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Abstract

Japan's commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest contribution the country has made in the history of its international peace operations. Notably, Japan's participation in the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on "human security" as one of the pillars of its diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan's participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone issue for its human security policy. Yet, one simple but important question arises. How consistent were Japan's commitments to the peace operations? In an attempt to answer to this question, this paper systematically examines Japan's contributions to the international peace operations for East Timor. In order to investigate long-term and complicated activities in the peace operations, this paper employs timeline "sequence analysis" as a research method which combines and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan's contributions to the peace operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement (INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISSET). The findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan's commitments to the peace operations were consistent and for human security of East Timor.

Keywords: *East Timor, International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law), international peace operations, Japan, post-Cold War period, United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)*

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**A Sequence Analysis of International Peace Operations:
Japan's Contributions to Human Security of East Timor**

Daisuke Akimoto

Abstract

Japan's commitments to the UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were the largest contribution the country has made in the history of its international peace operations. Notably, Japan's participation in the peacebuilding operations in East Timor was based on "human security" as one of the pillars of its diplomatic policy. Moreover, Japan's participation in the peace operations in East Timor was a touchstone issue for its human security policy. Yet, one simple but important question arises. How consistent were Japan's commitments to the peace operations? In an attempt to answer to this question, this paper systematically examines Japan's contributions to the international peace operations for East Timor. In order to investigate long-term and complicated activities in the peace operations, this paper employs timeline "sequence analysis" as a research method which combines and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan's contributions to the peace operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement (INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISSET). The findings of this research reveal to what extent Japan's commitments to the peace operations were consistent and for human security of East Timor.

Introduction

During the Cold War period, Japan was unable to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) because of its post-war anti-militarist pacifism, based on its Peace Constitution. However, the Japanese government enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in order to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. Japan's participation in UNTAC was a turning-point for Japan's peacekeeping operations (PKO) policy. In order to participate in UNPKOs, Japan's pacifism shifted from one-nation pacifism constrained by Article 9 of its Constitution to international pacifism based on the Preamble of the Constitution (Akimoto, 2012; Ishizuka, 2005). During the 1990s, Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to the following UN peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian operations:

Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), the Congo (1994), the Golan Heights (1995, 1996), Bosnia (1998), and Kosovo (1999) (Cabinet Office Japan, 2012).

In this context, the Japanese government attempted to make a greater contribution to UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor based on the concept of “human security” as one of the pillars of its foreign policy (Nasukawa, 2010), which “emerged as a tool for coordinating various activities of international aid and peace operations” (Shinoda, 2004, p. 1). Notably, as Gen Kikkawa (2007, p. 248) observed, Japan’s participation in the peace operations in East Timor was “the first test case of Japan’s human security policy”. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that military and constitutional limitations of Japan’s peace operations are obvious because “Japan avoids genuine risks for peace by not dispatching adequate manpower” (Lam, 2012, p. 193). Here, one simple but significant research question immediately arises. To what extent were Japan’s peace operations in East Timor consistent despite its military and constitutional constraints?

The purpose of this paper is to answer to this research question by systematically examining Japan’s contributions to the international peace operations in East Timor. To this end, this study employs timeline “sequence analysis” as a research method, which combines and simplifies analytical models suggested in earlier scholarship. Through the application of sequence analysis, this paper investigates four stages of Japan’s commitments to the peace operations in East Timor: 1) preventive deployment (UNAMET), 2) peace-enforcement (INTERFET), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) peacebuilding (e.g. UNMISSET). Finally, examined research data will be provided after the analysis of the four periods in order to visualise and evaluate the sequence of Japan’s peace operations for human security of East Timor.

Methodology

UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor were comprehensive, and can be divided into four major stages, as observed by Juichi Inada (2004, p. 229). This research utilizes this classification to conduct “sequence analysis” of the four periods. First, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), led-by Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ian Martin, was established on 11 June 1999 in order to observe the national referendum. Second, the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove, was initiated on 15 September 1999 as a peace-enforcement operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Third, as a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East

Timor (UNTAET) led by SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello was set up on 25 October 1999. Fourth, as a post-independence peacebuilding operation, the United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISSET), under the leadership of Japanese SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa, was organized on 20 May 2002.

