you approach the whole concept of the family. So I started a school of Systemic Studies. We started a program in gerontology, in mediation. The reason we did that was it comes out of a different frame.

P: So what you developed is an institute for mediation to deal with family problems.

F: But the institute was external to the School of Psyche.

P: That's what I mean; the same thing for gerontology. Yes?

F: The same thing with computer science. It was the only center that didn't have a content. Scigliano came back to this university. He left in [19]79, he came back in [19]82, 83 to take over what I was doing, which was meeting with research librarians from universities because they didn't have a doctoral degree and I wanted to use the computer as the primary vehicle. So I was writing the concept paper and wanted to come back. And he was an engineer by training. I said to Scigliano I'll let you come back only if you'll come back and do this.

P: So that became now the Center for Computer Science.

F: For computer science. And what I wanted him to do was not only build a center

for computer science, but to influence the way in which the other doctoral programs were functions.

P: As a result of that you end up with something called South Star. Would you explain to me what that was?

F: I ended up with what?

P: South Star, that was—

F: Oh, South Star was independent. That was Barry Pasternack.

P: Okay, that was not part of your system, but you used South Star for you overseas programs, right?

F: I used South Star because they were able to get to the satellite.

P: They were as I understand it operating Puerto Rico, or somewhere and you connect to them and connect to you other programs. Now you're moving closer and closer to what we call the virtual classroom.

F: We created, thanks to John, when he came back, he created the virtual classroom. We were able to do much more through computer technology. John played a big role in helping us move this university into the utilization of technology.

P: One concept that apparently didn't make it, there was the beginning of a 'Hospitality Center' or a Hospitality major, but ultimately that was dropped. What were the circumstances there because in South Florida that would seem like a very good idea?

F: It stopped because, when the college started to grow, the undergraduate college, when Dermanie the professor from Cornell for 25 years came.

P: Which was known for Hotel Management.

F: Exactly, and by the way, he was known all over the world. Of course I traveled, I would tell him where I'm going. I had someone meet me, and rooms and all. Everywhere, Norway, Sweden, Taiwan, all over. There were some students who worked with him. We started a program in hotel management, but it was started by using Dermanie as the Center Director and the resources that existed in this environment, that he knew, chefs and all. I used to commencements where the kids cooked during that class, it was very nice. Anyway, he reported to me. Then I said to him, I got to put you somewhere, you can't keep reporting to me, so I put him into the Undergraduate Center and he reported to Phil Deturk. That was why it ended. It ended after I got out.

P: What about nursing?

F: Nursing, was my era. I wanted to start a nursing program, but I wanted to start it in a field based mode where we would teach nursing in the hospital when they would change shift. So these were for two year nurses who wanted to get a bachelor's degree. They were already nurses, but they were only graduates from the community college. I was going to add the last two years. When you do that, you find that you don't have to give them that much of nursing because they already have that. They know how to take bedpans and all that. What you really want to do is give them the other skills that would enable them to function at a higher level.

I wanted the program to operate not on the campus. Of course, I didn't have the buildings that were necessary, I didn't have the laboratories. I wanted to do it in

the hospitals. So I brought in a Ph.D. from Columbia University to head that up.

And we did it and we had enrollment. And in September, she went to Washington [D.C] to some nursing accrediting group and they wouldn't let me do it that way.

So I went to Washington myself without her and I told them that if I can't do it that way then I won't do it at all.

P: A couple other developments while you were president, the Center for the Study of Law got a significant contribution from Shepard Broad, and now it becomes the Shepard Broad Law Center. Would you talk a little bit about Mr. Broad and his commitment to the university?

F: Shepard was a good friend of Abe Mailman through Abe Mailman, we had met a number of times. Augie Paoli went to see Shep Broad, I told you, Augie was the person who was supposed to raise the money. He thought about it. This was back in, in don't know, [19]78 or maybe [19]79. Anyway, we ended up making a deal where he would—his wife was still alive with Alzheimer's—so we made a deal that he would give us \$3,000,000 and we could use it, but we would have to pay interest, interest was ten percent, it was a big sum of money, because he needed that income to help pay the expense for his wife. So it made sense. In my mind I thought that by the time, when his wife died, that would stop. A deal is a deal. But, that's Shep. But, he was honored to have his name on a building. He had come from Minsk, Russia as a boy. Educated in New York City, came down here, formed one of the most outstanding practices after World War II. He was philanthropic. He did a lot. Broad Causeway is his. He built a lot of buildings. Built the American Savings Bank and put his son in as President. It wasn't a hard sell,

it is an honor in his mind to have a law.

P: Now there was an issue here with the name. The law school is named after Shep Broad, but the building itself is still the Leo Goodwin Sr. Building, right?

F: That's correct.

P: And that sort of worked out ok?

F: Not to Goodwin's wife, so we put another name on a dormitory.

P: So that sort of settled it?

F: Yeah, she's friendly, but now she's dead. You got the Wayne Huizenga School of Entrepreneurship, but the building is the DeSantis Building. So it's not unusual, in fact, when they wanted to give me a name, the choice I had was to have a building or not, I said no, I would prefer a program.

P: Well you also have a road named after you.

F: The road was Davie. I paid for that road. That's another story.

P: Well tell us that story.

F: You want to know the story?

P: Sure.

F: I had a big red Oldsmobile that I had from Berkley that I drove here. And the speed limit on Orange Drive was twenty miles an hour. You couldn't keep that eight cylinder Oldsmobile at twenty miles an hour. I just wouldn't stay that way. So after a while, they waited for me. So like once a month I got a ticket. They gave me the ticket, I went to the Chief of Police, Kline. Twenty-five dollars, got a receipt, I paid my twenty-five dollars. So when Davie decided to give me the road, I said, no, no, you're not giving me this road, I pay for this road. [Laughter]

So that's the story.

P: And all of that is critical to the development of the University. You have to have access. Clearly, there are different ways to get to the University now, but in the beginning it wasn't quite so easy, was it?

F: Well no, first of all you didn't have [Interstate Road] 95, so you had State Road 84, but I was coming from the South, so I would take [State Road] 441 to Orange Drive, Orange Drive to Davie Road, and then I would come here. But that was a slow road, it was twenty miles [an hour].

P: Also, it was significant, in 1989, what was Nova College, the undergraduate college, named for Jim Farquhar.