Simply put, the peace operations in East Timor consists of four phases as follows: 1) preventive diplomacy (UNAMET as a preventive deployment), 2) peacemaking (INTERFET as peace-enforcement), 3) peacekeeping (UNTAET), and 4) post-conflict peacebuilding (UNMISSET), as advocated by former United Nations Secretary General Boutros B. Ghali (1992) in his essay, *An Agenda For Peace*.

Strictly speaking, however, Ghali (1992) proposed “preventive diplomacy” as a peaceful action before conflict arises. Still, UNAMET can be categorized as preventive diplomacy in that it was a “preventive deployment”, aiming to prevent conflict from spreading during the ballot. INTERFET was not a UN force or UN-led peace enforcement unit, but rather a multinational force authorized by a UN resolution. Nonetheless, it can be categorized as UN-authorized “peace-enforcement” part of the “peacemaking” process. UNTAET was established based on Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, but in reality, this peace operation was a UNTAC-type “peacekeeping” operation. UNMISSET and the peace operations which followed can be categorized as post-conflict “peacebuilding”. During the four periods, Japan made substantial contributions to the peace operations in East Timor by dispatching civilian police to UNAMET in 1999, donating US\$100 million to INTERFET, sending civilian electoral monitors to UNTAET in 2001, and deploying peacekeepers to UNTAET and UNMISSET in 2002 (Cabinet Office Japan 2002-2004).

Needless to say, previous research has developed and employed sophisticated timeline conflict analysis methods, such as “conflict escalation and de-escalation” to clarify nine stages of conflict (Glasl, 1982), “progression of conflict” (Lederach, 1995), “conflict life-cycles” to analyse the birth/genesis, maturation/dynamics, death/solution of conflict (Galtung, 1996), the “life history of conflict” illustrated as a bell shaped curve (Lund, 1996), and the “hourglass model” to investigate conflict containment, conflict settlement, and conflict transformation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). In the examination of international peace operations, some researchers have focused on peacekeeping operations and other analysts have emphasized the significance of peacebuilding activities (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Francis, 2010). The earlier works provided applicable conflict analysis models and in-depth investigations, but they are methodologically different from analyst to analyst.

In contrast, this study integrates the analytical frameworks employed by the earlier studies and simplifies them as a “sequence analysis method”. Normally, the term “sequence analysis” is employed in the field of natural science, especially in genetics for the analysis of a DNA sequence (Margulies & Birney, 2008). However, a timeline-based sequence analysis can be applicable to political science (Fenno, 1986; Pierson, 2004), social science (Abbott, 1995), economics (Kanai, 2002), conflict analysis (Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977), and peacekeeping operations (Akimoto, 2012). The previous works in various academic fields employed the sequential analysis in different ways, but they indicate that it is possible to introduce the sequence analysis method into the field of peace and conflict studies. The sequence analysis method in this paper examines the “four stages” of peace operations (1. preventive deployment, 2. peace-enforcement, 3. peacekeeping, and 4. peacebuilding), followed by analysed and visualised research data. The simple sequence of peace operations in East Timor can be shown in Table 1 below.

Table1 : Sequence of Four Stages of Peace Operations in East Timor

Year	Month	Stage of Peace Operations	Name of Peace Operations
1999	June	1. Preventive diplomacy	UNAMET set up (preventive deployment)
1999	August	1. Preventive diplomacy	Ballot conducted (cause of violent conflict)
1999	September	2. Peacemaking	INTERFET operated (peace-enforcement)
1999	October	3. Peacekeeping	UNTAET established (pre-independence)
2002	May	4. Peacebuilding	UNMISSET, etc. (post-independence)

Note: For a detailed sequence analysis of the peace operations, see Table 2.

In order to apply the sequence analysis method, this paper investigates the data from the Cabinet Office Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and the United Nations as primary sources. The in-depth sequence analysis of the primary sources will assist in filling a gap in the earlier research regarding Japan’s contributions to international peace missions in East Timor (e.g. Gorjao, 2002; Inada, Yoshida, & Isezaki, 2003; Inada, 2004; Walton, 2004; Kikkawa, 2007; Llewelyn, Walton, & Kikkawa, 2009; Lam, 2012) and answering to the core research question: to what extent Japan’s peace operations were consistent and comprehensive for human security of East Timor.

Findings

Stage 1: Preventive Deployment: Japan’s Contribution to UNAMET

As an analysis of the first stage of the peace operations, Japan’s contribution to “preventive diplomacy” for East Timor, will be overviewed in this section. From the

perspective of a sequence analysis of international peace operations, UNAMET can be categorized as a “preventive deployment” for independence. Normally, preventive diplomacy is considered the prevention of conflict, and conflict already existed between East Timor and Indonesia. Still, UNAMET was a UN peace operation to prevent violence during the referendum period. In spite of the operation’s peaceful nature, Japan did not dispatch the SDF and reluctantly sent three civilian police officers. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal signed an agreement to resolve conflict over East Timor. An agreement was also reached on a “direct, secret, and universal ballot” to determine the future of East Timor and to set up an appropriate United Nations mission to oversee the process. On 11 June 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET (United Nations, 2001a).

In response to requests from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers from July 1999. In addition, Japan contributed US\$10.11 million to the UN Trust Fund, and provided 2,000 radios (MOFA, 1999a). As for the significance of Japan’s material contribution to UNAMET, Ian Martin noted that “Asia’s economic collapse was UNAMET’s good fortune: stocks of vehicles were available to be flown to East Timor from Tokyo” (Martin, 2001, p. 39). Due to the death of police officer Haruyuki Takada during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, a cautious debate took place in Tokyo when three civilian police officers were dispatched to East Timor (National Diet Library, 1999). In spite of the small number of participants, Japan was recognized as a “major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET” (Martin & Mayer-Rieckh, 2005, 130).

Ironically, the ballot in East Timor turned out to be a cause of conflict despite the peace operation as a preventive measure. According to UNAMET, as many as 446,666 East Timorese people registered for the ballot. The direct ballot in East Timor was carried out on 30 August 1999 and 98.6% of registered voters participated in the process. The result of the vote was that 78.5% of voters rejected the proposed plan for special autonomy and 21.5% voted in favour of being governed by the special authority of the Indonesian government (United Nations, 2001b, 2001c; Martin, 2001, pp. 60, 90, 94). Immediately after the result of the ballot was announced, however, anti-independence (pro-integration) groups burned down houses and killed people. UNAMET spokesman David Wimhurst pointed out that UNAMET was “defenceless” because “UNAMET had always been an unarmed mission and that security had always been the province of the Indonesian authorities” (United Nations, 1999b).

By 5 September, as many as 150,000 people, one-quarter of the entire population, had become refugees due to the violence and destruction. At this stage, 1,200 members of the Australian Defense Forces began implementing military drills near Darwin in anticipation of the UNSC adopting a resolution to authorize the armed intervention of multinational forces (Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 121-122). Gross human rights violations, including the indiscriminate killing of women and children, were conducted across East Timor in September. In addition, as many as 70% of the buildings (90% in Dili) were destroyed and approximately 270,000 people, one-third of the entire population, became refugees (Takahashi, Masuoka, & Monju, 2000, pp. 7-10, 13-20). UNAMET was able to hold the ballot but it could not prevent “crimes against humanity”, and major cities in East Timor became “killing fields” (Dunn, 2001). These mass killings and “human insecurity” (Umegaki, Thiesmeyer, & Watanbe, 2009) in East Timor were beyond the mandate of UNAMET and necessitated military intervention by INTERFET.

Stage 2: Peace-enforcement: Japan’s Financial Contribution to INTERFET

In the second stage of the peace operation (peacemaking/peace-enforcement), it is clarified that Japan made a financial contribution to INTERFET as a peace-enforcement operation in East Timor. On 15 September, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, recognising the security situation in East Timor as a threat to peace and security. The resolution authorized the establishment of a multinational force (United Nations, 1999a). INTERFET was established to “restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its task (and within force capabilities) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations” (Cobb, 1999). It is noteworthy that Resolution 1264 legitimized the use of force, stipulating “all necessary measures to fulfil [its] mandate” (Ibid).