F: Yes.

P: And that was a significant recognition of his contribution.

F: He made bigger contributions than that, but that was what we had, and for us that was a big contribution.

P: 1988, the Joe Sonken Building, where the University School Center opened. Where did you get the money for that building?

F: From Sonken. Sonken was a man who had a reputation for being part of the mafia. He had a restaurant, he came out of Chicago, he knew the boys, the boys knew him. On Sunday morning they would meet in his restaurant and they'd have a lox and a spread, and they all got together. And he was tried a half a dozen times and never was convicted. But, I needed some money to finish that building, so I went to see Joe, and Joe said, I'll give you \$750,000 and I'll give you the balance later on. We never got the balance, of course, he died. But we did get

the first money.

P: Any problem naming the building after him?

F: That was the deal. Everyone thought it was a bad look. As far as I was concerned, he was never convicted.

P: Although, certainly a shady character, right?

F: He was a shady character, and his friends were even shadier. And they would take pictures of who was going in and who was going out. He would say, I have a restaurant, that's what it's there for.

P: I think one of the most significant achievements, for you professionally, would have been the development of the Center for the Advancement for Education, which is of course now the Abe Fischler Center. Clearly, that was part of what you wanted to accomplish when you started. So how did you feel about how that has developed over the years?

F: Thanks to the person who Goldman brought in as the director, Wells Singleton, he has an entrepreneurial spirit. He has helped make that center what it is, programmatically and operationally. Some of the things are great, some of the things I would not have done, but that's okay.

P: The location is in the old Southeastern building in Miami?

F: Its three buildings.

P: Three buildings.

F: It's a big campus. You have to visit that. Don't write without looking at that. That is the Taj Mahal of the University. You have to go to that building.

P: And what did you have to do with that building specifically after you left the

presidency and with the program, did you work with them specifically, once you left the presidency?

F: No, I took the position that you don't need two women in the kitchen. I purposely never had an office in the Horvitz building. I purposely tried to avoid being visible, to the extent that I can. Attend functions, I like when Ray introduces me, its fine and he's always given me credit. But I try not to do anything except when he wants me to answer to him.

P: In 1992, the business school is now on the East Campus and you also have the Rosenthal Building is expanded. It now has a dining hall, a bookstore, administrative offices, and so the core of the university is really getting to be developed, and the keystone is going to be the Horvitz building. Talk about the process you went through with Bill Horvitz to get the money for that building.

F: Bill didn't give us any money from 1964 to [19]88 or there about. And it was Bob Steele who really kind of kidded him a little bit. And then he decided he wanted something with his name on it, and he deserved it. He offered me \$1,000,000 to put his name on the building. I was going to try to raise five or six million dollars for the building. I said, no Bill. I said I'm not putting your name on a building for \$1,000,000. He said I won't give you the money. I said that is your decision. I had known that he had just gotten \$200,000,000 in a settlement of his father and mothers estate. And I wasn't going to take a million dollars.

And it went up to about \$2,000,000. This was about 1991. I said no Bill, I need \$4,000,000 from you because then I can get some threes, some twos, and ones. If I took one from you, I'll never get the building built because I got limited time.

So he said no and I said no. But, now we are at \$2,000,000 from him. Then, I announced that I was leaving the presidency, that was [19]90, [19]91. I was talking to my wife and she said the probability is that he's not going to give it to the next guy that comes in. I thought about it and I made a deal.

P: But the money was actually not given until Feldman became president.

F: Feldman took the money and instead of building a three story administration building, it's only two stories. So now, part of the administration is over on 9th Avenue.

P: But it is a nice capstone for the campus?

F: Too small.

P: But still a beautiful building.

F: Too small!

P: Okay.

F: [Laughter] I would have waited to raise another couple million dollars, but Feldman was an image man.

P: What did you have to do with specifically the moving of the Miami Dolphins training facility on campus? Again I know this was completed after you left. But did you have any negotiations early on?

F: Jack LaBonte was a Trustee. The Dolphins wanted to move from where they were.

P: They were at St. Thomas.

F: And Jack called and said how would you like to have the Dolphins? I said, I'd love it Jack, but I don't have the time. He said, oh, no, no, I'll take care of it, I'll

work with them, but would you like it? I said sure. I got land; this would be like an endowment for me. So, Jack LaBonte and Dan Marino deserve a lot of credit for that. They worked with the Robbie brothers and the sister. Of course, Joe Robbie had died and they were in deep trouble.

P: So Tim Robbie was the president?

F: He was the president. And Jack and Dan Marino wanted it. Finally, they came to me and said, were now ready to sit down because we think we have a deal. I said okay. I visited, I met them in their facilities and we talked about it. We made a deal that we would give them a loan on the land, that they would pay "X" amount of dollars every year for the use of the land, seventeen acres. But then I found out they didn't have money to build the building. So I said, okay we'll build the building, but now you can't move until that is paid off. So we set up a contract.

P: In other words, you had a bond issue, or borrowed the money to build it and then they paid it off?

F: They paid it off.

P: It was a lease.

F: It was a net, net, net lease. If that piece of land was going on the tax rolls, they were going to have to pay the taxes.

P: Well they paid all of the cost, in other words, the architect and all of that stuff.

F: Everything.

P: What's the benefit to Nova? What's the benefit to Nova of having the Dolphins' facility?

F: One, that's my claim to fame.

P: That didn't open 'till [19]93 after you left.

F: That's correct. But that's still my claim to fame, I'll still be known for that, twenty years from now, they will only know that.

Two things: one, I did have land way out there where they are now. Second of all, I looked at it as the beginning of an endowment. We didn't have to do anything and that money was coming in every year. And the lease enabled me to raise the fee every five years. Of course, it's got eight five years renewable. But for the first ten years, they couldn't move. So, we had a ten year issue; paid off in ten years and during that period, they couldn't move. But the building is ours. We own that building.

P: So if they leave, it's your building.

F: It's my building.

P: Have they continued to pay every year, still today?

F: They pay every year.

P: How much money would that be?

F: It's \$150,000 a year.

P: That's a nice little extra income isn't it?

F: But they gave them an extra—where that bubble is, the deal was made with George Hanbury and Ray Ferrero where we now have a box in the stadium. I wouldn't have made that deal the way it is.

P: Why not.