The approximate number of the “coalitions of the willing” soldiers was 13,000, comprising troops from Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Australia (Dee, 2001, p. 1). The mission of INTERFET troops was to crack down on and disarm the East Timorese militia, which had been created by the Indonesian army (Isezaki, 2004, pp. 64-65). In this sense, the INTERFET mission was more difficult to carry out than other UN peace operations.

Predictably, Sadaaki Numata, the MOFA Press Secretary, was vague on the issue of dispatching the SDF to INTERFET, stating that “I think it is a bit premature for me to go further into the details of what sort of possible participation there might be in the United

Nations Peacekeeping Forces” (MOFA, 1999b). It is plausible that Numata avoided mentioning a SDF dispatch to INTERFET because of Japan’s constitutional restraints. The dispatch of the SDF to multinational military operations was technically impossible, and therefore, the Japanese government decided to support the launch of INTERFET by financially providing a fund of US\$100 million. Notably, the entire contribution to the INTERFET Trust Fund was US\$107 million (Dee, 2001, p. 10; McDermott, 1999).

In response to the worsening security situation in East Timor, the Japanese government decided to contribute an additional US\$2 million as an emergency assistance fund. One million dollars was donated to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and another million was contributed to the World Food Programme (WFP) (MOFA, 1999c). This immediate response from Japan indicates that the Japanese government believed that it was constitutionally impossible to dispatch the SDF to join a multinational force. At a press conference, the MOFA Press Secretary rejected the possibility of a dispatch of the SDF to INTERFET on the grounds of a lack of legal framework (MOFA, 1999d).

To make contributions to UN peace operations in East Timor, the Japanese government started to reconsider its conventional PKO policy. These decisions by the Japanese government regarding a non-military contribution to the security crisis of post-ballot East Timor were made based on the PKO Law. While making decisions on humanitarian aid, the Japanese government attempted to lift the freeze on peacekeeping forces (PKF) operations. In this context, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Komeito signed the “Three-Party Accord” on 4 October 1999 (Shoji, 2005). On 14 October, the Japanese government announced plans to dispatch a field study mission, made up of officials from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, the Prime Minister’s Office, MOFA, and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to East Timor. The Japanese government hoped to contribute towards the transportation of UNHCR goods by plane through 150 staff of the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) (MOFA, 1999e). Based on the PKO Law, the government contributed assistance goods, such as 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping mats, 20,000 water containers, and 5,120 plastic sheets for the displaced East Timorese (MOFA, 1999f). In response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government also decided to dispatch four aircraft (C-130H) as transport planes for the ASDF and a multi-purpose assistance plane (U-4) with six liaison officers between Surabaya (Java Island) and Kupang (West Timor) (MOFA, 1999g). In addition to the material assistance, the Japanese

government contributed US\$100 million to the UN Trust Fund, and the government, moreover, explored options to dispatch the SDF to East Timor in post-INTERFET operations.

Stage 3: Peacekeeping: Japan's Incremental Contribution to UNTAET

In the third stage of the peace operation (peacekeeping), Japan's contribution became gradually active, and finally, Japanese peacekeepers were dispatched to UNTAET. The mandate of the UNTAET operation was based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which includes "peace-enforcement". Yet, the UNTAET operation can be categorized as an UNTAC-type peacekeeping operation. Although the nature of UNTAET was peacekeeping rather than coercive action, Japan could not at first deploy the SDF to UNTAET due to constitutional constraints. Instead, Japan dispatched the SDF to Indonesia and West Timor to support UNHCR for the relief of East Timorese IDP during this period. On 20 October 1999, the Indonesian government decided to withdraw from East Timor and the UNSC set up UNTAET based on Resolution 1272, which was adopted on 25 October 1999 (United Nations, 1999c, 2001d).

The word "Timorization" became a slogan to empower East Timor and the nation-building process, and was also part of a process of "democratization" (Isezaki, 2004, p. 46). UNTAET was composed of three pillars: the military, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation (HAER), and Governance and Public Administration. HAER was conducted under the leadership of Akira Takahashi, who later became Special Adviser on Development and Humanitarian Affairs to the SRSG. HAER was "instrumental in coordinating a range of relief and humanitarian organizations and working with the East Timorese to determine relief assistance priorities" (Smith & Dee, 2003, pp. 62-63). Unlike PKF activities, humanitarian assistance is an area to which Japanese peacekeepers could make a substantial contribution. Takahashi's leadership in HAER assisted Japan's contribution in the field of humanitarian aid.

On 26 October 1999, MOFA Press Secretary Numata announced that Japan was willing to make a contribution to UNTAET in response to the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1272, although he did not mention the possibility of the dispatch of the SDF to UNTAET (MOFA, 1999h). Akira Takahashi, Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), was appointed by the UN Secretary General as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation of UNTAET (MOFA, 1999i). Takeshi Kamiyama, a MOFA official, was appointed as a senior civil affairs officer to take charge of the Environmental Protection Unit

of the Governance and Public Administration Component of UNTAET (MOFA, 2000).

These appointments of Japanese officials to pivotal positions in UNTAET reflected MOFA's diplomatic efforts to make a contribution to peace operations in East Timor.

On 19 November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 113 ASDF members to Indonesia and West Timor (Kupang) to transport aid materials. The ASDF left from the Komaki base and transported 400 tons of material, and UNHCR appreciated Japan's participation, which made it possible to provide aid for 120,000 East Timorese refugees (JDA, 2000, pp. 175-176). Yoshio Mochizuki, a Parliamentary Secretary for MOFA, visited East Timor on 11 April 2001 to meet the leaders of East Timor, including President Xanana Gusmao and Vice-President Jose Ramos-Horta. In these meetings, Mochizuki emphasized Japan's contribution in the three fields of agriculture, human resources development, and infrastructure (MOFA, 2001a). The dispatch of ASDF personnel to Indonesia and West Timor and Mochizuki's visit to East Timor show the non-military and indirect nature of Japan's contribution to the UNTAET operation.

In response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government dispatched 19 civilian election observers to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor based on the PKO Law (MOFA, 2001b). With regard to the election, the Japanese government decided to make an extra emergency contribution of US\$1,191,000 through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (MOFA, 2001c). On 30 August 2001, Constituent Assembly Elections were held with a voter turnout rate of 91.3%. 88 Assembly members were elected as part of a peaceful democratic process (MOFA, 2001d).

Significantly, the Koizumi government revised the 1992 PKO Law on 14 December 2001 to make SDF's participation in PKF possible (Cabinet Office Japan, 2001). In February 2002, in response to strong requests and expectations from the United Nations and the leaders of East Timor, the Japanese government decided to dispatch 680 Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel in engineer units and 10 PKF headquarters personnel to peace operations conducted by UNTAET (MOFA, 2001e, 2002a; Cabinet Office Japan, 2002-2004). In response to a further request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch eight electoral observers to the Presidential Election to be held on 14 April 2002 in East Timor (MOFA, 2002b). In the same month (29 April), Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi visited East Timor to inspect an SDF engineer unit serving in UNTAET (MOFA, 2002c). For Japan, participation in UNTAET, the Constituent Assembly Elections, and the Presidential Election without casualties was a symbol of success. If SDF personnel had been

killed, the Japanese government would have had to consider the withdrawal of the SDF. Moreover, the UNTAET operation itself was generally successful (Ishizuka, 2008, pp. 132-133).

Stage 4: Peacebuilding: Japan's Contribution to Post-independence Operations

In the fourth stage of the peace operation (peacebuilding), Japan, on the basis of its “human security” policy, maximized its contribution to the peace operation in East Timor. UNMISSET, under the leadership of SRSR Sukehiko Hasegawa from Japan, can be categorized as a post-conflict peacebuilding operation. Based on new diplomatic concepts such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, the Japanese government dispatched a total of 2,300 SDF personnel to East Timor. In addition to UNMISSET, Japan made a contribution to the subsequent UN peacebuilding operations in East Timor. East Timor gained independence from Indonesia on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by UNMISSET based on UNSC Resolution 1410 (United Nations, 2005a). The deployment of up to 5,000 military personnel, including 120 military observers, and 1,250 civilian police officers, was authorized based on the UNSC resolution (United Nations, 2005b).