F: Because I would like to raise that \$150,000; far more, because that land is far

more valuable than it was then, more valuable to us.

P: You would have increased the lease fee, right?

F: I would have changed it.

P: Now, they did do when—I understand there were a couple of soccer fields that had to be eliminated, they've replaced those, right?

F: Yeah, they've done things. And since Wayne had owned that, and Wayne is on our board—

P: It's a good deal for both institutions.

F: Yeah, no, no, no, and from a PR point of view, it's very good for us, it doesn't hurt us one bit.

P: When I was talking to Dr. Feldman, one of the things he was saying, is that they wanted to make sure that whenever the Miami Dolphins' facility was mentioned, it would be 'Miami Dolphins at Nova University' and that was part of the connection. It gives more of a positive image, I guess, to Nova.

F: Yeah, but Dan Marino became a good friend of ours at the University. We took his kid in, who had a slight autism.

P: To the Oral School.

F: In the Oral School. He shows up at functions. From a PR point of view, we can always use two or three of the Dolphins in pictures and things. It works out.

P: It connects you to the larger South Florida area, does it not?

F: Correct.

P: Now, let me get to the determination you made that you would step down after twenty-two years as president. Why did you decide to resign at that juncture? I

think resignation would be effective July 31st 1992, although you had announced earlier that you wouldn't resign. What were your reasons for resigning?

F: I did what I came to do. I built a university that had stability, that I knew would make it. There was no question about that in my mind. I knew it needed new leadership; leadership that I wasn't enamored to provide. And I kind of did what I did. I built a university from an academic point of view, it programs, it had students—I forget how big the budget was, fifty million, sixty million, I'm not sure of that figure any long. And I was a little tired. So it was time to get fresh blood in here.

P: Well I have your letter to the trustees. In that you sort of spell out all of the contributions that you have made and balanced budget for six year now, so financially the school was stabilized; from 57 students to 10,600; nationally recognized university complex. Another element here we hadn't discussed. It's a pretty big boom to Broward County, and by now Nova is one of the largest employers in the County, in people who are working with and for the university.

F: There is a report that—if you want to know the economic impact—there is report that was written—I just got it—that you might want to look at.

P: Okay what was the figure, currently?

F: Currently, it's \$2,300,000,000.

P: Then it was about \$300,000,000 but that's still significant.

F: Absolutely.

P: And you had new dorms, the beginning of the Horvitz; you had the expansion of the Rosenthal Center; the Dolphins' facility; the law school was on campus; the

business school was on campus; so physically, I think you believed that you had created a standard for this campus that would serve it for at least the near future.

F: And also that I changed the way Ph.D.'s in this university were produced. And we did the distance education. We pioneered that through to where it was becoming much more acceptable to my colleagues externally. The fight became less as we stayed on and did what we did. So, even the concept of distance education became an acceptable thing. So, I felt good about what I did and I wasn't going to do what I felt had to be done and Ray—wasn't my pick with Feldman. Ovid wasn't my pick or I would have made him—I would have recommended that to the Trustees and I didn't do that.

P: I want to go back to your resignation letter. One of the things you dealt with, and you know how difficult it is dealing with SACS and ABA, so getting accreditation of the law school is a long term difficult project.

F: And all that was done.

P: Yeah, but that had been completed, so everything is accredited. And you stated, I left the presidency feeling very satisfied psychologically, emotionally, and intellectually that I left the world a little better than I found it. Did that sort of sum up?

F: Yeah. I did what my father asked me to do.

P: One of the issues for university presidents that the story is that the optimal time is seven to ten years, after that the strain is too great for many individuals. You not only sort of started the university; you stayed on twenty-two years. That's a long time to be president of an institution.

F: I told you, I was a little tired.

P: Yeah, do you feel you stayed too long, or was that the right amount of time?

F: No, I think I stayed the right amount of time to accomplish the stability that I felt would not be there if I left earlier. In my mind, having balanced budgets, having programs on the campus, little debt, and having the acceptable external accreditation process done; I did it.

P: Had you plan ahead that you were going to retire, or was this sort of a snap decision?

F: I started to think about it in about 1990. I spoke to my wife and she didn't say no to. So what I didn't do—I took a six month sabbatical, and I was debating what I was going to do with the rest of my life. But I took up golf, and I found out that golf was not for me. I play it, but it's not for me. Then, I thought about going into the Fischler Center and being professor again and teaching. But, the more I thought about that, the more I thought I would be an interfering object. So I decided I wouldn't do that. So, what I thought I would do, was continue to represent the university with the new president until the new president took over more of that. And then wherever the new president took it over, I would drop back.

P: But after you had resigned the president, you were still a member of the faculty.

F: I am. I'm still a university professor.

P: And what kind of package did they give you when you resigned the presidency, after all you'd been here twenty-two years?

F: I don't remember all the details. I remember one item that was important to me

was that my children and my children's children could go to the University tuition free; that I remember writing in. They cut my salary—when Ray came in, the thing he did was to change what I had been working under. I could get \$75,000 and be a consultant or I could be an employee and get \$50,000 and the other \$25,000 would be used for my fringe benefits; and that's the one I took. So, I still get the \$50,000 salary and the \$25,000 goes to pay my insurance and stuff. So, I have my benefits here.

P: At the end of your presidency—I know today that presidents of the University have a car and lots of extra perks, I guess a seat at the Dolphins' stadium, that sort of thing.

F: I don't have that.

P: But did you have that at the end of your presidency? You didn't have that. And the university has never had a presidential residence.

F: Residence?

P: An official residence of the president. So you got an allowance to stay at your home.

F: A small allowance, yeah. I finally got to \$150,000 the last couple of years that I was president. I think Ray came to \$75,000 because that was half. I did have a car, but that was a car that was donated.

P: But that's true almost always, right?

F: So it was donated, but not a 'caddy.' I never wanted a caddy.

P: It wasn't red was it?

F: It was a Pontiac when Moody owned the Pontiac dealers, and I had a Chrysler

when the Massey owned the Chrysler dealership. These people are friends I made when going into association. But, the important thing for me was that I would have control of my pension. Because I never had a big pension and I was always concerned about that.

P: I'll read you what Jim Farquhar said, he said, "One of the greatest things I did was to ask Abe to serve as chief executive officer. It's not always possible for academicians to cross the lines into administration. Abe has done this magnificently. I don't think Nova would have developed as it did without his leadership." And I'm sure that was an important statement for you because of your relationship with him.