The independence of East Timor allowed Japanese peacekeepers to play a greater role. The Koizumi government decided at a Cabinet meeting to reassign a Japan GSDF Engineer Unit of 680 members (including seven female personnel) and PKF headquarters personnel, all of whom had been dispatched to UNTAET, for the post-independence nation-building operations of UNMISSET (MOFA, 2002d). The JDA organised 295 vehicles for the GSDF, two fleets for transportation and escort for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), and seven C-130H transportation aircrafts and a U-4 multifunctional support aircraft for the ASDF. The SDF was stationed in main cities, such as Dili, Maliana, Suai, and Oecusse (Pante Macassar), to construct roads and bridges and to offer support with water and food supplies in collaboration with the Korean forces (JDA, 2002, pp. 214-218; JDA, 2003a, p. 215; JDA, 2003b, p.12).

Japan's commitment to peacebuilding operations in East Timor gradually decreased as the UNMISSET mission was carried out. The changeover of Japanese peacekeepers was conducted in the presence of Toshio Kojima, Parliamentary Secretary for the JDA, on 13 March 2002. Responding to a request from the United Nations, the SDF Engineer Unit was reduced from 680 personnel to 522 (MOFA, 2003a). On June 14 2002 in New York, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced the appointment of Sukehiro Hasegawa as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Deputy Head of Mission (MOFA,

2002e). The United Nations decided to extend the mandate of UNMISSET in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1480 until 20 May 2004, and the Japanese government also prolonged the term of the GSDF engineer group and headquarters personnel operating in East Timor (MOFA, 2003b). In line with the gradual conclusion of UNMISSET, the number of SDF troops was reduced from 522 to 405. Prime Minister Koizumi, in talks with East Timorese President Gusmao in Tokyo on 23 February 2004, promised to make a further contribution of approximately one million US dollars to East Timor (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2004a).

After the mandate of UNMISSET expired on 20 May 2004, the Koizumi government decided on the full withdrawal of the fourth SDF personnel. Even so, the mandate of UNMISSET was extended from 20 May 2004 for a maximum of one year (MOFA, 2004a). The total number of SDF personnel dispatched to UNMISSET amounted to approximately 2,300 SDF troops, including 25 female personnel. The nation-building activities of the SDF consisted of 120 projects that included the maintenance and repair of roads, bridges and infrastructure, levelling land of the fields for elementary schools, and the construction of waste disposal facilities (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004b). Through the Trust Fund for human security, the Japanese government decided to support the “100 Schools Project: Improving the Quality of Primary Education in East Timor” conducted by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) (MOFA, 2004b).

Following the expiration of the mandate of UNMISSET on 20 May 2005, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a UN special political mission, was established with a one-year mandate. In April 2006, ex-national army troops dropped out of the army as a result of discrimination and the demonstrations. The East Timorese government intervened with the national army, and approximately 100,000 people became IDPs, around 60% of the entire population of Dili. In response, the Japanese government decided to provide emergency contribution of US\$5 million for an emergency shelter, water, and health care (MOFA, 2006a, 2006b).

After the UNOTIL operation expired, UNSC Resolution 1704 authorized the establishment of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Responding to a request from the United Nations, two Japanese civilian police officers were dispatched to UNMIT (Cabinet Office Japan, 2007). For presidential and parliamentary elections in East Timor, the Japanese government provided an emergency grant aid of US\$723,855 through the UNDP and dispatched 14 electoral observers (MOFA, 2007a, 2007b,

2007c). In spite of all these peacebuilding activities, the security situation in East Timor was not stable and Australian Defense Forces remained until the security situation improved (MOFA, 2008). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the UN peace operations failed in East Timor. Japan did not stop its contribution to the peace operations and dispatched two peacekeepers for cease-fire monitoring operations to UNMIT in 2010. In response to the extension of the UNMIT mandate to 31 December 2012, the Japanese government also extended the duration of its commitment until 28 February 2013 so that Japan could make an extra commitment in case of an emergency (MOFA, 2010, 2012; United Nations, 2012).

Discussion: Examined Data in the Sequence Analysis

As clarified by the sequence analysis of Japan’s commitments to the peace operations in East Timor, although Japan could not make a direct military commitment to “national security” of East Timor through INTERFET, it donated US\$100 million to the INTERFET operation, and continuous and substantial contributions were made by the Japanese government for “human security” of the East Timorese people as shown in Table 2 below (“PKO”, here, means general PKO missions regardless of stages).

Table 2: Sequence of Japan’s Peace Operations for Human Security of East Timor

Start of Operations	Name of Operations and Details	PKO	Humanitarian Relief	Election Observation	Contributions in kind, etc.
June 1999 (Stage 1)	Contribution in kind to UNAMET (US\$10.11 million to the UN Trust Fund) (2,000 radios)				o
July 1999 (Stage 1)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor (A political affairs officer and three civilian police officers)	o			
Sep. 1999 (Stage 2)	INTERFET (US\$100 million) Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for East Timor (US\$2 million) (US\$1 million to UNHCR and WFP)		o		o
Oct. 1999 (Stage 3)	Contribution in kind to UNHCR for the Relief of East Timorese Displaced Persons				o
Nov. 1999 (Stage 3)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment for East Timorese Displaced Persons (150 ASDF) (500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140		o		

	sleeping mats, 20,000 water containers, 5,120 plastic sheets)				
Aug. 2001 (Stage 3)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor (19 civilian election observers) (US\$1,191,000 through UNDP)			o	
Feb. 2002 (Stage 4)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor (680 GSDF and 10 PKF to UNAMET) (2,300 GSDF in total to UNMISSET)	o			
Apr. 2002 (Stage 4)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment for East Timorese Election Observation			o	
May. 2004 (Stage 4)	100 Schools Project (UNICEF)				o
June 2006 (Stage 4)	Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for East Timor (US\$2 million)		o		
July 2006 (Stage 4)	Emergency Grant Aid through International Organizations for IDPs from Unrest in Timor-Leste		o		
Jan. 2007 (Stage 4)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Timor-Leste	o			
Mar. 2007 (Stage 4)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Timor-Leste Election Observation (14 electoral observers and US\$723,855 through UNDP)			o	
Sep. 2010- Dec. 2012 (Stage 4)	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2 peacekeepers for cease-fire monitoring to UNMIT)	o			

(Combined Data from Cabinet Office Japan, JDA, MOFA, and the United Nations)

As the data displayed above demonstrate, Japan's contribution to the peace operations, particularly dispatch of the peacekeepers to East Timor, became active after the Japanese government adopted the human security concept as a pillar of its diplomatic policy.

Simply, the sequence represents that Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were consistent and comprehensive for human security (freedom from fear and want). Moreover, as represented in Table 3, Japan was the third largest donor for peacebuilding in East Timor following Australia and Portugal (2005 and 2006). This fact means that Japan made significant contributions to human security of East Timor especially in terms of “freedom from want”.


Table 3: Percentage of Top 3 Donors for Peacebuilding in East Timor (2005 and 2006)

Name of Country	Number of Donors	Number of Donors over 90% CPA	% of CPA by Top Donor	% of CPA by Top 2 Donors	% of CPA by Top 3 Donors	Total % of CPA by Top 3 Donors
East Timor	21	10	Australia (22%)	Portugal (20%)	Japan (15%)	Total (57%)

(OECD/DAC, 2008. p. 46)

As well as the financial contribution (freedom from want), Japan made significant contributions to human security of East Timor in terms of maintenance of stability (freedom from fear). Normally, the Japanese government has focused on financial contributions as its human security policy, but the case of East Timor reveals that Japan’s human security policy has become more active and contributory to freedom from fear. Indeed, Japan’s peace operations in East Timor were more comprehensive and large-scale than those in Cambodia (Akimoto, 2012; Walton & Akimoto, 2013). This fact can be visualised by comparing the case of Japan’s peace operations in East Timor with the other peace operations conducted by Japanese peacekeepers as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Percentage of Japan’s Peace Operations for East Timor of Total Operations