F: I didn't know about that statement. So, you know more than I know.

P: What happened in terms of your activities after 1992? Can you bring me up to date on what you've been doing other than trying to conquer golf?

F: Well what I have done is I did what I said I was doing. I continued to serve, even now. Right now, I serve on the South Florida Community Blood Center. I still represent the University in the Hollywood chamber. I helped start the Holocaust Research and Documentation Center and I still participate in that. I chaired for a good number of years the Broward Education Foundation, which is a K-12 foundation for the school system, so I still do that. I've been on Workforce One, so I started with Cedar and then Beta, and then Workforce One. So those things I do. I go to Temple Beth El once a year. So I still do that. [Laughter] I pay my contributions when I go there. And that's what I do. And occasionally I'll guest lecture on some things. I sit on two for-profit boards. I get a dinner. Alan Levin

just asked me to sit on an advisory board at a bank, so I'll do that. I fill in my time, but I have an office and that's the most important thing, and that the University provides for me. I have an office and I have that little small conference room, so I sit around with six or eight people. And it gives me a place to go every day and I come every day. Actually, unless I'm away, I do that. And I have a half-time secretary who is normally a student, a financial aid student, which provides for that student about \$10 an hour and a voucher for tuition.

P: That's a good deal for them.

F: I try to look for a junior coming in from the community college who has some computer skills and some other skills. This one I got now is leaving in June. She has finished her master's in business administration and I'll be looking to replace her.

P: One other issue we haven't talked about, and I'm not sure how much you were involved in the beginning of this, the merger with Southeastern. Can you talk a little bit about what—?

F: That was inevitable. I knew Mort Terry. I wanted to do it before they opened up where they are. They had opened but they weren't sure.

P: 1981 they started.

F: Right. What happened was they brought in a team from Rutgers University and they said that they shouldn't merge with Nova because Nova didn't have the resources, and they were right. But it was inevitable. That was going to be a stand-alone medical school. That wasn't the dream Mort Terry had.

When I put in Ovid as a provost, I gave him an assignment to work out a

three/four program with the medical school. I wanted to get better quality students coming into the college. So whenever that year was, I worked with Mort Terry and I sent Ovid to work with Melnick at the medical school and we had a three/four program. Three years with us and if the person got a B or better average and something on the MCATs, I forget all the details, they would be admitted as a freshmen here, and if they did what they had to do—so we already had an academic relationship long before that.

P: The articulation agreement was 1990.

F: Okay, that's when that took place. But Ovid was the person who worked with that one. And then, Terry called me. He said, I'd like to move to the campus, would you sell me some land? I said I'm not in the land business. Then he called me again a little while back—

P: Are we talking 1991, 1992 now?

F: I'm talking about around that period of time.

P: And then he called a second time—I was still president when these calls were coming in—and he called he said, would you rent me some land? I said I'm not in the rental business, and then I told him everything that is on this campus has to report to the Trustees of Nova University, everything. So if you want to come to Nova, you got to become part of Nova. And that's where I left it, just like that.

P: And then from what I understand, both Ovid Lewis and Dr. Feldman carried very extensive meetings with Southeastern and clearly this was a very complicated process because Southeastern, they didn't have pensions for their people. They were different accounting by-laws. You know, a lot of things that had to be

worked out.

F: Joel Berman is the guy who has all that information.

P: And what was his position?

F: He was the attorney. He is our corporate attorney now.

P: For Nova during that time. So he helped work out all this legal agreement. What impact did that merger have on Nova?

F: It's fabulous. It's a win-win game. We had to purchase back the land, paid \$200,000 an acre, for which we only got \$175,000 back when I needed it. So we had to buy the land. They had to build their own building with their endowment money, which they did.

P: They had \$35,000,000 in endowment and profits of \$3,000,000 a year. So this is a nice financial impact on the university.

F: From a financial point of view and from an academic point of view it gave us prestige in a field that we didn't have. It opened up a way of us developing even further.

P: And this is another example of this entrepreneurial spirit.

F: Oh yes.

P: Because this was an option that no one in the beginning would ever have imagined. Even when you were president, you, except for some limited public health issues, you had no idea of getting into the health business.

F: I didn't have the resources to open up a medical school. The only school I would open up is a DO because it's less demanding. But here I had a DO school. I did that with the School of Psychology of Miami. They offered the PsyD degree. We

were only offering the Ph.D. degree. It was a PsyD degree that gave that center economic viability.

P: Explain what the PsyD degree is.

F: The PsyD is a doctorate in psychology, but for practitioners. The PhD is for Academicians.

P: Was there a problem, do you remember, because this was a medical school of Osteopathy?

F: Not for me. In fact, for me it was more desirable because in the medical education, it's the milluer that you have to do research and do this and this and this. In fact, this school was moving in that direction. This school now was moving in that direction, the health sciences, that's what they're doing. And I'm saying, don't let that happen too strongly because the DO will go by the board because there is still more prestige in the MD than the DO.

P: Let's talk about the hiring of Steven Feldman. As I understand it, there was a national search and they had narrowed it to five candidates. I have found out some information that you favored a candidate from Empire State University from New York State.

F: I had nothing to do though with the picking.

P: You were not on the search committee?

F: I was not on the search committee.

P: But, you as past president, clearly you have some influence here.

F: I wasn't asked. And when they asked, I said I'm not going to make that decision.

P: Well, here is the notes of the Board of Trustees, February 21st 1992, Mr. Ferrero

called on President Fischler for his comments. Fischler noted by choice he had not become involved in the process until the five finalists were chosen, he had the opportunity to meet each of them and had been particularly impressed with Dr. Feldman's interest in Nova, the way he had researched and learned about the institution. Fischler stated that he believed Dr. Feldman would be an excellent choice and he supported the recommendation.

F: That not true.

P: Not true? This is from the minutes of the Board of Trustees.

F: Not true.

P: I wonder what happened between your attitude, which is clearly not for Feldman, right?

F: The person I wanted was someone who had come out of an environment which showed some movement out of the traditional box.

P: And he had come from Western State—

F: Connecticut.

P: Western Connecticut State University.

F: Right, there was nothing going on there that wasn't going on at any other college anywhere. I wanted someone that would take the opportunity of continuing to do some of the things that I was interested in doing, which was to make this university international in its orientation because had already been to Panama during my stay and in South America, and all those _____ going in Taiwan. I wanted someone that had somewhere in his background had demonstrated an understanding of what's going on in the world. Feldman didn't have that. The

other thing Feldman asked me when he came into my office was how do you run this university? I said what do you mean, how do I run the university? He says, if I say it's green, even if its yellow, I expect them to say its green. I said to Feldman, this is not a university for you. That's what I told him in my office. Ray and you can check with Ray, Ray asked me to stay on an extra year because he wasn't happy with Feldman. I said no, I was not going to stay on an extra year.

P: Was it awkward that you were still around when Feldman took the presidency. Do you spend a lot of time with him, advising him?

F: No.

P: Did he not call on you for advice?

F: He called on me. I moved my office before he came off campus on Davie Road, we had a building that we were renting. I made my office there. So by the time he came to campus, my office was down there. He wanted me to come back onto the campus. I suggested that it is best that I not be on campus. He would call me once every month or once every two months, but the questions he would ask me I wouldn't answer for him because I kept saying to him, the relationship with people is something that you're going to have to decide for yourself, I'm not going to talk about individuals. And I didn't. What he was using me for was primarily to tell him about John Doe and Marys, because I knew that my relationship with these people was entirely different than the relationship he's going to have with people. I wasn't going to influence him.

P: While he was on campus he was able to do a couple of things that had not been

possible previously because of a lack of money. One of the things he thought was very important was landscaping. He went around and developed a more attractive campus, which he thought not only gave the people at this university some sense of pride, but made it more attractive to students who were thinking about coming to this university.

F: I told you image was important to him. He ended up our money to buy dishes, television sets, so when he left, we had to send trucks back to take all that stuff. Image was important to him.

P: But isn't it important to the university as well.

F: It depends on where your resources come from and what your priorities are. He took \$750,000 I had raised for an antenna and that is what he used to beautify the campus.

P: He said that some of the other cost of it had come from private sources.

F: I'm sure he raised some money. He was not the president for this university.

P: To try to give him some credit, he did close this deal with Southeastern.

F: I'm not saying that he didn't do that.

P: Well, wasn't that a major contribution during his presidency?

F: Absolutely, he closed the deal with the Dolphins, he signed the paper. I didn't sign the last paper.

P: What were his strengths, what were his weaknesses?

F: His biggest weakness was his wife. If you want to know the truth, that was his biggest weakness. She wouldn't think of anything. She would pick up the phone and call John Somebody and say I want you here in fifteen minutes. So, all of a

sudden everyone here was working for her and then nothing was good enough for her. So, she ended up doing what I told you. They were enamored with the position of being president and they were enamored with the fringes and perks that came with it. But he lasted two years. I didn't fire him.

P: He had a four year contract. Now, I'm not sure if you're familiar with all the details.

F: No I'm not.

P: But anyway, the way I understand it, he wanted to get an evaluation, this is what is in the Board of Trustees meeting minutes, and he wanted to get an evaluation and his view was he thought he might get a pay raise, when he went through the process, the Board gave him a vote of no confidence and ultimately they are going to write him a letter and fire him. Do you know the details about that?

F: I know it. Ray ought to give you that.

P: Because he was the chairman of the Board of Trustees at that time.

F: Yeah, I think he had just taken it over.

P: At this point, there is not going to be a national search, they are a going to turn to Ovid Lewis.

F: Ovid didn't want. He didn't want it when I was President.

P: He had actually resigned as Associate Vice President when Feldman was President. Feldman says that he had resigned because he wanted to retire, but within a space of about six months he becomes President. Did the Board see him as the logical choice; they didn't want to do a national search?

F: I can't answer that, I can't speak for the Board. I'm not trying to be coy. I don't

know the dynamics of the Trustees. When I met with Ovid, he started to count the number of days he had left. And one day I said to Ovid, "Ovid don't say that to anybody else. I've heard it already half a dozen times. It's not doing you any good. Stop counting the days." I said, "We all knew you didn't want it. I knew you didn't want it."

P: Now you're talking about the presidency, right?

F: Yeah. So after he got the presidency, from the day he got in, he kept saying well I don't want it, I didn't want it, I'm only going to serve 'X' number of days. You don't do that. What you really say is I don't want the presidency or you take the presidency and you build on it.

P: You do your best. Well, I noticed for quite a period of time he was interim President and did not make him officially president for a certain period of time, and it may have been that attitude.

F: Well you can see what happened with Ray. Ray took it over in the middle of the year.

P: So in essence, literally a year after Ovid Lewis becomes president, Ray Ferrero who is Chairman of the Board of Trustees is in essence running the University.

F: I don't know how soon that occurred because again, I'm not privy to all this stuff. So I'd rather not say. But I do know that Ray was not happy. I do not know the dynamics that really led to Ray taking over the Presidency. But in January he took over the Presidency and Ovid was finished.

P: At one point I noticed that they both had offices sort of side by side. That would have been a little bit awkward for both men, would it not?

F: Absolutely.

P: Technically, Ray Ferrero was his boss.

F: That's correct.

P: So it's a little difficult to operate independently if your boss is right next door. Was that a down period for the school? I mean, we have a situation where you've done twenty-two good years, then you have a president who was only there for two years, then the next president really is there for one or two years. So it's sort of an unstable period for the University.

F: I saw the University going downhill during that period. When I heard that Ray was considering doing that; I could have applauded. Knowing Ray, I knew that Ray, having been here in this community and well known in this community and well respected in this community, if he decided to give up his law practice and take it over, then he would do the things that had to be done at this university. In my mind, what Hanbury and Ray have done, is what had to be done at this University and they deserve tremendous credit. Ray has done things that I would have never been able to do even if I wanted to do it. And George Hanbury, hiring George Hanbury from a city manager, who was here ten years in Fort Lauderdale, to come here be the finance administrator of this center, this is like a small city. And he brought those skills in and he has modernized the whole infrastructure and things are moving. And they are doing a couple things that even now I think are somewhat crazy, but may not be in the long run. Like buy Grand Oaks.

P: The golf course. Well its good land.

F: Its good land, but you may never be able to get that damn thing changed.