(Modified Data from Table 2 and Cabinet Office Japan)

As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of Japan's commitment to peace operations in East Timor in comparison with the other operations is relatively high (31% in PKO, 50% in humanitarian relief, 33% in election observation, 19% in contributions in kind). Japan dispatched its peacekeepers to peace operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, the Golan Heights, Nepal, Sudan, Haiti, and South Sudan, but the peace operations (PKO) in East Timor account for as many as 30% of the total. The figure, especially that of PKO, indicates that Japan's peace operations in East Timor were more consistent, large-scale and comprehensive than the other peace operations conducted by the Japanese government for human security (particularly "freedom from fear").

In short, not only did Japan make financial and material contributions to "freedom from want" of the East Timorese, but the Japanese peacekeepers contributed to "freedom from fear" of the people as well. Although Japan could not make a military commitment to national security during the INTERFET operation, its contributions to human security of East Timor were seamless and comprehensive, including peace operations, humanitarian relief, election observation, and contributions in kind. Japan's military and constitutional limitations could be overcome by cooperating with other countries, which are experienced in peace operations including peace-enforcement. In sum, the analysed data indicate the fact that Japan made holistic and consistent commitments to the peace operations for human security of East Timor.

Conclusion

This paper has examined Japan's contributions to the four stages of peace operations in East Timor through the application of sequence analysis. By utilising the sequence analysis method, the complexity of the multi-dimensional peace operations and Japan's contributions in East Timor has been clarified. As demonstrated by the data supplied in Table 2 and 3, as well as Figure 1, Japan has made long-term and large-scale contributions to the peace operations in East Timor.

In the post-Cold War period, Japan explored making contributions to UN-authorized peace operations in East Timor. Japan's first contribution was made to UNAMET as "preventive deployment". Japan dispatched a political affairs officer and three civilian police officers and made a substantial material contribution to UNAMET. Nonetheless, as a result of the 1999 ballot, an armed conflict broke out and approximately one-fourth of the East

Timorese population became refugees. This period represents a culmination of “conflict escalation” (Glasl, 1982).

The armed conflict in East Timor necessitated military intervention by INTERFET, as “peace-enforcement” for the sake of “conflict containment” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2005). Australian-led multinational forces contributed to peace-enforcement as part of the peacemaking process. Although the multinational forces were not a formal UN force, their military operations were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1264. While Japan could not make a direct military contribution to “national security” of East Timor, owing to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, it did make a financial contribution to INTERFET, UNHCR, and the WFP.

The mandate of UNTAET as a peacekeeping operation included peace-enforcement based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Therefore, in 1999 Japan dispatched the SDF not to East Timor but to Indonesia and West Timor in order to support UNHCR. During the UNTAET operation, Japan made humanitarian and legal contributions. Indeed, HAER, one of the three pillars of UNTAET, was carried out under the leadership of Akira Takahashi. In addition, electoral observers were dispatched to the Constituent Assembly Elections in 2001. Finally, in February 2002, 680 Japanese peacekeepers and 10 PKF headquarters personnel were deployed to UNTAET. The Japanese government revised the PKO Law in order to dispatch the SDF to peace operations during the “conflict termination” period (Lund, 1996).

In consequence of UNTAET, the Koizumi government sent more peacekeepers to UNMISSET as a peacebuilding operation led by SRSG Sukehiko Hasegawa. On the basis of diplomatic concepts such as “human security” and the “consolidation of peace”, Japan dispatched about a total of 2,300 peacekeepers to UNMISSET, which was the largest number in the history of Japan’s PKO policy. Furthermore, Japan has continued supporting post-independence peacebuilding operations, such as UNOTIL and UNMIT. Those UN peace operations literally involved “state-building” as a part of peacebuilding operations (Paris & Sisk, 2009). Thus, although it seems to be relatively simplistic, the sequence analysis method has contributed to clarifying the complicated Japan’s peace missions. In conclusion, the findings discovered by sequence analysis substantiate that Japan’s contributions to peace operations in East Timor were incremental, seamless, and comprehensive despite the technical limitations.

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