P: That's right. But they have, and it really started under Ovid Lewis, but it seems to me, one of the really important developments on this campus is the library facility. I mean that is now the largest library in the State of Florida; its high tech, its state of the art.

F: Everything that have done is throughout, not just the library, but that University Center, I never dreamed I would be alive to see a center like that on this campus.

P: They have a rec-center; they have now the dorms, the commons; Rolling Hills which was the golf club is now a dorm for graduate students.

F: Graduate students.

P: They are getting ready to expand this little section on University, this shopping center.

F: They will do that later.

P: It's a very aggressive planning program, is it not?

F: It still comes out of the strategy that was set up by Stone in 1966. So the campus is still primarily a walking campus; preferable parking. It's divided into where the students are living to the University Center and the academic piece is over there.

P: You have bus service.

F: Yeah.

P: It makes it a little more convenient to get around.

F: Yeah.

P: More buildings. One issue that seems to me still problematical, and I think President Ferrero is interested in this, is still growing the undergraduate

population.

F: Yes, he wants that to be a larger base. Up to about 5,000 students, I'm talking about the 18-22 year olds.

P: Yeah, and that has been part of the issue here because for a long time, it really didn't seem quite like a campus because there weren't many students initially, initially they were graduate students, there weren't a lot of dorms, and it looks like to me that he's now with the athletic teams; that you're really building the relationship that students have to other universities. That there are sports teams, there rec-centers, the dorms are on campus. More and more people are taking classes during the day on campus. So that was something that you had in the back of your mind as well, right?

F: Yeah, only I'm now looking twenty-five, fifty years from now, when I read that MIT was putting all there courses on it, making them available to the public, if you don't want credit you can just read the books and teach yourself. That's MIT doing that, in ten years their going to do that, that's all done. Library of Congress is now in that kind of format. You got to ask the question, what will education look like in thirty, forty, fifty years from now? I believe that you're going to need a home base, but when I look at Kaplan University and I look at the University without walls and I look at Phoenix University, I think that's the direction that independent education is going to have to go. Unless you're Harvard, and you got a tremendous endowment because what you're going to need to operate these private institutions and your buildings, and all of this stuff, forces you to be so much higher [in cost] than what people will [afford] to get an education.

There are now 350,000 students taking high school classes in a virtual format.

And the more I read that publication called, “E-School News” the more I see that even for the secondary schools more and more students are taking courses while they are in secondary school in the virtual format.

P: One of the issues that we talked a little bit about before is tuition. Clearly for a school like a Nova your primary competition would be a school like Miami, but you also have competition from Florida Atlantic. You’re sort of in the middle. From what I can tell, I looked up the current undergraduate tuition, and I understand that at the various schools it differs, it’s about \$19,000. So, that is more than FAU but quite a bit cheaper than Miami.

F: Yeah, the goal was to try to stay in the middle between those two. To try to do that if you could. That’s the goal, so that it wouldn’t be too big a jump for students to come here.

P: Because you really—

F: In the law school, by the way, it’s four times [the cost to come here].

P: Yeah, that’s no problem. The advanced schools are fine. But to build the undergraduate—

F: It’s tough, it takes time.

P: I want to ask you some overall general questions. But do you have any issues that we have not discussed or have not talked about that you would like talk about.

F: No, not really. I don’t really have any issues that I want to talk about. I think I did bring up the two examples that I wanted to get into this thing.

I see the institution becoming much more of a blend of the traditional and non-traditional. I call distance education a kind of non-traditional. We have to be some careful. I also am a little concerned to the degree to which we are looking for monies from governments. That's a concern. I always said that I was not going to end up with the University of Miami's position. If they take away the capitation from the University of Miami, if Tallahassee decides they are not going to fund these things, the University of Miami will not be able to function. If you look at the degree of their budget in relation to monies coming in from tax environments—I always think that if you want to stay independent, you have to be able to shut the doors of external monies like that and keep your doors open. So somewhere between ten and twenty percent is max from that [government funds].

P: It's helpful, but you don't want to be dependent on it.

F: That's correct. Because you never know what Tallahassee is going to do.

P: Primarily, because they don't know what they are going to do.

F: Well, it's true in any political environment. You don't have 'X' amount of _____, then everybody is cutting now. So to me that is a problem.

P: What it seems to me you have now is what they term a multiversity. This has all different levels. You have again, the concept that originally started from the cradle to the grave [education]. You have the idea of the University School, you have the community college, you have undergraduate, you have graduates, and now—

F: The institute for Retired People.

P: Yeah, for the retired.

F: So, we have it all.

P: Then, another one of these calculated risks, measured risks was the dental school. When they decided to build the dental school, there hadn't been many built. It was costly, but it turned out to be a good decision. I think.

F: That decision, again, Mort Terry deserves all the credit for that. Northwestern decided to close their dental school, we opened our dental school. We took in our first year students, but Northwestern students came to us for their second and third year. So we started with three years, instead of one year because we had students coming in. So, all of a sudden we had a tuition coming in that we didn't even plan for, so the guy was good.

P: As you look back on your twenty-two years as president, what would you say would be your most important achievements? You're most lasting achievements?

F: Well, I think the development of the concept that education can be brought to students, quality education can be brought to students where they are located and provide an opportunity for them to receive a quality education through a distance modality; the introduction of technology into the delivery system. That was a big movement that had a lasting influence on where American education is going now, especially, in higher education, more slowly in K-12. That I think was a significant breakthrough in higher education.

Also I think the notion that we could build an institution of higher learning where the expertise that the person brings to the institution is well recognized, but we also don't give away the decision making to people who are not sitting in the shoes of the individual that's responsible for making the decision. I think the

notion that you have to operate a university where the faculty is responsible for all this stuff and telling you what to do and sharing a level of relative ignorance in relation to their expertise is just wrong. And the notion that you need an academic senate where they balance one another and they have these exchanges, when a physicist is speaking one language and the anthropologist is speaking another language and the English professor is speaking a third language and the only thing they have in common is what's wrong with the administration or parking or food service or stuff like that. And I think that held us back in many ways, it hasn't improved us; it just held us back in many ways.

P: Are you speaking specifically about Nova or higher education.

F: Higher education in general. I don't think the public is getting what it really deserves for the dollars it's spending in many institutions. That's why I think it's very important for this history to be written because very subtly there are things that have happened here or that based on the way it's organized that I think has enabled Nova to be successful. I'm hoping that what written is going to contain some of that so that we don't end up more in the boxes that we built for ourselves and making it almost impossible to get out.

P: Did you have a lot of conflict with faculty members over issues like pay and tenure? Was there a movement to form a faculty union?

F: I've never had that trouble. The only reason I never had the trouble is because everybody got copies of all of the resources of the university on a monthly basis. When I say everybody, every dean knew exactly what that President's office cost. When the budget was built, I had a figure in here and here and I had to

justify the whole service end of this university. Everyone knew that I was keeping it as lean as possible because the money was coming from them. This was their university and the money was coming from them; they were the people who were earning the money.

P: But sometimes there are issues within those various semiautonomous units. That a director would not give pay raises to member of the faculty. So, when they had a problem they dealt with the director, not with you.

F: Correct, because the director was the one who helped put together the raise pool when we built the budget. Once I got a balanced budget, we would say, how much more could you give; what percentage could you give further that we could put into the raise pool. I didn't ask the Trustees what kind of raise we could give, I spoke to my colleagues, and they knew that I wouldn't take a raise every year, but I took a raise every other year, so I could add my piece, so that if you went from an assistant to an associate, you had a little extra money to give. So I would give you that money from my raise every other year. So I only took a raise every other year in the university. That raise came from the Trustees.

P: For the most part, the various divisions, the law school could offer salaries that commensurate with salaries elsewhere.

F: The law school salaries, when they came in, yeah. But, when it came to raises, they got the same percentage raise as everybody in the university. And the one year when Roger Abrams, who was the dean, wanted me to give more, I said, I'll only do it if you give it on merit. So, if you rank your professors, the bottom group doesn't get a raise because what you're really telling them is that they ought to

look for a job. He wouldn't do it. I said, therefore, you're no different than any other center. Whatever the raise pool is, that is what I have.

P: Of course, that has always been a difficult issue. Whether to give merit or across the board [raises]. Usually, people who are less productive prefer across the board.

F: You know you can't have it both ways because remember the money is coming from you. It's not coming from me. If you go back to looking at the budgets, there was never an income next to that President's office.

P: Going back to lasting contributions. Clearly, the University itself would be a lasting contribution.

F: Say that again.

P: The University itself, I was talking what you thought were most significant contributions you made. Well clearly, the fact that the university exists and has thrived over the years—

F: I feel good about that, I honestly do, but I also know people give me credit for more, they don't realize that there a lot of people involved in a university that are contributing. In the early years, everyone wore two and three hats. If you don't believe me, talk to Ed Simco. When he came here he was 6'5" he is now 5'4".

P: Another thing that has both impressed and intrigued me is the commitment of certain individuals in the community to this institution at a time when it looked like the institution was not going to survive, they stayed with it, they continued to make contributions of both time and money. We talked about earlier, that you got bailed out periodically from generous contributors in the community. That seems

to me to be a significant part of the development of this university.

F: Well, go back in its history; remember it grew from this community. It didn't grow because Stanford came and gave me money. So, the concept of the university grew out of blending available. The notion that we would have a womb to tomb educational system, that grew out of five citizens, who were the oatmeal club. So, if you look at the impudence for the university, it really came out of the community. There wasn't philanthropist that came in and said I'll give you \$5,000,000 or \$10,000,000. We didn't have that. We have it now. Wayne Huizenga came in and gave us \$3,000,000 and Broad gave us \$3,000,000. But, when you're talking about the conception of the university it grew out of the Forman brothers and Farquhar and Wright Redding and Paul Rogers. Paul Rogers wasn't a member but Dwight Rogers was here, his brother. Paul Rogers was in Washington.

P: He was a congressman.

F: Yeah. If you look at it, it grew that way.

P: You mentioned separately, that occasionally that you would have to go get help to meet the budget. I think you told me one story about going to see Mr. Mailman.

F: Well Mailman was very good to us, George English was very good to us, Dave Aucamp was very good to us. The banking community in general was very good to us. It was a community effort to help support the institution. Some dropped off because they felt we weren't going to make it and in a way sometimes I don't blame them. I was somewhat insecure myself. But the community did what it could do given the change in orientation and the notion of whether your kid could

come here or not. In the beginning I would say no, because if we were going to be the MIT of the South and just have PhD students, how many do you think we could support?

P: You mentioned that on one occasion, the 29th of the month, you would go to see somebody like Mr. Mailman—

F: Absolutely.

P: And he would write you a check for \$150,000.

F: Yes. When I say he, [I mean] the bank would write me a check.

P: Looking back on your twenty-two years, what were your biggest regrets?

F: I really don't have regrets. I'm sorry that it took so long to get to where we have a university that people recognize and has been accepted into the academic community, even though it was atypical. But, I don't think I have any regrets. It gave me an opportunity to do a thing I never dreamed I'd have. It's bigger than I ever thought it would be. It's sturdier than I even thought it would be. Am I concerned about? Yes. It has a bigger debt than I thought it would have. But I feel good about what I did with my life and I fulfilled what my father asked me to do.

P: Are there things that you wanted to accomplish that you were unable to accomplish during your years as president?

F: No, I don't think so. I stayed long enough to get to the point where I fulfilled what I promised Jim Farquhar, I fulfilled what my father asked me to do with my life. I really don't have any regrets as far as that is concerned.

P: One area that might be expanded, I'm not sure what the circumstances are

today, is international programs. Do you think there should be more of a movement in that direction? Most universities are in fact moving in that direction and have campuses in China and on and on.

F: I think we have the infrastructure to do more. But you have to have someone who is interested in the concept of a 'world university.' That person has to put in time and energy. I think Ray is doing some of it. He went to Malaysia. We now have a cluster operating in Malaysia.

You also need—I leaned something that I'll share with you. I did make one big mistake. What happened, when the people who came to the university in it's very beginning, they were good academics, but weren't happy in the environment in which they operated. If I felt that Berkley was the greatest place for me, I probably wouldn't have taken the job. But I was a little unhappy, even though I made full professor, et cetera, that their orientation and my orientation wasn't quite the same.

What I did was, when the person left who helped create the program, Dawn Mitchell left, what I did was promote the number two person, Jerry Sroufe. Bright University of Chicago graduate, et cetera. When John Scigliano left, I promoted the number two person to the number one slot. These people became the people sitting around my cabinet because they were now the rectors of these programs. These programs all reported, quote, to me. What that did was make that group much more protective of their own unit and not the entrepreneurial spirit which brought the person to the university. So all of a sudden it became more difficult for me to continue to do the exciting things that I thought the university might do.

That would be important to both the society and those who needed it. For example, John Scigliano left as he I told you, he went to Kent State. And after he was there for two years, he called me. And he said, Abe, I got to come back. I said, you left because you wanted to go to a traditional environment. [Scigliano said] I made a mistake, I want to come back. I thought I could bring him back into the center because now, we are now fusing the centers, the programs into centers. And I thought, come back as long as you are coming back to do what I want done, which is introduce technology as a vehicle now, so we can have meetings without having to travel so far. And things that we could use the technology for—for graduate students so they wouldn't have to run around and get papers given out. They'd all have it and you'd be online. I mean you can do a great many things if you're using that. So, I needed a place to put him and all of a sudden around my table they said no, here you're not going to spend some more money developing a new program. And I began to realize what I did. I wouldn't do that today, again.

P: So you should have brought in new talent, new ideas.

F: Yes. So when I started to do that it created some noise in each of the programs in which I did it. But it turned out that that was a wise thing and I looked also at my service area and all I had were people who grew up with us. And I finally said, no more. So I said to the director of human resources, I want a national search and if there is someone here, if they become part of the group that we look at, but not automatically do they move up. And some people got hurt in that process. But at least we gained something from the outside, coming in adding a fresh

look.

P: Why isn't Nova better known nationally and even in the State of Florida? A lot of people in the State of Florida don't know anything about Nova, some people have never heard of it.

F: That was true starting with the Nova High School. We had much more influence external to Broward County than we had in Broward County. We took the name Nova because the high school was so successful in my eyes. It was part of this whole concept developing new methodologies, implementing them, evaluating them, and disseminating them. But the dissemination took place external to our immediate environment. Initially, Nova was this MIT of the South, and it didn't have very much at all except some PR. But, when we created the distance learning, the first clusters, one was in California, one was in Jacksonville, one was in Palm Beach, one was in Miami. We didn't even open one here.

P: But even today, my experience at the University of Florida, most of the faculty have not heard of Nova Southeastern.

F: Probably because most of our faculty is not publishing in the literature.

P: What can you do to get out to the public because this is really a unique institution? It has an extremely interesting history. What can you do to get this message out to the people of the State of Florida? I noticed that locally lots of articles, I noticed a billboard coming in—that locally you get the people of this community involved with the university, but what about Gainesville and Tallahassee and other parts of the state, other parts of the country?

F: Ray is Chairman of the big associations in Florida. One is the Independent

Colleges and Universities and the other is other big one. Ray is President of both of those. He served as President of both of those. I was the one on the side of ICUF [Independent Colleges and Universities of Florida]. But, I finally got recognized because they gave me a plaque and I got another plaque from the other organization. But you got to have resources to do that. You really need a resource staff. We are tooling up now for a campaign, all of a sudden that development staff is not two or three, it's eight or ten, I don't know. I just met with three of them the other day. You need the resources to do that. During my Presidency, I didn't have the resources to do that and my orientation was to build programs.

P: Is it important now to do that.

F: I think Ray is doing that. I think Ray is in the process of beginning to do that. Ray is in the process of also bringing the university together so that we don't have separate smoke stacks He is working hard to do that in a variety of ways. So I think is one, people are walking around with pins. I think we are aware of that now; that we have to do some things internally to bring the institution together.

P: So you have some pride. Think of Florida, you know, I'm a gator. I don't like the concept, but the idea is they are emotionally connected to the university.

F: That's because those people have spent four years, in our field based programs, some of them haven't even seen the campus.

P: Right.

F: The law school has some commitment and the medical school will have some commitment, but the undergraduates—it's going to take us time. We're just at

NCAA II. When I was president, we were a NRI, and leaving the one below that one. So, we don't have a football team. The University School, by the way, has a football team, we talked about that. They now have a football team and the reason they have a football team is the parents kind of demanded it. No sport brings more of that rah-rah stuff than football and you got to have it. If I were President, they probably still wouldn't have it, because I don't think you want your knees banged up when you fifteen and sixteen and seventeen years old. Because that is a life you're going to have to live with. So, I don't know if it's right or wrong, it's just different priorities. For me the priority was to get another center built.

P: What do you see in the future of Nova? What will Nova be like in twenty-five years?

F: Depends who is leading it.

P: Well, with the current leadership?

F: The current leadership? I think the blend will remain. I think you'll have research oriented faculty coming in. It will move towards a traditional. I'm not sure how it's going to survive in that conflict. What hurt us a little bit was the negative publicity in the early [19]70s and the negative articles that reinforced the notion that original faculty came to build a traditional Ph.D. and university. And here I was, Richardson called it the 'monkey-farm.' You'll see that quote in one of the articles in the newspaper. So the main campus became the monkey-farm because other one was down by the port. So, I think fades. Miami still suffers from Sunshine U. It's no longer Sunshine U, its good university with good academic standards and

the one who replaced Henry King-Stanford even made it smaller and even more intellectual and more accountable. So I think we just have to live with it.

P: Do you think that in the future, it will be less innovative?

F: I think it will be less innovative because it will be more difficult to get through the machinery. There is machinery now here.

P: Bigger institution, more people to deal with, more institutional red tape, I guess?

F: And if you take the people who come from traditional institutions—that's what they know. That's their frame of reference. I learned that through Feldman's appointment. He was used to the resources coming to the President. I knew he wouldn't survive here. Believe it. I knew it. I knew it in one little interview. Not six hours, thirty minutes. You can't change the culture of a university if the money is coming to you because if the money is coming to you, it's not coming to you. It's their money.

P: Is there anything that we have not covered that you would like to discuss? Any final comments you would like to make?

F: No, except that I'm delighted with what's happening under the rubric of Ray Ferrero and George Hanbury. I give them great credit. The institution is far further along than I thought it would be in the timeframe of my lifetime. And I'm happy I had the opportunity to do this. Not everyone has a chance to do that.

P: On that note, we'll end the interview. Thank you very much.

F: You're welcome. [End of interview]